D-1 From: Hadland Sent: Friday, October 26, 2018 12:01 PM To: Brad Sperling ; Dan Rose > Cc: Arlene Boone >; Betty Ponto
Hi Brad, This is a May letter with no response yet, on the old fort From: A McKenzie < > Date: October 10, 2018 at 6:13:32 PM PDT To: JJHorgan
Dear Premier, John Horgan, Minister of the Environment, George Heyman, Minister of Public Safety, Mike Farnworth, as well as other Members of Legislative Assembly:
I call to your attention the following letter by Mr. Arthur Hadland now published in the public domain. Despite having sent this about 5 months ago, you have yet to provide Arthur with a proper response to this letter:
"May 18, 2018
Honourable Mike Farnworth Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General Room 128, Parliament Buildings Victoria, BC V8V 1X4 RE: BEDROCK AT SITE C
The extra billings for Site C on the backs of the ratepayers and taxpayers are mounting at an alarming rate. The amount of material being moved in the north-bank is in excess of any project estimates. The engineers at Site C cannot find bedrock!
The shale (old mud) is NOT bedrock in anyone’s imagination! * Thorndike Bernhart. World Book Dictionary. Volume 2 L-Z. 1989. shale n. a fine-grained rock, formed from hardened clay or mud, that splits easily into thin layers. The quest for bedrock to secure the dam site is continuing. BC Hydro has now hired 3 Italian Experts to find real bedrock for the construction of the Site C dam. The instructions provided to them was to spare no expense in the quest for construction grade bedrock.
There have been 5 professional reports previously that described the instability of the River Valley. The most damming quote occurred on Pg. 9 Klohn Crippen Berger and SNC-Lavalin September 2009 Report http://www.bchydro.com/energy_in_bc/projects/site_c/document_centre/stage_2_reports.html
“..the uncertainties in predicting both the extent and rate of the shoreline impacts lead to the proposal to adopt an observational approach for periodically reviewing and updating the reservoir impact lines after the reservoir has been filled.” March 28, 2019 D-1
If the employed Engineers were acting in a professional manner, they would have already provided the Province and your offices with written surety of dam stability and safety. To ignore this major safety flaw in the dam construction is the ultimate definition of willful blindness.
Please provide: 1. The names of the 3 experts and their expertise 2. The reports and conclusions of the 3 experts. 3. Total cost for their employment. 4. An independent professional Engineering statement that the dam is stable and safe for future generations. The people of Old Fort are very vulnerable. No provisions have been made for their future safety. WHY NOT? P.S. For a parallel example of a failed dam structure, please Google the Teton Dam (Idaho) 1976 - It also is located in a sedimentary basin.
This 2011 photo shows the massive slide of the sedimentary bedrock (Shaftsbury shales) lying above the axis of the proposed Site C dam site. This shale slump (slide) happened directly on the centerline of the proposed Site C. It occurred after heavy rains and buried the exploratory adit (mine or tunnel) that was constructed by BC Hydro (BCHPA) in the late 1970s. This failure of the shale substrate parallels the causes of the Peace River Bridge failure in 1957. This Shale cannot be considered to be bedrock. The other numerous slope failures along the River Valley can likely be attributed to the wetting of the Montmorillonite clay soils overlying this shale base. [LiDAR data acquired between July and August 2006 and covered an area of approximately 750 square kilometres. This area includes all of the slopes on both sides of the proposed reservoir area along Peace River and its tributaries between Peace Canyon Dam and the confluence of Peace River and Pine River, about 12 kilometres downstream of the proposed Site C dam site.
A total of 1,834 landslide complexes comprising 4,010 individual landslides were Identified. Estimated deposit volumes range between 1,600 cubic metres and 82 million cubic metres (PN-512, the Cache Creek Slide complex), with a mean value of 655,000 cubic metres, and a median value of 194,000 cubic metres.]
All information of this public project is being kept a secret. This is to the detriment of ratepayer and taxpayer interests. Where is the objective public watch dog?
The people of BC are being blindly obliged to pay for the Province’s economic and environmental boondoggle of the 21st Century! It is becoming obvious that that Site C must be stopped due to geological instability. I am awaiting a reasoned response.
Arthur A Hadland
Gramineae Seed Farm Arthur & Laurel Hadland
March 28, 2019 D-1
This is a reminder to you, a few members of the BC Legislative Assembly, that you still owe Mr. Hadland--and all the rest of us concerned--a proper reply. Such a proper reply must provide the 4 points Arthur Hadland has requested. If you cannot do so, we expect you to act responsibly by removing the construction permits you have provided to BC Hydro for Site C dam and for Mr. Mike Farnworth to resign.
Please respond to Arthur as well as to myself.
Sincerely,
April Mckenzie
March 28, 2019 D-1 From: Hadland Sent: Friday, October 26, 2018 12:04 PM To: Arlene Boone Betty Ponto
Hi Brad
That was a pleasure to visit with you .
I am passing on some info that you may be interested in. please confirm receipt.
Regards
Arthur
From: Hadland > Sent: August 29, 2018 4:49 PM To: g Hon. Daviid Eby ([email protected])
I have not had an answer to this letter. This is an immediately serious issue that needs attention now before more public funds are wasted.
Awaiting a response.
Arthru
ARTHUR HADLAND
Honourable Mike Farnworth April 6, 2018 MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY Room 128 Parliament Buildings Victoria, BC V8V 1X4
Re: SITE C DAM SAFETY
Dear Sir
I refer you to a report presented to the Canadian Dam Association dated Oct. 15 -20, 2016. The authors are engineers for the Site C dam. The following terms dominate the report when describing the bedrock conditions at the dam site: “moderately weak, flaky to fissile, silty shale interbedded with thin beds of siltstone, sandstone and shale” “Shear movements along their weak bedding planes and cross cutting discontinues……”
Do these phrases provide confidence in the bedrock integrity of the proposed dam site?
March 28, 2019 D-1 It continues on page 3: “leaving steep overburden slopes that have been prone to sloughing and sliding.” “subsequently large and small bedrock slides have occurred along the banks.” “There has been shear movement due to horizontal displacement along thin, weak bedding planes.” “Due to the very weak sedimentary bedrock….” The description of geological instability dominates the various sections of this report. It becomes obvious that the existing shale bedrock is too inferior for construction of a dam site. Unless of course you can find a Professional Engineer who will certify in writing that this site is safe to construct and hold a reservoir. I would ask that you visit the site and observe the current excavations just below the campsite where the mixture of sand gravel silt clay and shale is being removed in order to stabilize the slope. How do you bulldoze and dig out bedrock with machines??? Bedrock generally needs to be blasted. The engineers have not found real bedrock on the site. The last--minute reconfiguration of the proposed dam layout provides for more serious questions about the dam stability. This unnecessary project has the potential to emulate the Teton Dam Disaster of 1976.
Where is the level of surety in future dam safety?
The preceding report excerpts have not been taken out of context but rather are a large body of evidence that concurs with SNC Lavalin/Klohn Crippen 2009 statement: “…owing to the uncertainty is predicting shoreline impacts it is our proposal to adopt an observational approach for periodically reviewing and updating the reservoir impact lines after the reservoir has been filled.” p. 9 Klohn Crippen Berger Ltd. and SNC- Lavalin Inc. Sept. 2009. Peace River – Site C Hydro Project Reservoir Shoreline Impacts Methodology and Criteria Report No. P05032A02-10-001. These statements are all dam stoppers. Mr. Minister, in your role as Minister Responsible for Public Safety, it is your fiduciary responsibility to initiate an immediate outside, objective analysis from non-aligned professionals regarding the future safety of the downstream residents at Old Fort and South Taylor.
The referenced reports are attached for your perusal. Note also that’s there is a 2006 LIDAR report that documents 4010 slides within the proposed reservoir boundaries.
I am confident that your advisors will marginalize this information and comments.
Please use your own common sense to weed out the chaff from the grain.
Simply put, please find a totally independent Professional Engineer who will provide you with an irrefutable written opinion that the geology at Site C and the new dam reconfiguration is safe and does not constitute a future human safety crisis.
