INFLUENCING AUSTRALIAN : The Australian Aid and Parliament Project

Tamas Wells The Policy Lab University of Melbourne

INFLUENCING AUSTRALIAN AID: The Australian Aid and Parliament Project

Acknowledgements This report was primarily funded by Save the Children with contributions from the University of Melbourne. I acknowledge the generous support of participants in this research and of Save the Children staff, especially Sarah Carter, Marion Stanton and Mat Tinkler who shared their expertise and time. Thanks also go to reviewers of the draft report whose valuable comments shaped the final report considerably. This document presents the views and opinions of the author and does not reflect the official views of Save the Children. Tamas Wells is a research fellow at The Policy Lab in the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Melbourne.

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INFLUENCING AUSTRALIAN AID: The Australian Aid and Parliament Project

How then can aid policy be influenced? EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The legitimacy of foreign aid amongst political elites in Australia can be built through promoting multiple arguments Since 2013, aid commitments have for aid. Though the danger in promoting a range of been declining, reaching record low levels as a percentage of competing policy justifications for aid amongst elites – Gross National Income. During this period, many aid including social justice, economic, or security concerns - is organisations and community groups in Australia have that no coherent overall rationale is fostered. There is a attempted to advocate for greater commitments to aid. Yet pressing need to engage the Australian government toward through successive Australian budgets, low levels of aid have addressing deeper questions, not just of aid, but of persisted. How is aid policy made in Australia? And what are Australia’s foreign policy and its role in global development. the prospects for groups engaged in aid advocacy? Overall, recognising the highly centralised nature of aid The Save the Children Australian Aid and Parliament Project policymaking does not mean that aid organisations and (AA&PP) is an effort to influence the attitudes of decision individuals should not continue to advocate for more aid. makers in parliament, and to increase the level of Rather, aid advocates must tailor their efforts more government commitments to aid. Yet Save the Children and strategically within the constraints of the unique realm of aid other aid advocates must recognise the unique nature of aid policymaking. Recognition of this context of decision making policymaking in Australia. Aid policymaking is unusual as the around aid commitments reveals four strategic questions for primary beneficiaries of aid programs are not Australian advocacy programs such as the AA&PP. taxpayers or citizens, but people in other countries. Put differently, those who are most impacted by aid policy have • To what extent should the aid constituency continue to almost no ability to influence it. In combination with an elite focus primarily on social justice arguments, or emphasise led budget process in Australia, this creates a highly broader foreign policy rationales for aid? centralised decision-making process around aid • To what extent should aid quantity (and overall targets commitments. for aid volume) be a focus of aid advocacy? Whether or not the AA&PP can be successful in increasing • Is the goal of advocacy to politicise aid as a policy issue, commitments to aid depends on answers to three underlying or not? questions: Can aid commitments be influenced at all? Who can influence aid policy? And how can aid policy be • How can aid education and advocacy be funded in the influenced? Drawing on aid policy literature, AA&PP project long term? documents and interviews with twenty key informants – In an era of heavy cuts to aid, aid volume is a legitimate current and past parliamentarians, government bureaucrats, focus for aid constituency lobbying. Yet aid volumes cannot aid organisation leaders, and academics – this report be the end of the story for aid advocates. Even if aid flows addresses these three questions. from Australia were to grow, there are deeper questions Can aid commitments be influenced at all? about how aid fits within Australia’s broader foreign policy, Academic literature on the determinants of aid and especially how non-aid areas, such as trade, commitments often emphasises the ways in which aid levels environmental protection, and labour mobility, contribute to are influenced by global and domestic structures - leaving development goals. The aim of this report is to stimulate few prospects for individual actors to shift aid policy. It may new discussion around advocacy on aid commitments. be true that global and domestic structures are important in Ultimately though the aid constituency in Australia must influencing aid budgets, yet evidence from Australia and bridge their engagement with the Australian government other countries also points toward significant scope for toward addressing deeper questions of Australia’s role in individual advocates, or skeptics, to influence aid budgets. global development. Who can influence aid policy? Individual actors may be able to influence aid policy, but this does not mean that any shifts in individual attitudes and behaviour will lead to policy change. Who is involved matters significantly. The unique process by which aid commitments are made, means that decision making power is centred around political elites such as party leaders. Aid organisations and the general public, and even parliamentarians, are able to influence aid volumes only in a limited and indirect way. 3 INFLUENCING AUSTRALIAN AID: The Australian Aid and Parliament Project

with elites – including social justice, economic, or security INTRODUCTION concerns - is that no coherent overall rationale for aid is developed. Over the last 50 years, Australian government support for foreign aid has waxed and waned. At 0.22 per cent of The report concludes by raising four strategic questions for Australia’s GNI however, the current level of commitment to the future of aid advocacy. These strategic questions are: foreign aid is at an historic low point. There are many • To what extent should the aid constituency organisations and individual Australians who see a far larger role for Australian government aid. Yet what are the continue to focus primarily on social justice prospects for advocacy initiatives to influence the levels of arguments, or emphasise broader foreign policy aid Australia gives? rationales for aid? • To what extent should aid quantity (and overall Since 2015, with support from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Save the Children Australia has been delivering targets for aid volume) be a focus of aid the Australian Aid and Parliament Project (AA&PP). The advocacy? project has undertaken a series of learning visits involving • Is the goal of advocacy to politicise aid as a policy over thirty Australian parliamentarians visiting NGO issue? projects in PNG, , , , • How can aid education and advocacy be funded in Jordan and Lebanon. The aim of the project is to influence the long term? the attitudes of decision makers who determine, or will in the future determine, Australia’s foreign aid commitment. Before turning to the background of Australia’s aid This report draws on the case of AA&PP and aims to program, it is vital to distinguish between influencing the catalyse new conversations about aid advocacy in Australia quantity and quality of aid. There is some interconnection, in by examining the politics of aid policymaking. that aid cuts or rapid scale ups of aid can threaten the quality of the aid program. Yet the policy decision making Influencing Australian Aid begins by outlining the historical processes around aid quantity and quality are distinct. As background of Australia’s commitments to foreign aid and this report shows, policy decision making around aid quantity how the volume of aid is decided through the budget is a centred around government elites in Cabinet and process. It then describes the work of the AA&PP to change particularly those key individuals leading the budget process. the attitudes and levels of knowledge of parliamentarians In contrast, policy decision making related to aid quality is around aid. less centralised and nested more with the Department of The report then turns to the core assumptions informing the Foreign Affairs and Trade and other relevant actors. This AA&PP about how aid policy change happens, asking three report is primarily concerned with influence on the quantity key questions: of Australian aid rather than its quality. • Can aid commitments be influenced at all? Yet aid volumes cannot be the end of the story for aid • Who can influence aid policy? advocates. ‘Aid policy’ is too narrow a focus to address the • How can aid policy be influenced? complex global development issues of the present and future. Even if aid flows from Australia were to grow, they To answer these questions, the report draws on aid policy will be increasingly dwarfed by other funding flows - of literature, AA&PP project documents and interviews with investment, remittances and loans. The more pressing twenty key informants - current and former members of question therefore is how aid fits within Australia’s broader parliament, bureaucrats, aid campaign members, and foreign policy, and the extent to which Australia’s actions in academics. non-aid areas, such as trade, environmental protection, and labour mobility, support the well-being of communities in Influencing Australian Aid argues that despite institutional and less wealthy countries. Emphasising aid quantity may be structural constraints, individual political actors have the important for advocacy in the current period of aid cuts, yet agency to shape aid policy. However, given the highly it is not as important as other more far reaching questions centralised nature of decision making around aid of the future of development. It is hoped that this report can commitments, parliamentarians may have only limited and catalyse new discussion around advocacy on aid indirect influence. The commitment to, or scepticism of, commitments, yet also be a bridge to addressing deeper foreign aid amongst political party elites is the primary questions of Australia’s role in global development. determining factor for aid commitments. Finally, the legitimacy of foreign aid amongst political elites in Australia can be built through promoting multiple arguments for aid. Though the danger in promoting a range of justifications

