Badin District, and to Adverse Impacts to Fisheries and Wetland Habitats, Known As “Dhands”

NATIONAL DRAINAGE PROGRAM PROJECT (CREDIT NO. 2999-PK)

Public Disclosure Authorized

Follow Up to the Meeting of the Executive Directors of the World Bank (October 31, 2006) on the Inspection Panel Investigation Report No. 36382-PK and Management Report and Recommendation

Public Disclosure Authorized PROGRESS REPORT ON

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACTION PLAN

Public Disclosure Authorized

July 5, 2007 Public Disclosure Authorized

Contents

Introduction ...... 1 Summary of Progress on Implementation of The Action Plan...... 2 Progress on Immediate and Short Term Actions...... 3 Progress on Medium Term Actions...... 10 Long-Term Outcomes ...... 11

Annexes Annex 1. Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund’s (PPAF) Sindh Coastal Areas Development Program (SCAD) Annex 2. Note by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP), World Bank and PPAF: “Graduating the Poorest: Linking Safety Nets with Microfinance” Annex 3. Report by FAO Consultant: Assessment of Badin and Mirpurkhas Districts, Flood Management Plan Annex 4:. Report by FAO Consultant: Assessment of Present Condition of LBOD and Kadhan Pateji Outfall Drain (KPOD)

Tables Table 1. SCAD Projects by Partner Organization and Districts Table 2. Action Plan

Box Box 1. SCAD Implementation in Keti Bunder

Figure Figure 1. Left Bank of Indus River in Southern Sindh

Acronyms AKPBS Aga Khan Planning and Building NGO Nongovernmental organization Service NWFP North West Frontier Province AWB Area Water Board PO Partner Organization CGAP Consultative Group to Assist the PPAF Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund Poorest SAFWCO Sindh Agricultural and Forestry DPOD Dhoro Puran Outfall Drain Workers Coordinating Organization FAO United Nations Food and SCAD Sindh Coastal Areas Development Agriculture Organization Program FAO-TCP FAO Technical Cooperation SCAN Sindh Coastal Areas Network Program SIDA Sindh Irrigation and Drainage FO Farmers’ Organizations Authority GoP Government of Pakistan WAPDA Water and Power Development GoS Government of Sindh Authority KPOD Kadhan Pateji Outfall Drain WB World Bank LBOD Left Bank Outfall Drain WSIP Sindh Water Sector Improvement NDP Pakistan National Drainage Project Program

PAKISTAN NATIONAL DRAINAGE PROGRAM PROJECT (Credit No. 2999-PK)

MANAGEMENT REPORT ON STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACTION PLAN FOLLOWING THE INSPECTION PANEL INVESTIGATION REPORT (No. 36382-PK) AND MANAGEMENT REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (INSP/R2004-0007/4&5)

Introduction

1. On October 31, 2006, the Executive Directors discussed the findings of the Inspection Panel’s Investigation Report and the Management Report and Recommendation on the Pakistan National Drainage Project (NDP, closed in December, 2004).

2. The Panel found that the design of an earlier project, the Left Bank Outfall Drain (LBOD, closed in December 1997), whose ongoing contracts were funded and completed under the NDP for about 3.3 percent of LBOD’s total cost), underestimated prevailing conditions and the risk of extreme meteorological events. This contributed to the breakdown of the outfall system, suffering of local people in the lower Badin district, and to adverse impacts to fisheries and wetland habitats, known as “dhands”. The Panel also found instances of non-compliance with Bank operational policies.

3. The Management Report stated that while the LBOD and NDP projects did create opportunities for poor people by expanding agriculture substantially, all involved in the projects could have done a better job of mitigating the risks and impact of natural disasters on the poor within and outside the project areas.

4. After the closing of the NDP,1 Management has continued to work with the GoP and GoS to address the reform agenda initiated under the project, as well as to address the drainage and outfall challenges arising from the LBOD. An Action Plan prepared for this purpose identifies suitable strategies and instruments to progress on the reform agenda and to support the poorest people of the lower Badin and Thatta districts. The plan includes a poverty alleviation fund, a flood response plan, and a new lending in the water sector approved by the Executive Directors.

5. At the Board’s request, this report provides an update on progress made in the implementation of the Action Plan before the 2007 monsoon season. It describes the activities and projects initiated for the short term, as well as those being developed for the medium and longer term. The summary of the Action Plan is provided in Table 2. Four annexes are attached. These materials have also been posted on www.worldbank.org.pk.

1 The Implementation Completion and Results report was sent to the Executive Directors in May 2007.

Bank Management has committed to report back to the Board again in November 2007 on the implementation of the Action Plan.

Summary of Progress on Implementation of The Action Plan

6. Local communities and civil society organizations in Thatta district were visited in April 2007 by senior Bank Management. Overall, the GoP and GoS have been diligent in implementing the follow up actions approved by the Executive Directors as part of the agreed Action Plan. This report highlights the major results of the first eight months of the implementation of the Action Plan:

• Significant progress has been made to address the harsh conditions of the population living in the area. Direct actions to alleviate poverty are in place through an inclusive consultation process with the communities. The Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF) agreed to intervene in the area in June 2006. Since then, ten nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have engaged in efforts to improve the living conditions of the transient fisherfolk communities. This has resulted in 290 community projects prepared, approved, and being implemented with a commitment of about US$2.8 million. The PPAF is proving to be the right instrument to address extreme poverty in the communities outside the irrigation network given its targeting effectiveness and its partnership with capable NGOs. The mobilization capacity of the PPAF contributed significantly to the emergency relief efforts following the earthquake of October 2005 in NWFP and Jammu & Kashmir.

• A rapid assessment of ecological and livelihood conditions of the “dhands” in the vicinity of the outfall system has progressed less than expected. The consultation process on the terms of reference for the study with the Government and partners active in the area, the identification of a source of financing, and the appointment of qualified consultants took longer than planned. The assessment is now under way, and the first phase results will be available in September, 2007.

• Progress has been made in assessing and improving local government flood management systems. The assessment was carried in April/May, 2007 and discussed with the Government. Also, the district government of Badin, with the help of the Bank, has developed a “Contingency Plan to Combat Cyclones and Floods” for 2007. A similar plan is under preparation for the Mirpurkhas district. While the preparation of these plans represents an important initiative in addressing flood risks and vulnerability, capacity building at the local level will remain a long term issue, and the Bank will continue to assist the Government in supporting this action over the medium to long term.

• Progress has been made in carrying out an assessment of the functionality of the outfall system as well as in implementing the most urgent repairs. The assessment was carried out in April/May, 2007 and discussed with the Government. Increased efforts to repair the damages to the irrigation and drainage infrastructure that occurred during the floods of 2003 and 2006 have been made over the last couple

of years by the GoS with a commitment of US$12.6 million, of which US$2.5 million were spent in the last year. While the risk of floods has been reduced by enlarging the flow capacity of the outfall drains, the GoS has yet to put in place a detailed maintenance program for the drainage network. The maintenance program is expected to be effective by November 2007 and will be supported under the Water Sector Improvement Project (WSIP). Detailed plans to improve the functioning of the complex drainage infrastructure have also been initiated and will be supported under the WSIP.

• Appraisal and negotiations of the Sindh WSIP have been completed in March, 2007 and Board presentation is expected in September, 2007. The delays experienced between negotiations and Board presentation stem from the required clearances of the negotiated documents from the GoS and the GoP. This process has not finalized yet, and approval from Federal authorities is expected during their next meeting in August. Major lessons learned during the last ten years of the Bank’s involvement in the water sector have been incorporated into project design.

7. Management believes that while immediate actions have been taken to address the main issues affecting the area as a consequence of the floods of 2003 and 2006, flood risks in the coastal zone of the Indus river system will continue to be high. Historically, these areas have been flooded as part of natural phenomena. Efforts to reduce such risks need to be sustained through structural and non-structural measures in the medium and long term, which are being contemplated under the WSIP and potential follow-up operations.

Progress on Immediate and Short Term Actions

8. The Bank’s short term actions were selected to provide an immediate response to the plight of affected people and to address other related issues, including:

• Implementation of the Sindh Coastal Area Development Program (SCAD) in southern Sindh, including review of the social profile of the population in Badin and Thatta districts under the PPAF livelihoods program, with the aim of identifying specific nomadic and other vulnerable groups and addressing additional livelihood support issues;

• Rapid assessment of ecological and livelihood conditions in the dhands to identify immediate measures to improve these conditions;

• Rapid assessment of existing local government flood risk management systems to reduce flood damage and vulnerability by building capacity and improving flood risk response;

• Assessment of the condition of the right embankment of the LBOD spinal drain and its discharge to the Kadhan Pateji Outfall Drain (KPOD) and preparation of a detailed maintenance plan; and

• Timely implementation of the WSIP in order to ensure a rapid startup of the technical studies to design measures to improve the performance of LBOD and prepare a comprehensive flood and drainage plan for the left bank of the Indus River in southern Sindh.

9. Implementation of the SCAD. The SCAD was established under the PPAF with the objective of rehabilitating the livelihoods of coastal communities and developing local capacity through better integration of Sindh coastal areas with the rest of the country and economy (see Annex 1). The SCAD includes: (a) improving access to basic services, including health, education, and drinking water supply and sanitation; (b) increasing incomes through improved crop, fisheries and livestock production as well as marketing and micro-finance services; (c) securing access to, Box 1. SCAD Implementation in Keti Bunder and better management of, Keti Bunder is a small town along the Sindh Coast in Thatta coastal area natural resources; district, with a population of 1,460 persons living in 285 households. The majority of the population is engaged in (d) forming viable community fishing and the average monthly income per household is about organizations that are inclusive, US$70. Only 3 percent of the female population and 21 percent well governed, and can operate of the male population is literate. In the last ten years the in partnership with the public community has been affected by droughts and floods. Drinking and private sector; (e) water is supplied by tankers from another town. Expenditure on water represents 30 percent of the income of the household. integrating these areas with the Not surprisingly, the major health issues are waterborne national economy by diseases. developing rural growth The PPAF, through the Aga Khan Planning and Building centers; promoting integrated Service partner organization (AKPBS), is implementing development of physical several projects with the active participation of the community: safe drinking water; street cleaning; household latrines; waste infrastructure, including and storm water disposal; oxidation ponds and repairs of the construction of productive existing protection bund. infrastructure, such as jetties and wharfs; and developing transport and mobility, through the construction of inter- and intra-village roads and intermediate modes of transport, using infrastructure grants and micro-credit; (vi) promoting technological innovations, particularly the use of solar and wind energy for pumping water and generating electricity; and (vi) reducing physical vulnerability, through the construction of flood protection and sea water containment structures and better response mechanisms by communities. 8.

Financing agreements have been signed over the last year with ten partner organizations (POs) participating in the SCAD through an informal organization, the Sindh Coastal Areas Network (SCAN). The network provides a platform for improving the quality of life, alleviating poverty and reducing vulnerability in the SCAD area through a coordinated, cooperative and collaborative effort of all members, local community organizations and external support agencies. Out of US$18 million allocated for the SCAD under the PPAF, US$2.5 million have already been committed. The main activities being carried out are:

• The Social Safety Nets Survey has been completed;

• Social mobilization commenced in January 2007;

• A survey has been carried out to map all settlements in the coastal area and identify nomadic groups. The survey covers 2,830 settlements and includes socio-economic conditions especially in terms of housing, occupation, water and sanitation. The maps generated from the spot survey provide a GIS basis on which progress can be recorded;

• Eighteen community infrastructure projects (service and income improvement projects such as water supply and sanitation, roads, latrines, etc.) and seven integrated area upgrading projects, which include several community infrastructure and income improvement interventions at the village level, have been initiated;

• The table below summarizes the number of sub-projects approved by location. Annex 1 provides a breakdown of the types of projects being implemented and Annex 2 describes a CGAP/World Bank/PPAF pilot project to link safety nets with microfinance;

• The sub-districts (Talukas) along LBOD/KPOD—Badin, Golarchi, Tando Bago and Jati—are being targeted for early program implementation. Three POs are intervening in these areas and 98 projects have been initiated in 36 villages.

Table 1: SCAD Projects by Partner Organization and District2

S. No Partner Districts Amount Approved/ Projects Community Beneficiaries Organization Committed (M.Rs) Organizations 1 NRSP Badin 53.48 83 83 21,580 2 SPO Thatta 17.736 25 25 6,500 3 AKPBS Thatta 23.972 43 46 12,000 4 IET Karachi W 6.506 10 11 5,120 5 SCOPE Malir 6.5 27 27 8,640 6 HANDS Karachi E 3.587 14 14 5,040 7 BRDS Badin 3.601 15 15 5,400 8 SAFWCO Thatta 19.657 36 36 9,380 9 Sindh RSP Thatta 1.72 7 7 1,680 10 TRDP Tharparkar 18.0 30 30 7,500 Total 154.759 290 294 82,840 (US$2.5 million)

2 The Table is a revision of the table that was included in the Action Plan. Two activities have been added in the section on “Immediate and Short Term” actions, and some of the dates have been amended for reasons that are explained in this report.

10. Progress of the SCAD program under PPAF financing is overall satisfactory considering its promptness in mobilizing resources and partner organizations starting June 2006, and its community driven approach. While the PPAF covers the whole Sindh coastal area, targeted interventions are also being implemented specifically to communities under the direct influence of LBOD. While the PPAF has yet to show visible results, the demand-driven approach requires initial investments in social mobilization prior to income generating activities to ensure sustainability and community empowerment. The PPAF is also perceived as being too widely spread. However, when the SCAD program was conceived, the policy choice was to address poverty issues more broadly than what would be needed strictly around the LBOD area.

11. Rapid Assessment of Ecological and Livelihood Conditions in the Dhands. The dhands study has suffered significant delays due to extensive consultations on the scope of the study with the Government and existing organizations active in the area. Identifying the source of financing and appropriate expertise also proved more difficult than expected. However, the assessment is now under way. Funding through the Bank- Netherlands Trust Fund for Pakistan has been approved, contracts have been signed, and field work started in mid-June 2007.

12. The overall study has been divided into three coordinated sub-components. Component A, to be carried out by the National Institute of Oceanography, will (i) review the monitoring data concerning the interaction of the dhands wetland system and the LBOD outfall, including the Tidal Link, (ii) describe the direct physical impacts on the wetland system, and (iii) using new field data, investigate the intrusion of marine ecosystems into the dhands and model its effects. Component B will assess the status of the freshwater ecosystem and its wetland functions and services, including fisheries and water quality, and identify adverse and favorable trends. Component C will conduct consultations with local stakeholders in Badin and in and around the dhands, and undertake a socio economic assessment of the fishing communities directly linked to the dhands.

13. Field work, data analysis, and reporting are planned to be completed by mid- August, 2007. Findings and recommendations will be discussed with stakeholders in a final series of consultations, including GoS, and the report will be finalized by end of September, 2007.

14. Rapid Assessment of Existing Local Government Flood Risk Management Systems. The rapid assessment was carried out in April/May, 2007 and discussed with the Government. Badin is one of the most flood vulnerable areas of Pakistan. Flooding is frequent during the monsoon season and the period of flood inundation is typically very long. The region has few natural drains and its vicinity to the Indian border limits the possibilities of water disposal. For this reason, the area has low population, with the exception of transient fisherfolk located near the dhands, who normally move upland during severe weather. The flooding in this area is a natural occurrence. However, the floods of 2003 were particularly severe and evacuation and relief operations had to be carried out by the Army, the Provincial Relief Committee, and the District Coordination

Offices. The area was again hit by floods during 2006 and damages and relief operations occurred principally in Mirpurkhas district, north of the coastal zone.

15. Most recently, on June 23, 2007, tropical cyclone Yemyin 03B lashed the coastal area of Pakistan. While Karachi was the most affected area, floods were also reported in the area under LBOD influence. As part of its contingency plan, the GoS organized a task force to operate the canal network and reduce the water flows to prevent additional flooding in lower Sindh. Rohri canal and Nara canal were closed and irrigation officials reported that the banks of LBOD, Mirpurkhas main drain and other drains were normal and under control. The LBOD system was not affected by the cyclone. Under the PPAF activities, the Sindh Agricultural and Forestry Workers Coordinating Organization (SAFWCO) has begun social mobilization in the affected areas and implementation of relief actions, such as distribution of food, forage and seeds to the population.

16. The past experience of the 2003 and 2006 floods was the basis for preparing a “Contingency Plan to Combat Cyclones and Floods” in 2007 by the District Coordination Officer in Badin. This flood management plan includes: an early warning system; strict watch of the LBOD system; and location of refuges and other infrastructure that can be used in case of emergencies. It also establishes the role of different institutions during emergencies and identifies actions needed to improve the situation of the people and the role of the government and NGOs in cases similar to those in 2003.

17. The flood management plan for Badin needs further improvement. The Bank has identified and discussed with the GoS and the Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority (SIDA) the approaches that are needed, such as a clear definition of who is responsible for early alerts and warnings; improvements in the communication network; and responsibilities of the different institutions involved in dealing with flood management, including NGOs. A Bank consultant met with NGOs, including one of the requesters, to incorporate their ideas and concerns in the Flood Management Plan, during a field visit to lower Sindh on April 20, 2007. The institutional capacity of SIDA is expected to be improved through the capacity building component under WSIP. SIDA is working to improve the coordination required to make the Contingency Plan work. Mirpurkhas district also is preparing a Flood Management Plan, using the Badin example as a template (see Annex 3).

18. While the preparation of these plans represents a promising beginning in addressing flood risks and vulnerability, low institutional capacity at the local level keeps remaining a long term issue, and since the closing of the NDP in 2004 the Bank’s leverage in influencing decision making and investments has considerably reduced. Government efforts to reduce flood risks and vulnerability in the area can be supported however through the forthcoming WSIP, which among other things plans to help the Government examine long term options and solutions to irrigation and drainage issue of the outfall area.

19. Assessment of the Right Bank of the LBOD Spinal Drain and KPOD. The assessment was carried out in April/May 2007 and discussed with the Government. The emergency repair work to restore the functionality of the outfall drains—KPOD and

Dhoro Puran Outfall Drain (DPOD)—was undertaken during 2004 and 2005 by the GoS, in association with the 5th Corps of Engineers, Pakistan Army. About 394 cuts and breaches in drains and 224 cuts in canals were repaired by the Left Bank and Nara Area Water Boards (AWBs) and further strengthening of both banks of LBOD and KPOD has been continued after the 2006 floods. As of May 31, 2007, a total of Rs.756 million (US$12.6 million) has been committed in repairs and reinforcement of the system; to date about Rs. 322 million (US$5.3 million) has been spent, US$2.5 million of which in the last year. However, SIDA has estimated that a total of Rs 1,053 million (US$17.55 million) is still needed to complete the strengthening of the outfall system (see Annex 4) and the implementation will take over two years.

Figure 1. Left Bank of Indus River in Southern Sindh (Source: POE Drainage Master Plan)

20. In carrying out repair works and strengthening of drain banks, the discharge capacity of the KPOD and LBOD spinal drains has been increased to about 9,000 cubic feet per second (cusecs) as compared to the original design of 4,400 cusecs. This has been done by moving the bank out from the service road in the right bank of the drain (inspection path) by at least 20 feet and raising its level. The other bank, which does not have a path for field based inspection, has been raised in most reaches of the drain. Finally, the weir controlling the flow to the DPOD has been modified by reducing its crest level to discharge more water. With these measures, the storm water carrying

capacity of the drainage system has been increased significantly, enabling it to handle larger volumes of water and thus protecting the area against flooding.

21. The actions taken by the GoS to strengthen LBOD and KPOD will reduce the risk of flooding in the area. However, the GoS has yet to put in place a detailed maintenance program for the drainage network and this work is expected to start by November 2007 and will be supported under WSIP. Detailed plans to improve the functioning of the complex drainage infrastructure will require long term solution including the need to evaluate possible new structural options. A comprehensive solution to the flooding around the left bank of the Indus and safe disposal of drainage/flood waters will need to be developed through the studies envisaged under WSIP, as indicated below. The Bank provided guidance in the further refining of the flood management plan and the methodology will also be used for developing a sound Asset Management Plan in LBOD following the experience used in Punjab.

22. Implementation of WSIP Phase-I Project. The WSIP was negotiated in March 2007. It was approved by the GoS and the GoP. It will be submitted for approval of the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council in July 2007 and to the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors in September 2007. The delays experienced between negotiations and Board presentation stems from the need to wait for required clearances of the negotiated documents from both the Government of Sindh and the Government of Pakistan.

23. The overarching objective of the WSIP is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of irrigation water distribution in three AWBs—Ghotki, Nara and Left Bank—particularly with respect to measures of reliability, equity and user satisfaction. This would be achieved by: (a) deepening and broadening the institutional reforms that are already underway in Sindh; (b) improving the irrigation system in a systematic way, covering key hydraulic infrastructure, main and branch canals, and distributaries and minors; and (c) enhancing long-term sustainability of the irrigation system through participatory irrigation management and developing institutions to improve operation and maintenance of the system and cost recovery. Improved water management would lead to increased agricultural production, employment and incomes from about 1.8 million hectares or more than 30 percent of the irrigated area in Sindh, which is one of the poorest regions of the country. The WSIP covers the catchment area of the LBOD.

24. The WSIP will finance the following components:

(a) Community Development and Capacity Building (US$10 million): capacity of SIDA, AWBs, and Farmers’ Organizations (FOs) would be strengthened under the project, enabling them to perform their responsibilities according to the Sindh Water Management Ordinance of 2002. The project would strengthen the capacity of FOs to carry out operation and maintenance of the irrigation and drainage systems;

(b) Rehabilitation and Improvement of Irrigation and Drainage System (US$139.8 million): the main and branch canals, distributaries/minors (secondary

level canals) and drainage system in FOs areas would be rehabilitated and improved and a modern water measurement and accounting system would be installed throughout the canal systems in the three AWBs;

(c) Management Plans for Major Irrigation & Drainage Infrastructure (US$12 million): A feasibility study for rehabilitation of the Gudu barrage would be prepared and assistance provided to prepare studies for rehabilitation of the Sukkur and Kotri barrages. A regional master plan would be prepared to deal with floods and drainage issues on the left bank of the Indus River and measures designed for improvement of the Indus delta and the coastal zone;

(d) Monitoring and Evaluation of the Project Impact and Environmental Management Plan (US$4.2 million): This component would be for monitoring and evaluation and supervision of the environmental management and social action plans; and

(e) Project Coordination, Monitoring, Technical Assistance and Training (US$9 million): This component would support project coordination, monitoring of implementation activities, management and supervision of procurement by an independent project management consultant/ procurement agent, and technical assistance and training.

