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Metaphysics, Dialectic and the Categories Author(s): Stephen Menn Reviewed work(s): Source: Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 100e Année, No. 3, SIMMEL - LE PROBLÈME DU TEMPS HISTORIQUE (Juillet-Septembre 1995), pp. 311-337 Published by: Presses Universitaires de France Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40903425 . Accessed: 19/09/2012 10:40

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http://www.jstor.org ,Dialectic and the Categories

J'examinele statutet la fonctiondes Catégoriesdans la philosophied'Aris- tote.Le traitén'appartient ni à la philosophiepremière, ni mêmeà la philoso- phie tout court,mais à la dialectique.Il ne s'agit pas d'une « discussion dialectique» de l'être,mais plutôt de dialectiqueen tantque tel: ce traitéforme un ensembleavec les Topiques,qui a pour butd'aider le questionneurdans un débatdialectique à décidersi le termedonné peut tombersous la définitionpro- posée ou sous le genreproposé. Bien qu'il y ait un emploiphilosophique des Catégories,tout comme de la dialectiqueen général,l'opposition prétendue entre la théoriede la substancedes Catégorieset cellede la Métaphysiqueest fondée sur une méconnaissancedes buts différentsdes deux traités.

I examinethe status and function of theCategories in 'sphilosophy. The workdoes not belongto « firstphilosophy, » or indeedto philosophyat all, butto dialectic;not as a « dialecticaldiscussion » of ,but in thestrict sensethat it is intended,together with the , to helpthe dialectical dispu- tantto decidewhether a giventerm can fall undera proposeddefinition or a proposedgenus. Although the Categories, like dialecticin general,has uses in philosophicalargument, the supposed opposition between the accounts of subs- tancein theCategories and in theMetaphysics depends on a misunderstanding of the differentaims of the two works.

I

It is notoriouslydifficult to explainthe place of theCategories in Aris- totle'sphilosophy1. It is not obviouseither what subjectthe book is

1. I will assumethat the Categoriesis by Aristotle,and thatit is a singletreatise, although perhapsnot fullypreserved in its intendedform. But the title« Categories» has no autho-

Revuede Métaphysiqueet de Morale,N° 3/1995 311 StephenMenn supposedto be treatingor whatdiscipline it is supposedto belongto; but it is temptingto say thatit is aboutthe substances and otherkinds of beingsdiscussed in Chapters4-9, and, if so, it is temptingto say thatthe book is a contributionto « firstphilosophy », thatit is at least a sketch(if not a fullydeveloped treatment) of an answerto the same problemsAristotle will later treat in thecentral books of theMetaphy- sics. It is mostoften thought that Aristotle gives directly contrary theo- ries of substancein his early and later periods,maintaining in the Categoriesthat the primarysubstances are concreteindividuals like Socrates,and in MetaphysicsZ thatthe primarysubstances are forms likethe soul of Socrates.I willargue that this comparison and contrast betweenthe Categoriesand theMetaphysics rest on a basic misunders- tandingof Aristotle'saims in the Categories(and also of his aims in the Metaphysics).My aim is not to denythat there are contradictions betweenthe Categoriesand MetaphysicsZ, but to bringout the very differentkinds of inquiryto whichthese two worksbelong, and the differentpurposes Aristotle intends them to serve;while these texts may stillcontradict each other,they do so incidentally,on theirway toward answeringentirely different questions. I willstart by noting some reasons whythe Categoriescannot belong to firstphilosophy, and thenI will use thesereasons as a pointof departurefor determining what discipline theCategories does belongto, and whatfunction it servesin Aristotle's philosophy.I will returnin the last sectionto addressthe comparison betweenthe Categoriesand MetaphysicsZ, and to draw some morals for how to read the Metaphysics. The Categoriescannot belong to firstphilosophy for the same reason thatit cannotbelong to philosophyat all: it does not considercauses. First philosophyis the studyof « the firstcauses and principles» {MetaphysicsA 981b28-9,cp. T 1003a26-7).More generally, every branch of theoreticalphilosophy considers some range of ,and seeksthe causesof thesebeings: first philosophy seeks the causes of beingsuniver- sallyqua beings,while other disciplines seek the cause of someparticular genus(Metaphysics E 1025b3-10,cp. T 1003a21-32).All of thesetheore- ticalphilosophies are epistêmai,sciences, and we haveepistêmê of a thing onlywhen we knowits cause (PosteriorAnalytics 71b9-12). Even prac- tical and productivephilosophy seek to knowthe causes of the things rity(it is onlyone amongmany titles current in antiquity),and correspondsbadly to the contentof thetreatise; I willretain it heremerely for convenience. Although I believe, like mostscholars, that the Categoriesis an earlywork, I willnot restanything heavy on thisassumption.

312 Metaphysics,Dialectic and the Categories theystudy, these causes being our own actions2.But theCategories says nothingat all about causes,either directly or by implication.The word « cause » itselfoccurs only in thechapters on priorityand simultaneity (cc. 12-13),and onlyin a ratherincidental way; theonly explicit example of causalityin the Categoriesis thata man is « somehow» the cause of thetruth of the sentence« a man exists» (14bl8-22)3.The Catego- riesneither names nor gives instances of anyof thestandard four Aristo- teliankinds of causes. « Eidos » meansonly « species», and thereis no hinteither of PlatonicForms as causes or of Aristotelianhylomor- phism(« hulê» does not occur); thereis no mentioneither of natural teleologyor of anyother teleology. Nor doesAristotle consider the fourth kindof cause,the source of motion:although he givesan explicitclassi- ficationof motionsin c. 14, and uses bothkinesis and moreparticular motion-words elsewhere in the treatise,he consistentlyanalyzes kinesis as an attributeof a kinoumenon,and makesno mentionanywhere of a kinoun.Since the Categoriesdoes not studythe causes of any range of beings,it is not philosophy:even if it surveysthe differentkinds of beings(and thisis not its only,perhaps not its primary,concern), it is notfirst philosophy, because it does notconsider the causes of beings qua beings4. But if the Categoriesis neitherfirst philosophy, nor any otherkind of philosophy,what other discipline might it belongto? I proposeto

2. In thissense see EudemianEthics I 1216b16-25 (about both practical and productive sciences). 3. Aristotleremarks that A can be priorto B, eventhough neither A nor B can exist withoutthe other,if A is the cause of B's existing{Categories 14b 1 Off) . This mention of causalityis onlyincidental to Aristotle'sdiscussions of priority,coming as an after- thoughtafter he has mentionedfour main kinds of priority;but evenif he had said (as he does not)that causality as suchis one senseof priority,he stillwould not be offering a contributionto thescientific inquiry into the causes of a givenphenomenon: he would not be seekingthe causes of priority,and priorityis the subjectunder investigation. 4. I am unimpressedwith another reason that has beengiven why the Categories cannot be firstphilosophy: because, it is said, thistreatise dates froma periodwhen Aristotle didnot believe in a scienceof being,because he had notdiscovered that being is predicated pros hen.Even if Aristotlehad sucha period,the result would be merelythat first philo- sophywould be a scienceof thecauses of substances,and not also of thecauses of acci- dents:pros henpredication is invoked(as in MetaphysicsF2) onlyto allow accidentsto be treatedalongside substances; it comesinto play only once we assumethat we already havea universalscience of substance.(There is a thirdargument that the Categories cannot be aboutfirst philosophy: first philosophy is onlyabout things separate from matter, and the Categoriessays nothingabout such things.I thinkthis argument is sound,but the majorpremise is too controversialand I willnot relyon it here.This is consistentwith the assertionthat first philosophy is about causes of beingqua being:it is not about all causesof beingqua being,but only about those causes which are separatefrom matter. I will returnto some of theseissues briefly below.)

313 StephenMenn followthe ancient title The before-the-Topics,and to say thatthe Cate- gories,like the Topicsand the SophisticalRefutations, is a manualof theart of dialectic.The before-the-Topicsmay well have beenthe most widespreadtitle for the treatisein antiquity,before it was suppressed by systematizinglate ancient commentators ; and thereis somehope that thistitle will correspond to the actualcontents of the treatise,whereas Categoriesor On thegenera of beingcould coveronly Chapters 4-9 5. But beforeevaluating this description of theCategories, we mustunder- standwhat it implies;we mustnot confuseit witha muchless serious sensein whichthe Categories might be called« dialectical». We describe someextended passages of Aristotle'sscientific treatises (notably De Anima I, discussedbelow) as beingdialectical discussions of the subjectsthey teat(here, of thesoul), giving dialectical arguments for and againstvarious theses;these passages are not, of course,giving instruction in the art of dialectic,but ratherusing Aristotle's dialectical skill to teach(or to

