MIAMI UNIVERSITY the Graduate School

MIAMI UNIVERSITY The Graduate School

CERTIFICATE FOR APPROVING THE DISSERTATION

We hereby approve the Dissertation of Deanna Joy Watts Candidate for the Degree: Doctor of Philosophy

______Director Dr. Bryan W. Marshall

______Reader Dr. Ryan J. Barilleaux

______Reader Dr. Christopher S. Kelley

______Graduate School Representative Dr. Andrew R.L. Cayton

ABSTRACT

RHETORIC OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY: PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, AND SIGNING STATEMENTS

by Deanna Joy Watts

Modern presidents have increasingly engaged in public governing to reinforce their leadership role. They have also developed various administrative strategies designed to centralize bureaucratic decision making under White House authority. These actions have been prompted by changes such as a growing bureaucracy, increased partisanship, and inflated public expectations (Nathan 1983; Waterman 1989; Light 1995; Moe and Howell 1999; Rudalevige 2002; Howell 2003). One of the ways the president can juggle his role as the nation’s central political figure, exhibit leadership, and administratively communicate to the federal bureaucracy is through signing statements. Presidential signing statements are unilateral devices delivered in written or verbal form that are attached to a bill when the president signs it into law (Cooper 2002; Kelley 2003). Presidential signing statements do not have legal authority but they do become part of a bill’s legislative history and can be used as a reference during implementation (Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010). At times, they can serve to satisfy the public relations aspect of the presidency when delivered during public signing ceremonies (Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010; Korzi 2011). Previous research has shown that signing statements are designed to help the president manage the executive branch (Kelley 2007; Magill 2007; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010; Evans 2011). This dissertation examines the administrative rhetoric of presidential signing statements through empirical analysis and illustrative examples. The dissertation adds to the presidency literature by providing insight into how bill signing statements are used as an administrative communication tool.

RHETORIC OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY: PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, AND SIGNING STATEMENTS

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Faculty of Miami University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Political Science by Deanna Joy Watts Miami University Oxford, Ohio 2012

Dissertation Director: Dr. Bryan W. Marshall

Table of Contents

Introduction ...... 1 Bridging the Gap between Presidential Rhetoric and Administration ...... 1 Signing Statements: Rhetoric, Administration, and Expanding Presidential Power ...... 2 The Outline of this Dissertation ...... 4

Chapter 1 The Presidency and Signing Statements ...... 12 Researching the Presidency ...... 12 Redefining the Presidency and Increasing Control over the Executive Branch ...... 14 Traditional Methods of Presidential Administration ...... 17 Tools and Talk ...... 21 The Evolution of Signing Statements ...... 27 Summary ...... 30

Chapter 2 The Administrative and Rhetorical Presidencies, Executive Management Strategies, and Signing Statements ...... 34 The Administrative Presidency ...... 34 The Rhetorical Presidency ...... 37 The Politics of Administrative Strategies and Shift toward Rhetoric ...... 41 Administrative Communication ...... 43 The Blurring of Presidential Rhetoric and Administration ...... 46 Signing Statement Rhetoric as Policy Guidance ...... 55 The Institution, Administrative Rhetoric, and Unilateralism...... 58 The Rhetorical Administrative Presidency ...... 62 Summary ...... 65

Chapter 3 Presidential Administrative Rhetoric: Political Conditions, Context, and Expectations...... 68 Changing Administrative Strategies and Rhetoric ...... 69 Characteristics of Signing Statements since FDR ...... 69 Organization of the Executive Branch and Administrative Rhetoric ...... 72 Context and Administrative Rhetoric: Public Ceremonies vs. Private Signings ...... 77 Political Conditions and Administrative Rhetoric: Election Years ...... 82

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Political Conditions and Administrative Rhetoric: Approval Ratings ...... 85 Political Conditions and Administrative Rhetoric: United vs. Divided Government ...... 91 Summary ...... 91

Chapter 4 The Rhetorical Administrative Presidency and Signing Statements: Changes over Time and Effects of Political Conditions ...... 96 Data and Research Design ...... 96 Dependent Variables ...... 97 Symbolic Administrative Rhetoric ...... 98 Interpretive Administrative Rhetoric ...... 100 Command Administrative Rhetoric ...... 104 Independent Variables ...... 106 Results ...... 107 Frequencies and Descriptive Statistics: 1981-2008 ...... 107 Organizational Conditions and Administrative Rhetoric: Agency Level, 1981-2008 ...... 113 Organizational Conditions and Administrative Rhetoric: Inner vs. Outer Cabinet Departments, 1981-2008...... 114 Context and Administrative Rhetoric: Public Ceremonies vs. Private Signings, 1981-2008 ...... 116 Political Conditions and Administrative Rhetoric: Election Years, 1981-2008 ...... 119 Political Conditions and Administrative Rhetoric: Presidential Approval Ratings, 1981- 2008...... 121 Political Conditions and Administrative Rhetoric: United vs. Divided Government, 1981- 2008...... 123 Summary ...... 124

Chapter 5 Was it Something I Said?: Illustrative Examples of Presidential Administrative Rhetoric, and Signing Statements ...... 127 Presidential Signaling and Administrative Rhetoric ...... 130 Signaling and Symbolic Administrative Rhetoric ...... 130 Public Ceremony vs. Written: Welfare Reform, Immigration, and Administrative Rhetoric ...... 132 Context and Command Administrative Rhetoric ...... 136 George H.W. Bush and Command Statements...... 136 William J. Clinton and Command Statements ...... 138 Is Anyone Listening? ...... 141 iv

Reagan: Interpretive Administrative Rhetoric ...... 141 Center Stage: How Signing Statements Gained Mass Attention under George W. Bush ...... 143 GAO Reports: Bureaucratic Responsiveness to Bush II’s Administrative Rhetoric...... 144 GAO Report: 13 Provisions “Executed as Written” ...... 146 GAO Report: 9 Provisions “Not Executed as Written”...... 149 “Command” Administrative Rhetoric and the GAO Reports: Provisions “Not Executed” ...... 155 Summary ...... 159 Signaling, Context, and Administrative Rhetoric ...... 159 Bush II, Signing Statements, and Bureaucratic Responsiveness ...... 160

Chapter 6 Conclusion ...... 162 The Institution and Presidential Rhetoric ...... 162 Presidential Leadership, Rhetoric, and Unilateralism ...... 163 Discussion ...... 165 Summary of Results, and Contributions to the Current Literature ...... 165 Future Research ...... 168 Conclusion ...... 170 Appendix ...... 174 References ...... 182

List of Tables

Table 1: Signing Statements that Mention the Executive Branch Bureaucracy, 1981-2008 ...... 107

Table 2: Signing Statements that Mention the Bureaucracy by Administration, 1981-2008 ..... 108

Table 3: Administrative Rhetoric by President, 1981-2008 ...... 111

Table 4: Organizational Conditions and Administrative Rhetoric: Agency Level, 1981-2008 . 114

Table 5: Organizational Conditions and Administrative Rhetoric: Inner vs. Outer Departments, 1981-2008 ...... 115

Table 6: Context and Administrative Rhetoric: Public Ceremonies vs. Private Signings, 1981- 2008...... 117

Table 7: Political Conditions and Administrative Rhetoric: Election Years, 1981-2008 ...... 120

Table 8: Political Conditions and Administrative Rhetoric: Approval Rating, 1981-2008 ...... 122

Table 9: Political Conditions and Administrative Rhetoric: United vs. Divided Government, 1981-2008 ...... 124

List of Figures

Figure 1: Administrative Rhetoric and Tone: Overtime Percentages, 1981-2008...... 109

Figure 2: Signing Statements and Tone of Administrative Rhetoric: Frequencies, 1981-2008 . 110

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Dedication

To my Grandma Fuser, You meant the world to me and even though you are gone, you are always in my thoughts. I wish you were here to enjoy this with me, I know you would be proud. Love, Bertha Jr.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to start by thanking the faculty of the psychology and political science departments at Wheeling Jesuit University. Drs. Hull, Raudenbush, Phillips, and Hoffman encouraged me to take the plunge and apply to graduate school. Without their encouragement I might still be a sports photographer who always wondered, “What if…?” I would also like to thank my family who has stuck by me, cheered me on, and helped me along the way. First, my parents Barbara and Ken Watts, who, despite their complete dismay in where life has taken me, have been there to offer their unconditional support every step of the way. Thanks also to my Uncle Bill Fuser and Aunt Lois Patrick who have been spectacular cheerleaders, and helped me preserve my sanity over the past five years. I also want to thank my siblings Denise Reep, Darren Seely, and Collin Seely, and their families, especially Collin and his wife, Elizabeth, for letting me crash at their house when I needed to fly out of the Columbus airport or go shopping in the city for “big kid” clothes. Next, I would like to thank my dissertation committee and other Miami faculty who have mentored me along the way. Dr. Bryan Marshall has been a phenomenal and incredibly patient dissertation chair. I have been extremely fortunate to have such a great scholar to guide me through this journey. Along the way he has also become a great friend and colleague. He, along with Dr. Christopher Kelley, granted me the opportunity to join their research on presidential bill signing statements. Working with them offered me the chance to present at Midwest Conferences, get published, and find my dissertation topic. Words cannot express how grateful I am to them both. As for Dr. Kelley, he is not only an academic advisor but a big brother whose sarcastic wit kept me in stitches whenever I needed a good laugh. Dr. Ryan Barilleaux has also been an exceptional professor and mentor. He not only provided guidance on this project, but he has also been a great help by advising me on teaching, research ideas, academia, and life in general. Finally, I would like to thank Dr. Andrew Cayton, who graciously agreed to serve on my committee and whose contributions were greatly appreciated. I also want to thank Dr. Philip Russo for his enthusiasm and knowledge in the classroom. But I am also grateful for the numerous opportunities he provided during my time as a graduate student at Miami University. His invitation to work with the Center for Public Management and ix

Regional Affairs (CPMRA) allowed me to gain invaluable experience outside of the classroom. I would also be remiss if I did not thank Drs. Mark Morris and Andrew Dudas for all of their help and friendship, on the ice and off. I had the good fortune to serve as Dr. Morris’s graduate assistant and play alongside him at the Goggin on a co-rec ice hockey team. Both he and Dr. Dudas advised me during my time as a research associate in the CPMRA and introduced me to broomball. Special thanks also go to other department faculty: Drs. Patrick Haney, Laura Neack, Steve DeLue, Will Hazelton, Augustus Jones, John Rothgeb, and Randy Davis. I would also like to thank the department’s staff, Betsy Burger, Cheryl Chafin, and Mark Sawyer. Thanks also go out to the friends who supported my decision to pursue a graduate education and some new friends I made here at Miami. John Enrietto, Adrienne Lauck, and Margaret Lauck were great friends prior to my leaving for the wilds of Oxford, Ohio who have continued to be so despite the miles between us. Then there are the characters I have had the good fortune to call my friends over the past five years: Glypie (Grider) Jones who rivals my Type-A personality, stress level, and work ethic; Steve Hess, who is always upbeat and a source of great conversation and humor; Levar Smith who always stopped by my office with a smile and has become one of my greatest shopping buddies; and Charlie and Tami Ford who are two of the most generous and entertaining individuals I have ever met. I would also like to thank my past and present Public Administration buddies: Heath Ingram, Bethany Bowyer, and Mary Spilman, and friends who have since left Harrison Hall – Diana (O’Bryan) Liu, Madeleine (Barilleaux) Truax, Mark Lehman, and Dan Doty. Lastly, I would like to thank my friend Erin Lesnansky for giving me a place to go when I needed to escape from Oxford, and for agreeing to proofread this monster. Finally, at the risk of ridicule, I would like to acknowledge my (late) cat, Butters. He was the best pal a girl could ask for and, through thick and thin, was always there to put a smile on my face. I miss you every day, fuzzy buddy.

Introduction

Bridging the Gap between Presidential Rhetoric and Administration The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a more detailed examination on how signing statements have served as a rhetorical and administrative presidential leadership tool for modern era Chief Executives. Following Kelley (2003), and Conley (2011) this dissertation exams what the presidents are saying in their signing statements.1 The dissertation isolates and analyzes signing statements that contain language focused on the bureaucracy. Then, through empirical analysis and illustrative examples, my research provides insight into how this unilateral device is used by presidents for administrative communication purposes. Signing statements can offer presidents a way to limit bureaucratic discretion, guide policy implementation, or appeal for future legislation. As such, it supplements other avenues presidents can take to try and increase their administrative control over the executive branch, such as executive orders, memoranda, and political appointments (Waterman 1989; Eastland 1992; Moe and Howell 1999; Cooper 2002, K. Mayer 2002; Kelley and Marshall 2008; Lewis 2008; Whitford and Yates 2009). But the progressive use of signing statements suggests that they have evolved into a powerful, unilateral device that administrations use to achieve many policy and political goals and overcome governing obstacles (Light 1995; May 1998; Howell 2003; Kelley 2003; Rudalevige 2010b; Conley 2011; Evans 2011; Korzi 2011). Accompanying the discussion recognizing the versatility of signing statements has been the call for empirical studies that focus on the administrative use of signing statements (Kelley 2007; Durant 2009a; Rudalevige 2009a; Waterman 2009; Evans 2011; Marshall 2012). My dissertation accepts this challenge and is also designed to provide a connection between two disparate but widely researched topics in presidential scholarship: presidential rhetoric and the administrative presidency. The main research questions are:  Are there identifiable tonal variations in signing statements when presidents mention or communicate to executive branch agencies?  If so, does the president’s rhetoric demand bureaucratic action or merely use an agency as a symbol to advance their policy agenda?

1 Emphasis added by author. 1

 What factors associated with the agency contribute to signing statement tonal variation? Do changes in tone occur during notable timeframes such as election years, or under certain conditions such as divided government?  Finally, has presidential administrative rhetoric in signing statements changed over time?

Signing Statements: Rhetoric, Administration, and Expanding Presidential Power Cooper (1997, 2002), May (1998), Moe and Howell (1999), and Kelley (2003) were among the first to provide methodological analyses of presidential signing statements. Their early efforts heightened academic awareness and curiosity about this unilateral device. Subsequently, research interest on this topic has steadily increased. A few years later, journalist Charlie Savage (2006) brought signing statements to the attention of the general public with his news reports detailing the Bush Administration’s aggressive activities based on the unitary executive theory. This theory, subscribed to and promoted by White House officials, asserts that all executive powers are exclusive to the president (Savage 2008; Barilleaux and Kelley 2010; Fisher 2010; Pika and Maltese 2010; Genovese 2012). In his articles and the book that followed, Savage (2006, 2008) exposed the president’s signing statements and his numerous objections which essentially altered legislation. Savage’s article featured what Kelley (2003, 45) had defined as “constitutional” signing statements because they declared certain provisions unconstitutional, which Savage (2006) informed readers was how the Administration justified reinterpretation of the law or the president’s refusal to enforce the noted section.2 Even though it was not until the 21st century that this unilateral action attracted widespread attention from scholars, the media, and the public, presidential signing statements have been utilized across administrations since James Monroe issued two statements during his administration (Kagan 2001; Kelley 2003; Cooper 2005; Savage 2006, 2008; Pfiffner 2009a; Marshall 2012). The first was delivered to Congress in 1821 and offered his alternative interpretation of a bill that he perceived as undermining the president’s constitutional authority to “commission all the officers of the United States (May 1998; Kelley 2003, 2006; Eggspuehler

2 Savage (2008) included a chapter devoted to signing statements. The best seller, which piqued the media’s attention to Bush’s signing statements, credited Cooper (2002) and Kelley (2003) for their initial work on the subject. 2

2008; U.S. Constitution, Article II, Sec. 3).” While Monroe’s initiative was not well received by congressional members, it was not until one of Andrew Jackson’s signing statements that Congress first viewed it as an avenue for the executive branch to overextend its authority in the legislative process. In it, Jackson altered the use of congressionally appropriated funds for a road project located in the Michigan Territory that extended to Illinois (Kelley 2006; Fisher 2007a; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Pika and Maltese 2010). Over time, other administrations offended the legislative branch through this course of action but were vindicated when the Supreme Court supported the usage of signing statements in 1899. Following a challenge to a signing statement from President Tyler, the Supreme Court ruled that the president is within his right to inform Congress on his reasons for approving legislation for the official records (La Abra Silver Mining Co. v United States 1899; Kelley 2003, 2006; Fisher 2007a). Yet even though this method of presidential unilateralism was sustained by the judiciary, it was used infrequently during the Historical Presidency era. But there was resurgence in its use in the 1930s by Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR), increasing over time, and eventually gaining notoriety during George W. Bush’s administration. The trigger that ignited such a reaction was that Bush’s signing statements not only echoed but amplified Jackson’s attempt to trounce some of Congress’s authority. His signing statements cited several provisions that the president proclaimed would not, or could not, be implemented as written. Instead, the second President Bush provided his interpretation of specific sections in order to bring the legislation closer to his administration’s policy goals (Kelley 2003, 2006; Fisher 2007b; Pfiffner 2008; Savage 2008; Conley 2011; Barilleaux 2012; Marshall 2012). Signing statements are versatile tools for presidents. But due to the debate surrounding the Bush II Administration, a large portion of this attention has narrowed on the growing number of constitutional objections found in signing statements and their implications on executive- legislative branch relations (Cooper 2005; Devins 2007; Fisher 2007b; Kelley and Marshall 2010; Marshall 2012). Yet, the overall literature has shown that signing statements are more complex in nature and use. Presidents may use them simply to highlight the work and accomplishments of their administration, praise or demonize Congress, or appeal for additional legislation. They can also use a signing statement to distance themselves from provisions that run counter to their stated policy goals in order to temper criticisms from base supporters or

3 highlight the bill’s merits for particular constituencies (Groseclose and McCarty 2001; Yenerall 2006; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010; Erikson and Tedin 2011; Korzi 2011). However, research interests have shifted toward the administrative use of signing statements (Canes-Wrone 2006; Waterman 2009; Kelley 2007; Magill 2007; Durant 2009a, 2009b; Pfiffner 2009a; Evans 2011; Korzi 2011; Marshall 2012). Recently, some scholars have examined its potential to centralize the president’s authority on policy implementation, or the prospect that they require federal bureaucrats to violate civil service ethics (Cooper 2005; Kelley 2007; Magill 2007; Canes-Wrone 2009; Durant 2009b; Pfiffner 2009b; Waterman 2009; Kelley and Marshall 2010; Conley 2011). At the same time, others have challenged students of the presidency to find a bridge between public statements and administrative strategies (Eshabaugh- Soha 2006; Canes-Wrone 2009; Waterman 2009; Evans 2011). Both positions point to recent adaptations in presidential leadership and management of the executive branch. Due to the developmental history of signing statements and the evidence presented in previous work, signing statements may be one of the fundamental elements to recent presidential administrations and their approach to governing (Jones 2000; Kagan 2001; Kelley 2007; Waterman 2009; Kelley and Marshall 2010).

The Outline of this Dissertation This introductory chapter has provided some background information on signing statement research, the reasons this topic was chosen, why it is important to the field, and the main research questions. While this section has only provided a general overview of signing statements, subsequent chapters will delve deeper into previous research efforts and how this tool has been utilized by recent presidents. I will then use quantitative and qualitative analysis to examine the variables that are expected to influence the tone of the presidents’ administrative rhetoric. Chapter One will review the various approaches to researching the presidency and how this dissertation ties into the most current method, New Institutionalism. It will include an overview of the relationship between the presidency and federal bureaucracy. Especially presidential attempts made to increase White House control and limit discretion by incorporating unilateral tools into their management strategies. Additionally, background information on signing statements and how they have evolved into a political and administrative resource will be 4 examined. Finally, Chapter One will summarize the results of previous studies on signing statements and the political conditions that affect how and when they are issued. Chapter Two will explore this dissertation’s theoretical foundations and provide supporting examples of signing statements that mention executive branch departments or agencies and note the changes in their tonal variation. First, the Administrative Presidency literature will be reviewed and its numerous strategies discussed. Then the politics of presidential management will be presented, explaining why signing statements have become an important addition to the institution in its ever changing political environment. Presidents continue to battle Congress over administrative control, and the executive branch has grown substantially since FDR, which has fostered the rise in organized interest groups that lobby for or against federal agencies. These, and other factors, have contributed to the elevated efforts by administrations to seek new methods of executive management (Nathan 1983; T. Moe 1987; Arnold 1999; Pfiffner 1999; Burke 2000; Howell 2003; Aberbach and Peterson 2005a, 2005b; Weingast 2005; Berry and Wilcox 2007; Lewis 2008; Rudalevige 2011). The Reagan Administration identified signing statements as a device the president could use to supplement other means in order to protect their policy agenda and increase control over bureaucrats (May 1998; Kagan 2001; Kelley 2003, 2007; Magill 2007). However, it was not until Reagan’s second term that signing statements developed as his advisers intended, specifically the agreement to have them published in the Federal Register and the inclusion of the president’s comments in the legislative history of bills he signed into law (Meese 1985; Tarr 1985; Calabresi 1986; May 1998; Dellinger 1993; Kelley 2003, 2007; Spitzer 2012).3 This event is notable since previous research has found that bureaucrats actively seek out the president’s comments on new legislation, and these developments allowed for more accessible and authoritative guidance on policy implementation (Wood and Waterman 1994; Garrett, Thurber, Fritschler, and Rosenbloom 2006; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006, 2008; Whitford and Yates 2003, 2009). The Rhetorical Presidency is the second theory that contributes to the expectations of this dissertation. Presidents are now expected to govern in full view of the public, whether it is promoting their policy agenda or reminding the public of their administrations’ accomplishments (Tulis 1987; Zarefsky 2004; Jones 2005; Kernell 2007; Healy 2008). Signing statements fit

3 Official internal communications from the Reagan White House that detail the Administration’s plans to increase the use and awareness of signing statements will be included in this chapter. 5 within this aspect of the presidency because of the careful crafting of the president’s words and delivery. Presidential comments, written or verbal, draw attention. Moreover, the written commentaries or public speeches by contemporary presidents serve political purposes, target specific audiences, and are central to the institution’s power and position of authority (Neustadt 1960; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006, 2008; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Whitford and Yates 2009; Cohen 2010; Miroff 2010; Rottinghaus 2010). Combined, these three elements of presidential rhetoric are characteristics of signing statements and could be modified in order to direct the execution of policy or reinforce the president’s influence over bureaucratic activity. Due to the characteristics of signing statements, they can also serve as an unfiltered, direct line of administrative communication from the president to his subordinates, primarily, because the president issues a signing statement when a bill becomes law (Dorsey 1957; Denton and Hahn 1986; Neustadt 1990; Light 1995; Simon 1997; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Magill 2007).4 Additionally, they are attached to a bill’s legislative history and subsequently published in the Federal Register. The latter two characteristics of signing statements help to ensure the lasting effect of the president’s comments (Cooper 1997; Kagan 2001; Kelley 2003; Magill 2007; Campbell and Jamieson 2008). Thus, it will be argued that because signing statements are an exceptionally adaptable tool they can provide researchers a useful bridge between the administrative and rhetorical presidencies. Following Neustadt’s (1960, 1990) theory of presidential power, outright orders to deviate altogether from the legislation and engage in bureaucratic action not covered under the law should be relatively rare (see also Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010). This expectation is the result of an initial assessment of signing statements’ tonal variation. It is also based on the political tightrope modern presidents walk and the efforts made by the White House to prevent negative reactions from the public and press or draw attention to actions that may result in charges of an administration resurrecting the Imperial Presidency (Maltese 1992; Kumar 2003; J. Mayer 2004; Rudalevige 2006; Kernell 2007; Crockett 2009; Graber 2010; Garvey 2011; Sollenberger and Rozell 2011; Barilleaux 2012; Bennett 2012).5

