RESTRICTED FILE COPY Report No. AW-12a

This report was prepared for use within the Bank and its affiliated organizations. Public Disclosure Authorized They do not accept responsibility for its accuracy or completeness. The report may not be published nor may it be quoted as representing their views.

INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION Public Disclosure Authorized

THE ECONOMY

OF

THE GAMBIA Public Disclosure Authorized

December 3, 1969 Public Disclosure Authorized

Western Africa Department CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

Currency Unit - Gambian pound (1)

US$1 = o.417 1 = US$2.ho Gambian pound 1 pound sterling 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page_,No. BAJIC TA

'-AP (Tranlsport)

SUI4MARY AND CONCLUSIONS - vi

THE ECONOMY OF 1

I. Introduction 1

A. The Country and the People 1

B. Political Background 2

C. Structure of the Economy 3

D. Employment, ages, and Prices 4

E. Recent Economic Growth 4

F. Balance of Payments 7

II. Development and Prospects for the Principal Sectors 9

A. Agriculture, Livestock, Fishing 9

General 9

Groundnuts IC

Palm Kernels 14

Lime 14

Millet 14

Rice 15

Livestock 18

Fishing 18

Forestry 19

B. Manufacturing and Power 19

C. Transport 20

Port of Bathurst 20

River Transport 21

Road Transport 21 Page No.

D. Tourism 22

E. Education 23

III. Money and Banking 25

A. Banking Institutions 25

B. Short Term Credit 26

C. Long Term Credit 27

IV. Public Finance 27

A. Structure 27

B. Present Situation and Past Developments 30

C. Development Planning and Public Development Outlays 32

D. Treasury, Public Debt, and Foreign Aid 3$

V. Prospects and Creditworthiness 37

GDP 37

Foreign Trade 38

Public Sector 38

1-46 STATISTCAL ANNEX: 'fables

The This is the first Economic Report prepared by the Bank on The Gambia Gambia. It was drafted by a mission which visited in December 196o and was composed of:

Heinz Bachmann

Paul Floret (consultant) ABBREVIATIONS USED

CDC: Commonwealth Development Corporation A British public institution financing and managing investment projects in the British Commonwealth

CD&W: Colonial Development and Welfare Scheme British development aid to colonies

E (in tables): Estimates

GCB: The Gambia Currency Board

GCCBMU: The Gambia Central Cooperative Banking and Marketing Union A Bank and a groundnut marketing company, owned by the local agricultural cooperatives

GOiMB: The Gambia Oilseed Marketing Board The Government groundnut export monopoly

GRTC: The Gambia River Transport Company Jointly owned by the big tr ding companies and GOMB

ODI. :inistry of C*orsa,a Development A ministry of the British Government

OSAS: Overseas Service Aid Scheme An entity of the British Government providing assistance to developing countries

PWD: Public Works Department

UAC: United Africa Company A subsidiary of Unilever and the biggest private trading ccmpany in The Gambia

WACB: West African Currency Board Predecessor of GCB on a regional level

WAPCB: West African Produce Control Board Predecessor of GOIE operating on a regional level THE GAMBIA

BASIC DATA

Area: 4.,000 square miles

Population: (1968 estimate) 347,000

Rate of growth: 1-2 per cent

Density: 83 per square mile

Political status: Independent since February 1965 Member of the British Commonwealth Member of the Sterling Zone

Gross Domestic Product (at factor costs):

Estimates 1961 1964 1965 1967/68

at current prices - million £ 9.3 9.8 11.1 11.5

-average growth /3.3% p.a./

possible price r ise /0 .5 - 1% p .a./ per c-4pit;, - US $ 85 885.5 95.0 80.3 Structure (1965 estimates) Agriculture, livestock, fishing 53.2 Manufacturing 7.2 Construction 4.5 Trade, transport 12.6 Other services 3.6 Public authorities 18.9

100.0

Central Government Finance (in million £) 1964 1965/66 1966/67 1967/68

Total current revenues 2.0 2.7 3.3 3.0 Total current expenditures 2.5 2.5 2.7 3.2 Deficit of current budget (- = surplus) 0.5 -0.2 -0.6 0.2

Development expenditures 0.8 1.3 1.1 1.0

Total deficit 1.3 1.1 0.5 1.2 financed from: British aid 1.0 1.5 0.6 0.8 local loans 0.2 - - - Treasury reserves (- = increase) 0.1 -0.4 -0.1 0.I BASIC DATA : Page 2

Mfoney and Credit (in million £) Dec. 1965 Dec. 1966 Dec. 1967

Total money supply 2.6 2.9 3.0 Quasi-money 0.3 0.4 0.4 Credit to private sector 2.6 2.6 3.1

Balance of Payments Lstimates (in million £)

1961 1965 1966 1967

Imports 4.7 5.8 6.3 6.8 Exports 4.4 5.6 6.3 6.8

Trade Balance -0.3 -0.2 - - Net services -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 Net transfers -0.7 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8

Current Account Balance -1.2 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1

Commodity Concentration of Exports

1961 1965 1966/67 1967/68

Groundnuts (including processed) 96.6' 96.8-1 97.1! 96.9%

Foreign Exchange Reserves (US $ million)

Dec. 1965 Dec. 1966 Dec. 1967

Gross reserves (currency board)!/ 4.7 55 415 Net reserves 1/ 0.3 2.0 1.2 onth's imporTs (gross reserves) 10 10. 8

I? Position (US $ million)

December 1968 - Quota: 5.0 Drawings: -

External Public Debt (US $ million)

June 1965 June 1966 June 1967 June 1968

Total debt outstanding including undisbursed 1.0 1.0 0.9 2.h Total debt service - 0.005 0.005 0.007 Debt service ratio (over exports) - 0.o01- 0.03% 105% Group Operations: None

1/ Excluding foreign exchange holdings of the Treasury and Groundnut Export 16nopoly (GOMB), estimatecl at . million ($ .5 million) in Decfmber 1967. ¯ ® ® bU S ³ .. ¤ `® К´ J .CK В¿kеlа¿е M4UR1TANIA ¸¿ео¿v ¿е¡. е °_°°° е ° е » ° а о е е е е º°о³ ³ё е °  ¼аi ³¿, ³ о»ºа¸ SENEGA º4Y',l °" ³ ~ ^.. ' `  Á»¼² ' ¤ `1 ¼ ´ L I ¿ ¢ '. j \ е ³о о² r ¼Åо ²issau ь¸ГёаS ti J ,. П Oot Г ро¿о Ii О ' ®® NOUNGHEUL GUINEA ±.' r JQQF' ¡ М ¡ А ¿¸½³¿. ¿³ ° V . е 5 \\\ 1 ¢ i A > I ³²Áеiоw½ ¸ь,- ; ³ , ´АQ \\\ \ /i АСр ¿(, е § ¸`£ , COAST ³6HANA ¸о¸² еА º³ е Q ' р Ë \\\` .` ,ry ... 9 l ³Ï ' . ./ / ` ' ` º´ss ³¿¿Â . 4³ ' \ Iu G »¸ .. , а²Âаа½ е ¿о¿³¿о¿ . А а ½ 1 \ ... . >  . . ² ' I' V . ' а ½ r i Á о Á е´ ¸ Р '. 0 ` . ² ! , ¸е¿¿ º¸¸Ân¸² О _ ° ё \ l. / l ` . ¼а¸о е ².¸ ' __ º¿l¿³о _'_ _'_ -.-. . v _._ ; 1 , οе . - а¿. ¿,¿ . . . Î ³¿-³²¿¿i Ооа¸о¿а оа¿w¸¸ Kora / ¸е¸¿qÅ ¸i Å¿е , о ´ Â5²¿¸ ' 6ETOWN ' . \. ` ³ , .,, ²аао r . О Â Æ suwxaea . °G » Ë i . , . Kunloir КЕНЕW´И - - .f Ка ÁПа , 1 \ \\. . i - SomJObN¿EO à TNURST ' su TonloteD MansaKonk / ^" BqNSqNC Kosoi Ко1 ¿lа¿ 1 - оÂо¿¸w¿³ е» » °PO°° - - По ´аÁv²¿¿ i ' Kwinello ^ .°-. ½ . Å .^ ` DÈ eilan m ail ³FоΠ% ' V( } ½ - .. . - KarantaEa / _ /`. à ._. ` W1' Á . ... 514 ² -_i -- ' io Nossan Q " + р ё е \ ´р .` ..4' В l А 4 J obal I `` DiomaИOU1o \ S АИ¢ААI .//"а ._ /

v . ' °0 ² \0' 6 ¸ ¿ _.. _ ¿q ´ ° » ° М . р .\ Gomcis 1J 1 ² ` е / ³9' f. /l ¢ е ""i ¤ °` j / а »  е I ' L.% . re » _' ³ / Q Gunlur '-'--'-'-'-'-'---'-'-'-'-'-' е¸¸ь´²´ / v ¼²е¿¿Á ºа ¸¿ n q 5 р ²²Â¼ ´F´KOUROU § 1 1 ¸ р ¤ F » ® ® »» ` Ва¸¿lПА¿ 4.,v _r ¡  : »»° '.. Гs l¹ G°, 4ilin Иi e? » Á

о о о о о оо PAVEO RO´DS _-- - _ КOIDA ¤ »Â ?³ _ - ³ OTMER PRINCIPALR04DS } В1G¸О§А ² - / , ¸ - ® SECONOARYROA05 ! } + ё, о s о io zo ²о 5EDH10U - M1LE5- DёCEMBEF 19 ¬9 IBRG 2666 А SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

General

1 With a population of 350.,000., The Gambia is among the smallest nations in Africa. It is a generally well administered country, enjoying remarkable political stability. The Government follows a conservative and cautious financial policy; it has proven its ability to formulate realistic development plans and to adhere to them during execution. The climate for private investments - foreign and local - is good., but the Small size of the market limits private investments in manufacturing and services. Foreign trade and exchange regulations are liberal,, salaries are low and there is little interference of the public administration in the private sector.

2. Public services and transport infrastructure - on a very rudi- mentary level 25 years ago - have sharply expanded since 1945but the economic and sociological situation in The Gambia's mast important sector - agriculture - has hardly changed. Techniques remain predomi- nantly traditional., based on shifting cultivat4onand require extensive fallow. Government intervention in this sector has been small., limited mainly to groundnut marketing and some research. The administration has little knowledge of what is going on in agriculture and what should and could be done to stimulate output. Research is not sufficiently advanced to provide adequate guidance to Covernment and farmers, the Department of Agriculture is understaffed and the agricultural extension service is in- sufficient in number to have a significant impact on development. The only real achievement in this sector is the creation and successful ex- pansion of agricultural cooperatives., which are well run and increasingly active in ground-ut marketing. They are at present not used to channel productive credit into agriculture or to assist otherwise in the promotion of agricultural production,, but might well be used in the future for such purposes.

3. Population growth is not very high., estimated at 1-2% per year., and no increase in growth rate was experienced over the last 30 years. The considerable number of foreigners coming to The Gambia every year to culti- vate groundnuts during the rainy season (reaching about 10% of active male population) indicates that a limited amount of good agricultural land is still unutilized by the local population,, although population density is relatively high.

Past Economic Growth and Present Situation

4. The short rainy season (5 months) and poor soi.1s are the main factors determining agricultural potential. Non-irrigated agriculture is restricted to crops with short vegetative cycles (Tqith some possibilities for tree crops) and demands extended periods of fallow. Traditionally., The Gambia was a millet countrywith some produced along the river and up-land. During the first half of the 19th century., groundnut culti- vation was introduced and soon became a major activity of local farmers. - ii -

Today, the economy has a strong monocultural bias as production, processing, and iandling of ground:auts account for about one-third of GDP aid for over 9' of exports. The sha fluct ,uations in groundnut output (depending mainly on eather .conditio.is) introduced an element of instability into the economy. Main staple foods are illet and rice; rice production has substantially in- creased in the past 10 years, but remains insufficient to cover the growing local demand.

5. Between 1945 and 1964 value of groundnut exports increased by about 6% per year, with growth in real output accounting for about 2 per- centage points and increases in world market prices for about 4. During the four years from 1964 until 1967/68 growth was much faster, reaching 1.4% p.a. for export values and 6,9 for local production, thanks to three exceptionally good groundnut years. A further increase in export prices (1.4% per year), a sharp growth of unrecorded groundnut imports from , and a shift towards exports of groundnut oil rather than un- processed groundnuts have caused the value of oxports to rioo more ra- pidly than local production. This situation may well be reversed in the future since export prices are falling, the marketing organization in Senegal is improving and no further increase in the proportion of groundnuts processed locally can be expected.

6. Total GDP at factor costs has probably increased by about 5% per annum between 1945 and 1964 (or 3-3.5% at constant prices) and by nearly 7% per annum frog 1964 until 1967/68 (6-6.5% at constant prices). Real income per capit:ij apparently rose by an average of 3-3.5 from 1945 until 1964 and by 5-5.5% from 1964 until 1967/68. Thanks to a substantial increase in producer prices for groundnuts, the growth of income has been widespread, affecting the farming population as well as totn dwellers. Despite these increases, however, per capita income is still low, estimated at $80 in 1967/68.

7. Foreign trade is very important for The Gambia, illustrated by the fact that the combined value of imports and exports is almost as high as total GDP. Smooth and efficient management of the Port of Bathurst, which handles virtually all imports and over half of exports, is thus vital for the country and changes in port costs and mariti e freight rates have an immediate and substantial impact on the economy2. As exports increased at about 8% p.a. and imports at 6.6% over the past twenty years, the de- ficit of recorded foreign trade has continuously declined, but still averaged 22% of imports during the past five years. However, since a high proportion of imports is re-exported unofficially to Senegal and other 'est African countries, the real trade deficit is much smaller. Although detailed in- formation is lacking, the balance of payments as a whole seems satisfactory and foreign reserves have increased during the last few years.

1 Taking into account export price increases for groundnuts. As a result of increasing congestion in the Port of Bathurst, the West African Conference Line threatened in 1968 to iipose a 10/ surcharge on shipments to and from The Gambia. Its implementation was temporarily suspended on the promise of the Government to improve port installations. - iii -

Public Finance

8. The present financial position of the Government is difficult; over the past 25 years, current expenditures increased by 9.5% per annum while revenues have risen by only 8.2%. During the first half of this period, the current budget was generally in surplus, except for unusually bad groundnut years, but since around 1956, the current budget has nor- mally shown a deficit, except in unusually good groundnut years. Since development expenditures also increased faster than available financing - provided mostly by the UK - the development fund showed a growing deficit that added to the current budget difficulties. As a consequence, Treasury reserves dropped by over 75% between 1958 and 1962 and would have disap- peared completely had not the UK come to the rescue with a generous grant- in-aid program. Except in unusually good groundnut years, this grant-in- aid, which is in addition to the UK's contributions to the development fund, is essential to balance the current budget. Under present agreements, grant-in-aid continues on a decreasing scale until the end of FY 1970/71.

9. In the past it has been Government policy to concentrate its resources mainly on creating the administrative framework and the infra- structure necessary for economic growth, rather than to intervene directly in the productive sectors. In consequence, the bulk of Government expendi- tures (current and development) went for general administration (35%), transport and communications (28%) and social services (19%) while little was spent on agriculture (10%). As it turned out, this policy had limited impact on economic development, mainly because agriculture in The Gambia was - and still is - so underdeveloped that the provision of infrastructure alone is not a sufficient stimulus for economic growth. As a result, Govern- ment expenditures (increasing'by over 10% p.a.), ran far ahead of GDP (growing at 5-6% per annum) and despite several substantial increases in tax rates, which raised government revenues to almost 26% of estimated GDP in 1967/68, it became impossible to close the widening budgetary gap.

Prospects

10. The potential for economic growth over the foreseeable future is limited. As agriculture will remain the base of the economy for a long time, the speed with which an adequate and well qualified agricultural extension service can be staffed will be one of the crucial elements determining future development. Few, if any, agricultural projects can be successfully implemented without such a service, supplemented by agricultural research in fields where basic problems still remain un- solved.

11. Groundnuts will continue to form the backbone of the economy for a long time. Their growth potential,however, is limited by natural conditions within The Gambia as well as by world market conditions. Some expansion of areas under cultivation is possible by increased use of draft animals, but is limited by the availability of good soils, since with present techniques every additional acre of groundnuts demands 10 additional acres of fallow. Fallow periods could be reduced by applying - iv -

fertilizer, but the profitability of fertilizer has not yet been clearly demonstrated in The Gambia. Growth of physical output will thus remain slow and, over the next 5 years, will be almost entirely compensated by a fall in world market prices, so that total growth in money terms will be negligible.

12. Agricultural diversification is thus necessary. Primary em- phasis must be placed on crops which use soils not suitable for ground- nuts and which have a peak labor demand that competes as little as possible with that for groundnuts. In this connection, development of irrigated rice should have high priority because there is considerable potential for increased output and a continuous increase in local consumption that resulted in substantial rice imports. However, preliminary studies are necessary to provide the basic information needed to implement a compre- hensive rice program. Other possibilities for diversification which merit further consideration are the development of livestock to cover local demand and, on a smaller scale, the expansion of and lime production.

13. Manufacturing has expanded considerably since 1963, when pro- duction of groundnut oil started on a substantial scale. Further progress, however, is limited by the slow growth of groundnut output. The main growth potential outside agriculture is in tourism, which started on a small scale in 1967 and has since experienced a sharp growth. This is an interesting sector which should receive special attention by the Govern- ment, although - even under optimistic assumptions - -its contribution to-GDP will hardly exceed 2% by 1975.

14. Rough approximations project average grcTth of GDP in constant prices at 3.3% over the next 10 years. Taking into account the likely fall in groundnut prices, growth will fall to about 2.5% p.a. during the coming five years but may reach about 3.5% thereafter.

15. There is no.doubt that a continuing increase of public ex- penditures of over 10% per year would lead shortly to unmanageable fi- nancial problems. The Gambia's "Development Programme 1967/68 to 1970/71" assumes that growth in current expenditures can be limited to an average of 3.4%. Even if this limit can be adhered to, the current budget will -'roba- bl :not be in balance by 1970/71, when the present -rant-in-aid aieem-en with the UK comes to an end. The expected fall in groundnut prices is likely to reduce annual growth of foreign trade (The Gambia's main tax base)to about 1.5% over the next five years. With a slight increase in tax rates, in line with tax increases introduced during the past 10 years, growth of total revenues might average 1.8% p.a. While the possibilities of raising revenues above 1.8% p.a. by a general increase in tax ratos are liaited, selected increases of import taxes based on a comprehensive study of the demand and supply situation for each major import category may produce more significant results. Despite the projected slow growth, total public revenues are still likely to amount to about 24% of GDP in 1974, a re- markable achievement for a country with such a low per capita income. Nevertheless, until 1974 the current deficit will probably increase rather than disappear and renewed British grant-in-aid assistance averaging 5-10% of current expenditures will be necessary. Once groundnut prices have ceased to fall revenues will conceivably grow slightly faster than current expenditures, so that the current budget deficit might slowly decline. The Gambia's ability to contract and to service foreign debt is thus conditional upon the continuation of UK grant-in-aid at Lbout the curront level boyond the end of the present financial agreement.

16. Since no government savings will be available over the next 5-10 years to finance public development expenditures, financing will be a serious bottleneck. This outlook contrasts with the 1964-1967/68 Plan period, when local revenues financed about 21% of plan expenditures and total available resources exceeded total development expenditures in part because two out of the three and half years were exceptionally good groundnut years. Despite generous British assistance firmly agreed upon until 1970/71 - and expected to continue on a slightly higher level thereafter - financing of future public development expenditures is not assured. Even if such expenditures do not exceed the past level the gap between investments and British aid would reach 25%. However,the present development program foresees - rightly - an increase in development expenditure and if the program is fully implemented, the financing gap will exceed one third of total annual expenditures for the period 1968/69-1970/71 and will reach about £20,000 ($ 1 million) per year.

17. The mission assumes that aa average of £250,000 p.a. might become available from different local and foreign sources so that the Development Programme will have to be reduced by roughly E 170,000 or 14%. A small part of this £ 250,000 can probably be financed through local loans but, as past experience has shown, this possibility is limited so that tho bulk of financi.g will have to come from abroad. This raises the problmn of local counterpart funds to match foreign contributions. As a result of two recent exceptionally good groundnut years, the Gambia Treasury possess00 some limited reserves above what is required for a smooth execution of the budget. The best use it can make of these funds would be to use them as counterpart funds to match such foreign loans or credits as necessarily demand a local contribution. If the local contribution is kept on an average to 20% of total project costs, the present available excess reserves would be sufficient to match enough foreign funds to cover the resource gap for 5 to 6 years.

18. The Gambia's Development Programme 1967/68 to 1970/71 - restricted to public development expenditures - is built around a British development loan which covers about two thirds of planned expenditures. The most impor- tant projects not covered by this loan are Port of Bathurst improvement and - much smaller - several education projects and some projects in agri- culture to be identified. The program focuses primarily on transport and communications, and provides little for agriculture. Even if the Republic of 's rice project is added to Plan figures, the share of agriculture reaches only about 16% of total expenditures. In the mission's view, this is not an optimal allocation of resources but since most Plan projects are either already under way or at least committed, there is little possibility of changing the situation before the end of the present Plan period. This does not mean, however, that whatever leeway exists should not be used to initiate additional projects in agriculture. - vi -

19. As The Gambia obviously needs additional foreign funds on con- ditions compatible with the present difficult situation and medium term outlook of public finances, there is a definite case for Bank group fi- nancing, particularly as the projects submitted by the Gambia for Bank/IDA consideration are of high priority for the country (Port of Bathurst, rice development). By filling a considerable part of the gap between total development expenditures and bilateral aid, the Bank Group might become an important lender to the country. Although the country still has an almost negligible external debt and the debt burden will increase only very al if!,? the near future, londina on n tens tr the Gambia appears inad- visable. Per capita income is very low - about $80 - and growth prospects are not good in view of the country's dependence on groundnuts which face an uncertain future in the world market. Lhile The Gambia has tended to put excessive emphasis on development of infrastructure and services and has paid insufficient attention to agriculture, its overall performance has been creditable: Public finances have been well managed, domestic resources have been mobilized on an adequate scale, has been avoided and there has been little or no wasteful expenditure. On the grounds of both poverty and performance, The Gambia appears eligible for IDA financing. Future financial assistance will have to focus as far as possible on agriculture, particularly rice. It will have to take into account the country's limited ability to generate savings and, accordingly, to match external resources with local contributions. THE ECO10MY OF THE GAMBIA

I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Country and the People

1. The Gambia is a small country with a surface of 4,000 square miles, forming a 200-mile long and 15-30 mile wide stretch of land along both sides of the Gambia River. It is surrounded on three sides by the Republic of Senegal. Its topography is generally flat with a maximum height of 120 feet. In its middle and lower part the Gambia river is framed by stretches of swamps, partially flooded during the rainy sea- son, utilized for the cultivation of rice. Beyond these swamps stretch the sandstone "uplands" 60-100 feet above sea level, where most of the agricultural crops are grown, primarily groundnuts and millet.

2. The Gambia River is n avble for ocoan-going vessels up to 3,000 tons for 150 miles upstream and is regularly used by smaller ves* sels almost up to the eastern border with Senegal. Climate and vegeta- tion are subtropical. Average rainfall varies from 30 to 50 inches con- centrated in the five months from June to October. The short rainy season restricts agricultural production to crops with a short vegeta- tive cycle like groundnuts, millet and upland rice, and to some tree crops that are specially drought resistant like lines and (marginally) oil palms. Irrigated agriculture is possible along the Gambia Fiver, restricted to the rainy season in the lower parts of the river, but all year round in the upper parts, Outside the aangrove belt in the estuary of the river the country is mostly covered by opeh forest and grassland and has no high forests.

