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Curriculum Vitae March 2012 GEORGY EGOROV Curriculum Vitae March 2012 Dept. of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences Ph: +1‐847‐467‐2154 Kellogg School of Management Fax: +1‐847‐467‐1220 Northwestern University g‐[email protected] Academic positions 2010 – Assistant Professor of Managerial Economics, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University 2010 – Faculty Research Fellow, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 2009 – 2010 Senior Lecturer & Jacobs Scholar (tenure‐track), Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University Higher education 2005 – 2009 Ph.D. in Economics, Harvard University 2005 – 2008 M.A. in Economics, Harvard University 2001 – 2003 M.A. in Economics (cum laude), New Economic School, Moscow majors in Economic Policy, Finance, Managerial Economics 1996 – 2001 M.S. in Mathematics (summa cum laude), Moscow State University, Dept. of Mechanics and Mathematics Research interests Political economy, economic theory, game theory, organizational economics Teaching experience 2011 – Social Choice and Voting Models (graduate‐level) 2010 – Values and Crisis Decision‐Making (part‐time MBA program) Spring 2008 Economic Theory, Harvard University, TF for Profs. Oliver Hart and Roger Myerson Spring 2008 Game Theory in Economics, TF for Prof. Attila Ambrus 2006 – 2008 Contract Theory, Harvard University, TF for Prof. Philippe Aghion Fall 2004 Public Economics, State University of the Humanities (Moscow), Lecturer Winter 2004 Political Economy, NES, TF for Prof. Konstantin Sonin Fall 2003 Auction Theory, NES, TF for Prof. Konstantin Sonin Fall 2003 Public Economics, State University of the Humanities, TF for Prof. Konstantin Sonin Other employment and education 2007 – 2009 Research Assistant (Harvard, MIT, NBER) 2006 – 2009 Affiliate, the Institute for Quantitative Social Sciences (IQSS), Harvard University 2007 – Research Associate, CEFIR, Moscow 2003 – 2005 Junior Economist, CEFIR, Moscow 2003 – 2005 Research Assistant (New Economic School) Sept. 2004 Ronald Coase Institute Workshop, Tucson, AZ June 2004 15th Jerusalem Summer School in Economic Theory ‘The Economics of Risk Bearing,’ Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel June 2002 CIME Summer School ‘Real Methods in Complex and CR Geometry,’ Martina Franca, Italy Professional activities Referee American Economic Journal – Macroeconomics, American Economic Journal – Microeconomics, American Economic Review, American Political Science Review, Comparative Political Studies, Econometrica, Economic Journal, Economics of Governance, Economics of Transition, European Economic Review, Games and Economic Behavior, International Journal of Game Theory, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of European Economic Association, Journal of Political Economy, Journal of Politics, Public Choice, Oxford Economic Papers, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review of Economic Studies, Theoretical Economics Invited talks 2012: University of Illinois – Urbana‐Champaign, University of Oslo 2011: LSE, Warwick, Harvard‐MIT Applied Theory Workshop, Georgetown University, Stanford University 2010: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona), Harvard – MIT Positive Political Economy Workshop, George Mason University, Purdue University 2009: Harvard – MIT Positive Political Economy Workshop, Yale University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2008: Kellogg MEDS, Kellogg Political Economy seminar, Berkeley Positive Political Theory seminar Selected conference Wallis Conference on Political Economy (2011) presentations National Academy of Sciences Sackler Colloquium (2010), MOVE Workshop on Selection of Politicians (Barcelona, 2010) Determinants of Social Conflicts conference (Madrid, 2010) Political Economy in the Chicago Area conference (2009, 2010) Conference on Endogenous Institutions and Political Conflict (Berkeley, 2008,2011) Conference on Dynamic Political Economy (Princeton, 2008) Awards and honors 2009 New Economic School Alumni Association award 2007 Danieli Award, Harvard University, Department of Economics 2006 – 2007 Cox Fellowship, Harvard University 2005 – 2007 Harvard University Fellowship 2003 Best Student Paper, New Economic School 2000 – 2004 Research Grants of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research 1998 – 2001 Mayor of Moscow Fellowship for Distinguished Students 1995 2nd prize in International Soros Mathematical Olympiad Publications: peer‐reviewed • Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs (with Daron Acemoglu and Konstantin Sonin), forthcoming in American Economic Review. • Political Model of Social Evolution (with Daron Acemoglu and Konstantin Sonin), Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2011, 108(suppl. 4), 21292‐21296 • Political Selection and Persistence of Bad Governments (with Daron Acemoglu and Konstantin Sonin), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2010, 125(4): 1511‐1575. • Why Resource‐Poor Dictators Choose Freer Media: Theory and Evidence from Panel Data (with Sergei Guriev and Konstantin Sonin), American Political Science Review, 2009, 103(4), 645‐668. • Dictators and Their Viziers: Endogenizing Loyalty‐Competence Trade‐off (with Konstantin Sonin), Journal of the European Economic Association, October 2011, 9(5) 903‐930. • Coalition Formation in Non‐Democracies (with Daron Acemoglu and Konstantin Sonin), Review of Economic Studies, 2008, 75(4), 987‐1009. • Ramified Coverings over C2 and the Jacobian Conjecture (2004) Mathematical Notes, vol. 76, № 2, pp. 172– 182 (in Russian). • An Example of Five‐Sheeted Exotic Covering over C2 (2002) Mathematical Notes, vol. 71, № 4, pp. 532–547 (in Russian) Publications: other • Authoritarian Politics 101: Examples and Exercises (with Konstantin Sonin), The Political Economist (Newsletter of the Section on Political Economy, APSA), Winter 2011, XIII(2), pp. 2‐4. • Do Juntas Lead to Personal Rule? (with Daron Acemoglu and Konstantin Sonin), American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 99(2), 298‐303. • Commercial Litigation under Imperfect Information (2004) NES, Best Student Paper series Working papers • Markov Voting Equilibria: Theory and Applications (with Daron Acemoglu and Konstantin Sonin) • Endogenous Research Agendas (with Mattias Polborn) • Boycotts and (Self‐)Regulation in a Dynamic Game (with Bard Harstad) • The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non‐Democratic Succession (with Konstantin Sonin) • Political Accountability under Special Interest Politics • Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives (with Attila Ambrus) • Incumbency Advantages in Nondemocracies (with Konstantin Sonin) • Equilibrium Refinement in Dynamic Voting Games (with Daron Acemoglu and Konstantin Sonin) • A Political Theory of Populism (with Daron Acemoglu and Konstantin Sonin) Work in progress • Media Demand and Endogenous Polarization (with Mattias Polborn) • Political Competition without Elections (with Konstantin Sonin) • Endogenous Veto Power (with Daniel Diermeier and Konstantin Sonin) • Firms and Factions (with Daniel Diermeier and Timothy Feddersen) • Institutions, Innovation, and the Resource Curse (with Philippe Aghion and Erik Meyersson) • Electoral Threshold, Representation and Parties' Incentives to Form a Block (with Andrei Bremzen and Dmitry Shakin) • Electoral Mandate and Voting Behavior: Evidence from Russian State Duma (with Andrei Bremzen and Dmitry Shakin) .
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