5. I do notmean to hangtoo muchon thetitle, unlikely to be Aristotle'sown in any case. But thevulgate title « Categories» is a mistake,and supportsa falseinterpretation of the aim of the book. The differenttitles are discussedby ,In Categorias, p. 56-57,Simplicius, In Categorias,p. 15-16,with parallels in Elias, In Categorias,p. 132-133 and Olympiodorus,In Categorias,p. 22; thetitle Pro ton Topónis also mentionedby Simplicius,p. 379,with parallels at Elias, p. 241 and Ammonius,In Categorías,p. 14-15 (Porphyry,and Simpliciusin the earlierpassage, report this title as Pro tôn Topikôn). The evidenceis reviewedby MichaelFrede, « The Title,Unity and Authenticityof the AristotelianCategories », in hisEssays in Ancient Philosophy, Minneapolis, 1987, p. 17-21, who concludes,very plausibly, that Pro ton Topón or somethinglike it was the usual Hellenistictitle (on Frede'sp. 19,« Andronicus» in line6 is a mistakefor « Ammonius»). [Paul Moraux' ingeniousattempt to showthat the titleTa pro ton topónis the result of a post-Hellenisticmisunderstanding (Les listesanciennes des ouvrages d'Aristote, Louvain, 1951,p. 58-65)does notpersuade me. Morauxdoes nothave adequate ground to dismiss Simplicius'testimony that Andronicus argued against earlier writers who used thistitle, and thetexts which say that Herminus or Adrastusfavored this title do notsay thatthey werethe first to do so.] We couldmake the titles « [Ten]Categories » or « On theGenera of Being» applyonly by insisting that at leastcc. 10-15are an additionby a latereditor: but we have no rightto discard30 °7oof thetreatise to save a dubioustitle, a reckless procedurewhich (according to Simplicius,p. 379)goes back to Andronicus.The neo-Platonic commentatorsall rejectthe title The before-the-Topics:they insist that the treatise is an introductionnot just to dialectic,but to all of philosophy,and theywant the Categories to be readnot beforethe Topicsbut beforethe De Interpretationeand theother logical treatisesin thenow standard order (the Categories deals with terms, the withpropositions composed of twoterms, subsequent treatises with arguments composed of propositions;this marginalizes Categories cc. 10-15).Frede rightly rejects the view of the Categoriesas a logicof termsleading into the De Interpretatione,and noticesmany connectionsbetween the Categories and the Topics;but while he grantsthat it was « not completelymisguided to regardour treatiseas an introductionto the Topics», he also findsit « obvious» that« thisdoes not provide a trulyconvincing solution to theproblem of whatactually is thesubject matter of thistreatise and whetherit is a unifiedwork » (p. 20). Thisis notobvious, and I willargue that the Categories is in factto be interpreted as an introductionto the Topics.

314 Metaphysics,Dialectic and the Categories makediscoveries in) some otherscience. Likewise, it mightbe thought thatthe Categoriesis a dialecticaldiscussion of some subject(perhaps of being),using the art of dialecticto constructarguments about dialec- tical (perhaps the same problemsthat will be discussedmore rigorouslyin theMetaphysics), I am saying,by contrast,that the Cate- goriesteaches the art of dialecticby givingprinciples for constructing dialecticalarguments, no thatit uses the art of dialecticfor anything else; indeedI thinkit is falseto say thatthe Categoriesis a dialectical discussion,of beingor of anythingelse. A dialecticaldiscussion (like De AnimaI) shouldconsist of arguments,questions, dilemmas, and so on, all directedtoward a singleproblem; the Categories,by contrast, has verylittle argument of any kind,and simplylays down ruleson a widevariety of subjects,supported by examplesrather than by serious argument.This approach makes sense if theCategories is, likethe Topics or theSophistical Refutations, an encheiridionfor the dialectician to use in constructingarguments: the ultimate justification of therules is simply theirsuccess6. Dialectic,as Aristotledescribes it in theTopics, is thatart which enables us (whereverpossible) to refutethe proponentof some thesisout of his own answersto yes-noquestioning, and to avoid beingrefuted our- selves.The art of dialecticis not restrictedto any particularsubject- matter;the dialectician can formulatearguments about anything. If dia- lecticalarguments were scientific, then dialectic would be a scienceof everything,and therewould be no room for any otherscience7. But dialecticfails to be science,precisely in failingto graspthe causes of thethings it considers.Dialectical arguments address dialectical problems:

6. The Categoriesshares with the Topicsnot onlyits authoritarianismin laying down itsrules, but also a cheerfulwillingness to admitthat its rules have counterexamples. Both of thesefeatures are explained if the Categories has no scientificpretensions, and is intended simplyas a tool forthe dialectician; I willtry to showhow it is supposedto work.At thesame , the Categories is not a self-containedtreatise on dialectic,in theway that the Topicsand theSophistical Refutations are: it does not specificallyrefer to thecondi- tionsof debate,and itsrules are notformulated as imperativesto thedialectician, although (as we willsee) theyare easilyconverted into such imperatives. In myview, the Categories is notan autonomouspragmateia (it lacksan introductiondelimiting some subject of inves- tigation),but is simplya collectionof backgroundknowledge that the dialectician armed withthe Topicsmust presuppose ; in thisrespect it resemblesthe mini-« treatise » on the predicables,Topics 1,5-8. 7. Aristotle grantsthe inference« if thereis a scienceof everything,then there is no otherscience » at De PartibusAnimalium I 641a32-b4.(This doesn'timply that first philosophyis theonly science, because first philosophy is concernedonly with immaterial things;it studiesthe causes of all beings,but it does not studyall of theircauses. If firstphilosophy were simply ontology, it wouldbe impossibleto avoidthe conclusion that are no othersciences.)

315 StephenMenn dialecticalproblems are yes-noquestions, either of theform « is X Y or not? », or of theform « is Y thedefinition [or genus,or idion]of X or not? ». The dialecticiandoes notaddress questions of theform « whyis X Y? »8. The ultimateresult of a dialecticalinvestigation of everything wouldbe (at best)to be ableto classifythings correctly under their genera, and to haveright opinions about what attributes apply to thingsin diffe- rentplaces in thehierarchy, whithout knowing the causes why these attri- butesapply. By contrast,when science investigates the /zofr'-question « is X Y? », itis seekinga demonstrationthat X is Y (or non-Y):this demons- trationwill state the cause, and so itwill also answer the dioti question « why is X Y (or non-Y)?» A dialecticalargument may be a formallyvalid argu- mentfrom necessarily true premisses (one such argument, at Topics120b3-6, willbe discussedbelow), but it still does not prove an effectthrough its cause, and forthis reason it does notproduce epistêmê.

ii

But if dialecticalarguments do not produceepistêmê, what is their philosophicaluse ; and whatis theuse of the Categories,either for dia-

8. So Topics 1,4; thesample-problems Aristotle raises in the Topics confirmthat dialectical problemsask onlywhether and not whyY belongsto X. Dialecticis by (dialectical) the art whichenables us to refutethe proponentof a thesisout of his own answersto yes-no questioning,and to avoid being refutedourselves - whateverelse this art may turnout to know or to do. (The analysisof dialecticin termsof endoxa, given in the firstsentence of the Topics (100a 18-21),should not be overstressed:endoxa are simplywhat people willassent to when faced witha yes-noquestion, if theyhave no reason to believe that one answeror the otherwill favortheir side of an argument.Since thepremisses available to the dialectician are just whateverhis opponentassents to, naturallyhe needs to know how to constructan argumentfrom endoxa. I owe thispoint, perhapsobvious but widelyoverlooked, to Robin Smith.)Aristotle agrees with the Plato of the Sophistthat dialectic examines whether certain elementscan combinewith each otheror not, and thatit arrangesthings under their proper generaland species,by themethod of division.But Aristotledenies that this art gives scientific knowledge,either of the Forms (since thereare no Forms) or of anythingelse. As Aristotle arguesin PosteriorAnalytics II, the methodof divisioncannot demonstratewhat something is, because it does not statethe cause, as a scientificdefinition must. [Jacques Brunschwig, in his introductionto Aristote, Topiques I-IV (Paris, 1967), p. xxv, stressesthat dialectical problemsare yes-noquestions, and in n. 5 he notes the implicationthat why-questionsare not dialecticalproblems. But he adds thatthe question« whyis X Y? » can be reformulated to become a dialecticalproblem « is Z the cause of X's being Y? ». This is un-Aristotelian: the Topics givesno instanceof such a causal problem.Aristotle consistently assumes (as his methodrequires) that in a dialecticalproblem « is A B? », both A and B eitherfall under generaor are genera(or, if B is proposed as an idion or definition,that it includesa genus); this would not hold for « the cause of X's being Y ».]

316 Metaphysics,Dialectic and the Categories lecticor forphilosophy? The Topicstells us (101a36-b4)that dialectic can help the (would-be)scientist to discoverthe firstprinciples of his science.Aristotle is not thinkingof anythingvery mysterious here, and he is not attributingto dialecticthe powerto produceeither or epistêmê.The firstprinciples of a scienceinclude, especially, its defini- tions,and thewhole main body of the Topics(Books II-VII) is directed towarda methodfor testingproposed definitions9. Dialectic is useful in findingdefinitions, not because the dialectician as suchcan formulate a scientificallyadequate definition (he cannot),but because dialectic can helpto showus whatgenus to look fora thingunder, and wherewithin thisgenus to look; it does thischiefly by testingand refutingwrong generaand wrongdescriptions or definitionsof the thing. Althoughthe dialectician,as respondent,is called on onlyto answer yes-noquestions, and notquestions « whatis X? », Aristotlethinks that someonewho has theart of dialecticcan also offerdefinitions, not perfect definitionsbut definitionsthat avoid the kindsof faulta dialectician candetect. These (call them « dialecticaldefinitions ») areinfe- riorto the definitionsthat someone with the appropriatescience would give,but theystill have some value forscience10. Aristotle regards the kindof definitionscurrent in theAcademy (and preservedin thepseudo- PlatonicDefinitions) as being,at best,dialectical definitions: an example is thedefinition of virtueas « thebest disposition » of a thing{Defini- tions41 Idi). Aristotlecites this formula in EudemianEthics 11,1 (first at 1218b38)as a typicalexample of a definitionwhich does not teach

9. The rulesabout (Books II-III), genus(Book IV), and idion(Book V), give successivelystronger (but stillinsufficient) criteria that an accountmust satisfy in order to be a definition:Aristotle makes this point explicitly at the beginningof his account of definition{Topics VI 139a24-35;parallel in TopicsI 102b27-35).At thebeginning of his accountof genusand idion,Aristotle says thatthese « are elementsof [arguments] aboutdefinitions », but that« dialecticalarguer s rarelyinquire into them for their own sake» {TopicsIV 120bl3-15;see Brunschwig'snote ad locum).As Brunschwigsays, « the distinctionof the predicablesis the productof a methodicalanalysis of the conditions a definitionmust satisfy » (Aristote, TopiquesI-IV, p. xlix). 10. Aristotle describesthe kindof definitionsa dialecticianwould give, contrasting themwith scientific definitions (physical definitions, where the definiendumis a natural thing),at De AnimaI 403a29-bl6.Dialectical definitions do notcite the appropriate matter of thething, and so, althoughin somesense they state the form, they cannot give scientific knowledgeof it, sincethe formand matterof each kindof thingare correlative,and neithercan be knownwithout the other. These definitions apparently belong to theclass of definitionsdiscussed at the beginningof PosteriorAnalytics II, 10, which« signify but do not prove» (93b39-94al),since they do not statethe cause, e.g. the definition of thunderas « noisein theclouds » (94a7-8),contrasted with its scientific definition « noise of firebeing extinguished in the clouds » (94a5). 11,8 (93al4-bl4) argues thatthese imperfect definitions can giveus a startin lookingfor a scientificdefinition.