3. Population data are not very reliable. In 1968 total popu- lation was estimated at 347,000, of which about 10 per cent were born outside the country, mainly immigrants from neighboring regions. There are about 1,000 North Africans in the country and a few hundred Euro- peans and Lebanese mostly engaged in commercee The number of "atrange farmers" - temporary foreign immigrants cultivating groundnuts during the rainy season and leaving the country afterwards .*fluctuates around 10,000 per year. They account for almost 10 per cent of the active male population.

4. The population growth rate is difficult to estimate. Indi- cations vary between 1 per cent (based on the 1951 and 1963 census), 1.56 per cent (based on the two censuses in 1931 and 1951) and 1.77 )er cent according to age structure in the 1963 census (birth rate 3*87, death rate 2.10% The Government uses a rate of 2 per cent for its projections. Population is relatively old,with children below the age of 15 accounting for about 38 per cent of total population. It is composed of half a dozen major tribes, of which the Mandingos are the most aorou accounting for about 40 per cent of The Gambia4s total populaticn. Two-thirds of the inhabitants are UslinL, raain.- :unnites. _arabouts play an ixportaixt political role, - 2 -

About 10 per cent are Christians. The population is predominantly rural; around 85 per cent live in towns of under 2,000 inhabitants, and except for the capital of Bathurst (28,000 inhabitants), there are no other towns with more than 5,000 inhabitants. However, migration to Bathurst and its suburbs has increased over the past twenty years, and the capi- tal's population is growing at an average of 3.3 per cent per year.

B. Political Background

5. The Gambia is composed of the former British crown colony at Bathurst and the former protectorate in the hinterland. In the early 1950's the process of extending local autonomy was initiated and the country attained full internal autonomy in October 1963. In February 1965, The Gambia became a fully independent country within the British Commonwealth. Political, economic and cultural ties with Britain remain stron,. Financial and technical aid from Britain has continued after independence on a large scale and represents the only important source of foreign assistance for the country.

6. Until 1963 the United Party (U.P.) led by Pierre Sarr N'jie was the iain loc-1 Political force based priiaril- on the poyulatioi of Daturst. In the 1962 elections.however, the People's Progressive Party (P.P.P.) of Sir Dauda Jawar l which has its main poior base in the interior of the country won a majority in Parliament and has since then stayed in power. A pro- pcsal to introduce a Republican form of government did not obtain the necessary majority under the constitution in a national referendum held shortly after independence but this question is apparently to be sub- mitted to another referendum in 1970.

7. The Gambia is a member of the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations. It joined the IiF and IBRD in October 1967. On the eve of independence a team of United Nations experts studied the possibilities of a closer association between The Gambia and Senegal in view of The Gambia's unique geographic situation. The report did not recommend complete integration but considered that a process of associa- tion in gradual stages would be in the interest of both sides. In per- formance of these recommendations, agreements were concluded providing for cooperation in security and defense, in foreign relations, in inter- state vehicular traffic and in integrated development of The Gambia River Basin. Periodic consultations on the highest level supplement these technical agreements and have substantially contributed to the grow- ing good relations between Senegal and The Gambia, despite some friction caused by the extensive smuggling of consumer goods from the low cost/ low tariff Gambi, Lito the higher co6t/high tariff Senegal.

8. The Gambia's Government is British in structure, with a Gov- ernor General representin- Queen Elizabeth II, a Prime Minister with a cabinet of seven ministers and a Minister of State, and a unicameral Parliament. The country is divided into fivo divisions, headed by * divisional commissioners Vlu. the ci*Z of 2athut, headed by the Layor. The budgets of the divisions are voted by the area councils (called cit- coun- cil in Bathurst)and are fed by local taxes. Thirty-five districts are headed - 3 -

rby district chiefs (seyfus) assisted by district councils. Quality of administration is generally good. The Government is aware of the country's limited financial resources and has avoided all pure prestige undertakings. Budget control is satisfactory and the Government has shown itself capable of fonmulating and carrying out realistic development plans.

9. Government policy aims at maintaining a democratic form of public life and The Gambia is proud to be one of the few functioning democracies in Africa. Economic policy is basically liberal. The investment climate for local as well as foreign enterprises is good. Foreign transfer and foreign trade regulations are liberal and Government interferes little in the private sector. The major exception to this rule concerns groundnut exports which are handled by a state monopoly. Hoever, local groundnut marketing is in the hands of private trading companies and agricultural cooperatives. The level of prices and salaries is relatively low. Past Government policy has focused successfully on building up a satisfactory administrative structure, on developing education and public health and on providing the country with a good transport infrastructure. However, insufficient attention has been given to agriculture.

C. Structure of the EconoM

10. The Gambia's per capita income is estimated at $80 in 1967/68. Its economy has a strong mono-cultural bias. Production, processing and export of groundnuts account for over one-third of total GDP and exports of groundnut products (nuts, oil and cakes) exceed 95 per cent of total export value. The entire economy, including the public sector, is thus heavily dependent on groundnuts and variations in output volume (through climatic conditions) and in world market prices determine the country's economic situation.

11. The Gambia is primarily an agricultural country since over half of GDP at factor costs is derived from agriculture, livestock and fishing and over four-fifths of its working population consist of small farmers using traditional methods of production. Trade and transport are relatively important (around 13 per cent of GDP) reflecting in part the considerable clandestine re-export trade with Senegal, (and through Senegal with other countries near The Gambia) as Senegal has much higher import tariffs and higher landed prices. Although the actual smuggling is carried out entirely by non-residents and the role of The Gambia and its inhabitants in this trade is restricted to selling merchandise to foreign merchants, this re- export trade has become an important source of income to the country in general, but primarily to the Gambian budget. Another major sector of the economy is public administration, accounting for about 20 per cent of GDP, including construction carried out by the Public 11orks Department. Thus the public sector plays an important role in the economy of the country; about two-thirds of salaried labor force is employed in this sector, primarily in construction, education and public health. Manufacturing and crafts, private construction, as well as services other than trade and transport, are unim- portant, accounting for less than 5 per cent of the total GDP each. Two groundnut oil mills, a soft drink factory and several small traditional shipyards account for the bulk of manufacturing production. D. Employment, Wages, and Prices

32. Total working population was estimated at 165,000 in 1964 and might have reached approximately 170,000 by 1968. Of this, 85% are independent farmers, slightly less than 10% independent traders and craftsmen and only about 5% are salaried employees. The number of salaried employees rose from 5,000 in 1951-1955 to 8,000 in 1967 of which almost two-thirds are in public administration. While employment in the private sector increased by a little more than 10%., it more than doubled in the public sector over the same period.

13. The statutory minimum wage, which applies for unskilled labor, was raised from 3 s for an 8-hour day in 1951 to 5/8 d in 1963 (or by 88%) and to 6/8dat the beginning of 1969. For skilled craftsmen of the highest wage group, the average salary has increased from 6/6 d in 1951 to 10/8 d since 1963 or by 64%. Compared with neighboring Sene a salaries are low; in Senegal the statutory minimum wage stands at $1,261/for an 8-hour day (excluding substantial social charges), compared with $0.80 in The Gambia.

14. The internal price level in The Gambia has changed little since the early 1950's. Incomplete price series suggest that the cost of living declined slightly between 1951 and 1959 and rose by about 1% p.a. between 1961 and 1968. The high increase in nominal wage income over the last 15 years thus reflects an almost equal increase in the real standard of living of wage earners.

E. Recent Economic Growth

15. The first official attempt to estimate past economic growth was made in conjunction with the elaboration of the Development Programme. National income estimates for the poriod 1961 through 1965 are rough approximations only and have to be interpreted with caution. They suggest a growth rate of total GDP averaging 1.8% from 1961 through 1964, and an increase by 12.8% in 1965 due to a bumper crop of groundnuts. Growth over the total period 1961-1965 averaged about 4.hfo per annum, or i" at constant prices and slightly over 2% per capita at constant price. According to these estimates, the rise in GDP during the four years was due mainly to increasing production and processing of groundnuts ( 10% p.a.) and to an expansion in the public sector (6.5% p.a.). In subsistance agriculture, growth did not siLnificantly exceed population growth.

16. As sharp periodic fluctuations of groundnut production prevent a really meaningful analysis of economic growth over 4-5 years, the mission attempted to make some rough estimates of economic growth for the past 25 years. As mentioned above, groundnuts and public administration together account for about half of GDP and for these two sectors relatively well founded. estimates are possible. Groundnut exports increased by almost

1/ post August 1969 devaluation - 5 -

6% per year between 1945 and 1964, with growth in real output accouDting for only 2 percentage points and increases in world market prices for about 4. From 1964 to 1967/68 growth was much faster, reaching over 14% p.a. for export values, as a result of different factors:

(1) local production seems to have risen by 6% per year, partly because the increased use of animal-drawn implements facilitated an expansion of the area under cultivation but above all because three out of the four years were unusually good groundnut years;

(2) world market prices increased by 1.4% per year;

(3) unrecorded imports of groundnuts from Senegal seem to have risen sharply after producer prices were reduced in that country and after the marketing organization experienced difficulties in paying farmers cash; this factor might have accounted for about 4 percentage points;

(4) exports changed from decorticated groundnuts to groundnut oil, accounting tor another three percentage points in export vq7uf.

17. During the periods 1945-1968 agricultural output other than groundnuts (about one-third of GDP) probably increased at a rate of 2-3% p.a. or slightly more than population growth. Although accurate statistics are lacking, rice production has apparently risen considerably. In any event, the shortage of food which in the past often characterized the - few months prior to harvesting (hungry season) has no longer been evident in recent years.

18. Growth of government expenditures was an important expansioh factor during the past 25 years. Up to 1964, they rose at an annual tate of about 10% and at about 7.2% between 1964 and 1967/68. Growth in the other sectors of the economy (around 20f of GDP) was roughly estimated at 4-50 per annum.

19. Altogether GDP at factor costs increased at about 5% pej,year from 1945 to 1964 and nearly 7% per year between 1964 and 1967/68-'. At constant prices growth averaged around 3-3.5% and 6-6.5' respectively. Taking into account the substantial increase in world market prices for groundnuts, real income per capita might have increased by 3-3.5% p.a. from 1945 to 1964 and by 5-5.5% per year between 1964 and 1967/68.

L/ About 5.3% p.a. over the entire period. -6 -

These impressive growth rates aro howovor misleading in two respects: First, the market growth in the value of groundnut exports was largely due to an increase in prices and a shift to groundnut oil -- factors which will be no longer operative in the future; second the increase in public administration expenditures was made possible in part by sub- stantial British grant-in-aid towards the current budget and a considerale increase in grant and loan assistance towards development expenditures.. Without favorable prices and the increase in British aid, average growth would have been much smaller and real per capita income would probably have increased at an average of 1.5-2% per year from 1945 through 1964 and of h.-5% during the exceptionally good years 1964-1967/68. Thus the satisfactory rate of growth, achieved over the past 20 years, was to a considerable degree due to favorable external circumstances, while local expansionary factors working from within The Gambia economy remained weak. Since world market prices for groundnuts are expected to fall and grant-in-aid from the UK may either end by 1971 or at most remain constant, external factom may in the future have a depressing rather than stimulating effect. Thus, future growth will have to depend much more on local forces than in the past.

CYCLICAL FLUCTUATIONS OF GAMBIA'S ECONOMY

average annual growth rates Government Budget Groundnut Eport Import Current Production Values Values Revenues Exenditures

1945/46-47/48 2 boom years 31.0% 63.8% 66.2% 14.6/ 22.3% (1966-1948)

19b7/48-55/56 8 years of -2.6% 4.% 4.55 6.7% 1.6% (1948-1956) stagnating production but increasing world market prices

19_V57-57/58 2 boom years 28.7% 31.7% 27o7%!i 23.7% 0.1% (1956-1958) 1958/59-63/6 6 years of b (1958-1964) stagnation -4.2% -4.2% -1.3%-- 1.3% 9.1%

1964/6:-66/67 3 boom years 20.8% 29.1% 22.0% 22.1% 3.5% (1964-1967)

1966/67-67/68 beginning of -8.4% -13.3% 5.5% -9.8% 9.9% (1967-1968) stagnation (?) ' 1956-57 b1957-64

1/ Pnr details on the financial situation, see c.pterr. below. 20. The marked cyclical movements that characterized The Gambia's economic development during the past 25 years is another important consid- eration in projecting future growth. As shown in the above table, economic growth was very uneven between 1945 and 1968. Short boom periods showing extremely high growth rates were followed by extended periods of stagnation, due mainly to cyclical movements in groundnut production which might have been accompanied by similar fluctuations in output of other agricultural crops, for which no statistical data are available. Although climatic factors have presumably played a major role in this cycle (with rainfall dis- tribution over the cropping period probably as important as the total volume of rainfall) the mission was not able to find a fully satisfactory explana- tion of this groundnut cycle and to conclude whether it was likely to conti- nue. Thus, it cannot be excluded that the year 1967/68 marked the beginning of a new period of stagnating groundnut production with all the implications this would have on the economy and the budgetary situation of the Government. 1/

F. Balance of Payments

21. The Gambia's economy is strongly dependent on foreign trade. During 1961-1964 combined value of imports and exports including recorded re-exports averaged 80% of estimated GDP. But even if re-exports are excluded, foreign trade still reached a very high 68% of GDP, reflecting the monocul- tural structure of the economy which produces a crop that is little consumed locally, as well as the small local market, which makes it difficult to establish manufacturing enterprises for import substitution. In addition, foreign trade is stimulated by the position of Bathurst as an important West African transit center for manufactured consumer goods. Relatively low import taxes are among the main factors responsible for The Gambia's success in this trade, reinforced by low preferential tariff and a traditional ability of local import firms to find the most advantageous sources of supply on the world market without any bias regarding the country of origin. This is illus- trated by the fact that Japan has recently become the second largest supplier of The Gambia, with a market share increasing from 10% in 1963 to over 175 in 1967, while neighboring Senegal for instance discriminates against imports from Japan. On the other hand, the market share of the former colonial power, which is around 53% in Senegal, has dropped to 364 in The Gambia.

2:2. Over the last two decades, recorded exports have increased at an annual average of 8.1%, reaching L 5.2 million in 1967/68, while imports rose by 6.6% per annum to L 7.4 million. In the late 1940's, exports covered only about 65% of imports but over 82% by 1964-67. Past growth, however, has been extremely irregular following The Gambia's groundnut cycle, since groundnut exports not only detennine total exports but strongly influence imports as well.

1/ This remark remains valid in spite of the satisfactory result of the 1968/69 crop-year (4.7% increase in locally commercialized groundnuts over 1967/68, 9% increase in money paid to farmers, 37% increase in exort value, 23% increase in import value, 28% increase in government revenues). It is doubtful whether the increased commercialization reflects an increase in local production, which has probably stagnated or even fallen, while the sharp growth in exports is mainly due to an almost equal growth of export prices for groundnuts (+32%) which resulted inter alia in a five fold increase of export tax revenues and thus contributed heavily to the overall growth of budget revenues. - 8 -

23. Groundnute and groundnut products are the only important export items, averaging over 95% of total exports. Over the last twenty years, exports of groundnuts have changed from undecorticated nuts (up to 1953), to decorticated groundnuts and to groundnut oil beginning on a significant scale in 1963. By 1966/67 about 5% of the groundnut crop was processed locally and exported in the form of oil and cakes. Thus the value added derived from the production of groundnuts has continuously increased. Secondary export products are palm kernels, dried fish, shell fish, molluscs, hides and skins.

24. Imports (including re-exports) are composed predominantly of manufactured consumer goods and foodstuffs. Combined imports of these two categories averaged 75% of total import value in 1953-56 as well as in 1963-1966/67. Relative importance of equipment goods has declined from 13 to 10% while the proportion of raw materials and semi-finished products as well as of fuel remained stable at about 6 and 4% respectively. The importance of finished consumer goods is explained in part by high re-exports of such products and the same is true of foodstuffs, especially of tobacco and alcoholic beverages. Although import of rice, the country's main staple food,doubled between 1953/56 and 1963/67, its share remained stable at 6%. Low imports of raw materials, semi- finished products and equipment goods illustrate the fact that invest- ments in the modern sector remain small since the bulk of economic activity is in agriculture where traditional methods of production prevail and few imported investment goods are used.

25. Balance of payments estimates are available for the period 1961-1967, but are too sketchy to permit a detailed assessment; for four out of these seven years, fluctuations in the overall balance are reflected only by changes in net errors and omissions. Over the entire period, there was a small surplus resulting in a slight increase in foreign assets. At the end of 1967, combined net foreign assets of the public and private sector (Treasury reserves, currency board, OONB and tho one commercial bank) were estimated at E 3.0 million or over 5 months' imports.11

26. The major characteristics of The Gambia's balance of payments as emerging from these estimates are:

a. The foreign trade deficit has been relatively small after taking into account unrecorded exports; it averaged only 7% of imports between 1961 and 1965 (or Z 300,000) and was probably nil in 1966 and 1967.

b. The balance of services and transfers (excluding foreign public grants) shows a substantial deficit, fluctuating around E 1 million per year; it is slowly increasing.

/ Monetary statistics, which exclude foreign holdings of the Treasury and GOMB, show net reserves of only I 0.5 million at the same time. - 9 -

c. Between 1961 and 1967, the current account deficit averaged 1; 1.2 million per year. Over the same period, the inflow of public grants averaged about E 1 million and the private capital inflow E 0.1 million, so that the total inflow of foreign capital covered almost the entire current account deficit.

II. DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPECTS FOR THE PRINCIPAL SECTORS

A. Agriculture, Livestock, and Fishing

General

27. Agriculture, livestock and fishing are by far the most important economic activities in The Gambia. Around 85% of the country's total population live from these sectors, which account for almost 60% of total GDP and about 40% of monetary GDP. Over half of agricultural production is monetized and of that 814% is contributed by groundnuts, the remainder by palm kernels (2%), fruits, vegetables, livestock and fishing. Most important subsistence crops are millet, sorghum and rice, the basic staple foods of The Gambia. Millet and sorghum are grown on rotation with groundnuts, on light upland soils; rice is grown primarily in swamps along the Gambia River. Past concentration on groundnuts has been accompanied by an insufficient output of foodstuffs, so that rice has to be imported.

28. Knowledge about agriculture is limited and important technical and economic problems have not been sufficiently studied. Data on land use, soil quality, yields and agricultural production are sketchy. Long term impact of fertilizer on soil quality and yields is not definitely known and profitability of intensive fertilizer use on groundnuts has not been satisfactferily established. Insufficient knowledge makes Government intervention difficult and there is at present no long term Government strategy in agriculture. In addition the inistry of Agriculture in general and extension service. in particular, are insufficiently staffed. In 1968 only 71 persons were assigned to extension work (including seven in supervisory positions) and a con- siderable part of their time was spent on such administrative tasks as management of groundnut seed stores, sales of fertilizer and implements, etc. so that in total probably less than 30 man years were devoted to extension work; this is not sufficient to cover 50-60,000 farm families in a way that will show tangible results. Applied agricultural research and improvement in quality and size of the extension service is a precondition to any successful development program and ought to be given high priority. For this purpose, it will be necessary to increase budgetary allocations to agriculture which are now only 10% of annual current expenditures. - 10 -

29. The limited data available suggest that upland soils generally have a low nutrient value and in many areas are exhausted, while the extensive swampy areas along The Gambia Iiver have rich soils but are still comparatively underutilized. Population density of 83 persons per square mile is rather high, considering that the bulk of the population is living off agriculture and that water surfaces are large (around 10% of the country's total area). Agricultural techniques are predominantly traditional (shifting cultivation) with 3-5 years of crops (groundnuts, millet and some upland rice) alternating with 15-20 years offallow on upland soils but with no fallow on upland rice. Yields are obviously low as a result of poor soils and the inability to develop improved methods of cultivation.

30. Given existing techniques of cultivation, the available amount of upland soils of good quality barely suffice for the present labor force (including "strange farmers"), Under these conditions, any substantial increase in the area under cultivation as a result, for example, of mechanization, can only be at the expense of fallow. This is likely to reduce yields unless methods of restoring soil fertility other than by extensive fallow can be proved economic. Thus, growth potential for groundnuts and millet appears to be severely limited. For rice, on the other hand, development potential is much better, as substantial amounts of good land are still unutilized.

31. Land tenure outside the capital is overwhelmin-ly traditional, i.e., there is no legal private ownership of land, whicn is vested in the District Authorities in trust for the inhabitants. Rights to use . land, are normally acquired by clearance and cultivation and can be inherited. In fact, therefore, "ownership" of land can be said to be vested in the hands of the heads of compounds who allocate it to the various members of the household. Except for two Government research stations, there are no plantations or big estates in the country.

Groundnuts

32. Groundnuts which were first introduced by the colonial adminis- tration during the first half of the 19th century are the principal source of cash income in agriculture. Production expanded rapidly, reaching a peak during World War ; with an average production of 78,000 tons per year. The sharp growth of production until 1920 was followed by 35 years of stagnation with an extreme low during World War II,and the 1915-1920 average was not reached again before 1954-1958. Since then production has ftrther increased, averaging around 106,000 tons in 1964/65 - 1968/691/, despite relatively unfavorable weather conditions during the last two years. However,per capita production of groundnuts during the period 1960-64 remained 40' below the 1910-1920 average, and even the peak crops harvestedin 1966, 1967 and 1968 did not bring per capita production back to the level reached during the 1910ts.

l/ Excluding estimated sales of Senegalese groundnuts in The Gambia. - 11 -

33. Little information is available to explain the long stagnation in output as well as the continuous growth since 1954. It is quite possible that the sharp increase of production at the beginning of this century led to a serious soil depletion resulting in a fall of yields, a contraction of the area under cultivation and an increasingiandency to take up rice cultivation in the lowlands, while the number of 'btrange farmers'declined. Under the stimulus of rising world market prices after World War II production again increased. It apparently became profitable to utilize marginal soils, and expansion of the area under cultivation was facilitated by increased resort to animal traction. In addition, yields might have increased with the replacement of the Nigerian varieties with improved Senegalese seeds welladapted to local conditions. An uncertain element in the picture has been the changing pattern and volume of groundnut trade across the Senegalese border. In this connection, it should be pointed out that there are no reliable figurcs available on production, but only on the amount of purchases by local traders. These figures include groundnuts produced in Senegal but sold in The Gambia and exclude groundnuts produced in The Gambia and sold in Senegal. There has at times been considerable unrecorded trade across the border, depending on relative producer prices in the two countries. In 1967/68, for exam le, sales of Senegalese groundnuts were estimated to have woaaitod to 2 if 1/ olume purchaced in The Ganbia and thic percentage might have increas-ed in 3we,/b 34. Apart from the long term trend in groundnut production over the past 25 years, therebave been medium term cycles of considerable magnitude, characterized by two or three years of sharply increasing production alternating with an extended period (of up to eight years) of low and stagnating output which cannot be clearly assessed. It is possible, therefore, that the sharp increases in production in 1964, 1965 and 1966 would be followed by several years of considerably smaller production and it could well take 5-6 years to reach the past peak again. The actual fall in caowrcialization in 1967/68 and th probabl sta!-intion of local production in 196a/1969 suLrost that the .taguition poriod might have begun already.

35. The long term trend in groundnut output is difficult to project. Population growth and expansion of ox-plowing will tend to increase the area under cultivation, but yields may decline unless use of fertilizer becomes clearly economic. Thus, it is doubtful whether the average annual increase will exceed 2.570-3%. Since the proportion of Senegalese groundnuts sold in The Gambia may well decline, the rate of growth in exports will probably be even smaller.