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cut the aid budget. The aid budget increased slowly in the BACKGROUND OF AUSTRALIA’S remaining years of the Fraser government (Corbett 2017). COMMITMENT TO FOREIGN AID The landmark Jackson Review in 1983 advocated for a triple foreign aid mandate – humanitarian, commercial and foreign Understanding this history of aid policy in Australia is crucial policy interests. The new Hawke Labor government acted in making sense of the potential and limits of aid advocacy on many of its recommendations and the Australian efforts. The history of Australia’s commitment to foreign aid International Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB) in the last five decades can be divided into three distinct replaced ADAB. The review also led foreign policy elites to periods – 1972-2004, 2004 to 2013 and 2013 to the present first develop the idea of ‘a professional and autonomous aid (Howes 2015; Day 2016). agency’ (Corbett and Dinnen 2016, 100). Despite some hopes

Data from aid tracker @devpolicy 1972-2004 of an increase in aid as the Hawke government began in 1983, the program endured some of its largest cuts under During alternating periods of Labor (Whitlam), Liberal Labor, for example with the aid budget cut by 12 percent in (Fraser), Labor (Hawke/Keating) and Liberal (Howard) 1986-7 (Corbett 2017). Following the pattern of previous governments in Australia during the 1970s, 80s and 90s, the incoming governments, the Howard government also foreign aid budget kept a basic trajectory of small growth in reduced foreign aid as it came into power in 1996, before total volumes of aid. Yet there was also an overall slight making gradual increases in its initial years. Overall, Howes decline in percentage of GNI allocated to aid (see graph). (2015) describes this period in Australian foreign policy as Significant early reforms to foreign aid came with the one where international aid was a ‘backwater’– having slight . For the first time the different parts of rises and falls over time, but with no dramatic shifts in policy the bureaucracy engaged in development were brought into direction. one new administrative unit, the Australian Development Assistance Agency (ADAA). The Whitlam years also 2004-2013 brought small increases in the amount of foreign aid. Yet In contrast to the period of aid as a ‘backwater’, for a foreshadowing the cuts in 2013, the decade after 2004, foreign aid policy enjoyed a ‘golden incoming Fraser government abolished the new agency in consensus’ (Dobell 2015) - with bipartisan support and 1976, creating a new Australian Development Assistance commitment to a target of 0.5 percent of GNI. This period Bureau (which was absorbed more into Foreign Affairs) and began in 2005 when Howard announced at the United 5 INFLUENCING AUSTRALIAN AID: The Australian Aid and Parliament Project

Nations that the Australian aid budget would be doubled by 2013 - present 2010. This announcement was in the context of other major Howes (2015) describes the period since 2013 as one of OECD donors increasing their contributions, and ‘retrenchment’. Aid volumes have dropped even faster than domestically the Australian economy was buoyed by the they rose under the Rudd/Gillard government – with annual mining boom (Flitton 2013). This commitment by Howard to average decline of 10% (Howes 2015). There were changes increasing aid was unprecedented in Australia’s aid program not just in scale of the aid program but also in scope and since its formalisation in 1972. The Labor victory in the 2007 structure (Day 2016) – aid was redirected toward the Asia- election then saw an even greater commitment to scaling up Pacific region, and AusAID lost its executive agency status, foreign aid. Ultimately ODA increased by more than eighty being reabsorbed within DFAT. With a loss of budget and percent in real terms, from $3 billion in 2003-4 to 5.5 billion the autonomy of the agency, substantial foreign aid in 2012-13 (Day 2016). AusAid was given executive agency expertise has also been lost from DFAT (Wood, Burkot, and status and the number of AusAID staff grew from around Howes 2017). Overall, the aid scale up - initiated during the 500 in the early 2000s to more than 1700 in 2012 (Corbett Howard government and then increased during the 2017, 108). The commitment under Labor was, according to Rudd/Gillard years - has been effectively cancelled out by Corbett (2017) and (Day 2016), driven by Rudd’s personal the Abbott/Turnbull government cuts. Australian aid commitment to reaching the 0.5 GNI target. Politically, volumes have returned to ‘the way we were’ (Howes 2015). Rudd also used the commitment to aid to appeal to young, progressive voters (Corbett 2017) along with building support for Australia’s seat on the UN Security Council (Cooper 2012). The ‘Golden Consensus’ however, was a fragile one. First, the consensus was isolated and narrow - focussing on a budget target with no deep ‘anchoring’ (Day 2016, 642) within a broader debate or agreement about the role of aid in Australia’s foreign policy. Second, the personal attention from Rudd on aid policy later made it a ‘political and bureaucratic target’ (Corbett 2017, 113) as the Labor government came to an end.

