ISSUE BRIEF 05.10.19 The Status Quo, Extremism, and Reform: The Many Faces of Religious Authority in

Yusuf Sarfati, Ph.D., Illinois State University

Shortly after Turkey’s government started despite being a lay figure. This authority a military offensive into Afrin in Northern stems from a combination of his public Syria on January 2018, the Friday sermons— performance of piety, charisma, status prepared by the Turkish state religious as a graduate of Imam Hatip school (state authority Diyanet and read in every mosque religious high school), and political clout in the country—emphasized the religious as the leader of an Islamist party. Yet significance of “conquest” and asked the it is significant to note that an equally congregation to pray for the soldiers. Under large portion of survey respondents successive Justice and Development Party (42 percent) do not trust Erdogan as a (AKP) governments, the political religious authority, showing the widespread between Turkey’s official religious authority polarization around him. and its ruling Islamist party has been crafted Nihat Hatipoglu, a religious scholar, on a range of issues, from supporting academician, and popular television military incursions to fighting smoking personality, follows Erdogan in popularity or welcoming Syrian refugees. In such an with 31 percent of public trust. Mehmet environment where politics and religion are Görmez, the former head of Diyanet deeply intertwined, the power dynamics (the Directorate of Religious Affairs) between various religious actors and the commands the trust of 21 percent of the influence these actors enjoy among Turkish population, while Hayrettin Karaman, the Turkish President citizens as sources of religious authority most popular religious scholar among AKP can inform public debates about the role of circles, is trusted only by 11 percent of the Recep Tayyip Erdogan religion in politics. The religious sphere in respondents. İhsan Eliaçık, a writer and commands the trust Turkey is highly contested. activist who embraces a reformist Islamic of 40 percent of position and openly challenges the AKP, respondents as a commands 16 percent of the public’s trust religious authority, SURVEY FINDINGS as a religious authority. Fethullah Gülen is the least trusted Turkish religious figure, despite being a In a survey of 1,972 Turkish citizens, with 4 percent of survey respondents lay figure. described in detail in a previous country declaring their trust in him, and a whopping report (http://bit.ly/2HIMMpL), we 77 percent claiming that they do not trust examined religious authority in Turkey. The him at all, the highest distrust score. This is survey was part of a larger Baker Institute not surprising, as Gülen’s Hizmet movement study on religious authority in the Middle is completely securitized by the government East (https://bit.ly/2WfoqXT). The findings and the opposition alike, particularly after show that Turkish President Recep Tayyip the failed 2016 coup attempt for which it is Erdogan commands the trust of 40 percent held responsible. of respondents as a religious authority, RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 05.10.19

TABLE 1 — TRUST IN RELIGIOUS AUTHORITIES Erol Erol Gülen Gülen Tayeb Eliaçık Eliaçık Khaled Görmez Erdoğan Karaman Nasrallah Baghdadi Qaradawi Hatipoğlu Ghannouchi

1 (Do not trust at all) 26% 33% 29% 32% 31% 77% 34% 28% 27% 28% 37% 58% 27%

2 8% 9% 8% 9% 11% 3% 6% 6% 6% 6% 7% 3% 5%

3 13% 13% 11% 16% 16% 4% 7% 5% 6% 6% 6% 4% 7%

4 9% 12% 7% 12% 14% 2% 5% 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 5%

5 (Completely trust) 7% 28% 4% 9% 17% 2% 4% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 4%

