The Alliance: Two-Party Cooperation in Practice How did Liberals and Social Democrats cope with the mechanics of alliance? Dick Newby examines the record.
The Alliance was a unique experiment. It had two individual seats and a single leadership team. Of all these requirements, arguably the most distinguishing features which are rare in British problematic was how to divide up the Parlia- politics and, in combination, unparalleled. mentary seats in the first place. In the spring of , when the SDP was in its infancy, it The first was that one of the partners, the did not have a national constituency organisa- SDP, was a new party. Born out of desperation tion. The Liberal Party, by comparison, had at by pro-European social democrats in the La- least some activists in the large majority of seats, bour Party, it tapped a vein of enthusiasm for a and even if few in number, they understand- new style of non-confrontational politics which ably often had a very strong attachment to the led tens of thousands of political neophytes – idea that a Liberal representative should fight the so-called ‘political virgins’ – to join a po- the seat. By the summer of , they also had litical party and, in many cases, devote a huge candidates in place. amount of effort to active politics. To establish The agreement on how the seats would be and maintain a new party in Britain is daunt- allocated was reached in October after ingly difficult. Even if you can generate an ini- six months of sometimes fraught discussion. It tial surge of enthusiasm and members, to main- stipulated that there should be rough parity in tain momentum under the first-past-the-post the number of seats fought by each party; that electoral system is incredibly hard. As the Green in any one region, the ratio of seats fought by Party found when it obtained % of the vote the parties should not be greater than :; and but no seats in the European Parliamen- that seats should not be ‘clustered’. A six-strong tary elections, members and activists drain away National Negotiating Team was established in the absence of tangible electoral success. from each Party, and the two teams were to In order to give itself a chance in electoral meet in a Joint Negotiating Group (JNG). My terms, the SDP, from the date of its launch, an- role was to act as the SDP official responsible nounced that it would cooperate with the Lib- for servicing this Group and for managing the eral Party, not least in sharing out the Parlia- progress of the negotiating process. mentary seats between the parties. As Bill The way in which the two parties tackled Rodgers explains elsewhere in this issue, his the negotiations reflected – to SDP eyes at least statement at the SDP’s launch press conference – a fundamental difference of approach on how that the SDP would seek to fight half the Par- to run a political party. We undertook an ex- liamentary seats, leaving the Liberals to fight tensive amount of research, coordinated by US the other half, was a spur-of-the-moment de- polling expert Sarah Horack, and with aca- cision, rather than the result of careful strate- demic input from Ivor Crewe, on the gic thought. This decision, more than any other winnability of each seat. Based on this work, single act, however, set the framework in which we ranked seats in each sub-regional negotiat- the two parties would work. For, as soon as ing unit and provided our national team mem- voters had been denied the opportunity to vote bers with a detailed negotiating brief. Local for the SDP in over seats, SDP leaders had members of the negotiating team were ex- to be able to say that a vote for a Liberal can- pected to take a lead from the national team didate in those seats was equivalent to a vote member, who was either an MP or a member for the SDP. This required a common mani- of the Steering Committee. On the Liberal side festo, a single campaign both nationally and in there had been considerable resistance to there
14 journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 being any national input at all and ), there would have been parity By mid-, David Owen had their national negotiators were of- between the parties. As we only won adopted a rather more pragmatic ten little more than observers. Local seats between us, it was hardly sur- view. After returning from Colches- whim often appeared to matter more prising that the Liberals had the ma- ter where I had been to explain why than objective judgement. jority ( to the SDP’s ). they couldn’t have joint selection, I The first negotiating meeting was Despite the success of the pre- explained to him in frustration that held in Maidstone on December ’ seats negotiations, it was clear we would win the nomination in , two months after the negoti- that such a national approach would any event. ‘Let them have joint se- ating framework had been agreed. not be acceptable again. Local Lib- lection then’ was his reply. The SDP negotiator was John eral associations had hated it from The process still required delicate Horam (now Conservative MP for the start and their national leader- negotiations to complete and Andy Orpington). I accompanied him. The ship had found it irritating and