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party rooms or parliament, budget decisions on aid HOW IS THE VOLUME OF commitments are more likely to be left to political elites. Party leaders, ministers and elites in the bureaucracy are at AUSTRALIAN AID DECIDED? the centre of the decision making process about aid commitments (Lundsgaarde 2012). Foreign aid is a unique area of policymaking, as the primary beneficiaries The budget process in Australia of aid programs are not Australian In Australia, the budget process is the means through which taxpayers or citizens, but people in other the federal government decides how to allocate public countries. In combination with an elite led resources (Ministry of Finance 2018). Once the Budget is budget process in Australia, this creates a approved by Cabinet and Parliament, the government then highly centralised decision-making process allocates this money to various portfolios, including the aid around aid commitments. program. The design of a new budget in Australia centres around a committee of Cabinet, the Expenditure Review Before addressing the question of how aid policy can be Committee (ERC) (see chart). The ERC consists of the influenced, particularly around aid volume, it is crucial to Prime Minister, Treasurer and the Minister for Finance, understand the process for determining aid commitments in along with three or four other Ministers. The Prime Minister the Australian government. has direct influence within the ERC but also plays a key role in appointing the members of the committee. Aid as an unusual area of policymaking Compared to other areas of government policy making, for The ERC is thus a highly centralised decision-making body comprised of key party leaders. The budget process begins example welfare or health budgets, aid policy has distinct in November or December of each year when the ERC differences. Most notably aid policy making processes are considers the proposals from Ministers from different highly unusual as taxpayers or citizens in Australia see few portfolios. The ERC ‘scrutinise’ and ‘interrogate’ the of the immediate benefits of Australian aid spending, which proposed savings and spending from Ministers –with the primarily meets the needs of people in other countries (Grattan (Spratt 2017; Otter 2003). Aid policy is thus unique in that ERC described by an insider as the ‘razor gang’ 2017). At this point, the Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes democratic accountability mechanisms – between a a foreign aid budget for the following financial year. government and its voters – are diluted. Those who may be Importantly though, the Minister for Foreign Affairs is not able to influence decisions about aid are not those who are necessarily a member of the ERC. For example, in the most affected by it. Abbott/Turnbull government, Minister for Foreign Affairs Given the unusual accountability relationship around aid, has not been part of the ERC. Therefore despite this means that aid policymaking also has an unusual form reportedly making efforts to defend Department of Foreign of politics. Most obviously, as aid commitments make up Affairs and Trade budgets during the Abbott government, only a small percentage of government spending, and have her influence on ERC decision making was only indirect. little direct benefit for voters or citizens in Australia, it is an While the political party in power controls the membership easy target for government cuts – as exemplified by the of the ERC, as will become clear in this report, the budget limited public outcry following the series of Coalition process is also a site of internal factional struggles within government aid budget cuts since 2013. Not only does aid parties. This becomes relevant when considering aid volumes have little immediate impact in the lives of citizens in donor directly, but also where aid volumes become a proxy for countries, publics in donor countries also have very low other political struggles within parties. levels of knowledge about foreign aid (Burkot and Wood In the ERC’s development of the budget, the Department of 2015; McDonnell, Lecomte, and Wegimont 2003b). Finance and Administration also plays a key role through This combination of low levels of interest about aid amongst coordinating the preparation of the budget and forward citizens, and low levels of knowledge, means that aid estimates. Finance and Administration presents the ERC with policymaking processes are more centralised than other potential savings options – which may or may not be policy areas. Participants in this study reported that politically palatable for the government. Treasury is parliamentarians are far less likely to expend energy in meanwhile responsible for assessments of the economic and engaging in issues of international development compared to fiscal outlook and estimates of tax revenues. Officials in both other areas of more domestic relevance (Spratt 2017). Finance and Treasury have significant input into shaping aid Therefore, while budget decisions around more salient public budget decisions in the ERC (Corbett 2017). issues, such as social welfare or health, are the subject of In summary, there are two reasons why aid budget decision numerous public submissions, and are widely debated in making in Australia is unique. On one hand, international aid 7 INFLUENCING AUSTRALIAN AID: The Australian Aid and Parliament Project

is a unique area of policymaking in that normal democratic accountability mechanisms are diluted - those most affected by international aid have little voice in decision making. On the other hand, when compared to, for example, the United States, Australia has a highly centralised budget process. It is party leaders within the Expenditure Review Committee of Cabinet who have direct decision-making power. The combination of an unusual accountability relationship around aid policy, and a highly centralised budget decision making process, presents significant challenges for aid advocacy efforts in Australia, such as the AA&PP

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increased commitments to foreign aid. This shift had political THE AUSTRALIAN AID AND motivations as an effort to challenge the dominance of New Labour, yet it was only possible with a cohort of support at PARLIAMENT PROJECT the senior level and more broadly within the Conservative party. Since 2015, with support from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Save the Children Australia has been delivering A key role in shifting the knowledge and attitudes of the Australian Aid and Parliament Project (AA&PP). The Conservative Members of Parliament in the UK in the 2000s project has undertaken learning visits to aid projects in was played by the Umubano project, a Conservative Party PNG, Cambodia, Myanmar, Solomon Islands, Jordan and Social Action Project in Rwanda and Sierra Leone (Day Lebanon involving over 30 Australian parliamentarians. The 2017). The program was started in 2007 by David Cameron, learning visits have involved a mix of party representatives – who was Conservative party leader at the time, and Andrew including Labor, Liberal, National, Greens and independent Mitchell, who became Secretary for International parliamentarians. The aim of the project is to inform the Development in the Cameron government. Over the attitudes of decision makers who determine, or will in the following decade, hundreds of Conservative party members future determine, Australia’s foreign aid commitment. This volunteered in the project. In Day's (2017) case study of aid aim is then reflected in the selection of parliamentarians, policy change in the UK he argues that Project Umubano with emphasis given to those who may enter party influenced parliamentarian knowledge and attitudes about leadership positions in the future. aid and helped ‘create and connect a cohort of pro- development Tories’. Fundamentally, the design of the AA&PP assumes that, through exposure to new ideas and experiences, and by Exposing parliamentarians to aid programs in poor providing potential decision makers with a frame of countries can shift knowledge, attitudes and behaviour. reference they may not previously have developed, the There is still a missing link however, between changing knowledge and attitudes of Members of Parliament can shift. attitudes and behaviours of parliamentarians, and seeing This assumption is supported through a November 2017 increases in the Australian Aid budget. There are deeper review where alumni of the AA&PP overwhelmingly questions about the politics of aid policymaking in Australia reported that they had increased their knowledge about aid which are explored in the next section of the report. policy. There are also numerous examples of alumni changing their behaviour, especially in taking new actions toward raising relevant issues of foreign policy in parliament. Of the AA&PP project exposure trips, a Labor MP said, ‘every time you do one of these trips you learn more and get more real front-line experiences so can speak with greater authority.’ A Nationals MP similarly said the trip ‘provided some clarity. It certainly gave me a better understanding of some of the challenges. I think I will continue to be an advocate [of foreign aid].’ More than simply new knowledge about poverty and the role of aid, the trips also brought personal connections which parliamentarians felt added to their ability to advocate for commitments to foreign aid. Another Labor MP reflected that ‘politics is a story-telling profession and being able to meet with people first hand makes you a much stronger advocate…[the trips] build your confidence to be able to speak on these issues.’ The findings of the AA&PP review are supported by experiences of change in other contexts in the knowledge and behaviour of political actors around aid policy. Evidence from the UK shows that the positions of Conservative Members of Parliament on foreign aid were malleable. The Conservative party in the UK had traditionally taken a sceptical position toward foreign aid. Yet in the 2000s, the Conservative party shifted its stance toward advocating for 9 INFLUENCING AUSTRALIAN AID: The Australian Aid and Parliament Project