25. Particularly relevant is Component C of the WSIP, which includes detailed studies and preparation of a regional master plan in consultation with stakeholders. This plan would address flooding and drainage issues in the area on the left bank of the Indus River, taking into consideration structural and non-structural measures, including remedial measures for any outstanding deficiencies in the LBOD and measures for the retention and/or safe disposal of storm and flood water. A separate plan would be prepared for rehabilitation and improvement of the delta area, wetlands and coastal zone, taking into consideration the environmental importance of the region and its economic potential, and drawing upon international experience. Feasibility studies would be completed and detailed designs would be prepared for priority works for implementation under a future investment project that Sindh may undertake with the assistance of its development partners.

Progress on Medium Term Actions

26. Flood Management Plan for the Left Bank of the Indus River. A common understanding has been reached with the Governments of Sindh and Pakistan regarding the approach, methodology, and allocation of resources for preparation of a master plan to manage flood issues in the area of the Indus River and the coastal zone. About US$7 million have been allocated under WSIP to carry out this work, along with preparation of feasibility studies and detailed designs of priority works identified under the plan. WAPDA has begun studies in the area to determine the need for a structure in KPOD to control the back flows coming from the Tidal Link and the overall criteria for redesigning the capacity of the outfall system.

27. Coastal Development Program. Under the FAO Technical Cooperation Program (FAO-TCP), a mission visited Sindh on December 6-19, 2006 to develop a project concept note for a Coastal Development Program . While mission’s findings were discussed with the GoS and GoP, the final concept and the scope of the activities for the FAO-TCP are still under discussion and are not expected to be finalized before March 2008. Additionally, an Asian Development Bank (ADB) supported project (US$40 million) is financing mainly demand-driven community infrastructure. The PPAF has allocated about US$18 million. These are substantive resources for the coastal area, which counts about two million inhabitants. The coastal development program will need therefore to ensure alignment of its interventions and also address some of the issues identified under the regional planning studies mentioned above. The approach to coastal development will be finalized during the WSIP studies.

Long-Term Outcomes

28. In the context of improving management of irrigation and drainage infrastructure, services and equitable distribution of water in Pakistan, the Bank has intensified the dialogue with all Provinces in an effort to pursue institutional reforms coupled with infrastructure development. In Punjab, the Irrigation Sector Development Policy Loan (DPL-II)3 is actively promoting a new governance agenda in the irrigation sector to increase accountability and transparency in service provision and farmer participation. In Sindh, the WSIP would cover 30 percent of the irrigated area in which the Government has taken action to reform irrigation and drainage institutions, establish AWBs and develop FOs for irrigation management. The implementation of WSIP is a significant step in addressing the present governance issues in the Province by strengthening the financial management and procurement systems and pursuing the process of devolving irrigation management to the farmer community for greater accountability and transparency. In Balochistan a small scale irrigation and watershed management project combined with drought mitigation measures is being prepared. In NWFP the Bank is pursuing a dialogue to sustain the initial reform efforts carried out under the previous on- farm water management project.

29. An improved institutional framework for water resources management is also central to the Bank’s ongoing discussions with the GoP on further development of dams and water resources infrastructure on the Indus River. Pakistan is moving steadily to ensure the sustainable management of the Indus system; this will include the preparation and implementation of a comprehensive framework of policy and institutional reforms and development plans, all to provide sustainable and equitably-shared benefits to the people of Pakistan. This concept has been fully endorsed by key stakeholders at the highest level in the Government and by most civil society organizations. The challenge for the Bank and other donors is to move the process forward in a manner that ensures

3 To support the Government of Punjab Medium Term Irrigation Sector Reform Program begun in 2005 to implement institutional and policy reforms to improve their asset management plans; to make interprovincial water allocation and distribution more transparent; to decentralize irrigation management to water users associations; and to improve water productivity.

full government ownership at the federal and provincial levels and leadership in the water reform process, compliant with international best practice.

Conclusions

30. Implementation of the five actions under the Action Plan agreed by the Executive Directors during the discussion of the findings of the Inspection Panel’s Investigation Report and the Management Report and Recommendation on the Pakistan NDP project is broadly on track. Although the solution to many of the poverty, ecological and flood management issues of the outfall area of Sindh are of a long term nature and require management and structural measures, the activities initiated under the Action Plan are an important step in the right direction. Despite strong support at a high level in the GoS, weak capacity at the local level will remain a serious issue and will need considerable strengthening. The Sindh coastal zone and, in particular, the LBOD outfall system will continue to remain a high-risk subject.

31. Management’s assessment is that addressing the complex socio-ecological and structural issues affecting this area will continue to be a difficult challenge compounded by recurrent and adverse weather events. Management will remain actively engaged in following up on these issues. The NDP project is now closed, but the Bank will continue to support the Government through the on-going dialogue, the PPAF, the WSIP and the coastal zone management initiative under preparation. Management will report again to the Board on further progress in implementation of the Action Plan and other issues as needed, in November 2007.

32. As stated in October 2006 Report, in Management’s view the Bank was diligent in the application of its policies and procedures in this case. The Bank has done its best to help the Borrower to address two distinct problems with specific inherent complexities: the technical challenges of an outfall system in southern Sindh presented by LBOD, and the national reform process challenges taken up by NDP. NDP succeeded in initiating a process of critical governance reforms, changing the direction and strategy in the sector towards decentralization, participatory management and the empowerment of farmers. This was a critical step in transforming a governance system that was over 100 years old. This process will continue for some time, but the foundation has been securely established.

33. In regard to LBOD, with hindsight, the Bank could have made some judgments differently, especially by calling for more explicit consideration of risks and tradeoffs in the context of a participatory planning process during the LBOD design stage, by finding a way to support the implementation of the LBOD Environmental Management Plan at a much earlier stage, and by encouraging and supporting Sindh to undertake the livelihood diagnostic study in the coastal areas of Badin that were not benefited directly by LBOD. The Government of Pakistan and Sindh have promptly responded to the flood emergencies in the outfall area of LBOD, which as has been repeatedly assessed by different experts as a flood prone zone.

Table 2: Action Plan

Activities & Projects A B C Responsibility Updated- Schedule Immediate and Short Term • Implementation of Livelihood Improvement Pakistan Poverty Program in Badin and Thatta Districts Alleviation Fund 2006-2007 Phase I (US$2 million) 9 (PPAF) 2007-2009 Phase II (US$16 million 9

• Sindh WSIP 9 9 9 Appraisal GoS/GoP/SIDA Nov. 2006 Board Presentation WB Aug. 2007 Effectiveness GoS/GoP/SIDA Nov. 2007

• Socio-economic and environmental diagnostic 9 9 WB/SIDA Sep. 2007 study of the dhands and surrounding areas

• Assessment of the conditions of the right 9 embankment of the LBOD spinal drain and SIDA/WAPDA July 2007 KPOD. Preparation of a maintenance plan.

Rapid Assessment of Existing Local and 9 SIDA/Local May 2007 Government Flood Risk Management Systems. Governments.

Medium Term • Flood Management Master Plan for the left 9 9 9 SIDA 2007-2009 bank of the Indus River in southern Sindh

• Coastal Development Program 9 9 WB/FAO-TCP Mar. 2008 • Project Concept Note

Long Term Outcomes • Improved management (O&M) of irrigation and drainage infrastructure; improved service 9 9 9 GoP/GoS/WB 2006-2009 delivery and governance; and transparent and more equitable water allocation and distribution

• Modern institutional framework for Indus Basin GoP/GoS/WB 2009-2016 water resources management 9 9 9

• Sustained governance reform agenda GoP/GoS/WB 2009-2016 9 9 KEY: A: Poverty and livelihoods, B: Flood risk, C: Threatened ecosystems

Annex 1 PPAF’s Sindh Coastal Areas Development Program (SCAD)

Introduction The Sindh coastal areas have experienced a myriad of social and economic impacts as a result of natural disasters many of which have occurred in the last decade. Certain communities, particularly fishermen, have been the most vulnerable, relying on debt and migration as coping mechanisms. In order to help these vulnerable communities out of poverty, the PPAF, its existing/potential partner organizations (POs) working in and near the coastal areas, the World Bank and the communities discussed the role each can play to implement an integrated upgrading program for the area. Interactions with communities were conducted through an immersion process, where representatives from PPAF, the Bank, partner organizations and consultants spent days and nights in the homes of fishing communities, learning what challenges they face and their hopes and fears. This intensive interaction has helped everyone better understand what needs to be done and how.

Outreach and Partner Organizations With a view to deepening its outreach in the coastal belt, the PPAF has partnered with highly regarded civil society organizations with a track record of consistently high performance. At present there are ten POs (see box) participating in the Sindh Coastal Areas Development Program (SCAD); inclusion of several more is likely in the near future. (see Map 1 below for areas allocated to each PO). A formal network, i.e., Sindh Coastal Areas Network (SCAN) of these ten POs, has also been formed.

Box - Sindh Coastal Areas Development Program: Participating POs 1. Aga Khan Planning & Building Services (AKPBS) 2. Badin Rural Development Society (BRDS) 3. Health and Nutrition Development Society (HANDS) 4. Indus Earth Trust (IET) 5. National Rural Support Program (NRSP) 6. Sindh Agricultural and Forestry Workers Coordinating Organization (SAWFCO) 7. Society for Conservation and Protection of Environment (SCOPE) 8. Sindh Rural Support Program (SRSP), and 9. Strengthening Participatory Organizations (SPO) 10. Thardeep Rural Development Program (TRDP)

Program Strategy The strategy for the SCAD includes: (i) improving access to basic services including health, education and drinking water supply and sanitation; (ii) increasing incomes through improved crop, fisheries and livestock production, as well as marketing and micro-finance services; (iii) securing access to, and better management of, coastal area natural resources; (iv) forming viable community organizations that are inclusive, well governed and can operate in partnership with the public and private sector; (v) integrating these areas with the national economy by developing rural growth centers; promoting integrated development of physical infrastructure, including construction of productive infrastructure, such as jetties and wharfs; and developing transport and mobility, through the construction of inter and intra-village roads and intermediate modes of transport, using infrastructure grants and micro-credit; (vi) promoting technological innovations, particularly the use of solar and wind energy for pumping water and generating electricity; and (vi) reducing physical vulnerability, through the construction of flood protection and sea water containment structures and better coping mechanisms of communities.

Nature of Interventions Physical Infrastructure • Developing Rural Growth Centers (Integrated Area Upgrading Projects) • Reducing Physical Vulnerability • Constructing Productive Infrastructure • Developing Transport and Mobility • Promoting Technological Innovations • Integrating Work-Fare Concepts in Infrastructure Projects Improvement of Health and Education Services • Adopting, Upgrading and Operating Government Facilities • Developing New Community Managed Facilities Capacity Building and Social Mobilization • PO Staff Trainings • Community Trainings From Social Safety Nets to Micro-Finance • Built-in Work-Fare Program in Infrastructure Development • Social Safety Nets • Food Stamps for Participating in Community Meetings and Social Work • Cash Transfers • Asset Transfer Envisioned Activities under SCAN • Promoting mutual learning through a SCAN web page, output specific workshops, and exchange visits • Study tours to relevant success stories of the region • Facilitating linkages with various development sector organizations, R&D institutions, manufacturers and suppliers of equipment • Dissemination of baseline data, case studies and progress reviews of projects handled by various members • Dissemination of best practice case studies and information on innovative products • Publication of a bi-annual news letter

Progress to Date Brief over view of the activities undertaken • SCAD Action Plan (2007-12) Under Preparation Baseline Survey of 2,800 Settlements Completed Delineation of Union Councils boundaries in progress Launching of the Action Plan Scheduled for June 27, 2007 • 3 Health and Education Facilities Adopted and Improvement Process Initiated • Social Safety Nets Survey Completed • 8 Existing and 2 New POs identified for the Program and Financing Agreements Signed • Social Mobilization Commenced in January 2007 • 18 Conventional Projects and 7 Integrated Area Upgrading Projects (IAUP) Initiated, 3 IAUPs and 10 Conventional Projects Completed

Mapping All the Coastal Settlements A survey has been carried out to map all settlements in the coastal areas to be covered by the PPAF under the SCAD program. The survey covers about 2,830 settlements and includes socio-economic information for Sindh’s coastal zones, especially in terms of housing, occupation, water and sanitation (indicators of poverty). The maps generated from the spot survey provide a GIS basis on which more analysis can be undertaken by PPAF at a later date, including recording changes and progress in a visual format. The findings have been collated and mapping of coastal settlements has been completed.

Investments and Financing Agreements Of US$18 million allocated for the SCAD under the PPAF, US$2.3 million have already been committed for a number of proposals accepted/approved by the POs. The areas (Talukas) along LBOD/KPOD in Badin are being targeted for early program implementation. Financing agreements have been signed with ten POs for 290 projects that will be implemented by 294 community organizations and will benefit 82,840 people. Details are presented in the following table:

S. Partner Amount Community Districts Projects Beneficiaries No Organization Approved (M.Rs) Organizations 1 NRSP Badin 53.48 83 83 21,580

2 Thatta 17.736 25 25 6,500 SPO 3 AKPBS Thatta 23.972 43 46 12,000 Karachi 4 IET 6.506 10 11 5,120 West 27 5 SCOPE Malir 6.5 27 8,640

Karachi 6 HANDS 3.587 14 14 5,040 East 7 BRDS Badin 3.601 15 15 5,400 8 SAFWCO Thatta 19.657 36 36 9,380 9 Sindh RSP Thatta 1.72 7 7 1,680 10 TRDP Tharparkar 18.0 30 30 7,500 Total 154.759 290 294 82,840

Social Safety Nets Pilot The PPAF, with support and technical assistance from the Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP), has also embarked on a program of social safety nets for the Sindh coastal areas. Detail of this innovative pilot which can potentially have far reaching impacts for the extremely poor and destitute is included in Annex 2.

Constraints The PPAF has disbursed and/or committed over 100 percent of its funds and therefore, is faced with financial constraints to accelerate implementation. It is hoped that once additional financing for Social Financing is approved it would be able to support SCAD prior to PPAF III (scheduled to commence in fiscal year 2008-2009).

Map 1 - Coverage under the Program – PO Allocation of Areas

Annex 2.

CGAP, World Bank and PPAF Graduating the Poorest: Linking Safety Nets with Microfinance

Conventional microcredit is not always appropriate for people at the bottom of the economic ladder. In fact, for food-insecure people or people without sustainable livelihoods, credit can lead to indebtedness and actually increase their vulnerability. But this does not mean that microfinance has no effective role in working with the poorest.

After studying various institutional experiences, CGAP has found that using financial services to build on safety net programs can provide an important pathway for the poorest to “graduate” out of chronic food insecurity. As clients meet their consumption needs through a safety net program, accumulate savings, learn simple business skills, and develop financial discipline, they can use credit and other financial services to better manage their lives and pursue independent economic activities.

This “graduation” model How the Graduation Model Works assumes that the poorest need grants, food aid, or subsidized employment to provide for basic survival needs. Once these needs are met, livelihood training and carefully sequenced financial services (starting with savings and later credit) can help clients graduate from dependence on safety net programs and become full-fledged microfinance clients.

CGAP, the World Bank and the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF) have partnered to pilot the graduation model in the coastal areas of Sindh (in Badin, Thatta and West Karachi). These areas are amongst the poorest in Pakistan. Five NGO and MFI partners have been selected for the pilot. Work is underway to determine a targeting strategy for the poorest, identify livelihood options for them, develop appropriate packages of asset, training and health services, and create the correct sequencing of savings and other financial services. A study visit to BRAC in Bangladesh has also been organized. BRAC runs the largest “graduation program” linking safety nets and microfinance and the visit will assist in develop concrete ideas for the pilot. A rigorous impact assessment design is being developed jointly by Yale University and the MIT Poverty Lab to determine causality between program participation and changes in the economic and social conditions of clients.

Annex 3 Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nations

REPORT

ASSESSMENT OF

BADIN AND MIRPURKHASS DISTRICTS, FLOOD MANAGEMENT PLAN

Prepared By:

Muhammad Ehsan, Consultant

June 14, 2007

Islamabad Office ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AWB Area Water Board CCB Community Participation Basis DCO District Coordination Officer EDO Executive District Officer FAO Food and Agriculture Organization GDP Gross domestic Product GOP Government of Pakistan GOS Government of Sindh HANDS Health and Nutrition Development Society HESCO Hyderabad Electric Supply Company ICZM Integrated Coastal Zone Management IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources LBOD Left Bank Outfall Drain MAF Million Acre Feet NGOs Non Governmental Organizations NIO National Institute of Oceanography NRSP National Rural Support Program OFWM On Farm Water Management PEPA Pakistan Environment Protection Agency PFF Pakistan Fisher Folk Forum PMU Project Management Unit RBOD Right Bank Outfall Drain SCAD Sindh Coastal Area Development SCDRP Sindh Coastal Rehabilitation Project SRSP Sindh Rural Support Program SUPARCO Space and Upper Atmospheric Research Organization TMA Tehsil Municipal Administration WAPDA Water and Power Development Authority WSIP Water Sector Improvement Project

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A. BACKGROUND...... 1 B. INTRODUCTION...... 3 C. FLOOD EVENTS...... 3 Review of 2003 – Flood and affected Population ...... 3 Review of 2006 – Flood and affected Population ...... 5 D. RESPONSE TO 2003-FLOOD EVENT...... 7 General 7 By GoPakistan...... 7 Response by GoSindh in respect of 2003 Event ...... 7 By International Community...... 8 By NGOs...... 8 By UN and its Allied Agencies ...... 8 E. RESPONSE TO 2006-FLOOD EVENT...... 8 F. FLOOD MANAGEMENT PLANS ...... 9 General 9 Badin District ...... 10 Mirpur Khas District ...... 10 G. ASSESSMENT OF FLOOD MANAGEMENT PLAN OF BADIN DISTRICT ...... 10 H. RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 12 I. RECOMMENDED CONTINGENCY PLAN TO COMBAT CYCLONES & FLOODS – BADIN DISTRICT ...... 14

Appendix 1: Recommended Contingency Plan to combat Cyclones and Floods - Badin District

ASSESSMENT OF BADIN AND MIRPURKHASS DISTRICTS, FLOOD MANAGEMENT PLAN

A. BACKGROUND

1. Messrs Khadim Talpur, Mohammad Ali Shah, Mustafar Talpur, Munawar Hassan Memon, Iqbal Hyder, Mir Mohammad Buledi, and Najma Junejo on their own behalf and on behalf of “others who live in the area known as District Badin, Sindh Pakistan” in the Indus River Basin submitted a Request for Inspection to the Inspection Panel of WAPDA on September 10, 2004. The Request raised issues most of which related to the prior LBOD Stage 1 Project, which closed in 1997. The location and component of the LBOD Project is shown in Fig.1. The Requesters claimed that the LBOD system was faulty and they had incurred losses because of its poor design. The Requesters claimed that the Bank had failed to observe or had otherwise violated various provisions of its own operational Policies and Procedures. They also voiced concerns that the NDP project would extend the system to serve the entire Indus Basin, adding more effluents from the upper basin, through a National Surface Drainage System (NSDS).

2. Although the NDP project as originally conceived in the 1997 Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) was to have laid the groundwork for the NSDS, the concept was subsequently rejected as a result of extensive studies and reviews. Thus NDP did not extend the LBOD Spinal Drain constructed under LBOD Stage 1 Project that was closed in 1997. Responding to the claims in the Request about LBOD, the Management authorized an investigation through a Panel of Experts.

3. The Inspection Panel conducted the required investigations. The Panel met with the Requesters, local authorities and stakeholders including fisher folk, and discussed with Government of Sindh (GOS) authorities actions which could be undertaken in the short and medium term to address flood vulnerability and socio-economic and livelihood issues of people living in close proximity to LBOD and in the coastal zone of southern Sindh. The Panel issued its report outlining the findings of the investigation. The Management issued its Response in July 2006.

4. One of the five activities contained in a Short Term Action Plan approved by the Board of Executive Directors of the Bank in the light of Panel’s recommendations is: “Rapid assessment of existing local government flood risk management systems to reduce flood damage and vulnerability by building capacity and improving flood risk response."

Fig.1 – Location and Components of LBOD System

Nawabshah Component

Sanghar Component

Mirpurkhas Component

Area Flooded in 2003

B. INTRODUCTION

5. For carrying out activity “Rapid assessment of existing local government flood risk management systems to reduce flood damage and vulnerability by building capacity and improving flood risk response” services of a consultant1 have been retained.

6. Starting work on April 09, 2007, the consultant studied various reports related to flood events of 2003 and 2006 and the damaged caused by them, previously prepared2. The consultant undertook a mission to site from April 15, 2007 to April 21, 2005. He visited Karachi, Hyderabad, Mirpurkhas, Badin, Mirpurkhas Main Drain, LBOD, KPOD and starting point of Tidal Link to learn about the project area and see repair works accomplished and/or on-going, and to discuss the issues with government officials, technical staff of the concerned agencies and Institutes, local government officials, and NGOs3. Government and non-government officials and technical experts were extremely generous with their time and provided data and background information and reports to the consultant. The World Bank Islamabad Office, the office of PC of NDP Sindh, the staff and management of the Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority (SIDA), the Chief Engineer and Staff of WAPDA’s Hyderabad Office, the Director (Left Bank Canals AWB) and the Director (Nara Canal AWB) provided substantive support to the Consultant. The consultant is grateful to all these officials and experts for their hospitality and assistance. The findings of the studies carried out by the Consultant are presented in this report.

C. FLOOD EVENTS

Review of 2003 – Flood and affected Population

7. During the month of July 2003, Nawabshah, Mirpurkhas and Badin districts received heavy rainfalls4: Nawabshah (304 mm), Mirpurkhas (192 mm) and Badin (292 mm). The run-off produced by the rains in Nawabshah and Mirpurkhas districts, which includes the catchment area of LBOD System, enters the surface drains of LBOD System and goes to sea through LBOD Outfall system. Review of the design of LBOD Outfall system indicates that it has been designed to cater for a drainage rate of 1.5 cfs / sq. mile which is equivalent to surface drainage rate of 42 mm (1.67 inches) in a month. Rainfall received in 25 days of July 2003 was on the average 295 mm, which was 7 times the discharge capacity of LBOD.

8. Considering the envisaged run-off factor of 20%, LBOD system received 0.286 MAF of the total quantity of 1.43 MAF produced by the catchment area of LBOD due to rains. In order to drain out rain water, 2,050 drain inlets, with a capacity 1.8 cfs each, have been provided in the drains. The design discharge of LBOD Outfall system is thus 4,000 cusecs (7,934 AF/day) but it can accommodate up to 6,000 cusecs (11,900 AF/day) utilizing the freeboard. At this rate it would have taken ordinarily 24 days to evacuate this volume of water. In addition, Badin catchments area of 3.3 million acres received about 300 mm rainfall which also entered in LBOD System.