317 StephenMenu us ti esti,but stillhelps us to acquirescientific knowledge. Supposing thatmoral virtue is the best dispositionof the soul is like supposing that« Coriscusis the darkestman in themarket » (1220al9-20): « for we do not knowwhat either of these[virtue or Coriscus]is, but being in thiscondition is usefultowards knowing what they are » (a20-22)n. Supposingthat virtue or Coriscussatisfies such a descriptiondoes not tell us whator who theyare, but it tellsus whereto look for them (in themarket, in thegenus « disposition», or « psychicdisposition »), and howto recognizethem once we spotthem (it's thedarkest, the best). But dialecticgives us no morethan the (at best)true opinion that virtue is thebest disposition or thatCoriscus is thedarkest man in themarket: we stillhave to go look forourselves, and thisis not the task of dia- lectic.Nous, however it is supposedto comeabout, corresponds to seeing, and onlythis allows us to formulatea definitionexpressing what the thingis12. Fromthis sketch of how dialecticcontributes to philosophy,we can see moreparticularly what the Categories is supposedto contribute,first to dialecticand thusalso to philosophy.If I wantto establisha science of X, I mustfind out whatX is, and so I mustknow (or at leastopine truly)what genus X fallsunder: the scienceitself cannot deduce this knowledge,since it presupposesit. Dialectichelps by givingtests for whetherG can be thegenus of X. If we havean exhaustivelist of genera, and testsstrong enough to rule out everygenus that is not the genus of X, thenwe can discoverthe true genus of X by a processof elimina- tion. Once we have founda summumgenus for X, we can dividethis genusby its appropriate differentiae, in order to testwhich lower genera X is in (thisis theroyal Persian hunting method recommended at 235b-c):but firstwe need a list of possiblesumma genera, and tests

11. It is not entirelyclear what « being in this condition» is: I have supplied « suppo- sing » from 1218b37, but Aristotlehas no name for the conditionin the presentpassage (unlessit has disappearedinto the lacuna markedby Walzer-Mingayin the OCT). « Suppo- sing » may be too weak (even in the earlier passage, where we « suppose » that virtue is the best disposition,we are also told that this is clear from« induction»). But Aristotle may be deliberatelyavoiding « knowing» as too strong: we cannot know that Coriscus is the darkest man in the marketplaceuntil we know who Coriscus is (and who else is in the marketplace). 12. In all this, Aristotleis followingthe Meno: knowingwhat virtueis and knowing what virtueis like are compared to knowingwho Meno or Coriscus is and knowingwhat he is like. Both Plato and Aristotleapparently share the same solution: we can startwith a trueopinion about thepoion (obtained perhapsfrom authority or endoxa, or by refuting all otherpossibilities), and then, withthis opinion as a guide, we can go look and obtain knowledgeof the ti, and therebyalso of the poion.

318 Metaphysics,Dialectic and the Categories forwhether X can belongto each of them.It is thebusiness of dialectic to classifythings under their genera, but the Topicsby itselfis notsuffi- cientfor this purpose. Its testsfor whether X can fall undergenus G all presupposethat we are alreadyfamiliar with G; to applymany of thesetests, we mustknow whether G has a contrary,or anyof theother threekinds of opposites,and sometimeswhether it receivesmore and less13.Further, if G is not itselfa summumgenus, the Topicstells us to check whetherthe generasuperior to G apply to X {Topics IV 122a3-30),and, in particular,whether X and G fallunder the same cate- gory(120b36-121a9); similarly, in problemswhich are notexplicitly about genera,as whetherX and Y are the same, we can be asked to check whetherthey are in the same (VII 152a37-38).All thesetests presupposethat we alreadyknow how to findwhich category any given termbelongs to. In TopicsI Aristotleexplains the different things the dialectician must knowbefore he can applythe particular argument-forms given in Topics II-VII, including« thethings which arguments are composedof and which deductionsare about» {TopicsI 101M4-15etc.). Theseare definitions, idia, generaand accidents,which Aristotle distinguishes and explainsin Topics1,4-8; « but afterthis we mustdistinguish the gene tôn katêgo- riôn [i.e. the categories]in whichthese four occur » (1,9 103b20-21). Topics1,9 consequentlygives a listof theten categories (with examples of termsin someof them),information we willneed (alongside the defi- nitionsof « definition», « genus» etc.)to applythe procedures of Topics II-VII14.But we cannotuse thislist of categoriesunless we can deter- minewhich category a giventerm belongs to: a failureto do thisaccura- telymay leave us at a loss foran argument,or allowus to be victimized by sophisms.Indeed, Aristotle boasts in SophisticalRefutations 22 that « since we possessthe genê ton katêgoriôn» (178a4-5),he can solve

13. TopicsIV is devotedto testsfor whether G can be the genusof X. The testat 127b18-25 tells us to checkwhether G admitsmore and less,but X failsto; 123bl-124a9 givesa seriesof testsbased on checkingthe contraries of X and G; 124a35-b34goes syste- maticallythrough the other three kinds of opposites,the privation, the negation, and the correlative. 14. It maybe true(as arguedby Frede, « Categoriesin Aristotle», in his Essaysin AncientPhilosophy, p. 29-48)that Topics1,9 relieson a theoryof categoriesas kinds of predication,rather than as kindsof being(so thatin thesentence « whiteis a color», « color» wouldnot be a ,since it is predicatedin //esti) ; but the Topicsclearly also relieson a Categories-liketheory of categoriesas kindsof beings(this is presupposed by thetests I have cited,and indeedis also presupposedby Topics1,9). It is true,but irrelevant,that the Topicsdoes not use « category» as a technicalterm for these kinds of being:neither does the so-calledCategories.

319 StephenMenn sophismsof « figureof speech» thatarise when the poion is expressedas ifit wereposon or viceversa, the poioun as ifit werepaschon or thedia- keimenonas if it werepoioun {cf. 166b10- 19). Aristotlegives here the exampleof seeing [horan], which is expressedby an activeverb and so seems to be an instanceof poiein, but is in factan instanceof paschein: someone whomaintains a thesisabout seeing can be apparentlyrefuted by a ques- tionerarguing from principles about poiein ' therespondent can avoid admit- tingdefeat, and can persuadethe spectators that he has not reallybeen refuted,only if he can recognizethat seeing belongs to a differentcate- gory.To solvesuch sophisms, or to findthe appropriate arguments himself as questioner,the dialectician needs tests for when a termfalls under some category.Neither Topics 1,9 nor 22 givesuch tests: theypresuppose that we have alreadystudied the Categories. We can best make senseof the structureof the Categories,and of manyof its particularpoints, if we regardit as a manualfor testing termsproposed in dialecticalargument. Many particular rules in thetext, whichmake no senseas partof a programof ontology,make excellent senseas supplyingthe needsof a dialecticianarmed with the Topics. Oftenthey serve to supplyinformation which some passage in theTopics clearlypresupposes, but whichthe Topicsitself nowhere supplies, and we can inferthat the Topicsis presupposingthe Categories', even where thisis notthe case, featuresof thetext that would otherwise be neglected as insignificantcan be seen to have a clear functionin instructingthe readerin the art of dialectic. To beginwith, we can makesense of thefirst chapters of thebook15.

15. For the Greek commentators,the « antepredicamental» and « postpredicamental» materialare an embarrassingexcrescence (as we have seen,Andronicus suggested that cc. 10-15 were an editorialaddition by someone who wanted to connectthe book withthe Topics). The commentators'usual view is that Aristotleis simplyexplaining terms he uses in the main body of the text,i.e. the discussionof the categories; he puts termslike « parony- mous » at the beginning,since otherwisewe would not know what the word means and would be unable to followthe discussionof the categories; he can safelyput off « prior» and « motion» to the end, since we have at least a rough idea what these mean and can read the text withouthaving them defined,although we will profitby more precise discussions (so AmmoniusIn Categorías, p. 14). It is difficultto explain in detail how these discussionsare supposed to help clarifythe central text, and it is all too obvious that the discussionsat least in cc. 10-i 5 are of the same generalnature as the discussions in cc. 5-9. More recently,Frede has suggested(Essays in Ancient Philosophy, p. 23-24) that the treatiseis a series of studies of homonyms,these homonymsbeing just « subs- tance », « quality», « motion» and the like; so thata chapteron homonymsand synonyms and paronymswould be needed as an introduction.Frede himselfseems not to take this suggestiontoo seriously; indeed, Frede apparently thinks that, while the parallel with Metaphy- sics A shows that Aristotledid have a single purpose that would lead him to encompass all these topics in a single treatise,we can no longer tell what that purpose was (ibid.).