Awaiting your immediate response,
Arthur A Hadland Citizen of the Peace Food producer Former Director of Area C, Peace River Regional District
Virus-free. www.avg.com
March 28, 2019 D-1
CDA 2016 Annual Conference Congrès annuel 2016 de l’ACB CANADIAN DAM ASSOCIATION Halifax, NS, Canada ASSOCIATION CANADIENNE DES BARRAGES 2016 Oct 15-20
ROLLER COMPACTED CONCRETE BUTTRESS AT THE SITE C CLEAN ENERGY PROJECT
Neil Heidstra, P.Eng., Klohn Crippen Berger Ltd., Vancouver, BC, Canada John Nunn, P.Eng., formerly Klohn Crippen Berger Ltd., Vancouver, BC, Canada Andrew Watson, P.Eng., BC Hydro, Vancouver, BC, Canada Katie Dodman, P.Eng., Klohn Crippen Berger Ltd., Vancouver, BC, Canada Rod Carter, P.Eng., BC Hydro, Vancouver, BC, Canada Lillan Burmeister, P.Eng., SNC-Lavalin Inc., Vancouver, BC, Canada
ABSTRACT
The project is an 1100MW generating station on the Peace River near Fort St. John, BC, Canada. The project is underlain by dark grey moderately weak, flaky to fissile, silty shale interbedded with thin beds of siltstone, sandstone and shale. Thick glacial deposits were eroded as the ice masses receded and the Peace River down-cut a valley resulting in substantial redistribution of stresses in the river valley walls and an upward bulging of the valley floor and inward relaxation of the valley walls. Shear movement along thin weak bedding planes and local thrust faults also developed. Near-vertical jointing, parallel to the valley walls, weak bedding planes and cross-cutting discontinuities have been identified in both abutments. The original configuration of the spillway headworks and intakes were concrete gravity structures founded on deep cuts in the bedrock with weak bedding planes that daylight in the excavated slopes. A new layout was developed where the horizontal water forces on the headworks structures are taken down an inclined “buttress” to the bedrock below the river valley floor and by-passing the weak bedding planes located in the valley walls. This resulted in the unique concept of the RCC Buttress supporting the headworks structures, powerhouse and spillway structures.
RÉSUMÉ
Ce projet hydroélectrique d’une puissance installée de 1100 MW se situe sur la Peace River, près de Fort St John, CB, Canada. Le projet repose sur des schistes argileux gris foncé de résistance modérément faible, de feuilletés à fissurés, avec stratifications de schiste silteux et de minces lits de siltite, de grès et de schiste. Les épais dépôts glaciaires ont été érodés progressivement après la fonte des glaciers par la Peace River ; celle-ci a taillé une vallée entraînant une redistribution substantielle des contraintes sur les deux versants de la rivière, accompagnée d’un rebond du lit de la rivière ainsi qu’une relaxation latérale des versants. Des mouvements de cisaillement le long des plans de stratification minces et faibles ainsi que des failles de chevauchement locales se sont également développés. Des joints quasi verticaux, parallèles aux versants de la vallée, ainsi que de faibles plans de stratification et des discontinuités transversales ont été identifiés sur les deux appuis. La configuration originale la structure de l’évacuateur de crues et des passages hydrauliques était formée d’ouvrages poids en béton fondés sur des excavations profondes dans le roc avec la stratification des faibles plans de déposition exposée sur les versants excavés. Une nouvelle disposition des ouvrages a été développée où les forces hydrostatiques horizontales sur la structure sont transférées vers le bas de la fondation par un « contrefort » fondé sur le rocher en profondeur, bien en dessous du lit de la rivière, évitant ainsi les plans de glissement préférentiels présents au niveau des versants de la vallée. Un concept unique a été développé avec un contrefort en BCR supportant la structure des ouvrages de tête, de la centrale hydroélectrique et de l’évacuateur de crues.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Peace River hydroelectric system in British Columbia consists of two existing projects, G.M. Shrum Generating Station at the W.A.C. Bennett Dam and Peace Canyon Generating Station, and one project which is currently under construction known as the Site C Clean Energy Project. The Peace River hydroelectric system is presented in Figure 1.
The Site C Clean Energy Project’s 60 m high dam is located 83 km downstream of the Peace Canyon Dam. It is 7 km southwest of Fort St. John, just downstream of the confluence of the Moberly River and the Peace River, and 62 km upstream from the British Columbia/Alberta border. The reservoir, with a surface area of approximately 9,310 hectares, will extend back to the tailrace of the Peace Canyon Dam.
The Site C Clean Energy Project will consist of six generating units with a total capacity of 1,100 MW, producing an average of 5,100 GWh of electricity annually. Site C will take advantage of regulation of the Peace River that is provided by the W.A.C. Bennett Dam, generating electricity from water discharged by the G.M. Shrum Generating Station and the Peace Canyon Generating Station. Most of the inflow into the Site C reservoir will come from the Peace Canyon Dam; however, the Halfway River, and to a lesser extent, the Moberly River and smaller tributaries, will also contribute some inflows.
Figure 1: The Peace River Hydroelectric System
Studies for the development of the third hydroelectric generating station on the Peace River first commenced during the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. Conceptual arrangements of the project were developed and extensive field and laboratory investigations were undertaken. Work on the development stopped in the mid 1980’s and was briefly re-started in the period from 1989 to 1991. Studies re- commenced in 2006 and the configuration design was completed in 2010. This was followed by the definition design and finally the implementation design which is currently on-going.
Construction of the project started in the summer of 2015 with the preliminary works (site clearing,access roads, worker accommodation, construction power and other construction facilities). The Main Civil Works construction, which includes the construction of the earthfill dam, the diversion works, the approach channel, the roller compacted concrete (RCC) buttress and excavation work started in the summer of 2016. The implementation design of the generating station and spillway is currently on-going
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with the scheduled award for this work to be in the summer of 2017. Commissioning of the generating station is planned for 2023-2024.
2 THE GEOLOGY AT THE SITE
2.1 Regional Geology
The project dam site and reservoir area are located at the western edge of the Interior Plains. This region, from the Peace Canyon Dam to the B.C./Alberta border, is a flat to slightly rolling plain in which the Peace River has eroded a broad, U shaped valley on average few kilometres wide and 180 to 230 m deep.
The modern Peace River began to evolve after the retreat of the last ice sheet and the subsequent drainage of the glacial Peace Lake. In the expanse between the Peace Canyon Dam and Site C, the Peace River has cut down through a thick cover of overburden, which was deposited during and after glaciation, and into flat-lying Cretaceous silty shales, shales and sandstones. The valley generally follows the ancestral pre- glacial or inter-glacial drainage pattern; however, at the dam site the present day river is on the North side of its former valley.
The river has, for the most part, rapidly eroded its valley into unconsolidated glacial deposits, leaving steep overburden slopes that have been prone to sloughing and sliding. In the location where the river departs from the overburden-filled ancestral valley, it has cut down steep shale slopes. Subsequently, large and small bedrock slides have occurred along the banks.
Marine and non-marine- sedimentation in North-Eastern British Columbia and North-Western Alberta lasted from Jurassic to Upper Cretaceous time (190 to 65 Ma). In the Site C dam and reservoir areas, only lower and upper Cretaceous rocks are exposed in the river valley. The rocks belong to the Fort St. John Group of sedimentary rocks which are subdivided into four formations: Dunvegan, Shaftesbury, Gates and Moosebar. Only the shales, silty shales and sandstones belonging to the Shaftesbury formation, are present at and near the surface at the dam site.
2.2 Structural Geology at Site C
Site C is underlain by Lower Cretaceous rocks of the Shaftesbury formation. These rocks consist of dark grey, moderately weak, flaky to fissile, silty shale, interbedded with thin beds of siltstone, sandstone and shale. These rocks are of marine origin, and are in an intermediate stage of diagenesis. Fourteen lithologic units have been delineated in the bedrock at the dam site. The predominant rock type is a silty shale; weaker shale units comprise a small portion of the rock. The unconfined compression strength of the rock units at the site vary from 5 MPa to 15 MPa.
The stratigraphic section remains almost constant in thickness throughout the site, although rock units on the left (North) bank are often slightly coarser grained than their equivalent on the right (South) bank. A stratigraphic column identifying the geology at Site C is presented in Figure 2.
In the area of the dam site, the regional dip, modified in places by valley rebound and local shearing, is about 1 to 2° to the Northeast. Loads were induced on the soft shale by ice during continental glaciations. Thick glacial deposits were eroded as the ice masses receded and the Peace River down-cut a valley.
Substantial redistribution of stresses in the river valley walls occurred as the Peace River down-cut its valley. The changes in vertical and horizontal stresses resulted in an upward bulging of the valley floor and inward relaxation of the valley walls. There has been shear movement due to horizontal displacement
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along thin, weak bedding planes and along local thrust faults in response to unbalanced stresses that resulted from the regional unloading.