36. The Government concerned itself primarily with the marketing aspect and did relatively little to promote groundnut production. Up to the 1950's, its activities on the production side were limited primarily to fertilizer research, which proved to be difficult,so that only in 1959 was fertilizer sold to farmers for the first time. Although imports of fertilizer have since sharply increased they were still only 3,000 tons in 1268, ani part of this -:as goin:' to agricultural research stations. Long term impact of intensive fertilizer use on soil fertility and yields, however,is not yet sufficiently known and it is not yet clear whether it will be economic, -12 -

37. In the mid 1950ts, other extension service activities started on a small scale including pest control and seed improvement. In 195, the first "ploughing schools" were established to familiarize traditional farmers with the techniques of ox-plo-ing and to train local oxen for that purpose. By the end of 196', twenty-four such schools, renamed ixed Farming Centers, accomodated about 350 trainees. Their practical impact w-as rather limited, hownever in part because the traineos were almost all young people who did not find it zasy to influence their elders after having returned to their villages, in part because most farmers do not own and cannot afford E 40 to purchase a pair of bulls, in part because the agricultural implements made available by the 11inistry of Agriculture at a subsidized price (Ticott plow, Aplo wheel and tool bar) were poorly adapted to farmers needs; yet fanaers have learned to appreciate the advantages of animal traction and have often imported on their own the lighter Senegalese plows and seed drills, which they found more suitable. To some extent, expansion of the area under cultivation through the use of draft animals has been limited by lack of good land near many villages and the necessity of weeding increased areas by hand. 38. On the marketing side, the Government is much more active. Since the beginning of World War II, groundnut exports are a Government monopoly which was first exercised by the West African Produce Control Board (W.A.P.C.B.) operating in all British West African territories. In 1948, The Gambia Oilseed Marketing Board, a Gambian public enterprise, was established to take over from W.A.P.C.B, Its annual turnover of more than L 5 million exceeds by far the amount of about L 3 million spent by the Central Government under its current budget.

39. The marketing system as it developed over the years is based on a close cooperation between private trading firms (including agricultural cooperatives) and GOMB. Purchasing, storage and internal transport are carried out under license from GOB by p-.vate firms (which are also the principal importers and wholesalers of consumer goods) and cooperatives, (so called licensed buying agents). GOMB and the Government fix producer price and margin of the buying agents at the beginning of each harvest. GOMB reimburses buying agents for their transport costs at fixed rates. Undecorticated groundnuts have to be delivered to GOMB's decorticating mill at Kaur, 1/ for that part of the crop which is exported in the form of decorticated nuts - and to Bathurst (Denton Bridge) for groundnuts sold to the two private local oil mills. After decortication, GOM1B loads its nuts at Kaur on ocean-going vessels, while groundnut oil is shipped out of Bathurst. International marketing of decorticated nuts is done by Gambia Oilseeds Marketing Co. Ltd. in London, a fully-owned subsidiary of GCMB, while groundnut oil is exported by the two oil milling companies without GOMB intervention. To avoid too heavy dependence on the two milling companies, C7IB sells not more than 65, of total crop to the local oil mills so as to maintain its position in-tho zTorld market whore due to their specially high oil content (50*., an a 10 year average) Gambian groundnuts achieve a premium price. On the whole, this system works

/ 120 miles upriver from Bathurst. - 13 - quite efficiently. Traders margins average 22-23% of producer's prices and have not gro7,n unduly over the past 18 years. However, local trans- port costs have increased by 240% between 1949-52 and 1964-67 or by 6.4% p.a., which is considerably above average growth of cost of living and of mn=mum wages, althou :i one --old - ss_d e th-t the e2te si-re o construction program carried out during the last years would have led to a fall in transport costs. Through better organization, primarily of river transport and improvement of trans-shipping techniques, it should be possible to reduce transport costs.

40. GOBB aims at stabilizing producer prices from year to year and has generally been successful in doing so, except during the boom period of the Korean War. However, GOPM never attempted to stabilize the overall amount of funds paid out to groundnut farmers, so that sharp annual fluctuations in the volume of groundnut crops caused equally sharp fluctuations in farmer incomes, reaching up to 50Q fra: year to year. During the 20 years of its existence, GOMB has maintained a sound financial position, although high producer prices paid in neighboring Senegal until 1967 forced the Gambian authorities more than once to pay higher prices than ware juctified by the world market Ov-r this period, GOMB has been able to transfer more than 1 1.3 million ulihou unduly roducing its reserves to the Faucrao Fund to help financa- aricul- tural invostrento. At the end of crop year 1967/68 total reserves amounted to 1 770,000 or about 13% of GOMB's annual turnover. This is not an excessive cushion, but should be sufficient, especially since the abolition of preferential prices for Senegalese groundnuts in France gives The Gambian authorities more flexibility in adjusting producer prices to world market conditions. As the bulk of GO1B's reserves are held in the , fluctuations in its reserves have no direct impact on the monetary situation in The Gambia nor on the situation of The Gambian Treasury. hl. Over the last ten years, agricultural cooperatives have become increasingly active in groundnut marketing. With a market share of over 30% cooperatives as a whole are now the biggest single buying agent. Despite a rapid growth to a membership of over 40,000 in 1968, the cooperative movement is well organized and operates on a sound base. Its activity, however, has been limited deliberately to groundnut marketing and the granting of small consumer credits during the difficult period before the new crop is harvested. Through an ingenious system of collective liability, debt repayment is exceptionally high, averaging 95-98%. The Gambian Central Cooperative Banking and Marketing Union (GCCBMU),owned by the local cooperative societies, centralizes funds of all its member cooperatives and provides short term advances for crop financing. The cooperative system, as it exists today, could well play a more active role in future, not only in groundnut marketing but also to channel fertilizer and agricultural implements to farmers. - 14 -

42. In the 1967/68-70/7lDevelopment Programme, the bulk of investments foreseen for agriculture is for groundnuts (E 70,000 per year, as compared with an average of 56,000 during the past eight years), mainly for improvement of seed stores, storage and handling. These programs were taken into account in the mission projection of future groundnut output. Palm Kernels

43. GOMB is also responsible for the marketing of palm kernels, which is The Gambia's second most important export product, even though it reaches only 2.5% of the value of groundnut exports. Exports,which fluctuate considerably have increased from an average of 1,200 tons in 1945-58 to slightly over 2,000 tons in 1965/66 and 1966/67. They are a by-product of palm fruits collected primarily from wild palms and used to produce palm oil for localconsumption. A pilot scheme and a number of village plantations were started in the early 1960ts using improved varieties from Nigeria with little success. A thorough study of possible oil palm projects - undertaken by OD:M in 1965 - concluded that climatic conditions are marginal and do not permit achievement of sufficiently high yields to make oil palm plantations profitable. Lime

1j4. Over the last years, experiments with lime production were undertaken at Yundum Agricultural Research Station, based on surveys carried out by British and Israeli experts. Although results are not yet conclusive, yields obtained (200 lb. per tree, 30-40 tons per acre) and quality of aiLeead oil predOnal seen cLsin so t ' lile .: xction might well offer interesting possibilities in the future. illet

45. Traditionally, millet, sorghum and fonioi/were the staple food of The Gambia. Information on production is sketchy and does not allow a detailed .sest of past trends. However, it seems clear that y'.ligh-e d'e'-eri o::,teddint lst0ye: as a re .1:,0. declining soil fertility. Local foodstuff production became insufficient to cover normal needs of the population and increasing food shortages p)receded the harvesting seasons(hungry seasons). At the end of the 1940's average yields for millet and sorghum were estimated at 220 lb. per acre (250 kg/ha) and for fonio at 135 lb/acre (150 kg/ha) which is low compared to neighboring regions of Senegal (Casamance and Sine-Saloum) where yields averaged 700 kg/ha and 300 kg/ha respectively. The Government did little to improve production of these crops; while it carried out some inconclusive fertilizer research on upland crops, it apparently decided soon after the end of World War II to concentrate its efforts on swamp rice rather than millet, since most land suitable for rice cultivation was not yet under cultivation. Current production of millet and sorghum is estimated at around 25-30,000 tons per year and the trend is probably downward.

l/ Called Findio in The Gambia (Uiiberi - aciluz) - 15 -

Rice

46. Different from traditional upland crops, there is a considerable potential for increasing rice output by bringing into production hitherto little-used swamps along The Gambia River and on a smaller scale along the little creeks flowing into it. Until the 1940's rice was strictly a woman's crop cultivated on small plots near villages to supplement millet and sorghum, the main family dishes, and was little traded. This situation, however, has been changing during the last twenty years. Production appears to have risen from an estimated 20,000 tons of paddy in the late 1940's to about 3,000 tons or by an average of 4% per year and as surpluses developed for sale, men started to become interested in rice production. The development of rice cultivation seems to have been largely spontaneous, although the Government has promoted it, particularly by sponsoring a community development program to improve access to swamps. Rice has now become The ;Gambia's main staple food and consumption has risen so rapidly that 8-10,000 tons have to be imported annually.

47. Cultivation techniques and varieties differ considerably from one location to another , depending on local conditions. Three main types of cultivation can be distinguished:

- upland or dry-rice (banta faro) cultivated on slopes and on relatively rich soils near the villages, without rotation; yields vary widely with rainfall, but normally fluctuating around 800 lbs per acre for broadcast and 1,000 lbs. for transplanted rice. Between 10-15 f of the country's total rice output is produced this way and little expansion is foreseen for this type due to low yields and limited land availability.

- rice grown in rainfed swamps (faro) which are more or less inudatod during the rainy season, drying slowly in the dry season. Yields fluctuate around 1,OO lbs. for transplanted rice, which is the rule for swamp rice. Around 10-15% of all rice is cultivated this way. Some improvements are possible, primarily by better seedbed preparation, but growth potential is limited by available swamps and, in all events, less interesting than for tidal swamps.

- rice grown in tidal swamps(faro)along The Gambia River and its affluents which lie at such a level that tides inundate them twice a day, partially during the whole year, partially during the rainy season only. About 70 of The Gambia's rice crop is produced this way, with yields varying between 1,400-2,000 lbs. per acre. Tidal swamps in the lower river basin can be cultivated only during the rainy season when'seasonal floods push the salty sea water close to the mouth of the river-But those located higher up-river (beyond Pasari Island) receive fresh water continuously and can thus support a rice crop even during the dry season. The size of tidal swamps that could still be developed for cultivation is not well known, but it is estimated that the 40,000 acres now under cultivation could probably be tripled so that even without a change in techniques growth potential for tidal rice is considerable. - 16 -

18. The government's knowledge of rice cultivation techniques currently used and of possibilities for improving them is limited. Past public programs concentrated on building causeways into swamps to open up new rice areas while the authorities did little to improve traditional tech- niques, ozcopt in the McCarthy Island region,where a mechanized plowing scheme was established in 1953 as a successor to the abandoned CDC mec mied ~rice project. Under this technically well-run scheme, land which is too difficult to be worked with oxen is plowed and seedec' with tractor drawn implements. The area for which these services are provided to farmers in rainfed swamps has expanded from around 1,000 acres up to 1958 to about 6,000 acres in 1968. However, the charge per acre - E 3 - is insufficient to cover the actual costs of L 4-5; and the advantages cinaE to farmers in terms of earlier transplanting and better soil preparation do not appear to be sufficient to enable them to pay the entire cost.

49. A more thorough attempt to change traditional techniques of rice cultiLvation is presently o made by a team of experts from Taiwan, who started work in June, 1966. Efforts were first concentrated on improvement of upland rice cultivation and on pump irrigation. The program was expanded in 1968 when a tidal swamp project and a small creek project were begun and t s bea - u:athei' xnorid in 196 nTith An .. crease in the nrber of ezpe:ts -am 12 to aboat TO. In the _.ee-where water is fresh throughout the year, the Chinese have demonstrated the possibility of cultivating two rice crops per year with pump irrigation providing water for low-lying areas along the river banks. According to the Chinese experts, the development cost would be high: - $318 per hectare without counting the investment in pumps. The Bank's PMWAlV believes that this figure might be reduced to $200 per hectare, particularly if the farmers do most of the work themselves. A further $275 per hectare would be required for pumps. qperation and maintenance of the pumps and the use of improved varieties, application of fertilizer and insecticides, good irrigation techniques, and proper cultural practices would all require close supervision. Even so, the high yields obtainable-in the neighborhood of five tons per hectare from two crops, or nearlyL6500 lbs per acre - 4 vrnUi off-: frme - satiscto.', return 'or thc .r labor -nter deducting a.U non-labor costs.

50. However, there are possibilities for achieving good results with much lower investment costs in the non-tidal and tidal swamp areas. On the basis of theCinese mission's work, a PNWA mission has suggested a project to improve natural irrigation in some6,000 areas of non-tidal swamps already under cultivation and to develop about2,000 acres of uncultivated areas in such swamps. Installation of simple irrigation works, involving the construction of canals and ditches, bunding, land clearing, and land preparation with hand tools, is estimated to cost only $100 per hectare ($40 per acre) and to result in a yield of 3.POO lbs per acre in comparison with the current average of only,h00 lbs. Tentative estimates indicate that at least 2 ,000 acres could be developed for double-cropping.

1/ Pomanent 1-ission in Wst-Africa (Abidjan Office) - 17 -

$1. A feasibility study of the natural irrigation might well be undertaken. At the same time, however, the development of the tidal swamps should be further studied. In the tidal swamps already under cultivation, it should be possible to improve yields through the construction of bunds which would control the extent of flooding and provide partial control of drainage. The Chinese mission has just begun a pilot project for this purpose. Moreover, between Pasari Island and Kuntaur, where there is no sea water intrusion in the dry season, it should be possible to develop tidal swamps for two crops per year. For farmers who are very busy with their groundnut, millet and sorghum crops during and immediately after the rainy season, the possibility of growing a crop of rice during the dry season should in principle be particularly attractive-

52. Any program for the expansion of rice growing in the swamp areas would require a skilled and well-trained extension service, facilities for seasonal and medium-term agricultural credit and the further improvement of access to the rice-growing areas. Care would have to be taken to determine the appropriate acreage that can be cultivated per adult farmer, taking into account available labor and the demand on this labor for growing crops other than rice. If more rice is to be grown for the market, milling facilities will also have to be provided.

53. The interest of farmers in increasing rice production will be strongly influenced by the organization of rice marketing. Until now,little locl.y produced rice was sold and no permanent channels for rice marketing exist. The Department of Cooperation started a small marketing scheme in 1967/68 using local chiefs as buying agents but bought little more than 1Otons,at a loss of about 15 sh. per ton. This scheme was suspended in 1968/69 due to the low crop in that year.. If rice output is to grow substantially, increasing portions of this production will haveto be commercializod and tho working out of satisfactory marketing arrangements is an important component of a larger scale rice development program. Rice could be marketed through the existing agricultural cooperatives, through new cooperatives to be established specifically for this purpose, or through private traders (licensed buying agents). In any case, preparation of satisfactory arrangements will take time and have to be included in an overall development program for rice.

54. Price policy for rice is another aspect that needs careful consideration since stimulation of local production demands high producer prices, while for social (and political) reasons Government tends to keep consumer prices in Bathurst as low as possible, even at the price of subsidizing imported rice in 1967/68 (and probably again in 1968/69). Although some rice subsidies during short periods of extremely high world market prices might be justified, permanent subsidization of rice has to be avoided at all costs, not only for strictly financial reasons but because of its depressing impact on local production. - 18 -

5. The only project for rice improvement included in the present Plan concerns extension of the mechanized rice plowing program while the Chinese project operates outside the Development Programme but receives some Goverment contribution through the current budget.

Livestock

56. Livestock is an important but hitherto little exploited potential. Substantial improvements in health conditions achieved by several intensive innoculation campaigns and continuous good veterinary control have raised the livestock population from an estimated 30,000 head of cattle in the 1930's to over 230,000 in 1968 or by an annual average of over 6Z. Growth was parti- cularly fast up to the early 1950's (8.6b per annum) but has slowed down since (3.8% per annum) largely because insufficient grazing possibilities during the dry season are a limiting factor but also because marketing of local cattle has increased from virtually zero twenty years ago to around 14-15,000 head per year today. Since supply of local cattle is still insufficient to cover local demand, imports of cattle on the hoof from Senegal have increased to over 4,000 head per year. The limited data available suggest that The Gambia could be self-sufficient in meat by increasing slaughtering of local cattle by one third, which would reduce the rate of increase in cattle population from 4 to 2% per year. This could be accomplished only by persuading fanners to regard their cattle as a regular source of cash income instead of as a means of increasing their status and of meeting occasional emergency expenditures. Such a change in attitude would be encouraged by a marketing system that would guarantee farners a regular outlet by providing regular buying days in stipu- lated places and facilities for cash payment on the scal1o/

57. The only project for livestock included in the present Plan is a small program to improve quality of hides and skins and to upgrade quality of beef cattle. This is certainly useful, but will not tackle the basic problems impeding faster growth of livestock production and marketing in the country. At present, there is no extension service for livestock.

Fishing coast 58. Fishing is little developed despite good potential along the and The Gamb:ia River estuary. Hain resources are sardines, tuna, African herring (for smoked fish), rock lobsters and shrimp. Inland fishing is mostly of a part-time job carried out by farmers during the dry season while the bulk fishing in off shore waters is done by Senegalese fishermen. Catching of fresh fish is not sufficient to cover local demand. Some dried fish and shell fish (molluses) are exported, the latter by a small foreign company, the only semi-industrial enterprise engaged in fishing or fish processing in the country.

59. On the recommendation of a United Nations fishing expert, a small Fisheries Division was created in 1968 within the Department of Agriculture to implement on a pilot basis a credit program for purchase of outboard motors and building of smoking huts. Up to the end of 1968, 19 such motors were purchased and 6 smoking huts built. If this approach proves to be successful, a larger program might be considered. No other fishing projects are foreseen in the present Plan.

17 Indeed, since cattle imports fra Senegal were prohibited for sanitary reasons in 1968, slaughtering of local cattle has increased sufficiently - 19 -

Forastry

60. Forestry potential is limited, but has been well developed in the last ten years during which a Gmelina and teak plantation of almost 2,000 acres was established by the Forestry Division near Bathurst together with a well-equipped saw mill - the only one in The Gambia - which processes timber produced in the plantation and fra all over the country. The project is no doubt a technical success, well managed aad is apparently profitable. However, since the local farminf. community is unlikely to take up timber planting, its impact on economic growth is destined to remain extremely limited. In fact, in a country where natural forest stands are small and timber plantations cannot be developed on a significant scale, it is difficult to justify the fact that development outlays in forestry over the period 1960-1967/68 have been six times higher than those for livestock.

B. Manufacturing and Power

Manufacturing

61. Manufacturing is very limited. The small local market restricts production for local consumption, while the limited availability of local raw materials makes production for export difficult, except for groundnut oil. The production of groundnut oil started on a large scale in 1964 and represents the only processing industry of importance. Two oil mills - both located in Bathurst - produce 25,000 tons of Orude groundnut oil. small soft drink factory producing substantially below capacity; a distillery which finds it difficult to break even, a garment and shoe factory; and a small perfume and candle factory complete the list of manufacturing establishments. All are located in the Bathurst area. Electric Power

62. Electric power is produced by the Electricity Department of the Ministry of Public Works in six diesel plants spread over the countryof which the Bathurst plant - with an installed capacity of 4.5 MW (soon to be increased to 6.7 MW) - is by far the largest. Total installed capacity in the country was 10.5 M at the end of 1968. In Bathurst, consumption has increased at a rate of nearly 10% p.a. since 1961, growing from 4,330 1th to 7,570 1Mh in 1967.

63. Electricity is subsidized; subsidies have declined from about 391' of operating expenditures in 1961 to 27%o since 1965. Over the past eight years, expansion of generation and distribution has entailed annual investment expenditures averaging 1 30,000 per year (about 4.4% of total development outlays) financed by British development grants. The 1967/68- 70/71 Development Programme foresees expenditures for electricity of I 300,000 or about 1 75,000 per year. This includes an additional generator in Bathurst (B 150,000) which is already being installed and which - 20 - will take care of increased demand for several years, expansion of the distribution network in the Bathurst area (£9100,000), and increases in the capacity of secondary power stations (£M0,000). All three projects are being financed by British aid.

C. Transport

Port of Bathurst

64. The Port of Bathurst is the lifeline of The Gambia; it handles virtually all imports and over half of exports and its smooth and efficient functioning is of vital importance. At present, the port -well-located at the mouth of The Gambia River - consists of two wharves: Government Wharf - a concrete wharf - opened in 1952 is used for imports of general cargo and exports of groundnut oil, groundnut cakes and palm kernels, but is over- crowded and has insufficient storage space. Adiralty Wharf is an old wooden wharf that is in desperate need of repair, but is nevertheless used regularly for discharging of petroleum products and periodically for discharging of bulk cargo when Government Wharf is overcrowded. As the latter is also in need of repair, present port installations are clearly insufficient for a country so dependent on foreign trade.

65. Under existing conditions, a temporary breakdown of port services, especially if it happened during the groundnut trading season, could have serious consequences. Lack of storage facilities makes it necessary to export all groundnuts and the bulk of groundnut oil in the few months between the harvest and the advent of the rainy season. The G0MB as well as the local mills must accordingly operate on a tight schedule, particularly in years with bumper crops. In addition, growing traffic has caused increasing waiting periods for ships calling at Bathurst; and the West African Conference Lines recently threatened to impose a freight surcharge of 10% if port facilities are not improved shortly. Import traffic - which causes the main congestion - has increased from 50-60,000 tons in the early 1960's to an average of over 80,000 tons in 1965-68.

66. The Marine Department, a part of the Mlinistry of Public Works, is responsible for wharves, pilotage, buoys and berthing ships, while dis- charging and loading is done by private shipping agencies. The Department, which also runs several road ferries and operates a regular river service as well as a dock-yard, earns a surplus on its current operations, but it is not certain-hether all operating costs are properly reflected in its operation accounts. Except for the purchase of a dredger (Z80,000) in 1967, no major investments have been made in the port over the last 10 years. The 1967/68-70 Development Prof-ramme foresees investments of £80,000 for the port of Bathurst as a first step in a $ 2 million program to expand port facilities by constructing an additional wharf. An 0D4 financed feasibility study was started in December 1968 and is expected to point out the most appropriate action to be taken. There is little doubt, however, that port facilities must be improved in order to cope with increasing traffic and to reduce high risks of temporary breakdowns and that this deserves a high priority. The Gambia has contacted the World Bank on the fLnancing of this project. - 21 -

River Transport

67. Until very recently, transport on The Gambia River was by far the most important means of inland transport, facilitated by the fact that the river is navigable up to Basse, 244 miles east of Bathurst, and only 30 miles west of the border, and that no villages in The Gambia are located more than 20 miles away from the river. The extensive road construction program carried out over the last 20 years has considerably reduced its importance, but a high proportion of groundnuts is still shipped on the river. Between 30-35,000 tons of decorticated groundnuts are loaded each year at the decorticating mill at Kaur (118 miles up-river) on ocean going vessels for shipment to European ports. In addition, a considerable part of the groundnut crop is shipped to Kaur and Bathurst on the river. The licensed buying agents and GOMB have pooled their barges and other river craft in The Gambia iver Transport Company (GRTC) managed on behalf of all shareholders by UAC (United African Company). Agricultural co-operatives tend to prefer small local ship owners, organized in a river shipping cooperative. Despite this pooling of effort, river transport is not very efficient. The GRTC and Government have been discussing ways and means of improving river transport.

68. Except for groundnuts, there is little traffic on the river. The Marine Department runs a fortnithtly service to Basse, but traffic has considerably decreased from 3-LP00 tons and over 20,000 passengers around 195, to 1,500 tons and little over 10,000 passengers in 1965. Faster service at shorter intervals would no doubt increase traffic, but it is doubtful whether river transport can ever compete effectively with road transport.