320 Metaphysics,Dialectic and the Categories

If X is proposedin a dialecticalthesis, we wanttests for putting it in itsappropriate category, so thatwe can determinewhat genera and other attributesit has. But not everyterm is in a category,and c. 1 and the beginningof c. 2 (lal-19) givepreliminary tests for determining whether X fallsinto a categoryat all. Onlythings said « withoutcombination » signifya beingin one of the categories(c. 4 lb25-27),and so we must check(c. 2 lai 6-19) whethera proposedexpression involves combina- tion. Even if it does not, it may not fall underany genus,thus not underany category; so c. 1 givestests for whether X fallsunder a genus, and,if not, shows how to replaceit withsomething that does. Homonyms haveno generaor definitions,so if a homonymis proposedyou should seekclarification rather than risk debating at cross-purposes(cf. Topics 1,15). Paronymsalso have no genera:grammatikos is neithera species of humanbeing nor a speciesof science,so you shouldlook for the genusof grammatikêinstead. Homonyms and paronymsare kindsof things,not kindsof words(the classichomonyms are the two Ajaxes, « homônumoiand havingequal courage» at Iliad XVII,720), but they are kindsof thingsonly as relatedto words:since a femalegrammarian is grammatikê,she is homonymouswith her art, though a malegramma- rian is paronymousfrom it. This distinctionwould be irrelevantto a studyof beingqua being,but it is importantto the dialecticianwho may have to determinewhat things are predicatedof grammatikosor grammatikê,or what theyin turnare predicatedof16. Whatfollows is neithera theoreticalstudy of the kindsof beingfor theirown sake, nor a surveyof the kindsof terms,but rathera survey of the kindsof beingthat a termmight signify, with rules for locating any giventerm17. First you musttest whether X is said of something

16. The exampleof the homonymousgrammatikê is fromthe Greekcommentators (Porphyry,In Categorías,p. 70, Ammonius,In Categorías,p. 23, Simplicius,In Catego- rías,p. 37; actuallythey say mousike). Aristotle says only that paronyms must differ in ptôsis, andat firstsight it is notobvious that the commentators are right in taking this as « ending» (andnot as somedeeper feature which might distinguish the abstract from the concrete femi- nine);but in factgrammatikê and grammatikêare a perfectcase of homonyms,i.e. things whichhave the same name but different logoi (different genera and differentiae,ifthey are thekind of things that have genera and differentiae).I will come back to thiscase presently. Fora useof paronymy indialectic, see Topics II 109b4-7and context. (The account of paronyms has nothingto do withthe doctrine that being is saidpros hen; paronymouspredication and predicationpros hen are twoentirely different phenomena, and mustnot be runtoge- ther,as byGünther Patzig in « Theologyand Ontologyin Aristotle'sMetaphysics », Arti- cles on Aristotle(Barnes et al. ed., ,1975), v. 3, p. 38ff.) 17. We can acceptthe formula of theGreek commentators that the book is not about beingsqua beings,but about lexeis (or phônai) sêmantikaikath'ho sêmantikai(Simplicius, In Categorías,p. 68-69,etc.). Of course,expressions are sêmantikaionly insofar as they

321 StephenMenn else or not, and whetherit is in somethingelse or not,just by seeing how it sounds:« hê grammatikêis en tô(i) grammatikô(i)» is correct, « ho grammatikosis grammatikê » is not.These tests are imperfect,since « grammatikê» is said of Aspasia(assuming she wrotePericles' funeral speech);in suchcases, where the abstract and theconcrete have the same name,further tests show that they are homonymous.As Aristotlesays, « of thingswhich are in a subject,in mostcases neitherthe namenor the logos is predicatedof the subject;nothing prevents the name from beingpredicated of the subjectin some cases, but for the logos it is impossible» (2a27-31)18.The logosof grammatikêwhich fails to be pre- dicatedof Aspasia is its definitioncomposed of genusand differentia, so we can furthertest grammatikê by checkingwhether its genusand differentiaare predicatedof Aspasia: thepoint of Categorieschapter 3 is not to teachtheoretical lessons about generaand differentiae,but to use themto discernwhich things are synonymouslysaid of a subject and whichare merelyin a subject(it is so applied,c. 5 2al9-34,3a9-28). Oncewe knowthat « X » is said withoutcombination and synonymously of the thingsin question,these tests allow us to determinewhat kind of thing« X » signifies. Chapters4 through9 elaboratethis system of classification.Each cate- gorycomes with a listof idia by whichit can be recognized,and this constitutesthe core of each chapter:these idia do not make sense as a contributionto studyingbeing qua being,but onlyas a contribution to dialectic.The rulethat substance should « signifysome this » (3b10) can give only a propertyof termsand not of a class of beings;the rulethat substances are said synonymously(never paronymously) of all thethings they are said of (3a33-34),even if it givesa propertyof things, givesa propertythat can be verifiedonly with reference to names.Like- signifybeings, and so they« taketheir differences » from the beings they signify (Porphyry, In Categorias,p. 58); thusthe investigation,while primarily about expressions,is also incidentallyabout the genera of beings(ibid.). But thecommentators do not seemto be interestedin the Categoriesas givingtests and rulesfor locating a giventerm; and, as we haveseen, they link the book to theDe Interpretationeand denyany special connection withthe Tooics. 18. Aristotle'sexample here is leukon,which he allowsto serveboth for the abstract « whiteness» and forthe neuter of theconcrete « white» : « theleukon, which is in the body,is predicatedof its subject(for a body [sòma,neuter] is called leukon),but the logosof leukonwill never be predicatedof thebody » (2a31-34);since the body and the colorshare a namebut not a logos,they are homonymous.The exampleof grammatikê wouldbe exactlyparallel. In thesecases, the thing in whichX existsis homonymouswith X ; in themajority of cases,it is paronymous; in a fewcases, it is neitherhomonymous norparonymous, as theman in whomaretê exists is calledspoudaios rather than aretaios or the like (Aristotle's example,Categories 10b5-9); but in no case is it synonymous.

322 Metaphysics,Dialectic and the Categories wise,the best idion of qualityis that« similarand dissimilarare said accordingto it » (Ilal8-19): thiscannot tell us anythingontologically aboutqualities (surely similarity will be definedin termsof quality,not vice versa),but simplygives a linguistictest for whetherX-ness is a quality:« if two thingsare X, wouldyou say thatthey are homoial ». Besidesthese linguistic tests, the Categoriesis obsessivelythorough in listingwhether items in each categoryhave contrariesand whetherthey receivemore or less (and muchof the discussionof relativesis about anotherkind of opposite,the correlative): this feature of theCategories, otherwiseinexplicable, corresponds to the Topics'obsession with contra- ries(and withother opposites and degrees),and givesus theinformation we need to applythe Topics' testsfor whethera givenX fallsunder the proposedcategory. If we understandthe classificatoryfunction of the idia of each cate- gory,we can avoid some difficultiesthat resultfrom taking them as metaphysicaltheses. If the Categoriesis « at heart a contentious work»19, setting out a personal,and perhapsanti-Platonic, metaphy- sicalposition, then it is embarrassing,first that there are no details(acci- dentsdepend on substances,but how are differentkinds of accidents relatedto eachother? how are individual and universalaccidents related?), and,more seriously, that there are no arguments.The metaphysicalcontent of the Categoriesseems to reduceto the thesisthat « all otherthings are eithersaid of the primarysubstances as subjects,or are in them as subjects» (2a34-35),with its corollary that « if theprimary substances did notexist it wouldbe impossiblefor any of theother things to exist» (2b5-6).Since it was uncontroversialthat qualities and otheraccidents had to be in substancesin orderto exist20,the controversialmetaphy- sical contentreduces to theclaim that the species and generawhich are said of substancescould not existwithout the thingsthey are said of.

19. The quoteis fromFrank Lewis, Substance and Predicationin Aristotle,Cambridge, 1991,p. 13; Lewismeans that the Categories is an attackon thePlatonic theory of Forms. This seemsto be the currentopinio communis. 20. Plato, or course,recognized separate Ideas of qualitiessuch as justice.But Plato, and especiallyAristotle on Plato's behalf,call theIdeas ousiai,and Aristotletakes it as undisputedthat anything that exists separately (as theIdeas are said to) mustbe an . (AtMetaphysics A 990b22-991a8Aristotle has whatis apparentlya protest against positing substantialIdeas fornon-substantial participants.) No ancientphilosopher entertained the thoughtthat qualities could exist without inhering in substances(or whithoutthemselves beingsubstances); in Catholictheology the accidentsof the Eucharistiebread and wine are heldto subsist(by a miracle)without any substanceto supportthem, but as faras I knowthis is the onlycontext in whichit has everbeen maintainedthat accidents can existwithout substances.

