Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016)
Managing Editor Nikolai A. Gourof [email protected]
Senior Editor Thomas Colley [email protected]
Editorial Assistant Natalia de Orellana
CC License, The Editors of Strife, www.strifeblog.org ISSN 2052 3882 (06)
Nikolai Gourof and Thomas Colley Department of War Studies King’s College London Strand, London, WC2R 2LS
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Cover illustrations: Front cover: Ecce Homo (ca. 1849-52) by Honoré-Victorin Daumier. Back cover: Dinamismo del cuerpo humano Boxeador (n/d) by Umberto Boccioni
Contents
Matthew Polacko Napoleonic Elizabeth: Defender of the Realm 1
Jack Curran-Persell U.S. Counter-Insurgency Strategy in Iraq during the Tenure of General David Petraeus 12
Zoha Waseem Daesh in Pakistan’s Militant Landscape and the Allure for Urban Extremists 20
Alex Calvo Madrid – Moscow: Time for NATO to Close Ranks 29
Harris Kuemmerle The Role of Water in human Conflict and Politics: A Strife 4-part Series 45
Book Reviews
Ben Turnbull Katherine C. Epstein, Torpedo: Inventing the Military-Industrial Complex in the United States and Great Britain 57
Avram Lytton Norman Housley, Crusading & the Ottoman Threat, 1453-1505 59
Maya Ehrmann Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon's Party of God 61
William Philpott Peter E. Hodgkinson, British Infantry Battalion Commanders in the First Word War 64
Sebastian Åsberg Richard Sakwa, Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands 66
Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016)
Napoleonic Elizabeth: Defender of the Realm Matthew Polacko
Queen Elizabeth I is a prominent historical day, as the warrior queen mythos still resonates figure whose fame has persisted since her and she is still an integral component in the death. One aspect of her prominence is the fact national curriculum and dominant historical that she has been evoked and used by a variety narrative. In addition to national identity, other of people in the past for an assortment of themes that will be explored throughout reasons. However, arguably one of the most include gender and monarchy. pertinent time periods yet to be investigated thoroughly, is the Napoleonic period.1 The The Napoleonic era was dominated in Britain purpose of this article is to examine the uses by the war with France and Elizabeth’s earlier and commemoration of Elizabeth in Great war with Spain provides a clear case study for Britain during the ‘Great Terror’ of the the use of Elizabeth. The greatest concern that Napoleonic period to shed new light onto the presided in Britain during the conflict was the extent of her portrayal in popular culture, as fear of a French invasion, so much so, that the well as to identify if there were any parallel period 1796-1805, has been often described as political agendas in her deployment. The the ‘Great Terror’. Not to be confused with the popular culture that Elizabeth appeared in grisly ‘Great Terror’ in France between rival during the conflict includes poetry, songs, plays, factions during the French Revolution, it was ‘a caricatures and portraits. Although the use of time of acute fear and panic’ for the British, Elizabeth was varied, she is largely cast in a who believed that their liberty was under threat positive light with a strong emphasis on her from France.2 This concern was especially character and the role she played in the defence pronounced during 1803-1805, when a large of the nation. The preponderance of her French army was encamped at Boulogne on the appearance during this period, has also English Channel, awaiting an opportune contributed to how she is viewed even to this moment to invade. However, with the decisive French naval defeat at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1 The seventeenth century has been covered 1805, the immediate concerns of invasion comprehensively in both John Watkins’s Representing dissipated. Beyond the simple fact that the war Elizabeth in Stuart England (2002) and Elizabeth Hageman hastened the most extensive mobilisation of and Katherine Conway’s Resurrecting Elizabeth I in British manpower yet seen, the everyday life of Seventeenth-Century England (2007). It is in this age where the predominant aspects of Elizabeth’s afterlife British citizens was also impacted. Wheeler and representations took hold, through a number of different Broadley reveal in Napoleon and the Invasion of guises. The image of warrior queen, and its creation England (1908), that the ‘literature and when Elizabeth appeared before her troops at Tilbury, is iconography of the first period of the Great covered by Susan Frye in her article “The Myth of Terror is abundant enough, but between 1803 Elizabeth at Tilbury” (1992). Frye reveals how Elizabeth at Tilbury became a “myth of nationalist sentiment” in and 1805’ the invasion threat ‘seems to almost 3 the early Stuart years after her death, but does not have absorbed all contemporary topics.’ examine the myth in subsequent years. Two books also Consequently, a constant stream of anti-French published around the four hundredth anniversary of and negative portrayals of Napoleon was Elizabeth’s death, which are the most comprehensive and prominent, as he was openly caricatured and relevant works dealing with Elizabeth’s representations in 4 afterlife, are Michael Dobson’s and Nicola Watson’s vilified throughout the period. In the midst of England’s Elizabeth: An Afterlife in Fame and Fantasy (2002) and Julia Walker’s The Elizabethan Icon: 1603-2003 (2004). Both are chronological studies that examine a variety of 2 H.F.B. Wheeler, and A.M. Broadley, Napoleon and the written and visual genres, but make use of much Invasion of England: The Story of the Great Terror, 2nd ed. different material. They also cover different subject (Chalford: Nonsuch Publishing, 2007), p. 8. matter, but both contain very small sections on the 3 Ibid., p. 169. Napoleonic era. 4 Ibid., p. 8. 1
Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) this discourse, historical references also became The broadside has been a vehicle of expression pervasive, and a leading figure was Elizabeth. in England ever since the invention of the printing press.10 They served an important In 1798, William Pitt’s Government function of circulating news and commissioned historian John Bruce with the pronouncements for the common man, task of reporting on the defence measures that normally on single folio sheets, which would occurred under Queen Elizabeth to meet the have appeared on the walls of public Armada threat, by examining State Office establishments. Broadsides appeared in the Papers. He created an official three hundred thousands throughout the Napoleonic era but page Report on the arrangements which were made, for enjoyed their greatest influence, by far, during the internal defence of these kingdoms, when Spain, by the invasion threat of 1803.11 They were its armada, projected the invasion and conquest of produced by anonymous writers, but most England; and application of the wise proceedings of our importantly they ‘were mass productions ancestors, to the present crisis of public safety. The addressed to the people, not created by the report asserts that 1588 was ‘the only period in people.’12 The government subsidised some of history, which bears any resemblance to the the broadside publications but the propaganda present crisis in Europe.’5 In an extensive campaign was coordinated predominantly by a appendix to the report, the forces available in handful of loyalist publishers, such as James 1588 are contrasted with 1798, which reveal Asperne, John Hatchard and John Ginger.13 that the present defence was considerably This explains the considerable uniformity of better equipped for handling a potential message, which was used as an important invasion force.6 The ‘provident measures of weapon to assert unity in the face of potential Queen Elizabeth’ were also praised and division.14 The James Asperne produced attributed to the successful defence against European Magazine reported in December 1803, Spanish invasion.7 The report also points out that broadsides were ‘all calculated to raise in the oath of allegiance to the Queen that the lower classes of the people a just Elizabeth required her forces to take, owing to detestation of the character and base designs of information received that ‘Philip, and the the enemy.’15 Catholic party, had sent emissaries into her One such compelling broadside that appears in Kingdom, to undermine the allegiance of her the admirable anthology The Warning Drum: The subjects.’8 Although this measure was not British Home Front Faces Napoleon, Broadsides of adopted under George III, an Alien Bill was 1803, is a call of the ‘Citizens of London’ to revived and amended that was designed to heed the example of the Elizabethans for the prevent foreign emissaries from disseminating present French threat. The broadside outlines revolutionary ideas in Britain, and many of the in detail the number of soldiers raised and plans in the report were actually incorporated armed in each city of London ward in 1588. It by the government of the time.9 The emergence calls for the fellow citizens of London to of such a report reveals the remarkable imitate the example set by their ‘generous prominence that Elizabeth held in the minds of spirited Forefathers more than Two hundred leading government members during the Years ago.’16 The broadside exclaims: conflict, which will now also be examined in the various forms of popular culture. 10 Frank J. Klingberg and Sigurd B. Hustvedt, eds., The Broadsides Warning Drum: The British Home Front Faces Napoleon, Broadsides of 1803 (Berkeley: University of California, 1944), p. 19. 5 John Bruce, Report on the arrangements which were made, for 11 Stuart Semmel, Napoleon and the British (New Haven: the internal defence of these kingdoms, when Spain, by its armada, Yale University Press, 2004), pp. 41, 44. projected the invasion and conquest of England; and application of 12 Ibid., p. 54. the wise proceedings of our ancestors, to the present crisis of public 13 Ibid., pp. 41-42. safety (London: Printed by A. Strahan, 1798), p. 14. 14 Ibid., pp. 41, 57. 6 Ibid., See Appendix. 15 Ibid., p. 42. 7 Ibid., p. 91. 16 ‘Citizens of London!’ (London: Printed for J. Asperne, 8 Wheeler and Broadley, Napoleon and the Invasion, 116. 1803), quoted in Frank J. Klingberg and Sigurd B. 9 Ibid., pp. 115-116. Hustvedt, eds., The Warning Drum: The British Home Front 2
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Let us imitate the noble Example of such Ancestors. and No! she says still.’20 The song places Queen We are ten Times more numerous! Elizabeth, along with King Edward III and Ten Times more Opulent! May their sublime Spirit inspire us with a similar King Henry IV, at the center of English Ardour! defence and resistance to the French, despite Then will the Citizens of London, alone, bring into the fact England’s principle enemy of her reign the Field to oppose this Flagitious Foe was the Spanish. Ten Times Ten Thousand Men!17 Some broadsides even adopted a female voice This broadside printed for James Asperne, is a such as the fictitious ‘Female Association for stirring example of the role that the invasion Preserving Liberty and Property,’ which sought threat of 1588 played in the minds of loyalist to mobilise women for the war effort. On 27 citizens in 1803. Another broadside addressed August 1803, a broadside was issued on behalf ‘To the Inhabitants of the British Isles’ looks to of the aforementioned association, which past monarchs for inspiration in the defence of contained ‘Queen Elizabeth’s Speech to her Britain: People When Threatened by the Spanish Armada.’ The entire speech of ‘that great Our country is threatened with destruction, Which Heaven forbid! repeller of INVASION’ was printed, which is By the manes of our Edwards and our Henrys, attributed before battle with arming her By those of the great Elizabeth, subjects ‘with an holy and irresistible ardour’ to A Princess not inferior to any monarch that ever ‘which exalt, even the vulgar into heroes.’21 The swayed the British sceptre…18 ‘great Princess’ is attributed with conjuring up the story of the first century British tribal Mentioned alongside the King Edward’s and Queen Boadicea, who fought heroically against Henry’s, the ‘great Elizabeth’ stands out in the invading Romans.22 It is then deemed that comparison and is proclaimed to be in no way ‘neither the spirit which animated the Queen of inferior to any British monarch. W.J. Denison’s the Iceni, or the heroic Elizabeth, are extinct in ‘Address to the People of Great Britain’ rhymes this age, if it was necessary to call upon our off many of the successes in English history. Ladies for such efforts.’23 However, women are Amongst them, Elizabeth and the Armada are warned against turning into ‘Amazons’ and to included: ‘Recall the triumphs of Eliza’s reign, / 19 not ‘so much as let their nails grow for the The scourge of Philip and of haughty Spain!’ defence of their country,’ which is to ‘be left to Another broadside appeared that is a song to the men.’24 Therefore, despite the fact that the tune of the famous Royal Navy march Elizabeth was portrayed as the supreme ‘Heart of Oak.’ It is a patriotic verse that defender, females were still denied any public challenges the French and Napoleon, and role in defence. Her ‘heroic spirit,’ which was espouses the superiority of the English. It regarded as still being present at the time, was begins: ‘SHALL FRENCHMEN RULE O’ER only to be enacted on by men. US? / KING EDWARD said, No! / And No! said KING HARRY; and QUEEN BESS she The fact that so many broadsides looked to said, No! / And No! said OLD ENGLAND; / Britain’s past to galvanise defence for the Napoleonic struggle reveals much about British Faces Napoleon, Broadsides of 1803 (Berkeley: University of California, 1944), p. 104. 20 “Song: To the Tune of Hearts of Oak, &c” (London: 17 Ibid., p. 104. Brettell, 1803), quoted in Frank J. Klingberg and Sigurd 18 “To the Inhabitants of the British Isles” (London: B. Hustvedt, eds., The Warning Drum: The British Home Printed for J.ohn Stockdale, 1803), quoted in Frank J. Front Faces Napoleon, Broadsides of 1803 (Berkeley: Klingberg and Sigurd B. Hustvedt, eds., The Warning University of California, 1944), p. 92. Drum: The British Home Front Faces Napoleon, Broadsides of 21 “Queen Elizabeth’s Speech to her People, When 1803 (Berkeley: University of California, 1944), p. 35. Threatened by the Spanish Armada” (London: Printed 19 W.J. Denison, “Address to the People of Great Britain” for James Asperne; by Barnard and Sultzer, 1803) quoted (London: Printed for James Asperne, 1803), quoted in in Squibs on Buonaparte’s Threatened Invasion (London: Frank J. Klingberg and Sigurd B. Hustvedt, eds., The British Library, 1803). Warning Drum: The British Home Front Faces Napoleon, 22 Ibid. Broadsides of 1803 (Berkeley: University of California, 23 Ibid. 1944), p. 138. 24 Ibid. 3
Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) national identity. Stuart Semmel argues in Pray have you not read what Elizabeth said Napoleon and the British (2004), that lurking To her Peers when in Parliament sitting: ‘My Lords, I am told that proud Philip, grown bold, behind the invasion broadsides, which so often To invade us his fleet is now fitting; proudly invoked ancestral triumphs to spur on Your assistance pray lend, our rights to defend, contemporaries, ‘was a nagging worry that the Though I fear not this proud fellow’s bluster; national character was less hardy than it had Not his Armada great, which rides in such state, once been.’25 Consequently, this fear of national Nor all the proud Dons he can muster.’27 decline became a key aspect of British national identity, which can certainly be seen today as Elizabeth is shown to be a strong heroic leader the nation still struggles with coping from the that calls on her people to defeat the proud post-war loss of British Empire. This fear of blustering King of Spain. ‘What she asked was national decline is also evident in the readily granted. / No sooner equipt, she to broadsides where Elizabeth appears, especially Tilbury tript, / Where her forces for victory panted; / But the battle was won; for Drake in the broadsides that call on her person and 28 spirit to inspire for the present struggle. beat / this Don.’ Napoleon is further warned However, the Female Association broadside that the British have been masters of the seas seems to be at odds with Semmel’s argument since the Armada victory, and that Elizabeth’s that the hardiness of the national character legacy lives on with them: might be lacking, as the author of the broadside And confirm’d Bessy Queen of the Ocean. seems to believe that the ancestral heroic spirit Bonaparte, pray read this; nor at all take amiss is still at hand in the present time. Thus, it Those hints which I now lay before you; could also be that while Britons may have been For the very same fate doth now you await concerned about potential national decline if Which proud Philip receiv’d, I assure you: they were to somehow lose the struggle with Though we have not Queen Bess, we her courage possess, Napoleon, there still existed ample confidence And a King who is dear to us all.29 that the nation was fighting a laudable struggle in which just as in the past, Britons possessed Elizabeth’s courage is commended and her the necessary character to triumph again. confirmation as ‘Queen of the Ocean’ is owing Nevertheless, there is some validity to to the long successful English naval tradition Semmel’s arguments and it can be added that that began to take shape under her reign. In Elizabeth was the central historical figure contrast, King George III is not regarded as a invoked in the broadsides, which suggests that defender, but instead the ‘courageous’ and many loyalists viewed her as a leading spiritual ‘bold’ loyalty of the people towards him, is guardian of Britain. nonetheless still proclaimed.
Poetry Henry James Pye is a celebrated poet who published many war poems during the Poetry was a popular form of literature during Napoleonic age. He was Poet Laurete from this period and the major writers of the age, 1790 until his death in 1813 and his most such as Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Byron famous poem is Naucratia; or Naval Dominion and Shelley, were quite concerned with the 26 (1798). It was dedicated to King George III and war. An excellent source of commemoration is a glorification of the rise and progress of the of Elizabeth is Richard Braine’s ‘Serious Advice British at sea. It is an extremely long poem, to Bonaparte,’ which originally appeared in the nearly one thousand lines, but contains a large Gentleman’s Magazine (1803). It cautions section on the Elizabethan era. An entire stanza Napoleon to look back to Elizabeth and the is devoted to the exploits of Sir Francis Drake, great Armada victory, for what is awaiting him. The poem begins: 27 Richard Braine, “Serious Advice to Bonaparte,” in The Gentleman’s Magazine LXXIII (August 1803): pp. 763-764, quoted in Betty T. Bennett, British War Poetry in the Age of 25 Semmel, Napoleon and the British, pp. 64-65. Romanticism: 1793-1815 (London: Garland, 1976), p. 297. 26 Betty T. Bennett, British War Poetry in the Age of 28 Ibid., p. 297. Romanticism: 1793-1815 (London: Garland, 1976), p. ix. 29 Ibid., p. 298. 4
Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) including his famous circumnavigation of the Eisenstein’s famous Alexander Nevsky film, globe and subsequent discoveries, which added which stressed collective courage and resistance ‘new luster to Eliza’s reign.’30 Pye devotes against invaders, was also re-released.34 another much longer stanza to Elizabeth’s war with Spain, where he mentions the privateering Music and Theatre war, as well as the celebrated Armada victory. Much attention is given to liberty as he deems Elizabeth appeared in other forms of art during ‘No force shall bow the race who WILL be the Napoleonic period, such as through song free.’31 The English race is attributed as being and story. Music and song were an important the principal exemplars of freedom and part of everyday life and was in all probability therefore cannot be defeated by any nation. the most prevalent form of entertainment in This is yet another aspect of national identity Britain during the period.35 They also played a that remains to this day and can be heard by major role in the ‘struggle for the loyalty of the politicians in mentions of any conflict with British public’ during the war with France.36 Islamic terrorism. But Pye also portrays Wheeler and Broadley estimate that the number Elizabeth as an active defender of the island, as of loyal songs in fashion during the Great he states: Terror, numbered in the thousands.37 Music was composed largely from the working class Britannia’s Genius heard. Her virgin Queen with some government subsidisation, but was Active in toil, in danger’s face serene aimed at the working class38 to ‘produce a unity Calls to her generous subjects – at her word 32 of sentiment within the community, through a Art spread the sail, and Valour grasp’d the sword.’ 39 collective performance of songs and music.’ A Doran and Freeman contend in The Myth of prime exemplification of this was through the Elizabeth (2003), that ‘Elizabeth’s martial composer and playwright Thomas Dibdin, who reputation is an essential component of her wrote many popular songs such as ‘The Snug entire myth,’ which was ‘to be invoked in times Little Island.’ It first appeared in the The British Raft (1797) and was later reissued as an invasion of national crisis’ and that ‘the defeat of the 40 Spanish Armada’ confirmed Elizabeth ‘as a broadside by John Hatchard. The song evokes great Protestant champion’ and ‘also associated the Armada and Elizabeth is seen as the Elizabeth with English nationalism.’33 This is erstwhile defender and cunning leader of the confirmed in both the Braine and Pye poems, island. She is portrayed as the Queen bee at the as the role of Elizabeth is central to England’s centre of a well-protected hive: victory over Spain and for the nation’s survival, The SPANISH ARMADA set out to invade her, as she is portrayed as the supreme defender of Quite sure, if they ever came nigh land, Britain. The passages also reveal the They couldn’t do less than tuck up Queen Bess, significance of national myth-making, which are And take their full swing in the island. to be summoned in times of fear and danger, in Oh the poor Queen of the island! order to aid in rallying the populace to the The Dons came to plunder the island; But, snug in the hive, the QUEEN was alive nation’s cause. For example, Soviet propaganda hearkened back to thirteenth century Russian national hero Alexander Nevsky, who defended 34 James Combs and Sara T. Combs, Film Propaganda and Russians against invading German Teutonic American Politics: An Analysis and Filmography (New York: knights, as inspiration during the Nazi invasion Garland Pub, 1994), p. 49. 35 of Russia of World War II. He appeared in Mark Philp, “Music and Politics, 1793-1815,” in Resisting Napoleon: The British Response to the Threat of many wartime propaganda posters and Sergei Invasion, 1797-1815 (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), p. 173. 36 Ibid., p. 173. 30 Henry James Pye, Naucratia; or Naval Dominion 37 Wheeler and Broadley, Napoleon and the Invasion, 454. (London: Bulmer, 1798), p. 38. 38 Philp, “Music and Politics, 1793-1815,” 184. 31 Ibid., p. 40. 39 Ibid., p. 176. 32 Ibid., 39. 40 “British Raft” (London: Printed for John Hatchard, 33 Susan Doran and Thomas S. Freeman, The Myth of 1803) quoted in Loyal and Patriotic Hand-Bills, Songs, Elizabeth (Houndmills: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), pp. Addresses, Etc. on the Threatened Invasion of Great Britain by 16-17. Buonaparte (London: British Library, 1803). 5
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And buzz was the word in the island.41 Since the happy times when Elizabeth was Queen.47
The song ‘for years occupied a prominent The happy times of Elizabeth are then position in all patriotic anthologies,’ including contrasted throughout against the degradation many of the early Victorian song-books.’42 and starvation of the present situation, before ending just as the first song, with George III: Song books or ‘musical garlands’ were very popular during the Napoleonic period and May we follow their steps til we happily attain, nearly every large city or town had its own, And the Lord restore the King to his royal throne which normally contained many traditional again. 43 And long may he reign with glory and success, loyalist songs. One such song book from 1800 And may he reign hereafter in heaven’s happiness.48 contains two songs that present a distinct image of Elizabeth and her age. In ‘The Days of good It is wished that the King be restored to his Queen Bess’ she is presented as a celebrated royal throne, which refers to the power held by and successful monarch that brought glory to his unpopular son, the Prince Regent, due to England. It begins: ‘The times to display in the the illness that had stricken George in 1788- days of Queen Bess, Sir, / Whose name and 89.49 Julia Walker in the The Elizabethan Icon: whole memory posterity may bless, Sir, / Oh 1603-2003 (2004), argues that this section 44 the golden days of good Queen Bess!’ The should be taken as ‘bald-faced satire’ due to song goes on to further praise those ‘golden George III being stoned by an angry London days’ where streets were safe, churches were crowd in 1795, which was followed by scores full, food abounded and ‘the poor from the rich of bread riots and the opening of the first soup 45 never wanted relief.’ It then concludes with a kitchen in London in January 1800, to help show of support for the current monarch: ‘And alleviate the food shortage.50 The King certainly King George, like Queen Bess, have his golden had his critics, but Walker may be assigning days, Sir, / And may a longer reign of glory and him too much culpability in this instance. At no success, / Make his name eclipse the fame of point are the ‘present situation’ problems 46 Good Queen Bess.’ George III is wished to placed at his feet, as they are largely general eclipse Elizabeth’s fame, but one cannot help criticisms of the period and arrived at in order but deem this an impossible task after the to paint a superior picture of Elizabeth’s age. It revelations of just how glorious her golden days is more likely the Prince Regent and the King’s were. Especially, when after having already ministers are the primary culprits and that ruled for forty years, George has apparently still George has simply not lived up to Elizabeth’s not yet reached ‘his golden days.’ Elizabeth is fame. However, it is hoped that he can aspire to presented as an even more daunting model to do so and just as in the first song, reign with follow in ‘The Alteration of the Times, or the ‘glory and success.’ Days of George the Third!’ It begins: Further evidence of the existence of Elizabeth I’ll tell you of the times when Queen Bess rul’d the in the collective memory of Britons during the nation, And take a view of things in their present situation. Great Terror appears in plays. Warlike and O what an alteration is now to be seen, patriotic plays became very popular and during the height of the invasion scare the demand almost exceeded the supply.51 At least two 41 Wheeler and Broadley, Napoleon and the Invasion, 178. popular plays directly about the Spanish 42 Ibid., pp. 176, 181. Armada appeared during the invasion threat. 43 Ibid., p. 454. One, where the finale of a performance entitled 44 The Days of good Queen Bess. A new and Universal GARLAND Which contains My own, and the Days of my The Invincible Armada Revived, or, The Destruction of Grandfather, in the following new Songs, viz. I. The Days of Good Queen Bess. II. The Alteration of the Times, or 47 Ibid. the Days of George the Third! III. The Hardy Tar, or the 48 Ibid., p. 5. Seaman’s Complaint (Preston: Printed and sold by T. 49 Julia M. Walker, The Elizabeth Icon: 1603-2003 (New Walker, 1800), 1. York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), p. 118. 45 Ibid., p. 2. 50 Ibid, p. 119. 46 Ibid., p. 3. 51 Wheeler and Broadley, Napoleon and the Invasion, p. 436. 6
Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) an Invading Fleet was on display at Bartholomew Tilbury. Elizabeth is an upright and straight- Fair, was a British institution for centuries until back position, which points to the ‘upright the Victorian period.52 Upton’s Spanish Armada nature of the British as they saw themselves in was the other, which became a popular stage comparison to the French.’56 The George Cross production, as the 31 May 1804 Times attests to: of England is waving in the background and Elizabeth as leader is surrounded by a large The grand Historical Spectacle of the Armada, now group of static men that defer to her authority. representing with such uncommon applause at the This is contrasted by the fact that Elizabeth is New Amphitheatre, Westminster-Bridge, is certainly in motion on her way to win the battle, as one of the most happy, appropriate, and impressive 57 subjects that could be produced at the present witnessed by her flying scarf. The battle is moment; every word, every incident, carrying with it ‘clearly to be won by Elizabeth,’ as she ‘goes some interesting and forcible allusion…53 forth, paradoxically alone in a crowd, to face a task that will save her nation.’58 This agency of The Armada is referred to in glowing terms and Elizabeth in the Armada tale is firmly evident, provides a direct allusion to the present day unlike the later Victorian and Edwardian situation. Another article appeared in The Times periods, which credited the men around her shortly afterwards which adds: such as Francis Drake and Walter Raleigh.59 This suggests that the threat Britain faced in The fine representation of the new spectacle of 1805 was so great, that the nation was crying 1588…has increased the celebrity of the Royal Amphitheatre to such a degree, as to cause to cause as out for a leader who could inspire and deliver much stir and avidity to behold this performance as victory, even if that leader was a woman. ever attended the fate of the most popular production on the stage.54 The fear of French invasion also inspired extraordinary efforts by caricaturists. Visual As The Monthly Mirror reveals, the play was a satires were very popular during the patriotic spectacle designed ‘to inspire British Napoleonic period, as more caricatures were bosoms with enthusiastic ardour to repel a published in 1803, (the known figure is at least menacing desperate adventurer when he shall 250) at the height of the invasion scare, than in 55 dare to attempt the invasion of our shores.’ any year prior 1815.60 The majority focused on national defence, even eclipsing the customary Portraits and Caricatures favourite topic of taxes and many are specifically cantered on Channel defence.61 Another significant source of art that Queen John Bull was by far the most popular figure, Elizabeth appeared in was print and caricature. but Jack Tar and Britannia were also Elizabeth’s visit and celebrated speech to her represented. In terms of English historical main army at Tilbury prior to the arrival of the figures, of the 1400 prints from the Curzon ill-fated Spanish Armada in 1588, firmly Collection: Images of Napoleon and British Fears of established her iconic status as a warrior queen. Invasion, 1789-1815, only General James Wolfe Similar to Henry V’s oration at Agincourt in and Elizabeth I were evoked.62 Popular London 1415, Elizabeth at Tilbury is an epic moment in English history and legend. This scene is no better exemplified than in Thomas Stothard’s 56 Walker, The Elizabeth Icon, p. 120. 1805 print, entitled Queen Elizabeth at Tilbury 57 Ibid., p. 122. (Appendix 1). The print is the perfect 58 Ibid., p. 122. propaganda poster to inspire confidence and 59 Michael Dobson and Nicola J. Watson, England’s also resistance to Napoleon’s threatened Elizabeth: An Afterlife in Fame and Fantasy (Oxford: Oxford invasion. Elizabeth is depicted as a saviour in University, 2002), p. 201. 60 Alexandra Franklin, ‘John Bull in a Dream: Fear and armour on a white horse leading her army at Fantasy in the Visual Satires of 1803’, in Resisting Napoleon: The British Response to the Threat of Invasion, 1797- 1815 (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), p. 126. 52 Ibid., p. 445. 61 Ibid., p. 130. 53 The Times, 31 May 1804, p. 4. 62 Prints from the Curzon Collection: Images of Napoleon and 54 The Times, 9 June 1804, p. 4. British Fears of Invasion, 1789-1815, n.d., 55 The Monthly Mirror, July 1804, p. 127. Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) print shop owner William Holland’s 1803 print, been a leading symbol of the spirit of the ‘The Ghost of Queen Elizabeth!!’ (Appendix 2) British nation and although she was often is an exemplary example of Elizabeth as utilised to urge the public to prepare for defender of Britain.63 The caricature was defence in this period, she was normally ‘among the best-known in cheap print’ and like depicted as a ‘defenseless but virtuous female’ most of the other caricatures, it offered a and placed in an ‘acceptable domestic fantastical vision.64 Elizabeth appears as a ghost context.’65 This contrasts with portrayals of to haunt a clearly terrified Napoleon, so Elizabeth, who was afforded the license to terrified in fact, that his hat has leapt of his actually become the active defender of Britain, head, as he recoils aghast with arms raised and as witnessed in Stothard’s Tilbury print, or to at mouth gaping. She is holding a portrait entitled, least be displaying the requisite leadership for ‘Defeat of the Spanish Armada’ and while defence. The holding of political office was directing Napoleon’s gaze towards it, she entirely a masculine domain in this period and exclaims: ‘Monster! Look at that and tremble!!!’ female involvement in politics was largely The characterisation of Napoleon as a monster, deemed to be unacceptable because it was at the heart of the invasion caricatures, but challenged the natural order. The evocations of the existence of such a popular print that was Elizabeth do confirm this, most notably in the one of the only ones to invoke a historical Female Association broadside. However, more figure to oppose Napoleon, speaks volumes often than not during the invasion threat, about the prominence that Elizabeth held in Elizabeth is afforded the ability to be more the Napoleonic mind. It also lends further than just a maternal influence for the nation credence to the notion that there existed a and is instead the primary political protagonist pronounced concern that Britain lacked a of many Elizabethan evocations. It would martial figure that could actually defeat appear that during the invasion threat, some Napoleon. This caricature instead betrays a thought that the situation the nation faced was confidence in the past to which Britain shall be so dire that gender concerns should be set victorious, because she has already triumphed aside, thus allowing for even a woman to lend before. aid in the political sphere. Concluding Remarks National identity is another important theme that arises in this study. Evocations of No serious study of Elizabeth can be Elizabeth played into how Britons saw undertaken without some treatment afforded to themselves, which was most commonly the theme of gender. The representations of attributed as being hardy, honourable and Elizabeth certainly did not alter gender roles at courageous. These are important traits in the time, but they did challenge the existing defence and the defence against invasion is a preconception that women did not belong in common theme in British history, so it makes politics. While Elizabeth was used as an perfect sense that these traits formed a key important symbol of defence during the period, aspect of national identity in the Elizabeth the sole female to have eclipsed her in readings of the period. Elizabeth is also chiefly evocations in this manner, especially in characterised as a leading defender of Britain caricature, was Britannia. Britannia has long and the British people. In many instances England was substituted for Britain, which does easily make English the most dominant national bin/library?site=localhost&a=p&p=about&c=politi04& identity in Elizabeth’s representations. ct=0&l=en&w=iso-8859-1> (3 September 2011). However, this is likely owing to the fact that 63 “The Ghost of Queen Elizabeth!!” Prints from the Curzon Collection: Images of Napoleon and British Fears of she was simply Queen of England, as Great Invasion, 1789-1815, (London: William Holland, 20 July Britain did not come into being until a century 1803), b.12(8), Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) the question of national primacy. Nor does it to paint an image of an inept and feeble seem either that a new concept of Britishness monarch incapable of defending Britain. appears in the Elizabeth readings. Linda Colley’s seminal work Britons: Forging the Nation Elizabeth was certainly the most evoked 1707-1837 (1992), argues that the British came monarch and likely one of the most common to define themselves against the French ‘Other’ historical references in Britain during the Great and this does appear marginally in the Elizabeth Terror. Although the use of Elizabeth in the readings, but the identification of Britishness period was varied, she is largely cast in a very owes much more to the perceived national positive light as the staunch defender of greatness achieved under Elizabeth, especially Britain. Overall, the evidence does not point to with regards to the forging of the nation’s much of a parallel political agenda at work in martial and naval prowess against a rival her deployments, as it was predominantly Spain.66 Colley also argues that Britons came to loyalists that evoked her and who were rarely define themselves increasingly with the critical of the King and more often than not, monarchy in this period, to which Elizabeth quite praiseworthy. However, it is likely that no offers an interesting comparison with George other age has displayed such a pronounced III. uniformity of praise for Elizabeth. This appears to be the case because she did seem to Julia Walker argues that the nostalgia on display fill a martial leadership gap during the Great for Elizabeth ‘was mixed with genuine desire Terror, as the nation looked to the past, to both for a monarch capable of personally generating its most recent invasion defence and its greatest a victory.’67 This argument actually originated military triumph, for inspiration in its biggest with Christopher Hill in his essay, ‘Censorship subsequent struggle. Lastly, since her death, and English Literature’ (1985). He noted that: twice the nation has faced an invasion crisis and ‘A favourable method of political denigration although it is out of the bounds of discussion within acceptable limits was to praise Queen for this paper, a detailed study of the popular Elizabeth – often excessively – in order by cultural representations of Elizabeth during the implication to criticise her successors.’68 Nazi German invasion threat of World War II, However, during the Great Terror, Elizabeth would offer a particularly useful comparison to was only directly used to criticise George III in this study. the two chapbook songs. Therefore, it would seem that the praise afforded to Elizabeth was more about looking back to a bygone golden ______age, than the deployment of a parallel political agenda. It cannot be ignored that George III was portrayed as an important symbol of national resistance when one examines the entirety of the broadside and caricature narratives during the invasion threats, even if it was a bit part. The loyalty of his subjects towards George III is also never questioned and his appearance in the popular culture of the time does dramatically outweigh Elizabeth. Therefore, while the image of Elizabeth as defender was certainly cultivated, it should not be allowed to entirely undermine George III, or 66 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837, 3rd ed. (London: Pimlico, 2003), p. 5. 67 Walker, The Elizabeth Icon, p. 120. 68 Christopher Hill, The Collected Essays of Christopher Hill, vol. 1, Society and Literature in seventeenth century England (Brighton: The Harvester Press Limited, 1985), p. 57. 9 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) Appendix 1 Elizabeth at Tilbury (1805) 10 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) Appendix 2 The Ghost of Queen Elizabeth!! (1803) 11 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) U.S. Counter-Insurgency Strategy in Iraq during the Tenure of General David Petraeus Jack Curran-Persell Introduction argument as necessary. By the end of David Petraeus’s tenure as Background commander of Multi National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I), there was a feeling in many quarters The first four years of the Iraq war which that he and his COIN strategy had saved the began on 20 March 2003 and officially ended 1 United States from the brink of defeat in Iraq. on 18 December 2011 were strategically However, I will argue that the reduction in unsuccessful for the United States. Coalition violence actually occurred due to a synergetic forces had won the decisive battles but, for a relationship between Petraeus’s COIN strategy number of reasons, they were unprepared to and a combination of three significant social counter the violent insurgency that followed. and political changes in Iraq: the Anbar For the most part, commanders focused their Awakening, the al-Sadr ceasefire, and ethnic efforts on ‘kill and capture’ missions conducted displacement in Baghdad. This paper will begin from their main base, with an emphasis on U.S. by providing a brief outline of the context in force protection and transition of responsibility which Petraeus was appointed commander of to the Iraqi security forces (ISF) as quickly as MNF-Iraq and how the ‘surge narrative’ possible.2 Throughout 2006, Iraq descended developed. The second part of the paper will into sectarian civil war and the number of focus on the ethnic displacement which took civilians killed rose alarmingly, peaking at 125 place in Baghdad in 2006 and 2007. The third each night in December of that year.3 In section will explore the Anbar Awakening and January 2007, George W. Bush approved a new its relationship to the COIN strategy. The final COIN strategy which was centred on the part will explore the new strategy’s connection introduction of 30,000 more troops into Iraq, to the ceasefire ordered by Muqtada al-Sadr. as well as the adoption of a new set of tactics which was informed by The U.S. Army/Marine Throughout the paper, ‘U.S. COIN strategy’ Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24) will also be referred to as ‘the surge’ and will be released the previous year.4 This strategy taken to mean both the increase in troop became known as ‘the surge’ and it would be numbers as well as the adoption of the new overseen by the newly appointed commander population-centric COIN doctrine. The of Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I), timeframe under analysis is the period from 10 General David Petraeus. February 2007 to 16 September 2008 as this was the period in which Petraeus commanded Petraeus saw the solution to the conflict in MNF-I. Examples from outside of this political-terms and built a strategy which aimed timeframe will also be used to support the to protect the Iraqi population from insurgent groups and militias, especially in Baghdad 1 Leo Shane III, ‘Interview with Sen. John McCain’, in Stars and Stripes (11 August 2008), online at http://www.stripes.com/news/stars-and-stripes- 2 Congressional Record – Proceedings and Debates of the 110th interview-with-sen-john-mccain-1.82024 (last accessed 8 Congress, September 18 2007-September 28 2007, (United June 2016); Urs Gehriger, ‘Counterinsurgency in Iraq and States Government Printing Office, 2007), p. 440. Afghanistan: An Interview with John Nagl’, in World 3 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Politics Review, 18 September 2008, online at Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford University Press, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/2672/coun 2008) p. 126. terinsurgency-in-iraq-and-afghanistan-an-interview-with- 4 David H. Petraeus & James F. Amos, Field Manual 3-24, john-nagl (last accessed 8 June 2016). (United States Marine Corps, 2006). 12 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) where 80% of the sectarian violence had victorious and, despite disagreeing on the occurred in 2006.5 By doing this, the ultimate future of the American military in Iraq, goal was to create breathing space for Prime Presidential nominees John McCain and Barack Minister Nouri al-Maliki to carry out a series of Obama both agreed that the surge had brought reforms which, it was hoped, would lead to incredible security gains.11 political reconciliation and a government which could be viewed as legitimate by the Iraqi The American public echoed their population.6 To improve security, American endorsements. According to CNN/ Opinion troops were stationed within the Iraqi Research Corporation polls, in July 2007 only population in combat outposts (COP) as 22% of Americans believed the surge was a opposed to large Forward Operating Bases success.12 By July 2008, that figure had risen to (FOB). They partnered with the ISF, conducted 52%, and increased to 60% by September foot rather than vehicular patrols, actively built 2010.13 Accounts written by those in the ties with local community leaders, and adopted military or by reporters embedded within the many other methods documented in FM 3-24. armed forces tended to reflect this public Most importantly, all coalition forces were sentiment as well. Lieutenant Colonel Jim following the same set of tactics for the first Crider attributed the resumption of city life in time. Baghdad to his unit’s use of ‘the “close encounters” strategy and a constant presence’; The Surge Narrative Kimberly Kagan’s The Surge, one of the first in- depth studies on the period, assigned the credit Iraqi civilian fatalities fell slowly in the first to the change in strategy; and Linda Robinson eight months of the surge from 3,000 to 2,600 gave most of the recognition to Petraeus who, before decreasing sharply to 1,380 in she argued, had ‘accomplished a historic feat of September 2007.7 They continued to fall turning around the war.’14 However, other steadily throughout the rest of 2007 and 2008 commentators were more cautious about except for a small increase between February assigning success solely to the change in andApril as a result of violence in Basra.8 By military strategy. They pointed to other factors September 2008, there were 600 Iraqi civilian on the ground, that could potentially have deaths, the lowest that figure had been since proved decisive, one of which was the ethnic January 2004.9 Petraeus appeared to have met segregation of Baghdad.15 all of his objectives to improve Iraq’s security which were set out by President Bush on 10 11 Michael R. Gordon, ‘Rivals Present Sharp Divide’, in January 2007.10 With violence dramatically The New York Times (5 October 2008), online at decreased, the cause-and-effect relationship http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/06/us/politics/06ele between the surge and the decrease in violence cted.html (last accessed 10 January 2016); John McCain, ‘The Surge Worked’, in The Wall Street seemed logical to many observers. Throughout Journal, 10 January 2008, online at 2008, neoconservative discourse in the United http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB119992665423979631 States had declared Petraeus’s COIN strategy (last accessed 10 January 2016); ‘Linsey Graham: Speech to Congress’, NPR (4 September 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId 5 Darin E.W. Johnson, ‘2007 in Iraq: The Surge and =94303964 (last accessed 10 January 2016). Benchmarks – A New Way Forward?’, in American 12 Polling Report.com, ‘Iraq War’, online at University International Law Review, Vol. 24 (2008), p. 252; http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq.htm (last accessed 12 Petraeus & Amos, FM 3-24, p. 34. January 2016). 6 ‘The New Way Forward’, online at http://2001- 13 Ibid. 2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/78567.htm (last accessed 10 14 James R. Crider, ‘A View from Inside the Surge’, in June 2016). Military Review (March/ April 2009), p. 85; Kimberly 7 Iraq Body Count Casualty Database, online at Kagan, The Surge: A Military History (Encounter Books, https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/ (last accessed 2009); Linda Robinson, Tell Me How This Ends: General 10 June 2015). David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq (Public 8 Ibid. Affairs, 2008), p. 346. 9 Ibid. 15 Steve Coll, ‘The Generals Dilemma: David Petraeus, 10 ‘The New Way Forward’, online at http://2001- the Pressures of Politics, and the Road out of Iraq’, in 2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/78567.htm (last accessed 10 The New Yorker, 8 September 2008, online at June 2015). http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/09/08/the- 13 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) Ethnic Displacement pushing in to Sunni-occupied central Baghdad when the violence began decreasing in Throughout 2006 and 2007, sectarian violence September 2007.21 The fighting tended to occur levels against civilians in Baghdad escalated at the frontiers or fault lines between significantly with the trigger being the bombing neighbourhoods therefore once an area was of the Shiite Samarra mosque by al-Qaeda in conquered, the frontier simply moved.22 Had Iraq (AQI) on 22 February 2006. 16 The the frontiers disappeared as a result of a subsequent violence, which had features of a complete Sunni exit, then the ethnic cleansing civil war, resulted in large-scale population thesis could explain the majority of violence displacement within Baghdad that transformed reduction, but that was not the case as there the Iraqi capital from a mixed Sunni-Shiite city still existed large Sunni communities in into a segregated one.17 Many argue that by the Baghdad which JAM were attempting to time the surge had started, ethnic enclaves had penetrate.23 When the extra American troops already been created that were impermeable to arrived with new operational guidelines, they continued sectarian cleansing. Evidence to built blast barriers and erected concrete dividers support this thesis comes in the form of along these sectarian fault lines. These satellite imagery which shows the ‘nighttime checkpoints, berms and other population light signature’ in Baghdad increasing between control measures continued to be necessary 2003 and 2006 before declining rapidly from during the surge.24 More importantly, ethnic March 2006 to December 2007.18 The displacement in Baghdad cannot account for decreased light signatures appear to suggest the reduction of violence in predominantly that properties were being vacated or Sunni areas such as Anbar Province where abandoned by people being displaced by attacks were reduced from 1,350 in October violence. Maps produced by Columbia 2006 to 200 in August 2007.25 University also show the changing ethnicity demographic between 2006 and 2008 which The Anbar Awakening seems to endorse this theory.19 In September 2006, twelve sheikhs in the However, the ‘nighttime light signature’ study Anbar region came together to form the does not allow for possible variations in Awakening Council in response to AQI’s use of electricity supply and damage to power brutal tactics on the Sunni population. infrastructure, something very common in war Interviews with Iraqis suggest that the zones.20 Furthermore, the occurrence of ethnic grievances were twofold: not only had AQI separation does not necessarily translate into an violated tribal traditions, impinged on the immediate reduction of violence. The Mahdi money-making activities of the existing elites Army (JAM) and other Shiite factions were still and terrorised the population, they had also attempting to conquer territory and were proved to be an ineffective force in protecting Sunnis from Shiite-led violence in Baghdad generals-dilemma (last accessed 11 January 2016); Dexter during 2006.26 Therefore the objective of the Filkins, ‘Exiting Iraq, Petraeus Says Gains Are Fragile’, in The New York Times, 20 August 2008, online at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/21/world/middleeas 21 Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman & Jacob N. t/21general.html (last accessed 23 January 2016). Shapiro, ‘Testing the Surge: Why did Violence Decline in 16 Iraq Body Count Casualty Database, online at Iraq in 2007?’, in International Security, Vol. 37 (2008), pp. https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/ (last accessed 15-18. 4 June 2016). 22 Ibid. 17 The Gulf/ 2000 Project, ‘Ethnic composition in 2006- 23 Ibid. 2008’, http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/maps.shtml (last 24 David H. Ucko, ‘Critics Gone Wild: Counterinsurgency accessed 4 June 2016). as the Root of All Evil’, in Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 18 J. Agnew, ‘Baghdad Nights: evaluating the US military 25 (2014), p. 172. “surge” using nighttime light signatures’, in Environment 25 David H. Petraeus, ‘Report to Congress, September and Planning A, Vol. 40 (2008), pp. 2285-2295. 2007’, online at 19 The Gulf/ 2000 Project, ‘Ethnic composition in 2006- http://www.comw.org/warreport/fulltext/070911petrae 2008’, http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/maps.shtml (last us.pdf (last accessed 19 January 2015). accessed 19 January 2016). 26 Gary W. Montgomery (ed.), Al-Anbar Awakening, 20 Agnew, ‘Baghdad Nights’, p. 2292. Volume II. Iraqi Perspectives: From Insurgency to 14 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) council was to expel them from the area.27 In of Iraq became inaccessible to AQI, the order to do this, the group – which was a insurgents were driven into the desert where mixture of tribal members and Sunni they could no longer hide in plain sight and nationalists – needed to find a new ally. An were more easily eliminated.32 Secondly, it alliance with the United States suited both increased the firepower of the coalition forces. parties who could each further their own This increase in numbers combined with the political interests. The U.S. military created and segregation of the enemy meant that for the funded organisations such as the ‘Sons of Iraq’ first time, General Ray Odinero, Petraeus’s (SOI) and the much smaller ‘Daughters of Iraq’ second-in-command, could conduct full-scale (DOI) which entitled members who joined the operations in which multiple enemy locations fight against AQI $300/ month, training and a were targeted simultaneously as opposed to the potential career in the ISF.28 This helped the small tactical assaults they had previously been Awakening spread to the ring of Sunni suburbs limited to.33 Thirdly, it increased the legitimacy surrounding the Baghdad known as the of the government and the U.S. forces in the ‘Baghdad Belts’, to the north of Iraq and eyes of the general population as towns such as eventually the whole country.29 At its peak in Ramadi re-developed a police force, city May 2008 there were 103,000 members of SOI government, and growing economy.34 The on the U.S. payroll, eighty-five percent of police and army especially were a prerequisite whom were Sunnis.30 for holding territory and denying it to the insurgents.35 The final and most important This rapid spread of the Awakening had a large benefit was the improvement in intelligence it number of benefits for the U.S. military, all of provided. In order to best reduce the friction which were crucial for the reduced violence. of war, good intelligence is paramount and The first was that it removed a significant indeed there is an entire chapter dedicated to it number of opponents from the battlefield. in FM 3-24 which explicitly states ‘the ultimate John Allen, the Deputy Commanding General success or failure of the mission depends on of Multi-National Forces West, commented the effectiveness of the intelligence effort.’36 that, ‘when a sheikh came over he took his Therefore, acquiring thousands of former entire Area of Operations (AO) off the map to insurgents who had intimate knowledge of the the disadvantage of AQI.’31 As more sections human terrain meant that the armed forces were able to terminate targets, conduct raids on Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009, (Marine Corps insurgent safe houses and find hidden weapon 37 University Press, 2009), p. 242. caches more efficiently than ever before. It is 27 John A. Nagl & Brian M. Burton, ‘Thinking Globally clear how important this movement was for the and Acting Locally: Counterinsurgency Lessons from U.S. war effort, but how much of an impact – Modern Wars – A Reply to Jones and Smith’, in Journal of if any – did Petraeus’s COIN strategy have on Strategic Studies, Vol. 33 (2010), pp. 131-132. 28 Catherine Dale, ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, the emergence of this critical movement? Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress’, CRS Report for Congress (2009), pp. 113-125; Mike Starz, 32 Fred W. Baker III, ‘Al-Qaeda Fighters Flee Cities, Head ‘Soldiers Help Create “Daughters of Iraq” Program,’ in for Desert or Out of Iraq’, in Department of Defense News, Department of Defense News, 18 April 2008, online at 11 February 2008, online at http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=49 http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=48 628 (last accessed 4 June 2016); ‘U.S. trains Iraqi women 931 (last accessed 4 June 2016). to find female suicide bombers’, in CNN (18 June 2008), 33 Kagan, The Surge, p. 201. http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/06/24/d 34 Shultz, The Marines Take Anbar, p. 212. aughters.of.iraq/index.html?iref=topnews (last accessed 4 35 Edward N. Luttwak, ‘Dead End: Counterinsurgency June 2016); Adma Weinstein, ‘“Sons of Iraq” Transition Warfare as Military Malpractice’, in Harper’s Magazine to New Role, Purpose in Anbar’, in Department of Defense (February 2007), pp. 33-42. News, 30 December 2008, online at 36 Petraeus & Amos, FM 3-24. http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=52 37 M. Lynch, ‘Explaining the Awakening: Engagement, 507 (last accessed 4 June 2016). Publicity, and the Transformation of Iraqi Sunni Political 29 Dale, ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’, pp. 116-121. Attitudes’, in Security Studies, Vol. 20 (2011), p. 37; D. 30 Ibid. Matthews, ‘How Important Was the Surge?’, in The 31 Richard H. Shultz Jr., The Marines Take Anbar: The Four- American Prospect, 25 July 2008, online at Year Fight Against Al Qaeda (Naval Institute Press, 2013), http://prospect.org/article/how-important-was-surge p. 212. (last accessed 15 January 2016). 15 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) There are two interrelated arguments that are were far less predictable.42 These men also used to disprove the surge had an impact on prioritised the courting of local leaders, the the Awakening. The first and most evident is recruitment of police forces and the that the Awakening Council was formed on 9 transference of responsibility to the police for September 2006, four months before George patrols.43 All of these tactics were being utilised Bush even announced the change in strategy widely by American troops by mid-2007 but in and eight months before the final of the five previous years, they were considered ground- brigades was deployed to Baghdad.38 The breaking.44 The results in their Area of second is that most of the U.S. army had Operations were widely-recognised and it is already adapted to COIN tactics by 2004, but unsurprising that the Awakening originated in the reason that rates of violence had not Ramadi under MacFarland’s leadership.45 Whilst declined is because the political conditions were the limitations of primary data mean it is not as favourable in 2003-2006. Colonel Gian difficult to assess fully the use of tactics by Gentile who is a West Point lecturer and Iraq other commanders, Gentile offers no further war veteran argues both points. According to evidence beyond an account of his own him, the only difference brought about by the battalion that COIN tactics were widespread. surge was the introduction of COPs but other This is in contrast to a wealth of secondary and than that, the tactics and strategy of ‘protecting journalistic accounts that argue the methods the population’ had remained the same.39 Bill used by McMaster and MacFarland were Ardolino also concludes that ‘local political extremely rare before David Petraeus arrived in conditions, many of them beyond U.S. control 2007 and that the tactics being used by U.S. were responsible for much of the rapid security forces across the different AOs in Iraq were far progress seen in Iraq during 2007-8.’40 These from unified.46 Therefore it is very important to two strands of argument will be addressed next. recognise that the Anbar Awakening – a movement which has come to be viewed as a Contrary to Gentile’s account, COIN had not critical component in the reduction of violence been implemented widely from 2004. Its – actually originated in one of the very few methods had only been utilised by a handful of areas where COIN methods were being used commanders such as Colonel H.M. McMaster in Tal Afar in 2005 and Colonel Sean 42 MacFarland in Ramadi in 2006.41 Both were Ibid. 43 Ibid. among the first to utilise COPs which improved 44 Niel Smith & Sean MacFarland, ‘Anbar Awakens: The intelligence capabilities, moved troops closer to Tipping Point’, in Military Review (2008), pp. 41-52. the population and ensured coalition troops 45 Biddle et al., ‘Testing the Surge’ pp. 22-23. 46 S. Biddle et al., ‘Correspondence: Assessing the Synergy Thesis in Iraq’, in International Security, Vol. 37 38 Fotini Christia, Alliance Formation in Civil Wars (2013) p. 190; for literature on U.S. strategy and tactics (Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 235; John A. prior to the surge see David J. Betz, ‘The More you McCary, ‘The Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Know, the Less you Understand: The Problem with Incentives’, in The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 32 (2009), pp. Information Warfare’, in Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 52-53 29, No. 3 (June 2006), pp. 505-533; James Gow, ‘The 39 Judah Grunstein, ‘The Limits of the Surge: An New Clausewitz? War, Force, Art and Utility – Rupert Interview with Gian Gentile,’ in World Politics Review Smith on 21st Century Strategy, Operations and Tactics (2008), online at in a Comprehensive Context’, in Journal of Strategic Studies, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/1924/the- Vol. 29, No. 6 (December 2006), pp. 1151-1170; Thomas limits-of-the-surge-an-interview-with-gian-gentile (last E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq accessed 15 June 2016) (Penguin, 2006); Peter W. Singer, ‘Tactical Generals: 40 Bill Ardolino, Fallujah Awakens: Marines, Sheikhs, and the Leaders, Technology, and the Perils of Battlefield Battle Against Al Qaeda (Naval Institute Press, 2013), p. Micromanagement’, in Air & Space Power Journal, Vol. 23 219 (2009), online at 41 Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble: General Petraeus and the https://www.brookings.edu/articles/tactical-generals- American Military Adventure in Iraq (Penguin, 2009) pp. 56- leaders-technology-and-the-perils/ (last visited 10 June 60; T. Ricks ‘The Lessons of Counterinsurgency’, in The 2016); Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in Washington Post, 16 February 2006, onlne at the Modern World (Penguin, 2006); Paul Yingling, ‘A http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- Failure in Generalship’, in Armed Forces Journal, (2007), dyn/content/article/2006/02/15/AR2006021502586.ht online at http://armedforcesjournal.com/a-failure-in- ml (last accessed 4 June 2016) generalship (last accessed 10 June 2016). 16 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) prior to the surge. situation? The answer is that they lacked the doctrine and capacity to protect the population Despite MacFarland’s success, it is highly and help these pockets of resistance flourish in unlikely that the Awakening movement would to a fully-fledged Awakening.52 The military’s have been able to sustain itself, let alone spread focus at the time was on targeting individual throughout the rest of Iraq had it not been for insurgent leaders and protection of their own the new coherent COIN strategy that was forces, not the Iraqis. There is little wonder introduced in 2007.47 Evidence for this is found therefore that one of the first questions by examining the past behaviour of Sunni tribal prospective SOIs asked U.S. troops in 2007 was leaders who had attempted to re-align with ‘will you stay this time?’53 Indeed, MacFarland Coalition forces against AQI on four separate stated that the major obstacle in persuading the occasions between 2004 and 2006. Tellingly, Sheikhs to join the Awakening was the each attempt failed to materialise in to a wider- ‘memory of their first, failed attempt at reaching movement.48 In 2004, the Nimr establishing the Al-Anbar People’s Council’ in alliance formed but the coalition only sent one late 2005.54 However, with the change in Special Forces team of twelve to support the strategy, extra troops provided security for the group and they were easily put down. In 2005, Awakening sheikhs at meetings; military Colonel Dale Allford’s U.S. marines twice support was more forthcoming; and U.S forces attempted to develop ties with the Hamza were prepared to risk more to provide Brigade, later known as Desert Protectors.49 protection to the Iraqis.55 Perhaps most The first was a failure due to lack of U.S. importantly, Petraeus and Odinero encouraged support but on the second occasion, supported brigade and battalion commanders to replicate by only Allford’s marines, the Hamza Brigade the Anbar model elsewhere by making deals successfully defeated AQI and held the city of with ‘reconcilable’ sections of the Sunni al-Qaim. Some point to this as a success which insurgency.56 By doing this, they ensured that undermines the thesis that a COIN strategy resistance did not remain a local phenomenon. was needed to support Sunni resistance It must be emphasised this was not a stroke of movements.50 It was certainly a tactical victory luck; advice from Marines on the ground that but far from the widespread strategic success additional U.S. forces could expand this that the Awakening developed in to. The fourth movement against AQI was one of the reasons attempt in November 2005 was most similar to more troops were sent.57 This objective can also the Awakening - seventeen tribal elders came be seen in the original campaign plan.58 Yet together to form a council, directing tribesmen AQI were not the only enemy that the U.S. was in to the police. However, yet again, the alliance battling in Iraq, they also had to counter the broke down as the U.S. failed to protect the Shiite militias and in particular JAM. leadership and half of the elders had been killed by January.51 Therefore if discontent with AQI was not a 52 Ibid. new phenomenon among the tribes in late 53 Kagan, The Surge, p. 197. 2006, why did the pre-surge forces of MNF-I 54 Smith & MacFarland, ‘Anbar Awakens’, p. 46. 55 Andrew Hosken, Empire of Fear: Inside the Islamic State under the generalship of Ricardo Sanchez and (Oneworld, 2015), p. 102. then George Casey not take advantage of the 56 David H. Petraeus, ‘How we Won in Iraq’, in Foreign Policy, 29 October 2013, online at http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/10/29/how-we-won-in- 47 Peter Mansoor, Surge: My Journey with General David iraq/ (last accessed 4 June 2016). Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War (Yale University 57 M. O’Sullivan, ‘The Decision to Surge’, in The Press, 2013). Washington Post, 15 September 2008, online at 48 Biddle et al., ‘Testing the Surge’, p. 19. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- 49 Russell W. Glenn, Rethinking Western Approaches to dyn/content/discussion/2008/09/12/DI200809120273 Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Post-Colonial Conflict 9.html (last accessed 12 January 2016). (Routledge, 2015), p. 206. 58 U.S. Department of State Archive, ‘Fact Sheet: The 50 Biddle et al., ‘Correspondence: Assessing the Synergy New Way Forward in Iraq’, 10 January 2007, online at Thesis’, p. 184 http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/78567.htm (last 51 Biddle et al., ‘Testing the Surge’, pp. 19-22. accessed 12 January 2016). 