4 This dissertation will use the masculine form for general references to the president. 5 The term “Imperial Presidency” refers to Schlesinger’s (1973) work after Watergate and Vietnam and the theory that modern era presidents will continue to exploit the institution and expand its power beyond the Constitution, especially during war time. 6

Following the presentation of the supporting theories, the second chapter will conclude with this dissertation’s position that the institution has evolved into the rhetorical administrative presidency. Since the 1980s, presidents have modified the use of signing statements to their needs and varying political conditions. However, each has added to its standing and power as a unilateral device (Cooper 1997; Kagan 2001; Korzi 2011; Barilleaux 2012; Spitzer 2012). Therefore, with each administration, signing statements that target bureaucrats should become less symbolic in nature and increasingly provide subordinates with information regarding implementation or what should be considered a priority. While a signing statement is not the only “tool” that a president can use to reinforce his authority over executive branch bureaucracies, its “flexibility” makes it an attractive choice (Cooper 1997, 540; Kelley and Marshall 2010, 170). Because one signing statement has the potential to serve a multitude of purposes and may be issued quietly or with a carefully planned public ceremony, this subject merits a more focused examination. This point echoes the challenges issued by established political science scholars (Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Kelley 2007; Canes-Wrone 2009; Durant 2009a; Rudalevige 2009a; Waterman 2009; Marshall 2012). Chapter Three builds a theoretical foundation for the rise of the rhetorical administrative presidency. By using previous research on the rhetorical and administrative presidencies, the chapter outlines how signing statements can be used as a strategic communications tool. This chapter will generally review work on rhetorical strategies, organizational culture, and administrative communication in order to explain why all types of signing statements should be appreciated as complex and powerful administrative tools, whether or not they are written, delivered during signing ceremonies, feature constitutional challenges, or simply appear to be benign use of unilateralism to gain political capital through platitudes and credit claiming (Downs 1967; Edwards 1985; Light 1995; Kagan 2001; Cooper 2005; Kelley 2007; Magill 2007; Medhurst 2007; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Durant 2009a; Pfiffner 2009a; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010). This chapter will also examine variables within the political system that may explain tonal variation in signing statements and develop corresponding expectations for testing with data analysis. Overall, there should be an increase in interpretive statements simply because presidents continually seek ways to limit bureaucratic discretion by centralizing policy decisions. However, previous research has shown that the character of the language in signing statements is 7 affected by the occurrence of united or divided government or congressional attempts to limit bureaucratic discretion (Kelley 2003; Cooper 2005; Devins 2007; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010; Evans 2011). But for the purpose of this dissertation, variables associated with the administrative and public presidencies will take precedence. Chapter Four will empirically test the hypotheses presented in Chapter Three. Initially, descriptive statistics will provide an overview of the data, including between the individual presidents. The tone of the president’s administrative rhetoric was tested against the organizational, contextual, and political conditions that have been found to affect the content of presidential signing statements (Kelley 2003; Cooper 2005; Devins 2007; Berry 2009; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010; Rice 2010; Conley 2011; Evans 2011). Additional variables that have been cited as catalysts for changes in administrative and rhetorical strategies were also tested, specifically, factors such as executive branch organization, method of delivery, the election cycle, and presidential approval ratings (Cronin 1980; Nathan 1983; Waterman 1989; Neustadt 1990; Light 1995; Arnold 1998; Howell 2003; Hoddie and Routh 2004; Jones 2005; Kernell 2007; Edwards 1985, 2009). Organizational conditions such as agency level and the Inner versus Outer character of Cabinet departments were found to have a significant effect on the tone of presidential administrative rhetoric. Administratively, the president shares authority over the bureaucracy with Congress, but control may vary depending on a bureau’s position and mission. The results parallel other important research on presidential administrative communication (Cronin 1980; T. Moe 1989; Wood and Waterman 1994; Light 1999). According to Cronin (1980), Outer Cabinet departments are more susceptible to the president’s biggest competitors, specifically members of Congress and organized interest groups, during policy implementation. The reasoning is that Outer Cabinets perform an advocacy role on behalf of a constituency group (e.g., Education, Labor, or Agriculture), and these types of departments will have closer ties to the public (Cronin 1980; Lowery and Brasher 2004; Kernell 2007; Loomis and Cigler 2012). Conversely, departments such as State and Defense are designed and organized around the needs of the president (Cronin 1980). As such, Cronin (1980) states that presidents need to monitor Outer Cabinets more closely due to the nature of their policy areas and potentially divided allegiance. Based on the results this dissertation will

8 attempt to add to Cronin’s (1980) work on Inner and Outer Cabinets and administrative centralization. Inner Cabinet level departments were expected to be the main targets for symbolic or command administrative rhetoric due to their high public visibility, and position and proximity to the president (Cronin 1980). Conversely, Outer Cabinet departments were predicted to be the focus of signing statements that interpret the legislation in order to minimize bureaucratic discretion. The expectation for Outer Cabinets was based on their policy relationship with Congress and clientele groups (Cronin 1980). Also, by applying Cohen’s (2010) theories, the context of a signing statement’s delivery was expected to demonstrate how presidents modify, and narrow, their communication strategies for leadership and administrative purposes (see also Durant 2009b; Rottinghaus 2010; Korzi 2011). Public ceremonies are important because presidents need to communicate signals to constituent groups and subordinates in the hope that demonstrating leadership will gain them political support and bureaucratic compliance (Feldman and March 1981; Hinckley 1990; Hubbell 1991; Neustadt 1960, 1990; Van de Walle, Kampen, Bouckaert 2005; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Whitford and Yates 2009; Carpenter 2010; Tedin, Rottinghaus and Rodgers 2011). Kernell’s (2007) work demonstrated that presidents will make national appeals to the broader public in order to build support and overcome issues related to divided government, partisan politics, and the increased individual autonomy of members of Congress. Cohen’s (2010) work suggests that presidents have since adapted and now “narrow” their public appeals to target audiences because of the expansion of media formats and outlets, truncated coverage, and the increase in competing voices (2). Therefore, the president’s administrative rhetoric in signing statements that were issued quietly, and in written form, were expected to have more interpretive and command tones. Conversely, the president was expected to use symbolic rhetoric during public ceremonies. As expected, significant variations occurred when the data was tested against the conditions of public ceremonies or privately issued signing statements. Surprisingly, there were no significant effects for political conditions in explaining tonal variation. Despite the findings of previous signing statement research, the election cycle, public approval ratings, and the partisan makeup of the federal government had no effect on the tone of presidential administrative rhetoric (Berry 2009; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010; Rice 2010; 9

Conley 2011; Evans 2011). Adding to this puzzling result, the data suggests that tonal variation is significantly related to the time of year because most administrative signing statements are issued in the month of October. In general, there was very little evidence found for political variables as a predictor for changes to presidential administrative rhetoric. Chapter Five examines individual presidents and their use of signing statements in order to provide a closer look at how political conditions and legislative shortcomings can contribute to the White House’s strategic use of signing statements. It also seeks to determine if a signing statement’s administrative rhetoric has any effect on the executive branch. While symbolic administrative rhetoric may be assumed as lacking any substantive policy guidance the examples presented in this chapter suggest otherwise. Qualitative analysis will also produce supporting evidence that signing statements can benefit individual presidents by adding longevity to their policy preferences. Along the same line, the way in which presidents use signing statements will demonstrate how the gradual introduction of signing statements, and familiar language pattern of constitutional challenges that are present in all four administrations, eventually becomes part of bureaucratic culture. This position will be substantiated by official White House communications, department manuals, and GAO (2007a, 2007b, 2008) reports to Congress following its investigation into George W. Bush’s signing statements. In its summary, the GAO reported (2007a, 2007b, 2008) that the power and effectiveness of signing statements over executive branch departments and agencies may be overstated. The office took this position because a large majority of the provisions investigated were implemented as intended by Congress (GAO 2008). However, during a congressional hearing a GAO representative did recommend to the legislative branch that they revisit the issue (GAO 2008). Academic contributors to this topic have been restrained in intensifying the controversy surrounding signing statements and its nefarious implications for bureaucrats and their mission. Similar to the GAO’s (2008) final determination, they remain unconvinced that signing statements increase the president’s managerial power and authority (Durant 2009a; Rudalevige 2009a; Korzi 2011). But since this chapter presents evidence which suggests that signing statements can prompt bureaucratic responsiveness to the president and can result in bureaucrats deviating from the law as written by Congress the debate may be reignited. This chapter will conclude with an evaluation of the president’s administrative rhetoric using the provisions investigated by the GAO (2007a, 2007b, 2008) followed by a discussion of 10 the quality of the president’s policy guidance by comparing instances when his construal was heeded and it was not. Most of the time when bureaus implemented the provision as it was written the president was unclear in one, and sometimes two, key communications areas; either by not identifying a specific organization as his target audience, or clearly communicating how he expected subordinates to proceed with execution. Based on the literature, either of these shortcomings could have factored into the lack of bureaucratic responsiveness to the president’s direction (Neustadt 1960, 1990; Waterman 1989; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006). A cursory assessment of the first signing statements investigated by the GAO (2007a) suggests that when the president does not identify a specific bureau as the target of his policy guidance, the legislation will be executed as written by Congress. Conversely, when a specific department or agency is mentioned bureaucrats are more likely to follow the president’s interpretation of the provision in question. Overall, this chapter highlights the importance of examining presidential administrative rhetoric from several angles. Finally, Chapter Six summarizes the theoretical foundations and discusses the key implications from the empirical and qualitative analysis. This chapter closes with a basic assessment of President Obama’s administrative use of signing statements. The data suggest that, due to the criticisms launched at his predecessor and his own campaign promises, the Obama Administration has modified their language and the delivery of signing statements in order to minimize public disapproval (Coe and Reitzes 2010; Conley and Saas 2010; Savage 2010; Garvey 2011; Barilleaux 2012). Lastly, this chapter provides an overview of future research efforts regarding presidential administrative rhetoric.

Chapter 1 The Presidency and Signing Statements

In order to validate the framework of my research, this chapter will begin by briefly reviewing approaches to researching the presidency. Then, some of the political and organizational conditions that have been found to affect the behavior of elected officials will be discussed. The conditions that are presented in this chapter will provide some background for the independent variables that will be used for this dissertation’s empirical analysis. This chapter will focus on presidential administrative strategies that have been utilized and modified since Franklin Roosevelt’s Administration. First, more conventional methods, such as budget politics, reorganization, central clearance, and political appointments will be surveyed in order to provide an overview of presidential administration. From there, the discussion will move into the various unilateral devices available to the president, and their key differences. The chapter will conclude with a closer examination of signing statements, specifically, its history and rise under the Reagan Administration as a supplemental administrative tool, and how it bridges the gap between the administrative and rhetorical presidencies. Accordingly, this dissertation’s empirical analysis will begin with President Reagan.

Researching the Presidency Initial research on the presidency followed the traditional approach and focused on the legal and historical development of the institution. Institutionalism centered on formal rules and regulations, standard operating procedures, and how the relationship between the three branches as they interacted within their legal framework. While these early contributions were instrumental in providing a strong foundation and understanding of the office per the Constitution, students of the presidency found this approach lacking because it did not address the more informal dynamics of the political system (Thach 1923; Edwards 1981; Corwin 1984; King 1993; T. Moe 1993; Tatalovich and Engeman 2003). As a response, academic interest shifted to the opposite end of the spectrum, and the behavioral movement focused more on the personal qualities of presidents. According to this approach, the president’s personality and political skills are the primary source for power.

Rather than the Constitution, it was argued that the characteristics of individual presidents defined the institution. Evaluation of individual presidents was based on how well they navigated their political environment. This method is still relatively common among presidency scholars, and contributions have provided unique insights regarding presidential leadership styles (T. Moe 1993; Campbell 1993; Tatalovich and Engeman 2003; Bessette and Tulis 2009; Greenstein 2009). But the traditional and behavioral methods were still lacking in providing answers to questions about the Executive Branch. The current approach to presidential studies, new institutionalism, considers the institution and the individual instead of treating them as mutually exclusive. As a result, the president’s administrative role and efforts merit significant attention from scholars that subscribe to this approach (Burke 2000; Tatalovich and Engeman 2003; Rudalevige 2002, 2009a). New institutionalism is the guiding perspective for this dissertation because of its mixed methods approach and considerable attention to unilateral devices as an institutional phenomenon that has adapted to endogenous and exogenous political forces (Cooper 1997, 2002; Moe and Howell 1999; K. Mayer 2002; Howell 2003; T. Moe 1985, 2009; Pious 2006; Durant and Resh 2010). As such, it broadens the scope of traditional institutionalism by relating how the presidency capitalizes on Article II’s loose framework in order to cooperate with, or work against, the other branches (Zernicke 1994; Howell 2003; T. Moe 2009; Durant 2009b, 2011). By taking into account the constitutionally defined institution and individual presidents, research on unilateral action underscores how each administration has increased executive power within the office’s legal confines (Moe and Howell 1999; K. Mayer 2002; Kelley 2003; Cooper 2005; Barilleaux 2006; Black, Madonna, Owens, and Lynch 2007; Kelley and Marshall 2009; Krutz and Peake 2010). This approach has prompted presidency scholars to call attention to gaps in the literature. Cohen (2009) has argued that rhetoric should be considered part of the institutional presidency because public appeals have developed out of the rational choices made by presidents and become an institutionalized practice (see also Hart 1987; Burke 2000; Kernell 2007; Rottinghaus 2010; Bennett 2012). While unilateralism and presidential rhetoric are not viewed as overtly related, Cohen (2009) argues that both prerogative powers and oratory are the institution’s response to the changing conditions of their working environment.

Likewise, Durant (2009a) has stated that recent work on presidential administration has lacked in adjusting to the new “realities of the political system (90).” In order to advance scholarship in this area, he presents four suggestions. First, Durant (2009a) recommends taking a closer look at the political circumstances which may determine the strategy the White House employs, and if there are changes over time. Second, he says it is unrealistic to assume perfectly coordinated strategies between presidents and political appointees, and that bureaucrats will not try to out-maneuver the president’s efforts (Durant 2009a). Third, he notes that presidential administrative efforts can vary between and within administrations. Therefore, if the president’s policy guidance is ambiguous and does not provide appointees with clear instruction, the Chief Executive cannot effectively direct careerists (Durant 2009a). Finally, new research on the administrative presidency needs to incorporate institutional conflicts between the other branches, the overlapping policy jurisdictions of executive branch agencies, executive communication, and differences between presidential administrations (Durant and Warber 2001; Hart 202; Dickinson 2009; Durant 2009a; Rudalevige 2009a). I argue that a closer examination of the presidents’ use of signing statements as an administrative strategy could advance research as Cohen (2005) and Durant (2009a) suggest because exercising prerogative power and engaging in rhetoric have become standard practices for presidents in their efforts to protect their policy agendas, and reputations (see also Waterman 1989; Howell 2003; Barilleaux 2006; Kelley 2007; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Rudalevige 2009a; Canes-Wrone 2009, 2011; Evans 2011; Korzi 2011; Marshall 2012). The following establishes a foundation for this dissertation’s argument that signing statements, in general, serve as a link between presidential rhetoric and administration.

Redefining the Presidency and Increasing Control over the Executive Branch The contemporary model of the presidency, ushered in by FDR, significantly altered the president’s place within American politics through his broad reading and interpretation of the Constitution. Through presidential rhetoric FDR was able to redefine the institution and elevated the White House’s visibility and public prestige markedly above the other branches (Rossiter 1960; Nathan 1983; Lowi 1985; Edwards 1989; Langston 1995; Skowronek 1993; Burke 2000; Rudalevige 2002; Jones 2005; T. Cook 2005). Overall, his policies, governing style, Congress’s delegation of authority, and advancements in communications technology increased the presence 14 of government in the private sector and in the lives of American citizens. Burke (2000) noted that FDR’s legacy added four new attributes to the office that benefitted his successors, both Democrat and Republican. Since the 32nd president those elected to serve have the opportunity to:  Use “formal and informal power to make self-initiated decisions,”  set the national policy agenda,  add staff to help manage the growing government and increased public demands,  and reinvent the dynamic between the three branches of government (Burke 2000, 2).

These changes are generally highlighted in work that centers on the relationships between the president and Congress, the public, or the media. But these developments have also been instrumental in the expansion of presidential power and affecting how modern era Chief Executives govern (Waterman 1989; Stuckey 1991; Burke 2000; Han 2001, 2005; Jones 2000, 2005; Whitford and Yates 2009). Increased authority and control over executive branch agencies have been pursued since the earliest presidential administrations. Prior to Wilson, the federal bureaucracy was limited, States provided the majority of public services, and the citizenry was not as prone to making lofty assumptions about the power and ability of the White House (Tulis 1987; Langston 1995; Cooper 2002; Hoffman 2010). But with the steady increase in federal government services and subsequent creation of new agencies, high public expectations, and human and temporal limitations have compelled presidents to merge rhetoric and executive administration (Arnold 1998; Light 1995, 1999; Burke 2000; Howell 2003; Fisher 2007b; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010; Pika and Maltese 2010; Genovese 2012). The rhetorical administrative presidency has steadily progressed since Washington but picked up momentum under FDR and thrived under Reagan (T. Moe 1985; Tulis 1987; Howell 2003; Kelley 2003; James 2005; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Kelley and Marshall 2008; Hoffman 2010). A clear outline of this development can be traced to the actions taken following the Brownlow Committee’s (Brownlow, Merriam, and Gulick [1937] 2006) report. Congress conceded that the president’s administrative responsibilities warranted an increase in White House personnel. The Administrative Reorganization Act of 1939 created the Executive Office of the President (EOP), and the White House Office that was staffed with 15 advisers whose loyalties were exclusive to the president. Roosevelt remedied the shortcomings of the legislation with an executive order that transferred control over the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) from the Treasury Department to the White House. His unilateral action also established legislative clearance which is a mandate that all agency legislative requests must pass through the White House before being forwarded to Congress (Barilleaux 1988; Waterman 1989; Light 1999; Burke 2000; Cooper 2002; K. Mayer 2002; Howell 2003, 2005; Pika and Maltese 2010). These moves increased presidential control of the bureaucracy through budget politics, centralized control over legislative proposals, and politicized government personnel (Schick 1981; Barilleaux 1988; Arnold 1998, 1999; Burke 2000; Mikesell 2003; Fisher 2007b; Rubin 2010). From this point forward, presidents continued to accrue significant power over the bureaucracy by relying on both legislative and administrative methods to increase responsiveness, and limit discretion (Nathan 1983; Waterman 1989; Durant and Warber 2001; Barilleaux 2006; Durant 2009b). Despite FDR’s use of prerogative power, legislative means were still the main course of action for presidents seeking to expand their authority over subordinates. But toward the end of Nixon’s first term, administrative strategies became the preferred route to rein in bureaucratic discretion, and circumvent an increasingly adversarial Congress (Nathan 1983; Waterman 1989; Burke 2000; Tatalovich and Engeman 2003). This shift was detailed by Nathan (1983) in case studies which compared Nixon’s and Reagan’s management strategies and their use of political appointments as another way to increase White House control over bureaucratic activities. In his book Nathan (1983) endorsed the politicization of presidential appointees for administrative purposes in order to counter the vast numbers of agencies within the executive branch and potential threat of bureaucrats that might use their post to derail the president’s policy agenda. Through these loyalists the president should, theoretically, be able to extend presidential control over bureaucrats during implementation (Heclo 1977; Nathan 1983; Waterman 1989; Light 1999; Lewis 2008). But political appointees provide no guarantee for presidents that their policy agendas will be faithfully followed and executed. This framework follows the principal-agent theory where elected or appointed officials are the principals and bureaucrats are the agents with a model hierarchical relationship established between the two. The presumption is that agents will follow the orders of the principal due to contractual obligation. But the principal-agent theory also 16 assumes that both parties are rational actors motivated by self-interests. Due to their area expertise and subsequent information asymmetry, agents possess leverage over principals and may use it to affect policy implementation. Another disadvantage for principals is that it is impossible to continuously monitor them or know if they have delegated to the best agents (Nathan 1983; Light 1999; Kettl 1993, 2002; Frederickson and Smith 2003; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Gormley and Balla 2008; Lewis 2008; Whitford and Yates 2009). Adding to the problems associated with executive management, Congress’s propensity to write legislation with ambiguous language enhances bureaucratic decision making power, especially since presidents generally hold on to the notion that federal government careerists are resistant to change and can derail their agenda during implementation. Thus, the motivations and methods presidential administrations have used to continually work around this predicament have been well documented in work on the administrative presidency (Benze 1985; Waterman 1989; Eastland 1992; Wood and Waterman 1994; Arnold 1998; Light 1995, 1999; Moe and Howell 1999; Pfiffner 1999; Cooper 1997, 2002; K. Mayer 2002; Frederickson and Smith 2003; Wood and Waterman 2004; Kernell 2007; Lewis 2008; Edwards 1983, 1989, 1999, 2003; Kelley 2003, 2007; Kelley and Marshall 2008; Kettl 2012).