9. For expediting evacuation of rain water from their fields the population of Nawab Shah, Sanghar and Mirpurkhas made cuts in the drains of LBOD system that further increased the flow in Outfall Drain. This caused overflowing in the LBOD. The situation further aggravated due to flows from canal

1 Mr. Muhammad Ehsan 2 List of documents consulted in preparing this report is given in Appendix 1 3 A list of organizations and officials met by the consultant is given in Appendix 2. 4 Metreological Records of rainfall escapes and breaches that entered LBOD. It is pertinent to note that I&P Department did not close the inflows to irrigation canals despite the rainfall that worsened the flow condition in LBOD system which had to carry many times more discharge than the capacity of drains. High tide in sea and high level in Shakoor Dhand obstructed the flow, and area in the vicinity of Badin district suffered badly. It was observed on July 25, 2003 that a discharge of about 9000 cusecs passed through Spinal Drain in the proximity of RD 159+000. There were several breaches in the system particularly in KPOD. The area flooded is shown in Fig.1.

10. According to the information provided by the local government of Badin, the monsoon 2003 floods affected 390,469 persons in 1,407 villages of Badin district alone. The death toll was 88 persons and 321 injured. The 11,699 houses were destroyed while 21,063 houses were partially damaged. 9,110 heads of cattle were lost and 229,931 acres of cropped land was affected. In response, the authorities established 100 relief camps in the affected areas for relief operation and 23,650 persons were provided food and shelter for more than a month. Table 1 gives the names and population badly affected by 2003 floods.

Table 1: Villages and Population Badly Affected by 2003 Floods Sr. Affected Sr. Affected Name Village Name Village No. Population No. Population 1 Khamoon Mallah 320 32 Manthar Khaskheli 120 2 Khamoon Mallah-II 209 33 Adam Khaskheli 120 3 Shadman Lund 278 34 Gudo Khore 42 4 Missri Mallah 225 35 Hashim Mallah 62 5 Haji Hajjam 200 36 Samoon 100 6 Hanif Mallah 275 37 Ali Bengali 120 7 Gaji Mallah 150 38 Anwer Bengali 60 8 Yousuf Mallah 175 39 Rajab Mallah 54 9 Ramzan Sheedi 51 40 Karo Mallah 78 10 Jumoon Mallah 204 41 Nawab Ali Jamali 48 Faqir Mohammed 11 118 42 Mohammed Chandio 60 Mallah 12 Ibrahim Mallah 107 43 Mohammed Notiar 72 Master Allah Bux 13 85 44 Natho Bajeer 54 Mallah 14 Haji Ahmed Mallah 93 45 Ramzan Chandio 84 Gul Mohammed 15 357 46 Khamiso Dhandhal 48 Talpur 16 Ramzan Khaskheli 230 47 Ahmed Notiar 120 17 Lakho Pir 2,000 48 Natho Jamali 42 18 Bahadur Khan Lund 300 49 Allah Dino Notiar 36 19 Pir Bux Mandhro 104 50 Pinyo Mallah 90 20 Yousuf Bhatti 138 51 Sahbdino Jat 180 Mohammed Hassan 21 96 52 Lakhadino Notiar 60 Mandhro 22 Jurio Mallah 180 53 Beer Mallah 90 23 Haji Raboo 50 54 Khan Dal 48 24 Sono Khan Chandio 120 55 Haji Sujawal Jat 60 25 Malhar Mallah 156 56 Behdmi 840 26 Rafiq Bengali 54 57 Allah Rakhio Jat 150 27 Rafiq Dal 60 58 Photo Jat 104 28 Tamachi Bajeer 50 59 Murad Malir 1,406 29 Photo Chandio 60 60 Patel Qasim Dal 900 30 Ali Shah 72 61 Nabi Bux Lund 360 31 Mohammed Khaskheli 54

Review of 2006 – Flood and affected Population

11. Similar to the event of unusual rains generated flood during the month of July 2003, there was a flood event again in the LBOD project area in April 2006. There were intensive rains the particulars of which are given in Table 2.

Table 2: Rainfall in April 2006 Sr. No. Taluka Rainfall (mm) 1. Badin 298 2. Matli 231 3. Talhar 205 4. S.F. Rahu 110 5. Tando Bago 144 6. Mirpurkhas 272 7. Digri 362 8. Jhudo 150 9. Kot Ghulam Muhammad 207 10. Sindhri 281 11. H.B.Mari 273

12. Besides sheet flows caused by the intensive rains, again the population made cuts in the drains of LBOD system for expediting evacuation of rain water from their fields that increased the flow in Outfall Drain. This caused not only the overflowing and breaches in the LBOD but the breaches and overtopping also occurred in other main drains, branch drains and sub-drains of the LBOD System. Another significant phenomenon that occurred was heading up of water upstream of pipe culverts which have been designed to carry much less discharge than occurs due to heavy rains and cuts made by farmers. This caused breaches in the banks upstream, notable of these was at RD 350 culvert bridge across MMD, which caused breach in the left bank of MMD that threatened Mirpurkhas city. In order to safely pass the flow in the reach RD 245 to RD 500 of Spinal Drain of LBOD System earthen and gunny bag dowels were constructed in emergency.

13. Breach occurred in LBOD Spinal Drain at RD-435 NIP that affected villages; (i) Haji Khalid Bhurgri; (ii) Haji Qasim Bhurgri; (iii) Nawab Younis Talpur. Local people made cuts in the embankment of MMD to obtain relief from flooding, which subsequently converted into breaches at RD-117 IP, RD-151 NIP, RD-152.5 IP, RD-189 IP, RD-202 IP, RD-216 IP & RD-219 NIP affecting the villages Rano Ramdhan. Overtopping in MMD at RD-201 to 208, RD-213 to 217, RD-231 to 236 affected the villages; (i) Chounrow Bhurgri; (ii) Gul sheer Gorchani; (iii) Mirwah Gorchani; (iv); Khalid Leghari; (v) Syed Ali Nawaz Shah; and (vi) Muhammad Khan Banglani. Breach in Mirpurkhas Main Drain MMD at RD-354 caused flooding in the entire area of Taluka Hussain Bux Marri. The District Administration of Mirpurkhas sought the help of Pak Army teams and IPD staff to take remedial measures for repairing washed away embankment of MMD between RD-350 to RD-357 in order to save Mirpurkhas city. The breaches at RD-62 & 63 of Sanghar Main Drain (SMD) affected the village Khuda Bux Rajar and areas surrounding areas Sanghar Sugar Mill. Upward action of Dhoro Puran Outfall Drain seriously affected Aliani village and Roshan Abad near Jhudo.

14. It is pertinent to note that the event of 2006-Flooding did not impact Badin district as severely as it happened during 2003-flooding. This is due to diligent work carried out by Army in filling breaches immediately after the occurrence of 2003-flooding, and later in restoration work carried out by AWBLBC that is still in progress. D. RESPONSE TO 2003-FLOOD EVENT

General

15. Immediately after the flooding occurred in July 2003, the Federal Government as well as Provincial Governments launched a massive relief operation. International community also provided help in that the Governments of Switzerland (through SDC), Japan and Greece donated cash and relief items to the Government of Pakistan for flood affectees. Several indigenous and international NGOs participated in relief operations during and immediately after the flooding event of 2003.

By GoPakistan

16. The President and the Prime Minister separately visited the affected areas after the occurrence of the flooding in 2003. The Government of Pakistan provided grant of PKR 100 million for undertaking rehabilitation in the flood affected areas. The Government of Punjab provided grant of PKR 50 million for the Sindh province for undertaking rehabilitation in the flood affected areas.

17. National Rural Support Programme (NRSP) provided relief assistance to the affected people belonging to its Community Organizations. It has also provided food rations to 514 households and cooked food in relief camps in Golarchi Taluka to 2,175 persons and medical assistance to affected population.

Response by GoSindh in respect of 2003 Event

18. In view of the devastating damages caused by the flooding in 2003, the Sindh Government declared emergency and established a fund for relief operation contributing 50 million Rs from resources of Sindh Government. A Provincial Relief Committee was constituted to review the losses caused by the heavy rain and floods in the province, especially the damages to life and property in the districts of Badin, Thatta and Tharparkar. The Provincial Relief Committee and District Coordination offices were made responsible for the relief operations; affected families were provided tents, blankets and various food items, such as flour, pulses, cooking oil, sugar, tea, milk powder, etc. GoSingh arranged evacuation of marooned people by employing various government agencies including the Pakistan Army. The flood-affected victims were provided shelter at relief camps set up at the premises of various schools and other government buildings.

19. Nara Canal AWB and Left Bank Canal AWB provided technical assistance and support to various agencies involved in relief operation. They carried out emergency restoration works for the danaged irrigation and drainage networks in order to clear the floodwater and assured the availability of canal water in the area. Using machinery and equipment available in Lower Sindh Mechanical Division major breaches in irrigation and drainage networks were plugged in order to safeguard the people and valuable property including standing crops, buildings, roads network and others infrastructure.

20. Later on, a detailed assessment of losses and structural damage to LBOD and irrigation networks was prepared in order to restore the damaged infrastructure. Several schemes were prepared and implemented to restore the damaged infrastructure.

21. It was decided by GoSindh that the families of the victims (dead), who were bread-earners, would be given Rs. 100,000 each while other families would be given Rs. 50,000. By International Community

22. The Government of Switzerland, through SDC, provided US$ 36,700 for rehabilitation work in Dadu and Tharparkar districts. The Government of Japan donated cash grant of US$ 10,000 to the Government of Pakistan, which was in addition to the relief items worth US$ 160,000 handed over to the Sindh Government. The Government of Greece donated relief items worth US$ 57,000 to the Government of Pakistan for flood affectees.

By NGOs

23. In order to meet the immediate needs of the flood-affected population of Badin, Thatta and Dadu districts, the International NGO Forum comprising of Islamic Relief, SCF-UK and OXFAM-GB, Action Aid, Catholic Relief Service, Concern Pakistan and Church World Service jointly contributing funds to provide food and non-food packages in the relief camps and affected people in villages. These packages consisted of essential food items, water purifiers with containers, hygiene kits and cooking utensils. SCF-UK provided food to Tharparkar through Thardeep Rural Development Programme (TRDP) and to Badin through Strengthening Participatory Organization (SPO). Concern Pakistan distributed tents worth EUR 40,000 (US$ 45,610) in Badin through the Church World Service. Focus Humanitarian Assistance provided food assistance to five hundred families for seven days as well as mosquito coils and water purification tablets to these families for ten days.

24. The Pakistan Red Crescent Society (PRCS) provided blankets and medical camps using US$ 50,000 contributed by ICRC. PRCS had allocated US$ 50,000 from its own resources for relief work in Sindh and Balochistan provinces. In addition, PRCS received donations: (i) US$ 50,000 from USAID for emergency food supplies to the affectees in Sindh; and (ii) US$ 50,000 from the Chinese Red Cross. These funds were used to provide food, health and shelter to the affectees in both the provinces.

By UN and its Allied Agencies

25. The UNICEF delivered Jerry Cans of drinking water and water purification tablets worth US$ 40,000. Tents purchased by UNDP from funds allocated by OCHA (US$ 50,000) were distributed to the affectees in Badin. UNDP provided another amount of US$ 50,000 for coordination, monitoring and logistics support of relief activities in Sindh. WFP procured and distributed food supplies (400 tones wheat flour and 100 tones edible oil) worth US$ 200,000 for 240,000 beneficiaries in Thatta, Badin, and Tharparkar districts. Half of the food supplies were distributed in Badin, being the worst affected district. WHO also provided 50,000 water purification tablets and 50,000 packets of ORS worth US$ 15,000.

E. RESPONSE TO 2006-FLOOD EVENT

26. During the event of 2006, GoSindh carried out relief operation in the affected areas similar to the one carried out in response to the event of 2003 flooding. Since the damage during 2006 flooding was relatively on lesser scale than the 2003 event the relief operation was all indigenous effort. GoSingh arranged evacuation of marooned people by employing various government agencies including the Pakistan Army. The flood-affected had to be provided shelter at relief camps set up at the premises of various schools and other government buildings. Affected families were provided tents, various food items, such as flour, pulses, cooking oil, sugar, tea, milk powder, etc. F. FLOOD MANAGEMENT PLANS

General

27. Pakistan has had a long history of repeated localized and widespread flooding. Much of Pakistan is a flood prone region, with steep upper catchments and the potential for high intensity rainfall. The flood problem has been exacerbated by the progressive denudation of river catchments and the general deterioration of river channels from significantly reduced flows during non-flood seasons because of increased diversion from the rivers. Despite reservoir construction and major investments in flood protection, there remains a considerable flood hazard. The capacities of the dams to attenuate flooding and regulate river flows are being reduced by siltation.

28. Flooding mainly impacts on three areas of the country:

29. The main riverine areas adjacent to the Indus and its tributaries (the Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Sutlej and Kabul) where annual floods are used for irrigation. These areas are heavily populated and suffer catastrophic damage due to high intensity floods;

30. High torrent affected areas where intense local rainfall on steep, largely denuded mountainsides can cause major flash floods. Such floods cause immense damage due to erosion and inundation of agricultural and populated lands and to communications and urban infrastructure. large and sudden deposits of sediment from hill torrents near the confluence with major rivers may change hydraulic and morphological conditions locally in the main river, adversely affecting flooding and erosion conditions; and

31. Areas of poor drainage where water ponds in agricultural and urban areas as a result of heavy summer (monsoon) rainfall;

32. Generally Pakistan is impacted by the high floods in main riverine areas adjacent to the Indus and its tributaries every year during the Kharif season. These high floods cause severe damage to public infrastructure, private property, human life, crops and livestock, as happened in 1950, 1955, 1957, 1973, 1976, 1978, 1988, 1992 and 1995. Due to expectation of this category of flooding every year, the local administrations of the respective districts and other related departments in the vicinity of riverine areas prepared Flood Management Plans containing Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in 1980s to combat these floods. These Flood Management Plans have evolved into effective instruments for providing relief to population affected by a flood event. District Administrations generally deal with the non-structural measures to mitigate the effect of floods while the Irrigation Departments of the concerned areas deal with up-keep of the flood protection infrastructure to avoid or minimize flooding.

33. The flooding that occurred in Badin area during 2003 and Mirpurkhas in 2006 was of the category mentioned under bullet three above. Although the Badin area had witnessed rain water floods in the years 1959, 1961, 1962, 1964, 1967, 1970, 1973, 1976 & 1979 but these were relatively of much less severity than that of 2003 flooding. The flooding in Badin area was not expected to be recurrent event every year, as during the forty years (1959 and 2000) only about a dozen times the noticeable flooding due to rains occurred. The area used to remain under water from 2 to 3 months due to poor drainage.This inundation used to spoil crops in the vastly affected area, sub-merging hundreds of villages and displacing thousands of people. The inundation of area for months was a fact accepted without much of a complaint. Due to the fact that the flooding was an accepted norm and of the magnitude much less than that occurred during 2003, preparation of a Flood Management Plan containing SOPs prior to the 2003 event of flooding had not been considered necessary. The gravity of the situation became noticeable after the 1998 cyclone but the flooding in 2003 due to unprecedented rains prompted preparation of a Plan to combat an emergency. Otherwise, the effects of the floods were mitigated with spurred reaction, as no formal Flood Management Plan existed.

Badin District Contingency Plan to combat Cyclones & Floods

34. District Coordination Officer, Badin prepared a Flood Management Plan after the 2003 flooding event in year 2004 prior to monsoon season to combat situation similar to that occurred in 2003. It was reported to be have been updated every year. The updated version of this document is entitled “Contingency Plan to combat Cyclones & Flood / Rain 2007”. This Flood Management Plan is specific to the requirement of Badin District and was prepared keeping in view the lessons learnt during the 2003 flooding. As explained in para 38, the Contingency Plan prepared for Badin District gives only non-structural measures (flood warning systems, laws and regulations, and readiness for providing the relief measures to the affected population). It was found that the “Contingency Plan to combat Cyclones & Flood / Rain 2007” has been circulated to the key responsible officers of the district. During the meeting with representatives of 4 NGOs on April 20, 2004, the Bank Consultant saw its copy with one of the representatives.

Mirpur Khas District Contingency Plan to combat Cyclones & Floods

35. Mirpurkhas has yet to prepare a Flood Management Plan. The district administration (DCO) informed that a Flood Management Plan similar to the one prepared for Badin District would soon be prepared. As happened after the 2003 event, the effects of the flood event of 2006 were mitigated with spurred reaction, as no formal Flood Management Plan existed for the Mirpurkhas District.

G. ASSESSMENT OF FLOOD MANAGEMENT PLAN OF BADIN DISTRICT

36. Damaging effects of flooding are as follow:s

• Loss and damage to public infrastructure; • Loss of private property; • Loss of crop or reduction in yields of crop; • Loss of human life and livestock; and • Spread of water borne diseases.

37. The purpose of a Flood Management Plan for an area is to prevent and/or minimize the damaging effects of floods. Therefore a good plan should contain preventing measures and mitigation measures prior to and after the damage caused by a flooding. For minimizing the damaging effects of a flood two types of measures are necessary; (i) Structural (flood protection works); and (ii) Non-structural (flood warning systems, laws and regulations, and readiness for providing the relief measures to the affected population). Structural measures are meant to prevent or minimize the damaging effect by keeping the flood water away from the populous areas and safe passage of the flood water to the disposal areas or facilities.

38. The Contingency Plan prepared for Badin District gives the background of 2003 flooding and informs about the inadequacy of structural measures as those existed. However, it does not include the structural measures but suggests addressing the structural deficiencies. The Contingency Plan prepared for Badin District gives only non-structural measures (flood warning systems, laws and regulations, and readiness for providing the relief measures to the affected population). 39. It mainly focuses on preparedness for providing relief measures in the event of a flooding, including flood warning system, evacuation of marooned population and the temporary shelter. The plan contains the narration of the lessons learnt from 2003 Flood Event, which forms the basis of the preparedness plan.

40. It states that the early warning of cyclones and heavy rains will be communicated through Radio, TV and Police wireless system. The Plan does not mention as to who would be responsible for issuing the Early Warning. It is learnt that NIO carries out research development connected with tides and do publish the reports containing information about the tides. But the Meteorological Department is responsible to tracks down cyclones and the cloud systems producing heavy rains. Logically, the Meteorological Department should be the one to issue the early warning and they do as per their SOP but it is not mentioned in the Plan. There is a small meteorological station in Badin supervised by a junior official. This station monitors the rain fall as it occurs but is not in a position to issue the early warning. Accordingly, a clear source for receiving the early warning needs to be mentioned in the plan along with the official responsible in the District Administration to communicate the early warning to the remotest possible areas in Badin district i.e. the villages and settlements near the coast line such as; Shaikareyo etc. These settlements are remote and prone to suffer the most in case of a flooding, and have no TVs or radio receivers. It is time consuming to reach these places. It was learnt ‘Tapedars’ were the last link to pass on the information that, being revenue collecting staff, are not popular and not considered credible. Therefore, there must be a foolproof way to provide the information to the population in remote areas in time, which is considered credible by them.

41. The mechanism to declare the emergency is stated in the Plan, and establishing control rooms at District level, Taluka level along with the telephone numbers of the concerned officials are given. There is mention of Relief Commissioner’s Office in Hyderabad along with his telephone number but the role of the Relief Commissioner is not defined.

42. The mechanism to declare the emergency is stated in the Plan, and establishing control rooms at District level, Taluka level along with the telephone numbers of the concerned officials are given. There is mention of Relief Commissioner’s Office in Hyderabad along with his telephone number but the role of the Relief Commissioner is not defined.

43. The duties of the concerned XEN Drainage, Revenue Department, Education Department (for providing school buildings for the relief camps), Health Department, Taluka Muncipal Administration, Agriculture Department, Civil Defense, HESCO, telephone Department, Southern Gas Company, W&S Department, DPO-Badin and EDO (Community Development) are given in the Plan. Also mentioned in the Plan are roles of Edhi Welfare Trust and Pakistan Army. But the roles at union council and/or village level are not indicated.

44. The Contingency Plan includes the list of school buildings and number of rooms in them along with their capacities to accommodate displaced persons. It also includes the list of ‘DEHs’ (villages) and their population, organized taluka-wise along with the names of the concerned ‘Tapedars’. But the list of DEHs most vulnerable to flood risks is not prepared.

45. The Flood Management Plan does not indicate details as to where the population of specific ‘Dehs’ would be given shelter in case of need.

46. During the 2003 event, the hygienic conditions in schools where shelter was provided became bad, safe drinking water became short in supply and inadequate latrines made overall environmental conditions as intolerable. An officer spending money from the Government Exchequer to provide food during 2003 event is reported to have to face a lot of inquiries and embarrassment after the event in Badin District. For the future, the Secretary Government of Sind Food Department is requested to direct Director Food and Deputy Director to make prior arrangement of supply from Karachi and Hyderabad at the time of need / emergency. But the logistic indicating the quantities of food, safe drinking water, medicines etc., and the budget for the same is not indicated in the Plan.

47. Although the induction of NGOs and other philanthropic is implied in the Flood Management Plan but the detailed mechanism to organize and implement the participation by them is not indicated. It was informed by the representatives of the NGOs that during the 2003 relief operation there was no Disaster management Committee formed, which if had been formed including co-opted representatives from private sector and/or NGOs could have provided better guidance and arrangements particularly towards shortages of food items etc. There is no provision for forming such a committee in the Flood Management Plan.

48. The Flood Management Plan rightly points out the need for strict watch on the LBOD drains, which is virtually non-existent for the time being. This is subject of O&M of LBOD System. SIDA needs to look into it to improve the situation.

H. RECOMMENDATIONS

49. There is need to have a comprehensive Flood Management Plan for Badin and Mirpurkhas districts including structural measures. In this connection, Government of Pakistan has approved a PC-II for an amount of Rs. 41 Million for carrying out the Feasibility Studies by retaining services of consultants to identify and mitigate the problem in LBOD Outfall and Badin Area Drainage System. The TOR for carrying out the Feasibility Studies by retaining services of consultants to identify and mitigate the problem in LBOD Outfall and Badin Area Drainage System have been prepared by participation of stakeholders. The recently approved Project of Water Sector Improvement Program (WSIP), which would be implemented with the World Bank’s financial assistance, among other things, “[…]” will support the preparation of a comprehensive flood management plan for the Left Bank of the Indus River in Sindh including the Indus delta and coastal areas. This regional drainage master plan, agreed with local stakeholders during preparation of the national Drainage Master Plan, will encompass both surface drainage, sub-surface drainage, water logging and salinity control and flood risk management, and will include appropriate structural and non-structural options (e.g., flood warning and communications, flood proofing and improved preparedness and response systems). Planning and infrastructure management capacity will be built and the capacity of local authorities will be strengthened. A modern, world-class knowledge base will be developed with appropriate analytical tools and information management systems to support planning, operations and management. The detailed design would be prepared and made ready for implementation of the priority works identified under the master plan under a future investment project that Sindh may undertake with the assistance of its development partners“[…]”

50. The Government of Pakistan has formed a National Disaster Management Authority. It would be appropriate to have participation of this newly formed institution in preparing Flood Management Plan for the Left Bank of the Indus River.