69. At present, The Gambia River carries little or no Senegalese traffic although it is nowhere more than 20 miles away from the Senegalese border. It would seem desirable to explore the joint use of this excellent waterway by both countries, particularly now that Senegal is putting special emphasis on the development of the southeastern part of its territory for which the natural outlet is The Gambia River. Road Transport

70. Road traffic has sharpLy increased over the past twenty years. At the end of World War II, the country had only about 30 Yilos of all-weather roads in laterite, and less than 600 cars and lorries were registered. By 1967, the country had over 400 miles of asphalted or laterite roads and the number of cars and lorries was estimated at over 3,000. Traffic counts show that road t;ffic in and out of Bathurst has increased by 10-20% per year since 1961-Vmore for lorries and buses and less for passenger cars. For passengers and most cargoes, except ground- nuts, road transport has almost entirely replaced river transport.

1/ 16% per annum to and 1ron the north bank betweena1961 and 1967/68. 10-20Yi to and from the south bank between 1963 and 1967. - 22 -

71. Government has made extraordinary efforts to expand the road network, especially since 1950, when a comprehensive program of road rehabilitation, financed by CD & W grants was started. From 1960 on expenditures for roads and road ferries averaged over 30% of total develop- ment outlays, or about 1E 280,000 p.a. which isalmoAt3% of GDP. The 1967/68 - 1970/71 Development Programme foresees again substantial investments in roads, accounting for 23% of total planned outlays, and for almost one third of total investments for which financing is secured. At present, construc- tion under this Programme is well under way, and when it is completed, The Gambia will be endowed with two good all-weather roads running parallel to the river on both banks almost all the way up to the eastern border with Senegal. Road construction appears to have absorbed too LzZ,'o a porter f TbeGmbiaIs limited resources. Adequate economic justification has often been lacking, particularly since construction was not accompanied or preceded. by sufficient efforts to stimulate agricultural output, Although construction standards have not been extravagant, the need to provide funds for maintaining a growing road network has aggravated the country's budgetary difficulties.

D. Tourism

72. During the last three years, tourism has become The _aciia's faetc-t growing industry. The number of tourists visiting the country has risen from virtually zero in 1965 to almost 1,000 (or 14,000 overnight stays) in 1968/69. This growth is almost entirely due to the efforts of one Swedish travel agency, which has capitalized on the natural assets and relatively low prices in the country to develop group tourism. Fortnightly charter flights geared to the capacity of local hotel accommodations reduce transport costs to a point that 14-day package tours from Stockholm are offered at E 150 to E 200 per person.

73. The Gambia offers tourists a number of advantages during winter months from December through Apri-b particularly forryortlirn Europeans. The weather is pleasant and reliable and there are good beaches. The African background and a variety of bind and animal life also offer attractions to Europeans. On the other hand, opportunities for sport and entertainment are limited.

74. During the 1967/68 season, three hotels in Bathurst offered a total of 178 beds and this number may have increased to about 280 by the Spring of 1969. Plans exist to extend facilities and to build a fourth hotel outside town so that by 1970, the number of beds might reach 800 - 900. While this implies a relatively sharp growth of tourism in the short-ivm,it is likely that further expansion wil be slow. A recent study on , financed by ODM,;comes to the conclusion

1/ "Tourism in The Gambia", July 1964 by Research Services Ltd., London. - 23 - that the potential number of tourists willing to pay L 150 - 200 for two weeks of quiet beach life with no sophisticated entertainment and few other attractions is limited, a conclusion underlined by several interviews with major European package tour operators.

75. One of the difficulties in exploiting this limited potential is the lack of capital for expansion of hotel accommodation and other in tourist facilities. There is no regular source of long term capital the country. The possibility of establishing a development fund to assist in financing private enterprise is discussed in paragraph 91below.

76. Based on total costs of a package tour averaging L 175 plus pocket expenses of L 55, a tourist spends around Z 230 for one stay. Of this amount around E 100 are for transport and overhead of the tour operators so that about E 130 are spent in The Gambia, which makes a value added of roughly 1 60. An estimated 5,000 tourists would thus contribute E 300,000 to GDP in 1974/75.

E. Education

77. Education has experienced remarkable growth over the past twenty years, especially in the hin,terland where hardly any school facilities existed up to the end of World War II. EadIia-2 in primary schools rose by over 9% p.a. between 1946 and 1967/68, while in secondary schools. it increased by more than 11% per year. Over the same period, the proportion of children in the 5-14 age bracket attending primary school increased from less than 1% to about 12% in the hinterland and probably from about 30% to 55% in Bathurst. As indicated in the table below, secondary school enrollment has also risen significantly. Primary and secondary education 19h6-h8 1955-58 1964/65-67/68

Primary schools: absolute enrollment 2,530 5,650 13,430 relative enrollment-/ 4.3% 8.4% 17.h%

Secondary schools: absolute enrollment 370 825 3,480 relative enrollmentY 1% 1.9% 7.1%

Vocational schools: absolute enrollment n.a. 28 66

1/ relative to all 5 to lt year old children. T/ relative to all 11 to 18 year old children. - 24 -

78. The rapid increase in enrollment has been accompanied by little or no qualitative improvement. Standards of education are generally low and the syllabus is little adapted to needs and conditions in the country. Thus, the school system is producing an increasing number of semi-trained juveniles, who gravitate toward Bathurst, find few acceptable employment opportunities but are unwilling to return to the f-rm. The expansion of post-primary education designed to improve this situation has in most cases only postponed the problem, since post-primary training has also largely failed to prepare school leavers for gainful employment, particularly since no serious attempts were made to provide real practical training in agriculture or handicrafts. Increasingly aware of this situation, the Government, assisted byc. UNESCO Educational Planning Mission, fomulated a 10 Year Education Program in 1965 that emphasized practical training at all levels. In line with this program, the Goverment is serimusly engaged in changing the past education system and is seeking technical and financial assistance for this purpose. The 10-Year Program recommended a new syllabus for primary schools and increased emphasis on practical education, closely related to the requirements of agricultural life in the country.

79. About 12%o of primary school leavers are accepted in Senior Secondary Schools (Grammar Schools) which offer six and seven year courses of classical education to prepare for ontry to overseas univorsities. About one-third of primary school leavers are accepted either in one of the two Junior Secondary Schools (Secondary Modern Schools) or follow post-rimary courses similar to the ones offered in Junior Secondary Schools. In both cases, courses are for four years, with special emphasis on practical training, which,however,is at present not thorough enough to make real trained craftsmen or agriculturalists out of its graduates. The Ten-Year-Program recommended that these schools be changed to real technical schools (Junior Technical Schools) in Bathurst and Rural Vocational Schools in the hinterland.

80. Until now real vocational education has boon restricted to one establishment, the Vocational Training Center (Bathurst Technical School), which provides 3-5 year courses for mechanical engineering, motor mechanics, carpentry, masonry and telecommunications of relatively high qualitative standard. The number of trainees, however, has always been limited, and only recently exceeded 50. The 10-Year-Program proposed that this school be made a Senior Technical School for selected graduates from Junior Technical Schools and that an Agricultural Technical School be established for further training of high quality graduates from Rural Vocational Schools.

81. A Teacher Training College, opened in 1949, provides 2 and 3 year courses for the training of upper primary and lower secondary teachers. This College has almost met the need for new teachers despite static enrollment since 1962. However, the quality of instruction, particularly for secondary school teachers,requires urgent improvement; such - rroject is included in the 10-Year Programme. - 25 -

82. The outlays for education included in the 1967/68-70/71 Development Programme reflect the recommendations of the Ten-Year Program. Thus 42% of the funds provided for education is allocated to Rural Vocational Schools and Junior Technical Schools and 28% to inprove frcilities for teacher training. In the 10-Year Pro7ram, it is suggested that IDA be approached for the necessary financing which was estimated at L 680,000 ($1.6 million) of which E 120,000 ($ 0.3 million) are included in the 1967/68-70/71 Development Program.

83. Both projects aim mainly at improving the quality of instruction and at changing its basic orientation. Improvement of teacher training is a necessary first step to raise standards in primary and secondary education to a useful level while expansion and improvement of vocational training - primarily in agriculture-could be an important means of accelerating economic growth. As both projects will not primarily aim at increasing the number of students, expected increases in operating costs are relatively small. The projects appear to deserve high priority in view of their potential long term benefits.

III. MONEY AND BANKING

84. The Gambia is linked with the sterling area and the exchang.e rate of The Gambia pound is fixed bystatute at par with pound sterling.- The monetary system consists of The Gambia Currency Board, two commercial banks, a Post Office Savings Bank, and The Gambia Cooperative Central Banking and Marketing Union (GCCBMU). Both the Treasury and GOiB keep the bulk of their reserves abroad.

A. Banking Institutions

85. The Gambia Currency Board (GCB) h1as e4istcd s3lnce Qctober 1964, when it replaced the former West African Currency Board (WACB) of which The Gambia was a member. Between then and June 1968, WACB notes and coins were gradually taken out of circulation and replaced by Gambian money. The Board is required to hold gold or sterling assets amounting to not less than 70% of currency in circulation and other demand liabilities. Up to 15% of the assets might consist of long tem Gambian Government securities. Other eligible assets are local agricultural and commercial bills:ixuatzri4uitin 90 days and 3 months Gambia Government Treasury Bills.

1/ After the last sterling devaluation (November 1967) legislation was initiated to change this rigid relation and to defin, The Gambia pound in relation to gold rather than sterling, but nodrision had been taken by the end of 1968. - 26 -

86. By the end of 1967, about £800,000 of WACB currency had been exchanged against Gambian pounds and about an equal amount of Gambian-cur- rency had been put in circulation against sterling. In 1965, GCB ac- quired from WACB £113,000 in long term Gambian Government securities. Since then, it has made only one advance to Government of £4,000 which has been repaid. The Board, however, has become strongly in- volved in groundnut crop financing which restricts possibilities of in- tervention in other sectors. Thus, the GCB has not rediscounted any commercial papers other than those related to groundnut marketing. 87. Commercial Banking services are provided by a branch officO of the Standard Bank of West Africa with head offices in London - which has a sal;2l ffice at Basse - and since 1968 by a subsidiary of the Banque Internationale pour le Commerce et l'Industrie du S6n6gal (B.I.C.I.) which has its head offices in Dakar, and is related to the Banque Nationale de Paris (B.N.P.). In the past, around 75%. of their credits have been devctedi to crop financing and the financiig of imports. Although boti institut*Oris are in theory able to provide long-term financing specialized through subsidiaries of their respective mother companies, in prac- tice they have never engaged in this type of business.

88. The Gambia Savings Bank, established in 1962, is administered by the postal services. Savings deposits have shown a moderate but steady growth and in June 1968 slightly exceeded £250,000, of which about £200,000 were invested abroad. The Bank extends no credits to the local economy and has no administration capable of screening credit applications.

89. The Gambia Cooperative Central Banking and Marketing Union (GCCB4U) accepts deposits from and re-londs money to copratives* It acts at the same time as a licensed buying agent for GOPM utilizing the coopera- tive marketing societies as its agents. At the end of 1967/68, GCCBMU had assets of £273,000, of which slightly over 20 per cent represented credits to members, mainly for subsistence during the dry season. Its total share capital, surplus and reserves amounted to about £225,000.

B. Short-Term Credit 90. Groundnut crop financing is the major credit operation in the country, and regularly leads to an increase in money circulation from a low of around £1 million in September to over £2 million between December and March. iin sources of financing are GCB and commercial banks. Gene- rally, GCB channels its advances through the Government and the private banks to GCCBU, while the private banks grant crop advances to GCCBMU and other licensed buying agents out of funds borrowed from headquarters abroad and out of their own resources. In the past, GCB preferred chan- nelling through Government but plans to work in future mainly through com- mercial banks. In 1967/68, it established equal lines of credits of £300,000 for the Standard Bank and for Government. GCB lending to private banks was at a rate of 5-1/2%, while StanaLrd Banik re-tr th. onoy at 6-1/2, - 27 - to GCCBMU and at 7% to other licensed buying agents. Short term credit for financing of imports and local wholesale operations is provided by the commercial banks. Creditworthy firms (European and Lebanese companies) pay around 7% for such credits, while smaller local traders usually need a guarantor to receive credits from the banks, which cost them an additional 5%.

C. Long Term Credit

91. While demand for short term credit is thus well covered - although rather expensive for small enterprises - there is no insti- tution in The Gambia providing long term capital. Since 1960 the Treasury has operated a Revolving Fund amounting to £0-50,000 for the purpose of advancing credits to small local enterprises, but this has been on a limited scale and the Government is not well-equipped to handle this type of business. Its annual lending, exclusive of consumer credits, has averaged only £,000. The Department of Agriculture also operote-s a small credit fund from which.small.dovelopment projects and pqrchasos of agricultural implements can be financed, but its operations have not been very success- ful. Basically there is at present no effective way of meeting the small but growing demand for long term capital by small and medium size local enterprises. While the need is particularly acute in the field of tourism and perhaps commercial agricultural ventures (e.g. lime production) fishing, handicraft and small manufacturing enterprises also have a growing demand for capital as well as for assistance and advice in bookeping and other commercial problems. Graduates of the vocational school - although well trained technically - find it almost impossible to establish themselves in business for lack of capital, although there is a growing demand for repair shops of all kinds (including auto repair), primarily in the hinterland.

92. Establishment of a properly administered development fund, capable of providing capital as well as advice in business operations, should be actively explored. It is not clear whether the potential v olume of business would warrant the establishment and staffing of a special development corporation or bank. The possibility of activating the development financing business of one or both commercial banks might therefore merit examination. Apart from provision of necessary capital from external sources, some local reserves could be made available from The Gambia's Savings Bank, the Treasury's Revolving Fund and eventually from the Farmer's Fund.

IV. PUBLIC FINANCE

A. Structure

93. The public sector comprises the Central Government, five povin- ces, the ci - of Bathurst and the Gambia Oilseeds Marketing Board. The - 28 -

Bix local authorities have their own budgets fed by local taxes, primar- ily on property. Combined tax revenues of these authorities average about 10 per cent of the total revenue of the Central Government.

9h. The Central Government operates on two budgets, a recurrent budget and a development budget (called Development Fund). Distinction between the two, however, is vague since both include investments as well as current expenditures, which are difficult to separate. While the current budget is mostly financed by current revenues, about two- thirds of development expenditures are financed with grant aid and soft loans from Britain. Several special funds are administered by the Cen- tral Government. The most important is the Farmers Fund, established at the end of'1950 after liquidation of the old West African Produce Control Board. It serves mainly to finance small agricultural projects and its resources are replenished by interest on its investments and sporadic trQnsfers of profits from GOMB.

95. The current budget of the Central Government includes, on a gross basis, revenues and expenditures of the post office, the port of Bathurst, electricity and water supply services, public river-boat ser- vices and ferries. Revenues from these activities, together with rents from public property, average 12% of total .revenuo. GCMB1, -which operates outside the two Central Government budgets, has an annual turn- over exceeding the two budgets by a wide margin.

96. The financial situation of tho public sector is as much influ- enced by the groundnut cycle as the rest of The Ga.ribia's economy. Exports of groundnuts determine the volume of foreign trade from which almost two-thirds of budgetary revenues are derived in the form of import and export taxes. Indirectly groundnut exports influence most other sources of government revenues as well. On the other hand, government expend- itures tend to rise more or less independently of the groundnut cycle. Thus during periodsof stagnating exports o C-oer.nent r"ves, .t i deficits I&ve of'ten occurred.

97. Public finances are generally well managed. Budgets are re- spected and expenditure control and auditing are satisfactory. Finan- cial policy is conservative. Recognizing the country's limited resources the Government has refrained from conspicuously wasteful expenditures. Public indebtedness has been kept low with the help of generous grants from the United Kingdom. No short term debt is outstanding and no sup- pliers credits have been contracted. Combining finance and planning in a single ministry has facilitated the adoption of development plans reastically adjusted to the financing resources available and made it possible to utilize the longer term development program as the country's development budget. - 29 -

Budgetary situation and groundnut cycle Annual averages in £1,000

1946-48 1949-56 1957-58 1959-64 1965-66/67 1967/68 2 boom 8 years of 2 boom 6 years of 3 boom begin. of y ars stagnation years stagnation years stagnation(?) Total current revenues 1/ 627 1,015 1,843 1,824 3,143 3,129

Current expenditures 509 998 1,518 1,966 2,774- 3,164

Net current +U8 + 17 + 325 -162 + 369 -35 budget

Development expenditures 113 237 370 745 9922/ 1,015

British development aid 71 176 185 437 582 590

Net development ibuet - 42 - 61 -185 -308 -410 -425

Total net budget + 76 - 4. + 140 -470 -41 -460

British grant- in-aid - - - 243 257 -

Impact on Treasury reserves + 76 - 44 + 140 -227 + 216 -460 Treasury reserves, end of period n.a. 1,626 1,)24 515 1,366 933

I/ Including British pension payments, and local revenues earmarked for the fi- nancing of development expenditures. The latter are treated throughout the rEport as part of current revenues. 2/ Including £200,000 of estimated current expenditures officially classified under development expenditures. 3/ Excluding £200,000 of estimated current expenditures officially classified under development expenditures. - 30 -

B. Present Situation and Past Developments

98. The Government's present financial situation is difficult; except inespecially good groundnut years, current e.penditures exceed local revenues, and the current budget can only be balanced with substantial subsidies from abroad so that little, if any, public savings are generated to finance public development outlays. The short-tema fluctuations reflecting the groundnut cycle have tended to obscure the slow but continuous deterioration of the Government's financial position since the end of the war. In the period 1945 to 1967/68 cur- rent expenditures rose more rapidly - at an average annual rate of 9.5% - than local revenues which increased at a rate of 8.2%).

99. Up to 1948, this trend did not give rise to concern because high surpluses accumulated during the war were available to cover part of the increase in expenditures. However, the situation became more serious in the period 1949-56 which was characterized by prolonged stagnation. Average public savings fell to little over la of current revenues and the period ended with a substantial cur- rent deficit in 1956. Temporary relief was provided by the 1957/58 6 boom, but during the 1959- 4 period of stagnation the current budget again showed increas- ing deficits. Moreover, while the 1949-56 stagnation period started off with a surplus and showed a substantial deficit only in the last year, the 1959-64 stagnation period was characterized by continuous deficits. While the current budget had still shown a small overall surplus between 1949 and 1956, it showed a deficit of 10% of revenue between 1959 and 1964 and reached a deficit of over 17% 1/ in 1964,. The growing deficits were first financed by drawing down Treasury reserves which fell by about two-thirds between 1959 and 1962 even though British grant-in-aid was provided in 1962 to prevent a complete exhaustion of Treasury resources. During the three boom years 1965-66/67, when revenues in- creased by an average of over 22' per year, the current budget produced substan- tial surplus, replenishing to some extent the low Treasury reserves. However, a fall of less than 8 in the volume of groundnuts purchased in The Gambia in 1967/68 again resulted in a deficit in that year and the past trend makes the outlook rather pessimistic. 2/

100. The financial problem of the current budget has been aggravated by the fact that increasing amounts of development expenditures have had to be financed by the Treasury. Over the past 25 years, British devel- opment aid financed on the average 64% of the Gambia's development outlays. The financing of the remainder from local sources created no serious problems up to 1958, since development outlays were relatively small (around 24% of current expenditures), and the current budget was in surplus and yielded on the average sufficient public savings. However, the situation changed in the 1958-64 period when development outlays jumped to over 37% of current expenditures and the current budget was on average in deficit and thus unable to contribute to the financing of development outlays. While the part of development expenditures not 1/ After counting United Kngdom pension assistance as revenue, without which, the doficit would have amounted to 25% of revenue. 2/ The fact that 1968/69 was an extremely good year for the Gambian budget does not basically change this outlook. The sharp increase in government revenues - which led to a substantial surplus in the current budget - was mainly due to a marked and unexpected increase in world market prices for groundnuts (increasing by over 30% between October 1968 and March 1969). As this high price level will most likely not continue for very long, it will not solve The Gambia's longer term budgeting problems. - 31 - covered by British development aid nor by current budget surpluses aver- aged a low h4,OCO p.a. during the 1949-56 stagnation, it reached L300,000 per year in the 1958-64 stagnation period. Although part of this gap was covered by British grant-in-aid to the current budget in excess of current budget deficit, it imposed a severe drain on Treasury reserves. Following the short relief provided by the 1965-66/67 boom, this drain resumed in 1967/68 when the development fund experienced a deficit of L425,000 and Treasury reserves fell by one-third.

101. This unsatisfactory situation is due on the one hand to the rapid acceleration of current and development expenditures, which have risen much faster than GDP, and on the other hand to an allocation of resources which has given insufficient emphasis to the development of directly productive sectors. In fact, most public investments were of the revenue-consuming type while few had a direct and immediate impact on public revenues. In the period 1944 to 1967/8 current and develop- ment expenditures rose at annual rates of respectively 9.5 and 12.3%, while GDP might have increased by 5-6% per year. At the same time, tax revenues rose by 8.3% which is much less than expenditure but con- siderably more than GDP and which could only be achieved because tax rates were raised and foreign trade, the principal determinant of reve- nues, rose more rapidly than GDP (8.1% p.a.). Expenditures have always been largely devoted to administrative and other infrastructure. Expen- ditures for general administration (incli ding pensions) and security decreased from 37% of total expenditurel/ in 1947-56 to 32% in 1960-67. In addition expenditures for maintenance and new construction of adminis- trative buildings and staff houses have absorbed 8% of total expenditures. Operation, maintenance and expansion of the transport and communications infrastructure (net of commercial revenues derived from these operations) amounted to 29% in 1947-56 and 25% in 1960-67, reflecting the high outlays for the postwar road construction program. The share of education and health expenditures increased from 17% in 1947-56 to 20% in 1960-67. Ex- penditures in directly and immediately productive sectors were low; thus outlays for agriculture averaged only 10% of public expenditures. The Governrment's activity in the agricultural field was stbject to a vicious circle. Limited outlays did not pornit acquisition of sufficient knowledge in this sector and development of an adequate extension service. This in turn restricted absorptive capacity in agriculture, riaking it difficult .to incread&-Government spending in this field.

102. This pattern of public spending reflected the Government's basic conviction - strongly influenced by a liberal "laisser faire" attitude - that infrastructure investments would automatically produce growth in the private sector. This philosophy was reinforced by the fact that until the end of World War II public services in The Gambia were indeed rudimentary and in clear need of improvement. Moreover most civil servants - concentrated in the capital - have few ties with the hinterland and accordingly insufficient comprehension of the urgency and

1/ Current and development budgets combined. - 32 -

coiplexity of agricultural '.evelupnent. in zny event, the private sector :n particularly agricul'ure did iot respond ufficitntly to the provision of rieu infrastructurc so that thu production km became iiidequate to support the rapid increase in public outlays.

103. Although general orientation and size of government expend- itures are open to criticism public spending has not been lavish or ex- travagant. There have been no irresponsible wasteful expenditures or construction to unreasonably high standards. Host - if not all - public investments would have been necessary and economically justified sooner or later. However, a country with such limited resources as The Gambia and at such an early stage of economic development cannot realize all economically justified projects within a few years without running into financial difficulties; it needs to maintain a careful balance between projects which will yield an immediate economic return and help to gene- rate revenues quickly and those with much longcr term banefits which mean- while tend to consume rather than yield revenues.

C. Development Planning and Public Development Outlays

104. Until now The Gambian Government never attempted to integrate development in the private economy with public investments in an overall development plan. All development plans worked out over the past 25 years were in fact longer terms programs of public development expend- itures. During the first years after the war, these programs included only projects to be financed by British development aid (including local contributions) and were designed to plan the utilization of British aid made available over a certain period (3-5 years). Projects financed entirely from local sources were left outside these plans. The first such program was related to the British Colonial Development Uelfare Act of 1940. It was followed in 1945 by a 10-Year Plan (1946-55), superseded by a 7-Year Plan (19L9-56) when British aid was increased. The system chang,ed after 1958 when the Development Fund was established to central- ize development outlays financed from local resources as well as British aid. The 1964-66/67 development program presented a comprehensive list of all planned public development expenditures. It was followed by the "Development Programme 1>67/68 to 1970/71" which is based on a British development loan rather than on British grant aid as in the past but does include most, but not all,projects to be financed by other sources. The most important project not financed by British aid is the port of Bathurst extension, for which Bank/IDA financing is sought. Host non-British bilat- eral aid and assistance from the U-H is excluded from the Programme.