17 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) The al-Sadr Ceasefire Petraeus’s COIN strategy.64 Common knowledge suggested the stand-down was a On 29 August 2007, a six-month ceasefire was result of al-Sadr’s desire to consolidate his ordered by Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of the territorial gains and re-take control of the Sadrist movement and JAM, a militia loyal to al- militia which had become increasingly Sadr which had been formed in June 2003 in factionalised.65 Indeed, there were two concerns response to the invasion of the United States. for al-Sadr, apparently unrelated to the surge. Since then, they had engaged in intermittent The first was that JAM was engaged in an fighting with American forces, Sunni ongoing rivalry with the Badr Organisation, extremists, and more recently with other Shiite many of whom worked for the Iraqi police. militias such as Abdul Aziz al-Hakim’s Badr This culminated in a battle in Karbala where Corps.59 They had also been responsible for a JAM killed several hundred people during a large part of the ethnic cleansing of Sunnis in religious festival and incurred over three Baghdad in 2006 and the first half of 2007. hundred casualties of its own. Many observers The ceasefire meant that no coalition forces or in August 2007 assumed the ceasefire was a the ISF were to be attacked, snipers and bombs result of this bloodshed and nothing to do with were to be removed from the roadsides and, as the new strategy. As Lindsay and Long argue, with the creation of SOI, it took a large ‘coalition forces did not play a substantial role number of fighters off the battlefield, freeing in the Karbala battle, further underscoring that up U.S. forces to target AQI.60 The remaining if Sadr feared anything it was his fellow Shiites, rogue militia who ignored al-Sadr’s ceasefire not the surge.’66 The second concern for al-Sadr were also seriously disadvantaged as they were was that JAM was alienating the Shiite without safe houses, financial support, population on which it depended for new intelligence and concealment, leading to them recruits. The militia’s original objective at its being exposed to U.S. firepower in ways they creation was to protect the Shiite population had not been previously.61 Over an eight-month from Sunni and American attacks which they period between January 2007 and August 2007, did initially. However, as the population became civilian deaths only decreased by an average of more dependent on them for protection, some 67 deaths per month from 3017 to 2481.62 elements of the militias grew predatory and However, from August to September, civilian increasingly engaged in criminal activity.67 JAM deaths decreased by a significant 1094 to 1387 was therefore struggling to attract new recruits and continued to decrease monthly for the rest from the disenfranchised community. Al-Sadr of the year.63 This suggests that the al-Sadr was well aware JAM had an image problem and ceasefire could have been an important saw this as a potential opportunity to try to contributing factor in violence-reduction. reform his militia.68 However, like the Anbar Unlike the Anbar Awakening, this development Awakening, the al-Sadr cease-fire should not be was not in the American campaign plan, analysed separately from the surge. therefore to many onlookers, this was a fortuitous development completely unrelated to There are three ways in which the change in U.S. strategy related to the decision by al-Sadr to issue a ceasefire. The first is that, for more 59 John R. Ballard, David W. Lamm & John K. Wood, troops to be sent to Iraq, the Bush From Kabul to Baghdad and Back: The U.S. at War in Afghanistan and Iraq (Naval Institute Press, 2012), p. 140. 64 Gian P. Gentile, ‘Misreading the Surge Threatens U.S. 60 Bill Roggio, ‘Sadr calls for Mahdi Army ceasefire’, in Army’s Conventional Capabilities’, in World Politics Review, Long War Journal, 29 August 2007, online at (4 March 2008), online at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/08/sadr http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/1715/misr _calls_for_mahdi.php (last accessed 4 June 2016). eading-the-surge-threatens-u-s-armys-conventional- 61 Stephen D. Biddle, ‘Stabilizing Iraq from the Bottom capabilities (last accessed 10 June 2016). Up’, United States Senate: Second Session, 110th Congress, 2 65 Biddle et al., ‘Correspondence: Assessing the Synergy April 2008 p. 4. Thesis’, p. 180. 62 Iraq Body Count Casualty Database, online at 66 Ibid. https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/ (last accessed 67 Patrick Cockburn, Muqtada Al-Sadr and The Battle for 12 January 2016). The Future of Iraq (Scribner, 2008) pp. 205-215. 63 Ibid. 68 Ibid. 18 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) administration ensured it was a prerequisite that have been a contributor to the decreased the Maliki government pursue all armed militia violence, but it had not been completed by the groups. A leaked classified memo from time the U.S. troops arrived as entire Sunni November 2006 written by U.S. National communities remained and fighting continued Security Adviser Stephen Hadley suggests that at sectarian frontiers. Therefore population if Maliki was willing to pursue the rogue control measures implemented by the coalition elements of JAM, the U.S. would support him continued to be necessary throughout the ‘with additional forces of some kind.’69 The surge. The ceasefire called by Muqtada al-Sadr immediate crackdown on JAM in January 2007 more than likely occurred due to a combination appears to validate this idea. By January 18, the of factors, namely the desire to reform an ISF had detained four hundred Shiite militia increasingly factionalised militia; the exertion of members with links to al-Sadr and dozens of U.S. pressure; and the declining threat of the the JAM hierarchy were killed.70 As a result, Sunni insurgency. The latter leads in to the JAM began to observably change its behaviour. most important impact the new strategy made: They replaced their black uniform with civilian the enablement of the Anbar Awakening to clothing, they withdrew from checkpoints, the develop to its full potential. The emergence of leadership gave an order not to resist U.S. SOI not only reversed the momentum against troops, and al-Sadr himself left Baghdad most AQI and reduced violence across Iraq, it also likely for Iran.71 The second way U.S. strategy indirectly influenced the decision-making of al- put pressure on al-Sadr was through their Sadr in August 2007 to call a ceasefire to the successful SOI programme discussed in the violence in Baghdad. This evidence shows that previous section which had eased the pressure the surge should neither be viewed as the sole on U.S. forces fighting Sunni insurgents in causal factor in the reduction of violence nor Anbar. The receding Sunni insurgency should it be viewed as inconsequential. Rather combined with the extra 30,000 troops resulted David Petraeus’s surge and the three in more coalition forces and ISF free to pursue aforementioned changes relied on each other the JAM militia in Baghdad. Thirdly, the Shiite for success and it was this synergetic population had become less dependent on the relationship that brought about the improved militia for protection as a result of extra security environment in Iraq. coalition presence. With his militia struggling to attract new recruits to replace combatants lost in battle, it is highly likely that al-Sadr called a ______ceasefire in order to pre-empt a huge coalition assault on his militia that could have proved fatal. Conclusion This paper has shown that the new U.S. strategy was inextricably linked to the ethnic displacement in Baghdad, the Anbar Awakening and the al-Sadr ceasefire, albeit to different degrees. A slowing of ethnic displacement may 69 ‘Text of U.S. Security Adviser’s Iraq Memo’, in The New York Times, 29 November 2008, online at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/29/world/middleeas t/29mtext.html?pagewanted=all (last accessed 15 January 2016). 70 Louise Roug, ‘Maliki Pledges to Treat Militants with an Iron Fist’, in Los Angeles Times, 18 January 2007, online at http://articles.latimes.com/2007/jan/18/world/fg- maliki18 (last accessed 15 January 2016). 71 Kagan, The Surge, pp. 40-42. 19 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) Daesh in Pakistan’s Militant Landscape and the Allure for Urban Extremists* Zoha Waseem In* January 2016, Afghan Ambassador to individuals and cells claiming affiliation with Pakistan declared that a militants from northern Daesh have emerged across Pakistan, including Pakistan were fleeing military operations and the urban areas of Sindh and Punjab – the two joining the Islamic State (hereafter, ‘Daesh’) in most populated provinces. Investigators and Afghanistan.1 Hours after this statement, a analysts have called Daesh ‘a new brand of suicide attack on the Pakistani consulate in militancy’6, ‘global trend-setters’7, or Jalalabad was claimed by Daesh.23 Jalalabad is a downplayed it as an old threat with a new city in Nangarhar, an eastern province of name. Others, like the counterterrorism Afghanistan that is believed have a strong departments of Sindh and Punjab police, have presence of Daesh’s Khorasan province (or been cracking down on suspects affiliated with Wilayat Khorasan which includes Afghanistan Daesh, but uncertainty prevails over the extent and Pakistan)4, under the command of of its threat in the country and how to prevent defectors from the Afghan and Pakistani local militants from defecting or self-radicalised Taliban (the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan or individuals from joining it. TTP). Last year, Daesh circulated an online video of ‘Sheikh Jalaluddin training camp’, near The militant landscape of Pakistan is evolving the Afghanistan-Pakistan corridor.5 Since 2014, due to global trends and ongoing military operations in northern Pakistan8, a paramilitary- 9 * led operation in Karachi , and a supposed The author would like to thank Abdul Basit, associate realisation within the civil-military apparatus research fellow at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, that counterterrorism operations must be taken 10 Zia ur Rehman, journalist at The News, and officers of the to ‘logical conclusions’ in order for foreign Counter Terrorism Departments of Sindh and Punjab investments and projects (like the China Police for their relentless guidance. Pakistan Economic Corridor)11 to continue 1 Kamran Yousuf, ‘Majority of Militants Fleeing Pakistan uninterrupted. To complement these Joined Islamic State in Afghanistan’, The Express Tribune, 13 January 2016, online at operations, Pakistan devised a counterterrorism http://tribune.com.pk/story/1026774/majority-of- militants-fleeing-pakistan-joined-islamic-state-in- afghanistan-afghan-envoy (all online sources last accessed 6 Z. Rehman, ‘2015 Brought the Educated Terrorist to on 15 January 2016, unless stated otherwise). Karachi’, The News, p. 13. 2 ‘A Selection of Military Operations Conducted by the 7 K. Shahid, ‘ISIS in Punjab?’, The Friday Times, 01 January Islamic State’, Dabiq, No. 13, online at 2016, online at http://www.clarionproject.org/factsheets-files/Issue-13- http://www.thefridaytimes.com/tft/isis-in-punjab/ the-rafidah.pdf (last accessed on 31 May 2016). 8 ‘Nearly 350 Military Men Killed in Zarb-e-Azb: ISPR’, 3 This is the second suicide attack claimed by Daesh in Dawn, 13 June 2015, online at Nangarhar after the one in April 2015 that killed 30 http://www.dawn.com/news/1187994. people. 9 ‘Karachi Operation to Continue Till Logical 4 ‘Islamic State Expands Afghan Footprint With Terror Conclusion: COAS’, The News, 9 April 2015, available at Campaign’, Daily Times, 20 December 2015, online at http://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/3877-karachi- http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/foreign/20-Dec- operation-to-continue-till-logical-conclusion-coas. 2015/islamic-state-expands-afghan-footprint-with-terror- 10 ‘Operation Zarb-e-Azb to Continue Till Its Logical campaign. Conclusion: Army Chief’, The Express Tribune (13 July 5 B. Roggio & C. Weiss, ‘Islamic State Highlights “Sheikh 2015), online at Jalaluddin training camp” in Afghanistan’, The Long War http://tribune.com.pk/story/920259/operation-zarb-e- Journal, 19 November 2015, online at azb-to-continue-till-its-logical-conclusion-army-chief. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/11/islam 11 S. Safdar, ‘The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: An ic-state-highlights-sheikh-jalaluddin-training-camp-in- Assessment of Potential Threats and Constraints’, Conflict afghanistan.php. and Peace Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2 (July-Dec 2014), pp. 11-40. 20 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) strategy – the National Action Plan (NAP) – stability, particularly given the fact that this following the attack on the Army Public School brand of militancy is alluring for individuals in Peshawar in December 2014. and cells emerging from educated, middle- and upper-middle class backgrounds16. This is However, other factors have also altered the documented in the case of the Karachi cell, militant environment in Pakistan. These include members of which were behind multiple internal rifts within the TTP following recent attacks in Karachi in 2015, most notably on 13 crackdowns and the appointment of a new May when a bus carrying Ismaili Shias was leadership12; rifts within the Afghan Taliban attacked in the city, claiming 45 lives.17 While following the death of Mullah Omar13; territorial losses to Daesh-inspired cells are not discontentment within local militant groups due foreseeable, the threat of this ‘new generation to political reconciliations with the state; the of global jihadists’18 persists. inability of al Qaeda to theatrically display its strength in the region over the last few years; In the last section, I discuss the National and the lack of counter-narratives to religious Action Plan vis-à-vis its non-militaristic aspects extremism. It is in this environment that Daesh that are crucial for reclaiming the ideological has found support and the potential to space ceded to extremists in urban Pakistan. As indoctrinate young recruits. Hassan Abbas argues, military operations can enforce the state’s writ in ungoverned spaces of This article relies upon open source Pakistan but are unlikely to be sufficient in information and interviews with analysts and urban areas.19 Countering Daesh’s expansion investigators studying Daesh in Pakistan. It is entails countering existing radical religious sectioned into three parts. The first examines ideologies (particularly sectarianism), terrorist how Daesh’s ideology may be finding space in propaganda, as well as monitoring supporters Pakistan’s current militant landscape. Its extent and facilitators, including women20 and clerics is yet to be accurately deciphered but over the who are known to deliver sermons in favour of last two years fighters from local groups have radicalisation21. To implement these policies, reportedly left for Syria14, while others have the state needs independent law enforcement pledged allegiance to Daesh. However, the agencies working alongside counterterrorism existing militant landscape is too complex to specialists, not just the deployment of troops. easily become a fertile ground for Daesh to co- exist with other militant groups.15 The second Spatial Gains part focuses on the urban presence of Daesh- inspired extremists. It is argued that this is a The footprints of Daesh in Pakistan can be considerable threat to Pakistan’s internal traced back to mid-2014, shortly after Abu Bakr a-Baghdadi established the so-called caliphate 12 Saud Mehsud & Mehreen Zahra-Malik, ‘Pakistan in Syria and Iraq and chalked out a five-year Taliban Reject Islamic State Leader’s Claim to be plan of global expansion, identifying the Af- “Caliph”’, Reuters (19 December 2015), online at Pak region as Wilayat Khorasan. One of the http://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-islamic- state-idUSKBN0U20IT20151219. 13 Bilal Sarwary, ‘Life in the Taliban After Mullah Omar: 16 Ahmed Rashid, ‘Pakistan: The Allure of ISIS’, The New Afghan Islamist Commanders Reveal How the York Review of Books, 06 October 2014, online at Organisation has Split and Lost its Roots’, The Independent, http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2014/10/06/allure-isis. 10 August 2015, online at 17 Farhan Zahid, ‘Tahir Saeen Group: Higher-Degree http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/life-in- Militants’, Conflict and Peace Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2015), the-taliban-after-mullah-omar-afghan-islamist- pp. 151 – 160. commanders-reveal-how-the-organisation-has- 18 Zahid Hussain, ‘ISIS is no Taliban’, Dawn, 09 July 10449093.html. 2014, online at http://www.dawn.com/news/1117938. 14 Z. Rehman, ‘Pakistani Fighters Joining the War in 19 H. Abbas, ‘ISIS Eyes Influence’, p. 14. Syria’, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 6, No. 9 (2013), pp. 9-11. 20 Naimat Khan, ‘Terrorist Moms’, The Friday Times, 25 15 Hassan Abbas, ‘ISIS Eyes Influence in Pakistan: Focus, December 2015, online at Fears and Future Prospects’, Jinnah Institute, 23 December http://www.thefridaytimes.com/tft/terrorist-moms. 2014, online at http://jinnah-institute.org/wp- 21 ‘Mobile Signals Suspended for Third Friday Now’, content/uploads/2014/12/ISIS-PB-by-Hassan- Dawn, 19 December 2015, online at Abbas.pdf. http://www.dawn.com/news/1227313. 21 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) first acknowledgements came from Jamaat-ul- In an interview in Dabiq magazine in January Ahrar (an offshoot of TTP) after Daesh 2016, Khan called on Muslim men and women supported the release of a Pakistani prisoner to migrate to Khorasan.30 imprisoned in the US on terrorism charges.22 Shortly after, pro-Daesh wall-chalking and The year 2015 saw a surge in Daesh-related pamphlets began appearing across Pakistan.23 In developments across Pakistan with little official October 2014, six commanders of the Pakistani clarifications from the state31. Aside from Taliban publically pledged allegiance to al- events in Karachi, Punjab and the Federally Baghdadi. These included Hafiz Saeed Khan Administered Tribal Areas continued to depict (the Wali of Wilayat Khorasan) and Shahidullah signs of Daesh’s influence. Around mid-2015, Shahid (a former spokesman of the TTP).24 members of Jamaat-ud-Dawa (the political and They were joined by Abdul Rauf Khadim, charity front for Lashkar-e-Taiba) began formerly with the Afghan Taliban.25 A month defecting to Daesh; this would later be known later, Jundullah, an anti-Iranian, anti-Shia as the Daska cell (Sialkot, Punjab) when nine militant organisation operating in Balochistan, members were arrested in December 2015. became the first group to pledge allegiance with According to the CTD Punjab, they had been Daesh26. In November, students of Jamia in touch with a Pakistani national in Syria, Abu Hafsa, a madrassa affiliated with Islamabad’s Muavia Salfi.32 Also in mid-2015, two young Lal Masjid (Red Mosque), declared support for residents of Karachi, with no jihadi or military Daesh and were backed by chief cleric, Abdul background, were arrested by CTD Sindh from Aziz27. In December, a local commander of Balochistan. Security sources suggest they were Daesh from Syria, Yusuf Salafi, was arrested in deported from Iran after attempting to travel to Lahore, and reports suggested he reached Syria via Turkey at the behest of a contact, Abu Pakistan through Turkey to recruit Pakistanis28. Uqba, allegedly in Daesh’s network in Syria.33. In January 2015, in an address by Abu In July 2015, Malik Ishaq, the notorious leader Muhammad al-Adnani, Hafiz Saeed Khan and of an anti-Shia militant group Lashkar-e- Abdul Khadim were officially recognised by Jhangvi, was killed in a reported police Daesh as Wilayat Khorasan’s wali and deputy.29 encounter. According to police sources, Ishaq intended on joining Daesh.34 22 Zoha Waseem, ‘The Arrival of IS in Pakistan and the Towards the end of the year, the Daska cell was Politics of the Caliphate’, Strife Blog, 26 September 2014, online at http://strifeblog.org/2014/09/26/the-arrival- of-is-in-pakistan-and-the-politics-of-the-caliphate. Abu Muhammad al-Adnani ash-Shami’, Al Hayat 23 Ibid. (January 2015), online at 24 Zahir Shah Sherazi, ‘Six Top TTP Commanders https://pietervanostaeyen.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/ Announce Allegiance to Islamic State’s Baghdadi’, Dawn, al-adnani-say-die-in-your-rage.pdf. 14 October 2014, online at 30 ‘Interview with: The Wali of Khurasan’, Dabig, No. 13, http://www.dawn.com/news/1137908. online at http://www.clarionproject.org/factsheets- 25 ‘Khadim Named IS Chief for Afghanistan’, The Express files/Issue-13-the-rafidah.pdf (last accessed on 31 May Tribune, 30 January 2015, online at 2016). http://tribune.com.pk/story/830020/khadim-named-is- 31 A rare acceptance of the threat of Daesh came before chief-for-afghanistan. the Senate Committee a year later. In February 2016, the 26 ‘IS Visits Militants in Balochistan: Jundullah Director General of the Intelligence Bureau, Aftab Spokesman’, Dawn, 12 November 2014, online at Sultan, accepted that Daesh was an emerging threat in http://www.dawn.com/news/1143997. Pakistan. 27 A. Khan, ‘Clear Views: Lal Masjid Top Cleric Says He 32 S. Arfeen, ‘Providing Human Fuel’. Respects Islamic State’, The Express Tribune, 15 December 33 Personal interview with a security official in Karachi 2014, online at (October 2015); also, F. Khan, ‘Two Pakistani Men http://tribune.com.pk/story/806951/clear-views-lal- Caught Trying to go to Syria to Join Islamic State’, The masjid-top-cleric-says-he-respects-islamic-state/ Express Tribune, 03 October 2015, online at 28 N. Miraf, ‘Startling Revelations: IS Operative Confesses http://tribune.com.pk/story/966517/nipped-in-the- to Getting Funds via US’, The Express Tribune, 28 January bud-self-radicalised-militants-flight-to-syria-aborted. 2015, online at 34 Personal interview with a security official in Karachi http://tribune.com.pk/story/828761/startling- (December 2015); ‘Malik Ishaq’s Killing a Big Blow to revelations-is-operative-confesses-to-getting-funds-via-us. Daesh’, The News, 01 August 2015, online at 29 ‘Say, “Die in Your Rage!” An Address by the http://www.thenews.com.pk/print/13889-malik-ishaqs- Spokesman for the Islamic State, The Mujahid Shaykh killing-a-big-blow-to-daesh. 22 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) busted, a ‘women’s wing’ of the Karachi cell loyal to al Qaeda, Afghan Taliban, or TTP, have was identified, and reports began emerging of largely rejected the caliphate of al-Baghdadi. 42 Iran recruiting Pakistani Shia to fight in Syria35. For the purposes of this article, I discuss the These Shia fighters came to be known as second trend: individuals and cells that have ‘Zeinabiyon’. Shortly after, twenty-two people formed in urban areas of Pakistan, particularly were killed in an attack on Shias in Parachinar Karachi. (FATA), claimed by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi to be in response to Zeinabiyoun and the ‘crime of The ‘New Generation Militant’ taking sides with Iran and Bashar al-Assad’36. Through a sophisticated campaign of Thus, in the anti-state militant landscape of information dissemination, Daesh has become Pakistan, as of early 2016, four trends are a brand that is carefully manufactured and identifiable vis-à-vis Daesh.37 First, local delivered to a tech-savvy, internet-junkie, militants have praised and offered support on younger generation that has an appetite for ideological or sectarian grounds. Second, they learning and doing more.43 A few traits can be have formed cells (such as in Karachi, Lahore38 loosely applied to urban jihadists emerging in and Sialkot), with some amount of contact Pakistan and elsewhere over the last few years. (through social media or otherwise) with They are born and raised in cities and are not individuals believed to be in Syria or Iraq. The necessarily combat-trained in northern cells create a network through which they Pakistan, Afghanistan or the Middle East. They spread Daesh’s propaganda, sermonise, raise do not necessarily belong to the stereotypical funds, facilitate, and plan attacks or plan to martial races (Punjabi, Pashtun or Baloch) but leave for Syria. This could be the first step to include Urdu-speaking and Bengali minorities gain acceptance from the Daesh-central, or in as well. They are educated, possibly up to the words of a security official, ‘this is how they university levels, most likely in co-education build their CVs’39. Third, they have defected institutions and not madrassas. They are raised from existing terrorist groups (such as al by middle or upper-middle class families and Qaeda, TTP or Afghan Taliban), joined Wilayat reside in affluent neighbourhoods or cities. Khorasan and recruit militants to train and They are self-radicalised or influenced by fight in Afghanistan. Fourth, some have left for religious or sectarian (not necessarily extremist) Syria (possibly through Turkey and Iran, via companions, online, within social or familial Balochistan or Afghanistan), but their numbers networks, or through a movement known as are highly disputed and difficult to verify, Tableeghi Jamaat44. Further, they may prefer a ranging from 10040 to 50041. And lastly, those 41 P. R. Neumann, ‘Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq Exceeds 20,000; Surpasses Afghanistan Conflict in the 35 B. Dehghanpisheh, ‘Iran Recruits Pakistani Shi’ites for 1980s’, The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation Combat in Syria’, Reuters, 10 December 2015, online at and Political Violence, 26 January 2015, online at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria- http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq- pakistan-iran-idUSKBN0TT22S20151210. now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s. 36 S. Masood, ‘Sunni Militants Claim Deadly Attack at 42 S. Mehsud & M. Zahra-Malik, ‘Pakistan Taliban reject’ Market in Pakistan’, The New York Times, 13 December 43 C. Winter, ‘Documenting the Virtual “Caliphate”’, 2015, online at Quilliam Foundation (October 2015), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/14/world/asia/sunni http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp- -militants-claim-deadly-attack-at-market-in-pakistan.html content/uploads/2015/10/FINAL-documenting-the- 37 I am thankful to Abdul Basit for helping identify these virtual-caliphate.pdf. trends. 44 Tableeghi Jamaat is a Sunni movement that began in 38 U. Cheema, ‘20 Men, Women, Children from Lahore India in the 1920s and spread worldwide. According to Join Daesh, go to Syria’, The News, 31 December 2015, participants interviewed for this article in Karachi in online at http://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/85370-20- January 2016, tableegh is the preaching of basic Islamic men-women-children-from-Lahore-join-Daesh-go-to- principles. Volunteers travel within or outside Pakistan, Syria visiting mosques to spread Islam, at their own expense. 39 Personal interview conducted in Karachi (October They do not advocate jihad or debate politics. However, 2015) participants may independently choose, or be influenced 40 ‘100 Have Gone to Syria, Iraq’, Dawn, 05 January 2016, by certain elements within a jamaat (assembly), to move available at http://www.dawn.com/news/1230782. from tableegh to askariyat (militancy). According to 23 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) certain degree of comfort as a recruitment Guidelines for Lone Wolf Mujahideen and motivator, such as promises of money, payment Small Cells’ was translated into English and of debts, a chance at family life, and circulated online, allegedly by a Daesh employment in other sectors of a terrorist supporter.4849 It is an adaptation of an older al organisation, not just its militant wings. They Qaeda manual and tackles concepts such as may also be allured by a sense of adventure, security, vigilance, and covert warfare. belonging, and alternative social Important for urban jihadists are instructions environments.45 Moreover, they take a keen on how to manage information, conduct interest in local, national and international themselves in urban environments and hide in politics and current affairs which become a key plain sight, keep up to date with technology, motivator complementing their religious and avoid having links with other cells within a sentiments. country. At the time of writing, there was no evidence to suggest that the Sialkot, Lahore or What differentiates them from previous Karachi cells were in contact with one another, generations of militants is a desire to be a part though their handlers, within or outside of a ‘utopia’ of sorts, which Daesh promises Pakistan, may have been aware of their through grand narratives of a Sunni caliphate existence. There is also no evidence to suggest and a functioning society46, which is not soft on that they were in contact with the commanders religious minorities, non-believers or apostates, of Wilayat Khorasan in Afghanistan, suggesting but merciful towards those ‘who repent for that while the Wilayat may be recruiting from a their past beliefs and practices’47. As such, certain pool of jihadists, the urban cells are urban jihadists are generally more aware of generally self-proclaimed ‘jihadi’ volunteers their religious and sectarian identities. In many who are not necessarily interested in being ways, the existing sectarian divisions have trained under the leadership of a previous already exacerbated these differences for generation of militants. exploitation and capitalisation by Daesh’s sectarian narrative. Karachi is, by no means, unfamiliar with urban terrorism and has been a strategic hub for Urban areas and megacities are attractive for sectarian militants as well as TTP, al Qaeda, and terrorists for multiple purposes that include: the Afghan Taliban.50 In 2011, a Pakistani naval access to resources like money, through base was attacked jointly by TTP and al Qaeda employment or fund-raising, property and a militants in the port city. In June 2014, wider recruitment pool; the potential to liaise Karachi’s primary airport was attacked by with criminal groups for access to arms, drugs, militants belonging to TTP and Islamic safe houses and escape routes; the possibility of Movement of Uzbekistan (a former associate assimilation and camouflage in ethnically and of al Qaeda that pledged allegiance with Daesh religious diverse environments; the publicity in August 2015 and has been fighting the generated from high-profile attacks in urban Taliban in Afghanistan). In September 2014, centres; and opportunities for networking, connectivity, and access to information. They are also particularly attractive for lone-wolf 48 ‘Safety and Security Guidelines for the Lone Wolf Mujahideen and Small Cells’, initially by Al-Fajr Media urban jihadists. In October 2015, a 60-page Center, online at security manual titled ‘Safety and Security https://ansarukhilafah.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/saf ety-and-security-final.pdf. 49 M. W. S. Ryan, ‘Hot Issue: How Daesh’s Lone Wolf affiliates of the Jamaat, some tableeghs may be used by Guidance Increases the Group’s Threat to the United militants as a safe place to protect themselves from law States’, The Jamestown Foundation, 24 November 2015, enforcement agencies for months at a time. available at 45 Richard Barrett, The Islamic State (The Soufan Group, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_ne November 2014), p. 9, online at ws%5D=44834&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=381#.Vpj http://soufangroup.com/wp- s9_l97IU. content/uploads/2014/10/TSG-The-Islamic-State- 50 Z. Rehman, ‘Is ISIS Knocking on Karachi’s Doors?’, Nov14.pdf. The News, 16 March 2015, available at 46 Winter, ‘Documenting the Virtual’. http://www.thenews.com.pk/print/29453-is-isis- 47 Ibid. knocking-on-karachis-doors. 24 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) days after its formation, al Qaeda in South Asia attempted target killing of an American (AQIS) claimed the attack on a naval dockyard professor, the assassination of a social activist in Karachi. Security officials believe AQIS is Sabeen Mahmud, and the attack on Ismaili Shia still present in Karachi and has been trying to community.55 refurbish its position in the subcontinent in competition with Daesh. These high-profile From these attackers, Aziz was the most attacks were reminders that terrorists have been publicised. A resident of Karachi from an familiarising themselves with Pakistan’s upper-class background and member of the financial capital and largest city for years. For Tableeghi Jamaat, Saad graduated from IBA in the Daesh-inspired Karachi cell, this 2011. At university, he joined the Iqra Society, a familiarisation preceded individual decisions to religious discussion group. It is believed that it turn to religious militancy. was then that Aziz ‘drifted towards radicalisation’56. Fluent in English, he The Karachi Cell familiarised himself with the works of Sayyid Qutb and political Islam57. He met an al Qaeda It is believed that the Tahir Saeen group operative in 2013, following which he met Tahir became active in Karachi in January 2015, Saeen.58 Together, they pledged allegiance to shortly after al-Adnani’s statement recognising Daesh. After his arrest, he confessed to Wilayat Khorasan. Known members of this murdering Sabeen Mahmud because she was group include Abdullah Yousuf (one of the ‘promoting liberal, secular values’59. masterminds, suspected of being in Syria Even more concerning revelations emerged according to interviews with security officials), following the arrests of two couples and and Tahir Minhas alias ‘Saeen’, the second facilitators of the Karachi cell in December mastermind. Saeen, along with Saad Aziz, Hafiz 2015. Adil Masood, a resident of an affluent Nasir, Azhar Ishrat, and Asad ur Rehman were neighbourhood in Karachi and board member arrested shortly after the Safoora attack and of the College of Accounting and Management have subsequently been sentenced to death by Sciences was taken into remand by CTD military courts, but an unknown number of Sindh.60 Masood was allegedly also a business perpetrators and facilitators remain at large.51 partner in Saad Aziz’s Mexican restaurant in Saeen’s previous affiliation was with al Qaeda,52 Karachi and had degrees from Indiana but ended after a falling out over resources. University and Fordham University in the Saeen met other members of the Karachi cell United States.61 A second facilitator taken into in Hyderabad and Karachi (Sindh’s two urban custody was Khalid Bari, a former employee of centres). He himself was from Punjab. Pakistan International Airlines. Security officials have alleged that the wives of these two All of the arrested attackers were educated, individuals ran a so-called ‘women’s wing’ of barring Saeen – who was a high-school Daesh in Karachi, under the garb of an dropout.53 Nasir and Rehman had degrees from organisation known as Al Zikra Academy the University of Karachi; Ishrat studied from through which they collected funds from Sir Syed University in Karachi and worked for a mobile service provider; and Saad Aziz had an 55 F. Zahid, ‘Tahir Saeen Group’, p. 155. undergraduate degree from the Institute of 56 Ibid., p. 157. Business Administration (IBA), a prestigious 57 N. Hussain, ‘Pakistan’s New Breed of Militants’, Foreign university in the city.54 Together, the Karachi Policy, 09 June 2015, online at cell was responsible for a number of attacks in http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/09/pakistans-new- 2015 including an attack on a paramilitary breed-of-militants. 