Traditional Methods of Presidential Administration As Neustadt (1990) astutely observed, “of all the people involved with government action the president is only one of them (xxi, 3).” Roosevelt’s suspicion of the civil service was one of the contributing factors to bureaucratic expansion after the passage of his New Deal policies. New agencies and an influx of new public administrators were a response to the president’s assumption that established agencies and long serving careerists would resist the new programs (Nathan 1983; Hult and Walcott 2004; Lewis 2008). The end result was an executive branch that proved even more difficult to control due to overlapping policy jurisdictions and the high degree of probability that programs would be altered during implementation due to vague legislation (Michaels 1997; Burke 2000; Howell 2003). Ironically, Nathan (1983) wrote that a similar attitude was expressed by Nixon, who resented careerists because they would be unresponsive to his policies due to the organizational culture cultivated during FDR’s administration. As a result, presidential administrations have pursued and refined several management strategies over time to limit bureaucratic discretion and exert more influence over policy actions. 17

The opportunity for presidents to use a variety of administrative devices has been bolstered by Congress’s delegation of authority over policy making and budgeting. By capitalizing on congressional deference and exercising prerogative power, contemporary presidents have been able to strengthen the institution and counter changes in constituency expectations and the political environment (Burke 2000; Kelley 2003, 2006; Cronin and Genovese 2004; Aberbach and Peterson 2005b; Howell 2005; Barilleaux 2006; Marshall and Haney 2010). Through the powers granted by the Constitution, the legislative and unilateral actions taken for executive branch management revolved around the president’s appointment and removal power, budget politics, reorganization, and central clearance (Riley 1987; Barilleaux 1988; Waterman 1989; Golden 2000; Mayer and Weko 2000; Jones 2005). The power of the president to appoint government officials is clearly stated in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution. Currently, there are over 3,000 positions for political appointees, including Cabinet secretaries and their deputies or assistant secretaries, the heads of agencies and regulatory commissions, and attorneys (Waterman 1989; Kettl 2012). Light (1995) has referred to the increase in political appointee positions as the “thickening” of the federal government (7). But even with the numerous positions that have been established to provide the president with additional management muscle, the sheer size has created an additional problem for the administrative presidency. Presidents seeking to limit bureaucratic decision-making since this growth must contend with layers of lower-level, appointed administrators who are often unfamiliar with public sector management and have little or no experience with their agency’s respective policy area. Furthermore, some appointees are relatively removed from the reach of their department or agency superiors. So even when a department or agency’s chief administrator is empowered by close proximity to the president, his or her authority can be muted by layers of lower-level political executives. Plus, even if appointees are recruited, in part or whole, because of their loyalty to the president there is no guarantee that they will follow the White House’s lead or that careerists will follow (Waterman 1989; Nichols 1994; Light 1995; Aberbach and Rockman 1999; Richardson and Pfiffner 1999; Burke 2000; DeSeve 2009; Kettl 2012). Compounding the problems associated with trying to exert administrative control through political appointees is the lengthy appointment process and high turnover rates. Many potential recruits for high-level positions may balk at the intrusive and sometimes very public process. 18

The contentious aspect of political appointments revolves around the understanding that “who you get in government directly affects what you get out of government (Mackenzie 1981, xx).” This sentiment was more succinctly put by Eastland (1992), who wrote that “personnel is policy (189).” However, considering the extensive process of vetting, nominating, and confirmation, the tenure of most presidential appointees is, on average, two years or less. So while appointments are a vital element to the president’s administrative game plan, they may not get their choice confirmed and the high turnover rate undermines policy leadership due to interruptions and inconsistency (Linda Fisher 1987; Richardson and Pfiffner 1999; Lewis 2008; Light 2008; Pika and Maltese 2010; Kettl 2012). Removal power is another way in which the president can control agency decision- making through personnel. While not an explicitly granted power of the president, the right to remove political executives is accepted due to the precedent set by Washington. It was argued that in order for presidents to be held accountable for the execution of the law and performance of the executive branch, they needed to have the power to remove appointed subordinates (Thach 1923; Nichols 1994; Bessette and Schmidt 2009). The institutionalization of this authority has afforded presidents the ability to remove civil servants that are not covered under the merit system and replace them with personnel who are expected to demonstrate administrative loyalty to the Oval Office. Removal power was eventually supported legislatively with the passage of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, which created the Senior Executive Service (SES). This level of bureaucrat is not protected under the civil service merit system, operates under the authority of presidential appointees, and can be subject to transfers or demotions. However, such actions could be costly to the White House. Even with the power to remove, transfer, or demote appointees of members of the SES doing so could result in negative press and instigate bureaucratic resistance or the withholding of administrative support of expert knowledge (Heclo 1977; Nathan 1983; Waterman 1989; Fisher 2007a; Kettl 2012). Budget politics and central clearance are also ways in which the president can attempt to wrest control from executive branch subordinates. These strategies are considered to among the institution’s greatest advantages (Nathan 1983; Barilleaux 1988; Waterman 1989; Hult and Walcott 2004; Lewis and Moe 2010). Schick (1981) and Rubin’s (2010) work on the politicization of the federal budget outlines how it is used as a means for presidents to achieve policy goals at all levels of government. When Congress delegated the duty of submitting a 19 budget proposal to the Executive Branch, legislators also gave presidents the power to set the appropriations agenda for policies they considered most important. This development is notable with respect to executive branch management because even though Congress controls the federal government’s purse, it rarely strays far from the president’s proposals (Mikesell 2003; Simpson, Nowlan, and O’Shaughnessy 2011; Kettl 1993, 2012). As Riley (1987) states, “agencies need money” and presidents will support the requests of their department executives provided those requests align with presidential priorities (47). Additional control over departments and agencies’ funding and discretion is found in the centralized authority of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Located in the Executive Office of the President (EOP), this office develops the president’s budget proposal, reviews and approves legislative recommendations to Congress, and coordinates and develops programs (Barilleaux 1988; Waterman 1989; Golden 2000; Warshaw 2000). The Reagan Administration has been noted as a prime example for political administration by exercising budget politics and centralizing legislative and administrative tools in order to control spending and reduce the size and efforts of federal government bureaucracies that did not conform to his political and policy agenda (Schick 1981; Newland 1983; Caiden 1984; Riley 1987; Golden 2000; Rudalevige 2002; Rubin 2010). Reorganization of federal bureaucracies can also give the president leverage in affecting bureaucratic responsiveness. Decentralized agencies that have exclusive jurisdiction over a policy area are less susceptible to presidential control than agencies centralized under the authority of a larger department. This is due to the authority that is held by the department head and increased intra-departmental pressure and competition within the bureaucratic organization (Denton and Hahn 1986; Waterman 1989; Wood and Waterman 1994; Light 1995; Michaels 1997). As Kettl (2012) notes, organizational structure is political and reorganization is a way to control which policy issues are at the front of the agenda and a signal of presidential priorities. Agencies can either be placed under departments that will provide support or suffer under ones that do not. Reorganization can also have implications for an agency’s budget prospects depending on how important its mission is to the success of the department. However, reorganization efforts can meet resistance from Congress and interest groups representing constituent groups that could have services reduced as a result of relocation. Thus, this strategy could require a well-planned public relations effort to support any controversial 20 reorganization endeavors. For example, the Nixon Administration formulated a strong media strategy so that the president could use the press in order to gain public support for, and eventually succeed at, reorganizing the Post Office (Nathan 1983; Burke 2000; Rudalevige 2002; Pious 2008; Kettl 2012). But presidential concerns over policy implementation may be less out of malice and more out of necessity. Due to the ambiguous language used by Congress in writing new legislation, bureaucrats are sometimes forced to exercise discretion when enacting new policy (Jones 1984; Benze 1985; Pika and Maltese 2010; Weimer and Vining 2011). So the president must find ways to wrestle discretionary power away from agencies in order to increase the odds that implementation will conform to their preferences (Warshaw 2000; Hedge 2009; Berry 2009). This typically is pursued by utilizing several management strategies that have been developed over several presidential administrations. Some have been modified to meet the demands of the modern office, some have increased in scope, and others have been strengthened over time. But which strategies are chosen and how they are used to support the president’s agenda can vary within and between Chief Executives, especially since unilateral actions and the previously mentioned administrative strategies have their own particular strengths and weaknesses. This reality provides motivation for presidents to seek additional tools that will reinforce initial administrative actions (Schick 1981; Nathan 1983; Caiden 1984; Waterman 1989; Arnold 1999; Aberbach and Rockman 1999; Burke 2000; Cooper 2002; K. Mayer 2002; Rudalevige 2002; Howell 2003; Pika and Maltese 2010).

Tools and Talk In The Federalist Papers Hamilton ([1788], 1982) presented several reasons for the Executive Branch to be led by a strong, unitary executive rather than a committee. Through essays dedicated to the practice of public administration he argued that a unitary executive would provide “energy” to the office and promotes “good government (Hamilton [1788] 1982, 426).” In Federalist No. 70, Hamilton ([1788], 1982) presented unity as synonymous with accountability, and with a central figure executive branch subordinates would have clarity on administrative authority (Hamilton [1788] 1982, 426; see also Eastland 1992; Kettl 2002). Eventually, the Founder’s crafted an Executive Branch that intentionally afforded the institution

21 the flexibility and adaptability that were deemed necessary by Hamilton ([1788], 1982) (see also Moe and Howell 1999; Kettl 2002; Tatalovich and Engeman 2003; Pika and Maltese 2010). Due to “the ambiguity of the governing structure” and scholarship that quantitatively showed an increase in “unilateral action by presidents,” Moe and Howell (1999, 852, 854) developed a theory of unilateral action to explain why presidents have sought to expand the institution’s powers beyond those explicitly granted by the Constitution. It also shifts presidential theory away from Neustadt’s (1960) framework based on an individual president’s personal skill at persuasion back to the institution. Unilateralism suggests that presidents are able to conceive and exploit based on the constitutional design of the office (Moe and Howell 1999, Howell 2003). As such, unilateral actions have been taken by presidents since Washington (Cooper 1997, 2002; Moe and Howell 1999; K. Mayer 2002; Howell 2003; Fisher 2007a). But the Constitution provides presidents with advantages based on the design of the other two branches which also invites them to employ unilateral actions. Institutionally, Congress is at a disadvantage because it has “collective action problems” due to bicameralism and multiple members who represent diverse regions and constituencies (Lewis and Moe 2010, 375). The Supreme Court is limited because it was designed to react to challenges within the system after the fact. Since the presidency is occupied by a unitary executive the institution has the luxuries of swift decision making and the exercise of prerogative power. Presidents base their actions to incrementally increase the institution’s power on the restrictions, and expected reactions of the other two branches (Mayhew, 1974; Moe and Howell, 1999; Howell 2003; Magill 2007; Kelley and Marshall 2010). Even with numerous means for unilateral governing, each tool serves a different purpose, speaks to different audiences, and varies in visibility and legal authority. Cooper (1997) outlined “presidential power tools” as a way to undermine or control other institutions and protect or increase their power within their respective political circumstances (530). The president’s “toolbox” includes executive orders, memoranda, proclamations, national security directives, and signing statements (Cooper 1997, 531). While each varies in strength and weaknesses, all have been developed through precedent and practice as avenues to centralize the president’s control over policy (Cooper 1997, 2002; Howell 2003; Barilleaux 2006; Kelley 2006; Waterman 2009; Pika and Maltese 2010). Under the banners of unilateralism or unilateral power these tools have become mainstays of the presidency due to its vague constitutional framework and weak checks 22 on executive power by the other institutions (Moe and Howell 1993; Cooper 1997, 2002; K. Mayer 2002; Howell 2003; Marshall and Haney 2010). Executive orders (E.O.) are the most visible and widely known unilateral tool. This type of presidential directive instructs that an action be carried out by executive branch subordinates. Such action can include implementing policy according to the order, ceasing or altering implementation, or assuming authority related to implementation. Since President Grant, executive orders are issued according to a codified format and, because of the executive authority granted to the president through Article II, carry the force of law (Cooper 1997, 2002; K. Mayer 2002; Howell 2003). Proclamations are issued to gain the attention of groups or individuals that work outside of government. While early administrations used them as policy tools, recent administrations primarily issue proclamations when they want to recognize individual citizens, organizations, or nations. Replacing them are memoranda, which are generally internal communications between executive branch officials. This tool has been viewed as a less formal version of an executive order because it is not required to be published or numbered (Cooper 1997, 2002; K. Mayer 2002; Howell 2003). National security directives and executive agreements are ways in which the president can affect foreign policy matters without Congress. National security directives are given to official government departments or agencies involved with national security and foreign policy. This type of unilateral device is similar to executive orders but directives are not bound by the Federal Register Act and are typically filed as classified. Executive agreements also allow presidents to take unilateral action on foreign policy matters. These tools are used by presidents as an alternative to treaties which require the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. This action is taken when a president and a foreign nation commit to an agreement on policy issues such as trade or the environment (Cooper 2002; Howell 2003; Fisher 2007a). Signing statements are issued when the president signs a bill into law. But this method of presidential unilateralism is adaptable and has been used by presidents to reach government officials, and the general public. As such, this unilateral tool can be used to promote a president’s achievements or laud the accomplishments of others, such as members of Congress or private citizens. They can also be used to direct, guide, or recognize the role of bureaucrats, interpret vague or unconstitutional provisions, or convey a president’s expectations and priorities 23 prior to implementation. But unlike E.O.s, signing statements do not carry the force of law. However, since 1986, this device has been published in the Federal Register and included in the legislative history of new statutes (Teifer 1994; May 1998; Cooper 2002; Kelley 2003; Howell 2003; Magill 2007; Kelley and Marshall 2010). Of all the Chief Executive’s unilateral strategies, signing statements have been one of the most inconspicuous and, until recently, have not been extensively researched by presidency scholars. This is partially due to the large shadow cast by executive orders and the generally held belief that signing statements are utilized for congenial political gestures or as way for presidents to draw attention to their policy agenda (Fisher 2007a; Pfiffner 2009a; Kelley and Marshall 2010). However, this assumption has been slowly chipped away by recent scholarship and the controversy surrounding its use by George W. Bush. Accordingly, signing statements are now gaining recognition as a formidable addition to the president’s list “power tools” that helps them affect public policy administratively rather than legislatively (Cooper 1997, 529, 2005; Kelley 2003, 2007; Magill 2007; Pfiffner 2008; Berry 2009; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010; Conley 2011; Marshall 2012). While signing statements were evolving, the public was becoming more accepting of the rhetorical appeals by the nation’s leader. But this political development came at a high cost and is paid by the individuals occupying the Oval Office. As going public became less taboo, the expectations and demands Americans placed on the president rose (Lowi 1985; Tulis 1987; Langston 1995; Howell 2003). This change to the nation’s political environment has resulted in voters cultivating a distorted understanding of the nation’s governing system and the media devoting most of its attention on the White House at the expense of coverage on the federal government’s other institutions (Langston 1995; T. Cook 2005; Jones 2005; Healy 2008). Additionally, the nation’s political parties have been weakened by electoral reforms, resulting in a candidate-centered campaign. Congressional members are now motivated to consider their individual re-election needs over their parties’, making it difficult for recent presidents to build coalitions with their party members in the legislative branch. Conversely, party polarization within the government has made legislative bargaining more contentious and difficult. The problem is compounded by a powerful national media, which has become a political institution in its own right. The press’s current style of reporting frames compromise between elected officials as a sign of political weakness rather than sound governance (Cater 24

1959; Fiorina 2001; Patterson 1994, 2003; Edwards 2003; Barilleaux and Rozell 2004; T. Cook 2005; Sinclair 2006; Kernell 2007; Caesar 1979, 2009). Administratively, there are more agencies and personnel to manage and increasingly more complex issues on the national policy agenda (Benze 1985; Pfiffner 1999; Pika and Maltese 2010). Combined, these factors create a working environment fraught with political landmines that has encouraged modern era presidents to respond through a variety of unilateral and rhetorical strategies (Tulis 1987; Nathan 1983; Lowi 1985; Hart 1987; Moe and Howell 1999; Cooper 2002; Rudalevige 2002; Kumar 2003; Howell 2005; Jones 2005; Barilleaux 2006; Kernell 2007; Lewis 2008; Canes-Wrone 2009; Cohen 2010; Graber 2010; Stonecash 2011). Instead of relying on one strategy, presidents have responded to the current environment by utilizing a combination of strategies. This includes issuing signing statements along with appeals to the public through well-orchestrated communications or media events (Nathan 1983; Maltese 1992; Moe and Howell 1999; Cooper 2002; Rudalevige 2002; Howell 2005; Jones 2005). By embracing multiple administrative strategies in conjunction with rhetorical appeals presidents have a better chance at protecting the institution and their respective policy goals (Nathan 1983; Waterman 1989; Burke 2000; Golden 2000; Cooper 2002; Howell 2003; Kelley 2007; Lewis 2008). Thus, the theory of unilateralism is defined by two characteristics. First, unlike Congress, the president can act quickly because he alone makes the final decision on what path to take. Secondly, the president can base his decision on how the other two branches may react, however, since Congress is hobbled by the costs associated with coordinating support to take action against the president and the Supreme Court must wait until a case is presented to them, the odds fall in favor of the president. Research has shown that Congress is selective in its battles to curtail presidential power and the courts are typically deferential (Rossiter 1960; Sorenson 1963; Lowi 1985; Langston 1995; Kagan 2001; Kelley 2003; Howell 2003; Magill 2007; Kelley and Marshall 2010; Pika and Maltese 2010). Since Hamilton ([1788] 1982) voiced support for a unitary executive for the sake of administrative simplicity, the presidency has evolved considerably, and going public and unilateral action have been added to the president’s arsenal. These strategies bolster the institution, both politically and administratively, keeping the presidency at the center of the American political system (Tulis 1987; Moe and Howell 1999; K. Mayer 2002; Jones 2005; 25

Kernell 2007; Dunn Tenpas 2010). Thus, unilateral tools are supplements to other tactics that presidents have developed to influence policy through executive action rather than the legislative process. Overall, signing statements that feature mentions of federal agencies and symbolic or directive language can reinforce presidential strategies designed to provide more control over the executive branch (Nathan 1983; Waterman 1989; Dellinger 1993; Kagan 2001; Howell 2003; Magill 2007; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Kelley and Marshall 2008). Due to its institutional advantages, more partisan political environment, and greater public expectations, modern presidents have engaged in developing administrative strategies that can affect public policy long after negotiations with Congress end (Barilleaux 1988; Kagan 2001; Cooper 2002; K. Mayer, 2002; Kelley and Marshall 2008). Beginning with Washington, presidents have initiated prerogative power based on the “Take Care Clause” and the “oath clause” and established a range of the aforementioned tools to help exercise their claims on authority. But for the purposes of this dissertation the focus will be solely on signing statements (Cooper 2002; Howell 2003; Fisher 2007b; Barilleaux and Kelley 2010, 3; Kelley 2010). Previous efforts have explored the effect presidential rhetoric has had on bureaucratic action and responsiveness and has presented evidence that the president can influence his subordinates’ activities by commenting on policy (Wood and Waterman 1984; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006, 2008; Garrett, Thurber, Fritschler, and Rosenbloom 2006; Whitford and Yates 2009). Increasingly, Congress has noticed and taken issue with the regularity and position of presidential signing statements. Specifically, the points of contention are the constitutional challenges noted by the president and the reinterpretation of provisions that could alter how policies are understood by bureaucrats and ultimately implemented. To counteract the presidential use of unilateral tools Congress has mobilized the GAO to report on the effectiveness of signing statements, continued to include provisions with legislative vetoes even after the INS v. Chadha (1983) ruling, and individual members have publicly announced their institution’s grievances concerning presidential power (Liptak 2006; Eggen 2007; Fisher 2007b; Weisman 2007; Hulse 2007; Pfiffner 2008; Savage 2008; Marshall 2012). Other than side-stepping Congress and securing policy initiatives, signing statements can also be used to buttress other administrative strategies, such as political appointments, especially within lower-level or independent agencies. Nathan (1983) emphasized the importance of lower- level appointees have in facilitating executive branch management because they are involved 26 with the actual execution of new policy. Due to their position within the hierarchy, sub-Cabinet posts provide a link between the White House and careerists. But this can put lower-level political appointees in a tenuous position as an administrator because their leadership may be questioned. Or they may gravitate away from the president’s agenda and toward their respective organization’s culture. Nonetheless, by notifying political appointees of the Administration’s priorities through signing statements, the president could increase his leverage over sub-Cabinet executives and their responsiveness to the White House (Heclo 1977; Eastland 1992; Light 1999; Golden 2000; Warshaw 2000; Lewis 2008; Aberbach and Rockman 2009; Barilleaux 2010). By addressing what is expected of departments and agencies, the president has the potential to unilaterally limit bureaucratic discretion, especially since they are included in the new law’s legislative history for reference (Kagan 2001; Cooper 2002; Magill 2007; Korzi 2011).

The Evolution of Signing Statements In writing about the president’s duty to execute the law after serving as the 27th president, William Howard Taft (1925) observed that in order for bureaucratic subordinates to properly implement a new law they must have a clear understanding of its provisions. He declared that while Congress was free to “make the laws of the country” it is the president who holds the right to “construe them (Taft 1925, 78).” Taft also wrote that the presidential communication regarding policy implementation was “one of the greatest executive powers” and, unless the courts are called upon to decide the meaning of a statute, “Executive interpretation is final (Taft 1925, 78-79).” Signing statements provide a forum for “executive interpretation” because they offer a spoken or written comment by the president that is attached to legislation signed it into law (Taft 1925, 79; Kelley 2003). But unlike executive orders, this unilateral device lacks any legal authority so bureaucrats are not required to follow the president’s reading of the statute (Cooper 1997, 2002; Kelley 2003; Kelley and Marshall 2010). Signing statements were also a relatively late addition to the Chief Executive’s toolbox. The first president to issue a signing statement was Monroe, but this device was used sparingly until Truman. Then, during the Ford and Carter presidencies, its use gained momentum (May 1998; Kagan 2001; Kelley 2003, 2007; Conley 2011). During Reagan’s second term, the untapped potential of signing statements was formally recognized by White House advisers (Tarr 1985; May 1998; Kelley 2003, 2006). 27

In a memo, Reagan’s Acting Assistant Attorney General Ralph Tarr (1985) listed three reasons why signing statements should be considered an administrative tool. In his correspondence with the White House, Tarr (1985) pointed out that executive branch agencies rely on remarks made by the president in order to understand his policy preferences or as justification for their own interpretation of a statute. Due to their characteristics, signing statements could help the president manage the executive branch by narrowing his subordinates’ search for comments prior to policy execution (Tarr 1985). Tarr (1985) also stated that formal documentation of the president’s construal could be referred to by judges when the court is called upon to rule on public policy. The third advantage is that the president can also use signing statements to communicate with the legislative branch and apprise them of how the law will be executed (Tarr 1985). In 1993, the benefit and legitimacy of signing statements was echoed in a memo written by Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger. He added to the initial points made by Reagan advisors by noting that signing statements provide another way in which the president can communicate with the public, and “interested constituencies (Dellinger 1993, 1).” Dellinger (1993) pointed out that the remarks made prior to signing legislation are a direct line of communication from the president that can inform supporters about aspects of a bill that conforms to, or deviates from, the administration’s stated agenda. Both memos, drafted on behalf of a Republican and a Democrat, support a president’s right to advise executive branch subordinates in fulfilling their statutory requirements, including direct orders for them to ignore provisions the president deems unconstitutional (Tarr 1985; Dellinger 1993). From the White House’s perspective, extra-constitutional tools, such as signing statements, are a way to defend the president’s interests and adapt to ever-changing political conditions and government growth. But in order for the president to develop innovative approaches to management he needs to understand bureaucratic culture and organizational function, which some have lamented is a key failure of presidents (T. Moe 1993; Light 1999; Lowery 2000; Durant and Warber 2001). Consideration of these variables has been recommended when developing administrative strategies and could be a step in improving the managerial aspects of signing statements (Cronin 1980; T. Moe 1991; Cronin and Genovese 2004).

