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Chapter 43 Electoral Statistics
CHAPTER 43 ELECTORAL STATISTICS 43.1 India is a constitutional democracy with a parliamentary system of government, and at the heart of the system is a commitment to hold regular, free and fair elections. These elections determine the composition of the Government, the membership of the two houses of parliament, the state and union territory legislative assemblies, and the Presidency and vice-presidency. Elections are conducted according to the constitutional provisions, supplemented by laws made by Parliament. The major laws are Representation of the People Act, 1950, which mainly deals with the preparation and revision of electoral rolls, the Representation of the People Act, 1951 which deals, in detail, with all aspects of conduct of elections and post election disputes. 43.2 The Election Commission of India is an autonomous, quasi-judiciary constitutional body of India. Its mission is to conduct free and fair elections in India. It was established on 25 January, 1950 under Article 324 of the Constitution of India. Since establishment of Election Commission of India, free and fair elections have been held at regular intervals as per the principles enshrined in the Constitution, Electoral Laws and System. The Constitution of India has vested in the Election Commission of India the superintendence, direction and control of the entire process for conduct of elections to Parliament and Legislature of every State and to the offices of President and Vice- President of India. The Election Commission is headed by the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners. There was just one Chief Election Commissioner till October, 1989. In 1989, two Election Commissioners were appointed, but were removed again in January 1990. -
Politics of Genocide
I THE BACKGROUND 2 1 WHY PUNJAB? Exit British, Enter Congress In 1849 the Sikh empire fell to the British army; it was the last of their conquests. Nearly a hundred years later when the British were about to relinquish India they were negotiating with three parties; namely the Congress Party largely supported by Hindus, the Muslim League representing the Muslims and the Akali Dal representing the Sikhs. Before 1849, the Satluj was the boundary between the kingdom of Maharaja Ranjit Singh and other Sikh states, such as Patiala (the largest and most influential), Nabha and Jind, Kapurthala, Faridkot, Kulcheter, Kalsia, Buria, Malerkotla (a Muslim state under Sikh protection). Territory under Sikh rulers stretched from the Peshawar to the Jamuna. Those below the Satluj were known as the Cis-Satluj states. 3 In these pre-independence negotiations, the Akalis, led by Master Tara Singh, represented the Sikhs residing in the territory which had once been Ranjit Singh’s kingdom; Yadavindra Singh, Maharaja of Patiala, spoke for the Cis- Satluj states. Because the Sikh population was thinly dispersed all over these areas, the Sikhs felt it was not possible to carve out an entirely separate Sikh state and had allied themselves with the Congress whose policy proclaimed its commitment to the concept of unilingual states with a federal structure and assured the Sikhs that “no future Constitution would be acceptable to the Congress that did not give full satisfaction to the Sikhs.” Gandhi supplemented this assurance by saying: “I ask you to accept my word and the resolution of the Congress that it will not betray a single individual, much less a community .. -
Growing Cleavages in India? Evidence from the Changing Structure of Electorates, 1962-2014
WID.world WORKING PAPER N° 2019/05 Growing Cleavages in India? Evidence from the Changing Structure of Electorates, 1962-2014 Abhijit Banerjee Amory Gethin Thomas Piketty March 2019 Growing Cleavages in India? Evidence from the Changing Structure of Electorates, 1962-2014 Abhijit Banerjee, Amory Gethin, Thomas Piketty* January 16, 2019 Abstract This paper combines surveys, election results and social spending data to document the long-run evolution of political cleavages in India. From a dominant- party system featuring the Indian National Congress as the main actor of the mediation of political conflicts, Indian politics have gradually come to include a number of smaller regionalist parties and, more recently, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). These changes coincide with the rise of religious divisions and the persistence of strong caste-based cleavages, while education, income and occupation play little role (controlling for caste) in determining voters’ choices. We find no evidence that India’s new party system has been associated with changes in social policy. While BJP-led states are generally characterized by a smaller social sector, switching to a party representing upper castes or upper classes has no significant effect on social spending. We interpret this as evidence that voters seem to be less driven by straightforward economic interests than by sectarian interests and cultural priorities. In India, as in many Western democracies, political conflicts have become increasingly focused on identity and religious-ethnic conflicts -
Constitutional Development in India