51. WAPDA South must coordinate at appropriate level with GoSindh as well as consult other stakeholders in carrying out the Feasibility Studies through services of consultants to identify and mitigate the problem in LBOD Outfall and Badin Area Drainage System. For preparing a comprehensive DMP there shall be need for stakeholder participation, as has been done in preparing the DMP for Kotri. 52. In the interim the following actions are recommended for improving the existing local government flood risk management systems to reduce flood damage and vulnerability by building capacity and improving flood risk response:

(i) A system for ensuring the communication of early warning that is considered credible and clearly understood by the population prone to adverse effects of flooding needs to be established. A clear methodology should be framed to communicate warnings generated by the Meteorological Department in the shortest possible time, describing the SOPs of the departments, officials involved along with their responsibilities and logistics for implementing the system.

(ii) Routine vigilance through out the year and special vigilance during the Kharif season in respect of all drains in the LBOD System should be incorporated in the Flood Management Plan. This aspect is to be dealt as part of O&M activities to be carried out by the concerned AWBs. SIDA in association with AWBs should prepare Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for carrying out proper O&M of the surface drains of LBOD System. The O&M Manual (in 5 Volumes) prepared by WAPDA in 1991 and criteria used by IPD for computing M&R yardstick should provide the foundation to prepare the requisite SOP.

(iii) As the schools are used to give shelter, the primary purposes of school buildings to provide education to children is jeopardized due to deterioration using those as residential buildings that require substantial repairs afterwards but generally are not carried out due to limited budget available with W&S Department. Instead of immediately rushing the affected population to school building to provide shelter, which is itself a time consuming process (convincing people to move and to arrange transport and boats) it will be a good option to provide/construct shelters in the vulnerable villages. It is there recommended to provide shelters alternate to school buildings. This alternative could be constructing elevated earthen plate-forms close to each of DEHs so that the affected population can stay near to their properties but a higher elevation above the expected highest water level of flooding. There would be need, however, for the land to construct these elevated earthen plat-forms. As per the discussions held with the representatives of NGOs met, this can be done with community participation basis (CCB). The community can contribute piece of land while investment may be arrangement from an on-going project. It is considered that area required per person would be of the order of 2.5 m2 to 3 m2 per person. The plat-forms would be on the average about 2m high and can have wooden or steel trusses to install temporary covers such as tarpaulin. If constructed on CCB, the up-keep and maintenance can be carried out by the community. During the dry season these plate-forms can be used for community functions such marriage ceremonies etc. A total of 61 villages in 2003 and about 10 villages in 2006 were severely affected. Considering these villages prone to risk of flooding again and adding a few more, a total number of 80 villages would perhaps require these plat-forms. But the number should be determined by consultation with the concerned communities.

(iv) The list of ‘Dehs’ most vulnerable to flood risks needs to be prepared, and shown on a map indicating roads to establish evacuation paths. These ‘Dehs’ should receive the early warning of an emergent event at the top priority.

(v) The preparedness at village level needs to be reflected. The personnel relating villages can be informed as to where to contact in case of emergency, and also trained to initiate measures to save themselves from a big catastrophe.

(vi) It was learnt that a provision of stockpile edibles, medicines and clean drinking water for three days is maintained but during 2003 it took some 15 days for the affected population to return to their place. Adequate quantum of needed edibles, medicines and clean drinking water are to be determined, and stockpiles maintained as part of the Flood Management Plan. And, adequate budget allocation should be provided for this purpose as part of the Flood Management Plan.

(vii) There should be a provision for forming a Disaster Management Committee, which may include co-opted representatives from private sector and/or NGOs in addition to the government functionaries for providing better guidance and arrangements in the Flood Management.

I. RECOMMENDED CONTINGENCY PLAN TO COMBAT CYCLONES & FLOODS – BADIN DISTRICT

53. Building on the Contingency Plan to combat cyclones and floods for Badin and incorporating the above observations an implementable Contingency Plan has been prepared, the contents of which are included in Appendix 3.

54. The Flood Management Plan for Mirpurkhas District should be prepared by the district Administration using the Badin District Flood Management Plan as a guide.

APPENDIX 1

RECOMMENDED CONTINGENCY PLAN TO COMBAT CYCLONES & FLOODS – BADIN DISTRICT

APPENDIX 1

CONTENTS A. BACKGROUND...... 1 B. QUALITIES OF AN EFFECTIVE FLOOD MANGEMENT PLAN ...... 1 C. COMPREHENSIVE FLOOD MANAGEMENT PLAN...... 2 D. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR BADIN DISTRICT ...... 3 D.1 Objectives of the Plan ...... 3 D.2 Badin District ...... 4 D.3 Experience of 2003 Floods...... 4 D.4 Declaring Emergency in the District ...... 6 D.5 Control Rooms ...... 6 D.6 Most Vulnerable Villages...... 6 D.7 Arrangements for Early Warning...... 7 D.8 Vigilence of LBOD System during Moonsoon...... 9 D.9 Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) of the Department involved in Flood Management ...... 9 D.10 Possible Relief Camps...... 15 D.11 Names of Key Staff of District...... 19 D.12 Shelters in the Most Vulnerable ‘Dehs’ ...... 20 D.13 Facilities at Shelters (schools)...... 21

RECOMMENDED CONTINGENCY PLAN TO COMBAT CYCLONES & FLOODS – BADIN DISTRICT

A. BACKGROUND

1. Badin district was hit in 1999 by a cyclone that caused loss of 75 human lives but unprecedented heavy rains in the last week of July 2003 combined with breaches in irrigation canals and drains created a situation of extreme emergency especially in three talukas: Badin, Tando Bago and S. F. Rahu. With quick response and with highly dedicated efforts of 206 Brigade and its two units: (i) 4 Punjab; and (ii) 21 FF, Rangers and the Police and the Administration situation was survived and thousands of people were saved. But still 86 people lost their lives and 56 thousands people had to be shifted into the relief camps. Many areas could not be reached even on boats therefore five helicopters were used for dropping the food. People lost all their household belongings. Houses, cattle and crops were destroyed and there was acute shortage of food. Survey shows that more than hundred thousand families were worst affected.

2. Pakistan is impacted by the high floods in main riverine areas adjacent to the Indus and its tributaries (Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi and Sutlej) every year during the Kharif season. These high floods cause severe damage to public infrastructure, private property, human life, crops and livestock. Due to expectation of this flooding every year, the local administrations of the respective districts and other related departments in the vicinity of riverine areas have prepared contingency plans containing Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to combat these floods. These contingency plans are effective instruments for providing relief to population affected by a flood event. District Administrations generally deal with the non-structural measures to mitigate the effect of floods while the Irrigation Departments of the concerned areas deal with up-keep of the flood protection infrastructure to avoid or minimize flooding.

3. Although the Badin area had witnessed major rain water floods in the years 1959, 1961, 1962, 1964, 1967, 1970, 1973, 1976 & 1979 but these were not expected to be recurrent event every year. The floods used to destroy crops and affect vast area, sub-merging hundreds of villages and displacing thousands of people. The area remained under water from 2 to 3 months due to poor drainage. The inundation of area for months was an accepted fact. Due to the fact that the flooding was not expected to be a recurrent event and of the magnitude that occurred during 2003, no contingency plan had been prepared containing SOPs prior to the 2003 event of flooding. The response to the unprecedented flooding that occurred in Badin area during 2003 was spurred by the enormity of the impact. Afterwards, it prompted DCO, Badin to prepare a ‘Contingency Plan’ to combat disaster causing events in future, such as cyclone of 1998 and flooding in 2003.

4. The document prepared by DCO, Badin gives a treatise on preparedness for providing relief measures in the event of a flooding, including flood warning system, evacuation of marooned population and the temporary shelter. The plan contains the narration of the lessons learnt from 2003 Flood Event, which formed the basis of the preparedness plan but there are some gaps that need to be addressed. This Annex 4 gives the ‘Recommended Contingency Plan for Badin District, incorporating some missing details in the Contingency Plan prepared by DCO, Badin.

B. QUALITIES OF AN EFFECTIVE FLOOD MANGEMENT PLAN

5. Damaging effects of flooding are as follow:

• Loss and damage to public infrastructure;

APPENDIX 1

• Loss of private property; • Loss of crop or reduction in yields of crop; • Loss of human life and livestock; and • Spread of water borne diseases.

6. Flood Management Plans are prepared to prevent and/or minimize the damaging effects of floods. Therefore a good plan should contain preventing measures and mitigation measures against the damaging effects mentioned in para 5 above, prior to and after the damage caused by a flooding. For preventing/minimizing the damaging effects of a flood two types of measures are necessary; (i) Structural (flood protection works); and (ii) Non-structural (flood warning systems, laws and regulations, and readiness for providing the relief measures to the affected population). Structural measures are meant to prevent or minimize the damaging effect by keeping the flood water away from the populous areas and safe passage of the flood water to the disposal areas or facilities.

C. COMPREHENSIVE FLOOD MANAGEMENT PLAN

7. There is need to have a comprehensive Flood Management Plan for Badin and Mirpurkhas districts including structural measures. In this connection, Government of Pakistan has approved a PC-II for an amount of Rs. 41 Million for carrying out the Feasibility Studies by retaining services of consultants to identify and mitigate the problem in LBOD Outfall and Badin Area Drainage System.

8. The scope of work included in approved TOR, also endorsed by participant of the meeting of stakeholders on January 11, 2007, is as follows:

(i) To undertake a comprehensive study, conforming to the international standards, of LBOD System, must cover the following aspects. • To examine the existing and required surface and subsurface water drainage capacity of the present system of LBOD outfall drains and its collector drains. • The system needs to be enhanced in order to carry out taking saline and storm water in the event of maximum rains. • Estimation for upcoming maximum saline effluent and storm water to be handled under worst scenario (historical rainfall intensity /over 300 mm rainfall) and evacuation of storm water should be possible within a maximum period of three to five/three days. • To determine the deficiencies in the system in relation to the desired capacity of the system. • The other options for disposal of the drainage effluent/ surface runoff through an outfall aligned in a North-south direction may also be considered, because one reason for failure of the tidal link is its alignment in an East-West direction. • To suggest the appropriate structure at suitable place and related items of work necessitated to stop further scoring / intrusion of sea water in between RD.0 to RD.(-)22 of KPOD. • Analysis of the present lines/ alignments of outfall drains and study of pre-inception of LBOD and natural drains/Dhoras and the best option to carry the storm/saline effluent smoothly into sea. • Analytically determine parameters for redesigning of the entire LBOD Stage-I system and maximum permissible effluent and run-off recommended to be handled by the system. APPENDIX 1

• Analyse financial effects of various options highlighting the recommended option in relation to benefits. (ii) Re-design entire LBOD System, including outfall drains, to provide for the following: • Rainfall intensity of 75 mm with a return period of 50 years. • Rainfall intensity of 150 mm with a return period of 50 years. • Historical rainfall/ more than 300 mm. (iii) Prepare the PC-1 Pro-forma [as modified by the Planning Commission] incorporating each one of the above mentioned options for approval and implementation. (iv) Suggestions of stake holders may also be considered before finalizing the study for redesign of LBOD system. (v) Assess the damages caused to the entire LBOD system and people of the area etc, due to alleged defective designing of LBOD system. (vi) The environmental aspects of entire project may also be assessed and mitigation measures may be suggested. (vii) The study of disposal of storm water into sea through Dhoro Puran Drain and activation of other natural drains as source of smooth transportation may also be conducted. 9. The recently approved Project of Water Sector Improvement Program (WSIP), which would be implemented with the World Bank’s financial assistance, among other things, “[…]” will support the preparation of a comprehensive flood management plan for the Left Bank of the Indus River in Sindh including the Indus delta and coastal areas. This regional drainage master plan, agreed with local stakeholders during preparation of the national Drainage Master Plan, will encompass both surface drainage, sub-surface drainage, water logging and salinity control and flood risk management, and will include appropriate structural and non-structural options (e.g., flood warning and communications, flood proofing and improved preparedness and response systems). Planning and infrastructure management capacity will be built and the capacity of local authorities will be strengthened. A modern, world-class knowledge base will be developed with appropriate analytical tools and information management systems to support planning, operations and management. The detailed design would be prepared and made ready for implementation of the priority works identified under the master plan under a future investment project that Sindh may undertake with the assistance of its development partners“[…]”

10. The Government of Pakistan has formed a National Disaster Management Authority. It would be appropriate to have participation of this newly formed institution in preparing Flood Management Plan for the Left Bank of the Indus River.

11. In the interim the following Contingency Plan for Badin Districts recommended for improving the existing local government flood risk management systems to reduce flood damage and vulnerability by building capacity and improving flood risk response. This Plan is generally based on the Contingency Plan that has been prepared by DCO, Badin but some missing details have been provided.

D. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR BADIN DISTRICT

D.1 Objectives of the Plan

12. Following are the objectives of the Contingency Plan for Badin District to combat cyclones and flooding caused by rains. APPENDIX 1

(i) To combat heavy rains, floods and Cyclones keeping in view past experience so that human lives are saved and other loss is minimized; (ii) To provide standard operating procedure for District departments in case of emergency; and (iii) To ensure maximum timely relief to the affected people.

D.2 Badin District

13. Badin District was established in the year 1975. It comprises five Talukas: (i) Badin; (ii) Matli; (iii) Shaheed Fazal Rahu; (iv) Talhar; and (v) Tando Bago, and 46 Union Councils with 13 revenue circles, 103 ‘Tapas’ and 497 ‘dehs’. It is bordered by Tando Muhammad Khan, Hyderabad and Mirpurkhas districts in the north, Tharparkar and Mirpur Khas in the east Tando Muhammad Khan and Thatta districts in the west and Run of Kutchh (Arabian Sea) in the South, which also forms international boundary with India. Total area of the district is 6,525 Sq. Kilometers with population of 1,108,117. The district lies between latitude 24o–5’ and longitude 68o –15’ to 69o –25’ E of Greenwich.

14. The list of Revenue Circles in given in the Table D.2.1

Table D.2.1: List of Revenue Circles of Badin District S.No TALUKA NAME OF CIRCLE 1 2 3 1 Badin Badin 2 Nindo 3 Seerani 4 Talhar Talhar 5 S.T. Rahu S.F.Rahu 6 Tarai 7 Ahmed Rajo 8 Matli Matli 9 Phulejani 10 Tando Ghulam Ali 11 Tando Bago Tando Bago 12 Pangrio 13 Dadah

15. Most of the population (83%) resides in rural areas with farming as main source of livelihood. Akram Wah, Phuleli and Guni Canals of Kotri Barrage and Nasir Canal of Sukkur Barrage irrigate the district. It is at the extreme tail end of irrigation system. Main crops are sugar cane, rice, tomato, wheat and sunflower. There are six sugar mills and 30 rice husking mills in the district. The district produces about 50% of the total production of crude oil of Pakistan but remains one of the poorest districts of Sindh. Recent history shows that it has remained in the grip of disasters in one form or another. Cyclone, heavy rains, earthquake, droughts and floods have followed each other with short intervals.

D.3 Experience of 2003 Floods

16. Although District Badin was very badly hit in 1999 by a devastating cyclone in which 75 human lives were lost but unprecedented heavy rains during the last week of July 2003 combined with breaches of canals and drains created a situation of extreme emergency in the district, especially in three talukas; (i) Badin; (ii) Tando Bago; and (iii) S. F. Rahu. With quick response of the Administration, facilitated by excellent and prompt efforts of 206 Brigade and its two units: (i) 4- APPENDIX 1

Punjab; and (ii) 21-FF, Rangers and Police the situation was survived and thousands of people were saved. Yet 86 people lost their lives and 56 thousands people had to be shifted into the relief camps. As many areas could not be reached even with boats, five helicopters were used for dropping the food. People lost all their household belongings. Houses, cattle and crops were destroyed and there was acute shortage of food. Survey shows that more than hundred thousand families were worst affected.

17. The 2003 floods were caused by a combination of factors: i) rainfall in the area; ii) water coming to the area by the canals in the left bank below Kotri (total of more than 40,000 cusecs) iii) drainage water of the record storm in the month; iv) drainage water coming from the upper Nara basin carried by LBOD; v) the connection of the upper DPOD basin to the LBOD system; v) high sea levels and surge caused by the storm which blocked the direct discharge of the water and raised the levels in the KPOD and LBOD; vi) DPOD emergency flood way did not function as per design. There were breaches in LBOD and KPOD the flow through which inundated the adjoining areas.

18. Following were the specific observations/experiences:

(i) LBOD was a major cause of concern for the district. Unless it is properly re-designed it might cause heavy human and economic loss in next monsoon rains. (ii) During monsoon season, all gauges of irrigation canals should be properly monitored by Senior Irrigation Officers. In case of forecast of heavy rains the flow of water should be effectively stopped from the head. Experience tells that although record and reports of Irrigation Department show that there was no discharge of water in the canals but on ground canals were full of water. In fact functionaries at lower level in collusion with Zamindars continued water flows and when heavy rains occurred the Zamindars blocked their water courses and resultantly canals at the tail end burst and caused flooding of the area. (iii) Boats and vehicles for evacuation of population form low-lying areas should be kept ready during monsoon season. People did not move even after early warnings till the area were inundated with water and then it became very difficult to evacuate large population. (iv) Food Supply must be kept ready during rainy season because local traders refused to supply without cash payment and they also did not have much stock available. (v) Duties of all departments and officers should be clearly defined and responsibilities assigned because in case of emergency most of the officers avoided to take responsibility and only few officers were seen working dedicatedly. (vi) Relief Camps should be properly managed by posting a senior officer as in charge of camp. Food, drinking water, sanitation, electricity and proper medical cover would be required at each camp. (vii) Mobile medical teams with sufficient provision of medicines must be available to prevent any out break of diseases. Stock of medicines should be kept available. (viii) Vaccination of cattle and fodder for cattle must be arranged by Agriculture Department during the season. (ix) All roads and Government Buildings in the low lying areas especially in those areas which were flooded should be constructed at reasonably higher level so that those could be used as refuges in case of flooding of the area. (x) The low lying areas of district must have a proper surface drain network for draining out the water in case of cyclones or heavy rains. (xi) A proper media cell must effectively operate round the clock which would help in informing local and international relief agencies and NGOs. APPENDIX 1

(xii) Close coordination with the Brigade should be kept, as its quick response to the emergency situation saved thousands of human lives during 2003 event. The whole rescue and relief operation was carried out very successfully and efficiently with complete dedication and commitment of Army Officers and Jawans.

D.4 Declaring Emergency in the District

19. Whether or not a cyclone or an unusual rain storm will take place in a specific area is forecast by the Meteorological Department. It is understood that the Meteorological Department has a SOP according to which it informs the responsible provincial government about the event that may cause damage to lives and property. When the situation arises in which there is likelihood of any Cyclone, Heavy Rains and Flood, District coordination Officer in consultation with Zila Nazim would declare emergency in the District and all Government Functionaries, NGOs and Armed Forces would be informed to be on high alert. District Coordination Officer (DCO) in consultation with Zila Nazim would declare emergency in the District and all Government Functionaries, NGOs and Armed Forces would be put on high alert, only after the provincial government informs to do so.

D.5 Control Rooms

20. A District Control Room shall be established in the office of the District Coordination Officer, Badin with telephone No. 861996 immediately upon receipt of information from the provincial government, which would function round-the-clock. Daily situation report would be provided to this control room by all other control rooms, established at Taluka level (para 20). The Metrological Department would be kept in touch continually, for weather forecast. The telephone numbers of Metrological Department are :

Metrological Station Telephone No Badin 861125 853053 Karachi 021-8112880

21. Control Rooms shall also be established in each Taluka upon receipt of information to do so from the DCO, Badin to function with following Telephone numbers.

Sr. No, Taluka Telephone No i. Badin 861245 ii. S. F. Rahu 853053 iii. Talhar 8730280 iv. Tando Bago 854037 v. Matli 8740205

D.6 Most Vulnerable Villages

22. The following 61 ‘dehs’ were affected by the 2003 flooding. These 61 ‘dehs’ will form major part of the list most vulnerable ‘Dehs’. It is estimated that total number of the most vulnerable villages in APPENDIX 1

Badin district could be of the order of about 80, some of them in very remote areas close to sea shore e.g., Shaikareyo etc.

Sr. Sr. Name Village Name Village No. No. 1 Khamoon Mallah 32 Manthar Khaskheli 2 Khamoon Mallah-II 33 Adam Khaskheli 3 Shadman Lund 34 Gudo Khore 4 Missri Mallah 35 Hashim Mallah 5 Haji Hajjam 36 Samoon 6 Hanif Mallah 37 Ali Bengali 7 Gaji Mallah 38 Anwer Bengali 8 Yousuf Mallah 39 Rajab Mallah 9 Ramzan Sheedi 40 Karo Mallah 10 Jumoon Mallah 41 Nawab Ali Jamali 11 Faqir Mohammed Mallah 42 Mohammed Chandio 12 Ibrahim Mallah 43 Mohammed Notiar 13 Master Allah Bux Mallah 44 Natho Bajeer 14 Haji Ahmed Mallah 45 Ramzan Chandio 15 Gul Mohammed Talpur 46 Khamiso Dhandhal 16 Ramzan Khaskheli 47 Ahmed Notiar 17 Lakho Pir 48 Natho Jamali 18 Bahadur Khan Lund 49 Allah Dino Notiar 19 Pir Bux Mandhro 50 Pinyo Mallah 20 Yousuf Bhatti 51 Sahbdino Jat 21 Mohammed Hassan Mandhro 52 Lakhadino Notiar 22 Jurio Mallah 53 Beer Mallah 23 Haji Raboo 54 Khan Dal 24 Sono Khan Chandio 55 Haji Sujawal Jat 25 Malhar Mallah 56 Behdmi 26 Rafiq Bengali 57 Allah Rakhio Jat 27 Rafiq Dal 58 Photo Jat 28 Tamachi Bajeer 59 Murad Malir 29 Photo Chandio 60 Patel Qasim Dal 30 Ali Shah 61 Nabi Bux Lund 31 Mohammed Khaskheli

23. A detailed map of Badin District shall be prepared showing location of these most vulnerable villages. This map of a reasonable scale can be prepared using a Survey of Pakistan Map, and it should be prepared by a well qualified cartographer giving details of the roads, towns and cities to facilitate establishing evacuation routes. This map should be hung in each of the control rooms at district and Taluka levels. The copies of this map should also be available at ‘Revenue Circles’ and the concerned ‘Tapas’.