However, there is some evidence the White House did consider bureaucratic culture in its efforts to develop what was considered an “underutilized” instrument “of Presidential management (Tarr 1985, 6).” In documents circulated during the Reagan and Clinton Administrations, presidential advisers acknowledged the importance of executive agency participation in drafting “language that is acceptable to all (USDA 1984; Tarr 1985, 1; Forsgren 1996).” In outlining the decision making process, Tarr’s (1985) memo notes that signing statements are typically issued after an agency notifies the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) of an issue with an enrolled bill prior to its presentation to the president. However, as the president’s adviser he recommended a more formal method of communication in which agencies would provide a written list of isolated provisions that could trigger potential problems related to implementation or that violate the law. A more defined, uniform procedure would also give presidents and their staffs more time to decide and execute the proper response (Tarr 1985).6 Kelley’s (2003, 2007) work called attention to the institutionalization of administrative communications which made it easier for presidents to respond to ever changing political conditions. He reminds scholars that the Reagan Administration’s chief motivating factor for pushing signing statements to become part of a bill’s legislative history was to increase the institution’s influence over the actions of current and future federal bureaucrats (Kelley 2003). This is partially due to a key advantage of signing statements - its timing. This unilateral move is employed when the president signs a bill into law, prior to any bureaucratic action, and at a time when attention to new policy implementation is highest (Mayer and Weko 2000; Kmiec 2001; Magill 2007; Pfiffner 2008; Whitford and Yates 2009). Thus, by institutionalizing signing statements it has become a focal point for presidential direction. As a result, the White House has increased the potential for bureaucratic responsiveness to the president’s agenda and decreased bureaucratic discretion by formalizing the interpretation of new policy (Kagan 2001; Cooper 2002, 2005; Kelley 2003, 2007; Magill 2007; Pfiffner 2008). Communicating through signing statements also conveys to executive branch subordinates that the president’s administrative rhetoric can be used to justify the actions taken during policy implementation (Campbell and Jamieson 2008). This position was legitimized

6 Alito (1986) outlined a proposal for an official procedure regarding the decision making process for issuing a signing statement. Part of the strategy relied on using departments closer and more loyal to the president during the initial phase in order to increase compliance from other departments and agencies in the future. 29 when the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the institution’s claim to interpret policy. In its decision on Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council (1984) regarding the execution of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, the court affirmed that when Congress passes vaguely written legislation executive branch bureaucrats are forced to take action based on their interpretation. After the ruling, Reagan advisers claimed that, as head of the executive branch, it was within the Chief Executive’s authority to direct bureaucratic discretion (Kagan 2001; Kelley 2003, 2007; Magill 2007; Hedge 2009; Pfiffner 2009a; Conley 2011). Overall, Article II bestows executive authority on the president, along with one of the most important elements of administrative strategy, the power of appointment (U.S. Constitution 1788; Nathan 1983). Through this power presidents can appoint political loyalists to key positions within the bureaucracy in an attempt to ensure compliance. However, there are other methods available to help the president manage the executive branch. In order to maximize management efforts, presidents have been advised to use a combination of tactics in order to fulfill their executive role. This includes communicating with subordinates through unilateral devices (Nathan 1983; Tulis 1987; Waterman 1989; Eastland 1992; Light 1999; Burke 2000; Cooper 2005; Lewis 2008; Pika and Maltese 2010; Rudalevige 2002, 2009a, 2010b).

Summary Presidency scholars agree that controlling the federal bureaucracy is one of the most difficult tasks facing any president. As such, presidents must be creative in communicating their policy goals to those entrusted with implementation (Rossiter 1960; Cronin 1980; Pfiffner 1999; Warshaw 2000; Lewis 2008). Golden (2000) noted that presidents have become increasingly vocal about their frustration with the federal bureaucracy since the 1980s. So it is easy to understand why presidents and their advisors would strive to formulate new ways to centralize policy decisions. Until recently, the administrative strategy that caught the attention of most presidential scholars was political appointments following Nathan’s (1983) seminal contribution in this area. This area of research focused on the president’s ability to maintain or increase administrative influence over federal departments by entrusting Cabinet or sub-Cabinet executives with a certain amount of control (Waterman 1989; Pfiffner 1999; Daynes and Sussman 1996; Lewis 2008). But political appointees cannot provide presidents with strong assurances that the 30 execution of policy will follow their wishes (Neustadt 1960; Heclo 1977; Light 1999; Patterson and Pfiffner 2001; Lewis 2008; Pika and Maltese 2010; Dickinson 2011). Signing statements can supplement executive management strategies by providing presidents with the ability to communicate unilaterally. Plus, its flexible nature allows the White House to adapt a signing statement’s administrative rhetoric to political or institutional challenges faced by a president (Kelley and Marshall 2010; Evans 2011). Based on a federal government that employs thousands of civil servants, increasing public demands, and a dynamic political environment I argue that the White House utilizes signing statements in order to close the gap between the rhetorical and administrative presidencies (Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Canes- Wrone 2009, 26; Cohen 2009; Durant 2009a; Whitford and Yates 2009). Mentions of specific agencies during a bill signing may be structured for symbolic public governing purposes that benefit the president, and bureaucrats (Vermeer 2008). By highlighting an agency’s role in the legislative process the president’s rhetoric can share his success with bureaus and simultaneously display governing leadership to the public (Waterman, Wright, and St. Clair 1999; Van de Walle, Kampen, and Bouckaert 2005; Kelley 2007; Kernell 2007; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Kelley and Marshall 2010; Conley 2011; Korzi 2011). However, as part of their constant struggle with Congress for administrative control, presidents may choose to structure signing statement language to centralize policy decisions, direct attention to certain requirements or provisions, or interpret legislation. In some cases the president may become more forceful and use this platform to order subordinates to perform tasks not included in the legislation. The president’s command may simply instruct administrators to draft legislation that amends the bill he is signing, or he can use his signing statement to correct provisions identified as violating constitutional principles by directing bureaucrats to ignore a provision (Cooper 2002, 2005; Kelley 2007; Pfiffner 2008, 2009a; Barilleaux 2012). The medium chosen as the most appropriate by the White House also supports the position that signing statements can be viewed accommodating the president in his concurrent efforts to inform constituents and manage the executive branch (Moe and Howell 1999; West 2006; Kelley 2007; Durant 2009a; Kelley and Marshall 2010; Korzi 2011). Signing statements can be delivered during signing ceremonies in order to attract attention from the national press and public. In order to narrow the president’s communication, signing statements are published in the Federal Register, and since 1986, attached to the legislative history of bills signed into law 31 by the president. The reasons these developments were pursued by the Reagan Administration was to encourage responsiveness by making signing statements easily accessible for bureaucrats looking for policy guidance, and also as a way to communicate with the public (Tarr 1985; Dellinger 1993; Herz 1994; Kelley 2003; Elwood 2007; Korzi 2011). No matter the intent or format of a signing statement, the timing of this unilateral device acts as leverage against the president’s competing principles (Cooper 2002; Magill 2007; Medhurst 2007; Fine and Waterman 2008; Kelley and Marshall 2010). However, it is imperative that the president clearly communicates administrative guidance so that federal civil servants will be persuaded to follow his executive leadership (Nathan 1983; Waterman 1989; Neustadt 1960, 1990). This point was has been stressed in the literature on public policy. Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) defined policy implementation as “connecting actions to objectives (xxi).” But the transition from decision making, which is embodied in a statute, to executing the law in a manner that is consistent with the decision makers’ ideals is an increasingly difficult task. Policy issues are defined and redefined, the growing number of federal agencies has overlapping jurisdictions, and there can be conflicting interpretations among administrators (Bardach 1977; Jones 1984; Stone 2002; Whitford and Yates 2009; Weimer and Vining 2011). Whether they are using signing statements to communicate with the public or bureaucrats, presidential administrative rhetoric should not be as abstruse as the legislation that provoked the Oval Office to engage in unilateral action (Waterman 1989; Neustadt 1960, 1990; Cooper 2005; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Durant 2009b; Whitford and Yates 2009; McCarthy 2010). Politicians, in general, have been charged with viewing agencies as “convenient tools” that can be used to fulfill their policy agendas and campaign promises (Jones 1998; Richardson and Pfiffner 1999, 189). The pressure to successfully achieve policy goals are compounded by the president’s need to deal with the size, scope, and organizational complexity of the executive branch; competition from Congress; and exceedingly high public expectations (Benze 1985, 770; Lowi 1985; Langston 1995; Jones 2005). But rather than resist direction, Pika and Maltese (2010) state that department leaders look to the president for policy guidance and cooperation and support from their staff to carry out objectives. Because of this and the threat of “bureaucratic inertia,” which refers to the difficulty in altering an agency’s standard operating procedures once it begins to implement a new policy, presidents need administrative strategies 32 that can quickly make their preferences known (Cooper 2002; Calabresi and Lev 2006; Magill 2007; Lewis and Moe 2010; Pika and Maltese 2010, 253). Signing statements centralize policy guidance under presidential authority and can increase bureaucratic responsiveness, particularly after the Reagan Administration took the initiative to have them published in the Federal Register and attached to legislative histories (May 1998; Neustadt 1960, 1990; Kagan 2001; Kelley 2003; Cooper 2002, 2005; Eshbaugh-Soha 2008; Whitford and Yates 2009). Overall, by building on previous research on the rhetorical and administrative presidencies the results of this dissertation should contribute to an institutional development that also falls under theories based on unilateralism, the context of presidential rhetoric, and signaling (Nathan 1983; Tulis 1987; Waterman 1989; Wood and Waterman 1994; Shull and Garland 1995; Moe and Howell 1999; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Kernell 2007; Whitford and Yates 2009; Cohen 2010). However, this effort has a more narrow focus on the dominant tone of the president’s administrative signals and when variation occurs. By concentrating only on the policy remarks delivered through bill signing statements this research effort will provide results that provide a more detailed look at administrative rhetoric and presidential leadership.

Chapter 2 The Administrative and Rhetorical Presidencies, Executive Management Strategies, and Signing Statements

The purpose of this chapter is to review two separate presidential strategies: administrative and rhetorical. Presidents have used various types of administrative and rhetorical strategies in order to meet the challenges of the office and advance their public policy agendas (Nathan 1983; Tulis 1987; Barilleaux 1988; Waterman 1989; Cooper 1997, 2002; Golden 2000; Howell 2003; Rudalevige 2005a; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2009, 2010; Hoffman 2010; Rottinghaus 2010). By detailing these two presidential strategies and previous research in these areas, this chapter will demonstrate their eventual convergence. Based on the literature, and the work of this dissertation, I conclude by proposing that the overlap is strong enough for research to begin considering the Rhetorical Administrative Presidency (Wood and Waterman 1994; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006, 2008; Durant 2009a; Rudalevige 2009a; Whitford and Yates 2009; Hoffman 2010).

The Administrative Presidency Clinton Rossiter (1960) stated that the biggest obstacle for presidents to overcome in reaching their policy objectives is not Congress, it is the federal bureaucracy. He goes on to assert that the president fails to match the influence of Congress and organized interest groups, in attempts to manage the bureaucracy during policy implementation (Rossiter 1960). Frustration over the inability to trump competitors for control during execution has been articulated across presidential administrations, and is a hurdle for both Democrats and Republicans (Nathan 1983; Benze 1985; Warshaw 1997; Burke 2000; Durant 2009b). Indeed, the administrative presidency is a significant topic in the presidency literature and is devoted to research on the institution’s various management strategies. These plans for executive leadership are designed, and utilized by presidents and their advisors in order to increase bureaucratic responsiveness to administration policy agendas (Nathan 1983; Waterman 1989; Wood and Waterman 1994; Golden 2000; Lewis 2008; Durant 2009b). While the office has been presented as skeptical about subordinate loyalty, the abolishment of the spoils system presidents has fostered an even deeper distrust of the federal 34 bureaucracy. Suspicions directed toward careerists are a continuous pattern in the Oval Office, mainly because most civil servants pre-date newly elected presidents and are adopted by the incoming administration. Career civil servants are also subject to distrust because they continue to operate policy programs long after the president has left office. This is noted as especially true for modern presidents, particularly Nixon, who bemoaned that he was saddled with bureaucrats who supported New Deal and Great Society programs. As a result, he doubted that the federal government’s career civil servants had the ability to transfer their loyalty to a Republican administration (Nathan 1983; Pfiffner 1988; Michaels 1997; Burke 2000; DiClerico 2013). Aggravating the relationship is the bureaucracy’s longstanding reputation as being unable or unwilling to resolve coordination problems associated with large staffs, competition for resources, and jurisdiction. Elected officials also assume that civil servants are unwilling to comply with changes to organizational procedure and resistant to accepting additional responsibilities (Heclo 1977; Nathan 1983; Light 1995; Fisher 1998; Kettl 2002, 2012). Nathan (1975, 1983) first proposed the administrative presidency in his work comparing the management strategies of Nixon and Reagan. He outlined how Chief Executives could, and should, pursue policy goals through administrative strategies rather than fight through the legislative process (Nathan 1983). According to the guidelines of this management approach, presidents should politicize the bureaucracy through budgeting, reorganization, personnel reassignment and, most importantly, by appointing political and personal loyalists into key positions. By utilizing a combination of these administrative tools to centralize control under the White House, Nathan (1983) states that presidents can increase their power to influence the actions of the executive branch and limit bureaucratic discretion. Consequentially these maneuvers increase the president’s accountability for programmatic success or failure (Nathan 1983; see also Arnold 1999; Cooper 2002). But with the shift toward strategic administrative approaches presidency scholars note that modern presidents still do not possess enough power and authority to guarantee compliance from subordinates (Wood and Waterman 1994; Arnold 1999; Light 1999; Cooper 2002; Weingast 2005; Whitford 2005; Krause 2009; Rudalevige 2009b; Waterman 1989, 2009). But responsiveness to the president is not impeded exclusively, if at all, by obstinate careerists. Jones (1984) states that one of the biggest challenges bureaucrats face during the implementation phase are conflicting interpretations of statues directed at them from the 35 competing institutions. For the bureaucrats assigned the task of implementing new policy, overlapping communication makes it difficult to determine how they should proceed (Edwards 1980; Jones 1984). Contradictory administrative directions can occur because modern era presidents are frequently faced with the condition of divided government which may work to impede executive branch actions as well as the increased public accountability for policy outcomes faced by all elected officials (Edwards 1989; Edwards and Wood 1999; Sinclair 2006; Evans 2011). Congressional members may clash with the president and cause administrative interference in their writing of legislation, by communicating inconsistent expectations during hearings, and through the institution’s control over appropriations (Fisher 1998; Kelley and Marshall 2010; MacDonald 2010). Given the degree of hostility the president may encounter from the legislative branch, White House management of the federal bureaucracy regularly features a blend of legislative and administrative methods (Nathan 1983; Moe and Howell 1999; Howell 2003; Rudalevige 2009b; Kelley and Marshall 2010). The planning of administrative strategies is necessary even though Article II of the Constitution clearly states in the first line that “executive power shall be vested in a president” because it does not provide a model for presidential administration (U.S. Const. Article II, Section 1 1788; Heclo 1977; Nathan 1983; Burke 2000; Jones 2005; Pious 2008). Nonetheless, the label of “executive” denotes the president’s “power to execute the laws and this requires an administrative role (Cronin 1980; Warshaw 2000, 26).” Barilleaux (2006) notes that the Constitution’s vague structuring of the institution incentivizes presidents to continually increase the means to execute their duties, at least to the point where their creativity will not provoke the other branches to take issue. Part of this creativity is dedicated to defending executive power and molding public policy. In an attempt to protect their policy agendas, presidents have tried to harness the growing executive branch by measures such as increasing White House staff through the creation of the Executive Office of the President (EOP) and nominating political appointees who are chosen because their loyalty to the president. Personnel administrative strategies are accepted practice with the expectation that the assignment of stalwarts will help the president supervise and monitor the activities of the federal bureaucracy (Nathan 1983; Pfiffner 1988, 1994; Warshaw 2000; Gormley and Balla 2008; Lewis 2008). However, Rudalevige (2009a) expressed doubts about this tactic because politicizing the “wider bureaucracy” can be costly if Congress or 36 interest groups oppose an appointment (17). Therefore, the political cost may not be worth the effort since the placement of loyalists cannot guarantee responsiveness to the president’s policy preferences, simply because of the impossibility of supervising every step that is taken, at every level, and by all the agents involved in administering public policy (Rudalevige 2009a). Instead, after a bill becomes law, presidents have the option to make changes with additional legislation or through less costly administrative tactics (Nathan 1983; Waterman 1989; Pfiffner 2009a; Rudalevige 2009a). Unilateral action may be a better option because the president may face less resistance from other political actors or the public, and documented policy guidance may be a more efficient and effective was to influence subordinates. As such, signing statements are one such way to guard the president against Congress and provide lasting executive power over the bureaucracy (Light 1995; Kagan 2001; Cooper 2002, 2005; Kelley 2003, 2007; Magill 2007; Kelley and Marshall 2008).

The Rhetorical Presidency The development of the rhetorical presidency and “going public” has altered the citizenry’s understanding of the political system created by the Constitution, the roles the respective role and responsibilities of the institutions, and what constitutes good governance (Tulis 1987; Langston 1995; Jones 2005; Kernell 2007, 1). Once the practice of presidential public appeals was accepted by the citizenry, the assumption that the presidency is the most powerful branch soon followed. This belief has been perpetuated among citizens who now perceive the presidency as a person, not an institution. In judging the office by the individual serving as president, the mass public overestimates presidential power and authority to respond to demands and expects the other two branches, especially Congress, to follow the president’s lead. This notion is reinforced by the media, political socialization, and even the presidents themselves (Cronin 1974; Lowi 1985; Tulis 1987; Langston 1995; Jones 2005; Kernell 2007; Healy 2008, 2012). The foremost source of the presidency’s mutation and subsequent reliance on rhetorical appeals is Woodrow Wilson, who viewed the Constitution as a living document whose reinterpretation should parallel changes occurring within the republic (Tulis 1987; Jones 2005). In his essay The Public Presidency, Wilson ([1908] 2011, 48) states that as the nation and its government has become more “complex” the president was forced to become “much more” than 37 a Chief Magistrate (47). The academic turned executive claimed that political and societal changes made it necessary for the president to emerge as the “national voice” of all American citizens and leader of his political party (Wilson [1908] 2011, 48; Tulis 1987). Interestingly, Wilson ([1908] 2011) mentioned that individual presidents can choose or refuse the title of national political leader. If a president accepts this role and can succeed at winning “the admiration and confidence of the country,” he can be the most powerful force in the political system and possess the capacity to mold the nation and its ideals (Wilson [1908] 2011, 48). As a tradeoff, Wilson’s ([1908] 2011) version of the presidency requires a reduced role as executive administrator so that more time can be devoted to ideological leadership. While presidents since Wilson have devoted more energy to rhetoric and polling to interpret what the people want or at least want to hear, there is still a high premium placed on the administrative duties of the office (Nathan 1983; Eastland 1992; Burke 2000; Korzi 2003; Lewis 2008; B.H. Patterson 2008; Waterman 1989, 2009). The rhetorical aspects of signing statements are generally viewed as a way for the president to generate political or public support, call attention to the efforts of a president’s administration, rebuke opponents, or communicate with the bureaucracy (Cooper 1997; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Pfiffner 2009a; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010; Korzi 2011). But where other types of rhetorical appeal, such as the State of the Union, where the president makes an overarching attempt to reach a diverse national audience, the rhetoric of signing statements can be narrowly focused and delivered for the benefit of an intended audience (Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Cohen 2010). By issuing a statement prior to signing legislation, a president can inform constituent groups that they are leading the government in a manner consistent with their campaign promises (Kelley 2003; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Kelley and Marshall 2008). Eshbaugh-Soha (2006) specifically refers to presidential policy rhetoric as “signaling” and was informed by an agency director that the president can affect bureaucratic responsiveness through public speeches (49). But a dilemma faced by the rhetorical presidency is the lasting effect of their comments. Research suggests that after rhetorical appeals fade and the public turns its attention to other issues, so do bureaucrats. Consequently, the lack of saliency can affect long term bureaucratic responsiveness to the president’s policy goals (Hart 1987; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006, 2008; Whitford and Yates 2009). Therefore, it was an important step by the Reagan Administration to connect 38 the president’s words to something more enduring and legitimate in order to maintain an agency’s attentiveness to his policy agenda (Meese 1985; Calabresi 1986; Dellinger 1993; Eshbaugh-Soha 2005; Waterman 2009).7 By issuing signing statements at the very beginning of the policy process presidents can use language that best suits their policy and political goals. This includes using presidential rhetoric to interpret vaguely written provisions, or order subordinates to violate the conditions of a provision based on their executive authority (Kagan 2001; Magill 2007; Pfiffner 2009a; Kelley and Marshall 2010). The Reagan Administration refined Nixon’s approach to appointment strategies and methodically laid the groundwork to build the signing statement’s profile and influence. Their effort to centralize the president’s administrative authority and strengthen the institution’s cache of unilateral weapons was bolstered by the Supreme Court in 1984 (Kelley 2003; Calabresi and Lev 2006). Chevron USA v. Natural Resource Defense Council (1984) challenged bureaucratic interpretation of the Clean Air Act of 1977. The Court’s decision held that if Congress provided clear guidelines regarding policy implementation, then agencies were bound to follow them. However, if statutory language was ambiguous public administrators were within their authority to exercise discretion, and during judicial review courts should accept their interpretation as “reasonable (Chevron USA v. Natural Resource Defense Council 1984, II; Herz 1994; Calabresi and Lev 2006, 7; Kelley and Marshall 2010).” After the Chevron opinion and debate among advisers, the Reagan Administration concluded that signing statements could be used to communicate the president’s interpretation of statutes. By developing this approach to executive branch management communications the administration viewed signing statements as an effective way to guide bureaucratic decision making (Nathan 1983; Kagan 2001; Kelley 2003, 2007). Thus, signing statements could serve as a supplementary administrative strategy and influence bureaucratic action where others, like political appointments, fall short. In order to draw attention to signing statements and the logic behind their use, Attorney General Ed Meese announced at a meeting of the National Press Club in 1986 that the White House had reached an agreement with the West Publishing Company to have presidential signing

7 According to Kelley (2003), the use of signing statements, especially those classified as “rhetorical,” gained momentum during the Ford and Carter administrations. However, this dissertation begins its analysis with Reagan due to that administration’s activities regarding the institutionalization of signing statements. 39 statements included into the legislative history section of the United States Code Congressional and Administrative News (Kelley 2006). The argument was that this would make the president’s comments more accessible to the courts during judicial review. But another motivating factor was to send a signal to executive branch subordinates that they would be held accountable if they deviated from the president’s construal of the law (Kelley 2006). Additionally, Reagan’s team incorporated references to signing statements in speeches, legal briefs, and law review articles in order to increase the “legal community’s awareness” of them and counter the influence congressional reports may have on court decisions (Crib 1985, 1; Kagan 2001; Kelley 2003, 2007; Kelley and Marshall 2008). In addition to being openly accessible through the Federal Register, the public presentation of signing statements occurs when they are issued during a bill’s signing ceremony. Scholars have noted that the effects of unilateral “institutional acts,” such as signing statements and proclamations, can be emphasized when coupled with public presentation (Yenerall 2006, 134; Pfiffner 2008). Thus, presidents can use them to try and influence the public’s perception of the policy process. Through carefully crafted language, signing statements can provide an avenue for presidents to showcase governing leadership, especially when specific federal bureaucracies are mentioned (Groseclose and McCarty 2001; Kelley and Marshall 2007, 2008; Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2011). The public nature of a president’s signing statement rhetoric is empirically supported by research that suggests a connection between unilateral action and rhetorical strategies (Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010). Additional analysis has shown that when the president issues a signing statement, legislation is three times more likely to gain national prime time television news coverage (Kelley, Marshall, and Watts 2011). The increased use of the media to promote the president is not a new phenomenon. FDR and Nixon were both exceptionally skilled in understanding that the press was invested in news emanating from the White House. By staging events that worked within the industry’s time constraints, presidents could use the media’s needs to promote their policy agendas (Maltese 1992; Kurtz 1998; T. Cook 2005; Kernell 2007; Crouch and Maltese 2008). When considering rhetoric and judging how it can be more effective in presidential governance, Waterman (1989) and Eshbaugh-Soha (2005, 2006) both remind scholars of Neustadt’s (1960, 1990) five elements for successful presidential communication. In order to 40 maximize rhetorical influence and persuade others to comply, especially in administrative matters, a Chief Executive’s message should meet the following criteria: 1) Make it clear that the order has come from the president. 2) Presidents need to be clear in their statements on what action should be taken. 3) The president needs to use publicity, and the associated pressure, in order increase awareness that an order has been given and help secure compliance. 4) Whoever is receiving the order must have the capacity to carry out the given task. 5) The president needs to be perceived as within their right to call for an action to be taken.