1 Department – Political Science and Human Rights Semester- B.A. 2nd Semester Paper- Indian Government and Politics Note- I do not claim the material provided hereunder as my intellectual property as this is the collection from the writings of different scholars uploaded on websites. I have just collected, edited and arranged articles in one file according to syllabus for the purpose of enriching the students for preparation of their exams during the lockdown period. Students can also use various online sources for better understanding. I expressed my heartfelt thanks to all the authors whose writings have been incorporated in preparing this material. Constitutional Development in India Constitution is the basic principles and laws of a nation, state, or social group that determine the powers and duties of the government and guarantee certain rights to the people in it. It is a written instrument embodying the rules of a political or social organization. It is a method in which a state or society is organized and sovereign power is distributed. A constitution is a set of fundamental principles according to which a state is constituted or governed. The Constitution specifies the basic allocation of power in a State and decides who gets to decide what the laws will be. The Constitution first defines how a Parliament will be organized and empowers the Parliament to decide the laws and policies. The Constitution sets some limitations on the Government as to what extent a Government can impose rules and policies on its citizen. These limits are fundamental in the sense that the Government may never trespass them. -
Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly
ARUNACHAL PRADESH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY ORIGIN AND GROWTH With the enactment of the NEFA Panchayat Raj Regulation (No.3 of 1967), the grounding for the Legislative Assembly of Arunachal Pradesh was prepared. This Regulation introduced a three-tier system: Gram Panchayat at the Village level, Anchal Samiti at the Block level and Zilla Parishad at the District level. An apex Advisory Body, known as the Agency Council with the Governor of Assam as its Chairman, came into being on 29th December, 1969. A step further in the direction was taken with the enactment of NEFA (Administration) Supplementary Regulation, 1971 (No. 4 of 1971) which provided for replacement of the Agency Council by Pradesh Council and appointment of five Counselors’, one from each District, who were in charge of various development departments. This Pradesh Council thus came into being on 2nd October, 1972. As a natural outcome, the demand for a Legislative Assembly was pressed in every sitting of the Pradesh Council which made the Union Government to send a study team to assess the standard of Parliamentary acumen attained by the people of Arunachal Pradesh. The Union Government, after studying all aspects of the matter, agreed to the demand of the people for a Legislative Assembly, and on 15 August 1975, the Pradesh Council was converted into the Provisional Legislative Assembly of the Union Territory with all the members of the Pradesh Council becoming members of the Provisional Legislative Assembly and the Councilors being given the rank of Ministers. STRUCTURE OF LEGISLATURE Arunachal Pradesh has unicameral Legislature ever since its inception. -
Twenty Eighth Report
CB-II (JCOP) No. JOINT COMMITTEE ON OFFICES OF PROFIT (SIXTEENTH LOK SABHA) TWENTY EIGHTH REPORT A Comprehensive Review of the Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1959-Way Forward. Presented to Lok Sabha on 09.08.2018 Laid in Rajya Sabha on 09.08.2018 LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT NEW DELHI August, 2018 / Sravana, 1940 (Saka) Price: ___ CONTENTS P~GE COMPOSITION OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON OFFICES OF PROFIT (iii) INTRODUCTION......................................................................... (v) REPORT A Comprehensive Review of the Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1959-Way Forward. APPENDICES APPENDIX-I Extracts of Minutes of the 69 Forty Ninth Sitting of the Joint Committee on Offices of Profit (Sixteenth Lok Sabha) held on 31.01.2018. APPENDIX-II Extracts of Minutes of the 71 Fifty Second Sitting of the Joint Committee on Offices of Profit (Sixteenth Lok Sabha) held on 07.06.2018. APPENDIX-Ill Extracts of the Minutes of 73 the Fifty Third Sitting of the Joint Committee on Offices of Profit (Sixteenth Lok Sabha) held on 25.07.2018 APPENDIX-IV Minutes of the Fifty ::=ourth 75 Sitting of the Joint Committee on Offices of Profit (Sixteenth Lok Sabha) held on 07.08.2018 COMPOSITION OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON OFFICES OF PROFII T (SIXTEENTH LOK SABHA) $ Shri Kalraj Mishra Chairperson MEMBERS LOK SABHA 2. Shri T. G. Venkatesh Babu 3. Adv. Sharad Bansode 4. Smt. Meenakashi Lekhi 5. Shri Bhagwant Maan 6. Shri M.K. Raghavan 7. Prof. Saugata Roy 8. Smt. Supriya Sule #9. Kunwar Pushpendra Singh Chandel #10. Shri Janardan Mishra RAJYA SABHA 11. Shri Manas Ranjan Bhunia 12. -
(A) Whether the Telecom Commission Has Decided to Authorise Private