D.7 Arrangements for Early Warning

24. A system for ensuring the communication of early warning that is considered credible and clearly understood by the population prone to adverse effects of flooding shall be established. A clear APPENDIX 1

methodology shall be framed to communicate warnings generated by the Meteorological Department in the shortest possible time, describing the SOPs of the departments, officials involved along with their responsibilities and logistics for implementing the system.

25. The control room supervised by the DCO, immediately upon receipt of information from the provincial government shall send the official signals to the five ‘talukas’ to establish the control rooms at the respective taluka headquarters informing them about the forecast of the impending danger, its nature and expected time of occurrence.

26. The district control room shall also formally alert the concerned departments of other departments. This formal information may be in the form of a radio/wireless signal, written communication etc, duly documented.

27. Although the announcements will be broadcast via Radio, TV and Police Wireless System but in order to ensure that the population in remote areas who do not have radio receivers and TVs should receive the warning at the earliest. In this regard, Taluka control rooms shall communicate to all 13 Revenue Circles, 103 ‘Tapas’ which shall arrange via special messengers dissemination of information to 497 ‘Dehs’ promptly. About 80 most vulnerable ‘Dehs’5 shall be given priority to get the information. In ‘Dehs’ the announcements should be repeatedly made using loudspeakers and communication system in mosques, informing about the expected event and associated risks The suggested arrangements for communicating early warning are shown diagrammatically below.

Flow Diagram for Communicating Early Warning

Metereological Department Radio, TV, Newspapers

Provincial Government Other Departments, NGOs and Private Sector Local DCO, Control Room-Badin Philinthropic Organizations 5 Nos. Taluka Control Rooms at Badin, S. F. Rahu, Tando Bago, Talhar and Matli

13 Nos. Revenue Circles

103 Nos. 'Tapas '

497 Nos. 'Dehs ' Mosques

28. It is important that the most vulnerable ‘dehs’ are promptly informed about any expected event. For this purpose, ‘dehs’ and the ‘Tapas’ in which these ‘dehs’ are located can be provided with radios/wireless sets during the monsoon period. These radios/wireless sets (about 100 Nos.) can be given in the custody of responsible ‘Tapedars’ and ‘Village Heads’.

5 Include 61 ‘Dehs’ badly affected during 2003 flooding. APPENDIX 1

D.8 Vigilance of LBOD System during Monsoon

29. Two types of vigilance are part of the O&M activities of a drainage system that is to be provided by SIDA through the concerned AWBs: (i) routine vigilance through out the year; and (ii) special vigilance during the Kharif season (‘aabkalani period’). O&M of the surface drains in LBOD system has been below par mainly due to two reasons; (i) inadequate funding; and (ii) un-smooth handing over of the system to GoSindh – handed over by WAPDA in 1993-94, returned to WAPDA in 1994 and again handed over to Go Sindh in 2002 which accepted it with reservations. Immediately after the take-over by GoSindh, there was an unusual flooding event in 2003. From that time onwards instead of routine O&M activities repairs and strengthening of drain embankments are being carried out with O&M funds as well as special budgeting provided by Federal Government and GoSindh. There has been no standard operating procedure (SOP) in vogue for carrying out O&M activities.

30. The IPD procedure indicated by the criteria of the yardsticks for O&M of surface drains prepared by IPD in November 1988 does not provide any amount for ant vigilance on the drainage system. As such, no regular ‘beldars’ or temporary ‘beldars’ have ever been engaged on LBOD system during monsoon season.

31. The key player in carrying out vigilance is a ‘beldar’ who patrols over a reach of drain entrusted to him to carries out routine minor repairs, overseen by the concerned sub-engineer. The sub-engineer should also carry out frequent visits during the monsoon season. AENs and XENs should also make visits prior to monsoon season to check for special interventions (in weak areas) needed to render the banks of the drain safe against breaches.

32. The ‘beldars’ should be deployed at least during the 4 months of Kharif season as per the following criteria: (i) one ‘beldar’ for patrolling 10 RDs of a main drain; (ii) one ‘beldar’ for patrolling 15 RDs of a branch drain; and (iii) one ‘beldar’ for patrolling 20 RDs of a sub drain. In order to ensure attendance and daily patrol of the ‘beldars’, a ‘Mate’ (Foreman) needs to be deployed for a team of 10 – 12 ‘beldars’.

33. In order to enable the sub-engineer to frequently supervise the ‘beldars’ and also supervise several M&R works simultaneously on-going (normally the case) an official transport (a motorcycle) to the sub-engineer to visit remotely located sites should be provided. The ‘beldars’ should be provided bicycles, ‘kassis’ etc.

D.9 Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) of the Department involved in Flood Management

34. The duties of the concerned XEN Drainage of SIDA, XEN, Irrigation of AWBs/Irrigation Department, Revenue Department, Education Department (for providing school buildings for the relief camps), Health Department, Taluka Municipal Administration, Agriculture Department, Civil Defence, HESCO, telephone Department, Southern Gas Company, W&S Department, DPO-Badin and EDO (Community Development) are given in the paragraphs that follow.

D.9.1 SIDA/Irrigation Department 35. The duties to be performed by the concerned staff of SIDA, AWBs and Irrigation Department shall be as follows:

(i) Executive Engineer (Drainage):

a) He shall ensure that LBOD and other drains are working properly and rain flood water is continuously disposed off through the drains in the System. APPENDIX 1

b) He shall arrange for vigilance by deploying the ‘beldars’ at least during the 4 months of Kharif season as per the following criteria: (i) one ‘beldar’ for patrolling 10 RDs of a main drain; (ii) one ‘beldar’ for patrolling 15 RDs of a branch drain; and (iii) one ‘beldar’ for patrolling 20 RDs of a sub drain. In order to ensure attendance and daily patrol of the ‘beldars’, a ‘Mate’ (Foreman) shall also be deployed for a team of 10 – 12 ‘beldars’

(ii) Executive Engineer (Irrigation):

a) The Executive Engineers shall establish a round the clock control room in their office for making liaison with all concerned and prepare contingency plan of the Department and circulate its copy to all concerned before June 2006.

b) The Executive Engineers shall identify the vulnerable points of LBOD and Irrigation Canals.

c) The Executive Engineers shall be in touch with the Meteorological Department and inform the sister agencies about any emergency.

d) The Executive Engineers shall make special arrangements for watch and patrolling of vulnerable points.

e) The Executive Engineers shall make infrastructure arrangements in case there is any breach.

f) The Executive Engineers shall establish flood warning center at Taluka level.

g) The Executive Engineers shall make arrangements of sand bags and other material to be used at the time of need.

D.9.2 Revenue Department 36. The officials of the Revenue Department shall carry out following duties in case of a flood emergency:

a) The Revenue Department shall establish control room at each Mukhtiarkar Office round-the-clock under the supervision of DDOs Revenue.

b) The Revenue Department shall prepare contingency plan for evacuation of people residing in low-lying areas to safer places on any emergency.

c) The Revenue Department shall make arrangements for the availability of sufficient number of tents for any emergency.

d) The Revenue Department shall form quick response teams, comprising representatives of all concerned department for dealing with any emergency.

e) The Revenue Department shall arrange tractor trolleys and manpower in coordination with Police Department for dealing with any emergency.

f) The Revenue Department shall mobilize the village staff in the pre-and-post emergency work during moon-soon season. APPENDIX 1

g) The Revenue Department shall take steps for the arrangements of Relief Funds from the Relief Commissioner in case of any emergency.

h) The Revenue Department shall make prior arrangements of food supply in coordination with food department and distributions in case of emergency.

i) The Revenue Department shall make arrangements with coordination of District Police Officer, Badin for sufficient transport (Vehicles) for the evacuation and shifting of affected persons to relief camps with the assistance of Police, Rangers and Armed Forces in case of any emergency.

D.9.3 Education Department / EDO, Education 37. The duties to be performed by the EDO, Education (Education Department) shall be as follows:

a) The EDO, Education shall detail sufficient staff on duty at all relief camps.

b) The EDO, Education shall assist the Taluka Revenue Officers for properly establishing the relief camps in schools and provision of food in case of any emergency.

c) The EDO, Education shall ensure that all basic facilities are made available at each camp and monitor the duties of staff in case of any emergency.

D.9.4 Health Department / EDO, Health 38. The duties to be performed by the EDO, Health (Health Department) shall be as follows:

a) The EDO, Health shall ensure availability of doctors, paramedical staff and medicines in all hospital of the District during moon-soon season for preventive steps.

b) The EDO, Health shall depute medical teams at each relief camp in case of any emergency.

c) The EDO, Health shall make arrangements for the prevention of epidemic diseases.

d) The EDO, Health shall make sure availability of all vaccines especially dog bite and anti snake for any emergency.

e) The EDO, Health shall make arrangements for mobile medical teams with sufficient medicines during the emergency.

D.9.5 Taluka Municipal Administration under the Supervision of Taluka Nazims 39. The officials of the Taluka Municipal Administration shall carry out following duties under the supervision of the concerned taluka ‘Nazims’ in case of a flood emergency.

a) The officials of the Taluka Municipal Administration shall establish round-the- clock Control Rooms during the emergency. APPENDIX 1

b) The officials of the Taluka Municipal Administration shall ensure de-watering pumping machines are in proper order for emergency.

c) The officials of the Taluka Municipal Administration shall ensure proper cleaning of ‘nullahs’ for draining out the rainy water during moon-soon season.

d) The officials of the Taluka Municipal Administration shall identify the dangerous buildings and take necessary action as per Municipal Buildings Laws.

e) The officials of the Taluka Municipal Administration shall ensure the Fire Brigade and concerned staff available round-the-clock.

f) The officials of the Taluka Municipal Administration shall declare it essential for the staff to be present during the emergency in order to ensure availability of staff.

g) The officials of the Taluka Municipal Administration shall assist the concerned Revenue Officers for arranging manpower and establishing Relief Camps in case of any emergency.

h) The officials of the Taluka Municipal Administration shall arrange the required labour force and assistance from locals in case of emergency.

D.9.6 Agriculture Department / EDO, Agriculture 40. The duties to be performed by the EDO, Agriculture (Agriculture Department) shall be as follows:

a) The EDO, Agriculture shall make arrangements for machinery from mechanical wing for emergency.

b) The EDO, Agriculture shall depute DO, Animal Husbandry and his staff to save the livestock from flood diseases and losses during moon-soon season or in case of any emergency.

c) The EDO, Agriculture shall ensure availability of wooden material to Irrigation Department at the time of emergency by DO, Forest.

D.9.7 Civil Defence / Deputy Controller Civil Defence, Badin 41. Civil Defence shall be responsible for the following:

a) The Deputy Controller Civil Defence, Badin shall remain available along with staff in DCO Control Room in shifts round-the-clock in case of any emergency.

b) The Deputy Controller Civil Defence, Badin shall arrange the Razakars/ volunteers for rain relief/rescue activities at the time of need/ emergency.

D.9.8 Hyderabad Electric Supply Company (HESCO) 42. The concerned XEN/SDO shall carry out the following duties during an emergency: APPENDIX 1

a) The concerned XEN/SDO shall ensure that no case of electrocution occurs.

b) The concerned XEN/SDO shall make sure that in case of any breaking of live electric wires immediate steps are taken.

c) The concerned XEN/SDO shall ensure uninterrupted supply of electricity, as far as possible.

D.9.9 Telephone Department 43. Assistant Executive Engineer, Telephone department shall ensure full functionality of telephones all over the district and provide assistance to all departments on demand in case of need. Important telephone number that needs to be kept working are tabulated below

S. No DESIGNATION OFFICE RESIDENCE 1 Army Cantonment Badin 861200-861201 2 District Nazim Badin 862081-862108 862082-862108 3 District Coordination Officer Badin 861001-862362 862362 4 District Police Officer Badin 861667-861324 861234 5 Executive District Officer (Rev) 861744 861744 6 Executive District Officer(Edu) 861183-861784 862248 7 Executive District Officer(W&S) 862283 862248 8 Executive District Officer (Health) 861871 861871 9 Superintending Engr. Irrigation 861259 861259 10 Executive District Officer (Agr) 861623 857241 11 Taluka Nazim Badin 862165 862250 12 Taluka Nazim Talhar 8730230 8730745 13 Taluka Nazim Matli 8740760 8810483 14 Taluka Nazim T.Bago 854120 - 15 Taluka Nazim S.F.Rahu 853018 - 16 SDO HESCO Badin 861972 - 17 Civil Surgeon Civil Hosp:Badin 8619081-862479 862285 18 Deputy Manager Sui Southern 862241 861255 19 Assistant Engr. Telephone 861266-861111 861961 20 Fire Brigade Badin 116 - 21 Emergency Police Badin 15 - 22 Edhi Center Badin 115 - 23 Executive Engr H/Way Badin 861410 - 24 District Officer Road & Transport 861840 861840 25 Distt. Officer Social Welfare Bdn 861232 861232 26 Deputy Controller Civil Defence 861996 - 27 Deputy Distt. Officer (Rev) Badin 861358 - 28 Deputy Distt. Officer (Rev) SFRahu 853197 53017 29 Deputy Distt: Officer (Rev) Matli 8740255 - APPENDIX 1

30 Deputy Distt: Officer (Rev) T.Bago 854037 - 31 Mukhtiarkar (Rev) Badin 861245 861245 32 Mukhtiarkar (Rev) Talhar 8730280 8730280 33 Mukhtiarkar (Rev) SFRahu 853053 853053 34 Mukhtiarkar (Rev) Matli 8740205 8740205 35 Mukhtiarkar (Rev) T.Bago 854037 854037 36 Asstt: Engr. Drainage Badin 861422 - 37 Meteorological Department Badin 861125 862174 38 Zakat Officer Badin 861322 - 39 Executive Engr Irrigation Badin 861422 861422

D.9.10 Southern Gas Company 44. The officials of the Company shall make sure proper safety of gas lines and its supply.

D.9.11 Works and Services Department/EDO,W&S 45. The concerned EDO, W&S Department shall carry out the following duties during an emergency:

a) The concerned EDO shall make sure the availability of staff and arrange machinery for removal of debris and ensure that all roads are motorable for evacuation and relief.

b) The concerned EDO shall arrange private crane lifters in case of need during the emergency.

c) The concerned EDO shall ensure water supply, electricity and drainage at all relief camps in coordination with Executive District Officer (Education) and Executive District Officer (Revenue) during the emergency.

D.9.12 Food Department / District Food Controller 46. Secretary Government of Sind Food Department shall be requested to direct Director Food and Deputy Director Food to make prior arrangement of supply from Karachi and Hyderabad at the time of need / emergency.

47. The logistic indicating the quantities of food, safe drinking water, medicines etc., and the budget for the same shall be prepared by the DCO, Badin, and informed to the Secretary Government of Sind Food Department. Edibles that are fungible shall not be stockpiled, because they normally become rotten

48. Six portable disinfestation systems with a generator and inverse osmosis plants, producing 1-2 lts/sec of potable water shall be procured and deployed as follows: (i) 2 Nos. at Badin, and (ii) one each at Taluka Headquarter. It is estimated that each of this inverse osmosis plant would cost about Rs. 1,500,000 (about US$ 25,000). This is one time investment and may be funded through an on-going such as; Sindh Coastal Area Development Program (SCAD).

D.9.13 District Police Officer. Badin 49. The police department shall perform the following special duties during an emergency: APPENDIX 1

a) The District Police Officer, Badin shall be requested to provide help to the Irrigation Department and Revenue staff to avoid closure of Modules by Landlords / Agriculturist in case of floods in Canals / Water Courses.

b) The District Police Officer, Badin shall assist in evacuation of people from flooded areas.

c) The District Police Officer, Badin shall provide security to relief material and its distribution.

D.9.14 Executive District Officer (C.D.D), Badin 50. The induction of NGOs and other philanthropic agencies is cornerstone of the Contingency Plan. For the induction of NGOs and other philanthropic agencies EDO (C.D.D) shall chalk out a detailed mechanism to organize and implement the participation by them. A Disaster Management Committee shall be formed to assist DCO, Badin. This Disaster Management Committee shall include co-opted representatives from private sector and/or NGOs that are willing to provide not only the guidance but shall make arrangements for the material help particularly towards shortages of food items, tents, etc.

D.9.15 Edhi Welfare Trust 51. Edhi Welfare Trust shall be requested for funeral arrangement of un-claimed dead bodies, and other assistance as well to affected peoples in case of emergency.

D.9.16 Pakistan Army 52. Pakistan Army has provided an effective, quick and excellent response to save human lives during 2003 event. Control Room, supervised by DCO Badin shall request Pakistan Army to provide the following help in case of an emergency:

a) Providing boats (71 boats are generally available at HQ 18 Division Hyderabad), heavy vehicles and Helicopters for rescuing the people from affected areas.

b) Providing general assisting in relief work.

c) Providing medical assistance.

D.10 Possible Relief Camps

D.10.1 Taluka Badin 53. The list of schools/institutions indicating approximate capacity as well as the person in-charge that can be used as relief camps in Taluka Badin is given in the Table D.10.1. APPENDIX 1

Table D.10.1: List of Schools/Institutions in Taluka Badin S.No. Name of School/ Name of Incharge/Name of Doctor and Total Capacity of Institution Camp Para Medical Staff Class Accommodation Room ( Persons) 1 2 3 4 5 1 Government Islamia Mr. Abdul Razak Memon EDO Colleges Degree College Badin Badin 18 Dr. Nate Chango MO. Mr. Maqbool Turk 2 Govt: College Hostal Block Mr. Rafique Ahmed Leghari Asstt: Badin Progessor GDBC Badin Dr. Muhammad Ramzan Udhejo MO, 22 500 Mr. Walidad 3 Govt: Girls Marvee College Mr. Arbab Ali Phulpoto Asstt: Prof:GIDC Badin Badin 8 200 Dr. Shamshad Ali ?MO Mr. Mahveer 4 Govt Service Center Badin Mr. Wankjee Principal 8 200 Dr. Odho Mal MO Mr. Shamsuddin 5 Govt Poly Tec: Institute Mr. Nazim Ahmed Shah Principal 22 500 Badin Dr. Anwar MO Mr. Khamiso 6 Govt. Mono Tec: Institute Mr. Abdul Ghafoor Lecturer GIDC Badin By Pass Road Badin Dr. Ahmed MO Mr. Ramzan 12 300 7 Govt. Commercial Training Mr. Ghulam Hyder Hashmani I/C DOE Center Badin Tech: Badin 5 Dr. Manzoor MO Mr. Yaswant Roi 200 8 Govt: B Pry: School Badin Mr. Lala Qadir Bux Membon SPE 10 200 Sindhi Dr. Rasool Bux MO MR. Khalid 9 Govt: P School Badin Urdu Mr. Ali Akbar HST Dr. Muhammad Hanif MO 5 100 Mr. Shafi Muhammad 10 GPS Haji Khamiso Bhatti Mr. Abdul Sattar Bhurgari HST Dr. Abdullah MO Mr. Abdul Sattar 5 100 Soomro 11 GPS Gharibabad Badin Mr. Ghulam Muhammad Abbasi HST Dr. Sujait MO Mr. Ashfaque 5 100 12 GPS Agrovil Coloney Mr. Manzoor Ahmed APE Badin Dr. Iqbal Memon MO MR. Muhammad 5 100 13 GPS Pir Aali Shah Kot Mr. Muhammad Umar Soomro HST 5 100 Badin Dr. Abid Ali MO Mr. Nazir 14 Govt: Elementary College Mr. Muhammad Ismail Panhwar Badin Principal Dr. Nusrat MO Mr. Sulleman 10 200 15 GBHS Badin Mr. Muhammad Ramzan Mandharo 17 340 HST Dr. Zafar MO Mr. Wahidino 16 GGHS Badin –I Mr, Muhammad Khan Junejo HST 10 200 Dr. Sulleman MO Mr. Allah Bux 17 GGHS Badin –ii Mr. Samoon Mallah Dr. Akhtar MO Mr. 10 200 Khamiso Chang

APPENDIX 1

D.10.2 Taluka Talhar 54. The list of schools/institutions indicating approximate capacity as well as the person in-charge that can be used as relief camps in Taluka Talhar is given in the Table D.10.2.

Table D.10.2: List of Schools/Istitutions in Taluka Talhar S.No. Name of School/ Name of Incharge/Name of Doctor and Total Capacity of Institution Camp Para Medical Staff Class Accommodation Room ( Persons) 1 2 3 4 5 Mr. Abdul Qayoom Chang HM 1 GHS Talhar Dr. Mangan Khan MO Mr. Allahdino 8 160 Mr. Abdul Rahim Chang 2 GHS SAB Talhar Dr. Muhammad Umar MO Mr. Ashraf 5 100 Mr. Zahid Hussain Kaheri HST 3 GBPS Talhar Dr. Muzafar Ali MO Mr. Ali Raza 8 160 Mr. Ali Nawaz Lashari 4 GGHS Dr. Abdul Sallah MO Mr. Dilshad 7 140 Mr. Hassan Ali Nahiyoon Principal 5 GP College Saeedpur Dr. Asadullah Mol Mr. Asghar Arain 10 200

Mr. Muhammad Bux Nixamani 6 GHS Saeedpur Dr. Talib MO Mr. Sain Bux 7 140

Mr. Ghulam Mustafaq Khoso 7 GHS Rajo Khanani Dr. Ghulam Murtaza MO Mr. Santosh 7 140 Mr. Niaz Hussain HST Dr. Tayab MO 8 GHS Ghulam Shah Mori Mr. Asghar Khatti 7 140 Mr. Muhammad Bachal jamali 9 GHS Khadharo Dr. Zakir MO Mr. Abdul Rahim 7 14 10 GHS Ghulam Mohd Mr. Abdul Majeed Afridi 7 140 Nixamani Dr. Dilshad MO Mr. Alidino Mr. Ali Muhammad Kumbhar HM 11 GHS Peeru Lashari Dr. Muhammad Aslam MO Mr. Younis 5 100

D.10.3 Taluka Tando Bago 55. The list of schools indicating approximate capacity as well as the person in-charge that can be used as relief camps in Taluka Tando Bago is given in the Table D.10.3.