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But Aristotleseems not to intendthis to be controversial.He givesno argumentfor the mainthesis that « all otherthings are eithersaid of theprimary substances as subjects,or are in themas subjects», beyond sayingthat this is « obviousfrom the particularexamples » (2a35-36, wherethe examplessay onlythat a genusor a universalaccident must be said of [be in] some particularsto be said of [be in] the species, 2a36-b3); and he givesno argumentat all that« if the primarysubs- tancesdid not existit wouldbe impossiblefor any of the otherthings to exist», treatingthis simply as an obviouscorollary. Aristotle's main interestis in thedisjunctive classification, not in thecorollary about depen- dence. The impressionthat he is makinga controversialmetaphysical claimmust come from supposing that he is arguingagainst Platonic Ideas ; but he is not. Aristotleconsistently reports it as Platonicdoctrine that Ideas are individuals(« the idea is a kath' hekaston,as theysay », MetaphysicsZ 1040a8-9),sharing a logos and not merelya namewith the corruptibles21;they are not themselvesthe universaisthe Platonists attemptto define,but fall under the same definitions with other things22.The dialecticianneeds terminology to distinguishuniversal defi- niendafrom the indivdualsubstances that fall underthe definitions, whetherthese individuals include Ideas or not; and Plato wouldsurely agreethat the second substance horse could not exist if there were neither individualmortal horses nor the individualIdea of horse23.Aristotle almostcertainly did not believein Ideas whenhe wrotethe Categories, and the Categoriesmay be usefulin arguingagainst Ideas (as against

21. Afteran argumentthat corruptibles and incorruptiblesmust be differentin genus,Aris- totleadds « so it is clear that therecannot be forms,such as some people say: for one man will be corruptibleand anotherincorruptible. But it is said that the formsare the same in species withthe particulars[tois tisi] and not homonymous; but thingswhich are different in genusdiffer more than things which are differentin species » (MetaphysicsI 1059a10- 14). 22. « It is not possible to defineany idea [...] why does none ot themgive a dehnition of an idea? If theytried it would be obvious that what we are sayingis true » (Metaphysics Z 1040a8, b2-4). At Topics VI 148a14-22 Aristotlerecommends arguing against Platonic definitionsby showingthat they do not apply to the Idea, as they cannot if they entail mortalityor motion. 23. Aristotlesays that the species and genera of primarysubstances are called second substances(2a 14-19), and explains why this way of speaking is reasonable (2b29-37): it looks as if he is using termsthat were standard,presumably in the Academy, as termino- logy of the art of definition,distinguishing the sense in which (say) soul is a substance from the sense in which (say) Socrates' soul is a substance. The only alternativeI can see is to treat deuterai quasi-adverbially,so that deuterai ousiai legontai at 2a 14 and its parallels would mean not « are called "second substances" », but « are, in a secondary way, called "substances" ». But Aristotledoes in fact call them deuterai ousiai (as at 2b7), and if deuteraiousiai legontaidoes mean « are called "second substances" », then I thinkit cannot be taken as introducingnew terms,but only as recallingestablished ones.

324 Metaphysics,Dialectic and the Categories anythingelse), but they are notat issuehere. When Aristotle does argue againstthe Ideas, he appliesa batteryof specificarguments, distinguis- hingthose claims about Ideas thatare impossiblefrom those that are too vaguelyexpressed or thosethat are simplyunproven; he does not thinkthat a singlesweeping observation is enoughto knockdown the theoryof Ideas, and thisis not the aim of his observationabout first and secondsubstances. The rulesof theCategories need not be immune to metaphysicalconsequences, but Aristotle'saim in layingthem down is to aid thedialectician, not to pushfor sectarian metaphysical positions. Besidesformal idia, Aristotle also giveslists of thehighest species within each category,and thesetoo providea disjunctiveidion for the category: as TopicsIV advises,« checkif whathas beenproposed to be in a genus cannotparticipate in any of its species:for it is impossiblefor it to participatein thegenus without participating in anyof thespecies, unless it is one of thespecies in thefirst division [of thegenus] ; thesepartici- pate onlyin the genus» (121a27-30).This explainsnot onlythe lists of speciesin each category,but also someof Categoriescc. 10-15.Here in TopicsIV (121a30-39)Aristotle gives the examplethat if motionis proposedas thegenus of pleasure,you shouldrun through the different speciesof motionto checkwhether pleasure can fallunder any of them (and you shouldconclude that it cannot).Motion will also frequently be proposedparonymously as an accidentof something,when it is said thatsomething is moved:here too you shouldrun through the species of motion(Topics II Illb4-ll, III 120a38-b3).But the Topicsdoes not give a list of the speciesof motion:this is basic informationthat the dialecticaldisputant should come prepared with, and is suppliedby Cate- goriesc. 1424.

24. Frede's onlystated reason for finding it « obvious» thatthe Categories is not an introductionto the Topicsis that« it is difficultto see how the notionsof motionand of havingare especiallyrelevant to dialectic;in the Topics,at any rate,they play no role » (Essays in Ancient Philosophy, p. 20). It should now be clear how the Categories' discussionof howmany kinds of motionthere are (and whattheir contraries are) functions in an introductionto the Topics.The conceptof motiondoes playa rolein the Topics; and thereis a properlydialectical study of motion,distinguished from the physical study of motionby the fact that it does notconsider the kinoun, and hencedoes notdistinguish naturalfrom violent motion. The role of Categoriesc. 15, on having,is less clear.But accordingto the last sentenceof the paralleltext Metaphysics A23, echeinand en tini einaiare said in correspondingways; and in dialectical(but not scientific)argument, we oftenhave to decidewhether one thingis in another:Topics IV 126a3-16tells us to test whetherY can be predicatedof X by checkingwhether X and Y are in thesame thing ; but the Topicshas givenno accountof being-in,of how manykinds it has, or of how to recognizeit, and maybe presupposingsomething like Categories c. 15. Perhapsa parallel to the last sentenceof MetaphysicsA23 has droppedoff the end of the Categories,or

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At an evenmore basic level,you cannotapply the procedures of the Topicsunless you knowhow to discoverand recognizeopposites, and to recognizewhat kinds of oppositesthese are. TopicsII saysthat « since the [kindsof] oppositionsare four» (113bl5), you shouldcheck each of them,but the Topicshas notitself given an accountof theseopposi- tions,and seemsto be relyinginstead on Categoriesc. 10, whichdistin- guishesthe kindsof oppositesand givestests for tellingthem apart. Categoriesc. 10 also givesrules for when contraries have an intermediate (12al-20), neededfor the testat TopicsIV 123bl2-18,and notesthat wherethis intermediate has no name it mustbe definedby negation (12a21-25),needed for the test at TopicsIV 123bl8-23;Categories c. 11 collectsrules for arguing about contraries. Similarly, although the Topics tellsus to checkfor priority and simultaneity(as in TopicsVI,4 passim), it givesno accounteither of how to recognizepriority and simultaneity, or of howmany kinds they come in: it presupposesthe account in Cate- goriescc. 12-13.

in

If we say thatthe Categoriesis a manualof principlesof dialectical reasoning,and thatit wouldreasonably be calledThe before-the-Topics, we do not implythat it is usefulonly for formaldialectical contests, or thatthe highest goal it servesis plausibleopinion rather than truth. Simpliciusobjects, against this title, that the treatise is presupposednot onlyby the Topicsbut by all of Aristotelianphilosophy (In Categorias, p. 15): theneo-Platonists maintain that the Categories is an introduction both to logic (alreadybroader than dialectic)and to philosophyas a whole(ibid., p. 13). But sincedialectical argument is neededto findthe principlesof the sciences,and sincethe Categoriesis neededto apply

perhaps it should simplybe understood. The ingeniousdialectical argumentsof 111,3and PhysicsIV,3 depend on generalprinciples about being-in,its divisioninto kinds, and (at Physics III 202a28-31) its correlationwith having. (Plato's Parmenides contains work toward a systematicdialectical study both of motion and of being-in.)

326 Metaphysics,Dialectic and the Categories the rulesof dialectic,the Categorieswill also be presupposedby the particularscientific treatises. Still, the Categoriesdoes not supplypre- missesto be used directlyin scientificargument: they will be used only in the preliminarywork of determiningwhat kind of thinga proposed is. This preliminarywork ends whenthe object is definedand (if necessary)divided into its kinds;once we knowwhat the objectis, properlyscientific work can begin25. It needsstressing that, for Aristotle, the argumentsused to place a proposedobject X in its propergenus G, and to excludeit fromincor- rectgenera, are merelydialectical and not scientific.An exampleis the argumentat theend of TopicsIII: we can refuteXenocrates' claim that thesoul is a numberby dividingnumber into its species: « everynumber is eitherodd or even; therefore,if the soul is neitherodd nor even, it is clearthat it is not a number» (120b4-6)26.The argumentis valid and its premissesare necessarilytrue, but it is not scientific,since it does notprove an effectfrom its causes: it is notbecause the soul cannot be eithereven nor odd thatit cannotbe a number,but vice versa.By

25. Theprinciples of theCategories are not used exclusively in problems« is G thegenus of X » or « is GD thedefinition of X » ; theycan also be usedfor other kinds of dialectical problems,although not directly for demonstrations. But the kinds of problemsI am discus- singhere are themost prominent uses of theCategories, or at leastof theprinciples about thecategories. Apart from these, the categories can be usedfor arguments about sameness and difference{Topics VII 152a37-38,cited above): X and Y cannotbe numericallyor speci- ficallyor genericallythe same if theyare in differentcategories. The categoriesalso have anotherconnection with sameness, in thatthey give different senses in whichX and Y might be thesame: they might be thesame: they might be thesame in substance{ta auta proper), or thesame in quality(homoia), quantity (isa), pros ti (proportionals:X is pros A as Y is pros B), place or time(if X and Y are not thesame in substance,Aristotle prefers to say,not that they are thesame, but they have attributes which are specificallythe same.) FromCategories 6a26-35 testing for quantity by isonkai anison,and Ilal5-19 testingfor qualityby homoion kai anomoion,it seemsthat the system of kindsof samenessand diffe- rencewas morefamiliar than the system of kindsof being.Very similarly, the categories givea systemof kindsof motionand rest,and are used in thisway in Categoriesc. 14, PhysicsV,2, and elsewhere.Systems of kindsof samenessand differenceand motionand restseem to be at workalready in Plato'sParmenides; the system of kindsof being(going beyondPlato's distinctionbetween substance and quality)may be, in part,the resultof Aristotle'sreflection on theseother systems. 26. Actuallyhere Aristotle wants to arguethat number is not even an accidentof soul. If numberwere the genus of soul,and if numbercan onlybe dividedby itsprimary differentiaeodd and even,and by otherswhich fall underthese, then soul would be eithera speciesof odd numberor a speciesof even number;so it would be enough forthe opponent to disprovethe claims « everysoul is odd » and « everysoul is even». To showthat number cannot belong to soul evenas an accident,we have to disprove theclaims « somesoul is odd » and « somesoul is even». I willignore these subtleties here.