Don't know this person 37% 5% 40% 22% 10% 13% 44% 56% 56% 55% 46% 32% 51%

SOURCE Author’s analysis

this finding, a survey conducted in 2014 by RELIGION AND THE STATE KONDA shows that AKP supporters declared With regard to the relationship between the highest level of trust in the Diyanet as Islamist actors and the state, Turkey a source of religious authority compared to diverges from other surveyed Arab supporters of other political parties (Helsinki countries in certain ways that might affect Yurttaşlar Derneği 2014). perceptions of religious figures. As Brown (2017) states, Islamist movements are commonly seen as oppositional forces vis- RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM à-vis the state religious establishment in the The survey results also carry important Arab world. State religious officials typically implications on religious extremism in paint Islamists as politically motivated actors Turkey. The leader of the Islamic State (IS), who distort the “true meaning” of religion, Due to Islamist control Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, is the least trusted thereby positioning themselves against among the 14 figures included in the survey. of the state, we observe political Islam. In Turkey, however, the The fact that he is trusted by a mere 3 a notable overlap AKP’s rise to government in 2002 shifted percent of the respondents is encouraging between official Islam religious dynamics significantly. The Diyanet, and shows the very limited public appeal and political Islam the state body tasked with administering of IS in Turkey. At the moment, the ruling religious affairs in Turkey, not only expanded in Turkey. AKP and the Diyanet appear to be the most in size but also became more conservative significant mainstream alternative to the in its religious interpretations and embraced extremist ideology of IS in Turkey. an Islamist approach to religion. Currently, Some of the religious youth disgruntled the agency employs 117,000 people, and by the AKP’s statist Islam are more drawn its budget has increased fourfold since to IS (Celik 2019). The Diyanet spearheaded 2006 (The Economist 2018). Thus, due to efforts to combat the appeal of IS by Islamist control of the state, we observe publishing reports and circulating sermons a notable overlap between official Islam that condemned the group’s ideology and and political Islam in Turkey. The positive Islamic credentials (Demir and Koru 2016). correlation (0.613, p<.0001) between trust Thus, the argument goes, the United States’ in Erdogan and trust in Görmez, the former continued engagement and cooperation head of the Diyanet, illustrates the close with the AKP government and the state public association between Islamists and religious establishment as allies is key to official state religious discourse. In line with preventing the spread of IS’ extremist 2 THE STATUS QUO, EXTREMISM, AND REFORM: THE MANY FACES OF RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY IN TURKEY

ideology in Turkey. This cooperation has from a religious perspective. In the past important security implications, considering decade, worker’s rights movements, youth the accelerated bombing campaign initiated groups, Islamic feminist organizations, and by the group in Turkey in 2016-2017. human rights groups coalesced around However, Turkey’s involvement in the Syrian İhsan Eliaçık—an Islamic scholar with a civil war exposes a different undercurrent: reformist view of Islam. Eliaçık’s Islamic the appeal that some extremist religious interpretations are tolerant toward religious ideologies enjoy in the country. The spread minorities, embrace a liberal take on of the Syrian civil war to Turkey—coupled freedom of expression, support democracy, with the Turkish government’s logistical and challenge the statist, intolerant, and support to particular jihadist groups, such majoritarian discourse of pro-AKP religious as the now rebranded Al-Nusra Front, at figures. Our survey results confirm that different times during the conflict—along Eliaçık’s democratic interpretations with these groups’ easy access to existing have some resonance in Turkish society. Salafi networks within the country Respondents who are more likely to trust Instrumentalizing might have boosted jihadists’ ability to Eliaçık as a religious authority are more evangelical Christianity propagandize and recruit from within Turkey comfortable with the idea of their children in U.S. foreign policy (Stein 2016). The Janus-faced relationship marrying non-Muslims (i.e., more tolerant of the AKP toward religious extremism of other religions), more gender egalitarian, vis-Ã-vis Turkey is constitutes the crux of the issue. On one more likely to think there are multiple ways strategically damaging. hand, U.S. foreign policy needs to form to interpret Islam, and more likely to think cooperative relations with the AKP in order that “despite its flaws, democracy is the to fight IS inside and outside of Turkey. On best political system” than respondents who the other hand, the U.S. needs to use its declared trust in Erdogan and other pro-AKP leverage over Turkey to curtail the AKP’s religious figures. alliance with jihadist currents in Syria and A direct implication of this finding is that to act more firmly against their recruitment the issue of democracy in Turkey cannot networks within Turkey. be properly understood in the context of a secular-religious divide. Religious human rights associations such as the RELIGIOUS REFORMISTS Hak Initiative and Islamic women’s rights organizations like the Muslim Initiative The AKP’s relationship with extremism is not Against Violence Toward Women espouse the only nexus in Turkey’s religious politics. a pluralist and democratic position in line The AKP is unquestionably a hegemonic with Eliaçık’s reformist religious teachings; actor in the country’s religiopolitical sphere; therefore, they should be seen as potential Erdogan personifies this religious influence partners in efforts to promote democracy. as the party’s uncontested leader. Not only In particular, at a time when Turkey is does the party control the state religious experiencing anti-democratic policies and establishment and religious schools, it has widespread human rights violations such as also co-opted most of the country’s Islamic the arbitrary detention of Kurdish activists, civil society organizations by incorporating arrests of journalists, and the purge of civil them in the party’s patronage network. servants and academicians, support for Due to the AKP’s hegemonic position, such organizations is critical. In this context, scholarship on religious politics in Turkey these organizations might appeal to pious has overly focused on the AKP and until Turkish constituents in a way that secular recently the Gülen movement—or the civil society organizations would not. latter’s conflict with the AKP—without While partnering with reformist Islamic commensurate attention to alternative organizations is desirable, instrumentalizing religious interpretations that might evangelical Christianity in U.S. foreign policy challenge the AKP’s authoritarian and vis-à-vis Turkey is strategically damaging. nationalist Islamism. Of particular interest This became most apparent during the are reformist groups that challenge the AKP imprisonment of American pastor Andrew 3 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 05.10.19