Table D.10.3: List of Schools in Taluka Tando Bago S.No. Name Of School Camp Name of Incharge/Name of Doctor and Total Capacity of Para Medical Staff Class Accommodation Room ( Persons) 1 2 3 4 5 GHS Tando Bago Mr. Muhammad Ismail Memo 12 240 1 Dr. Harichand MO Mr. Usmanulhaq GGHS Tanod Bago Mr. Qamarzaman HST Dr. Harichand 5 100 2 MO Mr. Usmanulhaq APPENDIX 1

S.No. Name Of School Camp Name of Incharge/Name of Doctor and Total Capacity of Para Medical Staff Class Accommodation Room ( Persons) GBPS Tando Bago Mr. Ashfaque Ahmed Memon 5 100 3 Dr. Nasir Ali MO Mr. Akbar 4 Govt Mono Tech: Instt: T. Mr. Imdad Ali Jat Dr. Nazir MO Mr. Asif 20 600 Bago GHS Khalifo Qassim Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Dr. Zulfiqar MO 5 100 5 Mr. Akbar Bhurgari 6 GHS Pangrio Mr. Karim Bux Panhwar Dr. Fazal 17 340 Rehman MO Mr. Shoukat 7 GHS Wali Muhammad Mr. Sultan Ali Dr. Irfan Ashraf MO Mr. 5 100 Malkani Hariram 8 GHS Haji Khan Chandio Mr. Hussain Bux Chhalgari 5 100 Dr. Ashokkumar MO Mr. M. Ali 9 GHS Baloch Chak Mr. Ghulam Hyder Dr. Saeed MO Mr. 5 100 Ibrahim 10 GHS Khoski Mr. Muhaumdin Kaleri 7 140 Dr. Ibrahim MO Mr. Nasir

D.10.4 Taluka Matli 56. The list of schools indicating approximate capacity as well as the person in-charge that can be used as relief camps in Taluka Matli is given in the Table D.10.4.

Table D.10.4: List of Schools in Taluka Matli S.No. Name Of School Camp Name of Incharge/Name of Doctor and Total Capacity of Para Medical Staff Class Accommodation Room ( Persons) 1 2 3 4 5 1 GBDC Matli Mr. Muhammad Yousuf Kalkepoto Dr. Zulfiqar Saheto MO Mr. Rahim Bux 20 400 2 GHS Matli-I Mr. Mumtaz Hussain ADO Dr. Nadir Ali MO Mr. Allah nawaz 24 500 3 GHS Matli-II Mr. Muhammad Ayoob HM Dr. Azam Nixamani MO Mr. Asghar 10 200 4 GGHS Matli Mr. Zahid Hussain HST Dr. Abdul Karim MO Mr. Majeed 12 240 5 GHS TG Ali Mr. Sattar Ali Shah HM Dr. Zahid MO 10 200 Mr. Khanoo 6 GGHS TG Ali Mr. Abdul Ghani HST Dr. Bheemoon MO Mr. Remesh Kumar 6 120 7 GHS Haji Sanwan Mr. Muhammad Ashraf HST Dr. Saleem MO Mr. Ramzan 5 100 8 GHS Thari Mr. Muhammad Akram HST Dr. Muhammad Uris MO Mr. Tahir 5 100 9 GHS Umardin Punjabi Mr. Muhammad Ashraf HST 5 100 Dr. Munawar MO Mr. Idress 10 GHS Gulab leghari Mr. Qadir Bux HST Dr. Bharo MO Mr. APPENDIX 1

S.No. Name Of School Camp Name of Incharge/Name of Doctor and Total Capacity of Para Medical Staff Class Accommodation Room ( Persons) Najamdin Chandio 9 200 11 GHS Malhan Mr. Ghulam Mustafa HM Dr. Anwar MO 5 100 Mr. Sanaullah 12 GGPs Matli Mr. Banhoon HST Dr. Aftab MO Mr. 5 100 Yousuf 13 GMS Jamil Coloney Matli Mr. Abdul sattar Bhatti HST Dr. Abdul Jabbar MO Mr. Yousuf Memon 5 100 14 G Mono Tech: Instt: Matli Mr. Anwar Ali Dr. Anwar Memon MO Mr. Asghar Arain 10 200

D.10.5 Taluka Shaheed Fazal Rahu 57. The list of schools indicating approximate capacity as well as the person in-charge that can be used as relief camps in Taluka Shaheed Fazal Rahu is given in the Table D.10.5.

Table D.10.5: List of Schools in Taluka Tando Bago S.No. Name Of School Camp Name of Incharge/Name of Doctor and Total Capacity of Para Medical Staff Class Accommodation Room ( Persons) 1 2 3 4 5 GBHS Golarehi Mr. Muhammad Moosa Khoso 1 Dr. Siddique Memon MO Mr. Mukhtiar 10 200 GHS Golarehi Mr. Abdul Majeed SS Dr. Ashraf Memon 2 MO Mr. Mohan Lal 10 200 GGPS Golarehi Mr. Altaf Hussain JST Dr. Muhammad 3 Khan MO Mr. Missari 5 100 GGPS Jaffar Jakharo Mr. Ziaullah Cheema HST Dr. Abdul 4 Hafeez Soomro Mr. Mango 2 25 GHS Khorwah Mr. Muhammad Khan Chang 5 Mr. Muhammad Hassan MO 5 100 Mr. Ashfaque Maheri GBHS Kario Ganhwar Mr. Ali Ghulam Nimrio Dr. Muhammad 6 Ismail MO Mr. Ali Khan 10 200

D.11 Names of Key Staff of District

58. The names of the officers of Revenue Department in the district are given in Table D.11.1.

Table D.11.1: List Reveue Department Officers in Badin District S.No Designation BPS Name of Officer 1 Executive District Officer (Revenue) Badin BPS-19 Mr. Zahid Ali Abbasi 2 District Officer (revenue) Badin BPS-18 Mr. Muhammad Sadiq Rajar 3 Deputy District Officer (Revenue) Badin BPS-17 Mr. Nazir Ahmed Qureshi 4 Deputy District Officer (Revenue) Talhar BPS-17 Mr. Sardar Ahmed 5 Deputy District Officer (Revenue) S.F Rahu BPS-17 Mr. Hadi Bux Zardari APPENDIX 1

S.No Designation BPS Name of Officer 6 Deputy District Officer (Revenue) Matli BPS-17 Mr. Ghulam Qadir Junejo 7 Deputy District Officer (Revenue) T. Bago BPS-17 Mr. Ghulam Qadir Junejo 8 Mukhtiarkar (Revenue) Badin BPS-16 Mr. Qamar Memon 9 Mukhtiarkar (Revenue) Talhar BPS-16 Mr. Shoukat Ali Shaikh 10 Mukhtiarkar (Revenue) S.F. Rahu BPS-16 Mr. Ali Muhammad Shah 11 Mukhtiarkar (Revenue) Matli BPS-16 Mr. Saleem Ahmed Memon 12 Mukhtiarkar (Revenue) T. Bago BPS-16 Mr. Shankar Lal Rathore 13 Mukhtiarkar (Estate) Badin BPS-16 Mr. Mushtaque Memon 14 Mukhtiarkar (Estate Headquarter) Badin BPS-16 Mr. Ghulam Rasool Soomro 15 Mukhtiarkar (Revenue) Badin BPS-11 Mr. Muhammad Umar Memon 16 Mukhtiarkar (Revenue) Talhar BPS-11 Mr. Shabir Ahmed Rind 17 Mukhtiarkar (Revenue) S.F. Rahu BPS-11 Mr. Hameed Nohario 18 Mukhtiarkar (Revenue) Matli BPS-11 Mr. Qazi Imtiaz 19 Mukhtiarkar (Revenue) T. Bago BPS-11 Mr. Abdul Aziz Junjo

59. The names supervising tapedars of Revenue Circles are guven Table D.11.2.

Table D.11.2: List Supervisinf Tapedars in Badin District S.No NAME OF CIRCLE NAME OF SUPERVISING TAPEDAR 1 2 3 1 Badin Munshi Muhammad Ismail Memon Addl: Charge 2 Nindo Munshi Khair Muhammad Bhurgaro Addl: Charge 3 Seerani Munshi Mir Muhammad Khan Talpur 4 Talhar Munshi Bashir Ahmed Mughal Akkl: Charge 5 S.F.Rahu Munshi Karoji Sodho Addl: Charge 6 Tarai Munshi Kheto Sodho Addl: Charge 7 Ahmed Rajo Munshi Mevo Khan Nohani Addl: Charge 8 Matli Munshi Soran Singh 9 Phulejani Munshi Karam Ali Shah 10 Tando Ghulam Ali Munshi Ali Bux Chandio 11 Tando Bago Munshi Muhammad Aslam Nixamani 12 Pangrio Vacant 13 Dadah Munshi Noor Ali Khowaja

D.12 Shelters in the Most Vulnerable ‘Dehs’

60. As the schools are used to give shelter, the primary purposes of school buildings to provide education to children is jeopardized due to deterioration using those as residential buildings that require substantial repairs afterwards but generally are not carried out due to limited budget available with W&S Department. Instead of immediately rushing the affected population to school building to provide shelter, which is itself a time consuming process (convincing people to move and to arrange transport and boats) it will be a good option to provide/construct shelters in the vulnerable villages.

61. This option can not only provide shelter in case of moderate threat but can buy time for arranging suitable transport to shift affected population in case of a severe situation requiring safe havens (schools APPENDIX 1

etc.). The option would involve constructing elevated earthen plate-forms close to each of the vulnerable ‘Dehs’ so that the affected population can stay near to their properties but at a higher elevation above the generally expected highest water level of flooding. It is considered that area required per person would be of the order of 2.5 m2 to 3 m2 per person. The plat-forms would be on the average about 2m high and can have wooden or steel trusses to install temporary covers such as tarpaulin. There would be need, however, for the land to construct these elevated earthen plat-forms.

62. As per the discussions held with the representatives of NGOs met, this can be done with community participation basis (CCB). The community can contribute a suitable piece of land while investment may be arrangement from an on-going project. If constructed on CCB, the up-keep and maintenance can be carried out by the community. During the dry season these plate-forms can be used for community functions such as marriage ceremonies etc. A total of 61 villages in 2003 and about 10 villages in 2006 were severely affected. Considering these villages prone to risk of flooding again and adding a few more, a total number of 80 villages would perhaps require these plat-forms. But the number should be determined by consultation with the concerned communities.

63. The construction of elevated plateforms, if generally agreed by the population of vulnerable villages, can be funded through an on-going project such as; Sindh Coastal Area Development Program (SCAD).

D.13 Facilities at Shelters (schools)

64. As the schools/educational institutions are used to give shelter, their buildings are deteriorated using those for residential purposes. The hygienic conditions deteriorate due to lack of toilets. W&S Department shall address this deficiency in these buildings. Nd after the emergency is over shall restofre these buildings.

65. The provision of stockpile edibles, medicines and clean drinking water for three days is normally maintained but during 2003 it took some 15 days for the affected population to return to their places. Adequate quantities of needed edibles and medicines for at a week shall be maintained initially, as part of the Flood Management Plan. And, adequate budget allocation should be provided for this purpose as part of the Flood Management Plan.

Annex 4 Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nations

REPORT

ASSESSMENT OF

PRESENT CONDITION OF LBOD AND KPOD AFTER RECENT REPAIR

WORKS AND FURTHER WORKS NEEDED

Prepared By:

Muhammad Ehsan, Consultant

June 06, 2007

Islamabad Office

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADB Asian Development Bank AWB Area Water Board DCO District Coordination Officer DPOD Dhoro Puran Outfall Drain EDO Executive District Officer FAO Food and Agriculture Organization GDP Gross Domestic Product GOP Government of Pakistan GOS Government of Sindh HANDS Health and Nutrition Development Society ICZM Integrated Coastal Zone Management IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources KPOD Kadhan Pateji Outfall Drain LBOD Left Bank Outfall Drain MAF Million Acre Feet MMD Mirpurkhas Main Drain NGOs Non Governmental Organizations NIO National Institute of Oceanography NRSP National Rural Support Program OFWM On Farm Water Management PEPA Pakistan Environment Protection Agency PFF Pakistan Fisher Folk Forum PMU Project Management Unit RBOD Right Bank Outfall Drain SCDRP Sindh Coastal Rehabilitation Project SRSP Sindh Rural Support Program SUPARCO Space and Upper Atmospheric Research Organization TMA Tehsil Municipal Administration WAPDA Water and Power Development Authority WSIP Water Sector Improvement Project

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A. BACKGROUND...... 1 B. INTRODUCTION...... 4 C. FLOODS ...... 4 1. Review of 2003 – Flood and its effect on LBOD...... 4 2. Review of 2006 - Flood and its effect on LBOD...... 9 D. REPAIR WORKS CARRIED OUT AFTER FLOOD EVENTS ...... 11 1. Repair Works carried out by Pakistan Army...... 11 2. Works Carried out/Being carried out by Left Bank Canals AWB ...... 12 3. Works Carried out/Being carried out by Nara Canal AWB ...... 14 E. PRESENT CONDITION OF LBOD ...... 15 1. LBOD Spinal Drain...... 15 2. Kadhan Pateji Outfall Drain (KPOD)...... 15 3. Dhoro Puran Outfall Drain (DPOD) ...... 15 4. Other Main Drains, Branch Drains and Sub-Drains of LBOD System...... 16 F. FURTHER WORKS REQUIRED TO BE DONE FOR SURFACE DRAINS ...... 16 1. General ...... 16 2. Description of Civil Works needed to be carried out ...... 19 G. ACTIVITIES FOR SUSTAINABLE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF FLOODING ...... 20 1. Studies Initiated ...... 20 2. Studies Envisaged in WSIP ...... 22 3. Need for Coordinating Studies ...... 22 H. O&M OF LBOD...... 22 1. General ...... 22 2. WAPDA Produced Manuals...... 23 3. Criteria for O&M of Drains...... 23 4. Current Budget Allocations...... 24 5. Recommended Practice of O&M...... 24 6. Need for Updating O&M Yardsticks...... 24 I. CONCLUSIONS...... 25 J. RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 25

iii

ANNEX 1: Persons Met

ANNEX 2: List of Documents Consulted

ASSESSMENT OF PRESENT CONDITION OF LBOD AND KPOD AFTER RECENT REPAIR WORKS AND FURTHER WORKS NEEDED

E. BACKGROUND

66. On September 10, 2004, the World Bank’s Inspection Panel (the Panel) registered a Request for Inspection, submitted by Khadim Talpur, Mohammad Ali Shah, Mustafar Talpur, Munawar Hassan Memon, Iqbal Hyder, Mir Mohammad Buledi, and Najma Junejo on their own behalf and on behalf of “others who live in the area known as District Badin, Sindh Pakistan” in the Indus River Basin (Requesters). Many of the issues raised in the Request related to the LBOD Stage 1 Project, co financed by the Bank with ADB and other donors, which had closed in 1997. Fig. 1 gives the location and components of the LBOD System. The Requesters claimed that the LBOD system was faulty and they had incurred losses because of its poor design. The Requesters claimed that the Bank had failed to observe or had otherwise violated various provisions of its own operational Policies and Procedures. They also voiced concerns that the NDP project would extend the system to serve the entire Indus Basin, adding more effluents from the upper basin, through a National Surface Drainage System (NSDS).

67. The Executive Directors and the President of IDA were notified on September 17, 2004 by the Panel of receipt of the Request. Responding to the claims in the Request the Management authorized an investigation.

68. The Inspection Panel conducted the required investigation. The Panel met with the Requesters, local authorities and stakeholders including fisher folk, and discussed with Government of Sindh (GOS) authorities actions which could be undertaken in the short and medium term to address flood vulnerability and socio-economic and livelihood issues of people living in close proximity to LBOD and in the coastal zone of southern Sindh. The Panel issued its report outlining the findings of the investigation. The Management issued its Response in July 2006.

69. Although the NDP project as originally conceived in the 1997 Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) was to have laid the groundwork for the NSDS, the concept was subsequently rejected as a result of extensive studies and reviews.No extension of the LBOD spinal drain to join a national surface drainage system was done under the NDP project.

70. In the light of Panel’s recommendations the Board of Executive Directors of the Bank approved a Short Term Action Plan, which consists of five activities:

• Implementation of the Coastal Area Development Program (CADP) in southern Sindh

• Rapid assessment of ecological and livelihood conditions in the dhands to identify immediate measures to improve livelihoods and ecological conditions

• Rapid assessment of existing local government flood risk management systems to reduce flood damage and vulnerability by building capacity and improving flood risk response

• Assessment of the condition of the right embankment of the LBOD spinal drain and KPOD and preparation of a detailed maintenance plan

• Processing of the Water Sector Improvement Project (WSIP) in order to ensure a rapid startup of the technical studies to design measures to improve the performance of LBOD and prepare a comprehensive flood and drainage plan for the left bank of the Indus River in southern Sindh.

Fig.1 – Location and Components of LBOD System

Nawabshah Component

Sanghar Component

Mirpurkhas Component

F. INTRODUCTION

71. For carrying out activity indicated under bullet point 4 in para 5 above relating to ‘Assessment of the condition of the right embankment of the LBOD spinal drain and KPOD and preparation of a detailed maintenance plan’ services of a consultant6, have been retained.

72. Starting work on April 09, 2007, the Consultant studied various reports previously prepared7. The Consultant undertook a mission to site from April 15, 2007 to April 21, 2007. He visited Karachi, Hyderabad, Mirpurkhas, Badin, Mirpurkhas Main Drain, LBOD, KPOD and starting point of Tidal Link to learn about the project area and see repair works accomplished and/or on-going, and to discuss the issues with government officials, technical staff of the concerned agencies and Institutes, local government officials, and NGOs8. It is pertinent to mention that presently it is not possible to inspect the Tidal Link beyond its starting point without a boat, which is on account of virtually non-existent IP. Government and non- government officials and technical experts were extremely generous with their time and provided data and background information and reports to the consultant. The World Bank Islamabad Office, the office of PC of NDP Sindh, the staff and management of the Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority (SIDA), the Chief Engineer and Staff of WAPDA’s Hyderabad Office, the Director (Left Bank Canals AWB) and the Director (Nara Canal AWB) provided substantive support to the Consultant. The Consultant is grateful to all these officials and experts for their hospitality and assistance. The findings of the studies carried out by the Consultant are presented in this report.

G. FLOODS

Review of 2003 – Flood and its effect on LBOD

73. During the month of July 2003, Nawabshah, Mirpurkhas and Badin districts received heavy rainfalls9: Nawabshah (304 mm), Mirpurkhas (192 mm) and Badin (292 mm). The run- off produced by the rains in these districts, which includes the catchment area of LBOD System, enters the surface drains of LBOD System and goes to sea through LBOD Outfall system. Fig. 2 shows the schematic diagram of LBOD System and its outfall. Review of the design of LBOD Outfall system indicates that it has been designed to cater for a drainage rate of 1.5 cfs / sq. mile which is equivalent to surface drainage rate of 42 mm (1.67 inches) in a month. Rainfall received in 25 days of July 2003 was on the average 295 mm, which was 7 times the discharge capacity of LBOD.

74. Considering the envisaged run-off factor of 20%, LBOD system received 0.286 MAF of the total quantity of 1.43 MAF produced by the catchment area of LBOD due to rains. In order to drain out rain water, 2,050 drain inlets, with a capacity of 1.8 cfs each, have been provided in the drains. The design discharge of LBOD Outfall system is thus 4,000 cusecs (7,934 AF/day) but it can accommodate up to 6,000 cusecs (11,900 AF/day) utilizing the freeboard. At this rate it would have taken ordinarily 24 days to evacuate this volume of water. In addition, Badin catchment area of 3.3 million acres received 300 mm rainfall which also entered in LBOD System.

6 Mr. Muhammad Ehsan 7 List of documents consulted in preparing this report is given in Annex 2 8 A list of organizations and officials met by the consultant is given in Annex 1. 9 Meteorological Records of rainfall 5

Fig.2 – Schematic Diagram of LBOD System

WNSMD

ENSMD

SMD

MMD

LBOD SPINAL DRAIN

KOTRI DRAINS (Karo & Fuleli) KOTRI DRAINS

SINDH DHANDS DPOD (Cholri, Pateji Sanhro & Mehro) KPOD

SEA TIDAL LINK SHANKOOR DHAND RANN OF KUTCH

75. For expediting evacuation of rain water from their fields the farmers of Nawab Shah, Sanghar and Mirpurkhas made cuts in the drains of LBOD system that further increased the flow in Outfall Drain. This caused overflowing in the LBOD. The situation further aggravated due to flows from canal escapes and breaches that entered LBOD. It is pertinent to note that I&P Department did not close the inflows to irrigation canals despite the rainfall that worsened the flow condition in LBOD system which had to carry many times more discharge than the capacity of drains. High tide in sea and high level in Shakoor Dhand obstructed the flow, and area in the vicinity of Badin district suffered badly. It was observed on July 25, 2003 that a discharge of about 9,000 cusecs passed through Spinal Drain in the proximity of RD 159+000.

76. The 2003 floods were thus caused by a combination of factors: i) Rainfall in the area; ii) water coming to the area by the canals in the left bank below Kotri (total of more than 40,000 cusecs) iii) Drainage water of the record storm in the month; iv) drainage water coming from the upper Nara basin carried by LBOD; v) the connection of the upper DPOD basin to the LBOD system; v) high sea levels and surge caused by the storm which blocked the direct discharge of the water and raised the levels in the KPOD and LBOD; vi) DPOD emergency flood way did not function as per design. Plates 1 to 4 show condition of the flow in LBOD and inundation of area during 2003 – Flood.

Plate 1: Flow through LBOD at RD-274 during 2003-Flood

Plate 2: View of Berm of KPOD after Receding of Water of 2003-Flood

Plate 3: Inundation caused by 2003-Flood

Plate 4: KPOD at RD 50 after receding of Water, Inundation Visible

77. There were several breaches in the system particularly in LBOD and KPOD. List of breaches that were plugged by SIDA is given in the Table 1.

Table 1: List of Breaches in LBOD and KPOD (July 2003) Breach Sr. No. Location (RD) Width (Ft) 1. Shadi Large (LBOD) 182 35 2. Kazi Qudus village (LBOD) 165 130 3. Kazi Qudus village (LBOD) 163 50 4. Kazi Qudus village (LBOD) 162 100 5. Shadi large (LBOD) 170 45 6. Vidhri Chak (KPOD) 158 80 7. Vidhri Chak (KPOD) 158 30 8. Vidhri Chak (KPOD) 158 50 9. Village Mukhtiar (LBOD) 277 40 10. Village Rahim Notkani (LBOD) 279 55 11 Village Mehrab Chandio (LBOD) 285 50 12 Near VRB (LBOD) 295 25

Review of 2006 - Flood and its effect on LBOD

78. Similar to the event of 2003-flood that occurred due to unusual rains during July 2003, there was another flood event in the LBOD project area in April 2006. There were intensive rains in the Lower Sindh as indicated in the Table 2:

Table 2: 2006 Rainfalls Sr. No. Taluka Rainfall (mm) 1. Badin 298 2. Matli 231 3. Talhar 205 4. S.F. Rahu 110 5. Tando Bago 144 6. Mirpurkhas 272 7. Digri 362 8. Jhudo 150 9. Kot Ghulam Muhammad 207 10. Sindhri 281 11. H.B.Mari 273

79. Besides sheet flows caused by the intensive rains entering the drainage system, the local farmers again made cuts in the drains of LBOD system for expediting evacuation of rain water from their fields that increased the flow in the Outfall Drain. This not only caused overflowing and breaches in the LBOD but also breaches and overtopping occurred in other main drains, branch drains and sub-drains of the LBOD System. However, no water came to the area by the canals in the left bank below Kotri during the 2006 Event.