327 StephenMenn askingthe questions« is the soul odd? » and « is the soul even?» in a dialecticalcontest, we mightshame our interlocutor into admitting that the soul is not evenor odd, and so we mightforce him to admitthat it is not a number;similarly, by arguingin theintroduction to a scien- tifictreatise that the soul is neithereven nor odd, we mightawaken in our readerthe recognition that the soul is just not the kindof thing to whichthese predicates could apply; but we cannotdemonstrate that the soul is not a numberbefore we discoverwhat kind of thingthe soul reallyis. If we alreadyknow that X is in genusG, we no longer need to apply Topics-styletests to excludeit fromother genera at the samelevel ; we mightapply such tests to excludeX fromincorrect species of G, butagain we do thisonly because we lack an adequateknowledge of whatX is, and once we discovera scientificdefinition of X theneed for such argumentsceases27. Aristotleuses dialecticalarguments in thisway especiallywhen he is tryingto establisha scienceof someX whosegenus is unclearand con- tested.The bestexample is soul: Aristotleassumes at the beginningof De Anima II thatthe soul is a substance,and goes on to investigate whatkind of substanceit is (it is substancenot as matteror composite, likea body,but rather as theform of a body,412al5-21); but on some of the opinionsthat Aristotle has discussedand refutedin De Anima I, soul would not be a substanceat all, but a quantityor qualityor motion.So Aristotlesays in thefirst chapter, in reviewingthe difficulties of the studyof the soul, that« it is doubtlessfirst necessary to divide in whichof the generaand whatit is, I mean whetherit is some this and ousia, or poion, or poson, or some otherof the categorieswhich havebeen distinguished » (402a23-26). Indeed, of theaccounts discussed in De AnimaI, 'opinion that the soul is a self-mo ved number wouldimply that the soul is a quantity,and so wouldthe doctrine that Aristotleextracts from the Timaeusand rejectsat 407a2ff,that the soul is a magnitude; similarly, the « doctrinepersuasive to many» (407b27-8)

27. It is strikingthat the -formof an argumentfrom exclusion (« everyB is C or D, no A is C, no A is D, thereforeno A is B » ; let A = soul, B = number,C = odd, D = even) cannot be reducedto one of the canonical formsof the .Aris- totle is not really tryingthere to give an account of all syllogism-forms,but only of all syllogism-formswhich might occur in a demonstration:this form,though valid and useful in dialectic, is non-demonstrative.This is connected with Aristotle's denial that proof by cases is demonstrative{Posterior Analytics I 74a25-32), since an argumentby exclusion is convertiblewith a proof by cases (« no odd numberis a soul, no even numberis a soul, thereforeno number is a soul »).

328 Metaphysics,Dialectic and the Categories thatthe soul is harmoniatis would imply that it is a quality;and Aris- totlerejects the doctrinethat the soul is composedof the elementsof all the thingsit knows,on the groundthat this would place the soul in all the categoriesat once (410al3-21).In thislast passageAristotle is usingan argument-formrecommended by the Topics(150a22-26); so also in arguingthat motion cannot belong to the soul in its essenceor definitionbecause it does notmeet even the weaker criteria for belonging as an accident(De Anima405b31ff, 409b Uff), in arguingthat the soul cannotbe movedbecause it cannotadmit any of thefour kinds of motion (406al2ff),and elsewherein De Anima I. ButAristotle's most interesting use of dialecticalarguments to exclude the soul fromincorrect categories comes not in the De Anima but in theEudemus, which, as an exotericdialogue, has no scientificpreten- sions,and uses onlydialectical arguments (where it is not usingmyths) to arguefor immortality28. It is naturalfor Aristotle to take the argu- mentsof thePhaedo (or of thepart before Socrates invokes causal inqui- riesin answeringCebes at 95e7ff) as hismodels for dialectical argument ; he followsthe Phaedo in particularin arguingagainst the objection that thesoul neednot be immortal,since it maybe a harmonyof thebody. In theEudemus Aristotle gave two arguments against this objection, both argumentsin standarddialectical forms, both turning on contraries.The moreimportant argument is the first,which says, as Philoponuscites it,« harmonyhas a contrary,disharmony; but the soul has no contrary; thereforethe sooul is not a harmony»29. This is a directapplication of therules of theTopics for arguing against the thesis « harmonybelongs to soul as its genus»: the argumentneeds only the generalprinciple « if B has a contraryand A does not, thenB does not belongto A as its genus» (cf. TopicsIV 123b30ff),and so it does not dependon anyprinciples about the categories. But as Jaegersaw 70 yearsago, the argumentis connectedwith the principleof the Categoriesthat subs-

28. Thus Elias says that Aristotleargues for the immortalityof the soul « by necessary argumentsin his acroamatic works, but with probability,by persuasive arguments[dia pithanôneikotôs { in some manuscriptseikotôn J], in his dialogues » {In Categorias,p. 114; Ross, AristotelisFragmenta Selecta, Eudemus Fr. 3). 29. The witnessesare collected in Ross, AristotelisFragmenta Selecta, under Eudemus Fr. 7. Only Philoponus is a direct witness to the Eudemus. Damascius (whom Ross wronglycalls Olympiodorus: see the introductionto v. 2 of L.G. Westerink, Greek Commentarieson Plato's Phaedo, Amsterdam, 1977) is lecturingon the Phaedo, and is simplygiving cross-referencesto parallel argumentsin the De Anima and Eudemus, which he has taken from some commentaryon the De Anima (see Westerink, v. 2, p. 208-211).

329 StephenMenn tanceshave no contraries,even though the Eudemus argument does not explicitlypresuppose that the soul is a substanceor invokeprinciples about substance-in-general30.But the readeror interlocutorwill accept the proposition« soul has no contrary» onlybecause he is implicitly awarethat the soul is a substance;and Aristotleis motivatedto argue thatthe soul is not a harmony,not becausehe is worriedspecifically aboutharmonies, but because the main arguments for immortality might be defeatedif the soul wereanything like a harmony,i.e. //it were a quality.By arguingdialectically that the soul is not a harmony,Aris- totlehopes to elicitthe recognition that the soul is not like a harmony in the relevantrespect, i.e. thatit is not the kindof thingwhich has a contrary,because it is a substanceand not a quality;this recognition will be equallyuseful in the introductionto a scienceof the soul, or in a non-scientificdiscussion of immortality. Whenwe see how the Eudemusargument is connected,on the one handwith its parallel in thePhaedo (93all-94b3),and on theother hand withthe Categories, we can drawconclusions not only about the Eudemus but also about the Categories.The Phaedo's argumentthat the soul is not a harmonyturns on the claimthat a bettersoul is no morea soul than a worsesoul (93b4-6,dl-2), althougha betterharmony is more a harmonythan a worseharmony: this is enoughto infer(by Topics IV 127bl8-25)that harmony is notthe genus of soul, sincea bettersoul wouldbe bothequally a soul (and thusequally a harmony),and a better harmony(and thus morea harmony),yielding a contradiction.Plato also arguesthat, since souls are capable of participatingin virtueand vice,and sincevice is a kindof disharmony,soul cannotbe a kindof harmony,since « a harmony,being perfectly just this, a harmony,would neverparticipate in disharmony» (94a2-4):the argumentis an applica- tion of the rule of Topics IV, « checkif what has been placed in a genusparticipates, or is capableof participating,in somethingcontrary to thegenus: for then the same thing will praticipate in contrariessimul-

30. Werner Jaeger, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his Development, tr. Robinson,Oxford, 1934, p. 40-44. While thereis much thatis dubious in Jaeger'saccount, G.E.L. Owen's unfaircriticism in « The Platonismof Aristotle» (reprintedin Owen, Logic, Science and Dialectic, Ithaca, 1986, p. 203-205) has caused Jaeger's genuine insightsto be neglected.Owen is wrong to suggest (p. 203) that Jaeger was relyingon Damascius (or « Olympiodorus»), who importsthe word « substance» into his summaryof Aris- totle's argument:Jaeger mentions this passage only incidentally(p. 44), and he does not take it for more than it is. Jaegersays, rightly,that Aristotle,like Plato in the Phaedo, is « implicitlypresupposing » that the soul is a substance (p. 41).

330 Metaphysics,Dialectic and the Categories taneously» (123a20-22)31.What is strikinghere is not that the argu- mentsfrom the Phaedo and theEudemus fit the patternsprescribed in Topics IV, but thatthey implicitly involve different idia of substance givenin theCategories, namely that substances have no contraries(Cate- gories3b24ff), that they do notreceive more and less (3b33ff),and that a singlesubstance is capableof contraryattributes (4al0ff)32. The argu- mentsfrom the Phaedo and Eudemuseach dependon our grantingthat the soul passesone of thesetests and thatharmony fails ; thesedialec- tical argumentsrely on our implicitawareness that the soul is a subs- tance,and theyhelp bringus to recognizethis explicitly. It is not quiteright to say thatthe Eudemus is an applicationof the Categories',the pointis ratherthat the Categories,like the Topics,is an attemptto abstractand formulateprinciples of dialecticalreasoning thatwere implicit in such worksas the Phaedo and Eudemus.It may not be too muchto suggestthat Aristotle worked out the threetests of substancewe have mentioned,precisely in reflectingon the Phaedo and in writingthe Eudemus: certainly these tests have applications outside psychology,but of all the standardobjects of discussion,it is the soul whosegenus is mostobscure, and whosesubstantiality most needs to be established,whether for scientific psychology or foran exotericdefense of immortality.Even if the testswere not firstelaborated for the case of soul, theyfit the soul perfectly,and Aristotlewas surelyaware of thiswhen he wrotethe Categories(perhaps in roughlythe same period of his careerthat he wrotethe Eudemus).So it is wrongto say that Aristotle'sprimary candidates for substance in theCategories were things like Socrates,and werereplaced by thingslike Socrates'soul onlyin MetaphysicsZ: Aristotlewrote the Categories' account of substancewith Socrates'soul in mind33,although he seemsnot to have believedin the