flows. They point out that this effect has a long time lag THE AUSTRALIAN AID & though with bottoming out occurring only about 10-13 years after the onset of banking crises. After economic PARLIAMENT PROJECT AND HOW crises, falls in aid flows occur because ‘aid is forced to compete with domestic programs for those in need’ and AID POLICY CHANGE HAPPENS? support to the financial sector after crises serves to ‘crowd out’ pre-crisis spending (Dang, Knack, and Rogers 2013). Drawing on the example of the Australian Aid and (Dang, Knack, and Rogers 2013) use the example of Europe, Parliament Project (AA&PP) this section explores core where twelve of fifteen European Union Development assumptions about how aid policy change happens, asking: Assistance Committee (DAC) members reduced ODA in • Can Australia’s aid commitments be influenced at all? real terms in the face of fiscal and financial crises. • Who can influence aid policy? International economic crises, particularly the Global • How can aid policy be influenced? Financial Crisis (GFC) of the 2000s, are influential in aid policy decision making. Yet as Corbett (2017) argues, these Can Australia’s aid commitments be factors alone do not help to explain the Australian context influenced at all? and the three separate eras of aid spending outlined earlier. For example, compared to Europe, Australia emerged from There are important global and domestic the global financial crisis with far less impact on its banking structures that influence aid budgets, but and financial sector. Yet the 2013 cuts to the aid budget there is significant scope for individual were the largest in the country’s history (Howes 2015) and advocates, or sceptics, to influence aid in some cases even surpassed the cuts in European countries hit hardest by the GFC. Meanwhile, despite a constrained budgets. economic context, the Cameron government in the UK In considering the role of aid advocacy projects, one substantially increased the volume of aid spending after the overarching question is whether individual political actors GFC. The performance of the economy alone cannot predict can shape aid policy at all? Is aid policy simply determined Australia’s aid commitments. by broader structures, international or domestic, which are Other authors suggest that while aid levels are structurally beyond the control of individuals? The relative weight given determined, it is more domestic political factors rather than to structures or individual agency in changing aid policy is international or economic ones (Lancaster 2008; Tingley significant for understanding the contribution of advocacy 2010; Gulrajani 2017). Tingley (2010) argues that in OECD projects. countries aid policy is primarily determined by which Structural determinants of aid political party is in power. Conservative, right wing Within aid policy literature there is a stream of scholarship governments oppose aid because ‘conservatives believe foreign aid is an obstacle to the operation of more efficient focussing on the structural determinants of aid policy (Jones markets that may be better equipped to improve the welfare 2015; Dang, Knack, and Rogers 2013; Tingley 2010; Alesina of citizens’ (Tingley 2010). In contrast, left wing governments and Dollar 2000) drawing on predictive models to explain aid are assumed by Tingley (2010) to be more favourable to volumes in OECD countries. The core arguments from these foreign aid. In other words, through the electoral process authors is that there are certain key factors which certain ideas and ideological beliefs determine foreign aid determine foreign aid volumes, whether global economic policy. performance (Dang, Knack, and Rogers 2013), political party ideology (Tingley 2010) or the level of autonomy of aid At first glance, this analysis of political party ideology as a agencies (Gulrajani 2017). There may be short term determinant of aid could explain the 2013 cuts to Australian dynamics such as financial crises and global economic aid under the Abbott government. As the centre-right conditions (Dang, Knack, and Rogers 2013), or long term Liberal party gained ascendency the volume of Australian dynamics such as colonial relationships or political alliances aid fell. Yet partisan party politics cannot explain (Alesina and Dollar 2000). Crucially, through developing commitment to foreign aid over the longer term in Australia models of structural determinants, these authors give less (Rosser 2008; Corbett 2017; Corbett and Dinnen 2016; Day attention to the role of individual political actors in 2016). From 1970s to 2000s (the first era of Australian aid influencing aid policy. policy), despite various small rises and falls, Australia’s GNI contribution to aid decreased regardless of who was in Using aggregated data from donor countries, Dang, Knack, power. The pattern of incoming governments across the and Rogers (2013) argue that international or domestic Fraser, Hawke and Howard governments was that aid was financial crises are associated with a substantial fall in aid cut and then slowly increased over time. The lowest level of

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aid spending during this period was under the Hawke Labor What then would motivate a powerful political leader to put government in the 1980s. Further, contrary to perceptions aid on the policy agenda? Day (2017) suggests there are two that the ‘Golden Consensus’ was a Labor initiated pro-aid reasons. First, that a political actor has a strong personal policy, it was actually the Howard government that began commitment to aid. Second, that aid policy is a useful the commitment to double Australian aid (Corbett and political ‘proxy’ to signal their position on a more salient Dinnen 2016). A purely structural view of party ideology issue (Day 2017, 10). For example, while David Cameron also overlooks internal party divisions over aid policy. For may have been personally committed to international aid, example, while the Fraser government abolished the aid was also a proxy for the modernisation of the Whitlam government’s Australian Development Assistance Conservative party in the UK. Meanwhile, the 0.7 percent of Agency and reduced the aid budget, Coalition Minister for GNI target became a political proxy in 2012 for contests Foreign Affairs Andrew Peacock was opposed to the within the Christian Democrat party in the Netherlands changes (Corbett 2017). (Day 2017). Or in Australia, internal factionalism between Some authors who focus on structural constraints and conservatives and moderates in the Liberal party in 2013 modelling of aid volumes acknowledge that there are limits made aid a proxy for other struggles, with Abbot’s to attempting to predict aid flows in different countries conservative faction ultimately driving through large cuts to based only on structural determinants. For example, Jones the aid budget. (2015, 41) argues that there is ‘substantial heterogenitiy in In this sense, Day (2017) and Corbett (2017) emphasise the aid supply behaviour both between countries and over time’. need for a nuanced understanding of the relationship There is no way of accurately predicting the responses of between structure and agency in aid policy. International countries (Jones 2015). and domestic structures and institutions form the conditions The influence of individual actors within which aid policy is made, yet powerful individual aid advocates, or aid sceptics, can shape aid policy. For the Structural factors, both international and domestic, are AA&PP this debate around the role of structures or clearly important in influencing levels of foreign aid. Yet individual agents in shaping aid policy is central. understanding increases or decreases in volumes of aid requires analysis of specific country cases, and the role of The AA&PP is grounded in the belief that changes in the individual political actors within them. A number of authors knowledge, attitudes and behaviours of political actors can explore the interaction between structures and institutions, influence commitments to Australian foreign aid. Based on and the agency of individuals in forming aid policy (Corbett the aid literature and the perspectives of aid experts in 2017); (Day 2016)(Lundsgaarde 2012)(Spratt 2017) (Szent- Australia, there is evidence to support this core assumption. Iványi and Lightfoot 2015). However, this leads to a crucial further question about who is able to influence aid policy? To what extent can the Corbett (2017) takes a ‘court politics’ approach emphasising parliamentarians involved in the AA&PP realistically the role of ‘intentional agents who make consequential influence aid policy? decisions’ and how ‘key actors have sought (and, in some cases, been incredibly successful) to manufacture legitimacy Who can influence aid policy? for the aid effort in the absence of strong popular support’ The process by which aid commitments are (Corbett 2017). decided means decision making power is Meanwhile, Day (2017) explores aid policy in Australia, the centred around party leaders. Netherlands and UK comparing their profound changes in Parliamentarians may be able to influence aid policy trajectory in 2013 – Australia initiating substantial aid volumes, but only in a limited and cuts, the UK reaching the 0.7 GNI target and the Netherlands abandoning a 0.7 GNI target. Day (2017) indirect way. argues that states change the trajectory of their aid policy Individual actors may be able to influence aid policy, but this ‘when powerful individual political actors pay sustained does not mean that any shifts in individual attitudes and attention to aid policy issues.’ He suggests that ‘major aid behaviour will lead to policy change. Who is involved policy change is driven by senior political figures, usually matters significantly. Aid issues reach the agenda only when individuals at the party leader level’ (Day 2017). Unlike most political actors are personally motivated to give attention policy issues, aid rarely, if ever, reaches the political agenda and priority to aid policy and expend political capital on the through rising as a public priority, a bottom up process. Aid is issue. Yet in order for aid policy to enter the political a low issue salience (Day 2017) which means that it reaches agenda, these actors also need to have significant levels of the political agenda through top down actor driven decision making power. processes.