305 Written Answers BHADRA 7.1913 (SAKA) Written Answers 306 (a) whether the Telecom Commission bers of the National Integration Council last has decided to authorise private firms to reconstituted in 1990 is enclosed. install and run telecom services in certain areas; (b) and (c). The matter is engaging the attention of the Government. (b) if so, the areas identified for instal- lation of new network/exchanges by private STATEMENT firms; Prime Minister (c) the firnis proposed to be authorised to develop the telecom services; and I. Union Ministers and Chief Ministers (d) whether the telegraph service is 1 . The Union Home Minister also proposed to be included in this pro- posal? 2. The Union Finance Minister THE DEPUTY MINISTER !N THE 3. The Union Minister for Human MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIC'>IS (SHRI Resources Development P. V. RANGAYYA NAIDU); (a) No. Sir. 4. The Unton Minister of Welfare (b) and (c). In view of (a) above, not applicable. 5. The Union Minister of Informa- tion & Broadcasting (c) No such proposal is under consid- eration. 6. Chief Ministers of all the States to and Union Territories which National Integration Council have 31 Legislatures as per list attached. 5063. SHRI SYED SHAHABUDDIN: Will the Minister of HOME AFFAIRS be pleased II. Leaders of National Parties recog- to state: nised by the Election Commission (a) the present composition of the 32. Shri Rajiv Gandhi, President, National Integration Council; Indian National Congress (b) whethertheGovernment propose to 33. Shri S.R. Bommai, President, reconstitute the Council; and Janata Dal (c) whether the Government propose to 34. -
How Do We Choose Our Identity? a Revealed Preference Approach Using Food Consumption
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES HOW DO WE CHOOSE OUR IDENTITY? A REVEALED PREFERENCE APPROACH USING FOOD CONSUMPTION David Atkin Eve Colson-Sihra Moses Shayo Working Paper 25693 http://www.nber.org/papers/w25693 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 March 2019 We thank Ben Deaner, Omer Karaduman, and Sumit Shinde for excellent research assistance. David Atkin thanks the Stanford Economics Department and SIEPR for their hospitality while writing this paper. Moses Shayo thanks the I-Core Program at the Israel Science Foundation (grant no. 1821/12) and the Falk Institute for financial support. We thank Roland Benabou, Jon Eguia, Armin Falk, David Genesove, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, Matthew Gentzkow, Ori Heffetz, Supreet Kaur, David Laitin, Edward Lazear, ShabanaMitra, SharunMukand, Salvatore Nunnari, Ran Shorrer, Katia Zhuravskaya, the editors and four anonymous referees, and many seminar participants for valuable comments. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer- reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications. © 2019 by David Atkin, Eve Colson-Sihra, and Moses Shayo. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. How Do We Choose Our Identity? A Revealed Preference Approach Using Food Consumption David Atkin, Eve Colson-Sihra, and Moses Shayo NBER Working Paper No. -
Achievements of 1St Year of 17Th Lok
1 Hkkjrh; laln PARLIAMENT OF INDIA 2 PREFACE Indian democracy is the largest working democracy in the world. The identity of our pluralistic society, democratic traditions and principles are deeply rooted in our culture. It is in the backdrop of this rich heritage that India had established itself as a democratic republic after its independence from the colonial rule in the preceding century. Parliament of India is the sanctum sanctorum of our democratic system. Being the symbol of our national unity and sovereignty, this august institution represents our diverse society. Our citizens actively participate in the sacred democratic processes through periodic elections and other democratic means. The elected representatives articulate their hopes and aspirations and through legislations, work diligently, for the national interest and welfare of the people. This keeps our democracy alive and vibrant. In fact, people’s faith in our vibrant democratic institutions depends greatly upon the effectiveness with which the proceedings of the House are conducted. The Chair and the Members, through their collective efforts, give voice to the matters of public importance. In fact, the Lower House, Lok Sabha, under the leadership and guidance of the Hon’ble Speaker, is pivotal to the fulfillment of national efforts for development and public welfare. The 17th Lok Sabha was constituted on 25 May 2019 and its first sitting was held on 17 June 2019. The Hon’ble Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi, moved the motion for election of Shri Om Birla as the new Speaker of the Lok Sabha on 19 June 2019, which was seconded by Shri Rajnath Singh. -
Do Socio-Economic Conditions Influence Dynastic Politics? Initial Evidence from the 16Th Lok Sabha of India