Nathan (1983) contributes to this prescription when he asserts that truly effective presidential signals must be noteworthy. Signing statements satisfy these requirements because they are messages coming directly from the president and, with a few exceptions, are published with the president’s name at the end.8 Also the president is typically clear on which department or agency has his attention and why. The presidential rhetoric in signing statements that communicates administrative information generally provides specific aspects of the bill and responsibilities of the bureaucracy. Finally, while only a few are delivered during a ceremony, this type of unilateral communication is a public record the president’s remarks and its consumption is open for any interested parties through the Federal Registrar, and it is attached to a bill’s legislative history (Cooper 2002; Campbell and Yates 2008). Considering the potentially high costs of politicizing the bureaucracy, signing statements give the president a unilateral alternative that meets the rhetorical and administrative demands of the office (Rudalevige 2009b).

The Politics of Administrative Strategies and Shift toward Rhetoric Due to the noted changes and nature of the Executive Branch and new developments within the American political system, the administrative strategies of the president have been forced to adapt. Durant and Warber (2001) observed that the president now operates within a

8 Not all of the presidential remarks catalogued by the Federal Register feature this detail, such as Radio Addresses or ceremonial observances. A few of Reagan’s earliest signing statements were published in the Federal Register without his name. 41

“neo-administrative state,” and scholarship on the administrative presidency is primed for “second generation” research (237). The neo-administrative state is presented as a product of an expansive executive branch with decentralized authority where bureaucratic discretion is limited due to numerous influences from government officials, interest groups, and contracted partnerships with private sector and non-profit organizations (Peters 1996; Durant 1998; Kettl 2000; Aberbach and Peterson 2005a, 2005b; Campbell 2005; Berry and Wilcox 2007). The emergence of this new environment has created additional management obstacles for presidents. One problem is political appointees that are recruited for their loyalty rather than managerial skills and are unfamiliar with their respective department’s mission. Furthermore, appointees typically only remain in their position for no more than two years so presidents must deal with high turnover rates (Heclo 1977; Durant and Warber 2001; Lewis 2008; Light 2008). Another hurdle for the Chief Executive is living up to the high expectations of the public and the national media that have incrementally increased with each administration. Not only do presidents have the duty to execute the law; they must also establish and preserve a public image of administrative competence and control. As such, this new circumstance is one of the reasons given to explain why recent presidents have increasingly fused rhetoric and campaign-style governing with their administrative role (Langston 1995; Jones 1998; Waterman et al. 1999; Durant and Warber 2001; Lim 2002; Howell 2003; T. Cook 2005; Jones 1998, 2005; Kernell 2007; Rottinghaus 2010; Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2011). Signing statements fit within the new context of a public administrative presidency because they frequently mention executive branch agencies, are direct comments from the president, increase the media’s coverage of new legislation especially if delivered at a ceremony, and can be included for reference in the bill’s legislative history. Furthermore, they are one of many unilateral tools but can be more appealing because presidents can modify the language and issue them publically or privately depending on political circumstances or needs. This includes demonstrating leadership while providing policy direction for bureaucrats who are frequently faced with vaguely written policies (Kelley 2003, 2007; Rudalevige 2009a, 2009b; Kelley and Marshall 2010; Kelley, Marshall, and Watts 2011; Conley 2011). Finally, signing statements have been viewed by some as adding to the transparency of presidential administration because they are filed and accessible through the Federal Register, are familiar to the public through

42 signing ceremonies, and can contribute to public policy discourse (Cass and Strauss 2007; Korzi 2011; Barilleaux 2012). Recent work has recommended that future studies on the administrative presidency revise academia’s understanding of what is required for successful modern era presidents. Additionally, scholars are advised to reassess what tools are available and how various tools help presidents achieve their goals (Durant and Warber 2001; Durant 2009b; Rudalevige 2009a; Cohen 2010; Rottinghaus 2010). This dissertation builds on these suggestions to provide a more comprehensive understanding of signing statements in this new era of the administrative presidency by quantifying how bureaucracy-centered rhetoric within signing statements has been used as an administrative and public relations device since the Reagan Administration. This assessment will include variables typically associated with presidential strategies, such as divided government, election years, and the differences between individual presidents’ governing preferences (Cooper 2002, 2005; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2009; Berry 2009; Greenstein 2009; Rice 2010; Evans 2011). A qualitative analysis of how presidents have used signing statements will assess its effectiveness as a way to limit bureaucratic discretion, bolster compliance through a public demonstration of presidential authority, or enhance their leadership image.

Administrative Communication As an elected official and head of the Executive Branch, the president is the nation’s chief public administrator (Taft 1925; Rossiter 1960; Cohen 1997; Jones 2005; Thurber 2009). White ([1926] 2006) defined public administration as “the execution of the public business” but acknowledged that this task is subject to ever changing political and societal influences (52). Simon (1997) expanded the theoretical definition of administration to include decision making and argued that the process of decision making is the central characteristic of administration. To prompt a better understanding of administrative strategies, Simon (1997) shifted the field’s focus from organizational design to “the processes of decision as well as with the processes of action (1).” He also redefined organization as “the pattern of communications and relations among a group of human beings, including the processes for making and implementing decisions (Simon 1997, 18-19).”

This dissertation supports Simon’s (1997) views on public administration simply because presidents need to decide how they want a policy to be implemented and then select the best method of communication in order to affect execution. The characteristics of signing statements make them a viable choice for transmitting the president’s policy decisions. This type of messaging can target specific agents and inform them of what the president expects during implementation with the hope that they will receive his message and act accordingly (Jones 1984; Kagan 2001; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Kelley 2007; Magill 2007; Durant 2009b; Korzi 2011). Building on Simon ([1945], 1997) and others, Dorsey (1957) expanded on the role of communication in the administrative process (Deutsch 1951; Easton 1953).9 Essentially, he states that decisions are based on information transmitted through individual or bureaucratic communication. Since the primary characteristic of administering policy is the decision-making process, then it can also be classified as “a communication process (Dorsey 1957, 310).” Following this outline he advocated for research to “consider patterns of communication” because rhetorical strategies can be modified over time and codified so subordinates will anticipate direction and where it can be found (Dorsey 1957, 311). Dorsey (1957) also stated that the institutionalization of communication strategies can help centralize and legitimize executive authority (see also Feldman and March 1981; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Rodman 2009; Cohen 2010). Signing statements follow these patterns because this tool has been used with increasing regularity since FDR to communicate policy decisions. This unilateral tool has also been adapted to reflect the individual presidents’ interpretation of the office and the tactics developed by their advisers. For example, George W. Bush’s steadfast invocation of the unitary executive theory was a mainstay argument in most of his signing statements’ administrative communications (Kelley 2003; Conley 2011). However, Kelley (2003) states that the unitary executive theory was not exclusive to the Bush II presidency. During the Ford and Carter administrations, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) increasingly recommended that the president sign legislation despite White House reservations.10 Instead, presidents would issue a bill signing statement declaring the executive branch’s refusal to implement a provision because it

9 Simon’s Administrative Behavior was first published in 1945. The fourth and final edition was published in 1997. 10 Kelley (2003) found that Ford issued 130 signing statements during his time as president and Carter a total of 247. 44 was unconstitutional. Essentially, this type of signing statement rhetoric was employed in order to protect the presidency’s institutional power and either constrain or protect bureaucratic discretion (Kelley 2003; Evans 2011). But this type of rhetoric is just one of the ways in which presidents can use signing statements for administrative communication. While many developments regarding signing statements began with presidents prior to Reagan, it was during his two terms in office that actions were taken to actively increase widespread awareness of signing statements. Specifically, the Reagan Administration successfully managed to obtain central locations in order to increase accessibility by securing publication in the Federal Registrar and its attachment to a bill’s legislative history in 1986 (May 1998; Kelley 2003; Cooper 2002, 2005; Pfiffner 2008; Barilleaux and Kelley 2010; Beasley 2010; Genovese 2010; Conley 2011). Finally, because they are published as an official record and have faced little substantive counter action by the other branches, signing statements remain a powerful unilateral device to expand and preserve presidential power (May 1998, Kagan 2001; Howell 2003; Kelley 2003; Cooper 2005; Fisher 2007a; Berry 2009; Marshall and Haney 2010). Once the politics of the policy process move beyond negotiations and the decision is made for the bill to become law it is assumed that a “shift” occurs from “politics to administration,” but Jones (1984) states that this view oversimplifies the process (164). In reality, politics will extend into the administration of a new policy because elected officials are accountable to the public, and accountability is linked to decision making discretion during the execution phase (Hart 1987; Neustadt 1960, 1990; Kagan 2001; Cooper 2002; Howell 2003; Jones 2005; Rudalevige 2009a; Whitford and Yates 2009; Evans 2011). While the passage of legislation may signify agreement for government action, remaining disagreements over administrative decision making may later become an issue particularly after congressional elections, because legislation passed prior to Election Day may not reflect the ideological makeup of the newly elected members (Bardach 1977; Jones 1984; Popkin 1991; Howell 2003). As such, the veil of politics is always looming, especially since the president is also the only nationally elected representative but must balance this role with consideration of an ideological base (Jacobs 2005; Whitford and Yates 2009; Ellis 2012). Ultimately, both decision making and execution hinge on effective communication (Neustadt 1960; Denton and Hahn 1986; Waterman 1989). Given their position of authority, 45 executive administrators, in this case the president, are required to make decisions followed by instructions that outline their programmatic expectations. So there is ample motivation for presidents to seek a variety of ways in which to inform subordinates about policy preferences and implementation protocol. But a president’s communication strategies also need to consider the characteristics of his target audience, and their directions need to be clear and accessible in order to maximize responsiveness (Matthews and Stimson 1975; Feldman and March 1981; Jones 1984; Rockman 1984; Denton and Hahn 1986; Simon 1997; Zarefsky 2004; Eshbaugh- Soha 2008; Lewis and Moe 2010). This is especially true since, due to the bureaucratic agents’ place and purpose in the political system, several actors compete with the president for attention and deference (Wood and Waterman 1993; Stehr 1997; West 2006; Lewis and Moe 2010).11 Signing statements fall under the category of presidential administrative rhetoric even though they are written as part of a joint effort between the White House, presidential legal advisers, executive branch departments or agencies, and speechwriters. This holds true simply because there are multiple contributors to other types of presidential rhetoric (Kelley 2003; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Conley 2011). Signing statements are also supported as form of presidential administrative communication because comments become part of an official public record, and the president assumes responsibility for subsequent policy actions (Sorensen 1963; Campbell and Jamieson 2008). But unlike many other forms of presidential rhetoric, this unilateral communication device can convey to bureaucratic subordinates, through symbolic or substantive rhetoric, a president’s decision about new policy as it is signed into law and prior to any bureaucratic action (Kelley 2007; Magill 2007; Evans 2011).

The Blurring of Presidential Rhetoric and Administration Presidential rhetoric has been presented as a relatively continual trend, incrementally building with each administration and advancements in communication technology. The focus of this area has primarily been on the increase of rhetorical appeals, framing, and the role of the mass media (Tulis 1987; Jamieson 1988; Zernicke 1994; Lim 2002; T. Cook 2005; Kinder and Nelson 2005; Kernell 2007; Cohen 2008). As such, “going public” and making broad, national speeches that are widely publicized are considered standard practice for contemporary presidents

11 The clarity of the president’s communication through signing statements and bureaucratic responsiveness are discussed more in-depth in Chapter 5 with a brief review of the GAO’s (2007a, 2007b, 2008) reports to Congress. 46

(Tulis 1987; Langston 1995; Kumar 2003; Kernell 2007, 1). However, the political arena is not static and neither are presidential rhetorical strategies. Recent contributions to this area have noted that presidents are adapting this strategy due to the changes in the political environment, such as advancements in media technology, increased mediation of their messages, and decreased news coverage (Cohen 2008; 2010; Crouch and Maltese 2008; Graber 2010; Domke, Graham, Coe, John, and Coopman 2011; Bennett 2012). Lim (2002) outlined five distinct changes to the content of presidential rhetoric from Washington to Clinton. Overall, modern era presidential rhetoric uses simple language, alludes to ideals, exudes presidential courage, is structured around the public’s needs, and is delivered in a candid, “conversational” manner (Lim 2002, 346; see also Jamieson 1988; Jamieson and Waldman 2003). While Lim’s (2002) article does not identify specific contributing factors, he states that the reasons behind the uniform shift in public, rhetorical strategies are more complex than what has been presented in the literature. In urging scholars to reconsider how rhetorical appeals are defined, he also recommends that “context” should be included in future evaluations (Lim 2002, 347). The change in setting is central to Cohen’s (2010) recent work on the rhetorical presidency. In his context theory of presidential leadership, Cohen (2010) states that presidential leadership conforms to “their policy objectives” and “opportunities (12).” He also notes that there are numerous ways in which a president can go public, narrow rhetoric to a discrete audience, and exercise leadership (Cohen 2010). While presidents still engage in public appeals and use rhetoric to demonstrate leadership, they have altered the staging of their speeches in order to reach specific audiences (Cohen 2010). In Going Local, Cohen’s (2010) results suggest that presidents have decreased efforts to attract the national media and communicate with the mass public in favor of local news outlets and select groups. This rhetorical approach allows presidents to deliver messages through more amiable channels and with greater assurance that key supporters will hear them (Cohen 2010). But in adapting their communication efforts, presidents still need to deliver clear messages and be cognizant of their political environment (Cohen 2010). Cohen (2010) concludes that by focusing public rhetoric to more confined groups a president can gain support and increase the effects of presidential leadership. Similarly, Bimber (2011) has posited that not only has the “structure of information” changed but also its “distribution,” which can vary depending on the situation (9). Since 47 bureaucratic agencies represent and are involved in numerous aspects of American politics and public policy their mention by the president can reasonably be interpreted as deliberate especially when one also considers the attention to detail the White House Communications staff gives to any public or publicly available messages from the president (Maltese 1992; Zaller 1992; Kumar 2000, 2001, 2003; Crouch and Maltese 2008; Graber 2010; Bimber 2011). As such, I argue that the evolution of signing statements is a testament to the way in which presidents have adjusted their administrative strategies to new contexts and have narrowed rhetoric depending on their policy objectives (Cohen 2010; see also Cooper 2005, 517; Rottinghaus 2010). But policy rhetoric is not exclusive to the negotiations between Congress and presidents. In the policy process the “final” phases are adoption, when a bill is passed into law, and implementation, which is the continuous process of executing the law until it is modified or terminated (Jones 1984; Weimer and Vining 2011).12 Once a policy has been signed into law Weimer and Vining (2011) note that the most popular follow-up strategy is the use of rhetoric in order to gain public and media attention. By issuing publicized comments, political actors can express their interpretation of a law with the hope of influencing its execution. Because policies are “rarely self-executing” departments or agencies sift through documented comments from competing principles for guidance (Edwards 1980, 1; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006, 2008; Whitford and Yates 2009). At this stage the timing and accessibility of policy direction are important because they can determine which principal gets noticed (Jones 1984; Denton and Hahn 1986; B.D. Jones 1994; Kingdon 2003; Medhurst 1996, 2007). Signing statements are issued prior to signing a bill and give the president the opportunity to be the first principal to deliver guidelines to the agencies tasked with implementation. Whether they are delivered during a staged ceremony or privately, subordinates do not need to comb through news reports or other sources for presidential comments because signing statements are readily available (Kelley 2003; Cooper 2005; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Kelley 2007; Magill 2007; Whitford and Yates 2009; Cohen 2010). For these reasons signing statements could focus the bureaucracy’s immediate attention on the president’s interpretation (Cooper 2005; Magill 2007; Kelley 2007).

12 Quotations added by author for emphasis. 48

But rhetoric designed to address the White House’s administrative concerns is not limited to encroachments by Congress or difficulties of managing a growing executive branch. Recent presidential administrations also needed to consider the expectations the public placed on them to lead the government and solve national problems. Part of conforming to what citizens expect from their president includes the task of frequently informing them of steps the administration has taken and/or accomplishments (Langston 1995; Yenerall 2006; Kernell 2007; Rottinghaus 2010). For this type of messaging departments or agencies can be used as symbols in signing statements to emphasize a president’s evaluation of a bill or serve as a signal to important constituents that they have been faithful to their campaign agenda. References to certain bureaucratic organizations can also be used to try and instigate the public into pressuring Congress for further legislative action. By narrowing the target audience and molding the substance of a message, this form of political communication can supply key supporters, other political officials, and, especially, bureaucratic subordinates with information (Bennett and Manheim 2006; Kelley 2007; Cohen 2010; Rottinghaus 2010; Evans, Marshall, Kelley, and Watts 2012; Marshall 2012). The progression toward public administrative rhetoric is outlined by Arnold (1999) who pinpoints three eras of presidential management. The first era, focused on the supervision of an expanding state that began with the New Deal. Because of new programs and increased public accountability for the administration of the state, FDR took legislative and unilateral actions to centralize executive branch management. The second era, ushered in during the 1960s, is characterized by the presidency becoming firmly linked to the public’s assessment of government services and function. This phase added public-oriented political considerations to the administrative presidency. The third era started with Carter, and finds presidents trying to manage big government in a time of populist anger (Arnold 1999). In this era he states that administrative action required “public justification” because of electoral considerations and growing voter concerns over government spending and expansion (Arnold 1999, 224; see also Hart 1987). The third era has endured, and presidents are expected to address the public and inform voters on activities related to managing the federal government. As such, this political condition has provided ample motivation for the substantial increase in rhetorical administrative leadership, some of which directed a decidedly negative tone toward the bureaucracy. Following 49

Carter and after campaigning on promises to reduce government waste and size, the Reagan Administration formed the Grace Commission to report on government spending and potential reorganization. However, it has been noted that the Grace Commission offered very little in substantive reform and was primarily a way to support the president’s rhetorical claims of an out of control bureaucracy (Pious 1979; Levine 1986; Hart 1987; Arnold 1999; Goodsell 2004; Kettl 2002, 2012). Reagan’s successors also created commissions, made public pronouncements regarding reorganization and reforms in order to holster the federal bureaucracy, and announced plans to improve the delivery of public services as a way to demonstrate effective administrative leadership. One of the most recognized efforts is Clinton’s “reinventing Government” which was launched at a White House press conference during the signing ceremony for the Government Performance and Results Act (Clinton 1993a, 1310). It was announced that Vice- President Gore was selected by the president to lead the National Performance Review (NPR) and produce a report that evaluated ways the administration could improve government function. Combined, these moves were publically promoted as part of the newly elected administration’s effort to make federal government more responsive, and convey presidential leadership (Clinton 1993a; Warshaw 1997; Burke 2000; R. Moe 2003; Kettl 2002, 2012). By the end of the 1990s, the overly public nature of presidential management strategies was a common topic in presidential studies. Taking particular notice of the Clinton Administration, Jones (1998, 2000), Arnold (1999) and others stated that the administrative presidency evolved into something new (Waterman et al. 1999; Durant and Warber 2001; Canes- Wrone 2009; Durant 2009a). The main characteristic of this manner of governing is that presidents work to remain the central figure throughout the policy process. Terms such as “campaign-style governing” or “the permanent campaign” is used interchangeably but both describe the practice in which presidents publically promotes their policy agenda through strategically crafted rhetoric (Heclo 2000, 1; Jones 2005, 135). This type of communication finds modern era presidents leading through the American politics version of show-and-tell (Blumenthal 1980; Tulis 1987; Jones 1998; Heclo 2000; Jones 2000; Kernell 2007; Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2011).13 Public governing is attributed to several factors