em- Ellis (now Liberal Secretary-Gen- Liberal national negotiator was barrassing to have to soothe the an- eral) and I were sent to several places Hugh Jones , the Party’s Secretary- noyance of associations and candi- to arbitrate. One particularly diffi- General. The day was frosty. So was the meeting. The Liberals were ex- tremely reluctant to cede any seat Having seen the final edit of the where they had any significant de- gree of organisation. Armed with our broadcast, John Harris returned to Cowley ranking list, we demanded what we Street claiming that it would be ‘either a believed to be a fair mixture of good and bad seats. The meeting broke up triumph or a disaster’. He was right. with little achieved. A similar pattern was followed in the handful of other meetings held before Christmas. dates in seats which were to be cult area was Kirklees, and Andy and It took an outburst from Bill fought by the SDP. On the SDP side I spent a tedious evening hearing Rodgers over the New Year, sus- there was also a recognition that a from representatives of the two par- pending the talks until a more con- national deal was politically ties why they should both fight structive attitude prevailed, to inject unachievable. Agreeing to devolve Dewsbury. As we left the splendours real momentum into the negotiat- negotiations to area party level was of Dewsbury’s Victorian town hall to ing process. As the year progressed, relatively easy for the SDP. The prob- return to the station, we walked my priority became how to ensure lem which quickly arose, and bedev- across the open market. One stall that rough parity of outcome was illed the whole of the process, was caught my eye. ‘Eat tripe, don’t talk achieved. Agreement was reached in the request from many SDP con- it!’ it proclaimed. Unfortunately this the JNG that the Liberals could re- stituencies to have joint selection of principle was not enforced during tain their top (‘golden’) seats and candidates by members of both par- the negotiations. that the SDP would then have two- ties living in the seat. There were two Following the acceptance of a thirds of the next (‘silver’) seats. variants of this option: joint ‘closed’ package of joint open selections Reaching this outcome was tricky, selection where a shortlist was drawn by the National Committee in July given the number of regional nego- from members of one party; and , the seats allocation was soon tiations which were taking place. I joint ‘open’ selection, where there completed. Although some seats regularly trudged up to Hugh Jones’ was a shortlist drawn from members had changed hands between the two dusty lair in the Liberal Party head- of both parties. David Owen, now elections, the SDP fought seats quarters (then part of the National SDP leader, saw both these devices in , only five fewer than in . Liberal Club) for a glass of wine, a – but particularly joint open selec- The two rounds of seat alloca- dry biscuit and careful consideration tion – as a threat to the selection of tion were unprecedented in British of the silver seat list (which he was Owenite candidates, and feared that politics. In one sense the process was not allowed to admit to his party SDP applicants would temper their a great success. The seats were allo- ever existed). All but seats were views to gain Liberal support. This cated on a broadly equal basis and allocated by August and, as the view was not assuaged when Parry the deal held across the country. (The September conferences approached, Mitchell – a textbook Owenite – two parties only fought each other Roy Jenkins and David Steel horse- won one of the first joint open se- in three seats in , where local traded the rest. lections in Salisbury, and I was given Liberal associations ignored the na- The gold-and-silver approach was the unenviable task of travelling the tional seats deal.) The unintended vindicated by the election re- length and breadth of the country consequence of the process, and one sults. They showed that if the Alliance explaining to local parties which which was anathema to the had won or more seats (our wanted joint selection that they Owenites, was that, by the end, in- working assumption during – could not have it. creasing numbers of activists were journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 15 questioning the need, and in some from failure. joint commissions established, nota- cases the viability, of the two parties General election campaigning bly the Fisher Commission on con- maintaining their separate existence. activity was arguably the least suc- stitutional reform, which again were There were a number of reasons for cessful area of Alliance cooperation. able to agree on both the framework this, not least the experience of fight- Although joint press conferences and detail of Alliance policy. No is- ing elections jointly on the ground. were held and joint party election sues of unacceptable policy differ- But the huge amount of additional broadcasts were produced, the na- ence emerged and, during the time spent in negotiating on seat al- tional campaigns of and , election, differences within the Alli- location and, in the case of many for different reasons, were