WORKING PAPER Do Socio-Economic Conditions Influence Dynastic Politics? Initial Evidence from the 16th Lok Sabha of India Ronald U. Mendoza AIM Rizalino S. Navarro Policy Center for Competitiveness Jan Fredrick P. Cruz AIM Rizalino S. Navarro Policy Center for Competitiveness Unnikrishnan Alungal MDM Batch 2014 AIM Stephen Zuellig Graduate School of Development Management RSN-PCC WORKING PAPER 15-011 ASIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT RIZALINO S. NAVARRO POLICY CENTER FOR COMPETITIVENESS WORKING PAPER Do Socio-Economic Conditions Influence Dynastic Politics? Initial Evidence from the 16th Lok Sabha of India Ronald U. Mendoza AIM Rizalino S. Navarro Policy Center for Competitiveness Jan Fredrick P. Cruz AIM Rizalino S. Navarro Policy Center for Competitiveness Unnikrishna Alungal MDM Batch 2014 AIM Stephen Zuellig Graduate School of Development Management AUGUST 2015 The authors would like to thank Dr. Sounil Choudhary of the University of Delhi; Dr. Kripa Ananthpur of the Madras Institute of Development Studies; Ms. Chandrika Bahadur of the Sustainable Development Solutions Network; Mr. Appu Lenin of the Jawaharlal Nehru University; and Mr. Siddharth Singh of the Centre for Research on Energy Security for helpful comments on an earlier draft. This working paper is a discussion draft in progress that is posted to stimulate discussion and critical comment. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Asian Institute of Management. Corresponding authors: Ronald U. Mendoza, AIM Rizalino S. Navarro Policy Center for Competitiveness Tel: +632-892-4011. Fax: +632-465-2863. E-mail: [email protected] Jan Fredrick P. Cruz, AIM Rizalino S. Navarro Policy Center for Competitiveness Tel: +632-892-4011. -
Federalism Versus Regional Control
Working paper Federalism versus Regional Control Implications for Groundwater Resource in India Sheetal Sekhri March 2011 Federalism versus Regional Control: Implications for Groundwater Resource in India ⇤ Sheetal Sekhri† Abstract Federal versus regional control over provision of resources can have di↵erent impli- cations for long run sustainability of natural resources. This paper examines the trade o↵ between short term growth and long term conservation incentives of elected legis- lators from regional and national political parties for groundwater provision. Regional legislators have a stronger incentive to promote regional growth, which can lead to a rapid decline of resource stocks. On the other hand, regional parties are limited to contesting elections from the region, and hence have stronger incentives to conserve re- sources for future periods. These two e↵ects can o↵set each other. This paper proposes and tests the hypothesis that under high cost of provision to the legislators, regional regimes can lead to conservation because they internalize inter-temporal externalities. I use nationally representative data on groundwater from India, and an increase in the cost of groundwater provision for the legislators induced by the reforms in the elec- tricity sector, to show that private competition induced in electricity sector leads to groundwater conservation under regional regimes. JEL Classifications: O12, O13, Q01, Q25, Q56, H54 ⇤I wish to thank Central Groundwater Board of India for providing the groundwater data. Sisir Debnath provided excellent research assistance. Funding from International Growth Centre, London School of Eco- nomics(Grant # RA-2009-11-029) is greatly acknowledged. †Email: [email protected] 1 Introduction There is a fundamental trade-o↵ between resource intensive development initiatives, and sustaining the stock of these resources. -
Divest from Destructive Rampal Coal Business
7th of April, 2017 To: Banks and Investors in NTPC and/or India Exim CC: Abdul Hamid, Honourable President of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh; Shri Pranab Mukherjee, President of India; Sheikh Hasina, Honourable Prime Minister of the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh; Shri Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of India; Anwar Hossain, Minister of Environment and Forest, Bangladesh; Abdullah Al Islam Jacob, Deputy Minister of Environment and Forest, Bangladesh; Moshiur Rahman Ranga, Minister of Rural Development & Co-operatives Division, Bangladesh; Nasrul Hamid, Minister of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources, Bangladesh; Md. Shahriar Alam, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bangladesh; Anisul Islam Mahmud, Minister of Water Resources, Bangladesh; Muhammad Nazrul Islam, State Minister of Water Resources, India; Prakash Javadekar, Minister of State with Independent Charge for Environment, Forest and Climate Change, India; Piyush Goyal , Minister of State with Independent Charge for Power, Coal, New and Renewable Energy and Mines, India; Y S Chowdary, Minister of State for Science and Technology, Earth Science, India; Krishan Pal Gurjar, Minister of State for Social Justice and Empowerment, India; Vijay Sampla, Minister of State for Social Justice & Empowerment, India; Uma Bharti, Minister of Water Resources, River Development and Ganga Rejuvenation, India; Thaawar Chand Gehlot, Minister of Social Justice and Empowerment, India; Maneka Gandhi, Minister of Women and Child Development, India; Ravi Shankar Prasad, Minister of Law and Justice and Electronics and Information Technology, India; Arun Jaitley, Minister of Finance, Corporate Affairs, Information & Broadcasting, India; Anant Geete, Minister of Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises, India Appeal signed by more than 70 NGOs: Divest from destructive Rampal coal business Dear Investors, We are writing to express our deep concern regarding the coal-fired power-plant at Rampal, Bangladesh, proposed by the Bangladesh India Friendship Power Company, just 10 km from the Sundarbans Reserve Forest.