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• Within the aid policymaking system, who are In the United Kingdom, in the Cameron-Clegg Government, these powerful individuals? there was similar centralisation of aid policy decisions, • And to what extent can parliamentarians influence though this time resulting in sharp increases in aid spending. The ‘Quad’ - which functioned as an inner cabinet of the aid policy? Cameron-Clegg Government - was comprised of Prime This section outlines the potential influence of different Minister David Cameron, Chancellor of the Exchequer actors on aid decision-making; the executive and ERC, George Osborne (Conservative), Deputy Prime Minister parliamentarians, the bureaucracy, and the aid constituency. Nick Clegg (Liberal Democrat), and Treasury Secretary Danny Alexander (Liberal Democrat). This group The Executive and the Expenditure Review Committee committed to the 0.7 percent of GNI target – and ultimately In his analysis of aid policymaking in Australia, (Rosser 2008) ring fenced this commitment in the parliament. Day (2017) argues that ‘it is the executive arm of government that has argues that this was primarily through the personal dominated aid policy-making in Australia, reflecting the commitment of David Cameron and his presence within this nature of the foreign policy process in general’ Rosser decision-making body. (2008). Foreign policy decisions in Australia, including aid Parliamentarians spending, do not often require approval from parliament. This is in stark contrast to the United States where the Aid literature, and evidence from the AA&PP, point toward Congress has far more control over foreign policy decision aid budget decision making in Australia being centred making (Lancaster 2008), or the UK where aid spending is around a select few political elites. In contrast, Members of now legislated. Parliament who are not part of the party leadership, have far less scope to influence aid commitments. The institutions of parliamentary democracy in Australia make the process of deciding aid commitments far more This was apparent in interviews with current and former centralised. (Rosser 2008) argues that aid policymaking in parliamentarians, and aid experts, who portrayed only Australia: limited scope for backbench parliamentarians, particularly those in opposition, to influence aid policy. A Labor MP ‘has tended to involve only a small group of people: reflected that, ‘advocates of aid often see the meeting in my members of the Cabinet (most notably the Minister office with me as the culmination of what they have been of Foreign Affairs), Parliamentary Secretaries that doing’. Yet he suggested that his own influence on aid deal with international development issues, senior budget decision making was heavily constrained and that aid officials in AusAID, officials in the offices of the advocates needed an engagement strategy that was more Minster of Foreign Affairs and relevant Parliamentary sophisticated and able to target party elites, especially secretaries, and a few trusted outsiders’. conservatives. As noted earlier in this report, the Expenditure Review Despite the constraints facing parliamentarians it is still Committee (ERC) is a highly centralised decision-making possible that they can influence aid commitments in an group and its role is crucial to the process of deciding indirect or long-term way. The example of the UK points to foreign aid commitments. A former Labor MP interviewed the influence of a broader cohort of pro-development MPs in for this report said that the institutions of budget decision the Conservative party. Day (2017, 203) notes that when making in Australia meant that ‘funding allocations are not the Conservative party were elected in 2010 – with stated made democratically’ – there is little participation of commitment to the 0.7 target - 10% of the Conservative parliamentarians in budget decisions, especially around an caucus in the House of Commons (30 of 306) had taken part issue with low public salience, such as aid. in the Umubano development project in Rwanda and Sierra The Abbott government is a crucial case study of the Leone. centralised nature of aid budget decision making. Several Broader MP support for aid may not be sufficient for aid participants in this research argued that during the Abbott budget increases, yet it can create the conditions by which government, as the conservative wing of the Liberal party pro-aid political leaders, such as Kevin Rudd, can bring aid controlled the ERC, they were able to make rapid cuts to higher on the policy agenda. A former Labor MP suggested the aid budget. While Julie Bishop reportedly attempted to that while it is challenging to raise the attention of party minimise the aid cuts of 2013, she ‘came to understand that leaders to issues of aid, it is possible for parliamentarians to she was not able to wield influence in the ERC’ (Day 2017, exert some influence through submissions to the Minister for 170). Even amongst senior ministers there is a distinction Foreign Affairs, or parliamentary committees, related to aid. between those with decision making power on the ERC, and those outside the ERC. The influence of parliamentarians must also be considered over the longer term. Current backbench or junior MPs may