58 N. Ali & F. Zaman, ‘Anatomy of a Murder’, Herald, official, grenade attacks on schools, the online at http://herald.dawn.com/news/1153209. 59 Ibid 51 Personal interviews with security officials, October 60 F. Khan, ‘Alleged Financer? College Co-Owner Held 2015 and December 2015, Karachi. Over Safoora Bus Attack’, The Express Tribune, 19 52 Zahid, ‘Tahir Saeen Group’, p. 155-156 December 2015, online at 53 Ibid. http://tribune.com.pk/story/1012606/alleged-financer- 54 Ibid.; also, personal interviews with security officials college-co-owner-held-over-safoora-bus-attack. between October and December 2015, Karachi. 61 Ibid. 25 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) affluent women in the names of donations and In retaliation to the ongoing military operation, charity for the Karachi cell.62 Their roles Zarb-e-Azb, militants affiliated with TTP beyond financial support for this cell are attacked the Army Public School in Peshawar in difficult to ascertain. December 2014. The government then launched a twenty-point National Action Plan Another name that was connected with the to counter terrorism. Prior to NAP, the state Karachi cell and the ‘women’s wing’ was that of had relied upon the National Internal Security Kamran Gujjar, formerly associated with the Policy and the Pakistan Protection Act 2014 as AQIS. According to police statements, Tahir part of its counterterrorism strategy, both of Saeen referred to Gujjar as a ‘Daesh which were haphazardly drafted.63 The NAP commander’ in the city. Gujjar was taken into complemented the establishment of military the custody of in January 2016 and disclosed courts for speedy trials and the lifting of the names of women involved in fund-raising moratorium on death penalty. National activities for Daesh in Pakistan. He was subcommittees and provincial apex committees mysteriously killed in a ‘police encounter’ in (consisting of senior civil and military March 2016 in Karachi. Uncertainty prevails as leadership but no overseeing body, legal to whether or not Gujjar was in police custody framework, or transparency) were set up to at the time of death and his exact involvement oversee NAP’s implementation. The NAP also with the Karachi cell has been difficult to escalated operations in northern Pakistan and establish. Karachi, reducing terrorist and sectarian The complete details of individuals connected violence considerably during 201564. to the Karachi Cell have not yet been disclosed and the status of the cell at the time of writing However, the lack of implementation of non- is ambiguous. Nevertheless, this case study military aspects of the NAP remains a source helps explain why terrorists can find urban of contention, with one report describing this centres attractive for their operations and why as the ‘militarisation of counterterrorism urban militancy remains a complex and policy’65. Of relevance here, are points dealing complicated threat for Pakistan to tackle. with (a) countering hate speech and extremist propaganda; (b) banning the glorification of The Way Forward terrorist organisations through print and electronic media; (c) dismantling Pakistan’s law enforcement agencies have been communication networks of terrorist struggling to cope with militancy in urban areas organisations; (d) taking measures against the for decades because of the difficulties of use of social media for terrorism; and (e) profiling terrorists and distinguishing them dealing with sectarianism.66 Though these from ordinary civilians in densely populated points have not been elaborated upon further neighbourhoods. A politicised and corrupt in the NAP, taken together, they provide a non- police force favours tall budgets for military militaristic framework that may help counter equipment and training but insufficiently funds Daesh’s ideology and prevent indoctrination of investigations. There is continued reliance upon the Pakistani youth. paramilitary forces that are inadequately trained in urban counterinsurgency but increasingly equipped with policing powers. Additionally, 63 For a more detailed discussion on NAP, NISP and counterterrorism practices have generally been PPA, see International Crisis Group, ‘Revisiting Counter- ad hoc and highhanded, lacking long-term Terrorism Strategies in Pakistan’, Asia Report No. 271, 22 strategies and foresight. July 2015, online at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south- asia/pakistan/271-revisiting-counter-terrorism-strategies- in-pakistan-opportunities-and-pitfalls.pdf. 62 F. Khan, ‘Assistants of Terror: How Women Raise 64 PIPS, Pakistan Security Report, pp. 7-10. Funds for Da’ish in Karachi’, The Express Tribune, 21 65 ICG, ‘Revisiting Counter Terrorism’. December 2015, online at 66 A. Manan, ‘Fight against Terrorism: Defining http://tribune.com.pk/story/1013558/assistants-of- Moment’, The Express Tribune, 25 December 2014, online terror-revealed-how-women-raise-funds-for-daish-in- at http://tribune.com.pk/story/811947/fight-against- karachi. terrorism-defining-moment. 26 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) Yet there have been reports of Daesh using Tehran remains unclear. Third, Pakistan’s radio transmissions in northern Pakistan to history of supporting non-state actors in the spread their propaganda from Afghanistan67, region has created monsters too big to reign in and pro-Daesh pamphlets are known to be without backlash, as is evident given its strained distributed across Pakistan68. According to one relations with the Afghan Taliban following the report, despite NAP provisions directed against deaths of former Taliban chiefs Mullah Omar hate speech and the use of media for terrorism, (2013) and Mullah Mansoor (2016). And lastly, publications and electronic media produced by each of Pakistan’s four provinces and disputed groups such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa and Jaish-e- territories has internal militant or criminal Muhammad, are still circulated.69 Further, elements of its own.73 These are Pakistan’s residents of Islamabad remain perplexed at why complex ‘tiers of militancy’74, which makes its Lal Masjid’s cleric Maulana Abdul Aziz, who war on narratives that much more challenging. publicly endorsed the female students of Jamia Hafsa madrassa supporting Daesh, has been However, some practical considerations are allowed to operate in the Capital. In late 2015, worth mentioning. Given Pakistan’s social and residents complained of the state’s inability to cultural realities, it is unlikely that Daesh will prevent Maulana Aziz from delivering sermons achieve territorial gains in the country. Majority through the mosque – that too after he of Pakistanis are not Wahhabi, Salafi, or defended the 2014 Peshawar massacre and Deobandi (minority subsects of Sunni Islam threatened suicide attacks70. Through his from which individuals are more likely to turn sermons, the cleric reportedly spoke in favour to jihad) but rather followers of the Barelvi of Daesh and called for the imposition of subsect. Despite pan-Islamist and sectarian Sharia in Pakistan.71 The state, instead of narratives, Daesh promotes a predominantly arresting Aziz for repeated violations of the Arab culture, which is distinct from that of NAP, repeatedly disrupted mobile phone South Asia, which can pose another barrier to services to prevent the sermon from being Daesh’s large-scale penetration into regional heard, much to the inconvenience of ordinary societies. Also, most Pakistanis do not speak residents.72 Arabic, nor are they familiar with Arab pop- culture, fashion or literature (aside from Selective implementation of the NAP can be Quranic texts). Pakistan is also incomparable the result of multiple factors. First, deep-rooted with Afghanistan or Iraq in terms of religious sentiments exist across Pakistan’s ungoverned spaces and has been actively social classes that can be ignited in retaliation to seeking to restore the writ of the state in areas extreme measures by the state, possibly such as FATA.75 Additionally, al Qaeda has a escalating violence. Second, patronisation by stronger base in the sub-continent, compared Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan of sectarian to the core of Daesh. Al Qaeda’s past organisations and madrassas dating back to the affiliations with local militant groups, namely late 1970s continues, as Islamabad’s policy the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban and Lashkar- towards the recent conflict between Riyadh and e-Jhangvi has accredited it with more appeal than Daesh presently has in the region. These factors create a hindrance for Daesh to have 67 M. Achakzai, ‘Radio Caliphate’, The Friday Times, 15 January 2016, online at organisational presence in Pakistan. http://www.thefridaytimes.com/tft/radio-caliphate. 68 Abdul Basit, ‘How Big is ISIS Threat in Afghanistan- Pakistan’, The Counter Terrorist, Vol. 8, No. 3 (2014), pp. 73 T. Noorani, ‘War of Narratives, Dawn, 27 June 2014, 46-48. online at http://www.dawn.com/news/1115282. 69 International Crisis Group, ‘Revisiting Counter 74 K. Hyat, ‘Finding the Real Enemy’, The News, 24 Terrorism’, pp. 14-15. December 2015, online at 70 K. Ali, ‘Suicide Attack Threats Again Ring out of Lal http://www.thenews.com.pk/print/83978-Finding-the- Masjid’, Dawn, 20 December 2014, online at real-enemy. http://www.dawn.com/news/1151981. 75 Hassan Abbas, ‘Policy Brief: ISIS Eyes Influence in 71 Shahid, ‘ISIS in Punjab?’. Pakistan – Focus, Fears & Future Prospects’, Jinnah 72 ‘Mobile Signals Suspended for Third Friday Now’, Institute, 23 December 2014, online at http://jinnah- Dawn, 19 December 2015, online at institute.org/policy-brief-isis-eyes-influence-in-pakistan- http://www.dawn.com/news/1227313. focus-fears-future-prospects-2 (last visited 15 June 2016). 27 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) That said, should existing sectarian tensions within Pakistan be exacerbated, Daesh’s strong Sunni narrative might continue luring jihadists from the region (including those from local militant groups).76 An escalation in the region’s sectarian crisis can also deepen the involvement of the old guards (Iran and Saudi Arabia) and their proxy influences in Afghanistan-Pakistan. As Iran emboldens Shia militant groups in Pakistan and recruits fighters for Syria, Riyadh will resist Tehran’s influence to keep Sunni majoritarianism in the region with the help of Islamabad. Ideologically, then, Pakistan may see an increase in the influence of Salafism at home, a school of thought from which Daesh might fight sympathisers and recruits. The threat for individual Daesh supporters and small cells thus remains. This is why Pakistan must prioritise countering Daesh’s narrative and propaganda on local levels which requires reading beyond militarised counterterrorism frameworks. Pakistan should understand the nexus between political grievances and ideological greed which is fuelling resentment within a growing young population with easy access to online forums. Grievances towards the state because of lack of employment, corruption, and highhandedness of security forces, coupled with the search for a strong ideological identity (due to a lack of consensus over what is Pakistan’s Islamic identity77), give the youth resentment, excitement (a ‘five-star jihad’78) and a need to belong, which is a combination that groups like Daesh will continue exploiting unless the state provides alternatives. ______ 76 Abdul Basit also warns that the threat can multiply in Afghanistan-Pakistan if fighters returning from Syria- Iraq join Wilayat Khorasan or if existing militant groups begin siding with ISIS for strategic purposes. See Basit, ‘How Big is ISIS’, p. 47. 77 See C. Jaffrelot, The Pakistan Paradox (Random House India, 2015), pp. 439-541. 78 Abid Hussain et al., ‘Islamic Republic versus Islamic State’, Herald, 21 March 2016, online at http://herald.dawn.com/news/1153362 (last visited 15 June 2016). 28 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) Madrid – Moscow: Time for NATO to Close Ranks Alex Calvo Introduction: Spain and Russia - naval cooperation at a In spite of being an EU and NATO member, time of alleged sanctions. Spain’s Ceuta has become the Russian Navy’s most important logistical base in the Western The arrival of four Russian warships to Spain’s Mediterranean and Eastern Atlantic, allowing Ceuta on 5 August 2015 was no novelty. The Moscow to expand her naval presence in a ‘Moskva’ missile cruiser, the ‘Pytlivy’ escort sensitive area as part of her policy of openly ship, the ‘Ivan Bubnov’ large sea tanker, and the challenging the Atlantic Alliance. Despite ‘Shakhtyor’ rescue tug,1 marked the eleventh Ceuta’s importance for Russian naval activities, such visit in the year to date, and were followed Madrid-based think-tanks have refrained from on 26 August 2015 by the diesel-electric even mentioning it in any papers or during submarine ‘Novorossiysk’ and one day later the events. The Real Instituto Elcano, for example, fleet tug ‘SB-36’, bringing the total figure to has carefully avoided the subject. A short paper twelve.2 This is only one short of the total on ‘The Russian “drip”, the Ukraine, and number for 2014, thirteen. On 6 August for the Russia’s confrontation with the West’ published first time local media outlets failed to report it, in February this year did not even contain the joining Madrid-based newspapers’ policy of word ‘Ceuta’.4 silence. Previous visits had been extensively reported by newspapers such as Pueblo de Ceuta On the other hand, American commentators and La Verdad de Ceuta. The reasons are not like Luke Coffey and Fernando Betancor have clear, but given rising tensions between NATO written on the matter,5 while Gibraltar naval and Russia, Spanish authorities may have observers from #OpWest regularly report all deemed it prudent to restrict even further Russian port visits to Ceuta, which also feature knowledge about what threatens to become a major embarrassment for Spain. The submarine visit on 26 August, on the other hand, appeared http://www.fdbetancor.com/2015/12/16/ceuta-to- in the pages of La Verdad de Ceuta, but not on moscow-send-more-russians-by-alex-calvo/ (last those of Pueblo de Ceuta. Having said this, in accessed 10 June 2016). December 2015 Ceuta Port Authority For a list of the Ceuta Port Authority’s annual reports see published its 2014 annual report, with details http://www.puertodeceuta.com/autoridad- portuaria/memorias/anuarios (last accessed 10 June about the Russian naval presence in the city the 2016). previous year, and local reporting seems to have 4 Felix Arteaga, ‘La “gota” rusa, Ucrania y la resumed.3 confrontación rusa con Occidente’, in Comentario Elcano, 4 February 2015, online at http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano 1 ‘Group of Russian Black Sea Fleet ships enters Strait of /contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elc Gibraltar on way to Ceuta’, in Gibraltar Panorama, 6 ano_es/zonas_es/comentario-arteaga-la-gota-rusa- August 2015, online at ucrania-y-la-confrontacion-rusa-con-occidente (last http://gibraltarpanorama.gi/15209/131742/a/group-of- accessed 10 June 2016). russian-black-sea-fleet-ships-enters-strait-of-gibraltar-on- 5 See Luke Coffey and Daniel Kochis, ‘U.S. Should way-to-ceut (last accessed on 10 June 2016). Condemn Spain and France’s Military Support to the 2 R.S., ‘Un submarino y un remolcador de la Armada rusa Russian Federation’, in Issue Brief #4226, The Heritage realizan escala en el Puerto de Ceuta’, in La Verdad de Foundation, 20 May 2014, online at Ceuta, 26 August 2015, online at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/05/us- http://www.laverdaddeceuta.com/politica/noticias/politi should-condemn-spain-and-frances-military-support-to- ca/turismo/un-submarino-y-un-remolcador-de-la- the-russian-federation (last accessed on 10 June 2016); armada-rusa-realizan-escala-en-el-puerto-de-ceuta (last Fernando Betancor, ‘Spain: The Russians Are Coming’, accessed on 28 August 2015). in Common Sense, 22 June 2015, online at 3 Alex Calvo, ‘Ceuta to Moscow: “Send More Russians”’, http://www.fdbetancor.com/2015/06/22/spain-the- online at russians-are-coming (last accessed on 10 June 2016). 29 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) often in Russian media outlets.6 In order to time stands still’.8 better understand what is going on at Ceuta it may be useful to have a wider look at Spanish- Pragmatism Prevails Over Ideology and World Blocks. Russian relations. These similarities may perhaps help explain The Complex, Painful Path to Modernity by Two how, even when ideologically at odds, somehow Nations at the Extremes of the Eurasian Landmass. Spanish and Russian elites have often found a way to reach a modus vivendi, some sort of Spain and Russia are both ancient and proud pragmatic arrangement transcending not only nations sharing a number of common politics but even the division of the world into characteristics, with perhaps four being of opposed blocks. Thus, while Soviet particular relevance. First of all, their troubled intervention in the Spanish Civil War (1936- relation with modernity, and the painful and 1937) was followed by General Franco’s often violent roads they have followed in their sending of the ‘Blue Division’ (Wermacht’s 250 quest to achieve it. Second, their doubts when it Infantry Division) to the Eastern Front, with comes to deciding whether they are fully part the last prisoner only making it back in 1956 of Europe, or just halfway, with Russia’s once Stalin was out of the picture, this did not concept of Eurasia and Spain’s cross-Atlantic prevent a later discrete yet effective links to Latin America providing alternative normalization of relations.9 After some modest historical and geopolitical narratives. Third, economic exchanges and discreet contacts in their difficulties in holding together the diverse Paris in 1960-61, more substantive informal populations brought about by their military contacts took place in the French capital in expansion, a difficult enterprise often seen as 1964, leading to economic agreements such as only possible on the basis of force, or the an exchange of notes in 1967 to allow Soviet threat to use force. Fourth, the traditional merchantmen to dock at Spanish harbours,10 strength of conservatism among wide sections and the opening in 1969 of an office of the of their population, including in the religious Black Sea Shipping Company in Madrid.11 The sphere, religion playing a key role in the office illustrates the Soviet interest in one of historical formation of both Spanish and the countries providing an outlet to the open Russian national identity. Catalan MEP Ramon sea, a geopolitical and geo-economic constant Tremosa is keen to say that ‘there will be a in Russian history since the days of Peter the Liberal [in the European sense of the word] Great and even earlier, having been, according party in Spain when there is one such party in to classical historical interpretation, one of Ivan Russia’. More generally, he has often compared the Terrible’s goals for invading Livonia in the two countries, writing an article in 2006 January 1558. The arrival of Soviet oil in the where he cited a number of observers who had late 1960s may have played an important role at come to similar conclusions.7 Among them a critical juncture in Spain’s post-war recovery, Graham Greene, who wrote in one of his removing a potential obstacle to the country’s books that it is only in Spain and Russia that budding industrialization and avoiding social 6 See, for example, ‘Group of Russian Black Sea Fleet 8 Graham Greene, Monsignor Quixote (London: Penguin ships enters Mediterranean’, in TASS, 5 August 2015, Books, 2008), p. 80. online at http://tass.ru/en/russia/812688 (last accessed 9 Linz Archive of the Spanish Transition, March 10 June 2016). For an interview with OpWest’s founder Foundation, ‘Relaciones diplomáticas con la Unión Michael J. Sanchez, see Alex Calvo, ‘OP-WEST: Open soviética’, in Ya, 10 February 1977, available at Source Intel in Contested Maritime Spaces’, Center for http://www.march.es/ceacs/biblioteca/proyectos/linz/d International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 1 April 2015, ocumento.asp?reg=r11705 (last accessed on 10 June online at http://cimsec.org/op-west-open-source-intel- 2016). contested-maritime-spaces/15718 (last accessed on 10 10 Juan Carlos Pereira Castañares, ‘España y la U.R.S.S. en June 2016). una Europa en transformación’, in Cuadernos de Historia 7 Ramon Tremosa, ‘Castella Eterna’, in Avui, 5 January Contemporanea, Vol. 15 (1993), p. 195. 2006, online at 11 Kirill Rudenko, ‘España era una desconocida’, in Russia http://www.racocatala.cat/forums/fil/31710/castella- Beyond the Headlines, 3 April 2011, online at eterna-ramon-tremosa-lavui (last accessed on 10 June http://es.rbth.com/articles/2011/04/03/espana_era_un 2016). a_desconocida_12251 (last accessed on 10 June 2016). 30 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) unrest.12 In the words of Yuri Vladimirovich despite Soviet protests, maybe because the US Dubinin, then first secretary in the Soviet military presence in the country preceded it and Embassy in Paris and later ambassador to Madrid always took a very sui generis view of Madrid, ‘cooperation started in the maritime what membership entailed, with for example domain. The thing is that Spain is located on the military more concerned about ‘territorial the crossroads of very important maritime integrity’15 (written into the partly-military routes. We were very interested, and so were drafted 1978 constitution) than expeditionary Spaniards, so Moscow and Madrid decided to capabilities. take this first step’.13 In August 1969 Madrid and Moscow also reached an agreement on the An important figure at the time was Juan provisioning of Soviet trawlers in Tenerife Antonio Samaranch, a skilful political operator (Canary Islands), and June 1971 saw the birth who managed to be not only one of the few of ‘Sovyspan’, a Spanish-Soviet joint venture to Catalans to hold high office under Franco but supply trawlers operating off the Canary someone who survived the dictator’s demise Islands.14 and went on to become Spanish Ambassador to Moscow, president of the International In 1972 Madrid and Moscow agreed to Olympic Committee (IOC) from 1980 to 2001, exchange trade envoys, with full diplomatic and chairman of Barcelona-based lender La relations resumed in 1977, and the King of Caixa from 1987 to 1999. Samaranch’s Spain visiting the USSR in 1984. Those were diplomatic skills helped bilateral relations move years when Madrid was seeking to normalize forward and, more significantly, prevented the her foreign relations as part of the so called 1980 Moscow Olympics from derailing the ‘transition’ from the Franco regime, while normalization of relations. Just like Franco’s Moscow sought to play a greater role in world death in 1975 provided him with a launching affairs, going beyond her sphere of influence. pad , chairing Barcelona Provincial Council Although different in many respects, from 1973 to 1977, instead of terminating his geographically far away, and with little mutual political career, the Moscow Olympics played a knowledge, post-Franco Spain and pre- similar role, and what might have become a Perestroika Russia found each other useful. major embarrassment would in fact propel him Theirs was not the most important bilateral to the top of the IOC. Samaranch had a life- relationship, but it encountered no major long interest in sport, and enjoyed the obstacles and provided good political diplomatic arena, and having enjoyed influence opportunities for both capitals. Physical and the high life, he was eager to secure a place distance meant no major conflicting interests. A in post-Franco Spain. Uncertain whether he problem was the association in the minds of would manage to remain in high office, despite many Spaniards of the Basque group ETA with the ‘transition to democracy’ being carefully Soviet intelligence at a time of frequent managed by the military and Franco-era terrorist attacks. On the other hand, Spanish pressure groups, he may have realized his best entry into NATO posed no major problem, chances lied in securing a top-level international office from which he could either re-enter domestic politics if the opportunity arose or 12 ‘Relaciones Hispano-Soviética, Petróleo soviético para Franco y diversas consideraciones ideológicas’, in enjoy the world stage while quietly burying his Cambera Roja, 16 April 2014, online at links to the dictatorship. His help in lessening https://camberaroja.wordpress.com/2014/04/16/relacio nes-hispano-sovietica-petroleo-sovietico-para-franco-y- diversas-consideraciones-ideologicas (last accessed on 10 15 ‘The mission of the Armed Forces, comprising the June 2016). Army, the Navy and the Air Force, is to guarantee the 13 Kirill Rudenko, ‘‘‘España era una desconocida’’’, in sovereignty and independence of Spain and to defend its Russia Beyond the Headlines, 3 April 2011, online at territorial integrity and the constitutional order’. http://es.rbth.com/articles/2011/04/03/espana_era_un Constitución española de 1978, Chapter 8.1. An English a_desconocida_12251.html (last accessed on 10 June version is available on the website of the Constitutional 2016). Court, online at 14 Linz Archive of the Spanish Transition, March http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/en/constitucion/P Foundation, ‘Relaciones diplomáticas con la Unión ages/ConstitucionIngles.aspx#I4 (last accessed on 10 soviética’. June 2016). 31 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) the impact of the boycott was duly rewarded by parties, is of a country formally embedded in the Soviet Union which supported his accession the Western World, including NATO and the to the IOC presidency. Spain’s formula for EU, but deeply at odds with some of its most participating in the Olympics was to compete basic values. and march in the opening ceremony under the Olympic flag. While Madrid was not the only Another significant example was Madrid’s Western country to choose this solution, and attitude during the 1982 Falklands War, when it Samaranch had powerful personal motives to abstained on UNSC 502 and later failed to find a pragmatic accommodation with the comprehensively implement EEC sanctions Soviet Regime, the episode illustrates the against Buenos Aires. Interestingly enough, the complex and uneasy relationship between Spain Junta would seek Soviet aid when it realized it and the United States, and more widely the was going to lose the war. We could also Western World. Franco had taken advantage of mention Galicia’s regional Prime Minister the Cold War to complete his disengagement Manuel Fraga’s interesting personal diplomacy from the Axis and survive, despite widespread with Fidel Castro in the 1990s, based on expectations that the downfall of Hitler and pragmatism and common ancestry,18 but which, Mussolini would also amount to his end. coming from one of the leading figures of the However, the regime’s ‘normalization’ in the late Franco regime, also helped confirm that it late 1950s, with an economic stability plan, a was often Spanish nationalism, rather than left- basing agreement with Washington, and a wing politics, which fuelled support for the Concordat with the Vatican, as its main pillars, Communist regime on the Island among could not hide the continued nationalist nature Spanish public opinion and decision makers. of Franco’s rule. This was clear not only from Concerning perceptions of the Soviet Union the persistent anti-Americanism which survives among Franco-era elites, in his study of ‘Spain to this day in Spain and is equally shared by and the USSR in a changing Europe’, Juan Right and Left, but also from concrete policies Carlos Pereira Castañares stresses how hatred such as growing pressure on Gibraltar, of Communism as the regime’s ‘bete noire’ and culminating in the closure of the land border in ultimate rationale for the 1936 coup, went hand 1969. Gibraltar also features in Franco-era in hand with the fact that ‘the USSR will not be bilateral relations, since the widening in seen as an antagonistic superpower, possible February 1969 of the 1967 agreement on cause of a nuclear war’.19 Soviet merchant navy use of Spanish ports allowed trawlers to use harbours in the Canary Going back to Madrid’s decision to ignore US Islands, to the detriment of the Rock, with the President Carter’s Moscow Olympics boycott, it ensuing satisfaction by Spanish leaders.16 While took place at a time when some leading figures the land crossing would be reopened in 1982, among the post-Franco political elites where to this day Madrid has avoided recognizing the toying with the idea of non-alignment. These Rock’s right to self-determination, and regularly were the days when the opposition Socialists carries out maritime and aerial incursions, while included withdrawal from the Atlantic Alliance subjecting her population to punitive hours- in their election platform, a move from which long queuing at the border.17 Altogether, the they would retract by means of a referendum in picture of Spain one gets from such policies, 1986. Hostility towards NATO was not limited which have survived a change of regime and to the Spanish Left, however, with the Adolfo successive transfers of power between different Suarez administration attending the 1979 summit of the non-aligned movement in Havana, in a move that attracted some criticism 16 Juan Carlos Pereira Castañares, ‘España y la U.R.S.S. en una Europa en transformación’, in Cuadernos de Historia from a number of Western allies, and in Contemporánea, Vol. 15 (1994), p. 194. 17 UK Parliament, House of Commons, ‘Foreign Affairs 18 Carlos Prieto, ‘Fraga y Fidel, una historia de amor Committee, Second Report: Gibraltar: Time to Get off incestuosa’, in El Confidencial, 18 May 2013, online at the Fence’, 24 June 2014, online at http://www.elconfidencial.com/cultura/2013-05- http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/c 18/fraga-y-fidel-una-historia-de-amor- mselect/cmfaff/461/46102.htm (last accessed on 10 incestuosa_495191/ (last accessed on 10 June 2016). June 2016). 19 Pereira Castañares, ‘España y la U.R.S.S.’, p. 194. 32 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) particular Washington. The Socialist has fallen, with Spanish agricultural exports hit administration that succeeded the centre-right hard, while on the other companies like Talgo, UCD decided to attend the subsequent summit, Iberdrola, and Repsol remained active in Russia. in 1983 in New Delhi. The head of the Spanish The resulting contrast, coupled with Madrid’s delegation in New Delhi, Gonzalo Puente Ojea, soft line concerning the Ukraine conflict and defended the decision, saying that non- the Russian Navy’s continued reliance on Ceuta, alignment had become a ‘structural component has prompted some speculation concerning the in contemporary international relations’ and ultimate direction of bilateral diplomacy. adding that ‘Spain is one of those Western countries (...) with inalienable specific Fruit, and more precisely citruses, already dimensions that make up our international featured pre-eminently in early Spanish-Soviet personality’, while denying any incompatibility trade, with, for example, the barter in 1963 (in with NATO membership.20 Among major one of the first exchanges since the end of the parties of the time, only the ruling Catalan Spanish Civil War) through a German coalition CiU had solid pro-Western credentials, corporation of 500 tons of frozen pork and with for example then Catalan President Jordi butter for 5,000 tons of oranges and lemons, Pujol expressing alignment with core Western and the export of 31,000 tons of Spanish policies by travelling to Israel in 1987, just one citruses in 1972. In the years following the year after the establishment of full diplomatic downfall of the Soviet Union, Catalan relations between Madrid and Jerusalem. producers from the Lleida Region (Western Catalonia) made a major effort to enter the From the 1980s onwards, relations between Russian market. In 2011 Catalonia sold peaches Spain and the USSR/Russia have followed, and nectarines worth 45.6 million Euros to broadly speaking, a positive pattern in the Russia, an amount that fell to 25.3 million political arena, with an absence of major Euros last year, in the wake of Moscow’s disagreements and regular official trips, side by counter-sanctions imposed in reply to similar side with a relatively small volume of trade and moves by the EU and the US over the investment despite attempts to increase unfolding Ukraine crisis. The figure still economic exchanges during, above all, the later amounted to 13 percent of total exports.22 years of the Perestroika. Cultural exchanges Although some indirect exports, through have also continued, with a certain imbalance Belarus, Turkey and Russian partners based in given greater language learning facilities in Belgium and Holland may have softened the Russia. Since the first Russian edition of Don impact of the sanctions, the industry is clearly Quixote, in 1769, there has been a healthy worried about Russia and follows closely the interest in Spanish culture, giving rise to a political situation in the country. Manel Simon, significant number of specialists. From 1911 to director general of Afrucat (an association 1989, 705 works by Spanish authors were bringing together 90 percent of Catalan fruit published, with a total 36 million books producers) stresses that it is not easy to enter printed.21 and consolidate a presence in new markets, and underlines that ‘it took us ten years to get into Sanctions: Are Some Industries More Equal Than Russia’.23 Others? Talgo, Iberdrola, Repsol, and the Horticultural Sector. On 30 June 2015 the EU’s temporary subsidies and other measures designed to cushion the A look at Spanish-Russian economic exchanges impact of Russian sanctions expired. Unió de over the last few months shows a complex, Pagesos, Catalonia’s main farmers’ organization, diverse picture. On the one hand, overall trade had already demanded their renewal, asking the 22 David Rodríguez, ‘Entrar a Rússia per la porta del 20 Gonzalo Puente Ojea, ‘España y el movimiento de los darrere’, in Via Empresa, 11 August 2015, online at países ‘no alineados’’, in El País, 19 March 1983, online at www.viaempresa.cat/ca/notices/2015/07/entrararussiap http://elpais.com/diario/1983/03/19/internacional/416 erlaportadeldarrere13680.php (last accessed on 10 June 876401_850215.html (last accessed on 10 June 2016). 