13 Emphasis added by author. 50 beyond lofty public expectations, such as increased tensions between the Legislative and Executive Branches, party polarization, weakened party loyalty among voters, and powerful interest groups (Arnold 1999; Heclo 2000; Jones 2000; T. Patterson 2003; T. Cook 2005; Kernell 2007; Rottinghaus 2010; Domke, Graham, Coe, John, and Coopman 2011; Bennett 2012). Beyond the challenges related to formal management efforts, modern presidents have adapted their rhetoric and administrative tools to meet the elevated expectations of voters who expect them to harness what is generally accepted as one of the ills of federal government - an out of control bureaucracy. As a way to satisfy, or at least appear to satisfy, these demands campaign-style governing has emerged in recent years, and presidents often stage events where they can expound on their efforts and accomplishments (Waterman, Wright, and St. Clair 1999; C. Cook 2002; Cronin and Genovese 2004; Jones 2005; Garrett, Thurber, Fritschler, and Rosenbloom 2006; Gormley and Balla 2008). Since the Reagan Administration, signing statements have become an important element in the institution’s administrative and rhetorical evolution (Kelley 2003, 2007; Magill 2007; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Korzi 2011). The purpose of the rhetorical appeals and campaign-style governing is to gain support for their policy agenda, maintain a president’s image and popularity, and increase their overall leadership status. Consequently, civil public negotiations and debates between officials have been reduced, as have the public’s understanding of issues and their government (Tulis 1987; Jones 2005). According to the literature, the merging of campaign strategies and governing is most harmful when it results in actions or policies that lack in substance but are actively promoted as testaments of presidential leadership and power (Tulis 1987; Heclo 2000; T. Cook 2005; Jones 2000, 2005; Kernell 2007). While this approach to leading the nation has been building over the years, the credit for its institutionalization as a continuous process has been awarded to the Clinton administration (Tulis 1996; Arnold 1999; Edwards 1999; Heclo 2000; Jones 2000; Ornstein and Mann 2000; C. Cook 2002). Besides the ways in which campaign-style governing can distort the relationship between Congress, the president, and the nation another aspect of public governance has been identified by presidency scholars (Arnold 1998, 1999; Korzi 2011). Arnold’s (1998, 1999) evaluation of Clinton determined that by adapting the actions of Carter and Reagan, he and his advisers discovered a way to combine administration and political objectives. According to Arnold (1999), this was accomplished through the “reinvention” of government and the eventual 51 publication of the task force report, From Red Tape to Results (232). Academics have expressed lukewarm to negative opinions and analyses of President Clinton reorienting the public sector to adopt private sector ideals and equating citizens with private-industry customers (Goodsell 1993; R. Moe 1994; Kliman and Fisher 1995; Rubin 1996; Fry and Raadschelders 2008; Durant 2009b; Kettl 2002, 2012). However, this approach was well received by voters, in part because the report featured language that was tailored for public consumption, and it helped to publically promote Clinton’s effectiveness as president because he reiterated his understanding of the frustrations Americans have with government. This was accompanied by the president publically announcing the actions his administration had taken too address the issue (Arnold 1998; 1999; Kurtz 1998; Lowery 2000). Through political savvy and understanding that the public viewed the bureaucracy as out of control and irresponsible, the Clinton Administration set out to reform the public sector under private sector principles. This strategy was successful because the president’s rhetoric featured recognizable agencies and allowed the agencies some control in the reform process. The reorganization benefitted from the president and vice-president making repeated public statements about the administration’s success in reducing the size of government and improving public services. During the course of National Performance Review (NPR) administrative reforms Clinton was able to demonstrate the governing leadership that was demanded by citizens and attempt to claim some managerial authority over the federal bureaucracy (Arnold 1998, 1999; Kettl 2002; Van de Walle, Kampen, and Bouckaert 2005; Durant 2006; Pika and Maltese 2010). In step with campaign-style governing, Clinton fused the administrative presidency through presentation and the opportunity for political rewards. Through frequent public statements that featured his administration’s “reinvention” of government “this approach to government had the attractive quality of justifying government’s importance while attacking its conduct (National Performance Review 1993; Kurtz 1998; Arnold 1999, 226; Jones 2000; J. Mayer 2004).” But in order to reap the benefits of administrative success, Clinton and Gore had to get the attention of the nation, which was accomplished through public statements peppered with administration themed rhetoric (Arnold 1999; Kettl 2002; Pika and Maltese 2010). My initial readings of Clinton’s signing statements reveal numerous references to the NPR that support Arnold’s (1998, 1999) assessment of Clinton’s public-oriented approach to the 52 administrative presidency. The noted blurring of presidential rhetoric and administration has also been supported with recent empirical evidence. Upon concluding research on the utility of going public as a way to guide policy implementation, Eshbaugh-Soha (2005) claimed that a president’s rhetorical signals are a “one- time event” whose effects are fleeting (726). This limitation is due to various factors that characterize today’s political arena. One, presidents eventually turn their attention to other policy areas and modify the content of their public statements accordingly. Two, the strength of the signal depends on the responsiveness or role of Congress and other forces that can compete with the president’s message. But the president’s tone can also work against him during attempts to use rhetoric to advance the unitary executive’s role and authority as chief administrator (Eshbaugh-Soha 2005, 2006, 2008). Bureaucratic subordinates may become intentionally unresponsive or work against the president’s position if policy rhetoric negatively portrays executive branch agents (Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; see also Pious 1979; Wood and Waterman 1994; Golden 2000). Eshabaugh-Soha’s (2006) analysis on presidential speech and civil rights, environmental, and farm policies reported that issue saliency and complexity can affect the responsiveness of bureaucrats and the president’s tone of communication. The more an issue had captured the attention of the public and the media, the more responsive bureaucrats were to the president’s rhetorical signals. However, as issues and the implementation process grew more complex the less responsive federal government employees were to the president. Furthermore, Eshbaugh- Soha’s (2006) study found that bureaucratic responsiveness increased when the president’s comments were more supportive of an agency and recognized their contributions. Whitford and Yates (2003, 2009) empirically presented links between presidential statements and policy administration. They found evidence suggesting that when the president publically expressed implementation expectations the enforcement of drug laws changed accordingly. When the president highlighted enforcement, the number of arrests made by federal law enforcement officers and the number of cases pursued by U.S. Attorneys increased (Whitford and Yates 2009). In the end, like Eshbaugh-Soha (2005, 2006), they also found that as the president’s speeches moved on to other policy issues, the number of prosecutions declined (Whitford and Yates 2003, 2009).

Together these studies demonstrate that two seemingly diverse aspects of the presidency, administration and public rhetoric, increasingly overlap. The research also shows that these two areas are not just overlapping, but that presidents can be successful when they choose to engage in rhetorical administrative strategies (Eshbaugh-Soha 2005, 2006, 2008; Whitford and Yates 2003, 2009). Unfortunately for presidents expecting long-term success, research suggests that the positive impact of administrative rhetoric is fleeting (Eshbaugh-Soha 2005, 2006, 2008; Whitford and Yates 2003, 2009). However, in researching signing statements, government documents offer evidence that suggests differently. What makes this form of presidential administrative rhetoric different from other types of public policy speeches is that signing statements become part of the bill’s legislative history for continued reference, and both written and verbal signing statements are public record (Kagan 2001; Kelley 2003; Cooper 2005; Eshbaugh-Soha 2005; Korzi 2011).14 These characteristics may give signing statements an edge over policy comments made by elected officials that are only documented in press reports. Chapter 5 presents evidence to support this claim but the following example offers a preliminary glance and illustrates how a president’s signing statement rhetoric can be perpetuated.15 In 1996, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) issued a formal summary on the Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1993 and cited President Clinton’s interpretation of specific terms used in the bill that were noted at the signing ceremony. The office also published the guidelines in the Federal Register and directed bureaucrats to the bill’s legislative history and the Office of Special Counsel for further “guidance (Clinton 1993b; OPM 1996, 35088).”16 As this example suggests, a signing statement may provide the president with an opportunity to skew administrative influence in their favor long after its delivery (Tarr 1985; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 1982, 1993, 2005; OPM 1996; GAO 2007a, 2007b, 2008; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 255; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2009).

14 Not all signing statements that are issued only through verbal communication are included in the legislative history. However, an initial search through LexisNexis’s database has yielded results showing that some of these statements have been mentioned or included in a bill’s legislative history. 15 Additional examples supporting my position will be presented in Chapter 5. 16 By quoting Clinton’s (1993b) ceremonial remarks, and directing agents to the legislative history the memo directly and indirectly exposes bureaucrats to the president’s signing statement. 54

Signing Statement Rhetoric as Policy Guidance The benefits of using signing statements for image building or agency management are numerous since the president can use language that targets specific department heads or agencies. Additionally, signing statements allow presidents to act unilaterally and lift their messages above the noise of competing voices. It is also a strategy that is formally documented which can protect presidential rhetoric from being filtered by other actors, like the press, or taken out of context (Downs 1967; Dessayer 1990; Kagan 2001; Kelley 2007; Magill 2007; Durant 2009b; Marlowe 2012). But this form of presidential communication can also speak to the public about the merits or shortcomings of a bill, administration’s role, and any provisions the president disagrees with or will seek to change. In this respect, signing statements could signal interest groups to mobilize and pressure congressional members to respond. Presidential advisers have also admitted that signing statements are intended to provide the courts with a record of a president’s interpretation of law in the event regulatory rules or implementation practices are challenged (Tarr 1985). If a president’s words influence the court his policy direction could have an additional path to effect policy, even after he leaves office (Tarr 1985; Dellinger 1993; Kagan 2001; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Cooper 2005; Kelley 2003, 2007; Kelley and Marshall 2008; Korzi 2011). Overall, this unilateral tool is uniquely advantageous because it provides presidents with the first (of many) stances on the administration of new policy and helps guard the institution’s power (Jones 1984; Dessayer 1990; Kagan 2001; Zarefsky 2004; Barilleaux 2006; Kelley 2007; Magill 2007; Durant 2009b; Rudalevige 2009a; Kelley and Marshall 2010; Marshall 2012). Moreover, due to their flexible nature, the White House can modify the tone of the president’s administrative rhetoric depending on political and legislative needs. Previous work has divided signing statements into two categories, constitutional or rhetorical, and found that changes to the political environment can influence their content (Kelley 2003; Cooper 2005; Devins 2007; Berry 2009; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2009, 2010; Rice 2010). Constitutional signing statements are characteristically different because presidents use them to inform political actors that a provision is unconstitutional and infringes on the rights of the citizenry or presidential authority per Article II (Cooper 1997, 2005; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010). This type of signing statement is the most controversial, especially for public administration scholars, since it directly addresses a president’s interpretation of how a policy should be implemented. 55

By altering legislation by redefining terms or ordering agencies to ignore certain provisions such signing statements can create ethical and execution issues for the bureaucracy given their relationship with Congress (Cooper 2005; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010; Pfiffner 2009a; Waterman 2009). For example, in his Statement on Signing the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, George W. Bush informed subordinates that “the executive branch shall construe sub-section 1025(d) of the Act, which purports to determine the command relationships among certain elements of the U.S. Navy forces, as advisory (Bush 2005a, 785).”17 Specifically, the provision plainly states that “none of the funds available to the Department of the Navy may be obligated to modify command and control relationships to give Fleet Forces Command administrative and operational control of U.S. Navy forces assigned to the Pacific fleet,” and any changes to this order requires additional legislation (Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, 253-254). In both Congress’s bill and the president’s signing statement, the Department of the Navy was given explicit instructions placing them in a precarious administrative position (see Weingast 2005). Beyond the ethical implications for public servants, constitutional signing statements are viewed as more instrumental to presidential administrative strategies. Kelley and Marshall (2008) refer to constitutional signing statements as a “last-move advantage” utilized by presidents to communicate their interpretation of policies (255). This step is taken in order to affect implementation closer to White House policy preferences and achieve administratively what was lost in the bargaining process with Congress or when a veto threat does not prompt changes to the legislation (Cooper 1997, 2005; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2009, 2010; Marshall 2012). Rhetorical signing statements are used by presidents to get attention from the press, take credit for legislation, or communicate with the public and base supporters. But this type of signing statement can be also be used to praise or admonish the efforts of those involved in crafting the bill, such as Congress or federal agencies, or publically pressure Congress to follow the president’s policy agenda (Cooper 2002; Kelley 2003; Kelley and Marshall 2008; Waterman

17 H.R. 1268, Statement on Signing the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, P.L. 109-13, May 11, 2005. 56

2009). Even though scholarly attention to this type of signing statement has increased, very little research focuses specifically on presidential usage of rhetorical signing statements as a form of administrative communication. Because both types of signing statements reference executive branch agencies, both types of signing statements will be used in this study. Attention to only one category of signing statement could result in missing important tonal patterns in presidential administrative rhetoric. Moreover, while the administrative function of constitutional statements has been analyzed, the inclusion of rhetorical signing statements could supplement the campaign-style governing literature. Comments made when a president signs a bill into law can send a signal to voters on the White House’s investments in a particular policy and how it is serving the nation’s best interests. It can also create a stage for the president to publically flex his administrative muscles and demonstrate governing leadership (Tulis 1987; Barilleaux 1988; Jones 1998, 2005; C. Cook 2002; Kernell 2007). In his book on presidential transitions, Jones (1998) stated that the distinct boundary between campaigning for office and the act of governing is eroding as a result of a presidency- centered system. In this new style of governance, presidents use the visibility of the office to propose policy and promote themselves as active and effective leaders (Jones 1998; Kernell 2007). But during efforts to reaffirm their leadership authority and communicate to various audiences, presidents must contend with competing messages and opponents (T. Cook 2005; Cohen 2008; 2010). The nuance signing statements contribute to public governing is that they can be modified in order to frame a president as a leader. In this manner presidents can take credit and present evidence of legislative success. The timing of a bill signing can center the public’s attention on to the president and create an opportunity for the White House to inform voters that he is living up to their expectations. Simultaneously, signing statements can provide the president with the added bonus of communicating policy signals to subordinates (Kagan 2001; Magill 2007; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Kelley and Marshall 2010; Korzi 2011). In general, the tonal variation of a signing statement’s administrative rhetoric can help a president in two ways. One, symbolic mentions of an agency conforms to the goals of campaign- style governing. Two, unlike internal communications, these comments are displayed in a public record which makes it clear to the intended audience, including other government officials that policy decisions have been made by the president (Neustadt 1960, 1990; Kelley 2003; Cooper 57

2005). On occasions when the White House opts for signing ceremonies, the visible presentation, combined with the publication of the president’s remarks, emphasizes the institution’s central position in the system and administrative authority (Kagan 2001; Yenerall 2006; Whitford and Yates 2009; Kelley and Marshall 2010). As such, the research proposed for this dissertation is important because it: 1) examines presidents’ administrative use of signing statements in greater detail by, 2) identifying the conditions that shape presidential bureaucratic communication, 3) and provides several examples that strongly suggest that signing statements enhance presidential administrative power, and influences bureaucratic action.

The Institution, Administrative Rhetoric, and Unilateralism Even though the ambiguity of the Constitution opens the door for presidents to use rhetoric in executive branch management, there is also a political component in choosing unilateral devices for rhetorical administrative strategies. In Howell’s (2003) model of unilateral politics the first characteristic he lists is the presidency’s unparalleled ability to use the ambiguity of Article II and establish precedents to expand the institution’s power and authority. The second characteristic relates more to the exercise of executive power because it requires presidents to consider the political conditions before taking unilateral action in order to avoid provoking reactions from Congress or the courts (Howell 2003). But unilateral action is not merely a response to institutional conflicts; it is also a product of what the public now expects from presidents (Howell 2003; Jones 2005; Rudalevige 2010b). Prior to the rise of the public presidency, precedents for unilateral action were set during Washington’s administration in order to more narrowly define the powers and duties of the institution. These early acts of unilateralism do not appear to conform to the rhetorical aspects of the modern public presidency due to Washington’s conscious effort to practice restraint. Still, Hoffman (2010) points out that the first president did use his reputation and revered image to publically promote policy but he was careful to match it with the issue at hand and appropriate method of delivery. Washington’s proclamations reflect this assessment because they were written for a broad, national audience, provided his understanding of the issue and action that needed to be taken, and the president knew that they would be published in newspapers (Phelps 1987, 1989; Cooper 2002; Hoffman 2010). Additionally, the Executive was the only branch to 58 deliver proclamations which not only established the president as the voice of the nation but, through unilateralism, made him “the only voice (Hoffman 2010, 33).” The language and format of signing statements can also be narrowed in order to speak to an exclusive audience, such as Congress or the bureaucracy (Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Kelley 2007; Kelley and Marshall 2010; Lewis and Moe 2010). Campbell and Jamieson (2008) observed that when presidents want to speak to the general public their rhetoric will be easy to understand, and they may also exercise the option of delivering the signing statements during a ceremony (Campbell and Jamieson 2008; see also Korzi 2011). Signing statements that are intended to restrict comments for bureaucrats or congressional members will feature more “technical” or formal language (Campbell and Jamieson 2008, 205). As such, the executive language is structured in order to help the president “win” because constitutional objections, and government terminology can make Congress appear imprudent, and bureaucratic discretion is limited through interpretation of the statute (Riker 1986, 8; Campbell and Jamieson 2008). Lastly, the staging and rhetoric used in campaign-style governing signing ceremonies resonate with the public and press and reinforce a president’s leadership image (Riker 1986, ix, 8; Cooper 2002; J. Mayer 2004; Magill 2007; Patterson 2008; Rudalevige 2010a; Kelley, Marshall, and Watts 2011; Barilleaux 2012). Medhurst (1996) notes that both the “rhetorical context” and “the medium” are key elements to a president’s message and recommends that both aspects receive consideration by researchers (xix, xx). Rhetorical context is notable because the political and personal conditions leading up to the president’s commentary can affect the structure and content of the message, and their intended audience. Going beyond the traditional notion that the medium merely falls under the general categories of verbal or written communication, Medhurst (1996) asserts that the format of delivery is part of a president’s overall message. Using MTV appearances as an example, he argues that what is said and who is listening are linked to the manner in which presidential communications are delivered (Medhurst 1996; see also Campbell and Jamieson (2008) and Whitford and Yates (2009). For example, during a Rose Garden signing ceremony in 2002, George W. Bush signed two bills, the Department of Defense Appropriations Act and the Military Construction Appropriations Act.18 In his public signing statement the president acknowledged and

18 H.R. 5010 and H.R. 5011, Remarks on Signing the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003 and the Military Construction Appropriation Act, 2003, P.L. 107-248 and P.L. 107-249, October 23, 2003. 59 complimented the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army who were all in attendance. The president also thanked the U.S. military, some of whom were in the audience, and proceeded to expand on the merits of the legislation. Bush II (2002b) reminded attendees and public of the challenges facing the government and armed forces in protecting the nation at home and abroad against terrorists. Some aspects of the bills that the president highlighted during the ceremony were pay increases for military members, upgrades in military housing, increased funding for equipment, and increased funding for research and development of next generation weapons while discontinuing obsolete defense systems. Then, after congratulating Congress for their bipartisan efforts in passing these two spending bills, he publically reminded the members that the Senate was lax in passing legislation that would create the Department of Homeland Security (Bush 2002b). His appeal cited Truman’s reorganization of the nation’s military when he signed legislation creating the Department of Defense and garnished his signing statement with patriotic rhetoric. President Bush (2002b) also announced that the nation faced unconventional security threats that demanded immediate congressional action (Bush 2002b). At the time, the White House was trying to coordinate “homeland security activities” that fell under the jurisdiction of “more than 100 different Government agencies (Bush 2002b, 1869).” The ceremony took place when the president owned a 67% approval rating and two weeks before the midterm elections which resulted in both chambers boasting a Republican majority (Gallup 2012; Woolley and Peters 2012). A month later, the president signed the Homeland Security Act which reorganized numerous agencies under the newly created Department of Homeland Security that the president had lobbied for as a necessity for improving national security.19 In addition to the statement issued during the signing ceremony each bill was signed with an accompanying written statement. In the second statement for H.R. 5010, the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, President Bush (2002c) provided a summary of guidelines for the DOD and the CIA on which defense or intelligence activities were covered, or not covered, by section 8066’s framework for transferring funds.20 His administrative rhetoric’s interpretive tone was also for the benefit of the “Armed Forces” and the implementation of section 8116 which

19 H.R. 5005, Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-296, November 25, 2002. 20 H.R. 5010, Statement on Signing the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, P.L. 107-248, October 23, 2003.

60 provided funding for transportation, food, and other accommodations for members of military and their families who would partake in “chaplain-led programs (Bush 2002c, 1871).” In the paragraph the president stipulates that the provision should be implemented in a way to “accord the fullest respect” for the religious freedoms protected under the Constitution (Bush 2002c, 1871). The actual provision states that “the Secretary of a military department for Operations and Maintenance” may use the funds for the purposes identified in the president’s signing statement, with the exception of any mention of First Amendment religious freedom rights (Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2002, 1564). Interestingly, the Secretary in question was the Secretary of the Army, who was also in attendance during the president’s Rose Garden ceremony (Bush 2002b). Additionally, the president’s administrative rhetoric heavily borrowed some of the exact phrases found in section 8116. The written signing statement for H.R. 5011, for the Military Construction Appropriations Act, the president drew attention to section 119 which required the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress on efforts to recruit allied nations to help in the United States’ defense efforts (Bush 2002d).21 Despite noting that the provision infringed on the “President’s constitutional authority to withhold information” in foreign policy matters he informed the Secretary that “as a matter of comity” he will “keep the Congress appropriately informed” per section 119 (Bush 2002d, 1872). Considering that in most cases Bush II’s signing statement would have interpreted the provision as advisory, this message may have been included to prevent the Secretary from creating unnecessary friction between the two branches by following the protocols set by previous signing statements (see Cooper 2005). Given the dynamics of the political system, presidents are always challenged to adapt strategies to gain the power of persuasion or manage the federal government (Pious 1979; Neustadt 1990; Arnold 1998; Whitford and Yates 2009). This includes working with and around Congress, balancing the demands of the general public with those of ideological supporters, and responding to current events (Neustadt 1960; Murphy 2002; Gronbeck 2004; Jacobs 2005; Cohen 2008; Whitford and Yates 2009; Rottinghaus 2010). Arnold’s (1998) summary of presidential power notes that the office requires the president to become a proficient public administrator “because administration is part of the system through which his choices become

21 H.R. 5011, Statement on Signing the Military Construction Appropriations Act, P.L. 107-249, October 23, 2002. 61 policy (361).” But he also states that because of the political nature of the office, “the president is not so much a manager of administration; he is a tactician using it (Arnold 1998, 361).” The following chapter will present some factors that may have influenced the tonal variation of administrative rhetoric found in signing statements, and their theoretical foundations. Change may simply have occurred as the use of signing statements matured over time, or as a response to changes in their political environment and the need to overcome the obstacles of managing numerous agencies (Neustadt 1960, 1990; Tulis 1987; Light 1995, 1999; Jones 2005; Kelley and Marshall 2010). Since signing statements can be used to meet these various, and at times overlapping, challenges and demands of the office, each sub-section will conclude with corresponding hypotheses that will be empirically tested in Chapter 4. As formal administrative procedures were codified the arsenal of unilateral tools increased. Around the same time the three branches were reoriented into a rank order hierarchy dominated by the presidency and going public became an accepted, and expected, practice. But as communications technology advanced the president can be more selective in deciding where his voice is heard and by whom (Jones 2005; Cohen 2010; Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2011). Unilateral tools, such signing statements, are ways in which presidents can engage the institution in public and administrative rhetorical leadership and protect their policy agendas. Signing statements are a result of contemporary presidents blending prerogative power with public leadership. Discussion about unilateralism and rhetorical leadership combined with recent work on how presidential rhetoric affects bureaucratic responsiveness will support the argument that the “administrative presidency” has evolved into the rhetorical administrative presidency (Nathan 1983, 13; Wood and Waterman 1984; K. Mayer 2002; Cooper 2002; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006, 2008; Durant 2009a; Whitford and Yates 2009; Hoffman 2010).