105. The limited scope of these programs and the fact that they were all built around firmly agreed British aid, which covered around two-thirds of total outlays, made the plans more realistic than usual. 1thile limited absorptive capacity was a major bottleneck impeding realization of the Plan's targets immediately after the war,this situation has considerably improved concerning the 1964-66/67 Program (the first for which detailed data on real implementation was available). Eighty-six per cent of the - 33 -

overall expenditure target was realized with the ratio of achievement in the main sectors varying' from 11015 for -o'ministr t,ve builiJ.ng6 to 85-95% for agri.culture, tr-:±sport, urlter su,ppl nid sc.!er;& Yid electricity, and 60-65% for educ;,.tion end health.

106. Sectoral distributions of development outlays has changed considerably over the past 20 years, reflecting relative priorities and major preoccupations of the Government. Up to the middle of the 1950ts, the main emphasis was on public health and on improvement of sewerage, drainage and flood protection in the Bathurst area; in the 10 years 1966-1955 planned expenditures for these two purposes accounted for 60, of total planned outlays. Second )riority was. given to educa- tion, electricity, urban streets and agriculture/livestock. Two tend- encies characterized the early programs: concentration on non-revenue producing projects and concentration on the capital area. In the 10-YeLr and the 7-air Pr,Grams, over 80o of total ',utlays were for pro- jects without direct and immediate economic return, and expenditures ip the Bathurst area amounted to 75-80% of total plenined ex,penditures.1 The most substantial public outlays for agriculture during this period were made by CDC for a poultry scheme (Yundum) and a mechanized rice pro- ject (Wallikunda/tapu) but both projects were abandoned within a few years and had negligible impact on economic growth.

107. During the second half of the 1950's, investments in transport and comciunication became more important and development expenditures started to increase rapidly. Through the implementation of a 5-Year Plan for re- habilitation and extension of the road network an attempt was made for the first time to open up the country to all season access by road, thus re- placing the river as the main mode of transport. Other major transport projects concerned extension of the Port of Bathurst, rebuilding river wharves and improving airport facilities. Expenditures for agriculture increased somewhat after the two unsuccessful CDC projects were turned over to The Gambian Government to be transformed into agricultural re- search stations, while outlays for health, drainage, and seierage declined substantially.

108. During the early 1960's, general orientation remained basically unchanged. From 1960 through 1963, outlays for transport and communica- tions accounted for about half of total development expenditures;

1/ This picture does not substantially change even if public development expenditures made outside these plans are included (construction of administrative buildings and roads by PWD, agricultural projects fi- nanced by the Farmers Fund and development expenditures financed by local authorities),as they were also coqcentrated around the capital, not directly productive, or limited in size. - 34 -

agriculture fell to 201, with education (12p) in third position. Roads and bridges amounted for the bulk of transport investments, while in agriculture highest priority was given to rice. Geograph- ically development expenditures tended to be more evenly distributed than in the past, but the relation between revenue-producing and revenue-consuming projects changed little, since almost 80% of total outlays still fell into the second category.

109. The 1964-66/67 Program included substantial outlays hitherto financed from current revenues, mainly for equipment, spare parts and some recurrent costs, to ease the difficult situation of the current budget. However, the composition of development outlays changed very little: transport and communication accounting for one-third of total expenditures received top priority, followed by agriculture (21%) ;education and administrative buildings were each allocated about 10%, Directly productive expenditures, (agriculture, electricity and some minor outlays for promotion of handicraft and small industries) incroased to about 23% of total development outlays during this period.

110. The 1967/68.-1970/71 Development Programme again puts heavy emphasis on transport and communications (45%) but substantially reduces the share of agriculture (13%). Even if estimated expenditures by the Chinese rice mission - not included in the Programme - are added, planned agricultural outlays will only reach 16% of the total. After including the relatively high amount allocated to electricity (6%) and various minor projects for tourism, expenditures on directly productive sectors are planned to account for about 23% of the total. This is slightly more than in the past, but not onough to accelerate substantially economic growth in the country.

Financing of Development Outlays

annual averages

1945-58 1959-64 1965-66/67 1967/68 £00 000 % E~ £000 Z£000 10 UK Assistancel= 143 66% 564 76% 998 84% 590 58% Local Contribution 122 57% 37 5% 429 36% - Total Available Financing 265 123% 601 81% 1,427 120%o 590 58% Use of' Treasury Reserves - 1h41 19% - 235 425 42%

Total real expenditures 215 100% 745 100% 1,192 100% 12015 100%

1/I.ncluding indirect British contribution through grant-in-aid to the current budget in excess of the current budget deficits. - 35 -

111. Financing of development outlays did not create problems up to 1958, as current budget surplus and British development grants together were more than sufficient to finance development expenditures, so that Treasury reserves increased. In this period, absortive capacity was the main bottleneck, impeding faster growth of public investments. During the 1959-64 stagnation period, this situation changed basically as a result of sharp increases in development spendings and a steep fall in current budget surpluses. During this period, the only local source of financing was a loan of Z 200,000 subscribed to 60% by the Gambia Currency Board and which was' tius. rinaily a7long' term central bznk advance. Although British financial contributions increased to 76% of total outlays, about 20% of development expeddijtures had to be-Tinanced by running down Treasury reserves. This unsatisfactory situation was reversedduring the 1965-66/67 boom period, when total available financing again exceeded real expenditures, but in 1967/68, with no public savings available, over 40% of development outlays had to be financed by Treasury reserves.

D. Treasury, Public Debt, and Foreign Aid

112. The Treasury's main holdings consist of funds belongiTh t'o the Centr Government, andcreated for various purposes. The General Reserve Fund. Development Fund, and Farmers Fund, account for the bulk of Govern- ment-owned funds and thus represent the Government's main line of defense in case of budgetary deficits!/. In addition, the Treasury has at its disposal miscellaneous deposits, including funds accumulated through The Gambia Savings Bank, plus some deposits by local authorities. While holdings of the major Government Funds vary widely and sharply (between E 0.5 and 1.4 million during the last five years) depending on the budgetary situation, other resources are relatively stable, fluctuating around E 150,000 in the case of minor Government Funds and between -500, 000-O0eO in theeCase of non-Covtrfment deposits.

113. As already indicated, Central Government reserves have been characterized by a declining trend. While they stood at L 1.9 million, or 12 months average public expenditures at the end of 1958, they amounted to only L 0.9 million, or less than 3 months expenditures by June 1968. As long as British grant-in-aid continues to cover the bulk of current budget deficits, a reserve of around M 650,000, or about 15% of total current expenditures may be sufficient to cover unforeseen contingencies over the next years. This would leave a small margin for financing development expenditures by reducing Treasury reserves.

l/ Reserve Fund and General Revenue Balance.

Ilthou3h Devolopncnt Fund and Farmors Fund are formally ocamarked for financing of development outlrys only, both can also be used to finance current expenditures, as has happened in the past. - 36 -

1-14. Treasury accounts are held predominantly abroad, mainly in the form of British and other Commonwealth securities and in cash. Advances to the local economyEave been important up to the early 1960's, but were sharply reduced since 1964 when the general reserve fund had fallen to almost zero* Over 95% of total ssets held by the Treasury are thus highly liquid and can be mobilized without negatively influencing the local economy.

11. Management of public debt has always been conservative and public indebtedness has never been important, thanks in part to generous British aid, mostly in grant form. At the end of Fiscal Year 1967/68 total outstanding public debt amounteq to L 1 million and total debt service during that year to E 17,0001. The bulk of this debt is composed of British Government loans at very concessional terms. 10.6 million represents the first tranche of an interest-free British aevelopment loan (25 years) of L 3.2 million to be disbursed over the 1967/68-1970/71 Plan period, replacing former development grant assistance, while L 0.2 million are composed of British loans made todefraypart of The Gambia's pension payments to retired British civilsEnatz (two-third of iF4M:h interest jTt; methird A6-.YMi$. In 1967/68 debt service for the entire foreign debt amounted to E 3,400 or about 0.1% of total current expenditures and 0i.0% of domestic exporte.,

116. Local debt consists of one bond issue of E 0.2 million (1963-73 at 6%) of which 60% is held by The Gambian Currency Board, with debt service payments of E 14,000 per annum (0.5% of current expenditures). Although this debt is due in 1973, most of it can probably be re-financed. On the other hand, chances for an increase in local indebtedness are limited, demonstrated by the fact that only 40% of -1e 1963 issue was absorbed noro or los33 roluntarily by the private sector.

117. The bulk of foreign aid receivea by The Gambia is provided by the United Kingdom. Over the past 95 years British financial aid averaged E 1.1 million per year, of which E 0.45 million went towards the curentbudget and Z 0.65 million for development outlays. Aid from other sources was limited and reached not more than 10% of total British contribution: UNDP's assistance has increased to around E 50,000 per year, mostly for education and health; aid from the United States averaged L 25,000 mostly for agriculture, and the assistance given by the Republic of China for the rice scheme can be evaluated at about *1 25,000 per year, increasing to about E 75,000 per annum in the near future. Other aid programs include supply of fertilizer by the Federal Republic of .

218. Under the present aid agreement with the United Kingdom, The Gambia receives British development aid in the form of long term loans (see para. -1 above) of up to E 3.2 million during the 1967/68§70/71 Plan period, of which L 0.6 million had been spent in FY 1967/68. In addition, the UK has agreed to provide grant-in-aid towards the current budget, when it is in deficit, for amounts decreasing from E 590,000 in 1967AB to E 280,000 in 1970/51. No decision has yet been taken for the period after June 1971.

1/ Srcluding Goverment debt vis-a-vis its own Ands. - 37 -

V. PROSPECTS AND CREDITWORTHINESS

GDP

29. Prospects for economic development over the next five to ten years are not encouraging and future growth might well be slower than during the past 20 years. Production of groundnuts - remaining for a long time the country's main economic activity - is expected to increase not faster than in the past (2.5% - 3% p.a.) because of limited potential for expansion, and is probably going to suffer from a fall in world market prices, so that export proceeds from groundnuts may first stagnate and then increase only very slowly. This will in turn retard the growth of public expenditures and thus the contribution of this sector to GDP. Production of traditional foodstuffs (except rice) is not likely to increase much faster than total population. In consequence, in three major sectors of the economy, accounting together for an estimated 75% of GDP, economic growth over the next decade will most likely be slow, so that, even if production in several other sectors incroased much faster tha i the past - as can be expected for rice, tourism, possibly livestock and several secondary crops - overall growth will remain low.

120. Rough approximations suggest, that economic growth at constant prices might average between 2.5 - 3.5% p.a. over the next decade; near the lower limit at the beginning,-rhen groundnut prices are expected to fall; closer to the upper limit in the later 1970's. With population increase estimated at 1-2% per year, such growth rates would result in an increase of real per capita income of 1-2% per year. Total GDP might ribe- from an estimated average of E 11.9 million between 1964 and 1967/68 to an average of Z 13.6 million (1969-73) and E 16.1 million between 1974 and 1979. This projection is based on the assumption, that: a. groundnut output will grow 2.5 - 3% per year, while world market. prices will fall by about 10%, offsetting the increase in production during the next 3-4 years; b. rice production will increase 5% per annum; c. other agricultural production will rise at 3% per year, less for subsistence crops, considerably more for cash crops, livestock and fishing; d. output of manufacturing, power and services, not directly related to groundnuts will increase at 4% per year; and e. public sector spending will rise by 3.4% per year, as discussed below.

121. The growth prospects are modest by comparison with the estimated annual increase of 4% between 1945 and 1967/68. In the future, expansion will no longer be stimulated as in the past 20 years by an increase in groundnut prices and by a substantial growth of foreign aid. Nor will it be possible to increase income, as in the past, by a gradual shift in tports from-undbcorticatcd Lroundnuts to decorticated nuts and finally groundnut oil. - 38 -

Foreign Trade

122. Given the trend in groundnut exports, total exports (excluding re-exports) are expected to increase very slowly, probably at not more than 1.5% per annum over the next five years rising perhaps to around 2.5% during the second half of the 1970's. Imports for local consumption - which in the past have closely followed export trends - may rise at a somewhat lower rate, if local rice production can be increased enough to replace imports. Including re-exports, imports may rise by about 2% -per annum over the coming five years, and by about 2.5% thereafter. However, as long as public sector deficits continue to be financed by foreign aid and not by inflationary means, no balance of payments difficulties are foreseen.

Public Sector

123. If the above projections are realistic, there is no doubt that a continuing increase in public expenditures of 10% per year (current expenditures alone 7% per annum) as in the past would soon lead to unmanageable financial difficulties. On the basis of a growth of imports projected at under 2% per year and a 10fo decline in export prices (sharply reducing export tax revenues) the mission does not expect Government revenues to grow by more than 2% per year over the coming five years, and aLt 3-h in the late 1970's. Under these conditions even the substantial slow down ini the growth of current expenditures to 3.4% per year as foreseen in The Gambia's present Development Programme would not result in a balanced current budget within the next ten years. The public finance situation will thus continue to be one of the country's major problems. Continuation of British grant-in-aid to the current budget beyond the past agreement seems to be necessary. Little, if any, public saving will be forthcoming fcr paritipatn in the financing of public investments.

Mission Projection of Current Revenues .000 E

Direct Import Export Commercial iYscel. Taxes Taxes Taxes Revenue Revenues Total 0 1964-1967/8 236 1,678 214 361 487 2,976 0 1969/70-73/4 270 l,900 14 506 450 3,270 0 1974/5-78/9 330 2,230 157 673 510 3,800

124. Revenues from direct taxeg which were exceptionally high during the last three years as a result of dctormizod efforts to collect arrear will at best grow in line with GDP. The projection of import taxes is based on a slight increase in taxation from an average of 25,oW in 1964-

1/ 2 ver total imports - 39 -

1967/8 to 27% and 28% respectively in five and ten years. Import revenues will thus increase somewhat faster than total imports. By carefully analysing major import categories itc. by item., .-clocted increaoos in tax rates ought to be possible without endangering The Gambia's competitive position in West African trade and could result in some further increases in import tax revenues* on the other hand, if the present volume of re-export trade is drastically cut revenues from import taxes might well decline by 30-40%, resulting in an unmanageable budgetary crisis. Export tax revenues at present tax rates are projected to decline, due to the expected fall in world market prices. Tax rates could be increased by reducing producer prices, which however might well affect groundnut production and mar1eting, especially if the Senegalese marketing organization is improvedl/and if local rice cultivation is more actively encouraged. Commercial revenues (electricity, river transport, port operations, etc) are likely to grow at most 6% per annum as compared with 6.3% per year during the last five years. Miscellaneous revenues which include interest received by the Treasury on its investments abroad, were exceptionally high during 1965/6-1967/8, as Treasury reserves were high. The expected tight budgetary situation will likely result in a substantial decline of reserves and thus in a fall of interest earnings.

125. In total, Government revenues are projected to increase by an average of 1.8% er year during the early 1970's and might grow at 3.5, a. thereafter, when the depressing effect of declining ground- nut prices may have been absorbed. During the next five years, growth of revenues will thus fall behind growth of total GDP due to the fact that two-thirds of Government revenues are derived from foreign trade, which will grow less than GDP. This is just opposite to what happened in the past, when foreign trade and Government revenues increased faster than GDP* The relative share of Government reyenues vis-a-vis GDP is thus likely to decline somewhat from a high 26% - in 1967/6,,2/to an average of 23-24%'i.- the period 1967/70-78/79, still a remarkably high share for a country with a per capita income of under $80. After 1974, growth of revenues might average about 3.5%, in line with growth of total GDP.

Mission Projection of Current Budget ('000 g)

Total Local British Current Current Net Revenues Aidy Revenues Expenditures Result

1967/68 2,951 176 3,127 3,164 - 37 1969/70-73/74 3,270 100 3,370 3,620 -250 1974/75-78/79 3,900 80 3,980 4,280 -300

1/ Onder a lor.n/credit-arrecnent signed in February 1969 between Senegal and World Bank/lD, groundnut inrketing in Senegal will in fact be improved soon. 2/ By including revenues of local authorities, this share would increase by about 2 percentage points. / Overseas Service ;id Scheme, contribution to pension paynents, etc. excluding grant-in-aid. - 4/ Projected at an averagb annual growth rate of 3.4%. - 4O -

126. Growth of current expenditures has continuously declined from almost 15% p.a. in the late 1940's to 9% in the early 1950's and to slightly over 7% since 1960. The Development Programme 1967/68-70/71 is based on a growth of current expenditures not exceeding 3.4% per year over the Plan period. Such a substantial slow down is not impossible, but can only be achieved if the Government is determined to enforce this limitation against all pressures and resistance. Indeed - if the mission projection comes anywhere close to reality - a growth rate of 3.4% is the maximum The Gambia can afford without creating unmanageable financial difficulties. With such a modest increase revenues would fall 7% short of covering current expenditures over the next 10 years. This would be supportable only if the United Kingdom is willing to continue its grant- in-aid on about the same scale as in 1962/1965 beyond the end of the present agreement (i.e. 1971). Without such assistance in sight, The Gambia would have to introduce a very tight austerity budget with annual increases of under 1.5% or practically nil in real terms.

127. But even if British budgetary assistance continues, the sharp decline in future growth will make it essential to carefully set priorities and to channel the limited additional funds into highest priority sectors. Government's decision to slow down further expansion of primary education as long as no satisfactory new system is introduced is a step in this direction. Current expenditums of PWD - which account for about 25% of total current outlays and have substantially increased over the last 5 years - should be carefully screened for possible reductions while gcneral administrative expenditures should be prevented from increasing. As pointed out before, more should be done in agriculture, as building up an efficient and well staffed extension service is an essential prerequisite for future economic growth.

128. Account must be taken of the possibility that the average rates of growth projected for the future may not be realized during certain periods owing to medium term- fluctuations created by the groundnut cycle. It has already been pointed out (paragraphs 20 and 34) that The Gambia may be at the beginning of a new stagnation period that might well last for 4-6 years, during which long term growth of GDP, foreign trade, and Government revenues, as projected by the mission, might not be realized. In 1967/68, Government revenues declined by almost 10% and might fall again in the current year (1968/69). If a new stagnation period has in fact begun, The Gambia may face, in the years immediately ahead, annual current budget deficits approaching £0.5 million which could hardly be covered without a substantial increase in British budgetary aid. 41 -

129. The above projections of current revenues and expenditures are based on the assumption that The Gambia's re-export trade with neighboring countries (primarily but not exclusively Senegal) will not basically change in the near future. However, a substantial fall in re-exports in the near future would no doubt worsen this budgetary outlook, as the value of re-export trade has a direct bearing on government revenues. Measures taken recently by Senegal to discourage and reduce illicit imports thus might well increase the difficulties for The Gambia to reach a balanced budget within the next few years.

130. With the current budget probably in deficit over most of the next decade, financing of public investments will become a problem. Over bhe 1964-66/67 Plan period, local resources financed 21% of plan outlays; -the rest was provided by British aid, in part directly through contribution to the development fund, in part through budgetary aid in excess of current budgetary deficits. During the last three years, the relation was even 25:75, as two boom years had created substantial budget surpluses.

PUBLIC DEVELOPMENT OUTLAYS

Annual Averages in '000 £

Development Programme Other Outsidel/Total British Foreign Local Treasury Dev. Dev. Aid Aid Revenues Reserves Total Program Outlays

1965/66-67/68 (real) 873 - 282 -31 1,124 83 1,207

1968/69-70/71 830 170 30 50 1,080 1ho 1,220 (mission estimate)

1971/72-74/75 900 320 20 40 1,280 150 11. 30 (mission projection)

increase in reserves 1/ Chinese rice program, USAI, UN special agencies.

131., As British development aid is not going to increase during the remainder of the 1967/68-70/71 Plan period, the expected sharp decline in local revenues will create a financing gap averaging E hC0,00 a.p. (average Plan expenditure E 1,250,000, British aid L 830,000) which has to be compensated by increasing aid from non-British sources, if a decline - 42 - in overall development outlays is to be avoided. This presents two problems: timing and counterpart funds. Mobilization of foreign aid - except British, for which procedures are well run in and work relatively aaocthly- takes considorable timep espocially as Tho Gambia has limited experience in dealing with foreign aid givers. For this reason, the mission expects actual aid disbursements 1/ over the remaining three years of the Plnn to be below Government expectations (an average of £170,000 p.a. instead of £300,000). While total aid commitments over these three years (including World Bank group) may be considerably higher, most of these will be spent only during the following Plan period. In consequence, total development outlays will be less than expected in the Plan. The mission assumes that annual Plan expenditures will average only £1,080,000, while the Development Programme foresaw £1,250,000 per year.

132. Aid from non-British sources - including the World Bank group - is likely to become available only if The Gambia is able to make some local counterpart contribution to project costs. In the absence of public savings, it will not be easy to make such contribution. Two possibilities seem to be open: mobilization of local private savings and use of Treasury reserves. The 1967/68-1970/71 Development Programme foresees local borrowing of £100,000. It may be possible to realize this goal even though the potential for raising local funds is limited, as was demonstrated in 1963, when only £80,000 (out of a total loan of £200,000) could be placed locally. While Treasury reserves have declined, it has already been pointed out that a moderate sum can probably still be allocated to finance development expenditures. From these two sources, it should be possible to derive £60-80,000 per year over the next 6-7 years. This is not a large sum, but if it were used exclusively to match foreign assistance and if the local contribution could be kept as low as 20% of total project costs, total non-British aid of up to £400,000 per year could still be made possible provided a pipeline of projects is built up.

133. To keep public development expenditures over the coming three years, at the past level, The Gambia will need £10-200,000 of foreign aid per year, in addition to British development assistance already agreed upon and to aid from the Republic of China, USAID and the UN. Over the subsequent four year period, when public development outlays ought to increase, non-British aid (assuming a 10% increase in aid from the UK) would have to increase to about £300-350,000 per year, covering on the average 80% of project costs. Despite the current low external debt burden, it would be unwise to encourage lending to The Gambia on other than concessionary terms. The low level of per capita income ($80), the difficult budgetary situation, the modest growth prospects, and the country's dependence on a single crop with an uncertain future all militate against conventional lending. On the ground of poverty and performance, The Gambia appears qualified for IDA assistance. Although the country should obviously give higher priority to agricultural development and has tended to expand its public services too rapidly, its overall per- formance in managing its finances and avoiding inflation and wasteful expenditures has been creditable.