2016). 21 Pereira Castañares, ‘España y la U.R.S.S.’, p. 194. 23 Ibid. 33 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) European Commission to activate the measures veto.26 laid down for grave cases of market perturbations. On 16-17 June Josep Cabré, a While fruit producers have been caught in the member of its ruling council in charge of the cross-fire between the West and Russia, sector, travelled to Brussels, meeting high Moscow has not closed the door to wine and officials and a number of Catalan MEPs, olive oil. Two different interpretations have among them Ramon Tremosa.24 been given for this. On the one hand, this While Spanish agricultural exports to Russia seems to be a nod to Southern European originate from different areas, much of the fruit countries like Spain, Greece, and Italy, which comes from Catalonia, Valencia, and Aragon. are major exporters and at the same time seen Thus, as explained in a recent report by as relatively soft on Russia. On the other hand, Valencia-based weekly El Temps, ‘the some observers consider that these are announcement of the Russian veto in August products difficult to replace, given current 2014 left frozen farmers in Catalan-speaking restrictions on Moldavian and Georgian wines. lands [Catalonia, Valencia, the Western Strip In the Spanish case we can also note that oil (‘La Franja’), and the Balearic Islands]’.25 and wine exports are more evenly distributed among regions than is the case of fruit. Valencia has been particularly hit, given that Concerning wine, in 2014 Catalonia topped the Russia was the destination for 16 percent of rank with 1,295 exporters, who acheved sales exports in 2012-2014 of summer fruit (such as of 561 million Euros, but Castile-La Mancha peaches, nectarines, flat nectarines, apricots, and came close with 533.9 million Euros.27 plums), amounting to 73 million Euros in sales. Production is centred on the Ribera and Vall When it comes to olive oil, however, the d’Albaida counties. In 2014 Valencian farmers situation is different, given that although both avoided Moscow’s veto because by the time it Catalonia and Valencia grow olives, the bulk of was announced they had almost finished Spanish production comes from Andalusia, picking and marketing fruit. However, this early with 643,000 tons, 82% of the total in 201428, a schedule became a curse this year, since it was year in which Catalonia produced 37,400 tons.29 not until the end of the picking season, with Olive oil was not included in Moscow’s almost 90 percent of the fruit already gathered, counter-sanctions.30 That year Russia bought that Spain’s Agriculture Ministry approved aid some 7,000 tons of bottled olive oil from to the industry. This has cast a shadow on Spain, out of 270,000 exported.31 While this whether Valencia’s farmers will be able to benefit from the aid, with Ramon Mampel, 26 Ibid. secretary general of the ‘Unió de Llauradors i 27 J. Nebot, ‘Catalunya, líder en exportació de vi’, in El Ramaders’ (Union of Farmers and Livestock Singular, 16 March 2015, online at http://www.elsingular.cat/vadevi/notices/2015/03/catal Farmers) complaining that the measures passed unya_lider_en_exportacio_de_vi_6467.php (last accessed ‘exclude Valencian producers’. The Cooperative on 10 June 2016). Anecoop, the world’s top citro-exporter is 28 Ginés Donaire, ‘Andalucía producirá esta campaña un rumoured to be pondering liquidating its 56% menos de aceite de oliva’, in El Pais, 24 October Russian subsidiary, Agrikoop, having lost 2,500 2014, available at http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2014/10/24/andalucia/141 tons in sales last year due to the Kremlin’s 4162261_417490.html (last accessed on 10 June 2016). 29 Average is 32,000 tons. Gaynor Selby, ‘Catalonia Says 24 Albert Garcia, ‘Davant el veto rus, reclamen l’activació its Output will be Lower, but Prices should Remain de mesures per pertorbació del mercat de la fruita’, in La Stable’, in Olive Oil Times, 22 October 2015, online at Terra, 1 August 2015, online at http://www.oliveoiltimes.com/olive-oil- http://www.uniopagesos.cat/laterra/online/item/3281- business/europe/catalonia-output-lower-but-prices- davant-el-veto-rus-reclamen- stable/49339 (last accessed on 10 June 2016). l%E2%80%99activaci%C3%B3-de-mesures-per- 30 ‘Russian Import Ban Fuels Food Price Rises’, in BBC, pertorbaci%C3%B3-del-mercat-de-la-fruita&Itemid=543 19 August 2014, online at (last accessed on 10 June 2016). http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28849726 25 Violeta Tena, ‘La pedregada russa’, in El Temps, 14 (last accessed on 10 June 2016). August 2015, online at 31 Vidal Maté, ‘Las exportaciones de aceite de oliva http://www.eltemps.cat/ca/notices/2015/08/lapedregad superan el millón de toneladas’, in El Pais, 21 September arussa11046.php (last accessed on 10 June 2016). 2014, online at 34 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) was just 2.6 percent of total Spanish exports of both Russia and Spain’. The order, worth 100 bottled olive oil in 2014, the amount bought by million Euros, was placed in June 2011. Four Russians was more important than this figure train sets will be used on the Moscow – Nizhny may imply for two reasons. First, because of Novgorod route, and three on the Moscow – the industry’s hopes that sales to Russia have Minsk – Warszawa – Berlin route.33 In February much room for growth in the coming years. 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin sharply Second, because of their potential role in criticised imports of rolling stock, referring addressing one of the long-standing challenges specifically to Talgo at a meeting with for the sector, namely moving from bulk ministers.34 It is not clear whether this will exports for reprocessing in other producing mean an end to the company’s plans for the countries (450,000 tons bound for Italy in Russian market. 2014) to higher value-added final sales to higher income consumers. While Italian producers In the spring of 2014 Iberdrola Ingeniería remain a more common sight in many markets, began to build a GIS (Gas Insulated Russia imported 56% of its olive oil from Spain Switchgear) 500 kV-substation for the 1,020 in the 2000-2014 period.32 MW Votkinskaya hydro-power station. The turnkey project for RusHydro, worth 32 million Thus Madrid, in following its traditional policy Euros, is the company’s first large contract in of promoting the economic interests of Spain Russia. Designed to supply electricity to 1 proper, may well be more open to accepting million people in Perm’, Udmurt, Kirov, and end to fruit exports than a similar measure Bashkir, Sverdlovsk, in Central Russia, the involving wine and especially olive oil, in the project had to deal with the area’s harsh context of an understanding with Moscow weather, with temperatures down to minus 38 involving logistical support for the Russian centigrade, and be completed by the end of the Navy at Ceuta and taking into account the year without interrupting the functioning of the geographical distribution of production within existing subcentral, built in 1963. Iberdrola Spain. Ingeniería is active in some 30 countries, building turnkey projects for its parent Fruit producers’ woes are a remote far cry from company and other parties, in areas such as the continued presence of some Spanish electricity generation, nuclear engineering, companies in Russia, the most relevant cases renewable energies, and distribution networks.35 including Talgo, a rolling stock manufacturer, Its future in the Russian market is at the Iberdrola Ingeniería, a branch of electricity moment also uncertain. utility Iberdrola, and oil producer Repsol. On 1 June a ceremony was held at Moscow’s When looking at Spain’s energy industry, the Kurskaya station to inaugurate the first of most important company to have invested in Federal Passenger Co’s seven Talgo train sets, Russia is Repsol. Its presence goes back to attended by Russian Railways President Vladimir Yakunin and Talgo Chairman Carlio de Palacio. In his address, Guillermo Martinez, 33 ‘Talgo Trains Enter Service in Russia’, in Railway Managing Director of Talgo in Russia, said that Gazette, 3 June 2015, online at http://www.railwaygazette.com/news/passenger/single- this marked ‘the culmination of 20 years of view/view/talgo-trains-enter-service-in-russia.html (last work and negotiations’, adding that ‘we can accessed on 10 June 2016). finally see Spanish technology running across 34 ‘No More Rolling Stock Imports for Russian Railways’, this country, a very important milestone for in Think Railways, 19 February 2015, online at http://www.think-railways.com/no-rolling-stock- imports-russian-railways/ (last accessed on 10 June http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2014/09/21/act 2016). ualidad/1411328825_432877.html (last accessed on 10 35 ‘Iberdrola Ingeniería construye en Rusia la subestación June 2016). de la central hidráulica de Votkinskaya, de 1.020 MW’, in 32 ‘Olive Oil Imports Increase in Russia, Decrease in Future Energy Web, 21 April 2014, online at China’, in Olive Oil Market, 1 June 2015, online at http://futurenergyweb.es/iberdrola-ingenieria-construye- http://www.oliveoilmarket.eu/olive-oil-imports-increase- en-rusia-la-subestacion-de-la-central-hidraulica-de- in-russia-decrease-in-china/ (last accessed on 10 June votkinskaya-de-1-020-mw/ (last accessed on 10 June 2016). 2016). 35 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) 2006, when it acquired a stake in West Siberian to the Minister for Natural Resources and the Resources. Five years later it created a joint Environment of the Russian Federation, Sergei venture with Alliance Oil Company, called Donskoi, this find by Repsol is the biggest AROG, devoted to oil exploration and made in Russia over the previous two years.40 extraction. Repsol has rights in 27 blocks, 13 in the exploration phase and 14 already in Other Spanish companies active in Russia, development. 36 In 2013 Repsol produced which may suffer from an expansion of 14,600 equivalent barrels of oil a day in Russia, sanctions and import substitution drives include a figure that rose to 17,460 by mid-2014 with Técnicas Reunidas (2013 contract worth 1.1 the startup of new gas wells in the SK field. In billion Euros with Lukoil to design the November 2014 it deepened its alliance with construction of an oil refinery in Volgograd, NNK, a Russian vertically integrated oil formerly Stalingrad), Indra (much of whose company active in production of oil and natural activities are defence-related, putting a big gas in a number of Russian regions plus question mark on its future in Russia), and Kazakhstan, as well as refining. The purpose of Fluidmechanica (an icebreaker equipment the agreement is to group their existing joint manufacturer). Overall, fewer than 2,000 venture assets into a single management Spanish enterprises export to Russia (out of company, ‘to help optimise operational decision some 150,000 selling abroad), and of these, taking, reduce costs and achieve maximum only 100 have a physical presence in the synergies from the partnership’.37 With country.41 However, while these figures may not reserves estimated at more than 500 million seem impressive, and the overall volume of tons of oil equivalent, NKK’s yearly production business by Spanish enterprises not that high, is around 3.5 million tons, and it owns a some of these companies, like Repsol, are not network of more than 250 stations in the only politically well connected, but are seen as easternmost parts of the country. NNK has a spearheads in Madrid’s industrial policy of 51% stake in the resulting joint venture, called seeking to nurture global companies providing AR Oil & Gas B.V. (AROG), with Repsol higher added value products. holding the rest. By 2014 daily production was averaging 22,500 barrels of oil and 76 million The sharp drop in fruit exports while standard cubic feet of gas. The 2014 agreement companies like Talgo, Iberdrola Ingeniería, and lays down that Russian corporation ALREP, a Repsol remained active in Russia has raised subsidiary of AROG, will manage the joint suspicions that Madrid may have not been all venture’s assets, while NNK will manage oil that diligent in trying to soften the blow to an sales through a marketing agreement.38 industry mainly based in Catalan-speaking regions. An alternative explanation is that a In mid 2014 Repsol made headlines when it fragmented industry, despite different announced two hydrocarbon discoveries in the organizations like the ones mentioned earlier, Karabashsky 1 and 2 blocks in Western Siberia, may not have the same lobbying power as three which according to the company could add 240 politically well-connected firms like Repsol, million barrels to its reserves tally.39 According Talgo, and Iberdrola. The two theories are 36 ‘Repsol in Russia’, website of Repsol, undated, online http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=133686 at http://www.repsol.com/es_en/corporacion/conocer- (last accessed on 10 June 2016). repsol/repsol-en-el-mundo/rusia.aspx (last accessed on 40 ‘Repsol Makes Russia’s Largest Hydrocarbons 10 June 2016). Discovery in Two Years’, in Oil Voice, 23 June 2014, 37 Paddy Harris, ‘Repsol-NNK Seek Operational Boost in online at Russia through Management Amalgamation’, Oil and Gas http://www.oilvoice.com/n/Repsol_makes_Russias_larg Technology, 28 November 2014, online at est_hydrocarbons_discovery_in_two_years/88720b2402 http://www.oilandgastechnology.net/upstreamnews/rep 0d.aspx (last accessed on 10 June 2016). solnnkseekoperationalboostrussiathroughmanagementam 41 Irena Domingo, ‘Las 100 empresas españolas algamation (last accessed on 10 June 2016). establecidas en Rusia’, in Rusalia, 2 November 2014, 38 Harris, ‘Repsol-NNK Seek Operational Boost in online at Russia’. http://www.rusalia.com/empresasespanolasrusia (last 39 ‘Repsol Makes Russia’s Biggest Discovery in 2 Years’, accessed on 10 June 2016). in RigZone, 23 June 2015, online at 36 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) compatible, since Talgo is headquartered in Russian tourists came to be seen as very Madrid, with production there and in the valuable by Spain’s tourism industry, thanks not Basque Country, Repsol also in Madrid, and only to their quick growth but their relatively Iberdrola Ingeniería in the Basque Country. high spending, ‘almost 1,500 Euros per person Some Catalan companies are present in Russia, per trip, 600 Euros above other foreign like Antonio Puig (perfumes; with headquarters visitors’.44 This is significant because, although in Barcelona and Paris and production facilities Russian visitors never came to constitute a high concentrated in Catalonia, France, and Mexico) percentage of international tourists visiting and Roca (bathroom appliances, with Spain, their growth in recent years had headquarters in Barcelona and 76 production surpassed that of any other group, and their facilities worldwide), but they tend to spending power was also higher, meaning that concentrate, as in other markets, on areas they were seen as a priority by the industry and closely linked to final retail consumers, where authorities. Their main profile is that of ‘a the need for a friendly government lobbying on person between 25 and 44 years old, from one their behalf is not as strong as in, let’s say, of the two most important cities (Moscow or heavy engineering or energy. Saint Petersburg), with medium or higher medium purchasing power, often married with Tourism and real estate nosedive, under the combined children, who chooses to spend his holidays in weight of informal sanctions and the financial crisis a beach area’, who has a tour agency ‘organize the trip (transportation, hotel, and trips) and Concerning tourism, statistics show an acute handle his visa’. According to an online poll by drop in the number of Russian visitors to Spain Atorus (Russia’s Association of Tour over the last two years.42 Russian tourists Operators) last year, when it came to choosing numbered 1.2 million in 2012. That year, Spain, Russian visitors mainly valued the Catalonia received 743,928 Russian visitors, landscape, including beaches (37% of those 50% more than the previous year. Even though polled), culture (37%), the weather (15%), in 2013 the numbers of Russian tourists in people (10%), and cuisine (2%). Concerning Catalonia grew by a further 31.8%, with shopping, Spain’s IET (Tourism Studies Catalonia becoming the destination of choice Institute) points out three key areas for Russian for up to a million Russian visitors,43 these visitors: Barcelona’s Passeig de Gràcia (47% numbers started dropping abruptly from 2014 market share), Madrid’s Salamanca quarter onwards. In 2014 their volume had shrank by (10.9%), and Marbella’s Puerto Banus (10%).45 10.3%, and in the first quarter of 2015, 114,321 Before the advent of Russia’s economic crisis Russian tourists travelled to Spain, a 24.9% and the Ukraine crisis, the need for a visa drop on a year-on-year basis. This is taking (which was unnecessary for Russians’ other place as the overall number of foreign tourists favourite destinations, Egypt and Turkey) had keeps breaking new records, having risen by 4.2 been mentioned as a factor limiting the number percent in the first half of 2015 on a year-on- of Russian tourists, while Spain’s decision to year basis, to 29.2 million. grant residence permits to real estate and government debt investors above a certain 46 threshold was seen as a positive move. 42 ‘Here’s what Spain’s Record-breaking Tourism Season Looks Like’, in CNN , 23 July 2015, online at 44 Carlos Manuel Sanchez, ‘‘‘Bienvenido, mister Misha’’’, http://edition.cnn.com/2015/07/23/travel/gallery/spai in ABC, 13 May 2013, online at n-tourism-2015/ (last accessed on 10 June 2016). See also http://www.abc.es/economia/20130513/abci-inversion- ‘El turismo ruso cae un 25%: ¿a los rusos ya no les gusta rusa-espana-201305130848.html (last accessed on 10 España?’, in El Economista, 26 April 2015, online at June 2016). http://www.eleconomista.es/espana/noticias/6661680/ 45 Irena Domingo, ‘Turistas rusos: cómo vienen y a 04/15/El-turismo-ruso-cae-un-25-a-los-rusos-ya-no-les- dónde van’, in Rusalia, 29 May 2014, online at gusta-Espana.html (last accessed on 10 June 2016). http://www.rusalia.com/turistasrusos/ (last accessed on 43 Lluis Pellicer, ‘El turismo ruso cae un 20% por la crisis 10 June 2016). de Ucrania y la devaluación del rublo’, in El Pais, 25 46 Irene Rivas, ‘Que vienen los rusos’, in Capital, 26 September 2014, online at August 2013, online at http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2014/09/24/catalunya/141 http://www.capital.es/2013/08/26/quevienenlosrusos/ 1581862_971319.html (last accessed on 10 June 2016). (last accessed on 10 June 2016). 37 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) Russian investment in Spain has never government support’51 in that regard. At first amounted to a large volume, and has such expectations were met, with investment up furthermore concentrated on real state and by 560% in 2011.52 However the rouble’s fall, business directly catering to Russian visitors Russian economic troubles, and mutual and Residents. In 2013 Russian Ambassador sanctions, have taken their toll, just like with Yuri Korchagin publicly admitted this, adding tourism. Concerning large Russian enterprises, that the embassy would work to promote only Aeroflot with its operations centre in investments also ‘in productive sectors’.47 Madrid’s Barajas airport, and Lukoil with its terminal at Barcelona harbour are present, with From 1993 to October 2012, Russian legal and tax arrangements being cited as investment amounted to 190 million Euros, reasons for Spain not being an attractive although this figure does not include jurisdiction and some nearby countries seen as investment by Russian-owned companies better options. Rafael del Castillo Ionov, vice domiciled in other countries, and thus the real president of the Ibero-Russian Chamber of volume may be higher.48 In any case, Russia has Commerce, mentions another factor: criminal never ranked among the top 10 countries in cases against Russian businessmen (involving terms of FDI in Spain. Having said that, Rusal, the world’s largest aluminium producer, Russian investment in the real estate industry and UGMK, Ural Mining and Metallurgical became important when the financial crisis led Company) before the National High Court.53 to sharp drops in prices and a huge reduction in We should not forget, however, that contrary to the number of deals.4950 Centred on the popular perceptions, the bulk of Russian coasts of Catalonia, Valencia, and the Balearic investment in real estate comes from the Islands, Russian buyers came to be seen as ‘the middle-classes, not a few better known names. target clients to get rid of current real estate On the other hand, the Russian Embassy in stocks’, with ‘Spanish real estate agents and Madrid admits that ‘there are few Russian banks betting on Russian investors, enjoying corporations in Spain as a reflection of a situation of excessive dependence on oil and 54 47 ‘La embajada rusa promoverá inversiones productivas natural gas’. en España’, in Finanzas, 8 November 2013, online at http://www.finanzas.com/noticias/economia/20131108 Military exchanges and cooperation: modest yet /embajada-rusa-promovera-inversiones-2541615.html seemingly unaffected by sanctions (last accessed on 10 June 2016). 48 Alina Bondarenko, ‘Inversiones rusas en España’, in Russia Beyond the Headlines, 1 October 2012, online at Military cooperation between Spain and Russia, http://es.rbth.com/articles/2012/10/01/inversiones_ru other than logistical support for the Russian sas_en_espana_20369.html (last accessed on 10 June Navy at Ceuta, has traditionally been rather 2016). modest, although Madrid’s participation in 49 For a profile of Russian investors in Spanish real estate, including their motivations for their choice of ISAF provided some momentum for closer country, see Irena Domingo, ‘El perfil del comprador contacts and in 2011 shipbuilder Navantia ruso de vivienda en España: consejos para la venta de signed a cooperation agreement with Russia’s viviendas a clientes rusos’, in Rusalia, 18 December 2013, Oboronoexport.55 The 2014 government report online at http://www.rusalia.com/consejos-vender- on defence and dual-use exports explains, vivienda-rusos (last accessed on 10 June 2016). 50 Spain’s financial crisis and its impact on the real estate concerning the latter, that ‘shipments to Russia, industry, for half a century the economy’s cornerstones, 14.4 million Euros and [amounting to] 8.5 is dealt with in Steven Hill, ‘To Hell and Back: Spain’s percent took place before the imposition of Grotesque Recession and Its Surprising New Economy’, in The Atlantic, 18 October 2013, online at http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/10/ 51 Bondarenko, ‘Inversiones rusas en España’. to-hell-and-back-spains-grotesque-recession-and-its- 52 Ibid. surprising-new-economy/280678 (last accessed on 10 53 Rivas, ‘Que vienen los rusos’. June 2016). For a panoramic view of the industry as of 54 Ibid. mid-2015, see ‘2015, year zero for the real estate sector 55 ‘Navantia Signs Agreement with Rosoboronexport’, in recovery in Spain’, KPMG, June 2015, online at Defense-Aerospace, 12 July 2011, online at https://home.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2015 http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles- /06/Informe-2015-Real-Estate-KPMG-ingles.pdf (last view/release/3/127123/navantia-signs-agreement-with- accessed on 10 June 2016). rosoboronexport.html (last accessed on 10 June 2016). 38 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) sanctions by the European Union, or in released pending trial.59 While they were not put accordance with the exemptions thereby into pre-trial detention, some voices have included’.56 However, it is noteworthy that the complained that they were arrested, whereas Ukraine crisis does not seem to have put a dent volunteers fighting on the other side had not. on visits and agreements. Thus, on 20 November 2014, a delegation from the Russian Mid-Cat: Madrid’s indecisiveness Federation’s Ministry of Civil Defence, Emergencies and Disaster Relief of the Russian Whereas energy exports, and more precisely Federation, headed by Deputy Minister natural gas exports, play a major role in Vladimir Stepanov, visited the headquarters of Moscow’s relations with a number of countries, the Military Emergencies Unit and its units this does not apply to Spain. The country does located at Torrejon de Ardoz airbase. The visit not consume Russian natural gas, although in was part of the ‘VII Meeting of the Spanish- 2013 it imported 14% of its oil from Russia. Russian Mixed Committee’ on cooperation on The only significant Russian investment is the prevention of catastrophes, and the two Meroil Tank, Lukoil’s 50-50 joint venture with parties agreed to promote exchanges in Catalonia’s Meroil, which built a new oil seminars, simulations, and training.57 On 26 terminal at Barcelona Harbour, opened in 2012. December 2014, Spain’s official gazette The terminal features 13 tanks, with a total (‘Boletín Oficial del Estado’; BOE) published storage capacity of 360,000 cubic metres, the text of the ‘Agreement between the extending over 40 hectares and connected to Government of the Kingdom of Spain and the CLH’s oil pipeline network. The facility Government of the Russian Federation on the distributes petrol, aviation fuel, and biodiesel.60 Mutual Protection of Classified Information’.58 In a press release following the inauguration Although this treaty had been signed on 6 ceremony, Lukoil explained that ‘The new tank November 2013, the fact it was published on battery has transformed the terminal into a Boxing Day may indicate that Spanish major Mediterranean hub for transhipment of authorities were hoping the media would not petroleum products with a total capacity of pay much attention. 1,000,000 cubic meters’.61 Concerning the presence of Spanish volunteers In recent months there has been much talk of fighting on both sides in the Ukraine, in Midcat, a natural gas pipeline that would link February 2015 the National Police arrested the Iberian Peninsula with French and Central eight for having joined pro-Russian militias, and European distribution networks, through after appearing before a judge they were Catalonia. Speaking in Brussels on 5 March 2015, Spanish Industry Minister Jose Manuel Soria explained that the project’s goal was to cut down European dependence on Russian natural gas by 40 percent, diversifying sources 56 Office of the Prime Minister of Spain, ‘El Gobierno da a conocer el informe de exportaciones de material de defensa, otro material y doble uso en el año 2014’, 10 59 Jorge A. Rodríguez, ‘Detenidos ocho españoles por June 2015, online at luchar en el bando prorruso en Ucrania’, in El Pais, 27 http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/serviciosdeprensa/notasp February 2015, online at rensa/mineco/Paginas/2015/100615exportaciones.aspx http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2015/02/27/actualid (last accessed on 10 June 2016). ad/1425026528_611328.html (last accessed on 10 June 57 Ministerio de Defensa, ‘Visita de la delegación del 2016). Ministerio de Emergencias de la Federación Rusa’, 20 60 ‘Barcelona Port Becomes the Largest Oil Logistics November 2014, online at Platform in the Mediterranean’, in Catalan News Agency, http://www.ume.mde.es/noticias/2014/11/Noticias/visi 27 April 2012, online at ta_delegacion_federacion_rusa.html (last accessed on 10 http://www.catalannewsagency.com/business/item/barc June 2016). elona-port-becomes-the-largest-oil-logistics-platform-in- 58 ‘Acuerdo entre el Gobierno del Reino de España y el the-mediterranean (last accessed on 10 June 2016). Gobierno de la Federación de Rusia sobre la Protección 61 Lukoil Press Release, ‘Lukoil Opens New Terminal at mutua de la Información Clasificada’, Boletín Oficial del Barcelona Port’, website of Lukoil, 27 April 2012, online Estado (BOE), Vol. 312 (26 December 2014), p. 105457 at http://www.lukoil.com/press.asp?div_id=1&id=3631 ff. (last accessed on 10 June 2016). 39 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) of supply. Soria said that the pipeline should be the degree to which Spanish authorities are operational by the year 2020. One day earlier, really committed to Midcat is not clear, at least French President François Hollande, Spanish for two reasons. First of all, because it may Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, Portuguese amount to a salvo against Russia in an area of Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho, and particular importance to Russian diplomacy - European Commission President Jean Claude energy exports. As we have seen, Madrid has Juncker, had signed the ‘Madrid Declaration’, traditionally worked to stay clear of any full designed to relaunch a project first planned in blown confrontation with Moscow, and at the 2007. Since then, it has remained on the table, rare moments when Spanish leaders have with only a portion built and Spanish sources spoken openly against the Kremlin, namely blaming the French for not completing their concerning the Crimea, this has been motivated section. The Ukrainian crisis rekindled interest by ‘domestic’ factors and they have quickly in the project, and prompted some high reverted to their traditional position, which puts sounding rhetoric, with statements that them at odds with many of their Euro-Atlantic ‘Catalonia is in a privileged position to act as a allies. Furthermore, Repsol’s presence in Russia natural link between Northern Africa and means Moscow could repay Madrid in kind if Central Europe. The Midcat pipeline will be a the latter seeks to challenge her in the energy piece of strategic infrastructure for the entire arena. Second, as its name implies, Midcat European Union, linking the gas networks of would be located in Catalonia, 63 and Spanish Spain and France. This represents linking the authorities have traditionally sought to exclude Iberian Peninsula – which has direct this region from major infrastructure projects, connections with North African gas fields and working to promote the industrialization of hosts many gas processing plants – with Central regions in the Castilian core of the state, seen Europe, which is almost totally dependent on as loyal. Spanish economic nationalism has Russian gas’. Midcat’s planned initial capacity is deep roots, its modern incarnation going back 230 GWh/d from Spain to France and 80 to Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship (1923-1930), GWh/d from France to Spain. In charge of the and remains unabated to this day. For example, project are Spain’s Enagas and France’s TIGF Madrid excludes Catalan companies from the and GRTGaz. The former is responsible for defence industry and associated sectors such as building a 195 km-stretch from Martorell (near airspace, and has repeatedly refused to build the Barcelona) to the border, but only an 88 km- ‘Mediterranean Corridor’ of rail connections long section from Martorell to Hostalric (near between France and Valencia, despite being a Girona) has been built. The two French EU priority project and enjoying French companies are responsible for a 120 km-long support. Infrastructure projects involving section between the border and Barbaira (near France are particularly sensitive, with long- Narbonne), in the case of TIGS, and a 190 standing plans to build a water pipeline between Km-long stretch between Barbaira and the the Rhône and the Barcelona conurbation Rhône, in the case of GRTGaz. According to vetoed. Thus building a major natural gas Soria, construction will resume in 2016. The pipeline in Catalonia, while not impossible, and Spanish minister described the agreement as certainly in line with the EU’s desire to reduce ‘very important’, while stressing the project’s geopolitical significance. A number of EU 63 Some Catalan analysts have stressed Midcat’s strategic funding bodies, such as the European Fund for nature, with journalist Josep Prat writing, for example Strategic Investments, are to provide finance.62 ‘Catalonia appears as a transit zone and a beneficiary territory in geopolitical terms’. Prat also addressed the Despite Madrid’s sudden burst of enthusiasm, uncertainty concerning a possible declaration of independence, and Spanish commentary to the effect that it may prompt the freezing of the project and the 62 ‘North African gas to reach Central Europe through loss of EU financing, putting forward the view that in an Catalonia by 2020 to reduce 40% Russian dependency’, independence scenario ‘everything ends up in the hands in Catalan News Agency, 5 March 2015, online at of diplomacy, and the offsets that Catalonia may offer http://www.catalannewsagency.com/politics/item/north EU countries’. Josep Prat, ‘Catalunya, clau de pas del gas -african-gas-to-reach-central-europe-through-catalonia- a Europa’, in Lendavant, 29 November 2015, online at by-2020-to-reduce-40-russian-dependency (last accessed http://lendavant.com/catalunya-clau-de-pas-del-gas-a- on 10 June 2016). europa/ (last accessed on 10 June 2016). 