80. It is pertinent to note that the event of 2006-Flooding did not impact Badin district as severely as it happened during 2003-flooding. This is due to diligent work initially carried out by Army in filling breaches immediately after the occurrence of 2003-flooding, and later in restoration work carried out by AWBLBC that is still in progress.

81. Another significant phenomenon, however, that occurred was heading up of water upstream of pipe culvert bridges which had been designed to carry much less discharge than occurs due to heavy rains and cuts made by farmers. This caused breaches in the banks upstream, notable of these was at RD 350 culvert bridge across MMD, which caused breach in the left bank of MMD that threatened Mirpurkhas city. In order to safely pass the flow in the reach RD 245 to RD 500 of Spinal Drain of LBOD System, earthen and gunny bag dowels were constructed in emergency. The major breaches that occurred due to flooding are given Table 3.

Table 3: List of Overtopping and Breaches in LBOD System (April 2006) (RD) Sr. No. Nature and Location NIP IP Overtopping in LBOD 1. Several Overtopping in the reach 212-235 10

(RD) Sr. No. Nature and Location NIP IP 2. Overtopping in LBOD 225 3. Several Overtopping in the reach 248-296 4. Several Overtopping in the reach 270-298 5. Several Overtopping in the reach 298-300 6. Several Overtopping in the reach 304-306 304-306 7. Overtopping in LBOD 362 8. Overtopping in LBOD 431 9. Overtopping in LBOD 443 10. Overtopping in LBOD 449 11. Overtopping in LBOD 455 12. Overtopping in LBOD 479 Relief Cuts by people converted to Breaches 1. Mirpurkhas Main Drain (MMD) 52 2. Mirpurkhas Main Drain (MMD) 117 117 3. Mirpurkhas Main Drain (MMD) 151 4. Mirpurkhas Main Drain (MMD) 152.5 5. Mirpurkhas Main Drain (MMD) 189 6. Mirpurkhas Main Drain (MMD) 202 7. Mirpurkhas Main Drain (MMD) 216 8. Mirpurkhas Main Drain (MMD) 219 9. Mirpurkhas Main Drain (MMD) Mirpurkhas Main Drain (MMD) Breaches and Washing-away of Embankments 1. Breach in LBOD 435 2. Mirpurkhas Main Drain (MMD) 350-357 3. Sanghar Main Drain (SMD) 62-63

H. REPAIR WORKS CARRIED OUT AFTER FLOOD EVENTS

Repair Works carried out by Pakistan Army

82. After the 2003 floods, Rs.50 million were provided by WAPDA from the balance loan amount of the LBOD project in order to cope with immediate post flood situation. The emergent works to restore functioning of the outfall drains (KPOD and DPOD) were executed during the year 2004-05 in association with 5 Corps Engineers Pakistan Army in the following locations:

• Weir at RD 159 of KPOD: In order to pass more flow in DPOD to reduce passing of flow of the magnitude that passed in July 2003 through KPOD, the weir was slashed so as to lower it by 2 ft.

• KPOD, RD 25 to RD (-) 5: The earthwork has been carried out to restore Inspection Path (IP) in this reach. Also, the stone pitching in the reach RD (-)5 to RD (+) 1.030 has been provided on the outer slope of the embankment to counter the wave action of high water that may be caused by high tides that can come from the direction of Cholri Dhand due to collapse of the Cholri weir. The site was visited on April 17, 2007 and the works were noticed to be in reasonably good condition.

• KPOD, RD 60 to RD 50: The earthwork has been carried out to restore Inspection Path (IP) in this reach. No stone pitching has been provided on the outer slope of the embankment. The site was visited on April 17, 2007 and the work was noticed to be in reasonably good condition.

• KPOD, RD 60 to RD 52: The earthwork has been carried out to restore Non-inspection Path (NIP) in this reach. No stone pitching has been provided on the outer slope of the embankment. The site was visited on April 17, 2007 and the work was noticed to be in reasonably condition.

• Seerani Branch Drain RD.0.0 to RD.16: It was envisaged to restore Seerani Branch Drain. Also planned was the stone pitching along outer slope of IP side. The work has been reported to be completed.

• KPOD RD 0 to RD 84 (Both NIP &IP): The repairs to 10 pipe outlets were carried out.

• Repairs to 4 bridges at RD 27, RD 58, RD 77 and RD 84 of KPOD were carried out.

• KPOD RD 0 to RD 84 (Both NIP &IP): 16 new pipe outlets were constructed.

Works Carried out/Being carried out by Left Bank Canals AWB

83. More PSDP schemes have been prepared for execution during the period 2005-07 in order to strengthen both banks of LBOD from RD 204 to RD 159, and KPOD in various reaches. The works of these schemes are being procured and supervised by the Left Bank Canals AWB. The works included in these schemes were inspected by the Consultant in the company of MD, SIDA and Director, Left Bank Canals AWB on April 17, 2007, and found to be at various stages of completion. The particulars of these schemes are given in Table 4.

TABLE 4: Works Carried out/Being Carried out by Left Bank Canals AWB Expenditure Contract Amount As of End Status of No. Description of Scheme (Rs. M) March 2007 completion (Rs. M) 1. Earthwork for IP of KPOD RD 13.19 0.00 Work just (-) 5 to RD (-) 10, and stone started pitching on outer. 2. Earthwork for IP of KPOD RD 13.17 0.00 Work just (-) 10 to RD (-) 15, and stone started pitching on outer. 3. Earthwork of guide bank 16.03 0.00 Work not yet KPOD RD 0 - RD 4, and stone started pitching on outer and inner sides of the guide bank. 4. Earthwork of guide bank 15.24 0.00 Work not yet KPOD RD 4 - RD 8, and stone started pitching on outer and inner sides of the guide bank. 5. Earthwork for NIP of KPOD 5.65 0.00 Work just RD 5 - RD 15, and stone started pitching on outer. 6. Earthwork for NIP of KPOD 11.65 0.00 Work just RD 5 - RD 0, stone pitching on started outer and construction of 5 Nos. Pipe Inlets at: (i) RD 1; (ii) RD 2; (iii) RD12; (iv) RD 20; and (v) RD 24. 7. Earthwork for IP of KPOD RD 13.73 11.94 Work nearing 25 - 50, RD 60 – 85 and RD 98- completion. 108. 8. Earthwork for IP of KPOD RD 12.18 11.63 Work nearing 115 - 129, RD 146 – 159 and completion. stone pitching at RD 23 opposite outfall bridge of Lowari Branch Drain. 13

Expenditure Contract Amount As of End Status of No. Description of Scheme (Rs. M) March 2007 completion (Rs. M) 9. Earthwork for NIP of KPOD 20.70 21.52 Work nearing RD 15 – 52 and RD 60 – 85. completion. 10. Earthwork for NIP of KPOD 22.75 22.22 Work nearing RD 85 – 159. completion. 11. Earthwork for IP of LBOD 12.29 12.76 Work nearing Spinal, RD 159 – 204. completion. 12. Earthwork for NIP of LBOD 13.12 12.63 Work nearing Spinal, RD 159 – 204. completion. 13. Repairs to 2 bridges at RD 109 1.83 1.39 Work nearing and RD 122 of KPOD completion. 14. Repairs to 2 bridges at RD 146 1.70 1.39 Work nearing and RD 159 of KPOD completion. 15. Construction of 5 Nos. New 1.46 1.21 Work Inlet Structures along KPOD completed. 16. Repairs of 15 Nos. Inlet 4.45 4.44 Work Structures along KPOD completed. 17. Construction of 5 Nos. New 1.46 1.21 Work Inlet Structures along LBOD completed. 18. Repairs of 8 Nos. Inlet 1.73 1.68 Work Structures along KPOD completed.

84. The Inspection Path (IP) of KPOD and LBOD in the reach RD (-) 15 to RD 204 has been converted into berm by off-setting the IP by at least 20 feet and constructing the new IP 5 feet above this berm. Similarly, the Non Inspection Path (NIP) of KPOD and LBOD in the reach RD (-) 15 to RD 204 has been raised by converting the old NIP into berm by off-setting the new NIP by at least 20 feet and constructing the IP 5 feet above this berm. In this manner the flow carrying capacities of LBOD and KPOD have been increased to cater for unusual flows similar to those that occurred in 2003 and 2006. But this has been done arbitrarily without hydrological analysis and re-visiting operational criteria of drains in the LBOD system to establish the credible maximum discharge, which should be subject of envisaged studies to be carried out by the consultants being engaged by WAPDA. Nevertheless, the aforementioned works which are substantially completed can stand in good stead in case of need to cope with unusual flows. Since the earthwork has not been compacted using rollers but is consolidated only by the tractor-trolley used to haul material, there is likelihood of breaches in new IP and NIP embankment. Obviously the situation demands rigorous vigilance during the monsoon season.

85. PSDP schemes have also been prepared by the Left Bank Canals AWB for execution during 2006-07 in order to re-section the prism and strengthen both banks of LBOD Spinal RD 204 to RD 305.5 and Mirpurkhas Main Drain (MMD) from RD 30 to RD 254. The particulars of these schemes are given in Table 5. 14

TABLE 5: PSDP Schemes in Left Bank Canals AWB Estimated Cost No. Description of Scheme Remarks (Rs. M) 1. Re-sectioning, raising and strengthening IP 8.23 Work not yet &NIP of LBOD Spinal, RD 204-220. awarded 2. Re-sectioning, raising and strengthening IP 8.19 Work not yet &NIP of LBOD Spinal, RD 220 - 255. awarded 3. Re-sectioning, raising and strengthening IP 8.14 Work not yet &NIP of LBOD Spinal, RD 255-270. awarded 4. Re-sectioning, raising and strengthening IP 6.74 Work not yet &NIP of LBOD Spinal, RD 270-305.5. awarded 5. Re-sectioning, raising and strengthening both 8.53 Work not yet banks of MMD, RD 30-60. awarded 6. Re-sectioning, raising and strengthening both 8.58 Work not yet banks of MMD, RD 60-90. awarded 7. Re-sectioning, raising and strengthening both 8.04 Work not yet banks of MMD, RD 90 - 120. awarded 8. Re-sectioning, raising and strengthening both 8.50 Work not yet banks of MMD, RD 120-150. awarded 9. Re-sectioning, raising and strengthening both 8.85 Work not yet banks of MMD, RD 150-180. awarded 10. Re-sectioning, raising and strengthening both 8.58 Work not yet banks of MMD, RD 180 -200. awarded 11. Re-sectioning, raising and strengthening both 8.78 Work not yet banks of MMD, RD 200 - 225. awarded 12. Re-sectioning, raising and strengthening both 8.84 Work not yet banks of MMD, RD 225 -254. awarded

Works Carried out/Being carried out by Nara Canal AWB

86. After the event of April 2006 flooding in the area, PSDP schemes are understood to have also been prepared and/or being prepared by Nara Canal AWB in order to re-section the prism and strengthen banks of the drains in its jurisdiction; West Nawab Shah Main Drain (WNSMD) and its sub-systems, East Nawab Shah Main Drain (ENSMD) and its sub-drains, Sanghar Main Drain (SMD) and its sub- drains including Makhi Branch Drain and its two sub-drains, Sinjharo Branch Drain and its sub-drains, Patoyun Branch Drain and its two sub-drains and Mirpurkhas Main Drain (MMD) and its sub-drains from RD 254 to RD 365. The particulars and status of implementation of these schemes were not available. Director, Nara Canal AWB, however, informed that he intended to repair all drains and make them ready to carry their designed discharges, which appeared to be a daunting task to be carried out during the remaining 2 months before the advent of the monsoon period.

87. The Consultant visited the site of breach that occurred in MMD between RD 350 and RD 357, which had occurred due to heading up of water upstream of pipe culvert located at RD 350. It was noted that bed clearance and repairs to banks in the reach RD 350 - 357 was in progress. Although an additional pipe had been added to the original single pipe after the event of 2003 flooding but it did not prevent the breach. The Consultant suggested to the concerned XEN and the AEN to provide further additions to the two existing pipes in order to prevent breach again at upstream of this location during the impending monsoon season to save Mirpurkhas city. 15

I. PRESENT CONDITION OF LBOD

LBOD Spinal Drain

88. The repair works between RD 159 to RD 204 of LBOD both on the IP side (Right Bank) and NIP (Let Bank) are substantially completed. The Inspection Path (IP) has been converted into berm by off-setting the IP by at least 20 feet and constructing the new IP 5 feet above this berm. Similarly, the Non Inspection Path (NIP) in this reach has been raised, converting the old NIP into berm by off-setting the new NIP by at least 20 feet, constructing the IP 5 feet above this berm. In this manner the flow carrying capacity of LBOD in this reach (RD 159 to RD 204) has been increased to about 9000 cusecs to cater for the flows similar to those reported to have occurred in 2003 and 2006.

89. Four (4) PSDP schemes have been framed to carry out the repairs in the reach RD 204 - 305.5 during the year 2006-07, similar to those carried out in the reach, RD 159 to RD 204. There, however, had been breaches and overtopping in the reach RD 305 to RD 480 during the flood event of April 2006. Thus, there is need to re-section and strengthen banks of Spinal LBOD up to RD 480 and upstream.

Kadhan Pateji Outfall Drain (KPOD)

90. As per details given in para 14, 15 and 16, the repair works on KPOD, both on the IP side (Right Bank) and NIP (Let Bank) are in advanced stage of completion between RD (-) 5 to RD 204. The Inspection Path (IP) of KPOD in the reach RD (-) 5 to RD 159 has been converted into berm by off-setting the IP by at least 20 feet and constructing the new IP 5 feet above this berm. Similarly, the Non Inspection Path (NIP) has been raised/being raised by converting the old NIP into berm by off-setting the new NIP by at least 20 feet and constructing new NIP 5 feet above this berm. In this manner the flow carrying capacity of KPOD in the reach between RD (-) 5 to RD 159 has been increased to cater for unusual flows similar to those that occurred in 2003 and 2006 (reportedly maximum of over 8,000 cusecs during 2003).

91. With the completion of on-going repair works in KPOD that are expected to be completed during 2006-07, the KPOD would be in a reasonably good condition to safely pass flows similar to those occurred in 2003 and 2006. Thus, there will not be need to carry out more works for KPOD itself until such time as the credible maximum discharge is established by hydrological analysis and re-visiting operational criteria of drains in the LBOD system, which studies are to be carried out by the consultants being engaged (by WAPDA).

Dhoro Puran Outfall Drain (DPOD)

92. After the 2003 flood event, the weir at RD 159 of KPOD was slashed to lower it by 2 ft in order to pass more flow in DPOD to reduce the flow of the magnitude that passed in July 2003 through KPOD. No significant repair work has been carried out on DPOD itself, as none was considered emergent after flood events in 2003 and 2006. There may be need to carry out works on DPOD after the credible maximum discharge expected to flow through it is established by hydrological analysis, re-visiting operational criteria of drains in the LBOD system and the problem of back flows in certain conditions and other flow retarding conditions in DPOD that do exist, which studies are to be carried out by the consultants being engaged (by WAPDA). 16

Other Main Drains, Branch Drains and Sub-Drains of LBOD System

93. Except for closing breaches no special work is reported to have been carried out on other Main Drains, Branch Drains and Sub-Drains of LBOD System after the flood event of 2003. After the flood event of April 2006, the repairs and strengthening of banks of MMD is reported to be in progress both by Nara Canal AWB and Left Bank Canals AWB in the reaches located in their respective jurisdictions. Due to inadequate funds available for M&R, e.g. allocations of only Rs. 4.55 million and Rs. 4.85 million were made during 2005-06 and 2006-07 respectively for surface drains of Nawabshah Division, all drains in this division are expected to be in need of major intervention to address the deferred maintenance to restore their design capacities. The situation in other divisions is not expected to be different than that of Nawabshah Division for the same reason of paucity of funds for carrying out routine maintenance.

J. FURTHER WORKS REQUIRED TO BE DONE FOR SURFACE DRAINS

General

94. During the events of flooding in 2003 and 2006, the surface drains of the LBOD Drainage System, for reasons stated in Para 11 above had to pass discharges much higher than their respective safe carrying capacities. During the 2006 flood the banks of the drains were overtopped due to heading up of water upstream of pipe culvert bridges having lesser capacity than safe carrying capacity of the drain even at lower discharges e.g. at RD 350 of MMD. The flooding caused breaches in the banks, water passed over berms etc. This required not only closing of breaches but raising and strengthening of banks of the drains particularly the Spinal LBOD, KPOD and MMD to cope with the discharges similar in magnitude that occurred in 2003 should those occurred again.

95. Although there had been an investment of over 2,500 million Rupees under NDB but most of it (70%) was incurred on the ‘Remodeling of Nara Canal’ and Commissioning of Jamrao Twin Canal, 19% on the rehabilitation of drains related to drainage systems all other than those in LBOD System, 7% on lining of some 200 Water Courses and 3% on the procurement of Electrical and Mechanical equipment for LBOD System. Out of the eight performance contracts awarded for O&M of scavenger wells, interceptor drains, subsurface and surface drains of the LBOD Project in Sindh for 5 years, only two performance contracts were for surface drains of Sanghar and Nawabshah systems (total cost Rs. 82 million). Thus, the money spent under NDB on procuring civil works (through Performance Contracts only) for rehabilitation of surface drains in the LBOD System was only nominal. There is deferred maintenance in the prisms of drains. Until such time as the condition surveys are carried out it is not possible to identify the areas that would be more affected when the design parameters are exceeded. It is therefore considered appropriate to restore capacities of all main drains, branch drains and sub-drains as well as their banks to the designed parameters along their entire lengths to insure safe functioning of the System.

96. As was pointed out by the POE, it is emphasized that the monitoring program is essential to have a final LBOD Drainage System and Outfall System that can work according to the identified objectives. Due to complexity of the situation POE recommended an adaptive approach in order to learn at the same time the structures are built. This approach needs to be adopted to determine the nature and extent of long term works by hydrological analysis and re- visiting operational criteria of drains in the LBOD system and the consensus of all stakeholders after consultation. Pursuing this approach there is need to formulate an interim plan (keeping in 17 view as to what has been done so far after 2003 flooding, and on-going works) to carry out the works necessary to insure a safe function of the system, until such time as the nature and extent of long term works is established by hydrological analysis and re-visiting operational criteria of drains in the LBOD system and the consensus of all stakeholders after consultation, inventory of the surface drains has been prepared.

97. For preparing this interim plan, an inventory of LBOD surface drains was compiled initially using the information contained in an Index Plan of LBOD provided by Director, Left Bank Canals AWB and “Operation and Maintenance Manual, Volume 3, The Surface Drainage System (December 1991)”. The lengths of most of the drains given in the inventory were scaled from the AWB map. Wherever available the design discharges of the drains were indicated but substantial information had to be filled in this inventory relating to respective design discharges. Nevertheless, the information on lengths of the drains was sufficient to prepare the proposed plan of rehabilitation/restoration of LBOD Surface Drainage System, part of which has been implemented and some parts are on-going with the funds provided to SIDA under PSDP. Later, WAPDA’s office at Hyderabad was contacted again during the month of May 2007. WAPDA provided the information that has been used to up-date the inventory.

98. For estimating the cost of the works required to be implemented, unit rates per RD of each of the three types of the drains have been established using the costs of the completed works and on-going works. In the case of sub-drains it was assessed that those would require 50% of the unit cost for main drains while the branch drains would require 75% of the unit cost of main drains. Due to narrowing of section of spinal LBOD upstream of RD 305, it was assessed that the cost per unit length will be about 60% of the cost incurred on KPOD and LBOD main drains in the downstream reaches. The units rates used are: (i) Rs. 305,400 per RD of LBOD in reach RD 305-815; (ii) Rs. 306,700 per RD of other main drains such as MMD. SMD etc.; (iii) Rs. 230,000 per RD of branch drains; and (iv) Rs. 153,350 per RD of sub- drains. The summary of the proposed plan of rehabilitation/restoration of LBOD Surface Drainage System is given in Table 6. 18

TABLE 6: Summary of Proposed Plan of Rehabilitation/Restoration of LBOD Surface Drainage System Total Phasing of Work Works Sr. FY FY FY FY FY Total Description Required Remarks No. 2004- 05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 FY 2004-09 Cost Cost Cost Cost Cost Cost Cost (M.Rs) (M.Rs) (M.Rs) (M.Rs) (M.Rs) (M.Rs) (M.Rs) 1 East Nawab Shah Main Drain System 154.117 154.117 154.117 2 Gajrah Branch Drain Sub-System 77.668 77.668 77.668 3 Amurji Branch Drain Sub-System 94.306 94.306 94.306 4 West Nawab Shah Main Drain 80.509 80.509 80.509 5 Singhoro Branch Drain Sub-System 64.787 64.787 64.787 6 Makhi Branch Drain Sub-System 30.822 30.822 30.822 7 Sanghar Main Drain Sub-System 73.223 73.223 73.223 8 Patoyun Branch Drain Sub-System 38.872 38.872 38.872 9 Mirpurkhas Main Drain System 199.662 80.000 119.662 199.662 10 Left Bank Outfall Branch Drain Sub-System 124.677 124.677 124.677 11 Left Bank Outfall Spinal Drain 344.268 54.391 184.123 105.754 344.268 12 KPOD System 275.751 64.402 49.638 73.920 87.791 275.751 13 DPOD System 26.468 26.468 26.468 14 Outfall Structures10 224.221 100.000 124.221 224.221 Total LBOD Surface System 1,809.349 64.402 104.029 153.920 1,088.192 398.806 1,809.349

10 - The Outfall Structure to arrest effect of sea intrusion should be constructed only after comprehensive studies to properly locate it in KPOD.

Description of Civil Works needed to be carried out

99. DPOD: No significant repair work has been carried out on DPOD itself, as none was considered emergent after flood events in 2003 and 2006. In order to ensure safe functioning of DPOD there is need to carry out detail condition survey of its banks and cross-sections to frame a scheme for strengthening of banks and adequacy of the prism to carry 2,000 cusecs particularly after the slashing of the weir at RD 159.

100. KPOD: Almost all of the works envisaged for ensuring safe passage of flows through KPOD similar to those occurred in 2003 and 2006 have been either completed already or will be completed by end of year 2006-07 with funds being provided under PSDP. For the nature of works carried out see para 23. The scheme (s) for the remaining works that relate to its 4 branch drains need to be prepared and completed by end of year 2007-08.