Marker Bedding Rock Units Description of Beds Planes Rock Types
Figure 2: Stratagraphic Column of Rock Units and Bedding Planes at Site C
These effects are well known in the Peace River valley and were observed during the construction of the Peace Canyon Dam (Imrie 1991). “Sprung” bedding planes (upward bulging due to stress changes) were
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mapped both at the G.M. Shrum Generating Station and at the Peace Canyon Generating Station. Near- vertical jointing parallel to the valley walls, and riverward bedding plane movements, were observed at both of those dam sites. These weak bedding planes and cross-cutting discontinuities have been identified in the abutments at Site C.
2.2.1 Relaxation Joints
Prominent features of the bedrock at Site C include steeply dipping relaxation joints which strike parallel to the river near the valley slopes. These joints vary between vertical and a dip of 70° to the horizontal, towards the river valley. The relaxation joints were produced due to the horizontal stress relief that resulted from the river down-cutting and forming the valley as it exists today.
The relaxation joints are “open” near the face of the valley slopes, with partial infilling of silty clay and shale fragments. On the right bank the “open” joints have gaps ranging from 5 mm to 100 mm, and have been located to a depth of about 35 m from the valley face based on large diameter investigation holes. In an exploratory adit located on the left bank, the joints were found to have similar openings till about 20 m horizontally in from the terrace edge. Beyond those depths the joints were considered “closed” as they were found to be tight or with negligible gaps. Prominent joints were typically weathered by groundwater seepage.
2.2.2 Bedding Planes
Numerous bedding plane (BP) discontinuities have been mapped in the project area. They are typically found adjacent to concretion layers or sandy-silty laminations, or within weaker units. Most bedding planes are discontinuous hairline partings with little or no infilling; however, some have been found which appear to be continuous and infilled with silty clay. The location of the bedding planes in the stratigraphic column is presented in Figure 2
Laboratory tests to determine the shear strength of these bedding planes were undertaken by BC Hydro during the 1980’s and the results are presented in numerous reports produced at that time. The current design acknowledges the excellent work done during the 1980’s and much of the current design is based on the results of that field and laboratory work. Some of the bedding planes were found to have very low shear strength values. These bedding planes have largely influenced the decisions regarding the arrangement of the Site C dam. These critical bedding planes are BP-8, BP-12, BP-25, BP-28, BP-31 and BP-33.
BP-25 is located in both valley walls at an elevation just above river level. Laboratory tests revealed that this bedding plane has the lowest shear strength of all the bedding planes found at the site. BP-25 is a continuous discrete, planar, weak bedding plane, identified in virtually all boreholes drilled on site. BP-25 is considered to be the most important bedding plane for the design of the headworks structures, which are located on the right bank, as it daylights in the valley wall just above river bed level.
2.2.3 Shear Zones
Shears or cross-cutting discontinuities have been seen or inferred in most areas of the dam site. Any shears that have been traced on the site have at least 0.2 m of vertical displacement. These shears are characterized by at least 0.05 m of gouge and breccia and by distorted bedding. The major shears can consist of over 3 m of gouge and breccia with pods of intact rock and associated rotated bedding.
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The right bank, which has been more intensely investigated than the river and the left bank, was found to be more highly sheared than the left bank. The main shears in the right bank have been generally subdivided into North dipping and South dipping. These shears, for the most part, dip into the right bank.
Shearing beneath the river is not as prevalent as on the right bank. The most prominent and continuous shear observed in the river area is a shear that dips towards the left bank (northerly) at 9 to 15° and has offsets ranging up to 0.8 m.
3 SELECTION OF THE TYPE OF DAM AND CONFIGURATION OF THE PROJECT
3.1 Main Dam
During the initial stages of the configuration design, several studies were undertaken to investigate various options for the main dam. Due to the very weak sedimentary bedrock and the low modulus of the bedrock at Site C, concrete gravity type dams were ranked the lowest viable option for the main dam. There is no precedent for a concrete gravity dam of the height required at Site C constructed on similar weak bedrock. The selected main dam type was an earthfill dam with an impervious core. The selection was influenced by the local availability of till and gravel to construct the main dam and the ability of an earthfill dam to handle the predicted movements in the abutments over time.
During the studies for the selection of the main dam, several analyses were undertaken to investigate the stability of the concrete gravity dam options. These studies revealed that stability of concrete gravity dam structures in the river channel could only be achieved by engaging passive resistance of the foundation bedrock downstream of the structure. The weight of the concrete gravity dam itself was insufficient to provide the required shear resistance on the continuous bedding plane in the bedrock beneath the dam due to the low shear strength of these bedding planes. Hence, the principal resistance mechanism was the passive resistance of a theoretical wedge downstream of the concrete gravity structure.
4 ARRANGEMENT OF THE HEADWORKS STRUCTURES
4.1 Optimization of the Project Layout
There is a plateau on the right bank of the Peace River at the dam site that is at, or slightly above, the maximum normal reservoir level for the Site C project. The plateau is overlain by approximately 10 m of overburden. The suitability of this plateau for placing the headworks of the powerhouse and spillway was one of the reasons why this particular site on the Peace River was selected for the third hydroelectric generating station in the river system.
The headworks structures comprise the intakes for the powerhouse and the spillway structures that support the spillway gates. These are concrete gravity structures. The hydrostatic horizontal thrust on the headworks structures is carried down to the foundation bedrock beneath the structures and transferred into the foundation by shear and compression along the concrete/rock interface. The stability of the concrete gravity structures along the concrete/rock interface was a key consideration in addition to the stability of the foundation bedrock beneath the headworks structures.
At Site C, it was found that the stability of the bedrock beneath the headworks governed the layout of the headworks. The presence of weak bedding planes in the rock beneath the headworks, particularly BP-25, which only as a coefficient of friction of 9° and no cohesion strength, governed the sliding stability. BP- 25 daylights in the valley wall so the shear resistance at the bedding plane can only be mobilized by the shear friction on the bedding plane; no contribution from passive rock pressure. The presence of
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relaxation joints in the bedrock, which would be on the “upstream” side of the headworks structures, also had negative implications on the stability.
The stability analysis assumed full headwater pressure in the relaxation joints down to the intersection of these joints with BP-25. Since the bedding plane is considered undrained, an uplift pressure along BP-25 was accounted for, varying from full headwater pressure at the intersection with the relaxation joint to tailwater where the bedding plane daylights in the valley wall.
Rigid block stability analyses of the headworks, including the rock beneath the headworks, did not have the required factor of safety when checking sliding along the bedding planes that daylight in the valley walls.
The studies done for the concrete gravity dam option lead to two main conclusions: that the most attractive and robust solution to achieve stability of the headworks structures was to bypass the weak bedding planes that daylight in the valley wall and to transfer the hydrostatic horizontal thrust acting on the headworks structures down into the continuous bedrock below the river bed; and to minimize the hydrostatic horizontal loads on concrete gravity structures by minimizing their height.
This concept developed into the design of providing an inclined buttress that would transfer these loads from the headworks down to a key in the bedrock below river bed level, wherein the hydrostatic horizontal forces from the headworks are transferred to passive thrust in the continuous bedrock beneath the river bed.
The material selected for this inclined buttress was mass concrete as it only had to act in compression. As the volumes were significant, RCC was selected as the obvious construction material. RCC has the benefit of a considerable increase in placement rate and a lower cost of construction compared to conventional mass concrete construction.
4.2 Movement of the Bedrock due to Swelling
The foundation rock at Site C is susceptible to short-term and long-term swelling. The swelling behaviour is a combination of three mechanisms: water absorption into the rock structure and the re-establishment of effective stress and piezometric pressure equilibrium with total stress imposed on the material, i.e. primary consolidation/swell considered for a clay material; skeletal creep associated with the gradual release of stored strain energy within the mineral matrix of the rock, usually considered to be secondary consolidation/swell for a clay material; and pore water chemistry change due to dilution of the pore water by reservoir water and resulting changes to the strength of the double layer forces within the mineral matrix of the rock, resulting in long-term change in volume, i.e. swelling of the rock material.
Laboratory tests on rock samples obtained from core drilling showed that the rock swells when immersed in distilled water, “shale juice” (groundwater obtained from seepage from the rock at site), or ordinary tap water; but at a certain confining stress, this swelling is suppressed.