12 INFLUENCING AUSTRALIAN AID: The Australian Aid and Parliament Project

fill senior positions in the future. For example, Nationals MP were developed during subsequent governments (Corbett Darren Chester MP and Liberal MP Dan Tehan - who are 2017). AA&PP alumni – went from the backbench to Ministerial While bureaucrats can exert an upward pressure on aid roles in the Turnbull government. And while levels of MP commitments, they can also exert downward pressure, in influence may be curtailed in opposition, strategic decisions particular through the role of Treasury and Finance. A about policy platforms are often made in that period. In former Labor MP said that Treasury and Finance officials 2007 Kevin Rudd – then opposition leader - used the commonly viewed international aid simply as an ‘an opposition ERC to lock his planned aid increases into the expenditure to be minimised’. Corbett (2017) also highlights Labor policy platform (Day 2017). Meanwhile, Senator Penny decades of consistent opposition of Treasury and Finance to Wong announced in early 2018 that the Labor Party has a increasing the foreign aid budget, irrespective of economic group of parliamentarians engaged in designing Labor’s circumstances. He describes the reluctance of Treasury and policy on development assistance (Wong 2018). Six of the Finance officials to commit to long term expenditure for aid nine parliamentarians in this group are AA&PP alumni. recipients and their antipathy toward ‘welfare’ for poorer There are also examples of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ - who countries (Corbett 2017). For example, at the time of the were not part of an executive decision-making group - who 1986-7 budget the head of AIDAB suggested a 3.6 percent influenced aid commitments. In the Netherlands, Geert increase to aid budget (to ensure that the GNI percentage Wilders, the populist leader of the far-right Party for of aid allocations would not fall). Within the ERC budget Freedom was able to reframe aid in the Netherlands as an making process Treasury officials disagreed and advocated ‘elite hobby’ of the cultural and political elite (Day 2017). He for only a one percent increase (Corbett 2017). was not in the central circle of political power but could Development constituency and public influence present a sustained and successful attack on aid. Meanwhile, in New Zealand, Pat Webster, executive director of the While bureaucratic elites have played significant roles in Council for International Development in the 1990s, played influencing both increases and decreases in aid a significant role in increasing commitments to foreign aid commitments, the role of the development constituency in (Spratt 2017). She was a former Labour party senior vice forming aid policy is less clear. Rosser (2008) argues that president and used her connections and understanding of the domestic aid constituency have been largely excluded political systems to develop the Labour Party’s aid election from participation in the policy-making process. manifesto (Spratt 2017). More broadly though, there are indications that the global Bureaucracy development constituency does have some influence in Australian aid policymaking, both in relation to quality and Beyond the executive and parliamentarians, there is a quantity. For example, in the last decade gender has been central role for the bureaucracy in influencing levels of more prominent in Australian aid policy due to international Australian aid. In multi country analyses of aid policymaking shifts in development thinking (Kilby and Olivieri 2008). (Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot 2015) and (Lancaster 2008) Meanwhile, Jones (2015) highlights that Prime Minister highlight the influence of bureaucrats in aid decision making, Howard’s 2005 announcement of a commitment to the goal especially where parliamentarians and party leaders are of 0.5 per cent of GNI in aid spending was in a broader poorly informed about aid. Corbett (2017) also highlights context of growing OECD aid spending. the role of bureaucratic elites in Australia in informing aid policy decision making. Within the global development constituency however, Australia has primarily played a peripheral role. Rosser When significant changes have occurred in aid policy it was (2016) argues that the Australian government has tended to often due to alignment of a small number of bureaucrats be a ‘consumer’ rather than a ‘producer’ of development and the executive in a commitment to aid. Corbett (2017) policy ideas and therefore has tended to follow international describes how during the Whitlam government there were trends in aid policy, especially within the OECD. This is one several high-level bureaucrats, such as Nancy Viviani, the significant difference between the UK and Australia. Day Committee Secretary for the Joint Parliamentary (2016) suggests that in the UK there is greater circulation of Committee on Foreign Affairs at the time, who worked people between government, academia and NGOs and together to drive several reforms. Centralised decision therefore more active interaction between the global making, and alignment of bureaucracy and executive, can be development constituency and the UK government. In a two-edged sword however, both precipitating change but contrast, Australia is more ‘siloed’ (Day 2016). also leaving those changes vulnerable. The substantial reforms under Whitlam and Rudd were both vulnerable due Overall, even though many individuals in the development to the highly centralised way in which aid commitments constituency in Australia are highly committed to greater

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foreign aid volumes, their potential to influence aid policy is which citizens, backbench parliamentarians, or even heavily constrained. Ministers in Cabinet who are not part of the ERC, can influence budget decision making. Increases in aid volumes in What then of public opinion and pressure for increasing aid Australia can only be expected if there are advocates for commitments? Specific events - such as the 1970s anti-war increased foreign aid – motivated either by personal movement, the Ethiopian famine in the early 1980s, or the commitment or political calculation – in the highest levels of Boxing Day tsunami of 2004 – have undoubtedly galvanised political power. public support for aid at particular moments (Corbett 2017). A former Labor MP described a moment in the 2000s where How can aid policy be influenced? there was a ‘bottom up surge’ of support for aid commitments around the Make Poverty History campaign. The legitimacy of foreign aid amongst These created an environment where the Howard and Rudd political elites in Australia can be built governments had a base of public support to make through promoting multiple arguments for significant increases to aid commitments. Meanwhile, surveys aid. Though the danger in promoting a of Australian aid show broad public support for the aid range of justifications amongst elites – program. Burkot and Wood (2015) found that 75 percent of including social justice, economic, or Australians approved or strongly approved of Australia security concerns - is that no coherent giving foreign aid to poorer countries. overall rationale for the aid program is Yet despite significant efforts by NGOs around the world to developed. raise public support for foreign aid, scholarship on aid policy in OECD countries is generally pessimistic about the For the AA&PP the goal of increasing Australia’s influence of public opinion (McDonnell, Lecomte, and commitment to foreign aid relies on mounting a range of Wegimont 2003b; Otter 2003) arguments that resonate with different decision makers. This is supported by Corbett’s (2017) analysis of Australian aid In particular, it is important to note that approval of foreign which describes how the legitimacy of foreign aid has ebbed aid in public opinion surveys does not necessarily indicate and flowed over time as it has been manufactured or decisive support. In Burkot and Wood's (2015) study undermined by political elites. This has meant that multiple, mentioned above, 64 percent of respondents were also and at times conflicting, arguments have been employed to satisfied with the Abbott government’s decision to freeze the support the aid budget. It is important to note however, that aid budget. As Hudson and vanHeerde-Hudson (2012) point arguments for aid cannot be easily differentiated along out, even if stated public support for aid is high, this does not party lines – the assumption that Labor emphasises social necessarily ‘translate into political support’ as aid often has justice arguments while the Coalition focuses on national low salience in the eyes of citizens compared to more interest. In fact, aid reviews during both Labor and Coalition immediately relevant domestic issues. McDonnell, Lecomte, periods of government have attempted to balance aims of and Wegimont (2003, 1) conclude that trying to link ‘levels of poverty reduction and economic and security interests of public support with ODA levels almost inevitably leads to Australia (Corbett 2016). the conclusion that the former does not have a direct influence on the latter’. Corbett (2017) suggests that support for Australia’s aid program has been ‘manufactured’ through key arguments This report argues that aid is an unusual policy realm in related to policy legitimacy, technical legitimacy and Australia, and one centred on executive led decision-making administrative legitimacy. by a small group of political leaders and bureaucrats. The AA&PP targets parliamentarians and has demonstrated First the legitimacy of aid amongst key decision makers can potential in shifting knowledge attitudes and behaviour of be developed through focussing on policy. Corbett (2017) MPs. The ability of MPs alone to shift aid policy through the argues that it has been crucial for advocates of the aid mechanism of parliament may be limited however. The key program to articulate ‘the way that aid supports a vision of potential of the AA&PP approach is in targeting individuals Australia’s place in the world’. These visions can be based on who may, in the future, enter into the highly constrained aid ‘distant interests’ such as global social justice, or ‘close policymaking domain. interests’ such as domestic concerns in donor countries (Spratt 2017), for example for economic growth or national For aid policy advocacy programs more generally, an security. Multiple and diverging arguments may, in sum, understanding of the budget process is relevant in that it manufacture legitimacy for foreign aid amongst decision reveals the highly centralised way in which aid volumes are making elites. The experience of the AA&PP in conducting determined by government. Generating support at all levels exposure visits also demonstrates that different kinds of – from citizens to political leaders - for international aid may policy arguments resonate with different parliamentarians. have value. However, there are only indirect mechanisms by 14 INFLUENCING AUSTRALIAN AID: The Australian Aid and Parliament Project