40 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) dependence on Russian natural gas, would run sympathetic countries to Moscow (along with counter to this long-standing policy, which has Greece, Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria) and is one seen, for example, Madrid delay the much of the most openly reluctant towards taking a needed construction of European gauge hard line with Russia. This Spanish policy connections between Barcelona and Tarragona produces irritation and incomprehension in Harbours and the French railway network. A other European societies, particularly among possibility for Madrid to take point in efforts to Russia’s neighbours. Madrid’s position seems to lessen European dependency on Russian energy swing between a desire to prompt dialogue with imports while avoiding the construction of a Moscow and a fear of appearing to be a major infrastructure on Catalan soil would be belligerent partner, or one who obstructs the to drill the Central Pyrenees, bypassing common EU position’.65 This stands in contrast Catalonia. However, similar plans in the railway with Spanish Foreign Minister Garcia- domain (the so called ‘Central Corridor’) have Margallo’s early attempt to portray the Crimean consistently been rejected by French authorities, plebiscite as essentially the same as Catalonia’s 9 and this may explain why, at least publicly, no November 2014 semi-official referendum. similar proposals concerning a potential natural Although the authors of this report carefully gas pipeline have been made. Without French avoid any reference to Ceuta, they still open connivance, it is impossible for Madrid to their paper with a frank admission of Madrid’s completely escape the tyranny of geography, pro-Russian leanings. which dictates the construction of infrastructure projects along the old Roman The question is what are the motivations ‘Via Augusta’, although she retains the behind these leanings? More precisely, what capability to veto them. Thus Midcat may end explains the logistical support of the Russian up suffering the same fate as its water and Navy at Ceuta? As tends to happen in these railway predecessors. cases, it is difficult to point to a single cause, but we can draw together the points already The Midcat project is really ambitious, since discussed to help us shed some light on the Spanish authorities and commentators have issue. First of all, there is Spain’s deep unease stressed not only the possibility of transporting within the Western camp, the lack of strong North-African natural gas, but also LNG from shared values and ideals with the United States, the United States. In September 2014, Soria and corresponding feelings of being closer to travelled to the United States, meeting US Russia on many levels. Second, the distance, Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz and stating to psychological rather than geographical, from the media: ‘I discussed Spain’s capacity to the events that have ultimately prompted the import LNG … to then transfer onto Europe’. crisis between Russia and the West. Third, and The minister explained that the Iberian connected to this - the prevailing view that Peninsula had 8 re-gasification plants, half of Spain’s main challenge is preserving, by force or those in Europe, which were ‘best suited’ to threat of force if necessary, her existing supply the rest of Europe with an amount of borders, and subsequent reluctance to reorient natural gas equivalent to 10 percent of current her military toward the sort of training and Russian imports.64 mentoring activities carried out by, let’s say, the British in the Ukraine. Fourth, the lobbying Possible Motivations Behind Spain’s Failure to Fully power of well connected companies such as Implement Sanctions against Russia. Talgo and Iberdrola. Fifth, the positive impact on Ceuta’s economy of the Russian naval As noted in a report on the EU-Russia conflict, ‘Spain is widely seen to be one of most 65 Nicolás de Pedro and Antonio Sánchez Andrés, ‘Spain and the European Union-Russia Conflict: The Impact of 64 Andres Cala, ‘Spain Lobbies to Become European the Sanctions’, in CIDOB: Notes internacionals, Vol. 108 Gateway for US LNG Exports’, in blog of Andres Cala (February 2015), online at Campo, 11 September 2014, online at http://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_serie http://www.andrescalacampo.com/spainlobbiesbecomee s/notes_internacionals/n1_108/spain_and_the_europea uropeangatewayuslngexports/ (last accessed on 10 June n_union_russia_conflict_the_impact_of_the_sanctions 2016). (last accessed on 10 June 2016). 41 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) presence, plus the possible connections of towards Moscow that summer.67 some of the figures behind the provision of fuel. Sixth, the low-intensity campaign against Concerning future moves, Madrid may be Gibraltar, including work to challenge the worried that a possible additional round of British naval presence in Gibraltar. Despite all Russian sanctions may impact the industries these factors, Madrid’s EU and NATO that have to date managed to escape the brunt membership, and the need to be on reasonably of Moscow’s retaliatory moves, namely ‘energy, good terms with her alleged partners and allies, railways and advanced technologies’ according limit the extent to which Spain can deviate to the CIDOB report mentioned earlier, which from Western sanctions. Furthermore, the adds that ‘perhaps the business that will be country has traditionally followed a prudent most heavily affected is Repsol, but it may also policy in the last century, avoiding steps that mean that the first steps taken by Indra are although in line with its elites’ preferences may blocked off ’, stressing that ‘the companies that risk their stronghold in power. This explains are not affected—principally the large why, despite being pro-German, Madrid companies of the energy and infrastructure remained neutral in the Great War (playing a sectors—fear a possible fourth package of difficult balancing game in West Africa), and sanctions, and mean it is likely that Madrid will how it sent troops to the Eastern Front and resolutely oppose any attempt to impose acted as protecting power for Japan in the further punitive measures’. 68 United States during the Second World War while avoiding a clash with America and the This concern about the future of well- British Empire, discreetly disengaging as the connected companies based in Spain proper, war took a turn for the worse for the Axis. In fits with Madrid’s prudent approach to Central the same vein, Madrid abstained on UNSC 502 and Eastern Europe. Whereas countries like the and failed to implement sanctions against United States and Canada are keen to Argentina, while treating with kids-gloves the emphasize the strategic significance of the Argentine commandos intercepted when trying ‘Intermarium’ and the right of countries in the to get to Gibraltar, but otherwise refrained region to join NATO and the EU, refusing any from directly interfering with the Rock. notion of a Russian sphere of influence, Spain’s approach is very different. Not even the Concerning Russia’s motivations to allow some temptation to use the Crimea to badmouth Spanish companies to keep operating in the Catalonia’s drive to recover independence has country, this may be part of a wider deal, or taken Madrid off its traditional course. Thus, informal understanding on the use of Ceuta as while Foreign Minister Garcia-Margallo may her Navy’s main logistical base in the Western have spoken out comparing the two cases on a Mediterranean and North-East Atlantic. Civil number of occasions, at the end of the day War in Syria has raised the value of Ceuta, Madrid’s support for Kiev has been lukewarm which is furthermore strategically located at a at most, and Spanish military advisers are major chokepoint, right in front of Gibraltar. neither present not expected. More widely, engaging a mid-sized power suffering from significant economic and Referring to the Crimean plebiscite, Garcia- political problems can contribute to Moscow’s Margallo said that the parallel with Catalonia wider goal of politically splitting NATO. In was ‘absolute’69 and that a referendum that connection to this, we may note that in late 2015 Italy declared its disagreement with the 67 automatic extension of sanctions against ‘The Daily Vertical: Russia’s Play For Greece’, in Radio Free Europe, 8 July 2015, online at Russia,66 while Greece featured some overtures http://www.rferl.org/content/daily-vertical-russia-play- greece/27116228.html (last accessed on 10 June 2016). 68 De Pedro and Sánchez Andrés, ‘Spain and the 66 ‘Italy Moves to Block Automatic Renewal of EU Anti- European Union-Russia Conflict’. Russian Sanctions’, in Sputnik News, 9 December 2015, 69 Guy Hedgecoe, ‘Catalonia’s unwanted Crimean online at comparisons’, in The Irish Times, 19 March 2014, available http://sputniknews.com/europe/20151209/1031494494 at /italy-anti-sanctions.html (last accessed on 10 June 2016). http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/catalon 42 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) violates an internal constitution by definition have launched’. The minister underlined that violated international law and could not have the EU and the Eurasian Customs Union were legal effects, adding that ‘A territory which two pillars of what should end up being an area splits off in flagrant violation of an internal ‘from Lisbon to Vladivostok’.72 constitution can’t aspire to international recognition’.70 Neither history nor the At another joint press conference, in Moscow International Court of Justice seem to support on 10 March 2015, Lavrov stressed that ‘Spain’s Garcia-Margallo’s words, and Catalan voices position on the unilateral proclamation of were quick to point this out. Speaking to US Kosovo’s independence is well known and we public radio NPR, Marc Guerrero, vice- share it’, explaining that he had agreed with his president of the ALDE, the EU’s Liberal Party Spanish counterpart to accelerate work on a (third-largest in the European Parliament), number of pending bilateral treaties, including dismissed Margallo’s claims as ‘comple mutual recognition of driving licenses and nonsense‘ and the analogy with the Crimean as academic degrees.73 ‘a silly comparison’, adding that the referendum in the Crimea had taken place under ‘military Despite such statements, Spain has tried to walk occupation and with guns’.71 Whatever the a careful path, trying not to appear in the eyes historical and legal merits of the Spanish of its partners and Allies as too overtly pro- narrative, what matters from a practical Russian. Spanish media outlets and think-tanks perspective is that it quickly gave way to a remain silent on the issue, with the exception reversion to Madrid’s traditional prudence of local newspapers in Ceuta, while Madrid has concerning Russia. Instead of putting their tried to keep a low profile in multilateral fora, military where their mouth was, Spanish leaders above all the EU. Foreign Minister Garcia- chose to quietly insist on the idea that Moscow Margallo, however, was forced to publicly admit had ‘legitimate interests’ in the Ukraine, which Russia’s naval presence in Ceuta when should be taken into account when seeking a confronted with the issue by ERC (Catalan solution that avoided both the risk of a general Republican Left) leader Oriol Junqueras in a conflagration and the losing of face by the TV debate a few days before the 27 September parties involved. There was not much 2015 election to the Catalan Parliament.74 enthusiasm for the Euromaidan in Madrid, and Garcia-Margallo went as far as stating, at a joint Concluding remarks press conference with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov on 5 March 2014, that ‘it is Spain saw in the Crimean crisis an opportunity known that the current difficulties began when to rally the West against Catalonia, equating the president Yanukovich decided not to sign the association agreement with the EU, an 72 An audio recording of the joint press conference was association agreement that was erroneously published on the website of Spain’s Foreign Affairs presented as an exclusive and exclusionary Ministry, 5 March 2014, online at alternative to the Eurasian Customs Union that http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/SalaDePrensa/ Russia and other countries from the region Multimedia/Documents/2014-03-05_RP-MAEC- RUSIA_WEB.mp3 (last accessed on 10 June 2016). 73 ‘Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement and ia-s-unwanted-crimean-comparisons-1.1731236 (last answers to questions at a joint news conference following accessed on 10 June 2016). talks with Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation 70 ‘Crimea and Catalonia ‘the same’: Foreign Minister’, in José Manuel García-Margallo of Spain, Moscow, March The Local, 18 March 2014, online at 10, 2015’, website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of http://www.thelocal.es/20140318/crimea-and-catalonia the Russian Federation, 10 March 2015, available at (last accessed on 10 June 2016). http://archive.mid.ru//brp_4.nsf/0/05AFF07887322D 71 Alex Calvo, ‘Catalonia’s Marc Guerrero dismisses D543257E0400658A99 Spanish analogy with Crimean referendum, stresses that 74 The full footage of the 23 December 2015 debate is “at the end, democracy will win”’, in Bulletin of the Center linked in ‘Margallo branda la resposta manipulada de for Strategic Studies of Catalonia, 10 April 2014, online at Juncker en el cara a cara amb Junqueras’, Vilaweb, 23 http://www.ceec.cat/catala/articles/catalonias-marc- September 2015, online at guerrero-dismisses-spanish-analogy-with-crimean- http://www.vilaweb.cat/noticies/margallo-branda-la- referendum-stresses-that-at-the-end-democracy-will-win/ resposta-manipulada-de-juncker-en-el-cara-a-cara-amb- (last accessed on 10 June 2016). junqueras-2/ (last accessed on 10 June 2016). 43 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) Peninsula’s plebiscite with the Catalan 9 Western policy towards Russia, to press Spain November 2014 referendum. However, Madrid to close Ceuta to the Russian Navy and quickly reverted to her traditional prudent complete her remaining section of Midcat. This stance concerning Russia, and came to be seen would bring three benefits: putting a dent to as one of the EU members less eager to use Russia’s naval presence in a key strategic region, sanctions against Moscow. Furthermore, contributing to the EU’s energy security, and Western sanctions had no impact on Ceuta, sending Moscow and the world the message which has become the Russian Navy’s main that the West is united. logistic base in the Western Mediterranean / Eastern Atlantic, with 13 port visits in 2014 and 10 in the year to date. Ceuta plays an important ______role in Moscow’s attempt to build a significant naval presence worldwide. The presence of major Spanish companies in Russia gives Moscow further leverage ―and further incentives to Madrid― to stop Spain from taking point in Western policies aimed at the prevention of further territorial encroachments by the Kremlin, and this is clear in the absence of Spanish military advisers in the Ukraine. We should note that some of the companies involved, like Repsol, are politically well connected. Madrid also made much of Spain’s potential role in lessening the EU’s dependence on Russian natural gas, stressing the possibilities opened by the planned pipeline Midcat, which would enable Spanish re- gasification plants to feed the French and Central European distribution networks. This would allow not only North-African, but also US, natural gas to reach consumers in the rest of the EU. However, since this infrastructure is located in Catalonia, it would run counter to a policy of economic strangulation which has seen Madrid blockade the building of a water pipeline from France, European gauge connections from Tarragona and Barcelona Harbours, and the Mediterranean Corridor, among others. The latter has repeatedly been designated a priority project by the European Union and enjoys Paris’ support, to no avail. Furthermore, while to date the brunt of Russia’s agricultural veto is being born by Catalan-speaking regions, their possible extension to wine (with exports more widely spread over Spain’s geography) and olive oil (heavily concentrated in the politically powerful South), could make Madrid even less enthusiastic about standing shoulder to shoulder with her partners and allies. It would therefore make sense at this stage, before Madrid undermines even further 44 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) The Role of Water in Human Conflict and Politics: A Strife 4-Part Series The entries forming this series are all reprinted, in a lightly edited form, from the Strife blog (at strifeblog.org) where they were published in March 2016. All web references were last accessed on 12 June 2016, unless otherwise stated. Part I: Water A Wellspring of Conflict? has been widely discredited by scholars.2 No Paula Hanasz war has ever been solely over water. Rather, hydropolitics, the geopolitics of water, is Water wars; they seem inevitable in an age of regarded by academics and policymakers to be non-traditional security threats and problems complex. It is no longer possible to simply say such as climate change requiring collective that water causes conflict. action. But water is rarely a single cause of conflict. Certainly, water can be a stress In recent years, water scholars, including many multiplier in a conflict, but violent conflict can affiliated with the London Water Research also affect the equitable distribution of water, Group3 based at King’s College, have shown and thus exacerbate tensions. In other words, that more often than not, there can be it’s complicated. Conflict is never cooperation over a shared river and conflict straightforward, and neither is water over it at the same time.4 The Indus River is a governance. great example of this. The conflict between India and Pakistan following independence Nonetheless, the fear of water wars persists. from the British Empire included disputes over The logic is obvious to the point of a truism: the shared rivers of the Indus basin, and water scarcity combined with rapidly increasing eventually resulted in the signing of the Indus populations and the consistent growth in Waters Treaty in 1960. Although the treaty still demand for food and energy will lead to has its critics in both countries, it continued to competition between states over freshwater function throughout the two wars between resources. This competition, the thinking goes, India and Pakistan. is likely to culminate in violent clashes over control of this precious, finite and irreplaceable Another important point is that water conflict resource. is not always so bad, and water cooperation is not always what it seems. Disputes can force Commentators such as Brahma Chellaney have states to negotiate mutually agreeable built careers making this very argument.1 He outcomes, but at the same time, international argues that Asia may be on the brink of water treaties can cement an inequitable status quo. wars fuelled by China’s accelerating For example, India signed in 1996 an agreement consumption of water, energy and food, and its with Bangladesh over the sharing of waters of powerful upstream position vis-à-vis weaker, already volatile states on the Mekong and Brahmaputra Rivers (i.e., India and Bangladesh 2 Paula Hanasz, ‘Water War - What is it Good For?’, in APPS Policy Forum (19 March 2014), online at on the former, and Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, http://www.policyforum.net/water-war-what-is-it-good- Vietnam and Thailand on the latter). for. 3 London Water Research Group, online at Compelling though it is, the water wars thesis https://lwrg.wordpress.com. 4 Paula Hanasz, ‘Understanding Water Cooperation and Conflict’, in Global Water Forum (2 December 2013), 1 Brahma Chellaney, Water, Peace, and War: Confronting the online at Global Water Crisis (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, http://www.globalwaterforum.org/2013/12/02/underst 2013). anding-water-cooperation-and-conflict. 45 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) the Ganges River, but this arrangement greatly wishing to reserve some river flow for favours India and continues to be a source of environmental purposes and Aboriginal cultural resentment within Bangladesh.5 rights. Just because water is not unequivocally a An American water governance expert, Ken wellspring of conflict, that is no reason for Conca, argues that while most conflicts over complacency. Tensions over shared water water occur at the local level – at the scale of a resources are real and require our attention. city, say, or the watershed –they are also often The current conflict in Syria, for example, has driven by powerful global forces. For example, been exacerbated by decades of weak Conca argues that, ‘[t]he growth of industrial governance in the water and agriculture sectors, fish farming is fuelled by changing consumer and a lack of preparedness for severe drought.6 tastes in rich countries. Big hydroelectric Water, in other words, is often one piece in a projects in remote locations often power very complex puzzle of conflict. industrial processing facilities that plug into the global economy, while bypassing local The puzzle of water-related conflict does not economies and imposing a heavy burden on necessarily reveal a picture of states contra local communities.’9 states. Firstly, the notion of state’s priorities and approaches to water management as being Another red herring in the puzzle of water homogenous is incorrect because subsets of conflicts is the issue of scarcity. Looking solely national actors have different values and at factors such as the volume of water available agendas. Secondly, most water-related violence per capita does not take into account spatial happens at the sub-national level between variability in water resources within countries tribes, sub-national governance units such as and the technological or economic adaptation states or municipalities, rural and urban of nations at different levels of development.10 populations, water use sectors, etc.7 Some states such as Israel are relatively arid but can still maximise their per capita allocation For example, the disputes between Indian states through technologies such as desalination over shared rivers are arguably more heated and plants; others, like India, have abundant water entrenched than water disputes that India has resources but lack apparatus and ability to with neighbouring Nepal or Bangladesh.8 distribute these resources efficiently or Similarly, disputes can arise between, for equitably. instance, industrial water users and agricultural water users, or between urban consumers and In other words, water-related disputes do not environmental conservationists. The Murray- arise out of a lack of water per se, but rather the Darling basin in Australia provides an misallocation or mismanagement of existing illustration of tensions between water use water resources.11 When the distribution of sectors – farmers at odds with the city of finite resources is perceived as unjust, that is Adelaide and the policymakers in Canberra when disputes begin. 5 Paula Hanasz, ‘Sharing Waters vs. Sharing Rivers: The More importantly, water is rarely, if ever, the 1996 Ganges Treaty’, in Global Water Forum (28 July single cause of conflict. It is, however, a stress 2014), online at multiplier. In the context of other socio- http://www.globalwaterforum.org/2014/07/28/sharing- political disruptions, the lack of water or the waters-vs-sharing-rivers-the-1996-ganges-treaty. 6 Anders Jägerskog, ‘Don’t Blame the Drought!’, in Stockholm Water Front, No. 1 (May 2016), pp. 12-13. 9 Ken Conca, ‘The New Face of Water Conflict’, in 7 Aaron T. Wolf et al., ‘Managing Water Conflict and Navigating Peace, No. 3 (November 2006), p. 3. Cooperation’, in State of the World 2005 (The Worldwatch 10 Shira Yoffe et al., ‘Geography of International Water Institute, 2005), p. 87. Conflict and Cooperation: Data Sets and Applications’, 8 Paula Hanasz, ‘The Politics of Water Governance in the in Water Resources Research, Vol. 40 (2004), p. 2. Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin’, in ORF Issue Brief 11 Paula Hanasz, ‘The Problem with Problems of Water (3 November 2015), online at Scarcity in South Asia’, in Global Water Forum (25 http://www.orfonline.org/research/the-politics-of- February 2014), online at water-governance-in-the-ganges-brahmaputra-meghna- http://www.globalwaterforum.org/2014/02/25/the- basin. problem-with-problems-of-water-scarcity-in-south-asia. 46 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) inequitable distribution of water, can tip the a stress multiplier in conflict, as we just saw, but often fragile socio-political stability off-kilter. violent conflict can also exacerbate the water Even the renowned scholar Aaron Wolf, who situation. The effects of an existing or ongoing proposes the idea that water is largely a vector conflict can worsen the access to water for of cooperation, warns that ‘the lack of a clean those who need it most, such as internally freshwater supply clearly does lead to instability displaced persons. Water-dependent livelihoods, which, in turn, can create an environment more such as those in irrigated agriculture, could also conducive to political or even military be disrupted by conflicts that damage conflict.’12 Wolf adds that ‘water-related infrastructure or blocks access to water sources. disputes can also engender civil disobedience, This might set off a chain reaction across acts of sabotage, and violent protest.’13 sectors, exacerbating the conflict further. After all, water security is inextricably linked with Resentment about water allocation can food security and, thus, human security.16 combine with and exacerbate other existing tensions. The effects of climate change – Once conflict, no matter what its catalyst, another stress multiplier14– in conjunction with encroaches on the availability of and access to a population boom could, for example, lead to environmental resources, it may become shortfalls in water supply in the Middle East intractable. Grievances over control of natural and contribute to mounting discontent.15 But resources may contribute to the onset of environmental stresses alone are not enough to conflict, revenues from natural resources may cause conflict. finance conflict, and combatants often target or otherwise damage the environment. Both Syria and California have faced severe drought in recent years. But only in Syria has In recent conflicts in Iraq, we have seen dams the fabric of society almost completely captured by militias; the threat of destroying disintegrated. Why? Mismanagement and lack the dam is used as a ‘stick’ against downstream of foresight have left the country ill prepared to population, while the promise of continuous cope with such a drought. In contrast, although water supply is a ‘carrot’. The ‘weaponisation’ the Californian drought is taking its toll too, the of water and water infrastructure in this way is broader system of food production which is not a novel tactic; it has been employed by affected is more resilient to shocks: the USA is various groups in various parts of the world for better equipped than Syria for dealing with centuries. But attacking water infrastructure in natural disasters and the federal government war time for military gain is no different from structure is able to provide somewhat of an attacking or capturing other civil infrastructure economic safety net. Resilience, then, is the and as such does not strictly fit into the factor that determines whether water stress can understanding of water-related conflict. be contained or whether it will add to other stress multipliers and boil over into conflict. Once violent conflict subsides, peace is often fragile: countries with past resource-related The relationship between water and conflict conflicts are, according to Environmental flows in more than one direction. Water can be Peacebuilding,17 more likely to relapse, and to do so twice as quickly. Many parts of sub- Saharan Africa, for example, have been ravaged 12 Aaron T. Wolf, ‘Conflict and Cooperation Along by conflicts over natural resource extraction, International Waterways’, in Water Policy, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1998), p. 9. and unable to rebuild social and economic 13 Wolf et al., State of the World 2005, p. 88. stability through subsequent droughts and 14 National Research Council of the National Academies, Himalayan Glaciers: Climate Change, Water Resources, and Water Security (Washington D.C.: The National Academies 16 Paula Hanasz, ‘Water, Security, and the State’, in Press, 2012), p. 89. Reinventing Peace (18 March 2015), online at 15 K.M. Campbell et al., The Age of Consequences: The https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2015/03/18/wa Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Global ter-security-and-the-state . Climate Change (Center for Strategic and International 17 See the Environmental Peacebuilding website, online at Studies/ Center for a New American Security, 2007), pp. http://environmentalpeacebuilding.org/about/about/#s 60-61. thash.bg4QRlmB.dpuf. 47 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) famines. great respect, all his life he succeeded in holding both of these [the soldiers and the populace] in As discussed above, the availability of and check and he was never hated or scorned’.19 access to natural resources such as water can exacerbate or be exacerbated by conflict. The Although this might at first sound as a complexity of such conflicts has led to the conceptual overstretch, the image of the development of a new discipline – centaur can be useful to metaphorically environmental peacebuilding – which represent one of the least philosophical and ‘integrates natural resource management in more down-to-earth (or water) structures of conflict prevention, mitigation, resolution, and our time, major dams.20 In order to prove so, recovery to build resilience in communities some context is needed. affected by conflict’.18 Environmental peacebuilding is a growing field. Dams are, perhaps, the most spectacular way to tame water resources. They can serve multiple In conclusion, wars between nation-states over purposes, such as generating hydroelectricity, freshwater resources are unlikely, but sub-state controlling water flows, and allowing irrigated conflicts are not. Moreover, the cause and agriculture and urban development. As effect between conflict and water availability are illustrated by the work of the US-based NGO not always clear or unidirectional. The same International Rivers, we are currently water resources can simultaneously be a source witnessing a new boom in the global dam of conflict and an instrument for cooperation. industry. But things have not always been this In the coming decades, we will see more way. Following the first boom in the early and complex disputes develop, not only between mid-twentieth century, the number of dams groups of people, but also water-use sectors being built worldwide started to decline in the and urban versus rural populations. These 1970s. Sanjeev Khagram proposes four resentments over water allocation may function arguments to explain this phenomenon.21 as stress multipliers in other socio-political conflicts, which in turn could worsen the access The first is technical, due to the to water resources for those most vulnerable. overexploitation of rivers and the subsequent The conflicts we do see will certainly be more scarcity of suitable sites where new dams could complex and requiring nuanced approaches, be built. The second is financial, and is related such as those that can be applied based on to the shortage of funding for this kind of research within the emerging academic field of projects, which are notoriously very costly. On environmental peacebuilding. top of that, the hydropower sector is frequently linked with corruption. Transparency ~*~ International, an NGO which monitors corporate and political corruption, dedicated its 2008 Global Corruption Report to Corruption Part II: Dams as Centaurs in the Water Sector, noting that the Filippo Menga ‘hydropower sector’s massive investment volumes (estimated at US$50–60 billion In Greek mythology, the Centaur was a annually over the coming decades) and highly creature with the head, arms, and torso of a complex, customised engineering projects can man and the body and legs of a horse. The be a breeding ground for corruption in the Italian thinker Niccolò Machiavelli used the design, tendering and execution of large-scale image of the centaur to delineate the traits and attitudes of a good ruler, the Prince, who would 19 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (New American Library, know how to use his strength (or force), but 1958), p. 108. also his intellect. A Prince had to be respected 20 The International Commission on Large Dams to obtain obedience, as in the ideal case of (ICOLD) defines a major dam as a dam with a height of Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius, who 150 m or more from the foundation, a reservoir storage ‘possessed many qualities which earned him capacity of at least 25 km3 and an electrical generation capacity of at least 1000 MW. 21 Sanjeev Khagram, Dams and Development (Cornell 18 Ibid. University Press, 2004). 