The conceptual layout for the generating station developed during the 1980’s required the deepest cut in the bedrock, for the plunge pool of the spillway, to be 65 m. The estimated long-term heave on the floor of the plunge pool from the theoretical swelling of the bedrock was 0.4 m (Hanna and Little 1992). As the
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depth of excavation across the spillway and powerhouse varied considerably, the concern was differential movement generated from the swelling of the rock. The potential differential movement was estimated to be 150 mm over a distance of 12 m which raised concern over the complexity of the remaining design details and also uncertainty over the performance over the long operating life.
The mechanism by which swelling in the bedrock takes place, and the preliminary analyses of the response of the bedrock to swelling that was done for the original conceptual layout, lead to the following factors being considered for the layout of the headworks structures, in addition to those identified to achieve stability: minimize the depth of excavation; attempt to, where possible, reload the rock to stress levels close to those existing before excavation in order to supress the swelling in the rock after construction; and keep the depth of excavation across structures as uniform as possible to minimize the differential swell movement within the concrete structures.
4.3 Layout of the Headworks and Resulting Layout of the Project
The layout considerations derived from the stability analyses and the studies related to the potential swelling of the bedrock led to the following arrangement of the headworks structures: the axis of the headworks structures is parallel to the river, i.e. at right angles to the axis of the main dam. This minimizes the depth of excavation and hence minimizes the long term swell movement of the bedrock and differential movements within the concrete structures; the headworks structures are founded on the top of an RCC buttress that extends down the valley wall at an inclined angle and is keyed into the bedrock beneath the river bed level; the powerhouse is founded on an extension of the RCC buttress to minimize differential movement between the intakes, penstock and powerhouse structures; the spillway stilling basin is also founded on an extension of the RCC buttress to minimize differential movement between the spillway headworks and stilling basin; the powerhouse is located so that the excavation for the powerhouse and tailrace is at the downstream toe of the downstream closure cofferdam, which is required for the construction of the earthfill dam; and a till blanket and geomembrane is provided on the invert of the approach channel and is sealed to the headworks structures to limit ingress of water into the bedrock beneath the approach channel and under the RCC buttress. This will help limit swelling of the rock.
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Figure 3: RCC Buttress This arrangement of the headworks structures and powerhouse required the construction of an approach channel to convey the water from the reservoir upstream of the earthfill dam to the intakes and spillway. The portion of the approach channel between the intakes and the core of the earthfill dam is closed by a concrete gravity dam constructed of RCC. A rendering of the RCC buttress is presented in Figure 3 and a rendering of the completed project is presented in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Completed Site C Project
This arrangement resulted in hydraulic flow patterns to the intakes and spillway that are not fully optimized; however, initial computations indicated that hydraulic requirements could be satisfied with this arrangement with a wide approach channel and optimising the approach conditions to the spillway. Extensive physical hydraulic models tests were carried out in a laboratory on this arrangement of the project and the detailed hydraulic design of the intakes and powerhouse was optimized to provide the required power flow, spillway capacity and hydraulic conditions.
5 RCC BUTTRESS
5.1 Layout of the RCC Buttress
The RCC buttress has a number of significantly different cross sections, depending on the location. The buttress is divided into the following components (listed from upstream to downstream): core buttress: forming the abutment for the core of the earthfill dam and forming part of the main water barrier across the river; dam buttress: a bulkhead wall extending from the core buttress to the intakes of the power buttress; powerhouse buttress: supports the intakes, penstocks and powerhouse; transition buttress: a short bulkhead wall between the powerhouse buttress and the spillway buttress, which also supports the auxiliary service bay for the powerhouse; and spillway buttress: supports the spillway piers and radial gates, the low level outlets, the free overflow auxiliary spillway, the spillway chute slab and the stilling basin slab and walls.
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Typical cross sections of these components of the RCC buttress are presented in Figures 5, 6 and 7 for the dam, powerhouse and spillway buttresses, respectively.
Figure 5: Dam Buttress
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Figure 6: Powerhouse Buttress
Figure 7: Spillway Buttress
5.3 Stability Analyses
The governing load case for stability was found to be the extreme event of a failure of the impervious blanket and geomembrane in the approach channel and ingress of reservoir water into a relaxation joint that extends from the approach channel invert down to the lowest bedding plane, and the associated uplift on that bedding plane. This load case is considered to be a proxy post-earthquake load case where the
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impervious blanket and geomembrane have been damaged by the seismic event and the relaxation joints in the bedrock behind the RCC buttress have been opened by the seismic event.
An example of this governing load case is presented in Figure 8 for the dam buttress. Figure 8 shows the lateral hydrostatic and uplift pressures on the various joints and bedding plane 31. The downstream toe of the buttress is keyed into the bedrock and the sliding plane is assumed to include a passive wedge at the toe of the buttress, bounded on the downstream side by a shear zone. The shear zone is conservatively assumed to act parallel to the river and at the most adverse inclination for stability. The required factor of safety against sliding along the bedding plane and breakout along the shear zone for this extreme proxy post-earthquake load case was 1.1.
This load case determined the depth of the key of the RCC buttress. In the case of the core and dam buttresses, the RCC buttress had to extend down past BP-28 to achieve this stability. In the case of the powerhouse, transition and spillway buttresses, the key in the RCC buttress had to extend below the elevation of BP-33.
Figure 8: Governing Load Case for Dam Buttress
5.4 Swell Analyses
Analyses to estimate the swell movement of the rock and resulting movement the RCC buttress and structures supported on the RCC buttress were done using the 2-dimensional computer program, FLAC
CDA 2016 Annual Conference, Halifax, NS, Canada 12 March 28, 2019 D-1
(Itasca 2014). There are a number of parameters involved in modelling the response of the bedrock to swelling. These parameters and associated uncertainties include: Geological uncertainties o extent of relaxation joints and how they respond to excavation; o formation of new relaxation joints and/or “sprung” bedding planes; o discovery of previously unidentified shears or bedding planes; and o groundwater levels during excavation. Parameter uncertainties o physical properties of the rock, bedding planes and shears; o in-situ stress regime; o rebound response magnitude and mechanism; and o groundwater regime after impoundment Mathematical modelling o assumptions and simplifications. Ground treatment uncertainties o effectiveness of curtain grouting from plinth and buttress; and o effectiveness of drainage measures
In order to address these uncertainties in the swell modelling, it was therefore decided to adopt an Observational Approach to the final design and construction of the RCC buttress. Analyses have been completed for the base design of the RCC buttress for swell movements resulting from analyses using the best estimate of the various rock properties and expected groundwater conditions. The maximum movement that the base design can accommodate is the amount which would trigger additional design measures involving stress relief jointing in the base of the RCC. The additional joints would provide some articulation in the RCC buttress and include subsequent grouting of any joints that have opened. Instrumentation is being installed at critical locations in the bedrock below the RCC buttress to monitor movement of the bedrock throughout the excavation and RCC construction. The additional measures are included in the construction specification and could be removed from the construction plans if monitoring during construction indicates the movements are within the base case model.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The solution to constructing the concrete gravity headworks for the Site C Clean Energy Project, which are founded on very weak sedimentary rock with very low strength bedding planes within the rock mass, was to transfer the hydrostatic horizontal thrust on the headwork structures down to the continuous bedrock below the river level by way of an inclined buttress constructed of RCC. The RCC buttress carries the horizontal thrust in compression down through the buttress, acting as a strut, to a shear key in the bedrock.
The RCC buttress also forms a stable foundation for the powerhouse, intake, penstock and spillway structures that is designed to provide robust protection from a seismic event and to minimize the differential movement between and within these structures that could result from long term swell movement of the rock.
7 REFERENCES
Hanna, A. and T.E. Little. 1992. “An estimate of rebound potential of the Shaftsbury shales ay a damsite in British Columbia.” Can Geotech. J., Vol.29: pp 375-392. Imrie, A.S. 1991. “Stress-induced response from both natural and construction-related processes in the deepening of the Peace River valley, B.C..” Can Geotech. J., Vol.28: pp 719-728.
CDA 2016 Annual Conference, Halifax, NS, Canada 13 March 28, 2019 D-1
Itasca Consulting Group, Inc. 2014. “FLAC finite difference program version 7.0”. Minneapolis, MN, USA.