Along with policy legitimacy, Corbett (2017) suggests that any argument which leads to an increase in aid there is also technical legitimacy for foreign aid based in the commitments is valuable. If, rather, the goal is to increase specialised knowledge of aid agency personnel - the Australian aid quality and effectiveness, then more international community of practice around aid agencies coherence of argument is required. and NGOs, and the standards of professional development Several informants in this study however, suggested that practice. The international agenda around ‘aid effectiveness’ arguments for aid legitimacy are not necessarily mutually – with its emphasis on ownership, harmonisation, and exclusive or conflicting. It may be possible, one former mutual accountability - has been a central part of this AusAID official argued, to construct a coherent ‘narrative’ technical legitimacy of aid. Not only might aid contribute to about international development which incorporates both a vision of Australia’s place in the world, it must be effective social justice and national interest arguments and connects in achieving the immediate goals it is intended to achieve. At with political elites. Corbett (2017) is right to suggest that times Australia’s aid program has been reviewed and judged social justice and national interest arguments are often to be technically deficient, for example in the Jackson framed by their advocates in ways that are in tension. Yet review, and this has been an impetus to emphasise aid this does not preclude the possibility of manufacturing further in foreign policy debates. At other times, there has support for aid that draws together different kinds of policy been criticism, for example during the Rudd government, arguments. that Australian aid agencies have been ‘captured’ by international standards and the global development sector, rather than national interest (Corbett 2017). Finally, Corbett (2017) argues that support for the aid program requires administrative legitimacy -related to managing program risk, which primarily serves to protect the political interests of ministry or senior staff. This however leaves a tension between carefully coordinating aid efforts with other parts of foreign policy, so as to minimise risk for the Minister, and at the same time having a coherent and effective development impact. Overall, Corbett concludes that the absence of strong popular support will always present limits to government aid programs, so there is a need to manufacture legitimacy in other ways. Australian aid will always be ‘hostage’ to political fortunes (Corbett 2017). In this sense, multiple and at times divergent arguments must be mounted with different political elites to support ongoing commitments to foreign aid in Australia. The AA&PP contributes, though not necessarily systematically, to promoting each of these types of policy, technical and administrative arguments for aid. The challenge is though that while multiple diverging arguments may be required to gain elite support for the growth of aid budgets, this can be in tension with aid effectiveness (Lancaster 2008; Day 2016; Rosser 2008; Corbett 2017). If aid is justified for its multiple purposes then it is challenging for programs to be effective in any one of those realms (Corbett 2017). For example, in practice the aid program may be divided between, on one hand, a focus on good grassroots development practice and social justice and, on the other hand, activities that serve Australia’s security interests. This leaves the aid program open to criticism about its aims. Strategic studies expert Hugh White (2011) argues that there is ‘fuzzy thinking’ about how aid serves Australia’s national interests. If the goal is to increase aid volumes, then

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to be the case with all political and bureaucratic elites who STRATEGIC QUESTIONS FOR are making key budget decisions around aid. Should social justice arguments for aid be presented to parliamentarians ADVOCACY ON AUSTRALIAN AID and political and bureaucratic elites more strongly in a hope that they will increasingly resonate? Or on the other hand, The aim of this report is to catalyse new conversations as several members of parliament and aid experts argued, about aid advocacy in Australia by examining the politics of should the aid constituency change the nature of aid policymaking and particularly through exploring the engagement with political and bureaucratic elites and example of the Australian Aid and Parliament Project. The devote more energy to developing pragmatic, and national report stresses that foreign aid is a unique area of interest focussed, arguments for aid? policymaking and that aid advocates, including in the AA&PP, must tailor their efforts in response to this. Decision 2. To what extent should aid quantity making about aid volumes is highly centralised around (and overall targets for aid volume) political and bureaucratic elites, leaving the general public and aid constituency with limited voice. Even be a focus of aid advocacy? parliamentarians, unless they sit within the ERC, have only Australia’s foreign aid spending is currently at a historic low indirect influence on aid decision making. point and therefore it is a legitimate point of advocacy for Recognising the highly centralised nature of aid the aid constituency. Of significant concern in this research policymaking does not however mean that aid organisations however was the almost universal recognition that aid and individuals should not continue to advocate for more targets - such as the 0.5 percent of GNI target – have aid. Rather, this report argues that aid advocates must limited potency amongst political elites. A former Labor MP target their efforts more strategically toward key decision – who had been supportive of the aid scale up during the makers. Recognition of this context of decision making Rudd government - said that the 0.5 percent GNI target around aid commitments reveals four strategic questions for now had almost no ‘political resonance’. Meanwhile, a advocacy programs such as the AA&PP. Nationals MP and alumni of the AA&PP said that a focus on volume is less likely to get ‘traction’ amongst political elites 1. To what extent should the aid than specific tangible projects. Parliamentarians and aid constituency continue to focus experts suggested that while aid targets may have had some primarily on social justice arguments? momentum in Australia in the 2000s, they now held little sway amongst current political elites. Social justice arguments, and the technical legitimacy of aid, Several participants in this study instead pointed toward dominate discussion of aid policy amongst NGOs, academics possibilities of addressing quantities of aid, not through and concerned citizens in Australia. Aid is often considered overall targets but rather through addressing different to be important within this constituency, as it is effective and necessary ‘building blocks’ of an effective aid program. For supports Australia’s role as a good international citizen. example, calls for more aid could focus on specific sectors or Based on surveys, Wood (2018) also finds that the ‘good countries and highlight the value and effectiveness of these international citizen’ argument resonates most with the individual components rather than an overall figure related Australian public - with more than seventy percent of to GNI. Australians favouring a ‘humanitarian’ rationale for the aid program. The aid constituency has however, been reluctant Whether total volumes or ‘building blocks’, the danger of a to engage in wider foreign policy debates around Australia’s primary advocacy focus on aid volumes is that it avoids the national interest and the economic or security benefits of aid profoundly changing nature of global development. One (Day 2016). former AusAID bureaucrat lamented the engagement of the aid constituency with the public, and with policy makers, Aid policy change requires alignment of structures and arguing that when NGOs or aid advocates talk about aid institutions with powerful individuals who are motivated by there is an overemphasis on aid budget over quality. He particular arguments for or against aid. By limiting the suggested that more important than aid volume was more scope of pro-aid arguments, advocacy programs may fail to ‘intellectual resources’ engaged in creating some policy resonate with political or bureaucratic elites who have the coherence around the goal of aid in solving developmental capacity to support aid policy change. problems. What then is the next step for advocates of Australian aid? Similarly, Day (2016) argues that NGOs and individual Mobilising support for aid within the aid constituency and activists need to move away from talking about aid inputs, amongst the Australian public is likely best served by or specific targets related to Australia’s GNI. As emphasising its social justice role. However, this is unlikely international aid is increasingly dwarfed by other funding 16 INFLUENCING AUSTRALIAN AID: The Australian Aid and Parliament Project