Brunson. Rather than framing Brunson’s and Asia and provides religious services imprisonment in the broader context of to Muslim communities abroad, while human rights violations and grouping him the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination together with other U.S. citizens jailed in Agency (TIKA) aims to restore Ottoman Turkey, the Trump administration explicitly heritage sites worldwide (Tol 2018). called Brunson a “man of faith” and used In addition to its activism in religious its attempts to free him to appeal to its soft diplomacy, the most distinguishable evangelical base during the U.S. 2018 aspect of the AKP’s foreign policy in the midterm (Banks 2018). Framing aftermath of the Arab uprisings is its direct the U.S.-Turkey bilateral relationship as and indirect support of mainstream Islamist a “religious conflict” between Islam and movements. The AKP, together with Qatar, Christianity would surely backfire and acts as the patron of political Islam in an aggravate the broadly shared anti-American attempt to challenge Saudi Arabia’s regional sentiment among Turks. This type of hegemony (Yildirim and Ulrichsen 2018). In partisan backing of Christian religious figures countries across the region such as , would not only send the wrong signal to Egypt, Libya, Palestine, and Morocco, the Muslim citizens of the United States, but AKP supported Islamist parties to bolster also strengthen the AKP’s conspiracy-laced, its image as the leader of populist Islamic anti-American discourse amid widespread interests. The Turkish government became skepticism among the Turkish public of the primary ally of the Morsi government American meddling in regional affairs. Our during the reign of his Freedom and Justice Turkey’s championing survey findings confirm this sentiment, Party in Egypt, and also supported the of Islamist causes as 68% of the respondents claim they Muslim Brotherhood when the Egyptian clashes with the disapprove of U.S. intervention in the Middle state cracked down on the movement after hawkish approach East, while only 5% approve. the military takeover in 2013. During the brutal crackdown by the Al-Sisi government, embraced by the many Muslim Brotherhood members found Saudi-U.S. alliance RELIGION IN TURKEY’S FOREIGN refuge in Turkey and were granted asylum against any Islamist POLICY by a government friendly to their cause (Ahval 2019). This patronage of Islamism involvement in Middle The AKP government also incorporates was bolstered with Erdogan’s strong Islam into foreign policy, using “religious East politics. rebukes of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin soft power” in an attempt to “harness the Netanyahu’s policies toward Palestinians power of religious symbols and authority and of Trump’s decision to move the U.S. in the service of geopolitical objectives” embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. These (Mandaville and Hamid 2018, 2). Ahmet statements boosted Erdogan’s popularity Davutoglu’s ambitions to revive Turkey’s among significant segments of Arab publics. Ottoman-era glory and regional influence Our survey results confirm this, as Erdogan were put into policy when he served first as is the most trusted figure regionwide, foreign minister (2009-2014) then as prime commanding the trust of 36 percent of all minister (2014-2016) of successive AKP respondents in our survey of 12 countries governments. During this period, Turkey’s and passing all other Arab religious figures outreach to other Middle East countries in this category. and the Balkans extended. As part of this Turkey’s championing of Islamist religious diplomacy, the Diyanet has been causes clashes with the hawkish approach building mosques in various parts of the embraced by the Saudi-U.S. alliance against world, including Albania, Somalia, Sudan, any Islamist involvement in Middle East South Africa, and even the state of Maryland politics. However, it is imperative for U.S. in the U.S., and offering scholarships for policymakers to recognize that while most students to come to Turkey to study religion Islamists are currently facing repression in Imam Hatip schools and divinity faculties. and marginalization by their authoritarian Moreover, the Diyanet Foundation operates governments, they cannot be counted off offices in Latin America, Europe, Africa, as insignificant political actors, particularly 4 THE STATUS QUO, EXTREMISM, AND REFORM: THE MANY FACES OF RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY IN TURKEY