48 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) dam projects around the world’.22 The third abovementioned emergence of new funders.24 reason is economic, and refers to the viability Although all these motives seem valid, it is of cheaper alternatives (such as natural gas worth mentioning that there is a number of power plants), while the fourth is political, and low-impact and non-structural alternatives to stems from public protests against dams and dams (such as small hydroelectric power plants, the emergence of the environmental awareness infiltration galleries and wells, and seasonal paradigm inspired by the Green movement. dams) that would not cause, for instance, regional controversies and the displacement of As a result of the growing opposition to large thousands of people, and would not even dams, in 1997 the World Bank (which is the require the huge investments necessary to build single largest investor in large dams worldwide) a large dam.25 Then why do governments still ignited the work of the World Commission on tend to prefer taking the hard road? Here is Dams (WCD). This body had the responsibility where the centaur can provide analytical of reviewing the development effectiveness of insights to understand this phenomenon. large dams, along with their social, economic and environmental impact. The work of the As Bent Flyvbjerg effectively sums it up, WCD resulted in a report, published in 2000, megaprojects have to be considered as both which noted that ‘Dams have made an political and physical animals to appreciate the important and significant contribution to rationale behind their construction.26 The human development, and the benefits derived performative effects of dam building, those that from them have been considerable’, and yet, are clearly visible such as the diversion of a ‘[i]n too many cases an unacceptable and often river or the generation of hydroelectricity, unnecessary price has been paid to secure those epitomize the strength of the centaur, its animal benefits, especially in social and environmental side. Yet, there is also a hidden and more terms, by people displaced, by communities abstract dimension that accompanies the downstream, by taxpayers and by the natural construction of a large dam and that environment’.23 corresponds to the sapiens part of the centaur, its ideological production. I am referring to While all this might lead one to think that the what can be termed the ‘dam ideology’, or in large dam business was staring at a gloomy other words, the process through which ruling future in the early 2000s, the trend changed, elites use the symbolism of major dams to gain and hundreds of new, extremely costly and legitimacy and bolster a sense of national controversial projects have been launched in identity and patriotism.27 This aspect, I argue, the last few years. China and India, in should be considered, along with the ones particular, are now leading the dam movement mentioned above, as a driver of dam worldwide, driven by the prospect of producing development. In fact, if we apply this analytical more clean hydroelectricity while also lens to some of the current regional increasing their agricultural production to meet controversies triggered by dam building, we can growing energy and food needs. further our understanding of the issues at stake Ten years after the release of the WCD report, a special issue of the journal Water Alternatives identified the new drivers of dam (and 24 This special issue was appeared under the title hydropower) development, including a rise in WCD+10: Revisiting the large dam controversy, with guest editors Deborah Moore, John Dore and Dipak Gyawali; water and energy demands, climate change, the it was published as Water Alternatives, Vol. 3, No 2 (June increase in the price of carbon fuels, and the 2010). 25 Elizabeth Brink, Serena McClain & Steve Rothert, Beyond Dams: Options and Alternatives. A Report (American Rivers & International Rivers Network, 2004). 22 Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 26 Bent Flyvbjerg, Nils Bruzelius & Werner Rothengatter, 2008: Corruption in the Water Sector (Cambridge University Megaprojects and Risk: Making Decisions in an Uncertain World Press, 2008), p. xxv. (Cambridge University Press, 2003). 23 The World Commission on Dams, Dams and 27 Filippo Menga, ‘Building a Nation through a Dam: Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making The Case of Rogun in Tajikistan’, in Nationalities Papers, (Earthscan, 2000), p. xxviii. Vol. 43, No. 3 (2015), pp. 479-494. 49 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) and of the apparently uncompromising attitude idea, even though this might cause regional of the actors involved. tensions. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam This is not to say that large dams should be currently under construction on the Blue Nile analysed only for their discursive impact. in Ethiopia, which, when finished, will be the Rather, both dimensions of dam building largest dam in Africa provides great example. development – the performative and the Beyond electricity generation, flood control and discursive – should go hand in hand if we are grand irrigation schemes, the discursive weight to fully understand its meaning and to of the ideology attached to the dam suggests effectively address its necessity. Less that the Otherness is as important as the Self. controversial alternatives to large dams do exist, The fact that Egypt, a neighbouring and rival but their symbolic and discursive impact is of country, opposes the dam, can reinforce among course negligible compared to that of a its proponents the idea of the necessity of its megaproject. After all, the centaur wouldn’t go construction. Matters related to self- very far without his legs, and yet, it is his mind determination, sovereignty, the assertion of that sets the direction. power, the control of nature and, above all, patriotism and national identity, are all part of ~*~ the discursive constructions surrounding the dam. Furthermore, at the domestic level, the Part III. Transboundary Rivers and Climate dam can be portrayed as a nationally cohesive Change: Testing Times for Hydro- element that unites the population around a Diplomacy to Attain and Maintain national idea of progress and success. While Cooperation this phenomenon has been studied in the past Ashok Swain by environmental historians (some iconic examples are the Hoover Dam in the United Water is a basic condition for life and it also States, the High Aswan Dam in Egypt and the plays a fundamental role in human Marathon Dam in Greece), scholars studying development. The global water crisis is of such transboundary water relations have so far magnitude that it is growing into an issue of overlooked what appears as a twenty-first global common concern. This perspective puts century revamp of high modernism, that is ‘a the focus on transboundary rivers: strong, one might even say muscle-bound, approximately half of global fresh water is version of the beliefs in scientific and technical available through 276 international basins progress that were associated with around the world. Overall, 145 countries have industrialization in Western Europe and in territories that include at least one shared river North America from roughly 1830 until World basin. However, national politics complicates War I’.28 the policies towards the enhanced ‘river basin management’ of such shared rivers. Thus, while This seems to be happening not only in the dealing with the management of the Nile, but also in other river basins around the transboundary rivers, political issues are often world. In Central Asia, for instance, Tajikistan overshadowed by integrated water resources is building the large and controversial Rogun management (IWRM) terminology that has Dam (strongly opposed by neighbouring contributed to a failure of achieving global Uzbekistan), whose meaning has now gone water governance.29 beyond that of a simple multi-purpose dam. The Tajik President Emomali Rahmon has The management of transboundary rivers in often reiterated that the dam is Tajikistan’s different parts of the world cannot follow a national idea. It therefore seems difficult to particular golden principle of the value of imagine a government giving up on a national water; its demand and supply varies from one 28 James C. Scott, Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have Failed (Yale University Press, 1998). 29 Ken Conca, Governing Water (MIT Press, 2006). 50 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) basin to another.30 Thus, it can be safely argued their livelihoods and have limited coping that ‘one-shot approach of management within mechanisms and adaptive capacity. the context of IWRM is far too simplistic to be useful, or applicable’ for sustainable While the exact impact of climate change is not management of international rivers.31 In spite of yet known, it will have a clear bearing upon its huge significance for global peace and access to shared water resources as it affects development, the available knowledge on how hydrological cycles at all geographical scales, to manage transboundary waters is quite weak.32 from global to local. Some regions will become Moreover, the existing knowledge and much drier, some wetter. Variations in institutions on governance of international precipitation are already leading to more and rivers are becoming increasingly volatile severe droughts and floods, changes in the because of greater demand and a decreased groundwater recharge, high evaporation from supply of fresh water. Adding further to the fresh water systems, and alteration in river problem, the threat of global climate change runoff. Increasing number of high and untimely has started undermining the on-going regimes floods will threaten the safety of dams and and institutions of water sharing and other water infrastructure projects; severe management of transboundary rivers.33 droughts will drastically reduce water supply, irrigation and hydropower generation. Climate The Climate Change and Transboundary Water change is thus set to make water management challenges more complicated in terms of The controversy over the science of global providing safe drinking water, adequate warming and the procedures adopted by the sanitation, improved food production, and in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change generating hydropower and ecosystem (IPCC) in collecting data fails to undermine the protection. decades of climate research confirming the overall global climate change. Doubts and Moreover, climate change may have a serious denial have given way to debates about the impact on overall availability of river water flow scale and impact of climate change, particularly in international basins. Some parts of the basin in the developing countries. Agricultural will experience higher flows and others lower production in the Southern hemisphere may flows placing significant strain on existing become highly vulnerable to climate change, agreements and structures for the management given the other multiple stresses that affect of shared water resources, whether at local, food systems in these regions. Moreover, some national or international level, and thereby countries and societies are better in formulating increasing the need for serious conflict adaptation strategies for land- and water-use management institutions and practices. As can practices that buffers them against the negative be seen, the ongoing climatic changes will make consequences of climate change. To address the it impossible for a ‘business as usual’ approach, adverse effects of climate change, the which emphasizes building large projects to effectiveness and coping abilities of existing increase water supply in managing shared river institutions also matter. Within this context, systems. Increased freshwater variability will there is a general recognition that the introduce a greater uncertainty, which can pose developing countries will be the hardest hit by serious new challenges to the on-going the impacts of climate change, as they tend to practices of water sharing and management in depend more on the natural environment for transboundary river basins. New challenges for hydro-diplomacy 30 Ashok Swain, Managing Water Conflict: Asia, Africa and the Middle East (Routledge, 2004) The influence of hydro diplomacy has helped 31 Olli Varis, Cecilia Tortajada & A.K. Biswa, Management several disputing countries to not only agree on of Transboundary Rivers and Lakes (Springer, 2008). 32 Anton Earle, Anders Jägerskog & Joakim Öjendal their portions of shared river water, but also to (eds.), Transboundary Water Management: Principles and Practice (Earthscan, 2010). 33 Anton Earle et al., Transboundary Water Management and the Climate Change Debate (Routledge, 2015). 51 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) look other areas of cooperation.34 In 1994, sizeable reductions in precipitation, and the water played a critical role in the signing of a melting of glacial sources of major river peace agreement between Israel and Jordan. systems, less water supplies will be available to India and Pakistan, in spite of more than six the agricultural sector. Climate change will not decades of bitter rivalry, have only had lasting only decrease the supply of river water, it may cooperation over the sharing of Indus River also enhance its demand in domestic, irrigation, water resources. Thus, international rivers are industrial and ecological use. Thus, climate not only expected to induce riparian conflict, its change induced scarcity and uncertainly of water resource can also bring engagement and shared water resource in the arid and semi-arid cooperation in the basin. Many competing regions can possibly limit the potential of riparian countries in the South, most notably hydro-diplomacy. It is true that the projected the basin countries of the Mekong, Amur, impacts of global climate change over fresh Jordan, Syr Darya, Ganges, Mahakali, Nile, water supply might be huge and dramatic, but Komati, Limpopo, Okavango, Orange, and in a transboundary basin, the effects on the Zambezi rivers have signed sharing runoff might vary depending on the location. arrangements in the 1990s. The signing of these This further enhances the uncertainties and river agreements had brought a fundamental anxieties over the water availability in the shift over the possible impact of shared water shared river systems. Most of the existing river on riparian relations, a likely phase of agreements do have provisions to meet near- cooperation rather than conflict. Hydro- term shortfalls in the river flow. However, diplomacy is still being endorsed to take climate change can potentially bring long-term precedence over state-centric politics and changes to water availability, which requires decision-making over international water water regimes and institutions to be flexible and resources.35 robust enough to cope with the emerging situation. Most of these recently concluded river agreements have been possible as the riparian Climate induced changes in water supply might countries saw advantages in cooperating to demand comprehensive adjustments in the on- pursue further development of shared water going water sharing arrangement of shared resource to meet their growing demand. In rivers. The institutions overseeing water sharing some cases like the Nile, Mekong, Jordan and must be adaptable enough in re-allocating Zambezi rivers, diplomatic pressures and fluctuating water flow for various sectors. Thus, financial aid and grants from the international the task of hydro-diplomacy amid climate community had also facilitated the success of change entails both getting the disputing hydro-diplomacy. However, these river water riparian countries to sign river sharing agreements are in grave danger if they fail to agreements but also to ensure these countries receive institutional support for proper water support establishing regimes and institutions management at the basin level. which will have the provisions for information sharing, conflict management mechanisms, and Global climate change has added increased flexibility to adjust to the runoff variations in uncertainties to the smooth functioning and the long term. Moreover, mitigating or adaptive survival of these recent transboundary water actions at bilateral or even sub-basin levels to agreements. As Arnell argues, climate change address the impacts of climate change in a may affect both the demand and supply sides of transboundary river basin are unlikely to the balance.36 With increasing temperatures, achieve the objective of sustainable peace and cooperation over shared water resources. The 34 Ken Conca & Geoffrey D. Dabelko (eds.), emerging and unprecedented situation demands Environmental Peacemaking (Woodrow Wilson Centre basin countries to cooperate and act collectively Press/ The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002). and jointly. In the face of global climate change, 35 Benjamin Pohl, et al., The Rise of Hydro-Diplomacy: Strengthening Foreign Policy for Transboundary Waters a successful basin-based initiative is required to (Adelphi, 2014). facilitate better integration of demand and 36 Nigel W. Arnell, ‘Climate Change and Global Water supply and to promote meaningful participatory Resources’, Global Environmental Change, Vol. 9, suppl. 1 processes. Business as usual for hydro- (October 1999), pp. 31-49. 52 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) diplomacy and a singular focus upon bilateral hydro-diplomacy needs to involve itself not negotiation and arrangements is no longer an only in an increasing range of fields (such as option in the transboundary river basins. energy generation, food production, human rights, and health issues) but also hydro- Responding to new challenges diplomacy should also reflect sufficient knowledge about possible impacts of climate The unfolding effects of climate change will change (such as precipitation pattern, glacier further increase water scarcity, in the form of melting, temperature increase, rising sea water long-lasting drought and seasonal variation. encroaching fresh water system). Many People need a responsive state to attend to developing riparian countries, not only have to their basic need for water. When climate survive with the existing power asymmetry vis- change makes it difficult for the state to meet à-vis regional powers in the basins, they also demand for water, conflicts over a narrowing suffer from a lack of competent ‘hydro- resource base are less readily resolved; diplomats’ who can address climate change instability and violent conflict within states may issues while carrying out negotiation over feed instability and conflict between states shared water resources. within the basin. Efficient and good water management in the face of climate change is Hydro-diplomacy is needed to acquaint itself also part of peace-building effort – both in well with increasingly diversified climate change preventing countries from returning to armed policy processes. River water negotiators are conflict, and in helping avoid relapse after a required to have sufficient knowledge of the period of violence. climate change phenomenon and the possible impact of climate change on human, society, Despite the risk that climate change induced country and region. They also need to have an water scarcity poses to social wellbeing and overview of the existing and emerging schools economic growth, in most countries there has of thought regarding climate change and its been alarmingly little progress towards impact on water availability and demand. managing freshwater sustainably. Significant economic and political resources are needed to It is also crucial to identify and classify develop technologies and infrastructure that important actors and groupings and their provide better water management at the basin, positions on climate change and water national, and transboundary level. management issues. Moreover, hydro- diplomacy must have overview of increasing To reach agreement on meeting the competing legal and policy documents, which are coming and fluctuating demands for water in a out by international and regional organizations transboundary basin is, in fact, not an easy task. on the impact of climate change on water Hydro-diplomacy thus needs to adopt a total resources and possible mitigation and adaption resource view where river water is seen as a key measures. input for development and growth in the basin. The challenges are not only limited to the ~*~ technical and economic sectors, but also include crucial water sector reform, which is Part IV: ISIS and the Flood. The Hydro- political in nature. Moreover, the task of hydro- politics behind the Rise (and Fall) of Daesh diplomacy will not be anymore limited to basin- Harris Kuemmerle, Guest Editor, Strife based regimes and institutions, but also entails achieving effective water governance in the face The average person can only survive 3-7 days of climate change and influencing the without water before ultimately (and inevitably) supporting pathways from local, national and succumbing to a painful death. Likewise, there international policies and practices. is not a single nation-state on earth whose day- to-day existence is not entirely and utterly In the past, river-sharing issues could be dependent upon the economic, agricultural, effectively covered by a few negotiators trained political, cultural, and fundamentally life giving specifically to deal with water issues. But today, qualities of that all-important molecule. Water 53 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) is the lowest common denominator. There is men for groups like Daesh to exploit.40 While it no substitute, and there is no cure for its would be simplistic to claim that the drought absence. In a very real sense, governments live caused the Syrian uprising and resultant civil by the tap, and die by the tap; and the so called war by itself, it was an undeniable stress Islamic State are no exception. multiplier which Daesh were deftly able to exploit. However, water issues have also been After all, their rise occurred against the an integral factor in the rise of Daesh beyond backdrop of profound underlying hydrological just fuelling destabilisation and providing the factors and issues in the run-up to the environment for a large pool of willing recruits destabilisation of Syria in 2011, namely one of to join their state-building project. the worst droughts in half a century. A drought which was primarily the result of a confluence Water as a weapon of war of factors mainly including climate change, and ineffectual and short-sighted hydrological The brutality and savagery of Daesh tactics are management and agricultural policies on the well documented, with their latest attack in part of the Assad government. Make no Brussels sending shock waves around the mistake, droughts are very bad for business, world. However, probably their least well and a recent report by UN-Water (the inter- known (and arguably most effective) strategies agency UN organisation designed to assist have been their attempts to control the dams states promote water quality and availability) and waters of the Tigris and Euphrates; rivers suggested that as many as four-fifths, or about which constitute the vast majority of habitable 78%, of all jobs globally are moderately or and arable land in Iraq and Syria. Since their heavily dependent upon a stable supply of inception Daesh have at one time or another water.37 taken control of five dams along the Tigris and Euphrates; the Samarra, Nuaimiyah, Haditha, This is especially true in the rural Syrian north Mosul, and Tishrin.41 This has given them the east where the traditional reliance on agriculture capabilities to drown entire cities such as is made possible by the large areas of arable Baghdad or shutoff the water or electricity to land, compared to the rest of Syria. Indeed, the whole communities as a means of instilling area of Al-Hasakeh in particular is responsible psychological terror or controlling populations. for around 75% of Syria’s total wheat Capabilities which have been turned into production.38 This bounty, however, also makes actions on numerous occasions. For example, the north east region heavily dependent upon in April 2014 Daesh closed the gates of the reliable water supplies for life and living. Nuaymiyah Dam and the resulting flooding Therefore, it seems likely that such a major successfully unseated government forces in the drought would have hit Syrian employment area and caused water shortages for millions, hard as agricultural falters in its traditional and thousands to lose their homes.42 regions. And indeed, the result of this drought Furthermore, in August 2014 Daesh was the large scale unemployment of around successfully captured Mosul Dam, the control 800,000 people; which in turn resulted in of which put Baghdad and almost half a million thousands of young men moving from the rural Iraqis in direct danger of flooding and areas to the cities in search of work.39 This electricity blackout. The danger was deemed to arguably both added to existing stresses and be so great that the Iraqi government tensions and had the unintended consequence of creating a large and desperate pool of young 40 Ian Sample, ‘Global Warming Contributed to Syria’s 2011 Uprising, Scientists Claim’, in The Guardian (2 March 2015), online at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/02/glo 37 UN Water, The United Nations World Water Development bal-warming-worsened-syria-drought-study. Report 2016: Water and Jobs (UNESCO, 2016) 41 John Vidal, ‘Water Supply Key to Outcome of 38 Syria Needs Analysis Project, Impact of the Conflict on Conflicts in Iraq and Syria, Experts Warn’, in The Syrian Economy and Livelihoods (ACAPS, 2013) Guardian (2 July 2014), online at 39 Aron Lund, ‘Drought, Corruption, and War: Syria’s https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jul/0 Agricultural Crisis’, in Carnegie Middle East Center (18 April 2/water-key-conflict-iraq-syria-isis. 2014), online at http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/55376. 42 Ibid. 54 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) committed considerable resources (including new and current water works infrastructure and US assistance) to its successful recapture.43 delivery projects while also ensuring that the supply is sustainable. This investment will likely However, Daesh is still in control of a number require substantial financial and political costs of other dams in Syria and Iraq and their in their newly conquered regions as their control has given Daesh not only an effective inherited infrastructure becomes unfit for means of combating government forces, it has purpose. While at the same time Daesh will also also given them a powerful and coercive tool need to be able to evolve its institutional for both instilling dread and loyalty among structure in order to have the organisational populations.44 In the words of Michael Stephen bodies necessary to oversee these developments at RUSI, ‘the control of water supplies gives and manage the system while also making sure strategic control over both cities and they are well staffed with trained personnel. countryside. We are seeing a battle for control of water. Water is now the major strategic Going hand in hand with this management and objective of all groups in Iraq. It’s life or death. governance will be dealing with issues If you control water in Iraq you have a grip on pertaining to the equal use of the waters and Baghdad, and you can cause major problems. Daesh will have to have systems put in place to Water is essential in this conflict.’45 Indeed, in a mediate disputes over fresh water use 2014 issue of Dabiq (Daeshs’ official magazine) domestically in order to prevent tensions. While the group claimed that ‘it’s either Islamic State also having the diplomatic presence necessary or the flood’, making clear their willingness to to fight for the fresh water interests of their use water as a weapon of war.46 new state among their neighbours in one of the driest regions on earth. These realities will Water as a tool of peace necessitate cooperation (particularly internationally), and while there are some However, when the guns fall quiet and the limited examples of this occuring, it remains warriors go home the prevailing state must be unclear if Daesh will be pragmatic enough to be able to provide for the basic services of its able to put aside ideology and cooperate long- people, including its vanquished. That ability to term with those they may deem their enemy in provide basic services is one of the most order to keep the taps flowing. common tests of a state, and Daesh is not exempt from this. Adding to that, in the case of This is a daunting list of tasks for any state, arid Syria and Iraq, the supply of water is of especially a new one. So how well is the new particular importance and according to one so-called Islamic State getting on with intelligence official, ‘if ISIS has any hope of functioning as a state? While it is hard to say for establishing itself on territory, it has to control sure, all indications suggest that things are not some water.’47 However, this control also going as well as hoped. A 2014 report comes with responsibilities; and crucially, costs. suggested that Daesh seemed to be unable to provide even basic services, with water only If Daesh intends to survive as a state in the available for 3-4 hours a day in Raqqa.48 traditional sense then it must invest heavily in Likewise, a later report from August 2015 the building, upgrading, and management of suggested that services had improved in some areas, however, that the conflict was also taking a heavy toll on the infrastructure and the 43 Saira Khan, ‘The Islamic State and Water Infrastructure’, in Tel Aviv Notes, Vol. 10, Nr. 3 (2016), pp. 1-4. 44 Ahmed Rasheed, Raheem Salman & Isabel Coles, ‘Iraq Insurgents Use Water as Weapon after Seizing Dam’, in Reuters (11 April 2014), online at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security- 48 Liz Sly, ‘The Islamic State is Failing at Being a State’, in idUSBREA3A0Q020140411 The Washington Post (25 December 2014), online at 45 Vidal, ‘Water Supply Key’. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/t 46 The Islamic State, ‘The Flood’, in Dabiq, No. 2 (1435 he-islamic-state-is-failing-at-being-a- Ramadan). state/2014/12/24/bfbf8962-8092-11e4-b936- 47 Vidal, ‘Water Supply Key’. f3afab0155a7_story.html?utm_term=.25bd20a5110f. 55 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) medium to long-term sustainability of those This matters because while water politics and services was in doubt.49 the use of water as a weapon seem to have been a key asset of Daesh in their early years. As In response the group have taken steps to time moves on they will likely find water issues ensure they meet water and electricity demands, to be much more of a problem than an asset. including paying for Syrian and Iraqi Indeed, while the inability to provide basic government water infrastructure staff to remain services is not always in in of itself enough to at their jobs in Daesh controlled territory, topple governments, and the Daesh regime may taxing water, and bringing in outside indeed be popular with some. Daesh must also assistance.50 However, these are short-term know all too well that fresh water shortages can solutions and will likely not by itself be enough still be a significant contributing factor to to provide for the basic needs of the people in instability in a once prosperous region. Despite the longer term and much more investment in that, the situation in their territory seems to infrastructure and cultivation of domestic talent indicate that Daesh are largely failing both at will be required to provide an adequate supply providing those services in the short-term and moving forward. in building a system which can ensure stable supplies of water and other services in the long- Indeed, the fact that Daesh appear to be relying term, making their future as a state seem as so heavily on short-term water management uncertain as the waters of the rivers that solutions seems to suggest that the group still support them. lacks both expertise in this area, and a dedicated governing body for managing the system and ______developing long-term policies. While also underlying all of this, is what appears to be a fundamentally unstable cultural dichotomy. With Daeshs’ primary ideological drive seemingly to expand the state through war, at the expense of their civic ambitions to establish a civil Caliphate becoming more secondary. Concluding remarks Ultimately, with waters importance in war, also comes its inseparability from peace. And in order for Daesh to survive as a state they must have in place robust and effective agricultural, hydrological, and infrastructure policies to keep the waters flowing and the people alive. While also working to mediate fresh water inequalities within and without their borders. This responsibility (on top of their other duties as a de facto state) will place great strain on Daesh leadership and it seems that they still lack the expertise and stability necessary to effectively deliver on key public services and move beyond short-term solutions. 49 Laith Alkhouri & Alex Kassirer, Governing the Caliphate: The Islamic State Picture (Combating Terrorism Center/ West Point Military Academy, 2015) 50 Saira Khan, ‘The Islamic State and Water Infrastructure’. 56 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) Book Reviews Katherine C. Epstein. Torpedo! Inventing the Military-Industrial Complex in the United States and Great Britain. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014. ISBN: 978-06-74-72526-3. Pp. xi, 305. Hardcover. £37.95/ $47.50/ €43.00. Upon first glance, Torpedo! is ostensibly a bar one or two occasions, manages to avoid history of the early technological development getting bogged down in too much rivet- and manufacture of the torpedo in Great counting, a notable achievement in a book with Britain and the United States. Going further such depth and detail. The level of archival than a simple dry recounting of technological research undertaken in the composition of invention however, Epstein skilfully blends Epstein’s work is also generally impressive, with aspects of weapons production, armaments primary source material gathered from a range negotiations, and technical progress into a of different locations across both Britain and greater theoretical framework based upon America. William McNeill’s earlier ‘command technology’ concept. The ultimate stated goal For a work so heavily focused on the of Epstein’s work is to trace the origins of the production of armaments however, there military-industrial complex and to ‘map a busy seems to be remarkably little discussion of the but unexplored intersection of military history, more generalised nature of the armaments diplomatic history, the history of science and industry of the era itself. Bar some small detail technology, business history, legal history and in the introduction, and a single footnote policy history’. (p. 2) Whilst Epstein succeeds reference to the eminent Clive Trebilcock, there quite admirably in the latter goal, it is somewhat seems to have been little consideration of the debatable as to whether or not Torpedo! has wider market of warships and weapons achieved the former. technology. As Epstein’s account of torpedoes is intended to chart the origins of the more The book is divided into an introduction, six generalised ‘military-industrial complex’, this chapters, and a conclusion. The introduction appears to be something of a curious oversight. and conclusion are generally used to outline the Whilst collusion between governments and majority of Epstein’s thoughts and conclusions armaments firms in the development of some upon the more theoretical nature of the specific technologies did take place during this interplay between armaments, technology and period, the more general nature of the legal affairs. The individual chapters meanwhile armaments market of the time was inherently are each paired up; with three focused upon competitive, with few loyalties or obligations torpedo development within the United assumed on the part of either respective Kingdom and three the United States, in a governments or businesses. With the term roughly parallel chronological order. This ‘military-industrial concept’ remaining ill comparative approach helps to illustrate the defined at best, it is difficult to see how one can different routes taken by the British and necessarily assume this single example of American navies in evolving both the weapon weapons development to be indicative of a itself, and the policies which surrounded it. broader trend in military-industrial relations. It Epstein’s writing is generally free-flowing, and would not appear to be unreasonable to suggest 57 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) that there is scope for additional research to be done upon the subject before any sort of generalisations should be made. One intriguing new concept introduced in Torpedo! is that of ‘servant technology’, defined by Epstein as ‘technology dedicated to generating information that could be used to improve command technology’. (p. 75) Such a category could be expanded upon and used to analyse other navy-related technologies such as the chronoscope or Froude’s model ship tank. Unfortunately, possibly due to space considerations, Torpedo! neglects to develop the idea of ‘servant technology’ in any larger context; instead settling for a brief exploration of the subject insofar as it remains directly relevant to the subject of torpedoes. Epstein also wades briefly into the ongoing historiographical debate over Nicholas Lambert’s revisionist concept of ‘flotilla defence’, a subject which continues to be a source of historical controversy. However, Epstein’s somewhat one-sided subscription to Lambert’s interpretation of general British naval policy in this field feels somewhat premature given the number of queries that have been recently raised on the subject by David Morgan-Owen and Christopher Bell. Overall, it can be said that Torpedo! is a thoughtfully written, well researched publication which successfully examines both the development of a nascent military technology, and the resulting legal issues and business negotiations which that development caused. Far too few military histories take serious account of the commercial and legal dealings involved in the actual manufacture of a new weapon, preferring instead to focus purely upon technical or policy concerns. Epstein’s work is an excellent step towards helping to fill in this traditional historical blind spot. Ben Turnbull King’s College London ______ 58 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) Norman Housley. Crusading & the Ottoman Threat, 1453-1505. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. ISBN: 978-0-19-922705-1. Pp. xii, 242. Hardback. £68.00. The dramatic fall of Constantinople in 1453 to demonstrates how the church argued its case the Ottoman Turks under Mehmed II (‘the against an evolving threat and amidst changed Conqueror’ 1432-1481) seemed to crown the international dynamics. The Turks were often final failure of the crusading movement of the portrayed as classical barbarians who Middle Ages. After nearly four hundred years threatened European civilisation and culture, of intermittent conflict, not only were Christian while crusade was argued as an anecdote to this gains reversed, but nearly the whole of the threat to Christendom. Within this new topos, Christian east lost, and the heartland of Europe outreach was made even to orthodox Christian suddenly exposed. Attempts at reviving crusade states in the call to crusade. Certain states in for use against the Turks largely failed, and the particular (such as Hungary and Venice) were effort has sometimes been viewed as an ill-fated seen as antemurales or ‘bulwarks’ against the anachronism of the early Renaissance. Turkish menace, and messaging often followed the Horatian quote that it is also your business In Crusading and the Ottoman Threat, however, when your neighbour’s house is on fire, Norman Housley argues that attempts by Rome although this ‘became less relevant the further to organise a crusade against the Turks were away the burning house was’. (p. 35) Here not the ‘last gasp of a dying movement’ but a Housley acknowledges, yet largely skirts, what large scale and ‘resonant’ effort that had been should be a more central issue for his work: the retooled to meet current conditions and threats. reasons why this modernised effort at crusade (p. 1) While they failed to achieve their goals, largely failed. This is not the focus of his work, these efforts did have a significant impact on none the less, Housley seems to explain the contemporaries in terms of the mobilisation of ultimate failure of crusade as the result of men and finances, and the evolution of grand political constellations, self-interest, the communication (messaging) and organisational natural ‘synergy’ between French and Ottoman efforts. (p. 1) Housley builds on a growing diplomatic interests, German divisions and literature dealing with regional initiatives and increasing hostility to Rome, decreasing papal impacts, and the influence of humanist thought credibility and so on. (For example, pp. 38-9.) on crusading messaging as well as the role of However, based on the evidence presented the papal curia. This book begins by looking at here, it could be argued that one of the major the premise of crusade, its proposed strategy reasons was the double edged sword provided and mobilisation, the practical effects of the by the defensive, humanist rhetoric. While it aforementioned, communicating the church’s might well have mirrored wider social and arguments and rhetoric, and finally the role of literary trends, it was also an inherently weak indulgences in fund raising. Since little actual argument for crusade. If war against the Turks campaigning materialised, the usual sort of was as much practical as spiritual – to defend sources do not exist and so Housley looks at the borders of Christendom – then it stood to the promotion of crusades and related reason that those most threatened would be far literature/documents, preaching, letters, more moved by this argument than those dispatches from envoys, diplomatic exchanges, dwelling outside the Turkish shadow. The records of assemblies and so on. This presents regional nature of responses also raises the something of a problem which then permeates question of what constituted a crusade in the sections of this book as the sources allow first place since Hungarians, irrespective of Housley to write more about how Rome tried who convinced them to take up arms, had their to sell its argument for crusade than the own motivations separate from those arriving tangible effects that this effort had. from distant lands. Indeed, as Housley notes, the majority of the crusading force that arrived Housley’s first chapter on premises at Belgrade in 1456 appears to have been 59 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) Hungarian, although they were belatedly joined be unworkable in the context of the later by significant numbers of Germans after the fifteenth century, but it was not obsolete per se. siege was lifted. (p. 113) Perhaps it was easier to Where this work is weaker, is both in the limits convince the restless to seek glory, riches, and of its scope and sources (as far proving the serve god through offensive crusade than to central thesis) as well as exploring how the mobilise to defend someone else’s home. The evolution of messaging may have presented, latter argument could hardly have been and represented, the inherent weaknesses of a enhanced when one considers that ‘someone centrally organised, pan European crusading else’ often meant yesterday’s enemy. Again, movement in the context of this period. Housley does not thoroughly address these issues, and they sit uncomfortably within the wider framework of his thesis. Perhaps, the Avram Lytton crusading message was not as malleable as King’s College London Housley argues. Housley’s strongest chapter is the one dealing with more practical affairs: mobilisation of men ______and resources. Here he demonstrates that tens of thousands of men were mobilised in the period 1456-64 (though they were disproportionately drawn from threatened areas). He also sheds some light on the sometimes overlooked success at Belgrade in 1456 which owed much to the commitment of thousands of Hungarian and German ‘crusaders’ as well as the charisma of their leader, John of Capistrano (1386-1456). His other chapters, which deal more with messaging and the activities of a select number of papal agents, are interesting but provide less firm evidence for his main thesis, which implies that these orations and so on had a significant practical effect. Housley’s scope is also far smaller than might be imagined by the reader looking to understand European wide responses to these anti-Turkish crusading efforts. Most of the book focuses on papal led organising efforts, the so called ‘bulwark’ states (especially Hungary), and activity in Italy and Germany. Relegated to only occasional mention are France, England, Iberia and the Knights of St. John (despite their prominence in fighting the Ottomans from their Mediterranean outposts). Ultimately, while over-ambitious in his argument, Housley does demonstrate that later attempts at crusade attracted significant numbers of volunteers and monetary donations, and that the message was adapted to meet current conditions. Although the inherent nature of these adaptations probably helped limit its success. Crusade may have proved to 6 0 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) Matthew Levitt. Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2013. ISBN: 978-18-49-04-333-5. Pages: xiv, 407. Paperback. £19.99. Hezbollah, literally translated as ‘Party of God’, some of the agendas and activities of these is a militia, social welfare organisation, and global networks in his book Hezbollah: The political party based out of Lebanon. While its Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God. exact origins are difficult to determine, the Hezbollah is the ambitious product of over ten organisation is believed to have arose in the years of research, interviews, and collation of 1980s as a result of a number of factors information regarding Hezbollah’s global including the export of the Iranian Revolution, networks in general and covert activities in the marginalisation of Lebanon’s Shiite particular. community, and Israel’s invasion of Lebanon. Levitt is a former intelligence offucer and has Hezbollah established itself as a formal entity served as an analyst for the FBI, the U.S. with its 1985 manifesto, which rejected foreign Department of Treasury, and as a presence in Lebanon, denounced Western counterterrorism advisor to the U.S. State influence on the Islamic world, declared its Department. In his comprehensive volume on resistance to Israel, maintained its devotion to Hezbollah, Levitt utilises his credentials and the Iranian regime, and promoted the contacts, together with extensive research and achievement of its objectives through military documentation to present a dialogue on action. Hezbollah has been held responsible for Hezbollah’s international activities through the high-profile kidnappings and attacks against prism of a U.S. intelligence analyst. This is Western targets, such as the 1983 Marine supported by an exploration of declassified barracks attacks and the 1985 hijacking of intelligence records as well as interviews with TWA Flight 847. It has been designated a policy makers and senior officials. The book is terrorist organisation by a number of countries clad with details such as names, dates, and including Canada, the United States, Australia, events, which are weaved together masterfully Israel and the Netherlands. in a fast-paced and captivating tone. The narrative is accessible to readers with no prior However, over the years, Hezbollah has evolved knowledge about Hezbollah and is, therefore, from solely a militant organisation to one that is compelling. Levitt guides the reader through heavily involved in formal Lebanese state the origins, ideology, structure, and activities of institutions. Hezbollah’s popularity in Lebanon Hezbollah in the local and international arenas. has been buoyed by its representation as a He overlays each chapter with insight into resistance movement and its sophisticated Hezbollah’s methods, tactics, and procedures. welfare programs. Hezbollah won 10 seats in Lebanon’s 20091 elections and continues to take Hezbollah provides a thorough overview of an active role in Lebanese politics. Its transition Hezbollah and its global networks as well as an into mainstream Lebanese politics has led to its intriguing discussion of its criminal activities, its emergence as a powerful and multifaceted relationship with Iran, and the potential threat organisation with global networks. it poses to the West. Levitt begins the book with a useful background about Hezbollah’s Matthew Levitt, Director of the Washington genesis and traces its beginnings as a pro- Institute for Near East Policy’s Stein Program Iranian faction to an international party. He on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, explores then discusses Hezbollah’s expansion into Europe, Latin America, North America, 1 Casey L. Addis and Christopher M. Blanchard, Southeast Asia, and Africa and outlines its Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington various successful and unsuccessful plots. He D.C.: US Library of Congress, Congressional Research also describes its involvement in training Service, R41446., 3 January, 2012). 61 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) insurgents who fought against the U.S. in Iraq local criminal elements, as one of the drivers as well as its creation of a unit to support for the operations and expansion of Palestinian militant groups. Levitt denotes some Hezbollah’s global networks. of the steps taken by Western intelligence agencies to track Hezbollah and deter plots Levitt asserts that Hezbollah's willingness to worldwide, and he presents some of the use sophisticated military tactics at home as challenges to countering the organisation. well as abroad, its global reach, and its strategic relationship with Iran should be of serious One of the challenges he persistently refers to concern to Western actors, particularly the in countering Hezbollah is the organisation’s United States. He claims: ‘It is high time the immense logistical capability, which he suggests international community conducted a thorough is made possible through Iranian diplomatic, and considered discussion of the full range of logistical, and intelligence support. (p. 357) Hezbollah’s “resistance” activities, and what to Indeed, he systematically describes Hezbollah’s do about them’. (p. 373) Levitt clearly seeks to capability and its intersection with Iranian make the case that Hezbollah poses a danger to intelligence architecture. Examples of this U.S. security, made ever more prevalent by its intersection are the 1990s bombings in Buenos global expansion. However, the vast amounts Aires, believed to have been orchestrated by of documents, anecdotes, and interviews Iranian intelligence officials and carried out by utilised to support this claim are weakened by a Hezbollah operatives. Acts such as this imply lack of Hezbollah and Iranian sources. Levitt that Iran uses Hezbollah as a proxy, enabling refers to this limitation by asserting that given Iran to project its power and achieve its that the book covers the organisation’s illicit strategic objectives without having to contend activities, ‘it should be assumed that persons or with the consequences of militant activities on entities accused of illicit conduct of any kind ... the ground. The relationship between dispute those charges’. (p. xiv) While this point Hezbollah and Iran is a constant theme is certainly valid, additional sources, even if throughout Levitt’s work. Levitt identifies they deny claims of criminal activities, would Hezbollah’s position toward the West vis-à-vis its provide a more balanced picture of the relationship with Iran. In analysing Hezbollah’s organisation in light of any potential bias by global operations, Levitt places these in context Levitt’s bias as a former U.S. intelligence of Iranian strategy toward the West and its use official. of a ‘shadow war.’ Yet, he also asserts Hezbollah’s varying degrees of independence Furthermore, Levitt claims that Hezbollah’s from Iran. Thus, Levitt suggests that evolvement into a formal Lebanese party Hezbollah’s relationship with Iran renders it should not excuse its global illicit activities, as neither completely a proxy nor completely the organisation still constitutes a terrorist independent. threat. However, it is exactly the multifaceted nature of the organisation that would, Another constant theme of Hezbollah is the alternatively, seem to mitigate a terrorism threat convergence of terrorism and crime. Terror by Hezbollah. Its involvement in formal state groups must be able to finance their activities in institutions means Hezbollah has had to evolve ways that are undetectable to law enforcement; into a highly rational actor. Therefore, its and as finance is a vital resource for both considerations on whether or not to pursue criminal and terrorist groups, these groups may militant actions are likely subjected to a work together to further their financial goals strategic calculus that must take into despite dissimilar ideologies. For example, the consideration all of its formal structures, its alliance between a group with a Marxist- political position locally, and its image in the Leninist ideology (the FARC) and one with an world. extremist Shiite ideology (Hezbollah) would appear ill-matched, yet these groups are willing Additionally, given Hezbollah’s support of the to collaborate due to their shared interest in Assad regime, it would seem pertinent to place making a profit. Levitt, therefore, identifies more attention on events in Syria. It would be financial motive, abetted by cooperation with interesting to understand what connections 62 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) have been made between Hezbollah and Syrian objectives is essential. Levitt claims that its militias and in what way Hezbollah’s troops global reach and partnership with Iran render it engage in attacks against the rebels. Greater a serious security concern, particularly for the information regarding Hezbollah’s involvement U.S. and Israel, a claim that may be debatable in the Syrian civil war and possible explanations given Hezbollah’s evolvement as a rational for the significant amount of casualties it has actor. Through a plethora of case studies and suffered despite its years of military training extensive coverage of Hezbollah’s international would be valuable in understanding the activities, Hezbollah presents an intriguing and continued evolution of Hezbollah’s military comprehensive insight into this powerful wing. organisation and triggers the debate on whether or not Hezbollah should be considered a Finally, Levitt’s assertion that Hezbollah still terrorist organisation. poses a threat, particularly to the United States, would benefit from a more in-depth discussion of the lack of consensus over whether or not Maya Ehrmann to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist King’s College London organisation. While certain countries have designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organisation in its entirety, most countries, such as EU member states, recognise only its military wing ______as a terrorist entity. The lack of a global designation serves as a stumbling block to effectively counter any illicit activities carried out by Hezbollah and is, therefore, paramount to a discussion about the organisation’s global activities. While some consider Hezbollah an integral part of Lebanon’s political scene and an instrument of Lebanese resistance, others have labelled it one of the most sophisticated terrorist groups in the world. Levitt has contributed to this debate by mapping Hezbollah’s covert activities all over the world, including its logistical, criminal, and financial operations. His work provides a comprehensive chronicle of Hezbollah’s position vis-à-vis Iran’s strategic calculus in what he dubs a ‘shadow war’. While Levitt’s experience as a U.S. intelligence official may arguably constitute a potential bias in his presentation of this material, it also provides a unique approach to this subject. Besides discussing Hezbollah’s operations in Europe, Africa, and Asia, he also provides a fascinating review of Hezbollah’s presence in the Western Hemisphere and the potential dangers this holds for U.S. security. At a time when much of Hezbollah’s activities, including its involvement in the Syrian civil war, take place outside of Syria, a greater understanding of its modus operandi and 63 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) Peter E. Hodgkinson, British Infantry Battalion Commanders in the First Word War. Farnham: Ashgate, 2015. ISBN 978-14-72-43825-6. Pp. xiv, 250. Hardcover. £73.99. Peter Hodgkinson’s prosopography of the men of the western front had the chance to rise who commanded infantry battalions between rapidly, although rarely beyond the level of 1914 and 1918 is a significant addition to the battalion command. Although as one would growing literature that dissects the First World expect regular officers dominated command War British army. Interest in that army has been positions early in the war, by the final ‘hundred phenomenal for two decades, as a wave of days’ campaign, to which Hodgkinson devotes ‘learning curve’ revisionism attempts to a concluding chapter, ‘citizens’ with no pre- understand the nature, processes and outcomes 1914 military experience had started to of the military experience that produced a war- proliferate at the level of battalion command. winning army from the mishmash of regulars, These ‘temporary gentlemen’ were leaders and territorials, citizen volunteers and conscripts warriors. One of Hodkinson’s sources for that fought Britain’s first mass war. Leadership biographical information are the medal is one factor that makes an effective army and citations of his protagonists, for whom the much ink has been spilt over the skill (or lack award of the Distinguished Service Order for of) of the rapidly promoted generals who learnt acts of initiative or bravery seems to appear to war the hard way on the western front. Studies be a rite of passage. of junior leadership are much rarer and Hodkinson’s monograph is recommended both The nature of the subject leads inevitably to a to those with an interest in this war, and to repetitious style. Exemplary mini-biographies those who have a more general concern with follow one another in quick succession such how armies work. that one individual is hard to distinguish from the next, although some focus is provided by The body of research which lies behind this structuring the analysis around the battalion study is impressive. Not only has the author commanders of three different divisions, the striven to identify the 5,000 officers who 5th, 9th and 42nd, from the regular, ‘new’ and reached the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel during territorial armies. Themes investigated include the war, providing a rich bank of data for the appointment and fortunes of pre-war ‘dug- statistical analysis, but in many cases he has outs’ in the expanding army, the pre-war compiled detailed mini-biographies which puts military experience and professional training of flesh onto these bare statistical bones and gives battalion commanders, hiring and firing, and identity and character to this diverse yet the character and expertise of the men who fascinating group of men. Arguably the rose to command battalions. The author battalion commander is the most important concludes that the army responded effectively figure in the army hierarchy (and not just in this to the dual challenges of expansion and war), whose character and leadership both adaptation to a new sort of warfare, although fashions the martial spirit of the men under his when it came to promotion the army could not command and determines his unit’s fortunes as be classified as a genuine meritocracy. The they are subject to the decisions of higher author demonstrates the dominance of regular command. In a rapidly raised and green citizen officers in regular battalion command and the army such as the one Great Britain mobilized relatively limited promotion of pre-war that role is perhaps even more important. In a Territorial Force officers to battalion command war in which warfare changed rapidly and throughout the war, confirming statistically the attrition through death, wounding, burnout and long-perceived bias against officers who came sacking produced a quick turnover of senior from the reserves. This suggests that the pre- officers, men of energy and talent who had war ethos of the army remained solid, while it learnt the military trade in the proving ground was practical in the way it addressed its pressing 64 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) need for skilled wartime commanders. This was one of the factors that allowed the British army to match and later to master its more professional German opponents. Unfortunately, there is no comparison made with enemy or ally. Such comparative research is becoming essential to understand the shifting dynamic of combat and learning in the western front battle school. Still, Hodgkinson has provided an exemplary research methodology for anyone wishing to look at Battalion command in other armies. This book is highly recommended as an important contribution to the study of the British army in the First World War, and of military command more broadly. William Philpott King’s College London ______ 65 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) Richard Sakwa. Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands. London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014. ISBN: 978-17-84-53064-8. Pp. xiv, 297. Hardback. £18.99/ $28.00; Paperback. £9.99/ $15.95. It has been more than a year since the dramatic victorious Western powers who, instead of events in Kiev forced the pro-Russian President incorporating Russia into the post-Cold War Yanukovich to step down in February 2014. In security system, expanded their influence to the months that followed, Russia annexed Russia’s western borders. For the Russians, the Crimea, and a bloody insurrection has engulfed most inflammatory action was the inclusion of eastern Ukraine’s Donbas Region. In the Eastern and Central European countries to the burgeoning literature on the subject, Richard EU and NATO, as well as the EU’s Eastern Sakwa’s Frontline Ukraine has emerged as one of Partnership initiative (EaP). According to the more notable contributions and has already Sakwa, the EU and NATO have become been translated to a number of other languages. increasingly synonymous institutions and have embarked on a dangerous road of expansion Sakwa’s account of the crisis and its encroaching on Russia’s sphere of influence. background is a detailed one. He deals with One major reason for this is the accession of both the domestic and international dimensions Eastern European states to the EU and NATO, of the crisis. In examining the domestic nature which brought along with them their of the conflict, Sakwa makes an interesting Russophobia and longstanding animosity distinction between the so-called ‘monoists’ and towards Russia. The factors which enabled the ‘pluralists’ in Ukraine. He argues that the fateful expansion of the EU and NATO in struggle between these two competing visions particular are described as being a mixture of is a key factor in the current animosity within triumphalism, malice and incompetence on the Ukraine. Monoists have a more homogenous part of the West. vision for the country, emphasising the Ukrainian language, culture and history as a This is a detailed account of the crisis, with at core part of the desired state-building model in times contains interesting and perceptive Ukraine. The monoists usually argue for a observations. Sakwa is right to suggest that the centralised rule of the state and portray Russia Western powers, after the end of the Cold War as an historic enemy to the Ukrainian nation. could and should have done more to incorporate Russia to the Western political and The pluralists, on the other hand, have a more security order. Sakwa’s sympathy for the heterogeneous view of the country. ‘pluralist’ understanding of the Ukrainian Recognising the complicated history of Ukraine nation is also in the right place; federalisation and the diverse nature of the country, they with a certain amount of autonomy for Russian place more emphasis on federalisation, speaking regions would likely be a sensible decentralisation and pluralism. Sakwa, compromise to the ongoing hostilities in sympathetic to the pluralists, argues that the eastern Ukraine. Maidan revolution was effectively hijacked by nationalist monoists. This incited fear among However, Frontline Ukraine is in many ways a the Russian-speakers, which in turn assisted in flawed work. Sakwa seeks to create a balanced igniting the current crisis. account of the current crisis, going against the alleged prevailing anti-Russian sentiment in the Naturally, external factors, such as involvement West. In this he has failed and has instead by outside powers including the U.S., EU and created an unbalanced work which is one sided Russia, also contributed to the escalating crisis. in the reverse: exonerating Russia and its Many of the problems are rooted in what proxies of almost any wrongdoing while Sakwa describes as the asymmetric end to the placing the blame for the entire crisis at the Cold War: Russia was left behind by the EU’s, U.S.’ and Ukraine’s doorstep. 66 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) Sakwa defines Russia as a ‘neo-revisionist’ who matter are the big ones, such as the U.S., power, interested less in changing norms or EU and Russia. Traditional concepts of power rules and more in enforcing them. This is a politics, balance of power and spheres of strange description of a state which so influence are prevalent, which explains the obviously and abjectly violated international law condemnation of EU and NATO’s and norms through its annexation of Crimea, encroachment into Russia’s ‘neighbourhood’. an unprecedented act in post-war Europe. The The aspirations of middling states like Ukraine mere presence of far-right elements in the remain secondary. Sakwa is not alone in Maidan movement, such as the Svoboda party, is following this line of interpretation. Similar heavily emphasised, however, their poor accounts have emerged from prominent realists showing in the subsequent elections remains such as John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt in uncommented. Sakwa is largely in tune with the past. The argument that EU and NATO Moscow’s line that Euromaidan supporters expansion has ‘provoked’ Russia is a familiar were virulent nationalist Russophobes, and one at this stage, treating the self-determination states that Crimeans were indeed justified in of the countries of Eastern Europe as fearing the new Kiev government. Yet Human irrelevant. Rights Watch has reported that there were no discriminations or persecutions of ethnic However, Sakwa is exaggerating the push from Russians in Crimea prior to the 2014 EU and NATO to expand eastwards, annexation. They have however reported on overlooking that it was Ukraine and other widespread human rights abuses since then.1 Eastern European states who actively sought to join these organisations. Thus, it was not so Sakwa emphasises at length his condemnation much a conspiratorial scheme by the U.S. and of the forceful nature of the Ukrainian army’s EU to encircle Russia, as much as the desire of offensive against the Donbas separatists as the former U.S.S.R. member states and other being primarily responsible for the bloodshed ex-Warsaw pact countries to join the West in in Eastern Ukraine. The downing of MH17, search of the freedom, security and prosperity meanwhile, is swiftly dismissed as a ‘dreadful they never enjoyed under Soviet rule. In mistake’, for which no one can be held addition to the tendentious tone of the book, responsible. Russian incitement and support for some questionable factual assertions are present the rebellion is also downplayed. The pattern as well. For example, Russia is described as of Russian actions being excused and leading the dissolution of the Soviet Union, explained, while Western and Ukrainian actions when it was in fact Lithuania and the Baltic being unequivocally condemned, is recurring states who were the first Soviet Republics to throughout the book. Indeed, the annexation break free. of Crimea and the violent uprising in the Donbas is referred to as a ‘Russian spring’ Richard Sakwa’s Frontline Ukraine remains a resulting an ‘outburst of Russian self- valuable contribution to the debate surrounding expression’. The Donbas separatists are the Russo-Ukrainian crisis, presenting another preposterously portrayed as ‘pluralists’, despite point of view than the prevailing one in the exhibiting extreme nationalism and virulent West. However, it should also be read with the anti-Ukrainian sentiments. Overall, Russian knowledge that it is an alternative account. As actions are seen as defensive reactions to the crisis in Ukraine is still ongoing, readers Western challenges. may have to wait for the conflict to be resolved and emotions to subside before a more sober Reading Frontline Ukraine, one is arguably and balanced account can emerge. presented with a realist worldview. The actors Sebastian Åsberg 1 Human Rights Watch, ‘Crimea: Human Rights in King’s College London Decline: Serious Abuses in Russian-Occupied Region of Ukraine’, 17 November 2014, online at https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/17/crimea-human- rights-decline (last accessed on 15 June 2016). ______67 The Editors of Strife http://strifejournal.org King’s College London The Year MMXVI