CDA 2016 Annual Conference, Halifax, NS, Canada 14 March 28, 2019 Gramineae Seed Farm D-1 Arthur & Laurel Hadland
November 16, 2016 Honourable Mike Morris Solicitor General & Minister of Public Safety Parliament Buildings, Victoria BC
RE: Public Safety of Proposed Site C Thank you for your referral and response letter from the Comptroller of Water Rights. The response letter dated Sept 23, 2016 does not provide a statement that the dam structure and reservoir area impacts are safe for citizens of Old Fort, Taylor and Peace River, Alberta. I ask that your office provide a professional opinion on the dam’s safety from an objective source that is not affiliated with the Provincial Liberal Government or the Proponent, BC Hydro. The 1991 Report commissioned by the Honorable Jack Weisgerber, Minister of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources was prepared by the Geological Survey Branch of British Columbia by N.R. Catto *1, plus the Sept. 2009 Klohn Crippen Berger Ltd. and SNC-Lavalin Inc. Peace River – Site C Hydro Project Reservoir Shoreline Impacts Methodology and Criteria *2 on the uncertainty of the shoreline AND the potential parallel to both the 1976 Teton Dam Failure and the 2014 Mount Polley dam failure are sufficient justification for sourcing an outside opinion on the public safety of this project. A sedimentary basin is an extremely hazardous and unstable location for a water reservoir. Suffice to say that shale is not bedrock. It’s old mud. This fact cannot be minimized or marginalized.
In addition, I have attached images of a significant recent slide of the slippery clays that destroyed the access road to the river.+ There are also unconfirmed reports that an industrial hoe became stuck when cutting a foundation for the cement batch plant. How does a hoe dig in bedrock and then become stuck in the same bedrock? Notice the slump line in the shale on Image 3. (bedrock) Bedrock needs to be blasted, not dug by a hoe. There were no slides or slumps in the bedrock on the WAC Bennett or the Peace Canyon Dams.
Awaiting a positive response.
Arthur A. Hadland
*1 Quaternary Geology and Landforms of Eastern Peace River Region, British Columbia, 1991` *2 Sept. 2009 Klohn Crippen Berger Ltd. and SNC-Lavalin Inc. Peace River – Site C Hydro Project Reservoir Shoreline Impacts Methodology and Criteria Report No. P05032A02-10-001
cc: Auditor General for BC BC Green Party Adrian Dix, BC NDP Honourable Ralph Goodale, Federal Minister of Public Safety Auditor General of Alberta March 28, 2019 D-1
From: Hadland Sent: Friday, October 26, 2018 12:48 PM To: Arlene Boone >; Betty Ponto
Brad , here is the most recent letter that I have crafted. The other two that I sent on today are more background again with no response. The party system has whipped both sides of the house so there is no response to any of there facts and their hazard to the Peace and our citizens. PLEASE READ THROUGH AND SEE IF THE Board is willing to take action. I am dropping of a hard copy to your office this PM. Best of luck Arthur
Virus-free. www.avg.com
March 28, 2019 D-1 ARTHUR HADLAND
October 25, 2018
Brad Sperling PRRD Chair and Director of Area C
RE: Old Fort Landslide
This event was predictable and was addressed in the Board Approved 19 MITIGATION Points that were covered by an October 24, 2014 letter to Minister DeJong (Attached)
What has happened at OLD FORT is just the beginning of future bank failures.
Most of the 19 points were ignored or marginalized by the by the proponent BCHPA. Point #11: PUBLIC SAFETY is an issue surrounding the proposed Site C reservoir. The need to address and ensure public safety has become a priority at all levels of Canadian government. A September 2009 Klohn Crippen Berger and SNC Lavalin report produced for BC Hydro draws this factor to the fore within the pondage of the proposed Site C project. Page 9 Quote… http://www.bchydro.com/energy_in_bc/projects/site_c/document_centre/stage_2_rep orts.html "The uncertainties in predicting both the extent and rate of the shoreline impacts lead to the proposal to adopt an observational approach for periodically reviewing and updating the reservoir impact lines after the reservoir has been filled." The 200+ citizens of Old Fort (within Area C) lie immediately downstream of the proposed dam site. This is a very real issue and they are vulnerable to a dam break. The Teton Dam (Idaho) failed in 1976. It lay in a sedimentary basin similar to the proposed Site C. It is requested that BCHPA provide a written guarantee to those residents of Area C that they and their property is totally safe and secure from any dam breaks. It is further requested that the Panel recommend the Federal, Alberta & British Columbia Ministries responsible for Public Safety be co-signors of this guarantee. It is these ministers responsible for public safety who have the role to investigate, report, and form their respective opinions on the measures that will be taken to ensure public safety or to recommend that the proposed project is too risky in terms of ensuring public safety to be undertaken.
The previous observation made by professional Engineers should have halted further activity on Site C
It is an irresponsible statement that sentences the local community and the Taxpayers of BC to a series of escalating debt for this BC 21st Century environmental and economic disaster. In effect it sanctions a huge transfer of wealth from the Taxpayers to Private Interests.
…..2
March 28, 2019 - 2 - D-1 The Engineers have now taken an advocacy role with an open check blank. Estimated Costs have gone from $6 Billion up to $12 Billion. These costs will predictably climb to probably $15 - $20 Billion. This adds to the $78 Billion BCHPA financial obligation that the Taxpayers of BC now inadvertently support. This flies in the face of equivalent power from a Natural Gas cogeneration @ $1.3B (Calgary), Burrard Thermal (paid for) and the Columbia River Treaty.
This 2009 statement is supported by the report commissioned by the Honorable Jack Weisgerber, Minister of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources in 1991. This report prepared by the Geological Survey Branch of British Columbia (Quaternary Geology and Landforms of Eastern Peace River Region, British Columbia, by N.R. Catto 1991). This report was made without reference to the proposed flooding of the Lower Peace River Valley; rather it was commissioned to examine aggregate exploitation within the lower Peace River region. This report is brought to the attention of the reader regarding reservoir safety concerns. In summary the Report of 1991 states that development of the Valley sides should be minimized. *see page 3
Further, a LIDAR Report identified 4010 old slides within the Reservoir boundaries. Tension cracks, failure of the shale in minor and major slides all suggests to the layman that the responsible and emerging solution would be to stop Site C.
When are you as Local Government going to demand answers to protect the interests our community? 1. Mitigation Point #11 needs to be addressed. 2. A letter from an Independent Professional Engineer body assuring Premier Horgan and the Taxpayers of this Province that this project is safe and necessary. 3. Three foreign workers were hired by BCHPA in April 2018 to find bedrock at any costs. Please find out who they were, their credentials, how much they were paid and obtain an unredacted copy of their report to BCHPA.
If Local Government does not stand upon principles, it will fall for any and everything. In my view, BCHPA has never earned a social licence to operate in our Peace River. Please do not continue to drink BCHPA Kool-Aid!
The facts noted in this letter are serious. It is obvious that BCHPA is marginalizing these real concerns and only government has the mandate to respond to these questions.
Your efforts to protect the safety and interests of Area C are needed.
Yours truly
Arthur A Hadland cc Hon. John Horgan, Premier of BC Hon. Mike Farnworth, Minister of Public Safety and Attorney General Hon George Heyman, Minister of the Environment and Climate Change Strategy Hon. Michele Mungall, Minister of Energy, Mines Petroleum Resources Hon. Lana Popham, Minister of Agriculture March 28, 2019 ….3 D-1
- 3 -
SUMMARY Quaternary Geology and Landforms of Eastern Peace River Region, British Columbia, by N.R. Catto 1991 These six cautionary quotes were made researching the potential for exploration or exploitation of aggregate sites in the eastern Peace River area: 1. “Mass movements, including rotational and translation glacial slides and a variety of sediment gravity flows, commonly occur along all the major streams.”…..Page 2 2.“The high concentrations of montmorillonite and bentonite in the strata, however, together with their poorly consolidated nature, greatly increases susceptibility of these rocks to slope failure following fluvial (or anthropogenic) undercutting or overloading.”…..Page 2 3."The clays are generally plastic, susceptible to sediment gravity flow if disturbed, and contain a high proportion of material derived from the local Cretaceous bedrock.”…..Page 5 4. “Mass movements in the region can be induced by the fluvial undercutting, natural overloading of the slopes (e.g. by debris flow from above), loss of internal cohesion due to sudden saturation (as was common during June, 1990), or by human activity. Evidence of past colluviation in the region is extensive (Bobrowsky et al. 1991), and extreme caution is required in any effort to exploit or utilize river valley slopes.”…..Page 10 5. “Thus, all of the major terrain slopes present in the eastern Peace River Region are subject to slope failure. Extreme caution should therefore be observed in any effort to exploit or utilize river valley slopes.”…..Page 15 6."Valley slopes throughout the region are subject to slope failure and colluviation, and the development of these sites should be minimized."…..Page 17 summary excerpt
March 28, 2019 D-1
PEACE RIVER REGIONAL DISTRICT
email to: [email protected]
Office of: Electoral Area ‘C’ Director October 24, 2014
The Honourable Michael de Jong Minister of Finance PO Box 9048, Stn Prov Gov’t., Victoria, BC v8W 9E2
Dear Mr. Minister:
Re: Costs of proposed Site C
In your capacity as Minister of Finance you will soon be engaged in a decision making process whether or not to proceed with construction of the proposed Site C project.