31. Note thatthe principle presupposed by Plato's argument(and by Aristotle'srule) is non-trivialand ratherdubious: Plato's claimis notjust thatno harmony-of-type-Xcan participatein disharmony-of-type-X,but that no harmony-of-type-Xcan participate in disharmony-of-type-Y . 32. Theseare all idia of substanceat least relativelyto quality(see TopicsV, 1 for theidea of a relativeidion). But the last is malistaidion of substance{Categories 4alO-ll): so it is legitimateto argue« thesoul is capableboth of virtueand of its contrary,vice ; thereforethe soul is a substance». The othertests do notafford such a directargument. 33. soul shouldpass the othertests for substance, although they do not seemto be designedto proveits substantiality. The only test it mightseem to failis « notin a subject» ; but « in a subject» meanshere « what,being in somethingnot as a part,is incapable of existingapart from the thing in whichit is » {Categoriesla24-25). If (as I have sug- gested)the Categoriesis roughlycontemporary with the Eudemus and Protrepticus,the soul willnot be in its bodyas in a subject,since it can existapart from the body (and is, presumably,a partof the compositeanimal). Anyway, admitting contrary attributes

331 StephenMenn

Categoriesthat the soul was the formof its body, or thatimmanent formsin generalwere one kindof substance34.Of coursethe Catego- riesdes notsay thatthe soul is a substance,sticking to suchuncontro- versialexamples as « man» and « horse»: thisis becausethe Categories is not a treatiseon ontology,but a manualof dialectic,collecting the generalprinciples arguer s use in classifyingthings. It is notthe function of the Categoriesto decidefor the scientistwhether some particularX is a substance;but the Categoriesshows the psychologist, or any other would-bescientist, how to make this decision.

IV

Giventhis analysis of the functionof the Categories,we can return to addressthe comparisonwith Metaphysics Z. Since the investigation in Z is philosophical(and specificallymetaphysical), it has entirelydiffe- rentaims fromthe non-causaland thereforenon-philosophical discus- sion of the Categories:as Aristotlesays, summarizing the projectof Z at thebeginning of H (1042a4-6),« we are seekingthe causes and princi- plesand elementsof substances». We are seekingthe causes of all beings universally,but all otherbeings depend on substancesfor their , so thecauses of substancewill be thecauses of all beings(Metaphysics

is malista idion, and is enough to prove that the soul is a substance. (Soul is mentioned in the Categoriesas the subject of grammarand othersciences (Ial5ff), indeed it is Aris- totle's firstexample of a subject. This text does not prove that Aristotleis thinkingof soul as a firstsubject not presentin any other subject; but certainlyhe gives no hint of any furthersubject beneath the soul.) 34. If this is right,then thereis an importantcontradiction between Aristotle s beliefs in the Categoriesand in the Metaphysics(and to thisextent I can agree withthe interpreta- tion of Aristotledescribed in the opening sentencesof this paper). But this contradiction is incidentalto the purposesof the Categories,and mustbe inferredmore fromAristotle's silences than from anythinghe says in the Categories; we are reduced to guessing. For what it is worth,my guess is that Aristotledid recognize immanentforms at the time of the Categories,but that he did not regardthem as substances,including them instead under the fourthspecies of qualities, schemata kai morphai (he avoids the word eidos in thiscontext because he is usingthis technically for universais): cf. PhysicsVI 1,3 (datable veryearly on othergrounds, and plausiblycontemporary with the Categories),which argues that change in the fourthspecies of quality is not alteration,on the ground that it is unqualifiedcoming-to-be. If immanentforms are qualities,then Aristotle cannot be regar- ding the soul as an immanentform.

332 Metaphysics,Dialectic and the Categories

A 1071al-2,34-35). The Categoriesdoes not investigatethe causes of being,but simplylists different kinds of beingsand givestests for reco- gnizingthem; and it does this,not becauseit is interestedin beingas such, but because any simpleterm that mightbe proposed(unless it is said homonymously)must signify some one of thesekinds of being. The treatisemay, of course,be usefulfor the metaphysician, in the same way thatit is usefulfor any otherkind of philosopher,but thereis nothingto suggestthat it was writtenwith the metaphysicianespecially in mind35. If the Categoriesis comparableto any book in the Metaphysics,it is A. A offerssurveys of substance(A8, cp. Categoriesc. 5), of quan- tity,quality and relation(A13-15, cp. Categoriescc. 6-8),opposition (AIO, cp. Categoriescc. 10-11),priority and posteriority(All, cp. Categories c. 12), and having(A23, cp. Categoriesc. 15). But thereare crucialdif- ferencesbetween the Categories and MetaphysicsA, reflectingthe dialec- ticalpurpose of theformer and themetaphysical purpose of thelatter36. We can see thisboth in whatA omitsfrom the Categoriesand in what it adds. A omitseverything in the Categoriesthat is intendedto teach us how to place a termunder one genusor another:besides skipping the discussionsof homonyms,paronyms, and non-simpleexpressions, it entirelyomits all theidia of thecategories, such as whethereach cate- goryadmits contraries or degrees,as well as suchcriteria as « signifies some this», whichcan onlybe criteriaof terms.But A adds surveys of themeanings of being(A7) and of itsper se attributessuch as unity (A6), samenessand difference(A9); and it givesa newlyontological twist

JD. lo repeat:my aim is notto denycontradictions between the two texts, but to bring outthe different projects and purposesof theCategories and of theMetaphysics, projects and purposeswhich are missedwhen the two textsare broughtinto directopposition. (As I havenoted above, I believethat the Categoriesdoes contradictthe position of the Metaphysicson whetherimmanent forms are a kindof substance,and on whetherthe soulis an immanentform ; or, at anyrate, I believethat when Aristotle wrote the Catego- rieshe helda differentposition on thesequestions than he does in theMetaphysics, and thatthis different position is suggested,although not directlystated, by the textof the Categories.)I haveno intentionof « neutralizing» the Categories, or of makingit consti- tutionallyunable to contradicta metaphysicaltext, by assigningit to theart of dialectic. In sayingthat the Categories« simplylists different kinds of beingsand givestests for recognizingthem », I meanthat this is its intention,and thatit does not investigatethe causesof beings(which is theintention of theMetaphysics) ; I do notmean that the Cate- goriescannot contain or implycontroversial ontological opinions (although it certainly putsno stresson any suchopinions, and the attemptto read it as a criticismof Plato is based on a misunderstanding). 36. Contra Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy, p. 23: the Categories « differsfrom MetaphysicsA mainlyin tryingto givesome sortof accountof the systematicrelation of the variousthings treated ».

333 StephenMenn to thediscussions of contrariety(1018a35-38) and of priority(1019a4-ll). A also adds introductorychapters on principle(Al), cause (A2), and element(A3), treatingquestions foreign to theCategories (A4-5, on nature and necessity,continue this surveyof causal concepts). These modificationsresult from A's functionas an introductionto an inquiryinto the « causes and principlesand elements» of being (EZH0), and of itsper se attributessuch as unity(I): A startsby descri- bingcauses and principlesand elements,and thenproceeds to describe beingand its attributes.A (or A6-30)stands to the investigationthat followsmuch as theHistoria Animalium stands to thesubsequent biolo- gicalworks ; we mightcall it a HistoriaEntium. The Metaphysics is seeking thehighest causes, and in particularthe divine,which should be found amongthe highest causes of all; thehighest causes should be thecauses of themost universal effects, and forthis reason Aristotle proposes in Tl thatmetaphysics should study the causesof beingand of itsper se attributes,which are themost universal things of all. But « cause » and « being» and « one » (and so on) are each said in manyways: so the firsttask is thetask of A, to sortout theirdifferent kinds; subsequent books can investigatewhat kindsof chainsof causes, of what kinds of beingor unity,lead up to the desiredbeings, and whatchains fall shortof them. If we rememberthe place of MetaphysicsZ in thiscausal investiga- tion,we willnot confuse its task with the task of theCategories9 account of substance.Z beginsby referringback to A forthe manysenses of « being» (1028al0-ll); sincesubstances are theprimary beings, Z inves- tigatesthe causes of substance,in orderto discoverwhether there are substancesapart from the sensibleones, and whatthese separate subs- tancesmay be: for we will come to knowsuch substances,if at all, by recognizingthem as causesof substancesfamiliar to us. Z does not, like the Categories,give criteriafor substance:this is the businessof an introductionto dialectic,not of a treatiseon metaphysicsor on any otherscience. The Categories,although it givescriteria by whichsubs- tancescan be recognized,does not attemptto applythese principles, to drawup a listof whatthings are substances; but neither does Metaphy- sics Z37.It is not thebusiness either of an introductionto dialectic,or

37. AlthoughZ neitherformulates criteria of substance,nor applies criteria to produce a listof substances,it maycite criteria of substancein dialecticalargument, relying on somethinglike the Categories'list of criteria.But the onlyplaces I knowwhere Z cites criteriaof substanceare Z3 1029a28chôriston kai todeti (theseare probablyequivalent), and Z13 1038bl5to mekath* hupokeimenou (the same criterion is dismissedas insufficient