unhappy ance had much more to do with per- SDP local parties, the need to have affairs. In , the greater popular- sonality than policy. an argument with the national party ity of David Steel compared to Roy The disaster occurred on defence about joint selection, led many ac- Jenkins led to the farce of the Ettrick policy. A joint commission produced tivists to see merger as the logical Bridge summit at which Jenkins was a report in June which said Brit- option. From my national standpoint, effectively replaced by Steel as leader ain should retain its independent de- the thought of having to organise a of the campaign only days before terrent and decide on a replacement third round of seat negotiations af- polling day. (or not) only when Polaris was com- ter was deeply depressing. In , Owen and Steel dis- ing to the end of its natural life – Just as the experience of the seat trusted both their professional party years later. David Owen vehe- negotiations led local activists and staff, and each other, to such an ex- mently rejected this suggestion, say- national figures to question the vi- tent that they excluded staff from ing that it was ‘the sort of fudging and ability of a continuing two-party al- election planning and ran virtually mudging’ he had left the Labour Party liance after , broadly similar independent campaigns. It was a to avoid. In response, and amid scenes considerations applied in three other recipe for confusion and produced of confusion, the Liberal Assembly at areas with a large national input, predictably confused results. Nowhere is Eastbourne in September namely Parliamentary byelections, was this lack of a coherent structure passed an anti-Alliance, unilateralist general election campaigning and demonstrated more clearly than in the motion. Although Steel and Owen policy formulation. area of party election broadcasts. Nei- patched up their relations, the East- Parliamentary byelections were ther leader would relinquish personal bourne vote was a godsend to the the oxygen of the Alliance, breathing control of the broadcasts to staff and Alliance’s opponents and demon- new vigour and support into third- so, when the campaign began, virtu- strated an inherent flaw in the Alli- party politics even in times of national ally no work had been done on them. ance. Nobody doubted that there was doldrums. From Warrington in John Pardoe and John Harris, joint a large majority of members of the to Greenwich in , SDP chairs of the day-to-day campaign two parties combined who opposed byelection organisation had benefited committee, were given responsibility unilateralism. The nature of the par- greatly from Liberal help. In at the last minute, leading to the pro- ties’ relationship and the segregation Warrington – the first ever SDP duction of the famous ‘rabbit’ broad- of their decision-making meant that byelection – Liverpool Liberals dra- cast which featured Rosie Barnes and this majority had no outlet through gooned by Trevor (‘the vote’) Jones her family’s pet. Having seen the fi- which to express itself. enthusiastically supported Roy nal edit of the broadcast, John Harris Six years after the Alliance was Jenkins. By the time of Greenwich, returned to Cowley Street claiming formed, the experience of negotiat- six years later, senior Liberal cam- that it would be ‘ either a triumph or ing the division of Parliamentary paigners such as Chris Rennard were a disaster’. He was right. Unfortu- seats, fighting byelections and na- fully integrated into SDP campaign nately it was not a triumph. All the tional elections and forming joint teams. Under the leadership of Alec campaign professionals involved with policy had led me to the firm con- McGivan, the SDP had introduced the election were convinced clusion that an independent SDP innovations into byelection cam- that such amateurism was crazy. It was neither politically necessary or paigns, not least the use of high-vol- helped fuel their support for merger. organisationally viable. Nothing that ume target mail shots. This had gained Policy was an area both of great has happened in the first decade of Liberal respect to the extent that large success and of the Alliance’s greatest the life of the Liberal Democrats has numbers of Liberal activists were pre- presentational disaster. The shaken that view. pared to travel and help as byelection Limehouse Declaration and other foot soldiers. Equally, SDP politicians, early SDP policy statements caused Dick (now Lord) Newby joined the SDP staff and activists regarded it as axi- no great Liberal alarm, and Shirley as Secretary to the Parliamentary Com- omatic that they would visit Liberal Williams and David Steel were able mittee in April . From October byelections. Both parties fairly quickly to launch a ‘A Fresh Start for Brit- until Easter when the Party merged realised that they both benefited ain’ document in the spring of with the Liberal Party, he was the Par- equally from byelection success, or, with the minimum of fuss. Further ty’s National Secretary. He now speaks as in Darlington, suffered equally joint statements were produced and in the Lords on Treasury issues.
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