because they still enjoy legitimacy among Tol, Gonul. 2019. “Turkey’s Bid for Religious large segments of local populations relative Leadership: How the AKP uses Islamic to their authoritarian governments. When Soft Power.” Foreign Affairs, January 10, political opportunity structures change, and 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ Islamists reassert themselves in domestic articles/turkey/2019-01-10/turkeys- political scenes, Turkey’s close association bid-religious-leadership. with these groups can turn into an asset, as “United States and Turkey split over Muslim the U.S. inevitably will need to diplomatically Brotherhood.” Ahval, February 7, 2019. and politically engage with them. Yildirim, A.Kadir and Kristian Coates This report is part of Ulrichsen. 2018. “The Next Challengers a two-year project on of US Role in the Middle East.” The Hill, REFERENCES religious authority in June 25, 2018. https://thehill.com/ the Middle East. Banks, Adelle. 2018. “Pence, at religious opinion/international/393701-the- freedom summit, threatens Turkey over next-challengers-of-us-role-in-the- The study is generously detained US pastor.” National Catholic middle-east. supported by a grant Reporter, July 26, 2018. https://www. from the Henry Luce ncronline.org/news/politics/pence- Foundation. religious-freedom-summit-threatens- AUTHOR turkey-over-detained-us-pastor. Yusuf Sarfati, Ph.D., is an associate professor Brown, Nathan. 2017. Official Islam in the of politics and government at Illinois State Arab World: The Contest for Religious University, where he teaches comparative Authority. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie politics of the Middle East. Sarfati’s research Endowment for International Peace. interests revolve around religious politics, Celik, Ferhat. 2019. “İhsan Eliaçık: Din social movements, politics of culture and Devletin Emrinde.” Yeni Yaşam identity, and democratization. Sarfati Gazetesi, January 10, 2019. http://www. received an M.A. and a Ph.D. in political See more issue briefs at: yeniyasamgazetesi.info/din-devletin- www.bakerinstitute.org/issue-briefs science from the Ohio State University and emri-nde/. a B.A. in political science and international This publication was written by a Helsinki Yurttaşlar Derneği. 2014. Diyanet relations from Boğaziçi University. researcher (or researchers) who İşleri Başkanlığı Araştırması: Algılar, participated in a Baker Institute project. Memnuniyet, Beklentiler. Wherever feasible, this research is Hilmi, Demir, and Selim Koru. 2016. “The reviewed by outside experts before it is released. However, the views expressed Theological Battle between ISIL and the herein are those of the individual Turkish State.” War on the Rocks (blog), author(s), and do not necessarily May 4, 2016. https://warontherocks. represent the views of Rice University’s com/2016/05/the-theological-battle- Baker Institute for Public Policy. between-isil-and-the-turkish-state/. © 2019 Rice University’s Baker Institute Mandaville, Peter and Shadi Hamid. for Public Policy 2018. Islam as Statecraft: How Governments Use Religion in Foreign This material may be quoted or Policy. Washington, D.C.: Brookings reproduced without prior permission, Institution. https://www.brookings. provided appropriate credit is given to the author and Rice University’s Baker edu/research/islam-as-statecraft- Institute for Public Policy. how-governments-use-religion-in- foreign-policy/. Cite as: Stein, Aaron. 2016. Islamic State Networks Sarfati, Yusuf. 2019. The Status in Turkey: Recruitment for the Caliphate. Quo, Extremism, and Reform: The Many Faces of Religious Authority Washington, D.C.: Atlantic Council. in Turkey. Issue brief no. 05.10.19. The Economist. 2018. “Turkey’s religious Rice University’s Baker Institute for authority surrenders to political Islam,” Public Policy, Houston, Texas. January 18, 2018. 5