334 Metaphysics,Dialectic and the Categories of a treatiseon metaphysics(or any otherscience) to drawup a syste- maticlist of substances:rather, for each X, it belongsto thedialectical preliminariesto thescience of X to assignX to itsappropriate category. WhenZl-2 askswhat substances there are, it is notasking whether items on a recognizedlist of beingsfall into the category of substanceor into someother category. On thecontrary, « thequestion always asked and alwayspuzzled over, beforeand now, "what is being," is "what is substance":for thisis whatsome people say is one and othersmore thanone, somefinitely and othersinfinitely many » (1028b2-6):the ques- tionis and alwayshas been about whatbeings there are and not about whichof themare substances(Aristotle takes it for grantedthat the beingsin disputewill be substances).When Aristotle calls the question « whatis being» aei aporoumenon,connects it withthe old question whetherbeing is one or many,and identifiesit withthe questionof ousia,he is deliberatelyechoing the language of theSophist, and promi- at Z3 1029a8).The currentlypopular view that Z proposes« subject» and « essence» as jointlynecessary criteria of substance,and examinescandidates for conformity to these criteria,has no textualsupport that I can discover.« Subject» and « essence» are intro- ducedin the firstsentence of Z3 as sensesor kindsof substance(not conjunctively,as criteriafor substance):« substanceis said, if not in moreways, at least principallyin four:for the essence and theuniversal and thegenus seem to be the substanceof each thing,and fourthlythe subject» (1028b33-36).The pointis just thatif you ask ti esti X, I can answereither by givinga Y suchthat Y is X (the subjectof X) or a Y such thatX is Y per se (the essenceof X, or a part of the essence);either answer to the ti esti questiongives in some way the ousia or substanceof X (and if X is substance simpliciter,Y is substancesimpliciter). If Y is eitherthe subjector the essenceof X, it is the substanceof X (as H 1042a32-b8argues, matter must be substance,since it is a subjectand the subjectis substance);Aristotle has no need to arguethat something is bothsubject and essencein orderto validateit as a substance.Aristotle does assertthat substanceshave essencemore primarily than accidents do (althoughaccidents also have essences),and thatsubstances are identicalwith their essences (so are accidents,although notsubstance-accident compounds), but neither of theseclaims is introducedas a criterion of substance,nor is eitherso used. [I do notknow how the criteria-and-candidates reading of Z arose; it is usuallyassumed rather than argued for. Owen saw two potentially conflic- tingcriteria of substancein the firstsentence of Zl, whichdescribes substance as to ti esti kai tode ti (1028all-12); but it is in factobvious that the secondphrase explains the first,and thatAristotle was not thinkingabout any possibleconflict. Terence Irwin also interpretsthe first sentence of Z3 to supportthis reading. Irwin translates « Substance is spokenof, if notin severalways, at anyrate in fourmain cases. For in factthe essence, the universaland the genusseem to be the substanceof each thing,and the fourthof theseis the subject». Irwintakes the passageto be suggestingthe denialof whatit in factobviously asserts, that substance is said in severalways: he takesessence, universal, genusand subjectto be « ostensiblecriteria » forsubstance, and « criteriafor the same thing», so thatAristotle would be sayingthat (the chief or onlysense of) substancewould be somethingthat is simultaneouslyessence, universal, genus and subject(Irwin, Aris- totle'sFirst Principles, Oxford, 1988, p. 202-204,with nn. 14 and 16 fromp. 554-555). Thisdistorts the sense of thepassage in question,and cannotsupport the overall reading of Z. Whatother support this reading might have, I do not know.]

335 StephenMenn singto takeup its questionwhether only bodies exist, or onlyincorpo- reals,or bothtogether38. Already in MetaphysicsB Aristotlehad asked « whetherwe shouldsay thatthere are onlysensible substances, or also othersbeyond these », and whetherthese othersare as Plato says (997a34ff); now in Z2 he takesup thisinvestigation « whether there are onlythese substances or also others,or some of theseand also others, or none of thesebut others» (1028bl3-15;cp. b27-32). Aristotletakes up thisquestion in Z and subsequentbooks by starting with the « substancesagreed on by everyone...the naturalones » (H 1042a6-8),and examiningtheir causes, to discoverwhether some causal chainleads up fromsensible substances to an incorporealsubstance: as Aristotlesays in Z3, « sincesome of thesensibles are agreedto be subs- tances,we shouldinvestigate first among these... for learning always takes place throughwhat is less knowableby natureto whatis more kno- wable» (1029a33-4,b3-5). In Z Aristotleis not yetpresenting his own positiveproposal (given in A) fora chainof efficientand finalcauses leadingup fromnatural things to a separatenous: he is examiningand criticizingPlato's proposalthat the Forms,which are supposedto be incorporealsubstances in themselves,are also causesof sensiblethings, just by beingthe substance of thesesensible things, that is, theirformal cause (B 997b3-5,A99bl-4; cp. A 1017bl4ffon ousia = aition tou einai)39.The investigationof thesubstance o/the agreed-onsubstances,

38. The Sophist says that we are in aporia about the question, « what is being », and that this is no euporôteronthen the questions about not-being(246a 1-2), which are mesta aporias aei en tô(i) prosthenchronô(i) kai nun (236e3, closely parallel to Aristotle).On the question of being too, machê tis aei sunestêken246c3, and this question is an amphis- bêtêsisperi tês ousias 246a5. Beyond the archaic question whetherbeing is one or many, and how many (242b6ff,summed up 245dl2ff),the currentdispute is whetheronly bodies are beings and ousiai (246a7-b3), or only incorporealssuch as the Forms (246b6-c2), or both (the rightanswer, 249clO-d4, where the thingsin motionare bodies and the unmoved thingsare incorporeals).Aristotle reserves in principlethe rightto say that some of the sensiblethings he has mentionedare not substances,but in facthe takes the list (the simple bodies and living thingsand their parts, and the heaven and its parts) as agreed, and says so at H 1042a6ff; althoughAristotle says in Z16 that the simplebodies and the parts of livingthings are not substances,he doesn't mean thatthey fall into some othercategory: rather,they are substancesonly dunamei, because theyare beings only dunamei. (So they are less substance than what is substance entelecheiâ(i)' but in HI they are again listed as substances.) 39. Aristotlemakes nis projectclear in (among otnerpiacesj tne passage jusi enea irom Z3. He has just dismissedthe matterand the composite substance,not because they are not substances(they are substances,as HI reaffirms,although they are less substancethan the form),but because theyare « posteriorand manifest» (1029a31-2). So Aristotlepursues instead the thirdkind of substance,the form,« for this is most in aporia » (a33) - i.e., Plato says that it exists separately,and other people say that it does not. Aristotlethen (1029a33-34, b3-12) explains the project of ascending from sensible things,manifest to

336 Metaphysics,Dialectic and the Categories whichis thetheme of Z, is verydifferent from the non-causalaccount of substancegiven in theCategories. The Categoriesonly gives tests for a thingto be an ousia,and doesnot investigate the ousia o/a givenousia; Z, bycontrast, investigates subject and essencebecause these are in diffe- rentways « thesubstance o/each thing » (cf. 1028b35,103 lai 8), namely itsmaterial and formalcauses ; thesecauses of a substancewill themselves be substances,and the upwardcausal chainsmight lead to the desired separatesubstances40. As Aristotleargues in Z, Plato was wrongin clai- mingthat the substance or essenceof eachsensible substance is a separate incorporealsubstance, and so theresults of thecausal inquiryof Z are chieflynegative. But Z goesbeyond the Categories and beyonddialectic, and belongsinstead to philosophy,because instead of merelyclassifying thethings that are, it investigatesthe « causesand principlesand elements of substances» (H 1042a4-6);it belongsspecifically to firstphilosophy, becauseit uses thisinvestigation to addressthe question « whetherthere is someseparate substance, and whyand how,beyond the sensibles,or whetherthere is none» (Z 1028b30-31)41. StephenMenn McGill University us but « containinglittle or nothingof being» (1029b9-10),to thethings best known in themselves;he thenturns to thestudy of theousia of a thingas itsessence. This is Plato's procedurefor ascending to intelligiblerealities; Aristotle will follow it, and willshow in Z6ffthat it does not (as Plato claims)lead to separateForms. Aristotle's point has been lostpartly because of theidea (Jaeger's)that the ten-line passage 1029b3-12 has beenmis- placedin themanuscripts, and so maynot belong in thiscontext at all; in factit is only thetwo lines 1029b 1-2 that have been slightly misplaced. People seemto feelthat, when thelines have been put back in theproper order (1029a33-34, 1029b3-12, 1029bl-2, 1029bl3ff), it is the ten lines 1029b3-12that have been moved,since they have been takenout of Chapter4 and put intoChapter 3 ; thisfeeling is irrational,since the chapter-division is an artifactof thesixteenth century and is notpart of thetext of Aristotle.Cf. theLondon Noteson Book Zeta of Aristotle'sMetaphysics (Burnyeat ed., Oxford,1979) ad locum: « thispassage was thoughto have no specialrelevance to its context(whether placed at the end of Z3 withJaeger or leftin Z4), and was not discussed». 40. The pointis not thatAristotle did not have the conceptof ousia tinoswhen he wrotethe Categories:such a conceptis presupposedby the phraselogos tes ousias in thefirst sentence of thebook, and wouldin anycase be familiarfrom Plato (e.g. Phaedrus 245e2-4).Nor am I suggestingthat because the Categoriesdoes not ask afterthe ousia of a givenousia, it cannotcontradict Metaphysics Z on whatousiai there are; thepoint is just thatZ is carryingout a causal investigation,with philosophical and specifically theologicalends, and thatthe Categoriesis not. 4i. i wouldHKe to tnankjonn cooper, MargueriteDeslauners, Louis-André Dorion, RachanaKamtekar, Alexander Nehamas, Malcolm Schofield, and audiencesat theUniver- sitiesof Torontoand Chicago,for helpful comments and discussionat variousstages. I am also gratefulto PrincetonUniversity and theAmerican Council of LearnedSocieties forleave support in academicyear 1991-1992, and to McGillUniversity for its hospitality duringthat time.

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