In my capacity as Director for Electoral Area ‘C’ of the Peace River Regional District, which coincidently contains the proposed Site C dam site I have presented an impact statement and a request for compensation, attached. This is known as Undertaking #28 as requested by the Joint Review Panel on January 14, 2014. These conditions, which are designed to protect the interests of my constituents, have not been addressed by either the Joint Review Panel or the proponent, BC Hydro.
I would request that you read the attachment (Undertaking #28) and consider these costs and cumulative impacts prior to your decision. These issues need to be addressed prior to any consent to proceed.
It is worthy to note that the W.A.C. Bennett Dam was estimated to cost $400 million in 1961 by the then Premier W.A.C. Bennett. The actual construction costs including the transmission line to the coast cost $950 million by 1968. This is a cost escalation in excess of 100% of the original estimate. This suggests an escalated cost to build Site C of $16 billion plus.
Former BC Hydro CEO Charles Reid, in a June 18, 2013 Alaska Highway news article stated that the combined debt load of our public entity was $70 Billion. Additionally the agency borrowed the annual dividend to contribute to the Provincial budget. This would suggest that BC Hydro is bankrupt.
This information adds fuel to the need to have this project referred to the BC Utilities Commission (BCUC) for an independent review. After all this was the intended purpose of BCUC when it was commissioned in the early 1980’s.
Your due consideration of this letter would be appreciated.
Yours truly,
Director Arthur Hadland Electoral Area ‘C’
Attachments: c.c. – Liberal Caucus c.c. – Mike Bernier, MLA – PR South Peace c.c. – John Horgan, Leader of the Official Opposition c.c. - Pat Pimm, MLA – PR North Peace c.c. – Adam Olsen, Interim Leader, Green Party c.c. - Vicki Huntington, Independent MLA
PLEASE REPLY TO: ■ BOX 810, 1981 ALASKA AVENUE, DAWSON CREEK, BC VIG 4H8 TELEPHONE: 250) 784-3200 OR (800) 670-7773 FAX: (250) 784-3201 EMAIL: [email protected] 9505 – 100th Street, Fort St. John, BC V1J 4N4 Telephone: (250)March 785-8084 28, Fax: 2019 (250) 785-1125 EMAIL: [email protected] J9505 PLEASE BOX 810, 100 REPLY Arthur Director option, Region of Secondly, Lastly implementation. As Peace activities would Firstly, mitigation Dear Office DAWSON STREET, proposed per TO: POST of: Panelists there Basin A. be FORT your CREEK. a on including of Director, comment of Hadland faced mitigation the for Area ST. PRESENTATION is proposed request Trust Site BC JOHN. a PEACE part the VIG discussion with Electoral C C. a 4H8 parallel 6300 BC comment of on This of V1J requests reduced TELEPHONE: BC Site cumulative December 4N4 Area citizens will Hydro RIVER to C. of TELEPHONE: ‘C’ be the on items access for March 28, 2019 RESPONSE (250) and complemented of the Columbia the impacts 13, 784-3200 Area that Power lack REGIONAL (250) to citizens 2013 services C do 785-8084 or of with (800) plus Authority River AS (undertaking a not January social of 670-7773 the Fax: PER a have by due Area Basin discussion (250) a understanding licence 14, THE suggestion to FAX: a (BCHPA). C 785-1125 DISTRICT Trust. 2014 meaningful the specific (250) #28) PANEL within construction of 784-3201 EMAIL: for the to for a REQUEST the [email protected] that the EMAIL: need mitigation more Peace activities they [email protected] for D-1 specific D-1
Firstly, students of history understand that the past predicts the future. BCPHA’scommitment to ensuring health and prosperity for the Peace Region over the past 57 years is sadly lacking... Therefore, there needs to be a directed effort to ensure that this public utility (BCHPA)be held accountable for returning and contributing to our community for future and past benefits accruing to BCHPA.
As Director of Area C, the first request is to have the Panel require the establishment of the Peace Basin Trust in the amount of $400 Million. This Trust would be dedicated to the future of the Peace Valley and the community of Hudson’s Hope in recognition of the negative aspects of the 57 year Flood Reserve and the loss of economic opportunities caused by the two existing reservoirs. This trust would be a contractual agreement and be fully funded and in place prior to any issuance of an Environmental Assessment Certificate for the proposed Site C. The beneficiaries to this Trust would be limited to Electoral Areas lying within the Peace River Valley and the District Municipality of Hudson’s Hope. This represents a small step focused on gaining a social licence on the part of BCHPA. Another part of this request is the Panel recommending a Minority Legacy Agreement specific to Electoral Areas B and Cand the District of Hudson’s Hope.
The current Legacy Term Paper did not have the accord of Electoral Areas B, C or the District Municipality of Hudson’s Hope. Again a contractual agreement and full funding (to be determined) must be in place and begin immediately upon the issue of an Environmental Assessment Certificate. A management committee comprising of one member of the Comptroller of Water Rights and four nominees from the affected areas are suggested as a means to govern the mitigation points provided for this request.
2 March 28, 2019
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4. The bulk of the residential area within Area C remains under serviced in spite of booms caused by hydro dam construction and oil & gas activities over the past 60 years As a current mitigation measure for the citizens of Old Fort, Grandhaven, Clairmont and McLeod areas (approximately 1200 homes lying within Area C) need to be provided with water & sewer service. A provision for a liquid transfer station also needs to be incorporated into this request. Another factor is the discharge into the Peace River. It may be undesirable to continue this practice if a reservoir replaces the flowing river. It is suggested that spray irrigation on agricultural land would be an alternative. This extra cost needs to be borne by BCHPAas a mitigation measure.
5. Water Load Out BCHPAwould be constructing a bulk water load out for the proposed Site C project. It is requested that this be retained solely as a domestic water source for the Area C community, after the project is complete.
6. Fire Protection: The growth of population within Area C will be unprecedented with the construction of the proposed dam site. It is requested that a fully manned and maintained fire hall be constructed by BCHPAin the vicinity of Old Fort/Grandhaven. The capital and operational costs to be fully paid by BCHPAfor the life of the dam.
7. HEALTHCARE Our Hospital staffing will be over-taxed. It is understood that the existing hospital has 55 beds available. It will be the professional staffing that needs to be expanded to accommodate the increase in population during the seven year construction period. It is proposed that the increased operating costs be solely attributable to Site C be borne by BCHPAduring the dam construction. More doctors, specialists and nurses funded by BCHPAare paramount. • Ambulance service. This service also needs to be enhanced as it is also taxed to the maximum. There needs to be additional capital
4 March 28, 2019 9. 8. will the proponent Policing: Alaska policing of the proposed site recommendation accommodate need space Schools need Ministry the junction • need City would more beyond for school worked fact forwarded the Villa Spaces. item that need Seniors demands and Highway, costs of of to The Another Site 1000 need Fort service that during operational the school Education that Ill. complement for of and the (both local C on SD Care Old This A pupils St. proponent there expansion and for would anticipated it letter the pace that later the the #60 local Clairmont John. space is School Fort capital more request facilities this requested overpass are first dam by to needs. a of this be from funding service Road March 28, 2019 new cost complete at 2017. In the the a senior’s funded District 2 for of construction and week. significant Charlie order dams. is during the and site the City are needs #148 Ministry justified A this would that operating) that to Proposed prime North 5 the in North be of to is care. by It respond project land Lake. or dire the to is anticipating an Fort provide is located BCHPA. new taxed Road be number of requested example be by overpass Peace 7 acquisition Peace need In period. St. a Education’s years It Site borne the expansion fund need addition, direct to is 269. John’s to in for the of This Seniors influx the C Seniors of the the of the is would to safe expansion. by This the be Both consequence that resident Director’s the extra construction. request Grandhaven max. be concerns that needs. capital constructed of there need on passage mitigation ability Association funded slowness this Independent the more accelerate population the project. Additional for seniors is be capital costs is Area to West an It people in based a over additional by is this of migration immediate of area. request for C either requested the funding will side this who D-1 the will the arena. on Living Peace and This be of the at D-1
1O.Noise, dust and light disturbance: The network of construction access roads, conveyor running 24/7 and the actual excavation at the quarry on 8S’ Avenue will be intrusive and overwhelming for these surrounding citizens. Firstly, the most identifiable and constant impact will be the noise on a 24/7 basis. “Noise is more than just a nuisance. It constitutes a real and present danger to people’s health. Day and night, at work and at play, noise can produce serious physical and psychological stress. No one is immune to this stress. People appear to adjust to noise by ignoring but the ear in fact, never closes. The body at times still responds with extreme tension, such as to a strange sound at night. The most outward symptom of stress building up in humans, when faced with noise is annoyance. Exposure to excessive noise can also induce or aggravate stress related health outcomes, including those on the cardiovascular system, immune system, sleep, task performance, behavior, and mental health”. (Health and Welfare Canada 1989) http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/articIe/pii/0165 178189900474
This information and the significant noise, light and disturbance factors need to be fully satisfied prior to any future decision-making. At present the proponent (BCHPA)is not recognizing the interests of these impacted citizens.