1/ Other than from the U.K. STATISTICAL APPE-DIX

LIST OF TABLES

1. Piblic Debt

2. Public Debt Charges

3. Population

4. Manpower, Salaries, Prices

5. National Account Estimates

6. Recorded Foreign Trade

7. Exports

8. Exports

9. Imports by Major Categories

10. Balance of Payments Estimates

11. Groundnut Production

12. Groundnut Production, 5-Year Averages

13. Groundnut Prices

lb. GOMB: Groundnut Marketing Costs

15. Gambia Oilseed Marketing Board (GOM,IB): Financial Situation

16. Co-operative Hovement - Produce 'arketing 3ocieties

17. Livestock Population Estimates

18. Recorded Livestock Slaughtering/Estimated Cattle Imports from Senegal

19. ilectri.city

20. Port of' Bathurst

21. Up-river Ports

22. Roads, Road Traffic

23. Road Traffic Counts

24. Current Expenditures for Education - 2 - List of Tables (Cont' d)

25. Primary Education

26. Secondary Education

27. Teachorn and Teacher Training, Vocational School

28. The Gambia Currency Board: Selected Balance Sheet Items

29. Camercial Bank Credit by Categories

30. Monetary Survey

31. Gambia Revolving Loan Fund

32. Budget and Treasury

33. Revenues of the Current Budget

34. Current Government Expenditures

35. Sectoral Breakdown of Government Expenditures (1947-1966/67)

36. Financing of Development Expenditures

37. Development Fund Expenditures (Development Budget) by Sectors

38. Breakdown of Total Budgetary Expenditures (1960-1967/68)

39. 1964-67 Plan: Financing

40. 1964-67 Plan: Expenditures

4l. Development Programme 1967/68-1970/71: Financing

42. Development Programme 1967/68-1970/71: Planned Expenditures

43. Gambia Treasury: Total Assets and Liabilities

W4. Reserves of the Central Goverment

45. Total Foreign Aid Disbursements 1963-1967/68

46. U.K. Financial Assistance to the Budget h7. U.S. Assistance

48. U.N. Assistance Table 1. Public Debt

Compensation Loan Commutation Loan Development Total Sinking Total Net Gambia Loan Local Loan 1/ Currency Board Loan from from H.M. Treasury from H.M. Treasury Loan Gross Fund Incl. Excl. 3 % 6% Advance B.U.A. 2/ interest free 6 3/4 % Interest free Undisbursed undisb. 1933 - 1963 1963 - 1973 repayments from repayments from from UK 12-1970 2-1972 December 1956 38.8 38.8 23.0 E 15.8 E 15.8 E

December 1958 38.8 38.8 28 E 10. 10.8 E December 1960 38.8 38.8 33.5 5.3 5.3 December 1961 38.8 38.8 36.2 2.6 2.6 December 1962 38.8 38.8 39.8 - 1.0 - 1.0 December 1963 - 200.0 32.5 232.5 - 232.5 lo8.o December 196h - 200.0 67.5 267.5 1.9 265.6 205.0 June 1965 - 200.0 65.0 2.0 72.5 32.5 352.0 3.0 349.0 349.0 June 1966 - 200.0 6.0 2.0 88.7 34.6 370.3 5.1 365.2 365.2 June 1967 - 200.0 65.0 2.' 109.5 ho.7 397.2 7.6 389.6 389.6 June 1968 - 200.0 - 2.0 1LO.- 50.9 598.0 991.3 9.6 981.7 981.7

1/ Subscribed for f- 120,000 by West African Currency Board, held today by the Gambia Currency Board £ 80,000 privately in The Gambia

2/ British United Airlines. Used to finance Governent participation in Gambia Airways Ltd.

Source: Colonial Reports (1956-1958), Financial Reports (1960-1965/66), Budget 1969/70. Table 2

TOTAL PUBLIC DEBT CHARG38 L1 (00 )

1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1965/66 66/67 67/68 196691969/7 J-buge bVget Local debt: interest 1.4 1.4 1.4 - 10.5 6.0 15.2 12.0 12.0 12.01

rmortization .9 .9 - 1.9 1O 2.0 2n6 2,0 2.0 2.0

Foreign debt: interest ------292 2.3 3. 4.7 6.2

amortization ------27,8

Total 2.3 2.3 1.9 - 12,4 7.0 19.4 16.9 17.4 18.7 48.0

/1 Excluding Fariers Fund loan, considered a debt uithin governmaent. Sourcet Financial reports (1960-1965/66); 1linistry of Finance; Budget 1968/69. Table 3

PCPUtIATIOE

000

A. Past Trends e s t i m a t e s census projection

1931 1951 1959 1963 1968

Bathurst 14.4 19.6 23 27.8 Kombo 5.5 E 7.7 9 12.2 Hinterland 185.1 252.4 263 275.5

Total 205 279.7 295 315.5 347

B. 1963 Census

Age groups age male female tptal 0 - 4 22.2 22.3 /44.5 5 - 9 22.4 2,2.2 44.6 10 - 14 15.5 14.3 29.8 15 - 24 27.0 33.2 60.2 25 - 34 29.4 32.7 2.1 35 - 44 18.7 14.8 33.5 over 44 25.5 15.5 41.1

Total 160.7 155.0 315.7

Birth and Death Rates Region Birth Rate Death Rate Net Increase Bathurst 48.4 24.7 23.7 0/oo Kombo 39.8 18.7 21.1 Western Division 37.1 14.4 22.7 Lower River Div. 39/1 19.9 19.2 MacCarthy Island Div. 31.4 22.6 13.8 Upper River Division 17.1 26.4 10.7

Total 38.7 21.0 17.7

Sours.es: Colonial Reports; 1963 Census; Development Programme 1967/68 to 1970/71 'fable 4.

MANPOWER, SALARIES, PRICES

1948 1951 1955 1959 1963 1967 1969

Manpower (Nr. of employees in '000)

Government 2.5 2.5 6.9 6.4 5.0 Private 2.9 2.6 2 .6E 2.6 3.2 Total 4.1 5.4 5.1 9.5 9.0 *T.2

Wages and Salaries (per 8-hour day)

Unskilled laborers 1/ 2s3d 3s 3s4d 3s4d 5s8d 5s8d 6s8d Craftsmen 6s6d 7-10s 7 -10s l0s8d lOs8d

Cost of Living Index Old index (March 1950 = 100)

December 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959

Total 127 133 122 114 109 113 104 126 124

New Retail Price Index (Kendall index of 78 items, 1st quarter 1961=100)

Yearly averages 1961/2 1962/3 1963/4 1964/5 1965/6 1966/7 1967/8

Total 101 106 109 102 105 107 108

Total Working Population (1964 estimates)

Salaried: public sector 6.3 private sector 2.7 9.0

Independent: traders, craftsmen 15.0 farmers 140.0 155.0

Total working population 164.0

1/ Statutory minimum wage

Source: Colonial Reports, Statistical Summaries Table 5.. NATIOHAL ACCOUIT ESTIAT-Z

(illion £)

Hational Product (at factor cost) 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1967/68

-Gambian Estimates - -- iission Estimates

Agriculture, livestock, fishing

lonetary 2.7 30 2.7 2c07 3.2 3.0 Non-monetary 2.4 2.5 2,6 2.6 2.7 3.0 Total 5-1 5.5 73 7.7 77 - -

4manufacture, craft, repair 4 -. 4 s.4 .6 (8

Construction 2/ .5 ,5 .6 .5 .5 3.8

Trade, transport 1.3 1.2 12 1.3 1.4

Services s4 a4 -' .4 .4

Public authorities 1 1.6 lo5 1.3 1.7 2.l 1.7 Total 903 9.5 9.2 9.8 U.l 11.5

Public authoritino

Administration 1.0 1.1 1,1 1.3 1.4 1.8

Public utilities *2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2

Public construction .4 .4 .5 .4 .4 .4

G. 0. . B. *2 - -. 2 -- .4 -.4

Foreign revenues .2 .2 o2 .2 .1 .1

Total 2.0 1.9 1.b 2.1 2.5 2.1

1/ Public construction included under construction, excluded fron public authorities.

Sources: The Gambia Government Development Programme 1967/68 to 1970/71 mission estimates. T BL l T RECo0 LD Fo'l-EGN TPJLDD (1000 t) Axports Domestic Trade as ;> of I m p o r t s 1xports Balancc Imports Recorded Total Re-exports Net-imports 196 9h9 69 880 627 -253 69.0

1947 1,99 6h 1,885 1,106 -779 58.7 1948 2,621 76 2,545 1,682 -863 66.1

1949 2,356 126 2,230 1,628 -602 73.0

1950 3,282 116 3,166 2,170 -996 68.5

1951 3,997 351 3,646 3,018 -628 82.8'

1952 3,709 264 3,45 3,695 +250 107.2.

1953 2,221 254 1,967 2,607 +6h0 132.5

1954 2,595 135 2,460 2,912 +452 118.V 1955 3,710 161 3,549 2,472 -1,077 69.6.

1956 3,729 185 3,544 2,368 -1,176 66,8'

1957 h.762 263 4,499 3,981 - 518 88.5

1958 3,910 444 3,466 4,109 + 6h3 118.5

1959 3,148 169 2,979 2,787 - 192 93.6

1960 3,222 265 2,957 2,516 - hi 85.1,

1961 h,572 142 h,h30 3,232 -1,198 73.0

1962 4,481 91 h,390 3,478 - 912. 79.2 1963 4,229 112 4,117 2,984 -1,133 72.5

1964 h,336 125 h,2U 3,171 -1,040 75.3 1965 5,794 131 5,663 4,751 - 912 83.9 1'966 Jan -June 2,832 92 2,7ho >,213 ±l,73 1j3.7 1966/67 7,12_ 302 6,d23 6,011 - 812 88.1 1967/63 7,520 153 7,367 5,213 -2,15)4 69.3 1968/62 9,269 213 9,056 7,168 -2,101 77.3 gaitrce: Trade Reports 1952-1962; Customs 3epartment rieports 1963, 1964; statistical summiary 1964, 1966/67. TABLE 7

EXPORM (EXCLUDING RE-EXPORTS) Value in '000 Z 19146 19147 19148 19149 1950 1951 1952 LL 195495 5 12 1 Groundnuts: undecorticated 596 1,066 1,529 1,571 2,107 2,679 3,562 2,478 1,722 903 0 0 decorticated -- -- 99 ------957 1,453 2,252 3,722 groundnut oil -- -- 15 ? 1 173 10 6 77 Oo 0 cakes - 101 - 21 _46 24 12 51 total 596 1,066 1,646 1,579 2,108 2,902 3,587 2,505 2,802 2,380 2,268 3,773 Palm Kernels 19 24 30 38 45 87 93 86 87 81 83 70 Dried Fish 1 1 1 3 2 4 9 4 8 12 16 12 Other products 5 10 16 26 13 12 14 7 126 1) Total 1-106 1 1.628 2.170 3.018 3 2.607 2.912 2,472 2.368 3.981

1958 1 1962 12 1& 1 1 19 196/68 1968/69 January-une Groundnuts: undecorticated - -- 0 ------0 ------decorticated 3,722 2,432 2,218 3,077 3,321 2,189 1,697 2,398 groundnut 2,458 2,265 1,576 4,065 oil 0 46 84 -- -- 415 908 1,523 969 cakes 2#328 2-,400 1,721 35 21 80 45 25 242 451 679 712 1,246 1,073 1.156 total 3,757 2,499 2,382 3,122 3,346 2,866 3,056 4,600 4,139 5,839 5,049 6,942 Palm kernels 76 124 98 80 89 96 72 102 51 128 137 165 Dried fish, crunatacen and 18 19 29 22 35 35 37 molluses2) 28 13 23 21 43 3 Other products I2 7 6 2 1 21 6 18 Total exports 4,109 2.787 2,516 3478 2,984 3.171 4 4 6,011 5.213 7,168

1) incl. exports of Ilmenii for £ 117,000 2) incl. exports of Ilmenit for £ 251,000 3) incl. exports of Ilmenie f

EXPORTS (EXCLUDING RE-EXPORTS) Tonnage 1946 1947 19148 14 190 15 192 2- 2L 2a1956 15

Groundnuts: undecorticated 31,590 49,390 66,430 61,110 58,790 53,790 60,680 50,980 34,530 22,570 0 0 decorticated 6,180 4,86o 2,500 ------12,730 23,660 37,990 49,290 groundnut oil -- -- 130 50 0 830 SO 40 520 0 20 0 cakes -- -- 260 50 0 1,510 410 640 1,290 670 360 1,340

Palm kernels 1,290 1,160 1,240 1,550 1,580 1,560 1,750 1,670 1,860 1.810 1,800 1,060

Dried Fish n.a. n.a. 10 20 20 40 30 80 140 100 170 260

1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 January-June

Groundnutst undecorticated -- -- 0 -- -- 0 0 - decorticated 62,930 40,570 33,130 51,1h0 58,250 40,240 30,320 33,140 34,800 34,900 28,100 52,170 groundnut oil 0 390 660 0 0 4,450 8,460 12,830 9,000 23,750 24,720 lo,506 cakes 1,020 540 2,080 1,340 730 6,580 11,750 16,020 13,900 31,290 26,150 27,507

Palm Kernels 1,470 1,780 1,630 1,590 1,840 1,700 1,310 1,520 840 2,310 1,940 2,448

Dried Fish crustacca and 310 300 510 400 460 750 830 530 360 550 380 729 molluscs

Sources: Trade Reports 1952-1962; Customs Department Reports 1963, 1964; Statistical Summary 1964, 1966/67. Table 9

IPORTS BY MAJOR -ATECDRIES - VALUE IN 'O.

1953 1951 195 1956 19f7 1958 1959 1960 196i 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1966/67 1967/68 Jan-June Energy (Petroleum 119 106 139 159 164 125 133 1u 161 157 155 150 96 196 268 Produtct s) Raw Materials and Semi finished l111 Products 212 2 2 236 209 256 226 264 277 284 360 E 190E 370 E 490 E Lumber 15 12 2? 23 31 7 T T 7 13 * 7 7 Cement 27 29 U1 39 r2 44 73 48 55 83 69 68 85 59 86 140 Corrugated sheets 5 11 28 37 60 46 31 53 63 58 81 92 111 50 116 181 Equipment Goods 175 1& 2j 610 449 423 329 561 519 E62 E E 840 E Motor cars & lorries -0 41 129 i-I 70-3 T99 TM TM ~ 34 1-0- 7"J TE~ Machinery, n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 199 222 181 138 454 48 102 245 except electrical

FoodsT,uffs , Beverages and Tobacco 8152 805 1 081 ' 036 11415 1 221 517 996 o6 1 277 11170 1236 1 35, 6991,5 2 0 Rice 192 '4U 31 ~ in'~~25 300 310 ';tt358 4103 '3t 17 34 -7 Sugar 74 81 148 114 184 140 140 126 174 136 126 94 190 62 210 239 Tobacco 65 98 108 97 194 196 150 162 121 119 179 191 272 161 398 n.a. Alcoholic beverages 12 50 74 66 77 91 76 73 81 89 9t 93 96 49 115 119 Wheat flou- 78 71 77 -q 95 59 90 9 79 95 89 80 81 59 106 138 Finished Products for oeti on& clothing E 8 1- E - 1 1E 1E Cotton fabrics (101) (474) (575) (o10) (712) (357) (227) (263) (8k3) (171) (100) (521) (1,007) (294) (1,137) Apparel (46) (1,149) (87) (125) (107) (19) (11W) (118) (68) (320) (151) (185) (256) (227) (86) (237) (110) Medicines and drugs 64 90 91 98 130 78 93 83 108 118 150 116 146 57 142 152

Unclassif ea9 85 10-1 126 129 1 5 137 239 219 210 219 180 2k0 E 1h0E 2 50 E 260 E TOTAL 2 2,595 3,710 3,729 4,762 3,910 3,118 3,222 4,572 1,181 4,229 4,336 5,79k 2,832 7,125 7,520

Source: Trade Reports 1958, 1960; Statistical Sunmary 1964, 1966/67. Table 10 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ESTIMIATES (In million £)

Goods 1961 1962 1963 196b 1965 1966 1967

Exports f.o.b. 4.4 4.2 3.8 4.0 5.6 6.3 6.8

Inports c.i.f. 4.7 4.6 4.3 4.3 5.8 6.3 6.8

Services

Exports 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4

Imports 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7

Balance of goods and services -a -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.4 -0.3- -0.3

Net transfers -0.7 -0.6 -0.9- -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8

Balance on current account -1.2 -1.0 -1.5 -1.2 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1

Public grants 0.5 0.9 1.7 0.9 0.7 1.4 0.7

Public loans (net) ------0.2

Private capital 0.1 0.1 0.1 - 0.1 0.1 0.1

Balance on capital account +0.6 +1.0 +1.8 +1.0 +0.8 +1.5 1.0

Net errors and omissions +0.3 -0.3 +0.3 -0.2 +0.9 +0.6 +0.5

Changes in Foreign Assets -0.3 -0.3 +0.6 -0.4 +0.6 +1.0 +0.4 (Increase +)

Net foreign assets end of period n.a. 0.8 1.4 1.0 1.6 2.6 3.0

Remarks: Foreign trade data include estimates of unrecorded exports (mainly re-exports of consumer goods to Senegal) and imports (mainly groundnuts from ScEnegal).

S.urces: D-vel-ment Programme 1967/68 to 197/7', June 1967 IF 1968 Reportz *:: the Gambia Table 11 GROUTDFUT PRODUCTIOF

(long tens)

Exports Seeds 1/ Tota Commercial- Seeds Total ization

Average 1900/04 26,000 3,500 29,500 1944/45 43,120 5,170 48,390

1905109 38,000 5,200 43,200 1945/46 41,094 5,586 46,680

1910/14 61,000 8,300 69,300 946/47 56,398 7,672 64,07c

1915/19 69,000 9,400 78,oo 947/48 70,500 9,590 80,090

1920/24 65,000 8,900 73,900 948/49 61,000 8,300 69,300

1925/29 60,000 8,200 68,200 949/50 59,740 8,120 67,860

1930/34 64,000 8,700 72,700 950/51 58,780 7,990 66,770

1935/39 52,400 7,100 59,500 1951/52 60,617 8,243 68,860

1940/44 31,000 4,200 35,200 1952/53 52,671 7,159 59,830

1953/54 56,177 7,643 63,820

1954/55 59,657 8,113 67,770

1955/56 56,561 7,689 64,250 1/ 12% of total local production; 1956/57 72,938 9,922 82,860 including seeds bought by GOMB. 957/58 93,716 12,744 106,460

1958/59 61,525 8,365 69,390

1959/60 52,857 7,193 60,050

960/61 75,414 10,256 85,670

1961/62 84,747 11,513 96,270

1962/63 74,926 10,194 85,120

1963/64 73,216 9,954 83,170 Table 11 (cont'd)

Commercial- 1 ization Seeds Total

1964/65 90,808 11,902 102,710

1965/66 117,968 13,872 131,840

1966/67 126,300 14,000 140,300

1967/68 118,200 11,300 129,500

1968/69 123s830 11,30 135,260

Source: Government Statement on Agricultural Policy, 1957.

Colonial Reports; GODB Annual Reports.

Annual Econanic Reviews Sierra Leone and The Gambia by Standard DanIk Group, August 1969

1/ 12 of total local production; including seeds bought by GOMB. Table 12

GROUNDNUT PRODUCTION 5-Year Averages

Total Per capit, Production Ponulation Production long tons (T0O0) long tons

1900/0 29,500 123 0.24 1905/09 43,200 130.5 0.33 1910/14 69,300 140 0.49 1915/19 78,400 150 0.52 1920/24 73,900 161.5 0.46 1925/29 68,200 17h 0.39 1930/34 72,700 188 0.39 1935/39 59,500 203 0.29 1940/44 35,200 219.5 0.16 19h/45 - 1948/49 61,800 238 0.26 1949/50 - 1953/54 65,400 258 0.25 1954/55 - 1958/59 78,200 281 0.28 1959/60 - 1963/64 82,100 311 0.26 1964/65 - 1968/69 1Cs,OO 3h0 0.31

Average annual growth rate

1944/45 - 1948/49 1949/50 - 1953/54 f 1.1% p.a. ) 1954/55 - 1958/59 + 3.6% p.a. ( 1.9% p.a. 1959/60 - 1963/64 - 1.0% p.a. ) 1964/65 - 1968/69 + h.9% p.a. j/

1/ Excluding estimated imports from Senegal.

Sources: see table 11. Table 13

GROUNDI'NUT PRICES (Base undecorticated)

Comercialized Producer Fxport Paid to farmers Production Price Price

(long tons) ( £/ long tons) '000 £

Average 1900/0h 26,000 (5.8) 8.8 (151) - 1905/09 38,000 (4.5) 7.0 (171) 1910/14 61,000 (5.8) 8.8 (354) 1915/19 69,000 (7.2) 11.1 (497) 1920/24 65,000 (11.3) 17.3 (735) 1925/29 60,000 (9.2) 14.2 (552) 1930/34 64,000 4.0 8.3 256 1935/39 52,400 4.8 7.4 252 1940/44 31,000 4.8 7.4 149 Year 1944/45 43,120 12 14.9 517 1945/46 41,094 12 14.7 493 1946/47 56,398 16 18.9 902 1947/48 70,500 20 23.3 1,410 1948/49 61,000 22 25.7 1,342 1949/50 61,533 22 38.3 1,314 1950/51 64,698 29 48.4 1,876 1951/52 67,074 40 58.2 2,474 1952/53 57,856 32 48.4 1,685 1953/54 63,430 32 49.0 1,798 1954/55 66,685 32 40.0 1,910 1955/56 62,778 25/10 42.9 1,400 1956/57 77,698 31 51.5 2,256 1957/58 97,391 27 39.9 2,530 1958/59 64,348 22 37.0 1,354 1959/60 55,171 24 40.6 1,267 1960/61 76,938 27 41.9 2,036 1961/62 85,472 27 40.0 2,288 1962/63 74,973 27 37.4 2,024 1963/64 73,233 27 38.3 1,978 1964/65 90,928 27 046.0 2,456 1965/66 117,968 28 43.4 3,302 1966/67 126,314 28 41.7 E 3,539 1967/68 118.240 27 37, E 3,192 1968/69 123,d30 28 49. - 3,467

Remarks:

1. Commercialized production includes seeds brought by GOME (different from tables 11 and 12) 2. Export prices are for decorticated groundnuts (0.7 tons) from 1955/56 onwards and thus include decorticating costs of between - 3, per long ton.

urce.~ Ses tab?e 11. Table 1h

G,0.M.B. GROUNDNUT MARKETING COSTS

6 per long ton % of producer price

Undecorticated

Producer Traders Local Total costs Overhead Price Allowances Transport undecorticatedL/Decortication

194,/50 22 3.12 23 1.47 6.59 30 0.10 0.5

1950/51 29 5.68 20 1.64 7.32 25 0.81 3

1951/52 40 8.60 21 1.50 10.10 25 1.00 2.5

L92/93 32 7.37 23 1.26 8.6J, 27 0.70 2 2) -1953/54 32 7.51 23 1.87 9.38 29 2.64 0.64 2

19?4/55 32 6.41 20 1.98 8.39 26 2 ) 1.50 5

1955/56 25.5 5.41 21 2.10 7.51 29 2.80 2) 1.25 5

5 6/57 31 5.75 19 2.1o 8.15 26 2.46 0.70 2

1957/58 27 5.40 20 2.46 7.86 29 2.52 0.50 2

)958/59 22 5.00 23 2.76 7.76 35 2.73 0.75 3

5 /6o 24 5.00 21 2.91 7.91 33 2.53 0.92 4

160/61 27 5.90 22 3.14 9.04 33 2.58 0.58 2

:961/62 27 6.26 23 3.22 9.48 35 2.76 06 2

2/63 27 5.94 22 3.22 9.16 34 2.30 0 .80 E 3

C?3/64 27 6.06 22.5 3.16 9.22 34 2.20 0 80 E

2 ,'35 27 6.15 23 3.31 9.46 35 2.20 2

)9 6 28 6.30 22.5 3.47 9.77 35 2.30 06E 2

i '6 7 28 6.28 22.5 3.44 9.72 35 2.60 06 2

1) traders allowances plus transport

2) by private installations

) by G.O.M.P., installations

bouren ,0.M.B. Linnual Renorts Table 15

GAMBIA OILSEED MARKETING BOARD (G.O.MI.B.)