The Rhetorical Administrative Presidency As discussed previously, the theory of a rhetorical administrative presidency is the institutionalization of documented and publically available presidential communications that serve the institution’s political and administrative needs.22 It posits that by structuring their

22 Emphasis added by author. 62 comments about policy provisions around specific departments or agencies within the executive branch and commenting on implementation, presidents can kill two birds with one stone. In essence, the two birds are presidential demonstrations of executive leadership, either for the public’s benefit or to wrest influence away from Congress, and providing policy direction to bureaucrats prior to implementation. The stone is the president’s rhetoric (Kernell 2007; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006, 2008; Whitford and Yates 2009; Cohen 2010). The criteria that administrative-styled rhetoric must be documented and accessible relates to a noted shortcoming of presidential communications and bureaucratic responsiveness. Previous research has shown that as the president and the media’s attention turns to other issues on the agenda, the bureaucracy’s attention wanes as well (Eshbaugh-Soha 2003, 2006; Kernell 2007; Whitford and Yates 2009). By adding the condition that presidential administrative rhetoric be officially documented, as signing statements are in the Federal Register, distinguishes this form of executive communication from other types of presidential commentary. It also suggests that by establishing a permanent point of reference departments and agencies will continue to follow the president’s instructions even after he leaves office (Dorsey 1975; Riker 1986; Hart 1987; Benson 1996; Cooper 2002; Weingast 2005; Whitford and Yates 2009). This idea is supported by Rottinghaus (2010) who found that the president’s leadership efforts are more successful when “pathways of communication are clearer (198).” This theory is also based on presidency scholars’ observations that the rhetorical and administrative presidencies have increasingly overlapped (Canes-Wrone 2006; Waterman 2009; Durant 2009a; Conley 2011). In order to preserve their agenda, Eshbaugh-Soha (2008) states that presidents must use public engagements to send “signals” and communicate instructions to bureaucrats to “effect the implementation of policy (118, 119).” While bureaucratic responsiveness is contingent on the president’s clarity and tone, utilizing administrative rhetoric is also an “efficient” way in which to manage through the “multiple layers” of the executive branch (118). Whitford and Yates (2009) also theorize that presidents engage in public appeals in order to affect bureaucratic responsiveness during policy implementation and show that presidents have also been successful using public comments to increase bureaucratic responsiveness (see also Eshbaugh-Soha 2006, 2008). As one of many ways in which a president can engage in a rhetorical administrative strategy, signing statements fit the criteria for effective communication with the ability to adapt the contextual staging of presidential rhetorical 63 leadership (Dorsey 1957; Neustadt 1960, 1990; Edwards 1989; Waterman 1989; Hager and Sullivan 1994; Cooper 2002; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006, 2008; Whitford and Yates 2009; Cohen 2010). Additional research has shown that presidents modify the rhetorical content, and limit their use of signing statements depending on factors such as their approval rating, policy type, and election years (Foyle 1999; Kelley 2007; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Eshbaugh-Soha 2008; Edwards 2009; Kelley and Marshall 2009, 2010; Conley 2011; Evans 2011; Marlowe 2012; Marshall 2012; Spitzer 2012). Kelley and Marshall (2008) have found evidence that presidents are more likely to issue a signing statement for major legislation and when they are faced with a divided government. In restricting their calls for action through signing statements, presidents can strategically reduce their political “costs” and reap more benefits while maintaining the “usefulness” and “impact” of rhetorical appeals (Edwards 1989, 72; Kernell 2007; Pious 2008; Kelley and Marshall 2009, 518). Furthermore, Cohen’s (2010) context theory of presidential leadership provided evidence that presidents are becoming more selective in how they communicate their policy preferences and that their messages have been progressively more narrowed for more exclusive audiences (see also Jones 1998; Jacobs 2005; Canes-Wrone 2006, 2011; Marshall 2012; Rottinghaus 2010). His theory also notes that context, such as institutional organizational structure, or need to mobilize supporters, greatly influences presidential leadership strategies (Cohen 2010). Rather than trying to relate signing statements and the president’s administrative tone to congressional action, this dissertation is focused on other conditions that may affect executive communications. Specifically, it will examine the organization of the executive branch, public versus private signings, the election cycle, and presidential approval ratings (Edwards 1983; Bond and Fleisher 2000; Durant and Warber 2001; Canes-Wrone 2004; Hoddie and Routh 2004; Cooper 2002, 2005; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Rudalevige 2011). The condition of organizational structure takes into account Light’s (1995) work on the difficulty of managing policy execution through the vast layers of the federal government (see also Wood and Waterman 1994; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Krause 2009; Whitford and Yates 2009). Studies demonstrate that presidential rhetoric is no guarantee for success, but proper delivery may improve a president’s ability to get other political actors to follow their lead (Edwards 1983; Neustadt 1960, 1990; Light 1999; Druckman and Holmes 2004; Johnson and 64

Roberts 2004; Cohen and Powell 2005; Canes-Wrone 2006; Kernell 2007; Kelley and Marshall 2008; Evans 2011). This also applies to research on the administrative presidency’s ability to lead and manage the federal bureaucracy through rhetoric (Wood and Waterman 1994; Garrett, Thurber, Fritschler and Rosenbloom 2006; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006, 2008; Whitford and Yates 2009). As such, the following chapters of this dissertation will add to this literature through an in-depth examination of the presidential administrative rhetoric of bill signing statements. Chapter 4 will present empirical evidence that suggests presidents have adapted their administrative rhetoric in signing statements as a response to certain organizational and political conditions. Then Chapter 5 will follow with a qualitative analysis of bureaucratic responses to the comments.

Summary In the past, presidents used “publicized instructions” in order to demonstrate leadership and control over the federal bureaucracy, but they were negative in tone (Pious 1979, 230). Scholars have advised that while “publicized actions” can “provide useful themes” for presidential administrative communications they should avoid language that demonizes subordinates (Heclo 1977; Pious 1979, 230; Garrett et al. 2006). By perpetuating negative characterizations of bureaucrats presidential rhetoric may cause a drop in morale or job performance, foster resentment toward appointed superiors, affect how policy is implemented, and diminish the general public’s confidence in government institutions (Pious 1979; Light 1999; Goodsell 2004; Garrett et al. 2006). This position is supported by the work of Wood and Waterman (1994) that examined an aggregate of presidential statements regarding environmental policy. They found that when presidential communication on environmental policy regulations was negative in its overall tone the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) responded with more aggressive enforcement of the law (Wood and Waterman 1994). Overall, these studies suggest a relationship between the tone of administrative rhetoric and bureaucratic responsiveness. Rhetorical and administrative strategies are not distinct aspects of the office and more recent efforts have even demonstrated their overlap (Eshbaugh-Soha 2005, 2006; Canes-Wrone 2009; Whitford and Yates 2009). Research has pinpointed distinct changes in presidential rhetoric, leadership styles, and ways in which modern era presidents have adapted to meet the 65 demands of the office (Hart 1987; Tulis 1987; Lim 2002; Kernell 2007; Cohen 2010; Bennett 2012). Signing statements have evolved into an administrative strategy that supplies the president with the means to continue issuing publicized instructions without creating an adversarial relationship with subordinates. This argument is based on the delivery and accessibility of signing statements, their intended role of detailing the president’s interpretation of the law, and the public’s expectation to witness presidential leadership (Hart 1987; Kagan 2001; Howell 2003; Cooper 2002; Kelley 2003, 2007; Durant 2009a; Korzi 2011). Thus, the key characteristic analyzed in this dissertation will be the tone of communication toward the bureaucracy used in the signing statement. The tone of signing statements are expected to vary between symbolic, interpretive, or command rhetoric. As previously noted, purely rhetorical appeals by the president to government officials have been found to get the attention of bureaucrats (Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Whitford and Yates 2009). However, policy guidance from the president provided through speeches and interviews can require bureaucrats to cull through newspapers, press releases, and other media. As such, these types of policy comments may be able to affect bureaucratic behavior for the short-term. But coupling public supervision with official, on-the-record directives should secure a president’s policy agenda long after their administration has left office (Muir 1992; Kagan 2001; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Magill 2007; Whitford and Yates 2009; Waterman 2009). As Campbell and Jamieson (2008) point out, presidential rhetoric is deliberately crafted with consideration to “context,” “timing,” and “audience” (22, 23, 205; see also Medhurst 2007).” Depending on a president’s expectations or success with bargaining during the policy process, signing statements could be used for administrative or political purposes. Two of the three tones that have been identified and coded for this dissertation, specifically interpretive and command, can communicate to the bureaucracy how the president wants the law to be implemented. Command rhetoric can also provide subordinates with alternative instructions when the legislation deviates from the president’s policy agenda. Symbolic tones could be used to alert the president’s supporters to pressure Congress or use executive branch organizations as cognitive shortcuts so that their message can be easily comprehended by the general public (Kinder and Nelson 2005; Kernell 2007). Due to the insurmountable pressure placed on the Oval Office, presidents have actively sought out new ways in which to protect their policy agenda by limiting bureaucratic discretion 66

(Lowi 1985; Barilleaux 1988; Jones 1998; Burke 2000; Rudalevige 2002; Tatalovich and Engeman 2003; Healy 2008; Pious 2008). Scholars have noted that in order to manage the executive branch and firmly set implementation guidelines, presidents need to utilize multiple administrative strategies, including various methods to communicate policy guidance (Nathan 1983; Light 1995, 1999; Golden 2000; Aberbach and Peterson 2005a, 2005b; Whitford and Yates 2009). Recent developments to the organizational and political environment not only require that modern era presidents rely on rhetoric; it also motivates them to take unilateral action according to Howell (2003). The development of the bill signing statement has provided yet another way in which presidents can carry out their duty to faithfully execute laws (Cooper 1997, 2002; Kelley 2003; Kelley and Marshall 2010; Evans 2011). Signing statements can also relieve civil servants of the burden to seek out policy guidance since this type of presidential administrative communication is organized and published as an official record (U.S. Government Printing Office, Office of the Federal Register 2011). By adding empirical research that focuses on signing statements, as they relate to the administrative and public leadership roles of the contemporary presidents, this dissertation should provide more insight on the organizational and political conditions that affect executive branch policy messages.

Chapter 3 Presidential Administrative Rhetoric: Political Conditions, Context, and Expectations

Chapter 3 links this dissertation’s theoretical foundations to several hypotheses that are based on empirical research regarding presidential rhetoric, administration, and unilateralism (Cronin 1980; Nathan 1983; Tulis 1987; Waterman 1989; Moe and Howell 1999; Howell 2003; Zarefsky 2004; Cooper 1997, 2002, 2005; Hoffman 2010; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010; Conley 2011). Specifically, it will focus on organizational and political conditions such as the president’s relationship with various Cabinet departments, the election cycle, and approval ratings. The following chapter will then empirically test these expectations and present the results. Additional research on the president’s administrative rhetoric is important because as Rose (1976) states in his work on presidential management, “the words of the President not only state an objective, but also commit public officials to action (148).” Unilateral presidential directives, like signing statements, are appropriate sources for this research area because these tools reflect Downs’s (1967) work on bureaucratic decision-making, and advice for top-level executives to engage in developing “distortion-proof messages (126).” Signing statements also have the potential to meet Downs’s (1967) communications requirements because the president’s decisions are not filtered through political appointees. Because of this, unilateral devices conform to what Downs (1967) described as “distortion-proof” messaging because it comes directly from the president, is delivered at the same time a bill is signed into law, and was deliberately made available through the Federal Registrar by the Reagan administration (Downs 1967, 126; Denton and Hahn 1986; Kelley 2003; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Pfiffner 2008; Savage 2008). Essentially, this framework for administrative communication is delivered quickly and directly from the executive to his subordinates, limits this type of messaging to high priority tasks, and institutionalizes the transmission method of information (Downs 1967; see also Edwards 1983; Cooper 2002, 2005; Kelley 2003, 2007; Magill 2007; Pfiffner 2008). As such, the president’s administrative communication through signing statements can provide subordinates with cues, or substantive information regarding policy. Especially, if a new statute could create interdepartmental conflicts (Waterman 1989; Kagan 2001; Eshbaugh-Soha 68

2006, 2008; Kelley 2007; Magill 2007; Whitford and Yates 2009). In 1985, a Deputy Attorney General stated as much in his letter to Fred Fielding, who served as Reagan’s Counsel to the President, concerning implementation of the Pacific Salmon Treaty Act (Jensen 1985). While a signing statement was considered prior to the bill’s passage, none was issued which resulted in confusion over administration between the Departments of Interior and Commerce. Deputy Attorney General Jensen (1985) stressed in his letter that future conflicts between departments could be avoided by using signing statements because such documentation can help direct subordinates on the statute’s execution, and resolve any confusion over jurisdiction or duties. As Neustadt (1990) stated, “trying to stop fires is what Presidents do first. It takes up most of their time (131).” But in order to stop jurisdictional conflicts, or prevent them from occurring in the first place, the president must decide on the best method to communicate policy direction (Denton and Hahn 1986; Medhurst 2007; Denton and Kuypers 2008). Considering the point made by Reagan’s Deputy Attorney General in his letter, it appears that White House advisers regarded the use of a signing statement as a more efficient means for the president to “stop fires (Neustadt 1990, 131).”

Changing Administrative Strategies and Rhetoric Characteristics of Signing Statements since FDR Unilateral devices have become common practice among presidents in order to overcome the restrictions placed on the institution by the Constitution’s system of checks and balances, especially when dealing with Congress (K. Mayer 2002; Howell 2003; Warber 2006; Rottinghaus and Maier 2007; Krutz and Peake 2010). Until recently, executive orders received the bulk of scholarly attention on presidential unilateralism. But research on signing statements has provided new insights into when and how presidents choose and use signing statements over other unilateral devices (Cooper 2005; Kelley and Marshall 2006, 2008, 2010; Berry 2009; Conley 2011; Evans 2011; Evans, Marshall, Kelley, and Watts 2012). Due to the impact the Reagan Administration had on the development and institutionalization of signing statements most of the presidency literature focuses on its use by his successors, especially George W. Bush. However, signing statements have been around since Monroe issued the first one in 1822, and were increasingly utilized by presidents since the 1950s (May 1998; Kelley 2003; Berry 2009; Conley 2011). 69

For all of the recognition given to Reagan, Conley (2011) found that both Ford and Carter were both as generous in using this method of unilateralism as more recent administrations. Since 1945, to the end of Carter’s tenure in 1980, a total number of 934 signing statements have been issued (Conley 2011). In fact, Berry (2009) found that both Ford and Carter had issued more signing statements during their short time occupying the Oval Office than Bush II during his two terms. So even though signing statements did not merit much attention prior to Reagan, recent work has shown that since the mid-20th century it was gaining traction as a way for presidents to exercise prerogative power in affecting policy outcomes or make rhetorical appeals (Cooper 1997, 2005; Magill 2007; Berry 2009; Conley 2011; Evans 2011; Kelley and Marshall 2010; Evans, Marshall, Kelley, and Watts 2012). But signing statements are more than just another way in which the president attempts to expand the institution’s power. Kelley and Marshall (2008, 2009, 2010) have shown that the decision to issue a signing statement is influenced by the president’s political circumstances, such as the election cycle, and if the bill is a major piece of legislation. Following Neustadt (1960, 1990), they determined that most signing statements are used for the purpose of exhibiting public governing leadership, and persuading others to support their policies (Kelley and Marshall 2010). Additional results of their empirical research have revealed that presidents are more likely to issue a signing statement for major legislation, especially under divided government. However, even with the increased number of signing statements during this time, presidents are less likely to include constitutional challenges and substitute their own interpretations under divided government. Rather, presidents are more likely to challenge certain provisions under unified government which suggests that presidents become more assertive in their executive rhetoric during periods when they are at greater risk of provoking a confrontation with Congress (Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010). Recently, Evans (2011) published empirical results that support more in-depth research on signing statements as an administrative tool. In looking at the constitutional challenges that have been offered in signing statements, he also examined the provisions in question. Evans (2011) found in his research on Bush II’s signing statements that the president issued more challenges on legislation including provisions mandating that agencies report to Congress, thus interfering with the president’s role as Chief Executive. Also, despite the literature’s noting that presidents have an inherent distrust of the bureaucracy, Evans (2011) found that Bush II was less 70 inclined to challenge legislation that delegated power over new policy to bureaucrats (Heclo 1977; Pious 1979; Nathan 1983; Burke 2000; Kettl 2002). Rather than remain static in its content and delivery it has been found that signing statements feature significant variation in presidential rhetoric (Berry 2009; Rice 2010). The constitutional objections found in Bush II’s signing statements sparked academic attention, and eventually, press scrutiny (May 1998; Cooper 1997, 2002; Kelley 2003; Savage 2006, 2008). However, Kelley (2003) reported that constitutional objections and presidential construal of legislative intent began to rise almost thirty years prior to the 43rd president’s administration and blatant promotion of the unitary executive theory. This is supported by Berry (2009) whose work provides empirical evidence that since Nixon, the percentage of signing statements issued by individual presidents, with the exception of Clinton, have shifted toward rhetoric objecting to the constitutionality of statutes. Thus, there is evidence that shows signing statements have moved away from laudatory to more interpretive rhetoric meant to assert presidential authority against challenges from Congress, or over the bureaucrats charged with implementing policy that is important to the president’s agenda (Cooper 2005; Waterman 2009; Kelley 2007; Kelley and Marshall 2010; Berry 2009; Rice 2010; Conley 2011; Evans 2011). Overall, the number of signing statements varies by year, but its use depends on the president’s political environment, and it was developed for administrative purposes as shown in previous research (Cooper 1997, 2002; Kelley 2003, 2007; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010; Berry 2009; Conley 2011; Evans 2011). Kelley and Marshall’s (2010) work that has shown that signing statements are primarily reserved for major legislation due to their “complexity and ambiguity” and provide an arena for presidents to expand the power and authority of the institution (17). But it was not until midway through the Reagan Administration that signing statements began to rise among the ranks of the president’s unilateral tools (May 1998; Kagan 2001; Cooper 2002; Kelley 2003). Thus, the first testable hypothesis predicts:

H1: The percentage of signing statements that mention executive branch bureaucracies should increase over time (Jones 1998; Ponder 1999; DiClerico 2013).

Moreover, in comparing Reagan and Bush II’s signing statements, Campbell and Jamieson (2008) observed that Reagan’s earlier attempts the president referred to the State 71

Department in order to support his objections to illustrate congressional interference in executive functions. The language used by Reagan was intended for the general public and the president also provided context for his remarks. But the rhetoric found in signing statements has changed over time and, rather than speaking as the individual occupying the Oval Office, it has been observed that Bush II “speaks as the executive branch (Campbell and Jamieson 2008, 206).” Additionally, it has been noted that Reagan’s rhetoric was designed to persuade others to his position. Conversely, Bush II ‘s signing statements are brusque, and his rhetoric is mostly limited to statutory interpretations and claims of authority (Campbell and Jamieson 2008). As such, signing statements will shift from symbolic administrative rhetoric to more substantive language in order to direct bureaucrats and protect the president’s policy agenda by limiting bureaucratic discretion. Therefore, the second testable hypothesis relates directly to the president’s incentive to use signing statements as administrative communication. In particular:

H2: The administrative communication in signing statements should become increasingly interpretive in tone over time.