101. LBOD: The works in the reach RD 159 – 205 have been completed. For the nature of works carried out see para 21. There is need to re-section and strengthen banks of Spinal LBOD up to RD 480 and upstream. The accumulated maintenance in the 15 sub-drains and Shadi Bahadur Branch Drain out falling directly in Spinal LBOD is also required to be addressed. The proposed plan includes the works pertaining to these drains.

102. Other Drains: The proposed plan includes works for other main drains, branch drains and sub-drains in order to re-section and strengthen banks of these drains.

103. Improving Outfall System: In order to formulate a strategy to address the wide range of challenges of dynamic problems of LBOD Outfall System and achieve objective of improving the functioning of Outfall System, POE has indicated several structural alternatives in their report including: (i) “A” - Construction of a regulating structure at the junction of KPOD and the Tidal Link; (ii) “B”&”C” - Construction of two control structures at the bifurcation of the Spinal Drain, one in KPOD and the second in DPOD; (iii) “D”&”E” - Measures to protect the Kotri Drains by diversion of the Kotri drains that enter (or all of them as before) towards Pateji Dhand, and possibly Mehro Dhand; and (iv) “E” - Control of Tidal Link access to the Dhands – the most important but complex situation. Although the construction of outfall control structures to improve functioning of the Outfall System is included in this plan11, as the construction of these structures is considered necessary to arrest intrusion of sea water and have flexible control over flows into DPOD and KPOD, but the location of the regulating structure at the junction of KPOD and the Tidal Link should be determined after comprehensive and thorough studies.

104. The cost of total plan of rehabilitation/restoration is of the order of Rs. 1,809 million. An amount of Rs. 64 million were provided by WAPDA (Rs. 50 million out of the remaining loan amount available with them); and source of balance amount of Rs. 14 million is not known. The Government of Sindh has committed Rs. 692 million under PSDP. Thus the total funds committed so far are Rs. 756 million. The balance amount of Rs. 1,053 million has to be ear marked from some other source. The information about availability of funds in GoSindh’s future budgets is not known. It is pertinent to mention that the amount required during the FY 2007-08 is Rs. 1,088 million. As of end of FY 2006-07, it is anticipated that a cumulative expenditure of Rs. 322 million would have been incurred, with the maximum spending of about Rs. 154 million

11 Item 14 in Table 6.

during FY 2006-07. The envisaged expenditure of Rs. 1,088 million during FY 2007-08 seems a large target but can be met with proper spade work i.e. preparation of annual work plans, immediate condition survey of the drains by respective Drainage Divisions of the two concerned AWBs, preparation of schemes, timely award of contracts and allocation of required amount in the budget.

K. ACTIVITIES FOR SUSTAINABLE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF FLOODING

105. The activities that need to be carried out to determine sustainable solution to the problem of flooding of surface drainage system of LBOD involve the following:

• Determine deficiencies in the existing LBOD Drainage System and find remedial measures;

• Carry out studies to determine the preferred revised design of the outfall system, considering the alternative proposals identified by the World Bank POE to reduce the flood risk problems and the impact of the discharge of saline effluent; and

• Establish an effective O&M program for the surface drains and outfall system of LBOD;

Studies Initiated

106. Government of Pakistan has approved a PC-II for an amount of Rs. 41 million for carrying out the Feasibility Studies by retaining services of consultants to identify and mitigate the problem in LBOD Outfall and Badin Area Drainage System. WAPDA has been given the responsibility to procure and supervise these consulting services. Short-listing of consulting services has already been completed.

107. TOR were prepared. IPD arranged a meeting on January 11, 2007, attended by the following, to finalize these TOR:

(i) Rais Khair Muhammad Burgari (Chairman NC AWB Mirpurkhas); (ii) Muhammad Hashim Dal (Chairman LBCAWB Badin); (iii) Mr. Khair Muhammad Junejo (Notable Agriculturist); (iv) Major (R) Omer Farooq Ahmed Khan (member LBC-AWB Badin); (v) Muhammad Moosa Mehndhro (UC Nazim Bhugra Memon); (vi) Mr. Noor Ahmed Bhurgri, Taluka Nazim KGM; (vii) Syed Mumtaz Ali Shah, DCO Mirpurkhas; (viii) Mr. Allah Dito Shar, DCO Sanghar; (ix) Mr. Agha Aijaz Ahmed Khan, Managing Director SIDA Hyderabad; (x) Mr. Atta Muhammad Soomro, Chief Engineer, Right Bank Sukkur; and (xi) Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Dahri, Director Nara Canal AWB Mipurkhas.

108. The scope of work included in approved TOR, also endorsed by participant of the above meeting (para 42), is as follows:

(viii) To undertake a comprehensive study, conforming to the international standards, of LBOD System, must cover the following aspects.

• To examine the existing and required surface and subsurface water drainage capacity of the present system of LBOD outfall drains and its collector drains.

• The system needs to be enhanced in order to carry out taking saline and storm water in the event of maximum rains.

• Estimation for upcoming maximum saline effluent and storm water to be handled under worst scenario (historical rainfall intensity /over 300 mm rainfall) and evacuation of storm water should be possible within a maximum period of three to five/three days.

• To determine the deficiencies in the system in relation to the desired capacity of the system.

• The other options for disposal of the drainage effluent/ surface runoff through an outfall aligned in a North-south direction may also be considered, because one reason for failure of the tidal link is its alignment in an East-West direction.

• To suggest the appropriate structure at suitable place and related items of work necessitated to stop further scoring / intrusion of sea water in between RD.0 to RD.(-)22 of KPOD.

• Analysis of the present lines/ alignments of outfall drains and study of pre- inception of LBOD and natural drains/Dhoras and subject the best option to carry the storm/saline effluent smoothly into sea.

• Analytically determine parameters for redesigning of the entire LBOD Stage-I system and maximum permissible effluent and run-off recommended to be handled by the system.

• Analyse financial effects of various options highlighting the recommended option in relation to benefits.

(ix) Re-design entire LBOD System, including outfall drains, to provide for the following:

• Rainfall intensity of 75 mm with a return period of 50 years.

• Rainfall intensity of 150 mm with a return period of 50 years.

• Historical rainfall/ more than 300 mm.

(x) Prepare the PC-1 Pro-forma [as modified by the Planning Commission] incorporating each one of the above mentioned options for approval and implementation.

(xi) Suggestions of stake holders may also be considered before finalizing the study for redesign of LBOD system.

(xii) Assess the damages caused to the entire LBOD system and people of the area etc, due to alleged defective designing of LBOD system.

(xiii) The environmental aspects of entire project may also be assessed and mitigation measures may be suggested.

(xiv) The study of disposal of storm water into sea through Dhoro Puran Drain and activation of other natural drains as source of smooth transportation may also be conducted.

109. Request for Proposal was sent to the short-listed consulting firms and date for the submission of proposals had been fixed as April 21, 2007. These studies are expected to commence in June 2007.

Studies Envisaged in WSIP

110. The recently approved Project of Water Sector Improvement Program (WSIP), which would be implemented with the World Bank’s financial assistance, among other things, “[…]” will support the preparation of a comprehensive flood management plan for the Left Bank of the Indus River in Sindh including the Indus delta and coastal areas. This regional drainage master plan, agreed with local stakeholders during preparation of the national Drainage Master Plan, will encompass both surface drainage, sub-surface drainage, water logging and salinity control and flood risk management, and will include appropriate structural and non-structural options (e.g., flood warning and communications, flood proofing and improved preparedness and response systems). Planning and infrastructure management capacity will be built and the capacity of local authorities will be strengthened. A modern, world-class knowledge base will be developed with appropriate analytical tools and information management systems to support planning, operations and management. The detailed design would be prepared and made ready for implementation of the priority works identified under the master plan under a future investment project that Sindh may undertake with the assistance of its development partners“[…]”.

Need for Coordinating Studies

111. The SIDA would be the primary project implementing agency for WISP. As per PAD of WSIP, “[…]”SIDA would also be responsible for preparation of the master plan for flood and drainage management on the left bank of the Indus river and plans for delta area and costal zone (Component C2) in coordination with other concerned provincial and federal agencies, and collaborate in future project preparation (Component E2) and technical assistance, training and strategic studies (component E3) “[…]”. There is thus need to establish coordination between WAPDA and SIDA to streamline the modality of undertaking required studies so that: (i) there is no duplication of the activities among various agencies involved in studies; (ii) all studies are coordinated at a proper level; and (iii) the solutions found are acceptable to all stake holders.

L. O&M OF LBOD

General

112. O&M of the surface drains in LBOD system has been below par mainly due to two reasons; (i) inadequate funding; and (ii) un-smooth handing over of the system to GoSindh – handed over by WAPDA in 1993-94, returned to WAPDA in 1994 and again handed over to Go Sindh in 2002 which accepted it with reservations. Immediately after the take-over by GoSindh, there was an 23

unusual flooding event in 2003. From that time onwards instead of routine O&M activities repairs and strengthening of drain embankments are being carried out with O&M funds as well as special budgeting provided by Federal Government and GoSindh. There has been no standard operating procedure (SOP) in vogue for carrying out O&M activities.

WAPDA Produced Manuals

113. The Consultants of WAPDA on LBOD Stage I Project produced procedures for O&M of LBOD System in five (5) volumes of the document entitled “Operation and Maintenance Manual”, Volume 3 pertains to the Surface Drainage System, which gives organization, operation procedures, maintenance needs, equipment provide by the Project for O&M activities (presumably also handed over to IPD, Sindh) and reporting Forms. No annual budget estimate or yardsticks have been included/suggested in this Manual. The list of equipment available for O&M activities, was supposed to be located at designated places indicated in Volume 5 of the Manual entitled “Equipment and Workshop”. Most of this equipment is now reported to be out of order.

Criteria for O&M of Drains

114. The procedure contained in Volume 3 of WAPDA produced O&M Manual, however, is different from the IPD procedure indicated by the criteria of the yardsticks for O&M of surface drains prepared by IPD in November 1988, which is as described below.

(i) 1" surgrassing of IP of main and branch drains in a year;

(ii) Excavation by Dragline considering that Branch Drain required bed clearance after every fifth year;

(iii) Excavation by Excavator considering that Sub Drains will require bed clearance in alternate year;

(iv) Weed clearance (branch & sub-drains) considering that all categories of drain require weed clearance every year as weed grows with flourish;

(v) Bankworks (all categories) manually by tractors considering wear and tear of 0.5 ft every fifth year;

(vi) Repair to structures @ Rs: 500/structures (VRB, DRB, VRC, RC, WCA, Siphon, SWI);

(vii) R&M of Vehicle considering 3 vehicles running 1500 KMS (1000 miles) per month at Rs. 3/- per KMS inclusive of major and minor repair; and

(viii) Rs. 30,000 for miscellaneous items of works.

115. Based on the above criteria the yardstick of Rs. 7,585/mile, Rs. 11,378/mile and Rs. 15,170/mile of main drain, branch drain and sub-drain respectively had been computed on the basis of the then Schedule of Rates (1988). The mile in this context means 5 RDs (5000ft). It is pertinent to note that this yardstick does not include the supervision charges i.e. salaries and allowances of XENs, AENs, SENs and regular vigilance staff (Baildars, etc) required through out the year. Also not included in this yardstick is the special additional temporary vigilance staff required in Kharif (Monsoon) season. This is perhaps the reason for engaging ‘Abklani’ labour 24

reported to be hired at the rate of Rs. 1,250 per month, which is below par the minimum wages of Government for Grade 1 employees.

Current Budget Allocations

116. The annual budget allocations are made without regard to yardstick and inflation and are grossly inadequate. These need to be made realistic based on the prevailing Schedule of Rates and logical requirement for carrying out proper O&M activities.

Recommended Practice of O&M

117. There is need to develop improved and cost effective Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for O&M of surface drains of LBOD System in the interim period till such time as the LBOD System is revamped after detailed studies. This should take in to account operating procedures so as to keep the flows in drains to as low as possible.

118. In addition, the criteria for routine maintenance should be made realistic so as to keep the drains in reasonably safe conditions to withstand effects of possible high flows.

119. Before the beginning of the fiscal year, in consultation with the beneficiaries (FOs, District Governments, etc.) the annual work plans for M&R should be prepared by the XEN concerned of the Drainage Division using the information provided by the concerned sub-engineer/AEN. These should be based on the unit works assumed in the approved Yardsticks or any inspection made to establish need for special/emergent repairs. The concerned Director, AWB should approve these annual work plans. The work plans should not be only in the form of lists of works but should have objective of carrying out M&R activities as envisaged by the unit works on which the Yardsticks are based. This will avoid possibility of accumulation of M&R works in case the funds are adequately provided.

120. For procurement of M&R works through contracting, there in need for timely preparation of bidding documents and award of contracts.

121. The key player in supervising M&R works during execution by the contractors is the concerned sub-engineer. In order to enable the sub-engineer to frequently supervise several M&R works simultaneously on-going (normally the case) official transport to the sub-engineer (motorcycle) to visit remotely located sites should be available. AENs and XENs should also make codal checks on the implementation of M&R works.

Need for Updating O&M Yardsticks

122. Without changing the existing criteria for computing the O&M yardstick, as an interim step to provide for effective O&M activities, it is necessary to immediately up-date the financial costs of O&M works taking into account the inflation. At the rate of 10%/year, the up-dated yardstick works out to be Rs. 42,170 /mile, Rs. 63,260 /mile and Rs. 84,340 /mile of main drain, branch drain and sub-drain respectively. It is important to point out that administratively 6.5% inflation per year is allowed but the realistic inflation works to be 10% to match the market prices. Based on the aforementioned yardstick the annual budget requirement for each of the surface drain has been computed.. There shall, however, be need to revise the criteria for computing the yardstick to include the missing items such as the cost of routine vigilance through out the year and special vigilance during the Kharif season, and also taking into consideration prevailing market rates to make it realistic. 25

M. CONCLUSIONS

123. Following conclusions are made in respect of assessment of present condition of LBOD and KPOD after recent repair works, further works needed and preparation of a detailed maintenance plan.

(i) The emergent works to restore functioning of the outfall drains (KPOD and DPOD) were executed during the year 2004-05 in association with 5 Corps Engineers Pakistan Army.

(ii) The strengthening of both banks of LBOD from RD 204 to RD 159, and KPOD from RD (-) 22 to RD 159 were found to be at various stages of completion, and is expected to be completed, as envisaged by end of FY 2006-07.

(iii) Although after the event of 2006 flooding the schemes to carry out work on Mirpurkhas Main Drain (MMD) from RD 254 to RD 365 have been prepared and were noticed in progress in order to re-section the prism and strengthen its both banks. The requisite re-sectioning and strengthening of remaining length (RD 204 to RD 815) of LBOD Spinal and all other main drains, branch drains and sub-drains remains to be undertaken.

(iv) A total investment of the order of Rs. 1,809 million is needed for rehabilitation/restoration of surface drains of LBOD System. So far the total funds committed are Rs. 756 million consisting of an amount of Rs. 64 million provided for emergent works in year 2004-05 that included Rs. 50 million out of the remaining LBOD loan and Rs. 14 million, source unknown) and Rs. 692 under PSDP of GoSindh. The balance amount of Rs. 1,053 Million has to be ear marked from some source. As of end of FY 2006-07, it is anticipated that a cumulative expenditure of Rs. 322 million would have been incurred, with the maximum spending of about Rs. 154 million during FY 2006-07. The envisaged expenditure of Rs. 1,088 million during FY 2007-08 seems a real large target but can be met with proper spade work.

(v) As the construction of an outfall control structure across KPOD is considered necessary to arrest intrusion of sea water, its construction is included in this plan. In view of the huge investment involved and experience of failure of Cholri Weir it is necessary to determine its location after comprehensive and thorough studies.

(vi) There is a need to find a sustainable solution to the flooding problem of surface drainage system of LBOD by determining deficiencies in the existing LBOD Drainage System and finding remedial measures.

(vii) No Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) are in vogue for carrying out proper O&M of the surface drains of LBOD System. As a result, there is damage to drains during monsoon season and ad hock allocation of meager budget for O&M activities compounds the problem. There is thus need to establish a professional O&M program for the surface drains and outfall system of LBOD that should be fully funded.

N. RECOMMENDATIONS

124. Following actions are recommended for: (i) ensuring safe functioning of the system; until such time as the nature and extent of sustainable solution to flooding problem of surface drainage 26

system of LBOD is established, (ii) proper O&M of the surface drains of LBOD system; and (iii) find the nature and extent of sustainable solution to flooding problem of surface drainage system of LBOD.

(viii) Since the earthwork in the reach RD (-) 22 to RD 159 of KPOD and the reach RD 204 to RD 159 of LBOD has not been compacted using rollers but is consolidated only by the tractor-trolley used to haul material, create special temporary vigilance teams to patrol the drains during the impending Kharif season (monsoon) to spot ‘gharas’, heavy rain-cuts and other deformation in the strengthened banks so that timely emergent repairs could be carried out prior to any serious damage or breach.

(ix) In order to carry out re-sectioning and strengthening of remaining length (RD 204 to RD 815) of LBOD Spinal drain and all other main drains, branch drains and sub- drains, immediately commence spade work i.e. undertaking condition survey of the drains by respective Drainage Divisions of the two concerned AWBs, preparation of schemes and timely award of contracts,

(x) GoSindh needs to ensure that adequate funds are allocated in the budget during FY 2007-08 and 2008-09 for implementing the schemes to re-section and strengthen remaining length (RD 204 to RD 815) of LBOD Spinal drain and all other main drains, branch drains and sub-drains.

(xi) The duplication between studies initiated by WAPDA to find a sustainable solution to the flooding problem of surface drainage system of LBOD by determining deficiencies in the existing LBOD Drainage System and finding remedial measures and those envisaged in WSIP should be sorted out. There should be clear delineation of responsibilities and coordination of WAPDA and SIDA.

(xii) SIDA in association with AWBs should prepare Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for carrying out proper O&M of the surface drains of LBOD System. The O&M Manual (in 5 Volumes) prepared by WAPDA in 1991 and criteria used by IPD for computing M&R yardstick should provide the foundation to prepare the requisite SOP and corresponding realistic yardstick.

(xiii) As a result, there is damage to drains during monsoon season and adhoch allocation of meager budget for O&M activities compounds the problem. There is thus need to establish a professional O&M program for the surface drains and outfall system of LBOD that should be fully funded.

(xiv) It is necessary to immediately up-date the financial costs of O&M works taking into account the inflation. At the rate of 10%,/year, the up-dated yardstick works out to be Rs. 42,170 /mile, Rs. 63,260 /mile and Rs. 84,340 /mile of main drain, branch drain and sub-drain respectively as compared to the present yardsticks of Rs. 7,585/mile, Rs. 11,378/mile and Rs. 15,170/mile of main drain, branch drain and sub-drain respectively.

ANNEX 1

Persons Met

NDB Karachi

1. Dr. Salman Memon , NDP, Karachi Tel: 0333 219 9419

SIDA

2. Mr. Hashim Leghari, MD SIDA, Hyderabad 3. Mr. Allah Bux Mirbahar, GM (Operations), SIDA, Hyderabad 4. Dr. Mumtaz Ahmad Sohag, GM (R&D), SIDA, Hyderabad Tel: 0300 307 3736 5. Mr. Ali Asghar, Deputy Director

AWB, Left Bank

6. Mr. Jam Mithan Khan, Director, AWB Left Bank

WAPDA

7. Mr. Hazoor Bux Memon, Chief Engineer & PD Water South, Hyderabad 8. Mr. Muhammad Javaid, Director, CSD, Hyderabad 9. Mr. Shafqat Ali Samejo, Project Director, CDI 10. Mr. Akbar Ali Bajkani, Director PCC II 11. Mr. Irshad Ahmad Bohio, Senior Engineer (Civil) 12. Mr. Naeem Arif, Senior Engineer (Civil)

Nara Canal AWB

13. Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Dahri 14. Mr. Farid Ahmad Khokhar, XEN Drainage, Sanghar 15. Mr. M. Nawaz Soomro, XEN Drainage, Nawab Shah 16. Mr. Junaid Ahmad, Assistant Director, Mirpurkhas

District Government, Mirpurkhas

17. Ms. Sughra Juenejo, Distrct Nazim 18. Mr. Mumtaz Shah, DCO

District Government, Badin

19. Mr. Safdar Ali Agha, DCO

Representatives of NGOs

20. Mr. Khadim Talpur, Secretary, Save Coast Action Committee (SCAC) 21. Mr. Iqbal Haider, Secretary, LAAR Humanitarian and Development Program

ANNEX 1

22. Mr. Ali Muhammad, Secretary, Badin Development Organization 23. Abdullah Turk, General Secretary, Badin Development & Research Organization (BRPO)

National Institute of Oceanography (NIO)

24. Dr. M. M. Rabbani, Director General 25. Mr. Syed Moazzam Ali, SRO 26. Dr. Tariq Masood Ali Khan, Physical Oceanographer

ANNEX2

LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

1. World Bank, Review of the Performance of the Left Bank Outfall Drain, Stage I (KPOD, DPOD, Tidal Link and Cholri Weir) - Report of the International Panel of Experts, June 2005

2. World Bank, Management Report and Recommendation in response to the Inspection Panel Investigation Report - Pakistan: National Drainage Program Project (Credit No. 2999-PK), July 2006

3. World Bank, Sindh Water Sector Improvement Project (WSIP). Diagnostic Survey and Preparation of Investment Component, Draft Final Report, 2005

4. World Bank, Project Appraisal Document for Sindh Water Sector Improvement Phase-I Project, March 31, 2007

5. FAO/World Bank Cooperative Program, Implementation Completion Report, NDP, IDA Credit 2999 – PK, June 2005 6. Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority, Left Bank Outfall Drain, Stage-I Project, Operation and Maintenance Manual, Volume 2, December 1991

7. Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority, Left Bank Outfall Drain, Stage-I Project, Operation and Maintenance Manual, Volume 3, December 1991

8. Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority, Left Bank Outfall Drain, Stage-I Project, Operation and Maintenance Manual, Volume 5, December 1991

9. Sindh Irrigation and Power Department, Operation and Maintenance Yardstick for Irrigation Infrastructure, November 1988

10. IMTA, Sindh Water Sector, Review of Drainage Issues, 2005

11. Left Bank Canals AWB’s Presentation on Details of Rehabilitation Works Carried out on LBOD and KPOD, April 2007

12. I&P Department, Presentation to Chief Secretary GoSindh on LBOD, April 2007

13. Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority, Brief on LBOD Project, April 2007 14. Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority, Report on LBOD performance in 2003 Rains, 2004

15. Sindh Irrigation & Drainage Authority (SIDA), Report on Rainfall 2003-Damages, Relief Operations by Government and Non Government Organizations, February 2006