Financial Situation

1000 E Extra Profit and Loss Account ordinary Transfers R e s e r v e s Ground- Palm Misc. Overhead Net financial to Reserve Price Stab. nuts kernels Revenues Amortiz. profits transactions Reserves Account Reserves Total

September 1949 1,309 n.a. 1949/50 514 16 18 -5 543 - 543 1,852 1950/51 656 88 15 -47 632 -1,577 1) - 945 907 1951/52 212 1 38 -242 9 - 350 1) - 341 566 1952/53 133 18 12 -140 23 23 589 953/54 98 -1 11 -97 11 11 600 954/55 -492 -5 22 -174 -649 + 649 2) - 600 1955/56 146 1 13 -145 15 1956/57 15 615 260 875 -203 -2 4 -81 124 124 1957/58 -244 - 615 384 999 1 7 -64 -300 - 300 528 171 69 1958/59 39 27 7 -65 - 65 + 26 3) - 39 489 171 660 1959/60 59 20 4 -48 35 35 524 1960/61 n.a. n.a. 247 -2 6 -40 211 211 735 n.a. n.a. 1961/62 -29 -9 13 -29 -54 -54 681 121 1962/63 802 -153 2 17 -21 -155 + 39 4) -116 681 5 686 1943/64 -15 3 17 -26 -21 + 20 4) - 1 681 4 685 1964/65 374 24 30 -38 390 - 40 1) 350 831 204 1,035 1965/66 200 11 29 -42 198 1966/67 198 1,029 204 1,233 -12 7 36 -57 -26 - 60 1) - 86 876 271 1967/68 -407 51 1,147 +22 -44 -378 5) -378 769 - 769 1) transferred to Farmers Fund 2) transferred from Farmers Fund 3) special contribution from the Government 4) interest on Farmers Stabilization Fund investments, transferred from Gambia Government 5) transfer from Farmers Fund of £113,000 possible

Sourues: Annual Reports of G.O.M.B. 1949/50 - 19"/67 Table 16:

CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT - PRODUCE PIARITING SOCIETIES

Groundnuts Reserves Number of marketed Ccsh loans of all of primary Number of Villages market to mimbers societies societies members covered tons share £'CCO '000 £

1955 4 1956 1.2

1957 14 4.2 1958 1.6%

a 95 9 2.6,; 9.4

1960/1 45 7,480 122 5,090 6.71 88 16.9

1961/2 53 15,447 229 10,579 12.4% 88 31.6 1262/3 61 20,381 303 11,970 16,0 104 49.7

1963/4 66 23,149 373 15,660 21.4, 154 89.8 i96L/5 66 24,745 391 24,849 27.4? 137 64.7

1965/6 66 30,230 429 34,864 30.0% 242 56.9

196/7 81 37,128 514 40,443 32.1% 331 81.2

1967/8 85 40,724 547 36,825 31.2" 410 104.4

c,circes: Colonial Reports Statistical Summaries Table 17

LIVESTOCK POPULATION ESTIMATES

Cattle Goats Pis Donkeys Horses Poultry

1934 30,000

1946 86,000 1948 96,000

1951 122,000

1905/55 122,000 51,000 75,000 3,000 4,000 200 227,000

1958 143,000

1962 182,000 54,000 94,000 2,000 4,000 220,0CO

1966 207,000 76,000 108,000 6,000 n.a. n.q.

1968 232,000

Sources: 1934-1958 Colonial reports, estimates based on livestock tax.

1962-1966 Statistical Summaries, based on census

1968 Based on inoculations by rinderpest eradication control in 1968. Table 18

RECORDED LIVESTOCK SLAUGHTERING /ESTIMATED CATTLE IMPORTS FROM SEIGAL

No. of animals slaughtered per year No. of cattle in Bathur,t carried by ferry from Barra to Bathurst

Cattle Pigs Goats Sheep J

1954/55 3,000 1,000 700 400

1958 3,500 850 210 150

1961 3,890 1,040 530 290 1,870

1962 3,890 1,170 780 400 1,220

1963 3,810 1,220 630 ho 1,190

1964 3,890 1,390 800 360 1,740

1965 3,910 660 1,160 1,120 3,060

1966 4,510 940 720 620 Jan.-June 1,620

1967 4,780 1,020 800 880 66/67 4,320

1968 4,870 1,125 1,68 916 67/68 3,800

1/ Highly underestimated, as private slaughtering important.

Sources: 1954-58 Colonial reports 1961-67/68 Statistical Summaries Table 19

ELECTRICITY

1. Installed capacity (situation end of 1968)

Bathurst : 4.5 N ( + 2.2 M11 being installed) 24 h service

Brikama 2x 1.16 KI being installed 24 h service

Mansa Konko : 95 KW 15 h service

Georgetown 190 KW 2h h service

Bansang (hospital only) 1.16 KI4 24 h service

Basse : 2x 1.16 KJ 24 h service

2. Production, Consumption (Bathurst netuork) ((000 Kwh) Production Consumption No.of consumers

1950 1,203 1951 1,508 1952 1,717 1953 1,876 1954 2,213 1955 2,574 2,317 1,449 1956 3,168 1,646 1957 3,570 1,738 1958 3,959 2,090 1959 4,149 2,200 1960 4,509 2,563 1961 5,094 4,330 2,805 1962 5,523 4,695 3,082 1963 6,355 5,403 3,268 1964 6,064 5,154 3,520 1965 6,749 5,737 3,748 1966 8,275 7,034 3,964 1967 8,901 7,567 4,283

Source: Colonial reports; Electricity Department PRJD Table 20

PORT OF BATHURST

Number of CARGO MDVEMIENIT (Tons) Ships Celling Discharged Loaded Total

1938 207

1947 166 21,58o 55,430 77,010

1957/58 166 58,700 42,560 101,260

1958/59 205 51,260 68,080 119,340 1959/60 162 45,460 49,000 94,460

1960/61 173 50,380 29,710 80,090

1961/62 189 55,460 39,150 94,610

1962/63 181 60 5,0 100,540

1963/64 171 59,650 31,380 91,030

1964/65 157 51,480 38,200 89,680

1965/66 152 72,400 46,160 118,560

1966/67 208 90,790 62,430 153,220

1967/68 188 88,180 41,840 130,020

/ Including 10-20 ships per year passing through Bathurst in ballast and proceeding up-river to load groundnuts at Kaur and formerly at Kuntaur.

Source: Colonial Reports; Statistical Summary 1964, 1966/67; Marine Department FTD. Table 21

EVACUATION OF GROUNDNUTS ON OCEAN GOING SHIPS FROM UP-RIVER PORTS

Number of Ships Groundnuts exported Calling (Tons)

1949/50 23 39,41o

1950/51 26 39,640

1951/52 28 41,690

1952/53 26 n.a.

1953/54 22 34,540

1954/55 21 34,410

1955/56 n.a. 25,280

1956/57 20 44,760

1957/58 27 37,550

1958/59 17 22,300

1959/60 14 19,233

1960/61 21 27,180

1961/62 25 32,520

1962/63 17 30,750

1963/64 13 26,490 1964/65 15 33,100

1965/66 16 37,195

1966/67 15 34,770

total shipping ports:

until 1954/55: Kuntaur, Kaur, Balingbo 1955/56 - 1964/65: Kuntaur, Kaur since 1965/66: Kuntaur only

sourco: GOM1B Arnual Reports Table 22

ROADS, ROAD TRAFFIC

ROAD MILAGES

bitumenised P.W.D. laterite tracks Total (miles) 6 1946 -- 30 appr. 600 appr. 30

1951 -- 80 1 600 n 680

1957 42 185 " 480 " 700

1962 110 126 494 730

1968 162 221

MOTOR VEHICLES LICENSED

Lorries and Cars Motor Others Total buses cycles

1946 389 135 79 l4 617 19649 532 275 4.6 40 893

1953 753 409 100E 83 1,345

1957 719 527 212 incl. 1,458

1961 554 697 240 incl. 1,491

1964 673 1,002 236 incl. 1,911

1965 900 1,193 325 incl. 2,418

1907 licensed 909 1,345 384 incl. 2,638

on the road 1,333 1,588 384 incl. 3,305

.ources Colonial Reports; Statistical Summaries; UN Statistical Advisor : Periodic Reports. TABLE 23

ROAD TRAFFIC COUNTS (no,of motor vehicles)

South Bank (3 days averages of traffic in and out of Bathurst) North Bank Transgambienne

Date Lorries and Buses C a r s t o t a 1 Barra-Bat- Transgambia.) Date hurst eury1 ) ferry December 1963 h08 1,567 1,975 1961 1,609 18,069 August 196k - - 2,263 1962 2,080 21,178

December 1964 541 1,901 2,442 1963 1,602 25,196 August 1965 300 2,321 2,622 1964 1,564 26,213 December 1965 531 2,148 2,679 1965 2,736 32,294

July 1966 605 2,285 2,890 1966 J 1,325 19,601

December 1966 1,280 2,365 3,645 1966/67 3,541 34,825 August 1967 607 2,12 3,019 1967/68 4,289 n.a.

7 growth per year 22.6% 10.1% 16%

1) total number of motor vehicles transported per year Sources: UN Statistical Advisor: Periodic Reports, Nov. 1967 Statistical Summary 1964, 1966/67. Table 24

Current Expenditures For Education

Vocational Teacher Elementary Secondary Training Training Adult Education a scellaneous Adinistration Total

Real Expenditures £ '000 1954 35.1 19.7 4.8 13.2 9.9 82.7 1955 39.h 21.6 5.4 12.9 11.8 91.1 1956 45.4 19.1 8.4 13.9 15.3 102.1 1957 54.1 32.0 9.3 20.7 15.9 132.0 1958 49.8 30.6 9.0 23.4 .7 .6 16.9 131.0 1959 55.7 37.h 4.4 19.7 .7 .3 15.7 133.9 1960 62.2 47.2 4.4 26.0 .7 1.1 14.3 155.9 1961 82.0 55.5 5.5 36.9 .7 2.8 19.3 202.7 1962 96.3 58.8 11.7 41.8 1.0 25.1 234.7 1963 100.3 62.7 5.2 51.6 .8 6.5 24.2 251.3 Budget 1966/67 U1.5 73.5 9.0 47.5 1.0 7.5 22.0 272.0 1967/68 131.0 102.0 14.0 49.5 1.0 12.0 25.5 335.0 1968/69 158.5 104.5 16.o 57.0 1.0 7.0 29.5 373.5 Real Expenditures % 1954 42 24 6 16 12 100% 1955 43 2L 6 L 13 100% 1956 4h 19 8 1h 15 100% 1957 h1 24 7 16 12 100% 1958 38 23 7 18 1 13 100% 1959 1 28 3 15 1 12 100% 1960 ho 33 3 17 9 100% 1961 h1 27 3 18 1 10 100% 1962 41 2 5 18 1 10 100% 1963 h0 25 2 20 3 10 100% Budget 1966/67 41 27 3 18 3 8 100% 1967/68 39 30 h 15 4 8 100% 1968/69 43 28 4 15 2 8 100%

Sources: Colonial Reports 1954-1961 Lducatior. Department. Annual Summary 1962 Ministry of Education Report for 1961-63 - Budgets 1967/68, 1968/69 ?riary Euucaj:.

Bathurst area Hinterland Total

Nunber of Junber of pupils ktLer of Number of p.zpils Nunber of Nwber of pupils Sdiools Boys Girls Tota) 5:foola Boys Girls Total Schools By Girls Total

1946 8 1,872 8 300 E 16 2,170 E

1947 8 2,028 Ii 37J E 19 2,oo E 1948 8 2,172 12 400 E 20 2,510 E 199 8 2,154 23 8 50 E 31 3,000 E

1951 11 2,694 2-1 85- 35 3, 58

1953 11 2, 8Cr: 1,119 43 3,925 195 I1 2,513 1,)28 3,Li. 919 42 3,300 1,160 4,460 June 1957 14 2,743 1,542 4,S85 5,8: ;% 1,395 h 3,94 2,036 5,980

Oct. 1959 15 2,697 1,63 6,340 1,739 )53 2,097 51 4,436 2,001 6,437 196061 46 h,344 2,203 7,07 196, /- 2 60 5, 27 2,336 7,663 1962/63 67 6,558 2,873 9,431 1963/64 69 7,345 3,172 10,517 196L/65 77 8,062 3,1,2 11,504 1965/66 83 8,921 3,703 12,624 1966/67 16 3,190 2,559 5,74" 71 6,891 1,578 8,469 90 10,081 4,137 14,218 1967/63 16 3,38 2.72- 6,10 7,562 1,720 9,282 93 10,946 4,440 15,386

Source: Colonial Reports 1946-1960; Statistj calSuimery 194*., . '/S7, EducatiDn Departmeni Annual Sunary 1966/67, 1967/68 Table 26

Secondary Education

Bathurst Area Hinterland Total

Number of Nvaber of pupils Number of Number of pupils Number of Wombe of pvpilm Schools Boys Girls Total Schools Boys Girls Total Schools Be" ML12 TOW 1946 4 187 162 349 1 20 E370 1947 4 187 151 338 1 20 E 5 360 1948 4 197 171 368 1 20 E 5 370 1949 4 184 175 359 1 20 E 5 380 Z 1951 4 435 1 25 E 5 470w

1953 4 h25 1 45 E 470 1954 4 344 183 527 1 94 94 5 438 183 621 June 1957 4 448 299 747 1 82 82 5 530 299 829 Oct. 1959 4 797 337 1,134 1 98 98 5 895 337 1,232

1960/61 9 1,152 412 1,56 1961/62 11 1,392 62 1,9A1 1962/63 11 1,733 W63 2,576 1963/64 12 1,858 832 2,690 1964/65 13 2,063 929 2,992 1965/66 17 2,329 1,056 3,3" 1966/67 9 2,014 988 -,'002 7 622 65 687 16 2,636 1,053 3,689 1967/68 9 2,130 950 3,080 7 700 80 780 16 2,830 1,030 3,560

Source: Colonial Reports 1946-1960; statistical Sunwry 1964, 1966/67, Education Department knual Sumry 1966/67, 1967/68 Table 27

Teachers and Teacher Training, Vocational School

Number of Teachers Teacher Training Institute Vocational School 2/ Primary Schools Secondary Schools Number of Students Nuber of Students Trained Other Total Graduates Non-Graduates Total Men Women Total

1949 30

1952 22

1954 157 31 n.a. 23

June 1957 210 37 57 30

Oct. 1959 219 64 35 13 48 30 1960/61 229 77 76 21 97

1961/62 151 131 285 19 52 71 75 19 94 24 1962/63 195 150 345 20 69 89 120 23 143 44

1963/64 216 129 345 21 109 1/ 130 132 18 150 46

1964/63 240 130 370 25 105 130 122 24 146 50 1965/66 263 130 393 28 105 133 97 32 129 69

1966/67 334 126 160 35 110 115 90 22 112 58

1967/68 339 156 495 L0 129 169 112 21 136 87

1/ From 1963/64 onwards including some teachers in Mission Schools previously classified as Primary

2/ Bathurst Government Technical School (excluding clerical and accounting center)

Source: Colonial Reports 199-196"; St. istical Summary, 1964, 1966/67. -dU-Lt r_U

The Gambia Currency Board: Selected Balance Sheet Items

('000 £)

1965 1966 1967 Dec. March June Sept. Dec. March June Sept. Dec.

asets Foreign assets (net) 1,693 1,651 1,248 1,030 1,949 1,437 1,156 963 1,856 (of which foreign assets of the West African Currency Board) (427) (406) (375) (349) (287) (257) (235) (215) (200) Domestic credit 358 308 158 158 158 498 158 113 313 Government (158) (158) (158) (158) (158) (158) (158) (113) (113) Private sector 1/ (200) (150) ------(340) -- -- (200)

Total assets = total liabilities 2,051 1,959 1,h06 1,188 2,107 1,935 1,314 1,076 2,169

,iabilities Currency liabilities 2,051 1,959 1,406 1,188 2,107 1,935 1,314 1,076 2,169 (of which West African Currency Board) currency liabilities outside banks) (427) (406) (375) (349) (287) (257) (235) (215) (200)

ource: Data supplied to IMF by the Gambian Government and the Gambian Currency Board (rearranged).

Lending to the Government for on-lending to GCCBMU treated as lending to private sector. Table 29

Commercial Bank Credit by Categories

('000E )

Mid-Month 1967 1968 March June Sept. Dec. March

Commercial 1.007 561 478 908 989 GCCBMU 92 -- 221 484 335

Rice imports 405 -- 21 114 446 Industrial 250 240 237 234 222

Transport, oil and fuel 15 35 43 80 17

Public bodies 1 17 -- 1 --

Personal mortgages 25 23 21 22 21 Other 9 11 10 20 13 Total 1,804 887 1,031 1,863 2,043

Source: Data provided by the Gambia Government to IMF

Import/Export 83% 63% 70% 81% 87% Table 30

Monetary Survey

('000£)

1965 1966 1967 Dec. March June Sept. Dec. March June Sept. Dec.

Assets Foreign assets 95 1,651 1,823 1,044 711 1,275 1,510 1,018 508 Domestic credit 2,805 1,691 835 1,159 2,710 2,036 1,027 1,286 3,165 Claims on government 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 113 113 Claims on private sector 1 2,647 1,533 677 1,001 2,552 1,878 869 1,173 3,052

Total assets e total liabilities 2,900 3,342 2,658 2,203 3,421 3,111 2,537 2,304 3,673

Liabilities Money 2,553 3,012 2,137 1,634 2,868 2,794 2,044 1,785 2,972 Currency (2,001) (1,864) (1,287) (1,099) (1,944) (1,793) (1,203) (1,036) (2,027) Demand deposits 2/ (552) (1,128) (850) (535) (924) (1,001) (841) (749) (945) Quasi-money 336 359 377 392 380 393 383 3E9 372 Other items 11 -29 144 177 173 124 110 130 329

Source: Data provided by the Gambia Government and the Gambia Currency Board to IMF.

1/ Lending to Government for on-lending to GCCBMU treated as lending to private sector. 2/ Includes public sector accounts. At end 1967 public sector dema-nd deposits amounted to G 4E9,000 and timc deposits,£G 1 , C. Table 31

Gambia Revolving Loan Fund £ During the Year End of Period Credits granted Repayments Credits Outstanding

1960 1,500 - 1,500

1961 100 100 1,500 1962 2,400 800 3,100 1963 23,600 700 26,000 1964 16,200 21,000 21,200

1965 Jan-June 4,200 11,400 14,000 1965-66 9,300 2,000 21,300 1966-67 22,900

1967-68 23,500

Sectoral Distribution (1960-65/66)

Subsistance credits 51%

Machinery, equipment 27%

Agriculture 20%

Mlachinery for agricultural processing 2%

100%

Source: Annual Reports of the Accountant General (Financial Report) Information by the Ministry of Finance Table No. 32

Budget and Treasury £ '000 Total Net Bud- net Im- Current Operations Develop. getary U.K. 2/ pact on Treasur 3/ Revenues/Exendit. Net Expendit. Results Assistance Treasury Reser'ves

1944 426 312 +11- 18 + 96 9 +105 n.a. 1945 515 335 +180 h +136 22 +158 n.a. 1946 551 402 +149 52 + 97 47 +14 794 1947 606 525 + 81 102 - 21 76 + 55 866 1948 724 601 +123 185 - 62 90 + 28 976 1949 700 777 - 77 338 -41 158 -257 822 1950 745 794 - 49 255 -30 188 -116 1951 887 783 +104 382 -278 193 - 85 1952 1,133 1,053 + 80 365 -285 126 -159 2,244 1953 945 949 - 4 131 -127 215 + 88 1.956 1,214 1,081 +133 81 + 52 167 +219 2,592 1955 1,306 :1,099 +207 165 + 42 192 +234 1956 1,191 1,451 -260 175 -435 166 -269 1,626 1957 1,781 1,583 +198 227 - 29 195 +166 1,798 1958 1,906 1,454 +452 512 - 60 175 +115 1,924 1959 1,566 1,541 + 25 585 -560 220 -340 1,619 1960 1,597 1,635 - 38 532 -570 192 -378 1,250 1961 1,686 1,988 -302 741 -1,oh3 486 -557 692 1962 1,796 2,073 -277 758 -1,035 912 -123 457 1963 1,870 2,227 -357 1,056 -1,413 1,719 +306 763 1964 1,987 2,453 -466 800 -1,266 4/ 999 - 67 515 J-3`65 1,486 1,306 +180 623 - h3 l 431 + 35 700 65/66 2,701 2,653 +248 1,263 -1,015 1,514 +499 1,258 66/67 3,273 2,676 +597 1,095 - 498 551 + 53 1,366 67/68 2,981 3,164 -183 1,015 -1,198 738 -46o 933 68/69 3,830 3,2h3 +582 984 - 397 1,096 5/ +699 (wrellsm) 1/ From 1958 on, including revenues earmarked for development expenditures. 2/ Towards current and development budget (incl.OSAS, pension payments, etc.) / Reserves of Central Government only (Reserve Pund, Development Fund, Farmers F'und). Reserves increased in 1952 due to liquidation of WAPCB /11 Part of which was financed by local loans. I/ Includi.ng no UK aid of L 6,000

Sou):rce: Colonial Reports; Annual Financial Reports. of the Cwrent Budget

1000 r 151 1952 1953 1954 1955 1944 1945 1946 1947 ML IW 1950

Direct Taxes 13.9 14.4 37.8 20.3 20.1 13.5 72.7 on individuals 123.9 16.8 261. 184.2 65.7 on cenpanies W7'f3.6 .3 9 . 229.3 Total direct taxes 113.

Indirect Taxes .6 491.7 450.3 345.2 486.2 526.3 Import duties E5.2 41.3 202.9 172 245.3 368.5 Export duties T"- A37 PH 517. 831.5 m Total M 52.6 793 3389 T157 5.9 8.1 9.7 15.5 16.6 15.5 15.1 17.3 Licences, etc. 9.0 7.5 6.7 6.6 15.7 22.1 23.3 25.0 22.7 19.7 12.6 13.5 Fees, etc. 16.9 18.5 18.3 20.6 12.7 13.5 35.9 37.8 25.3 10.8 17.2 19.0 15.4 10.9 42.4 11.3 Postal Services 31.8 38.5 41.8 48.3 74.8 73.8 operations 36.5 31.5 22.7 23.5 27.6 35.8 Commercial 7.7 8.9 8.3 8.7 6.9 9.3 10.4 Rents 5.3 4.2 2.5 8.1 5.5 3.1 27.8 31.3 34.2 33.8 29.6 30.5 37.3 Port Dues 2.4 1.9 1.6 2.2 2 17.1 25.2 44.1 8.6 18.6 3.4.0 Ikl ,21 19. 141 Miscellaneous M57 1,116. 911.9 .1717 -1M . Total local sources 744O -48 ;T"7 5T" 697.7 3" 15.6 15.8 17.7 23.2 27.0 10.2 13.3 19.8 20.3 20.8 20.3 20.9 Interest 18.8 13.8 6.0 5.6 19.0 13.6 profits 5.0 12. . 0 . Currency Board 761. n1 Total revenues M_7_ M. .