flows - of investment, remittances and loans - he suggests a Several participants argued however that the value of move from promoting ‘aid policy’ to promoting bipartisan agreement depends on the agreement itself. In ‘development policy’. Achieving development goals other words, if major parties all agree to historic low levels increasingly relies on more than just aid (Day 2016) and of aid then it would be unlikely that the aid constituency Australia’s actions in non-aid areas, such as trade, would be satisfied. The call for a ‘bipartisan’ strategy, and environmental protection, and labour mobility, may have removing the ‘politics’ from aid policy, can also be a political greater impact on communities in less wealthy countries. tactic in itself, designed to reduce scrutiny on political party Rather than focussing just on aid inputs he argues for policy. ‘cultivating a more far ranging and robust discussion about To what extent should aid advocates be attempting to foster aid and development (Day 2016). greater political competition and debate about aid policy? Fostering such as discussion however may not be realistic This is a key consideration as different advocacy efforts may for a public audience with low levels of knowledge about aid, work at cross purposes. While some organisations may be let alone about aid’s connection to foreign policy goals. One attempting to foster political party competition around aid aid expert suggested that public campaigning on aid should policy, others may be attempting to build less politicised and continue to focus on simple issue based or aid volume bipartisan commitments to aid. messages. Detailed questions of aid quality and purpose may be important in engaging with elite decision makers, he 4. How can aid education and argued, but these discussions are more suited to advocacy be funded in the long term? ‘bureaucrats’ and ‘boffins’. One of the key conclusions from this report is that diffuse Developing more robust debate about aid and development public campaigning alone is highly unlikely to influence aid will also be challenging given the shedding of development commitments. Aid policymaking is a uniquely centralised expertise in DFAT in the last five years (Wood, Burkot, and process. However, if aid advocacy in Australia increasingly Howes 2017). Several key informants interviewed in this engages with political and bureaucratic elites, such as report stressed that there needs to be greater investment – through the AA&PP, then this entails higher costs through by the aid constituency and the Department of Foreign greater professional or academic engagement and tailored Affairs and Trade itself - in fostering debate about how aid programs, such as exposure visits. Fostering support for aid constructively supports broader development and foreign will require new sources of funding. policy goals. One option for support of advocacy to aid policy decision 3. Is the goal of advocacy to politicise makers is through NGOs or private providers raising aid as a policy issue? combined advocacy funding. Wood (2016) argues that if NGOs dedicated 0.7 percent of the income that they There is also little agreement within the aid constituency received from private donations, then that would raise about the aim of advocacy and whether or not to politicise almost $7 million for aid advocacy and education. aid as a policy issue? Is the aim for aid advocates to create In contrast, McDonnell, Lecomte, and Wegimont (2003) political party competition around aid policy, and leverage argue that it is the responsibility of OECD donor aid the election cycle to focus on particular aid commitments? agencies, such as Australia’s DFAT, to support the profile of Or alternatively, is the aim of aid advocacy to make aid less aid. They argue that donor agencies do not allocate nearly of a partisan issue? In her address at the Australasian Aid enough resources to increasing public or government Conference, Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs Penny awareness around the benefits of aid. Campaigns in Europe Wong (Wong 2018) said that a Labor government commits have called for greater allocation of resources to education to ‘increase investment beyond current levels’. She went on around foreign aid, for example calling for 3 per cent of to say however, that she would much prefer ‘to take all of the ODA in Norway, 2 per cent of ODA in Germany to be politics out of aid, and have the Government join with us in a spent on public awareness (McDonnell, Lecomte, and bipartisan commitment to rebuilding Australia’s aid and Wegimont 2003a). Should DFAT itself take a far greater role development programs’ (emphasis added). Similarly, a in supporting parliamentarians and other members of Liberal MP and alumni of the AA&PP argued that aid government to increase their knowledge about Australian advocates need to ‘get the balance right’ and that if aid? advocates ‘speak out too much’ they could do ‘more harm than good’. Or more candidly, another Liberal MP said that if aid became more of a partisan issue then the aid constituency would almost certainly ‘lose’.

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CONCLUSION In an era of heavy cuts to aid, aid volume is a legitimate focus for aid constituency lobbying. This report has argued however, that these efforts need to be more closely tailored to build impact in the highly centralised realm of aid policymaking. The unique nature of aid policymaking and the ‘accountability gap’ makes aid advocacy unlike many other areas of campaigning. The primacy of elite level decision making in aid policy – and the limited salience of social justice arguments - is challenging for the aid constituency to recognise as it cuts against the grain of the sector’s values and approaches. Ultimately, more effective advocacy on aid policy will require new strategic reflection about the rationale for aid itself. In this sense, this report has also argued that aid volumes cannot be the end of the story for aid advocates. Even if aid flows from Australia were to grow, there are deeper questions about how aid fits within Australia’s broader foreign policy, and especially how non-aid areas, such as trade, environmental protection, and labour mobility, contribute to development goals. The aim of this report is to stimulate new discussion around advocacy on aid commitments. Ultimately though the aid constituency in Australia must bridge their engagement with the Australian government toward addressing deeper questions of Australia’s role in global development.

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Minerva Access is the Institutional Repository of The University of Melbourne

Author/s: Wells, T

Title: Influencing Australian Aid

Date: 2018

Citation: Wells, T. (2018). Influencing Australian Aid. Save the Children.

Persistent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11343/218172

File Description: Published version