A second impact that the proponent (BCHPA)has missed or ignored is that the noise and disturbance will cause the impacted residents to lose is a significant and measurable loss of the rural lifestyle including actual depreciation of the real property. It is doubtful that the surrounding properties could be sold at fair market value during the construction phase due to the previously mentioned negative impacts. In real property terms the owners of these lands will lose a portion of their Bundle of Rights described as quiet enjoyment. It is doubtful that this loss and the peoples’ lifestyle losses can be meaningfully compensated. The residents of the valley and surrounding uplands will suffer these same effects plus the cumulative loss of quiet enjoyment going back to the granting of Wenner-Gren’s charter over the Valley in 1957.
6 March 28, 2019 D-1
It is suggested a specific policy designed to address these impositions on impacted residences be developed recognizing the BCExpropriation Act. The amending suggestions that Blair Lekstrom, the former Minister of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources, made at the Dawson Creek th Panel Hearing January 9 2014 bear consideration in addressing Site C land acquisitions. He certainly recognized that a 5% premium over market value was not adequate compensation; instead he suggested a factor of up to 100%, to recognize forced displacement.
11.PUBLIC SAFETYis an issue surrounding the proposed Site C reservoir. The need to address and ensure public safety has become a priority at all levels of Canadian government. A September 2009 Klohn Crippen Berger and SNC Lavelin report produced for BCHydro draws this factor to the fore within the pondage of the proposed Site C project. Quote... “The uncertainties in predicting both the extent and rate of the shoreline impacts lead to the proposal to adopt an observational approach for periodically reviewing and updating the reservoir impact lines after the reservoir has been filled.’ The 200+ citizens of Old Fort (within Area C) lie immediately downstream of the proposed dam site. This is a very real issue and they are vulnerable to a dam break. The Teton Dam (Idaho) failed in 1976. It lay in a sedimentary basin similar to the proposed Site C. It is requested that BCHPA provide a written guarantee to those residents of Area Cthat they and their property is totally safe and secure from any dam breaks. It is further requested that the Panel recommend the Federal, Alberta & British Columbia Ministries responsible for Public Safety be co-signors of this guarantee. It is these ministers responsible for public safety who have the role to investigate, report, and form their respective opinions on the measures that will be taken to ensure public safety or to recommend that the proposed project is too risky in terms of ensuring public safety to be undertaken. 35I 12.Land Use Issue on Avenue (Shaman property), the proposed borrow pit for fill for the dam site: This land has been zoned light-industrial by the Peace River Regional District (PRRD). After the $14 Million purchase by BCHPA,the use would potentially become heavy-industrial with all of
7 March 28, 2019 D-1
its inherent impacts on the surrounding community. i.e. noise, dust, traffic, etc. This needs to be mitigated to the satisfaction of the neighboring property owners. Also this sale has removed 27 light industrial properties from the local real estate market right when the Regional community is on the cusp of extraordinary expansion in the gas sector. As a mitigation measure it is requested that the proponent replace these 27 lots in a location that is compatible with PRRD’sland use bylaws. Secondly, as another mitigation measure there needs to be a bond posted (accessible by Electoral Area C)that would provide full rehabilitation of this site so that it is useable for future light industrial or residential purposes. This action would take place immediately after the site is not required for dam construction purposes.
13.MUSEUM: Our Heritage River, the oldest Caucasian habitations, Rocky Mountain Fort (1794) and Rocky Mountain Portage Fort (1805), the steamship landing areas, ancient archeological sites, and colonial history need to be permanently celebrated. As a mitigation measure, it is requested that the proponent be responsible for the capital cost and operating costs of a world class museum. (To be located within Area C)for the duration of the proposed Site C dam. Location, focus and themes of the proposed museum would be undertaken by a management committee consisting of the local Historical Society, the Curator of the Simon Fraser Museum and the Provincial Ministry responsible for Museums. As a note aside, the former Minister of Education, A. J. Brummet, MLAfor Peace River North requested this facility in a letter to BCUCin 1981.
14.Expropriation threats and procedures: Residents inside and outside the proposed pondage have been or will be subject to expropriation threats and procedures. The passive land acquisition program has not been very passive according to Mr. Roy Kelly’spresentation in Dawson Creek on January 8, 2014. These forces have been in place since 1957. It is suggested that this has stymied growth and development in the valley and surrounding area. This is an ugly vehicle of convenience used by Government authorities over people who through no fault of their own are very negatively impacted by this power. It is all of the people of the
March 28, 82019 D-1
valley who have lived this threat for the past 50+ years with no recognition or compensation for this silent but omnipresent cloud over their lives. This needs to be addressed in a meaningful manner.
15. Specific course curriculum on food production: As mitigation it is requested that the Panel recommend to the Premier of BCthat a specific course curriculum on food production (agriculture/horticulture) be mandatory at the primary, elementary and senior school levels. In a small way this will serve to educate future generations about the importance of BC’sriver valleys and their food producing capabilities. NOTE:Less than Y4of 1% of BC’spopulation is currently engaged and has knowledge of larger scale food production.
16.Reservoir rehabilitation: It is doubtful that much can be accomplished in the rehabilitation of the valley after the pondage is no longer useable. It is requested that an annual reserve fund be incorporated by legislation into the operating budget for Site Cfor the duration of the dam. It will be necessary to develop methods to undertake rehabilitation for the drained reservoir prior to commencement of construction.
17.Weed control: an annual budget needs to be developed to ensure that the pondage and its impact areas are managed to control or eliminate noxious weeds.
18.Recreation: As a small mitigation measure, it is requested that the Province enact a Provincial Park Status over fractional N1/2 of theSl/2 19-83-18 W6M. This site is a vacant piece of Crown Land that is locally known as the Peace View Point or Old Fort View Point. It is a very high use recreation area. It is located at the south end of th100 Street and provides for a spectacular view of the Peace Valley. It is currently an unregulated site of Vacant Crown Land. This request would be in addition to enhanced public access to the reservoir after it is safe.
9 March 28, 2019 D-1
19.North Peace Leisure Pool: This Regional District recreation facility located within the City of Fort St. John is at its half-life. This facility will be requiring replacement in 12 years. This facility is jointly funded by Electoral Areas Band Cand the City of Fort St. John. Replacement and capital funding will be a challenge for our communities. It is requested that BCHPAbe engaged in providing a minimum of 50% of the capital funding at the time of replacement, in recognition of the impacts that the construction phase of Site C will have on our Regional Facility.
It is requested that all of these mitigation requests complete with contractual agreements and committed funding be in place, prior to the issuance of an Environmental Assessment Certificate.
Factors that are not mitigatable:
o losses to agriculture & horticulture o loss of the land to farms, ranches and residents o the loss of the river recreational experience o loss to river fisheries o loss of wildlife habitat o loss of river history, archaeology and paleontology
This is a modest attempt to recognize the need for mitigation effects for proposed Site C.