9 6 6 1967/68 1962 19 9 196 1 5/ 6 1966/67 1Drc TW 1958 Ma 1 1961 June Direct Taxes 45.3 68.5 5o.5 79.9 69.5 80.2 33.9 32.5 36.5 28.6 27.6 52.7 on individuals 17.1 118.1 73.6 97.6 208.5 123.1 Y4.1 162.0 186.1 97.3 87.6 112.8 96.0 on companies _". .8 5.1 3.3 2.5 cattle tax _ X7 PHT

Indirect Taxes 911.2 903.7 545.5 1,391.4 1,873.5 1,738.1 501.7 739.0 666.1 580.5 595.6 847.0 798.8 85.8 Import duties 223.8 36.2 41.1 39.1 43.5 292.8 34.0 236.8 Export duties 252.9 567.2 474.0 260.8 88.4 3.1 2.0 1.2 93.8 81.6 _.j 491 13.3 19.0 156.8 Purchase tax 56.1 -3.1 2,12.3 7M 7 Total 81"0.7 f 37 7M ;" F" 1, . M9. ,094.0 7= 1,777. 43.8 46.8 26.5 L7.0 58.1 6b.7 etc. 17.5 25.7 28.9 31.0 24.9 27.5 34.9 50.2 Licenses, 32.9 58.0 92.6 71.8 30.1 79.3 55.0 Fees, etc. 19.6 28.0 37.8 21.8 32.7 43.9 55.1 55.1 55.0 50.3 70.0 72.6 83.3 Pert Dues 32.3 54.2 51.6 40.6 41.0 91.6 59.5 62.0 26.4 28.1 28.5 33.5 38.6 79.6 50.6 68.0 Postal Services 25.7 25.8 182.8 206.3 224.0 116.d 117.7* 134.5* 129.6* 116.0* 165.8* 100.6* Commercial Operations 77.2 117.0 90.5 10.5 27.0 57.7 13.5 15.4 13.9 16.7 22.5 13.3 Rents 10.5 10.2 14.2 12.7 42.7 1.0y b -9 151.6 204.9 24.3 414.5 32. 30. 22.0 16.0 27.5 Miscellaneous 2d.0 1"W-9 T,75. 1413.3 31. 29 70179 2,1 Total local sources 117677 1,72!8 T,77 1,17. 0 M.J 7 1,-452.2 1,46b. 60.2 86.6 88.6 30.7 22.5 52.7 23.5 68.1 19.3 Interest 17.5 33.6 50.1 41.7 125.0 75.0 .2 0 150.1 150.0 - 120.0 Currency Board profits 13.2 25.8 2.0 172. Total revenues M132

97.1 42 51 51.5 58 68.6 33 72.6 87.5 * of whicht Electricity 41 82 77.L n.a. River Services 50 54 46.8 56 52

1962 1963 196 1965/66 1966/67 0 1956 ~ 1958 0_0~ 1961 Revenues 9 11 15 6 7 10 9 10 6 9 Direct 56 7 65 67 64 T4 68 63 59 64 58 58 55 Foreign Trade 68 13 11 13 12 11 10 13 13 13 14 17 14 Commercial 6 10 9 9 7 Other local 6 5 6 6 6 6 6 10 12 10 11 7 5 7 Foreign 2 _ .2 100 100 100 100 100 100 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100

Source: Colonial Reports, Annual Financial Reports.

1/ From 1965/66 on called excise tax I/ Balance pre-1962 property advance and transport advance - 75.8 Table 3h

Current Government Expenditures

19 b 12L 19L6 197 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 195 5.8 7. 5.6 104 1. 130 95 Governor, Legislature 5.3 7.4 81.4 11.9 13.0 19.5 199.1 Ueneral Administration 86.0 142.7 17b.1 139.9 141.5 212.3 1h3.8 241.2 Finance and Customs 21.3 21.2 20.4 25.6 30.3 30.3 28.8 34.4 31.1 Justice and Police 31.2 29.9 34.6 41.4 50.3 57.7 66.0 69.6 77.1 16.6 Military and Defense 13.1 13.1 15.2 17.0 15.0 15.1 20.5 17.1 Education 27.7 29. 1 5 * 54.0 8.9 59 733 82 Public Health 68.4 70.0 84.0 80.2 80.5 89.9 103.0 108.3 117.5 93.8 Agriculture 47.5 45.7 55.5 51.8 67.1 116.8 141.5 115.6 264.4 380.1 187.3 233.6 163.1 Public Works * 174.6 189.6 282.5 314.6 79.4 Marine ------97.9 99.2 - Electricity ------54.6 5.2 4.6 5.B. - - - - - SupPly & Mirr Industries 3.2 Post Office / - - - - 11.0 10.9 13.8 10.3 36.5 Printing Office 8.6 10.0 14.1 12.0 16.4 19.2 15.2 16.3 16.2 Pensions and Gratuities 36.5 36.1 32.9 37.2 41.5 49.4 56.9 59.4 72.4 2.3 2.3 9.6 16.9 Public Debt __ 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3 312.6 335.0O 401.5 T T 77 071.0 777.1 79-7. 79.9 1,03.3 949.0 1,051.1 1,-9r

* Public Works includes Marine up to 19.2 - Electricity up to 1954 1/Net until 1954, gross thereafter

1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1965/66 1966/67 1967/68 Jan-June Governor, Legislature 21.3 24.9 25.6 27.8 38.8 31 37 40 41 19 38 28 26 General Administration 334.2 261.1 251.7 269.8 278.5 322 308 294 377 1/275 232 244 234 Finance and Customs 39.7 39.1 46.5 45.5 45.8 77 78 77 90 45 81 86 91 Justice and Police 91.0 101.2 121.3 138.3 157.9 203 219 211 208 119 261 233 236 Military and Defense 17.2 17.9 36.0 3.9 ------Foreign Affairs ------9 41 60 170 Education 100.7 122.1 131.0 131.7 155.9 203 224 232 249 126 274 292 356 Public Health 131.6 154.7 154.5 158.6 168.4 206 224 235 248 117 22Lt 258 Agriculture 122.4 149.1 65.1 67.5 73.9 96 96 111 116 69 121 175 301 Public Works 249.5 335.2 260.9 308.3 309.4 398 401 454 391 204 472 620 720 Marine 145.7 162.3 128.7 121.5 132.6 149 150 147 138 59 125 120 146 Electricity 50.4 58.6 57.4 62.0 67.8 81 84 97 99 50 103 109 147 Post Office 40.0 37.3 32.6 34.7 39.0 43 50 68 59 37 83 62 68 Printing Office 19.4 23.9 20.5 21.1 21.7 34 35 32 34 20 36 36 34 Pensions and Gratuities 71.4 78.5 105.0 134.0 128.7 128 151 218 373 143 323 333 342 Public Debt .16.8 16.8 16.3 16.8 16.8 17 16 11 30 14 30 30 35 1,451.9 ],382.7 4 53.6 6-,5bl.5 635.2 1,?88 2,013 2,27 4Li53 306 3453 2,676 3,i6L -/

- ncl. Public Service Commission and Establishment Office (h 63,000) of ihich abou- £22-,000 formerly included in devEIopment expenditures Source: Colonial Reports, Annual Financial eports. Table -3

Sectoral Breakdown of Goverment Expenditures

Aricult. Education Health PWD1 Adiinist.2/ Others Total

Current Budnret 0 97-5o 8 5 12 31 37 7 100

0 195 1- 5 4 11 6 10 28 37 8 100

0 1955-58 9 8 10 28 37 8 100

Current and Development Budgets

0 1960-63 10 12 9 27 32 10 100

0 1964-66/7 11 11 9 25 32 12 100

1/ Including Postal Services net of Postal Revenues.

2/ Including Pension Paynents.

Source: Mission calculations. Table 36

FINANCING OF DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES

from 14ontributionI 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1956 the Un.Kingdom Development grants 22 47 76 90 158 188 193 126 215 167 192 166 Local Funds Current budget surpluses 1/ 180 149 81 123 - - 10 80 - 133 207 - Use of Treasury Reserves 2/ -158 -1lh -55 - 28 180 67 85 L. -84 -219 -ZL4 9 Total 22 7 180 77 1T9 239 - - 27 9 Total development expenditures 4 102 8 338 255 382 261 81 i6 17 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1965/66 1966/67 1967/68 Contribution from j the U.K. Dev. Grants 195 175 220 192 441 317 985 453 139 910 383 52 OSAS Grants - - 17 4 8 12 (46) Development loans - - - 538 Indir Assistance 318 376 6 23 596 156 Total - 17 220 192 635 13TI T7 Local Funds 17 7 7 Current budget surpluses 198 452 25 - - - - - 180 248 597 - Local borrowing 23 4 Use of Treasury reserves 2/ -166 -11 40 340 300 12 68 a11 -699 - 53 425 Total 32 337 70W 123 -3C 192 -251 74 Total development expenditures 227 512 585 532 741 758 1,0 800 623 1,263 1,9 1015

1/ Including local revenues earmarked for development expenditures. 2/ - = increase of reserves / Aid to the current budget in excess of current zuoget aeficit. Sources:Colonial Reports, Financial Reports Table 37.

Development Fund Expenditures (Development Budget) by Sectors I£ 000

15 1959 1960 1961 1962 193 14 1965 1965/66 1Z66/67 126L6 Jan.June

Agriculture Reseac, extension (Yundm) 25 25 24 19 :17 17 43 11 Grouninuts: seed stores, mixed farming centres, etc. 21 29 32 32 61 27 k L8 advances to GOMB (Kaur Mill) - - - - - 45 80 - n.a. Rice: Sapu, Genoi, tractor ploghing, causeways 46 69 45 31 149 41 53 11 Livestock 10 6 - - - - - 2 Forestry 5 9 11 15 12 114 16 18 15 Agricultural Training - - - 1 7 1 8 14 - Other (ind. contributions towards investments of local adinst.) 6 6 21 9 2 11 7

Total Agriculture 120 144 118 122 155 157 258 228 97

Development Officers (recurrent) 11 26 34 43 - - - - Transport Infrastructure Roads and bridges up-country 118 186 272 407 125 151 266 119 532 Streets and bridges Bathurst area 21 25 29 17 1 - - 1 1 Ferry stations and ferries 114 120 9 1 4 10 50 6 2 Port and river wharves 7 13 8 3 1 3 34 114 13 Marine: river vessels, repair fac- ilities 9 9 4 11 28 34 85 - 2 Airport 2 2 - 141 7 4 4 22 72 Total Transport Infrastructure 171 355 322 580 166 202 439 262 6?2

Radio and Telecommunications 6 - 8 3 95 14 17 66 30

Electricit 14 2 1 5 12 9 120 27 58 Education 60 79 126 107 110 39 84 122 5 18 13 ? 34 3 l 61 1 Water Supply and sewage 32 33 21 37 16 32 38 88 57

Administ. Build. & Staff quarters 74 46 57 102 99 106 106 79

Coastal protection, land reclamation 12 1 8 - 21 5 2 4 -

EquiomenL n.*. . (mostly police and P1D.) 3 11 41 6 18 18 89 94 21

Surveys - - - - 2 - 8 2 -

Current ex. PWD & Min. of Local Govts. 15 - - 11 29 8 18 21 -

Miscellaneous - 11 - 4 9 16 42 23 Total 526 710 754 1,053 1r9 607 1,259 1,095 1,D15

Adjustonits 6 31 1 16 8 -

Total Dev. Fund Expenditures 512 741 8 1.056 B00 623 1015

Source: Annual Financial Reports

Development Fund Expenditures

Breakdown by Sectors 0 0 1960 1961 1262 1 1964 1965 1965/66 196/67 1967/68 1960/63 196L-67/68 Jan.June Agriculture 24.7 22.9 20.1 15.7 19.3 23.6 20.4 20.8 9.6 20.8 13.2

Transportation/'Communication 33.3 47.9 43.5 55.2 32.6 34.7 36.1 30.0 64.2 45.0 40.0 Electricity 2.6 .3 .1 .4 1.4 1.4 9.5 2.5 5.7 .9 4. Education/Health 12.8 12.4 17.5 13.4 17.9 9.1 11.5 16.6 5.5 14.0 12.5 dater & sewerage, coast protec- tion,adminstr. build. 22.2 10.8 11.3 13.2 19.5 23.0 11.5 15.6 10.6 14.4 15.3 Other equipment .6 1.5 5.4 .6 4.8 2.9 7.0 8.6 2.1 2.0 5.3

Others *3 4.2 2.1 1*. 5 5 14.0 5 9 2.3 2.9 4.3 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Table -t8

Breakaown of Total Budgetary Exoenditures 1 (Net of Commercial revenues and of UK contribution towards pension payments)

'OOOL 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1965/66 1966/67 1967/68 10/1963 1964- 1966/67 Jan.-June 4 years 7Uyears General Adninist. 1/ 560 70k 709 661 782 522 776 755 815 Buildings 192 141 171 221 267 190 250 285 188 Transp. & Comm. 406 699 660 938 540 283 789 782 1,218 Elect. Water, Sewage 98 83 79 79 92 60 186 141 166 Agriculture 205 266 248 276 271 216 379 h03 398 Education 206 282 350 339 359 165 358 414 381 Health 186 219 231 269 281 135 294 308 289 Pensions & Gratuities 129 128 151 182 279 80 231 236 210 Public debt 17 17 16 11 0 14 30 30 Total 1,999 23 2.& 2 2,901 l1 3,293 3 3 700

General Adninist.2,/ 20.0 27.7 27.2 22.2 27.0 31.3 23.6 22.5 22.0 26.3 24.7 25 Buildings 9.6 5.6 6.5 7.4 9.2 11.5 7.6 8.5 5.0 7.3 8.0 7 Transp. & Comm. 20.3 27.5 25.2 31.5 18.6 17.0 24.0 23.3 32.9 26.2 23.9 25 Elect.,Water,Sewage .4.9 3.3 2.7 3.0 3.2 3.6 5.6 4.2 4.5 3.4 4.3 4 Agriculture 10.3 10.5 9.5 9.3 9.3 13.0 11.5 12.0 10.8 9.9 11.1 11 Education 10.3 11.1 13.4 11.4 12.4 9.9 10.9 12.4 10.3 11.6 11.3 11 Health 9.3 8.6 8.8 9.0 9.7 8.1 8.9 9.2 7.8 8.9 8.8 9 Pensions & Gratuities 6.5 5.0 5.8 6.1 9.6 4.8 7.0 7.0 5.7 5.8 7.0 7 Public Debt .8 .7 .6 .4 1.0 .8 .9 .9 1.0 .6 .9 1 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1/ Current and development expenditures combined 2 Including Miscellaneous

Sourse : Mission oleulations Table 39

1964-1966/67 Plan : Financing

PLANNED REALIZED

Local resources '000 1 o '000 1

Revenues 290 6.6 183 4.8

Surplus of current budget 598 13.6 376 10.0

Loans and advances 715 16.2 2h7 6.5

Total local resources 1,603 36.4 806 21.3

British grant aid 1/

Towards the current budget - - 1,569 1 l.5

Towards the Development Fund 2,800 63.6 1,926 50.9

Total British grants 2,800 63.6 3,h95 92.4

Total resources available for 7 0 10,3 finance Plan expenditures , 100 113.7

Total Plan expenditures 4,403 100. 3,781 100.0

1'et impact on treasury reserves - - 4. 520 13.7

1 Including £160,000 of soft loans

Sources: The Gambia Government Development Programme 1964-67 Annual Financial Reports Table 40

196)4-1966/67 Plan : Expenditures

000Z

Planned Realized Rate of Realization

Agriculture 925 788 85.1%

E Roadg 683 663 Wharves, ferry ramps, port 213 222 106,2A Marine 233 1)7 63.% Airp.rt 102 37 36.3%

Total transport infrastructure 1,231 1,069 86.8%

Rado, Telecommunications 108 192 177.8%

Electricity 179 167 93.3%

Education 586 355 60.6%

Health 255 172 67.5%

Water supply, sewerage 216 194 89.N

Administration buildings Staff quarters 356 390 109.6%

Coastal protection 102 32 31.4%

Equipment 186 239 128.5%

Surveys 26 12 46.2%

Current exp.(PWD,Local Gov) 123 76 61.8%

Miscellaneous 110 95 86.4% 4,403 3,781 85.9%

Sources: See table 39. Table 41

Develnpment Programme 196'7/68 - 1570/71 : Financing '000 £

Entire Plan Period 1967/68

Planned Mission Estimate Real

British development loan 3,200 3,000 540 British development grant 80 80 50 Bilateral aid 200 100 - World Bank loan 1,000 1/ L00 2/ Local Revenues: currency board surplus 300 - / other local revenues 120 - Local loan 100 100 Treasury reserves 600 425

Total Development Programme h,2804,000 1,015

Chinese rice mission not included 200 21 E UCAID not included 100 26 E UN and special agencies not included 220 58 E

Total Development outlays h,800 1,12h

1 For Bathurst port. I Estimated real expenditures. Commitments might be much higher. V Included in current budget

Sources: The Gambia Government Development Programme 1967/68 to 1970/71 Gambia Treasury. Table 62

DEVEOPHEd PEOGRAM 1967/60 - 19 s PLAIE EXPFDITURES

b '000 %'0hI0co Agriculture Research, extension (yundua) : Agricultural stations 30 30 Plant 25 25 Experimental schemes 40 95 1.9 40 95 2.9 - - Groundnuts Mixed farming centers 4O 30 10 Seed Stores 80 80 1 Co-operatives staff quarters 10 10 Ox-drawn equipment, revolving loan 10 60 Groundnut storage and handling 100 290 5.8 100 280 8.5 - 10

Rice Sapu, agricultural station 20 20 . Sapu, plants 20 60 .8 20 60 1.2 -

Livestock 10 .2 10 .3 .

Forestry Plant 15 15 - Plantation (Nyambri) 40 55 1.1 60 55 1.7 -

Oil palmes and Limes 20 .6 20 .6 -

Unidentified marketing, fishing, etc. 160 2.8 160

Total agriculture 650 13.0 500 15.2 150

Transport Infrastructure Roads, streets 1,075 21.5 990 30.2 85 Ferries and ferry ramps 60 1.2 60 1.8 - Port, wharves 8L0 16.8 60 1.2 800 Airport 160 2.8 -140 Total transport infrastraeture 2,115 62.3 1,090 33.2 1,025

Radio and Telecommunication 152 3.26 152 6.7 10

Electricity 312 6.24 302 9.2 10

Educati on Primary Schools 40 .8 60 1.2 Vocational Schools, technical Schools 1 3 1 E 2.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. Secondary Schools 52 1.0 52 1.6 Reacher training 87 1.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. Tozal education 317 -T-3 6.4 167

Health 150 3.0 135 6.1 15

Water Supply 2h3 6.9 263 7.4

Administrative buildings and staff quarters 15 8.3 355 10.8 60

Equipment (PWD) 61 1.2 61 1.9

Surveys 10 .2 10 .3

Tourism to be identified 60 1.2 - - 60

Miscellaneous to be identified 222 4.5 - - 222

Contingencies 290 5.8 290 8.8

Grand Total 5,000 100.0 3,281 100 1,719

Source: The Gambia Government Development Programme 1967/68 to 1970/71 Table 43

Gambia Treasry: Total Assets and Liabilities

Assets Liabilities I CF Spec. End of Cash Advances Investments Total Deposits Overdrft Funds Res.2 Total Year 193 84 600 877 96 - 205 576 877

1952 35 325 2,249 2,609 100 63 1,997 hh9 2,609

1953

1954 298 302 2,433 3,033 221 - 1,960 852 3,033 1955

1956 26 668 1,707 2,401 89 122 1,397 793 2,401

E -. E 1957 432 467 1,502 2,,401 10E1 1,204 1,092 2,401

1958 426 552 1,612 2,590 118 - 1,429 1,043 2,590

1959 139 596 1,628 2,363 86 - 1,505 772 2,363

1960 170 364 1,519 2,053 165 - 1,246 642 2,053

19161 266 1,119 1,h26 220 52 966 188 1,426

1962 23 275 1,030 1,328 328 259 492 249 1,328

1963 ho 233 984 1,622 439 - 775 408 1,622 1964 208 108 718 1,034 391 5h9 94 1,03

End of June

1965 567 60 733 1,360 328 878 15h 1,360

1966 1,226 51 733 2,010 341 - 1,500 169 2,010

1967 1,671 h0 757 2,h68 292 30 978 1,168 2,468 1968 1,020 72 718 1,810 331 - 588 891 1,810

.1/ Reserves (Reserve Fund and General Revenue Balance)

Source : Colonial Reports 1951 - 1961 Report of the Accountant General 1962 - 1965 / 66 indicated by the the Gaibia authorities 1966 / 67 - 1967 /68 Table 44

Reserves of the Central Government l/ h '000

End of Reserve Fund Development Fund Farmers Fund 4/ Others Total Changes eriod (net) 681 113 5/ 794 1947 740 126 g/ 866 + 74 1948 912 64 g 976 +110 1949 79 31 g 822 -154 1951 576 7 - 583 1952 449 15 1,780 2,244 +1,661 1953 1954 852 28 1,712 2,592 +343 1955 1956 793 46 787 1,626 -966 1957 1,092 56 6 5 0 E 1,798 E +172 1958 1,043 209 672 1,924 +126 1959 772 216 631 1,619 -305 1960 642 70 538 1,250 -369 1961 188 45 459 692 -558 1962 249 -185 393 457 -235 1963 408 - 15 371 2' 763 +306 19614 94 95 186 140' 515 -248 June 65 154 206 340 700 +185 66 169 718 371 31,258 +558 67 1,168 118 44o -36- 1,366 +108 68 891 -308 482 -132 -' 933 -433

Excluding minor spec4al funds earmarked for specific purposes and deposits by Institutions other than Central Government. 2/ Short term advances granted by the Government, repaid in 1965. / U.K. Grant-in-aid wrongly paid in 1966/67, repaid :in part in 1967/68, the remainder to be repaid in 1968/69. L' Excluding price stabilization fund from 1956 onwards. 5/Stear.:0r Depreciation Reserve (later incorporated in the Development Fund)

Source : see table 43 Table h6

TOTAL FOREIGN AID DISBURSEENTS

'000 £

1963 1964 1965 1966/67 1967/68

UK : towards current budget 733 528 596 148 176

towards Development Fund 985 470 918 590 590

Total 1718 998 1514 738 766

Republic of China (rice) - - - 20E 25E

USA n.a. n.a. 36 9 26

UN n.a. n.a. 21 5 58

Source: See detailed tables 46, 47, 48 Table 46.

U.K. Fizancial Assistance to the Budget

1953 1259 1962 1361 1962 1963 1964 1965 1965/66 1966/67 1967/63 Tnwnana thea J_j current Budget OSAS Grants - - - 45.7 63.3 135.9 91.7 86.2 110.8 115.9 OSAS Loans 107,1 - - - - - 32.5 75.1 9.2 35.7 39.9 41.2 Grant-in-aid - - - - 531.4 565.0 361.5 192.3 449.7 (360.0).1/ Total - - - 77 594 .7 733T 327.3 2d7.7 .9777 57UZ8.3 Towards the Development Fund

OSAS Grants ------17.6 4.2 8.0 12.4 (45.6)1/ Develop. Grants 175 220 192.3 4&0.7 316.9 985.2 452.7 139.0 909.9 332.5 51.8 Dev. Loans - - - - - Total - - - - - 538.0 T7r 192.3 477 3.9 9752 470.3 7.2 917.9 Grand Total 394.9 589.5 Grants 175 220 192.3 436.4 o11.6 1,636.1 923.5 421.7 1,478.4 510.4 158.t Loans - - - - 32.5 75.1 9.2 35.7 Total 39.2 579.2 17 220 192.3 777. 91.1.6 71-5. 430.9 50.7 738-1

Paid out in 1966/67 but reimbursed in 1)67/63 (L 227, 00) and in 1968/69. Due in 1967/6' but payment not received before end of Fiscal Year.

Sses i .a-gl Reports; Annual Finazial Reports. Table 47 U.S. Assistance

'000$ per Fiscal Year

1. Project Assistance, Technical Cooperation and Developmen\ Grants

1966 1967 1968

Commitments

Agriculture 190 -

Others 11 36 Total n.a. 201 36

Expenditures 102 21 63

2. Volontary Relief Agencies (PL 480 Title II)

1955-62 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 0 p.a.

Expenditures

40 40 16 11 151 106 109

3. Scholarships 1966 1967 1968

Students arriving abroad none 2 4

Source: Operations Report, Data as of June 30, 1967 and 1968 by AID. Table 48

UN ASSISTANCE

'000 £

1965 1965/66 1966/67 1967/68 Total J-J

Education 7.3 14.1 22.7 20.4 64.5

Health - 16.1 16.0 32.1

Fishing 3.7 7.4 7.3 3.7 22.1

Miscellaneous - - 7.4 17.8 25.2

Total 11.0 21.5 53.5 57.9 143.9

Source: "Summary of Technical Assistance Activities", The GaMia 1967 by UNDP Regional Office, Dakar.