10 March 28, 2019 SUMMARY Arthur Director Sincerely, initiated funds near inadequate. arrangements the In contingency ensuring the Environmental If suggested community must Peace As industry suggestion overcome Furthermore be the addition followed Director effects PRRD future. be decision for A Region. of Hadland by placed and that the would as Area by I of that the of needs An This believe for up its the requested becoming the our proposed Area need is Assessment It citizens option first by ones potentially C a to need will is projected demands Region’s moratorium to the the continue C to that before need that be I significant scrutiny is be have constituents of March 28, 2019 a Site mitigation addressed. the the five in will Area to mitigation overloading and Certificate. any expenditures real C. place, current there consideration be year undoubtedly be and C. logistics power addressed 11 concerns extra placed prior industrial needs items overview of These governance concerns Area financial project impact to of on and to and that the this cumulative of by surface. this C be tsunami by corresponding growth a and her development. issuance my written project. are unto District resources BCUC. process. model citizens their constituents fully Fully the imposed of effects material Municipality neighbours for of addressed the It Peace committed This to is in an Area natural my contractual the cope Area have would over will earlier and very C D-1 with is with C who been the be gas plans of then a D-1
ADDENDUM
Social Licence on the part of BCHPAis sadly lacking. A social licence may include inclusiveness, accommodations, adhering to the principles of stewardship, responsibility, commitment to the long term welfare of impacted communities, acceptance, openness and transparency. The population of the Valley’s rural community has been devastated and demoralized by 57 years of the shadow of BCHPA’sflooding plans. The Hudson’s Hope community has shrunk from a population of 1400 in 1978 down to present day population of 970. Sid Parker (former mayor of Revelstoke) visited our Peace Region in July 2010. In in a talk July 12 he confirmed that BCHydro devastated his community and the surrounding rural areas when the Columbia River was flooded. This is also captured very well in Laurie Dressier’s research on the genesis of the WACBennett Dam. (Reference: Designs for Disciplines An Introduction to Academic Writing, 2003, Harnessing of the Peace: Economic and Environmental Themes Amid Public Responses to the Construction of the Bennett Dam, 1957- 1968, page 253)
I will iterate that the Proponent has not earned social licence • Area C Director was excluded from participation in the April 19, 2010 grand announcement ceremony • Area C Director was initially excluded from the ‘Regional Government Liaison Committee’ process • Purpose of proposed Site C has shifted 5 times in 3 years • In 1976 the Peace region was threatened with blackouts and brownouts if
Site Cwas not built (did not happen) • Exclusion of Site Cfrom BCUCoversight • Approximately $1/2 Billionwas spent to justify the project with virtually NO resources allocated to the other side of the story • Polling of the uninformed used to justify the project • Refusal to provide Trust Funding for the last 50 years for the existing WAC Bennett and Peace Canyon completed projects • Marginalizing the future value & utility of high quality farmland within the valley
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• Unwillingness to recognize the negative aspects of cumulative impacts on the valley, it’s resources and people • Fiscal irresponsibility— How can BCHPAand its ratepayers have a debt of $70 Billion? • The unwillingness to recognize and respect community planning processes Reference is made to PRRDBy-law 1870, 2009 which enacts the North Peace Fringe Area Official Community Plan. The purpose of this plan is to provide a general statement of the existing and proposed land use and service requirements in the areas covered by the Plan. It is important to note that nowhere in the Plan is there reference to heavy industrial use associated with hydro-electric dam or inundation. Rather there are strong statements supporting agriculture (3.1) and recognizing the Peace River as a proclaimed ‘Heritage River’ in support of Stewardship of the River (Policy 10.3.15). This document has been signed off by The Ministry of Community and Rural Development. While it is recognized that the Act governing BCHPAactivity gives the agency precedence over Regional Law (seesection32,BCHPA). It is the writer’s contention that the non-involvement of the Site C proponents in the Regional land use planning process demonstrates a lack of a social licence on the part of the proponent.
13 March 28, 2019 D-1 BC Hydro CEO admits $70 billion obligation July 4, 2013
Responding to Arthur Hadland, during a public discussion at a Fort St John Chamber of Commerce meeting on June 18, BCHydro CEO Charles Reid confirmed that in total the corporation owed almost $70 billion: $15 billion in longterm debt, $4.5 billion in deferral accounts, and some $50 billion in future contractual obligations. He defended the position saying, deferral accounts represent borrowings to finance current projects (such as smart meters and Demand Side Management) which are expected to be paid back out of revenue from the corporation’s customers. The contractual obligations mainly consist of guaranteed commitments to Independent Power Producers (IPP). These obligations do not appear on the books of either BCHydro or the provincial government. The debt, Reid said, was secured by $100 billion of assets. However, as these assets show up on the 2012 Annual Report as assets of a mere $21 billion. It would appear he is citing a replacement cost—hardly an asset. According to BCHydro’s 2012 financial statements: net income was $558 million from total revenues of $4.7 billion; $230 million was paid to the provincial government. http://islandtides.com/assets/reprint/bchydro_20130704.pdf
______Debt not okay: Hadland
Gaven Crites Photo Charles Reid, BC Hydro president, speaks to a room of people gathered at the Stonebridge Hotel in Fort St. John June 18.
June 19, 2013 Gaven Crites BC Hydro’s $14 billion debt was criticized in Fort St. John yesterday when the president of the public electric utility company was speaking at the invitation of the Fort St. John Chamber of Commerce.
Charles Reid, president of BC Hydro, spoke about the company and gave an update on their ongoing projects in the area, including the Site C dam.
Arthur Hadland, Peace River Regional District Area C director, asked Reid about the debt following Reid’s speech to close to 50 people in a room at the Stonebridge Hotel.
“I feel that debt, especially with a public utility, is not a good thing,” Hadland said. “If the organization is looking after business, and we have that much debt, I don’t think business is being looked at that well.”
Reid said it was a difficult question to answer.
March 28, 2019 D-1 “It’s my opinion that our asset base is worth well over $100 billion, so is $14 billion of debt on an asset base of that size badly leveraged? I’m not sure,” Reid said.
He said BC Hydro is working with the province on debt reduction and the company has to borrow money to pay a dividend to the province, which doesn’t help the debt situation.
“What we’re doing with the debt, we’re investing,” Reid added. “We’re investing in B.C. We’re investing in the asset.”
Hadland said he didn’t buy Reid’s argument.
“That was an accountant speaking,” Hadland said. “Debt is not okay. It’s not okay in your household, and especially if it’s our public utility.”
Reid also talked about the Site C dam project. He said it’s currently under a very rigorous environmental assessment process and he wouldn’t comment on whether he is confident it will get final approval from the province.
“I believe in my heart that we need this,” Reid said of Site C. “We’re doing lots of work on that. That has to go to fruition and we have to get a ruling. I’m just optimistic generally. I’m hopeful. Our people have done a great job on that and we’ve put together a very good case from the environmental point of view. Once that decision is reached, it’s entirely up to the province. It’s not our call. “
The proposed dam and hydroelectric generating station on the Peace River has been a contentious issue in the Northeast for many years. Many residents, organizations and First Nations oppose the project on both environmental and economic grounds. Reid said Site C is a big project, so it’s bound to attract many points of view.
“You’re going to have your supporters and you’re going to have your opponents,” he said. “We face this on a smaller scale with transmission lines that impact people. We face this with almost every single project we work on. What we try to do is look at a balanced, fair way. You can’t totally mitigate everything. We do our best. It’s more of a social thing where we’re trying to do things for the greater good. There may be some individuals impacted. Well, let’s try to make that as less impactful as we possibly can. We really work on that.”
Reid also spoke about a change in BC Hydro’s philosophy with doing business with different communities and stakeholders.
“I was very pleased to hear the philosophy is changing,” said Mayor Lori Ackerman, who attended the luncheon. “Their philosophy is now to leave communities better off. We’re used to working with the petroleum producers and the pipeline companies – those who are involved in the oil and gas industry. As communities, working with those companies, there are ups and downs, the bad and the ugly, but on the whole, we have a good relationship with those organizations and entities. So, it’s nice to see Hydro has taken that same approach to leave communities better off.”
Reid said the $7.9 billion price tag for Site C has not changed.
March 28, 2019 D-1 “As far as we’re concerned, that’s the number,” he said. “The majority of the time, when we work on our capital projects, we are at or below budget. Occasionally you might get one that’s outside that, but that’s usually ones we don’t spend so much up-front work on. We’ve done a tremendous amount of up-front work on Site C. So, I’m very confident in the number.” http://www.alaskahighwaynews.ca/article/20130619/FORTSTJOHN0101/130619922/-1/fortstjohn/debt-not- okay-hadland
March 28, 2019