Organization of the Executive Branch and Administrative Rhetoric Light (1995) presented a view of the federal government’s expansion of bureaucratic organizations after the New Deal, which continued under administrations after FDR. The increase occurred horizontally, but also vertically through hierarchical layers and was referred to by the author as a “thickening” of the federal government (Light 1995, 7). The literature on presidential administration has noted this can significantly complicate an executive’s ability to manage subordinates due to reasons such as bureaucratic inertia, competition from Congress, or from appointees putting their respective agency’s clients, or interest groups preference above the president’s (Downs 1967; Heclo 1977, 1981; Pious 1979; T. Moe 1989; R. Moe 1990; Light 1999). In his book, Light (1995) provides seven consequences of the “thickening” of the federal government but, in general, can be summarized as “information distortion” which then results in the loss of responsibility and accountability during implementation (64). Since the president is the only nationally elected official, and how the public, press, and Congress perceives the functionality of the federal government rests on their shoulders (Tulis 1987; Waterman 1989; 72

Arnold 1998; Cronin and Genovese 2004; Jones 2005; Kernell 2007; Patterson 2008; Lewis and Moe 2010). Therefore, modern era presidents have increased their use of unilateral means in order to meet the administrative challenges due to the size and scope of the executive branch bureaucracy. Unilateral actions are also a response to the skewed level of programmatic accountability placed upon the individual occupying the Oval Office (Howell 2003). But, as Cooper (1997) stated, unilateral tools are the most effective when the president and their advisors understand the institutions within the federal government, and learn to use various tools accordingly. The most well-known and substantive tool are executive orders because they possess legal authority to mandate bureaucratic action. Executive orders are very narrow means of administrative communication because the president’s target audience is a particular department or agency within the executive branch. Despite the absence of legal force, signing statements do offer the president greater “flexibility” in governing through rhetoric (Cooper 1997, 2002; K. Mayer 2002; Kelley 2007, 738; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010). Administratively, when issuing a signing statement the president is providing their interpretation right before signing the bill into law, thus reducing bureaucratic discretion and avoiding the arduous task of trying to correct procedural issues later (Neustadt 1960; B.D. Jones 1994; Light 1995; Riley and Brophy-Baermann 2006; Magill 2007; Whitford and Yates 2009; Kelley and Marshall 2010). Similarly, the president’s commentary can facilitate coordination, prevent jurisdictional battles when a provision requires the collaboration between two or more departments or agencies, or gain the attention of independent agencies whose organizations may be able to resist White House control (Neustadt 1990; Wood and Waterman 1994; Light 1995; Rudalevige 2002; Campbell 2005; Weingast 2005; Whitford and Yates 2009). Overall, signing statements can help the president communicate effectively and efficiently through layers of bureaucratic hierarchies. But unlike executive orders, signing statements can increase attention paid to the president’s policy signals when it is delivered during a well-staged ceremony (Cooper 2002; Rudalevige 2002; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Yenerall 2006; Whitford and Yates 2009; Kelley and Marshall 2010; Korzi 2011). Therefore, despite the layers of hierarchy and vast number of agencies, the president’s message remains unfiltered and meets Downs’s (1967) recommendation for “distortion-proof” communications (126). Direct communication is especially important given that government agencies vary in mission and policy area. Depending on who the policy affects, a new statute can divert attention 73 away from the president’s agenda and toward the preferences of his competition, such as clientele groups or Congress (Heclo 1977; Cronin 1980; Wood and Waterman 1994; Light 1995; Rudalevige 2005a; Weingast 2005). Wood and Waterman (1994) found that when the president and Congress vie for administrative dominance and produce competing policy guidance executive branch agencies will adhere to whichever one reflects its organizational preferences. However, other scholars have stated that departments and agencies will comply with the president’s policy leadership simply because of his constitutional authority (Polsby 1978; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Pfiffner 2009a; Rodman 2009). The institutionalized, public presidential administrative rhetoric of signing statements can help the president reach bureaucrats at all levels, and focus subordinates attention to the president’s as the Chief Executive and the unfiltered message guiding policy implementation (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984; Eshbaugh- Soha 2006; Kelley 2007; Whitford and Yates 2009). But signing statements can also allow the president to use his message to confront current political conditions, or capitalize on the opportunities exclusive to the office. These conditions include the executive power established by the Constitution, a large and complex federal government, electoral concerns, changes in approval ratings, or the amount of attention given to the office compared to the other branches (Cooper 2002; Kelley 2003; Durant 2009b; Kelley and Marshall 2009, 2010; Rice 2010; Evans 2011; Korzi 2011). Because of their adaptability, signing statements can serve the public presidency by incorporating federal agencies into speeches for symbolic governing purposes. Acknowledgement of a department or agency, either positively or negatively, can serve as a way to communicate the president’s policy agenda to voters, interest groups, or legislators. In this respect, assuming a symbolic administrative rhetorical tone would benefit the president during public speaking engagements (Cooper 2002; Kelley 2003; Denton and Kuypers 2008; Korzi 2011; Evans, Marshall, Kelley, and Watts 2012). In order to capitalize on voter’s emotions, the White House must also be sensitive to the knowledge the public has about the federal government, especially with respect to the number of agencies that fall under the authority of the departments in the president’s Cabinet. For successful displays of campaign-style public governance presidents must structure their comments around departments or agencies that are familiar to the general public (Edelman 1964; Edwards and Wayne 1985; Hinckley 1990; Van de Walle, Kampen, and Bouckaert 2005; Garrett, Thurber, Fritschler, and Rosenbloom 2006; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Whitford and 74

Yates 2009). High-profile departments, such as Defense or Agriculture, would help the president convey his message to a broader audience unlike their respective sub-Cabinet agencies, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency or the Foreign Agricultural Service. An additional advantage of signing statements is that the president can provide direction without disrupting established agency procedures. When engaging in political administration, it has been noted that the introduction of new management strategies must consider that bureaucratic responsiveness is related to organizational routine and values (Meier and O’Toole 2006; Meier, O’Toole, Boyne, and Walker 2006; Frederickson and Matkin 2007; Magill 2007). Public administration and presidency scholars have stated that public and political administrative leadership, and its success in influencing subordinates, requires executives to appreciate the significant role of established institutional norms and the power of making a desired action part of the bureaucracy’s predictable routine (Gaus 1947; Arnold 1998; Meier 2006; Frederickson and Matkin 2007). Frederickson and Matkin (2007) observe that “quiet leaders” will take a methodical approach to work around rules that impede their goals and find ways to affect institutional change through “enduring practical ways (39-40).”23 The Reagan Administration was certainly methodical in enhancing the utility of bill signing statements. Signing statements provide a way for the president to work around Congress, and it’s timing and inclusion in a bill’s legislative history does not violate bureaucratic norms. In fact, since bureaucrats actively seek out the president’s policy comments this unilateral device compliments bureaucratic routines and its permanent attachment to the legislative history can ensure the longevity of their administrative rhetoric (Edwards and Wayne 1985; Waites 1987; Muir 1992; Cooper 2002, Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Eshbaugh-Soha 2008; Kelley and Marshall 2008; Evans 2011). But the administrative tone that is taken by the president is the result of the choice made by the president and their administration (Waites 1987; Cooper 2002, 2005; Zarefsky 2004; Kelley and Marshall 2010). As Zarefsky (2004) points out, the choice of presidential rhetoric is structured as “invitations to respond (607).” By identifying the tonal variation in signing statements, this research can offer some insight on how presidents use this medium in order to invite bureaucrats to respond to their policy agenda (Waites 1987; Emrich, Brower, Feldman, and Garland 2001; Whitford and Yates 2003; Magill 2007).

23 Moore and Kreth (2005) also advocated knowing “institutional rules” in their article on organizational leadership and the use of heresthetic rhetoric (312). 75

Altogether, the policy guidance presented through signing statements should also assist the president in reaching across various types of agencies, and down through the numerous layers of the executive branch. As Wood and Waterman (1994) have shown, some agencies are more difficult to manage than others because their policy domain may elicit administrative interest from Congress in order to appease members’ constituents. Similarly, Light (1995) identified the vast layers of federal agencies which can create a significant obstacle for presidential management. This suggests another testable hypothesis related to signing statements as administrative communication.

H3: Presidents should be more likely to use signing statements with an interpretive tone to target lower-level agencies, independent agencies, or when a bill involves multiple, unrelated agencies with overlapping jurisdictions.

But variation between executive branch bureaucracies can occur within the same rank. In his seminal work, The State of the Presidency, Cronin (1980) divided the president’s Cabinet into two categories, Inner and Outer. Inner cabinets include those whose jurisdictional domains rest mainly on foreign or economic policy. These departments are presented as the most collaborative with White House advisors and loyal to the president and his policy preferences. Outer Cabinets also serve the president but represent particular client or constituency groups. These departments’ loyalties are more suspect because they are involved with domestic policies that open the organizations to pressure from interest groups and members of Congress who need to protect their electoral interests (Cronin 1980; see also Arnold 1999; Pika 1999; Wood and Waterman 1994; Light 1995; Van Horn, Baumer, and Gormley 2001; Riley and Brophy- Baermann 2006). As such, Cronin’s work offers another testable implication for signing statements as administrative rhetoric, and suggests that:

H4: There should be more interpretive or command tones in signing statements that target Outer departments (Cronin 1980).

Context and Administrative Rhetoric: Public Ceremonies vs. Private Signings Medhurst (1996) has written, that the context is part of the president’s message because of the way in which it is “composed and treated” and “the manner in which the audience is invited” to become a part of his comments (xix). The context in which a president issues his remarks largely depends on the political environment and desired outcome (Medhurst 1996; see also Denton and Hahn 1986; Hargrove 1998; Kumar 2000; Jacobs 2005; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010; Beasley 2010; Cohen 2010; Miroff 2010; Ellis 2012). Signing statements offer presidents a unilateral tool that can be shaped to reflect governing style and convey information to specific audiences depending on its content. This is evident because their commentary can be delivered orally during carefully planned, public signing ceremonies with language that is easily understood by the general public, or discretely in written form containing more formal administrative jargon (Campbell and Jamieson 2008). Because signing statements can serve multiple purposes, it is preferred over other unilateral tools, such as executive orders, in order to meet the public governing aspect of the rhetorical administrative presidency. Rossiter (1960) observed that students of the presidency and public administration understand the institution as more than just the individual that was elected to the office. This cannot be said for the general public who only understand the presidency as solely responsible for the function of the government (Rossiter 1960; Jones 2005). Since then, Hart (1987) writes that presidents make public appearances and engage in campaign-style rhetoric because “many Americans have come to believe that governance occurs only when their president talks to them (15).” But as Edwards and Wayne (1985) point out, in order for the president to use rhetoric to attract attention from the public and other government officials they need to create symbols out of what is “familiar (125).” Because the general public recognizes several federal departments and agencies, the bureaucracy serves as a perfect symbolic reference for several political actors (Hart 1987; Muir 1992; Van Horn, Baumer, and Gormley 2001; Waterman, Rouse, and Wright 2004). However, the president is not only the nation’s leader, but also head of the executive branch their administrative rhetoric can serve as a powerful signal. Public speeches can either influence public support for the bureaucracy, or shift the public’s resentment over the policy failures of

77 elected officials onto federal civil servants (Pious 1979; Levine 1986; Cooper 2002; Waterman, Rouse, and Wright 2004; Garrett, Thurber, Fritschler, and Rosenbloom 2006). Public rhetoric that refers to the bureaucracy has been used in the past to frame the president’s administrative intentions and signal ideological supporters (Pious 1979; Wood and Waterman 1994). Several scholars point to Reagan as instigating the practice of presidents publically criticizing the bureaucracy in order to gain support for their policy agenda beginning with his inaugural address (Newland 1983; Levine 1986; Hubbell 1991; Golden 2000; Riley and Brophy-Baermann 2006). But attacking the bureaucracy and using them to symbolize the federal government’s shortcomings occurred long before the 40th president took office (Hubbell 1991; Waterman, Rouse, and Wright 2004). In general, Americans’ low opinions about the federal bureaucracy have been largely due to the electorates’ shift toward conservatism and the perception that it was unresponsive and incompetent because of the protections afforded civil servants (Hubbell 1991; Kettl 2002; Riley and Brophy-Baermann 2006). While Reagan’s symbolic executive rhetoric has been questioned by public administration scholars, presidency scholars and former White House advisors have identified a more enduring legacy. Administrations since Reagan have modified their symbolic use of the bureaucracy in order to more effectively communicate their policy agenda, and enhance their leadership persona and standing as Chief Executive (Levine 1986; Griscom 1992; Emrich, Brower, Feldman, and Garland 2001; Waterman, Rouse, and Wright 2004; DiIulio 2007; Kernell 2007; Evans 2011). After his election in 1992, Clinton was determined to appoint a diverse Cabinet in an effort of symbolic governing directed toward campaign supporters from minority and women’s groups (Jones 1998). DiIulio (2007) points out that the Bush II Administration frequently used agencies as rhetorical symbols, as well as White House messengers, in order to maintain the president’s public leadership image. However, going public can also benefit the president as an administrator. Public appearances by the president that features administrative rhetoric has been identified as providing bureaucrats with starting points for policy implementation, foster coordinated efforts, and can focus agencies’ attention to the administration’s policy priorities (Wilson 1989; Miller 1993; T. Cook 2005; Riley and Brophy-Baermann 2006; May, Workman, and Jones 2008; Whitford and Yates 2003, 2009). Therefore, policy rhetoric communicated through the president’s public statements limits bureaucratic discretion by informing subordinates of the 78 decisions made by the White House (Carlin 2003; Medhurst 2003; T. Cook 2005; Eshbaugh- Soha 2008; Rudalevige 2010a). Vermeer (2008) also points out that publicity can benefit departments and agencies. He states that for some federal bureaucracies “keeping its work in the public eye, the agency minimizes opposition (124).” Public acknowledgement can also help agencies repair their public image, such as FEMA or the EPA, especially when it is the president that is extolling the positive benefits of its work (T. Cook 2005; May, Workman, and Jones 2008; Vermeer 2008). The fact that bureaucracies often contribute to the president’s speeches increases the likelihood that their policy leadership will be followed (Carlin 2003). A manual published by the Department of Agriculture (USDA) in 1984, and an updated version in 2002, invites agencies under its authority to submit “a draft signing statement” for bills in which “approval is recommended and the measure is of high public interest (24).” The department’s manual even provides an example in the appendix to serve as a template for future submissions (USDA 1984, 2002). Signing statements issued out of public view are still public in nature due to publication in the Federal Registrar and availability in a bill’s legislative history. But this change in the president’s delivery may be an indication that he is narrowing his message to a select audience, specifically bureaucrats. Campbell and Jamieson (2008) added constitutional signing statements to their list of public presidential rhetoric in the updated edition of Deeds Done in Words even though it is unclear that the president’s words result in governmental action (Campbell and Jamieson 1993). Regardless, even though written signing statements are comments by the president prior to signing a bill into law, like those delivered during a ceremony the authors note a distinct difference in the president’s rhetoric (Campbell and Jamieson 1993). For example, during public signing ceremonies the president’s rhetoric is more pedestrian in order to appeal to a broad audience. Campbell and Jamieson (2008) state that in written signing statements featuring constitutional challenges the audience is clearly intended for government officials because the president uses “technical, even arcane” language that would be lost on most voters (205). This change in the president’s rhetorical arena is more conducive to signing statements designed to expand and protect the power of the presidency against the other institutions, including bureaucrats that may resist his policy agenda (Campbell and Jamieson 2008).

In cases when the president issues two signing statements, one during a signing ceremony and the other privately and in written format, there are noticeable changes in their language that support Campbell and Jamieson’s (2008) points. During a ceremony President Clinton (2000a) announced that he had signed legislation that established a national drunk driving standard. In attendance were members of Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), the Secretary of Transportation, and various members of Congress that were involved in passing the bill. The Rose Garden affair touted the merits of the new law and boasted that it was a result of the executive and legislative branches working together to ensure a better future for the nation (Clinton 2000a). Clinton (2000a) also took the opportunity to inform the public that legislators were lax in passing the budget which surprised him because he “thought that Congress would want to get the job done so they could go home and run for reelection (2580).” While he clarified that his comment should not be taken “in a negative way” it was clearly a jab at the GOP controlled Congress less than two weeks prior to the election (Clinton 2000a, 2580). So, in addition to exhibiting leadership the president also used the venue to publicly pressure Congress to pass the remainder of appropriations. In particular “an education budget that is worthy of our children,” therefore it is clear that this signing statement was intended to communicate with several target audiences, including voters (Clinton, 2000a, 2580).24 In his written Statement on Signing the Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Clinton (2000b) still included praise for individual congressional members but devoted more attention to interpreting certain provisions. He commented on sections that restricted the Department of Transportation’s regulation of fuel economy standards, and earmarks for future projects that cut into the funding of those already in progress (Clinton 2000b). The president concluded this signing statement by objecting to Congress inserting a legislative veto in section 347, and based upon “the Supreme Court’s holding in INS v. Chadha” states that he will interpret the provision “as advisory (Clinton 2000b, 2582).”25 Given the president’s rhetoric in this signing statement, it is clear he is narrowing his audience to government officials.

24 H.R. 4475, Remarks on the Establishment of a National Drunk Driving Standard, P.L. 106-346, October 23, 2000. 25 H.R. 4475, Statement on Signing the Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, P.L. 106-346, October 23, 2000. 80

These examples also illustrate Hart’s (1987) observations that when engaging in rhetoric it is important to understand the limitations of the audience, which would explain why Clinton (2000a) restricted his discourse during the ceremony to two themes, highway safety and Congress failing to pass the remainder of the budget. But Hart (1987) also compares presidential rhetoric to “the politics of distraction (69).” This strategy allows the president to use rhetoric to give “us something to think about” but also, divert attention away from topics that he does not want brought to the public’s attention (Hart 1987, 69). Depending on the signing statement context the president can provide some insight into who are the intended target audiences, and what he wants their audience “to think about (Hart 1987, 69; see also Edwards and Wayne 1985; Kernell 2007; Whitford and Yates 2009).” Using federal agencies as rhetorical symbols during public appeals can help the president secure broad national support for the president’s policy agenda, or simply gain political capital and leverage through increased popular support (Tulis 1987, 1996; Stuckey 1991; Langston 1995; Kurtz 1998; Jones 2000; Kernell 2007). By calling on citizens to support their policies, presidents attempt to provoke bureaucratic responsiveness due to issue saliency, increased awareness of an agency’s statutory obligations, or as a signal to clientele groups and the bureaucratic organization that the president support their mission (Riley 1987; Arnold 1998; Eshbaugh-Soha 2008; Whitford and Yates 2009; Rottinghaus 2010). Likewise, public speeches, such as the statements given during a bill signing ceremony, can also help the president penetrate through layers of bureaucracy. By doing so the Chief Executive may be able to communicate with lower-level agents that use their obscurity to resist the president’s direction (Edwards and Wayne 1985; Light 1995; Lewis 2004; Whitford and Yates 2009; Rudalevige 2010b). But by issuing a signing statement in written format, the president can narrow his audience and use for formal administrative language that provides clearer guidelines for execution. Privately commenting on legislation can also enable the president to take unilateral administrative action without stirring public concerns over the enlargement of presidential power (Campbell and Jamieson 2008; see also Cooper 2002; Howell 2003; Lewis 2005; Cohen 2010). As a political tool, public signings provide the president an opportunity to exhibit leadership via his rhetorical skills, demonstrate governing ability, and communicate with multiple targets. Since the president is addressing a broader audience during staged ceremonies, 81 his signing statements should focus on a particular department or agency that is familiar to the general public. By identifying high-profile agencies that represent economic or foreign policy the Chief Executive can appear more “presidential” to constituents (Wood 2004, 573). In recognizing clientele departments or agencies the president is reaching out to policy supporters or voters (Peterson 1992; Pika 1999; Denton and Kuypers 2008). The context in which the president delivers his signing statement provides the fifth testable hypothesis.

H5: Therefore, signing statements characterized by a symbolic tone should be more likely during public ceremonies, and interpretive or command tones should be more likely in the context of written statements when the bill is signed privately.

Political Conditions and Administrative Rhetoric: Election Years Kernell (2007) explains that under the current political conditions it is important for presidents to identify their audience and structure their comments accordingly. This is especially true during election time because political parties have weakened since the 1968 reforms. Subsequently the president needs to rely on popular support in order to mobilize the electorate, and earn the support of interest groups who can urge their members to support the president at the polls (Kernell 2007; see also Wattenberg 1998; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Patterson 2003; Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004; Thurber 2009). In writing about her experience as a public administrator in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Radin (2002) confirms that the White House was extremely cognizant of the election cycles which meant increased attention on departments and agencies that were important to key constituency groups. As it is with modern era governance, Thurber (2009) states that presidential election campaigns need to “decide what tactics or tools” will send a clear message to supporters in order to get elected (3). Again, signing statements appear to rise to the occasion and are one of the tools chosen by the president to help him succeed during election years. Kelley and Marshall (2008, 2010) found that even though presidential election years do not have a significant effect on the president’s decision to issue a signing statement, it does have an effect on the rhetorical characteristics of presidential signing statements (see also Kelley 2003; Conley 2011). During presidential election years, signing statements are more aggressive in protecting the institution’s authority, and the president’s policy agenda, by challenging the constitutionality of certain 82 provisions. This is also the case in election years when the incumbent is in their final term and leaving office (Kelley and Marshall 2008). The results of research on election cycles and signing statements are supported by previous analysis that focused on congressional activity in managing the federal government. Light (1995) agrees with Fiorina (1989) and echoes that claim that re-election concerns motivates some members of Congress to increase their branch’s involvement in executive administration in order to appear as frustrated as their constituents with the bureaucracy. As such, legislation passed during presidential election years may increase the number of provision that require additional oversight, or “micromanaging interference (Light 1995, 110).” In his work on the management of the federal government, Light (1995) provides empirical evidence that shows increased congressional involvement in the structure and administration of the executive branch. Therefore, the tone of the president’s administrative rhetoric in signing statements issued during presidential election years may be related to the electoral needs of Congress. Additionally, congressional members no longer have the backing of strong political parties so they need to actively promote themselves. In order for members that are up for re- election during this cycle to increase credit claiming talking points for their campaign, legislation may intrude into the president’s administrative territory (Thurber 2009; Engstrom 2012; Jacobson 2013). As Arnold (1999) pointed out in his essay on presidential administration, “the managerial presidency is always constrained by electoral considerations (223).” But while presidents frequently use signing statements prior to presidential elections, Kelley and Marshall (2008) find that this was not the case during midterm election years. Even though the number of signing statements may decline during this time, the president may still use them as a signal to voters. Again, Kelley and Marshall’s (2010) work which found that during midterm elections signing statements were more often used to attract public attention, rather than as a response to institutional conflicts (see Kelley 2003). The president can use their position during congressional elections because the public views the individual and office “as the primary symbol of government (Hinckley 1990).” Regardless of the weak party system, presidents serve as the symbolic leaders of their political party. Party members in Congress can benefit from the president’s visibility, and public image (Edwards 1983; Van Horn, Baumer, and Gormley 2001; Sinclair 2009; Milkis 2010). When the 83 president engages in various types of public rhetoric they have the ability to promote legislative achievements reflects onto congressional party members. However, the same fate applies when the president’s policy agenda is unpopular among voters and they reject him and his party despite numerous public appeals (Edwards 2009; Sinclair 2009; Wayne 2009; Milkis 2010). Nonetheless, by using signing statements the president can highlight the cooperative efforts between the two branches the president, and can help their party “demonstrate a competence for governing and build a valuable reputation (Arnold 1999; Van Horn, Baumer, and Gormley 2001; Kernell 2007; Wayne 2009; Kelley and Marshall 2010, 175).” Kelley (2003) concluded that when signing statements are utilized as a rhetorical tool during election years the president can inform the press and the public of their governing ability and leadership. He also states that the public will project their positive assessment of the president’s performance onto congressional members during midterm election years (Kelley 2003). This position is supported by Edwards (1983, 2009) whose empirical results indicate that positive assessment of the president’s performance can benefit their party during midterm elections, even with voters from the opposite party. As long as the president remains popular among the electorate their public appeals that expound on legislative success can help members of Congress in their bids for re-election. Moreover, the president’s rhetorical leadership can also serve as a signal to interest groups who, in turn, allocate resources to support the campaigns of his party’s congressional members (Peterson 1992; Pika 1999; Edwards 1983, 2009). However, as Edwards (2009) noted whenn comparing Clinton’s inability to positively affect the public’s opinion of his party in 1994 and Bush II’s success in actively campaigning for his party during the 2002 midterm, the president needs to structure their rhetoric around terms that resonate with supporters. Due to the differences in presidential and congressional elections, the tone of the president’s administrative rhetoric should depend on the election cycle. During presidential election years, whether or not the president is up for re-election or leaving office, the tone of administrative rhetoric should become more interpretive. Doing so allows the president a chance to protect his policy agenda in case he loses the election or the candidate from the opposition party wins the open seat. Whereas during midterm election years the president’s signing statements should feature more symbolic administrative rhetoric in order to appeal to his party’s base voters and supporting interest groups (Peterson 1992; Pika 1999; Van Horn, Baumer, and 84

Gormley 2001; Kelley 2003; Edwards 2009; Kelley and Marshall 2010). I argue that presidents attempt to build positive governing perceptions through their signing statements by engaging in administrative rhetoric. The next two testable hypotheses are based on election years overall, and the election cycle.

H6: The president is more likely to engage in administrative rhetoric during election years, and less likely during off years.

H7: The president will use symbolic tones to enhance the perception of governing leadership during midterm election years. Conversely, the president’s symbolic tone should decrease during presidential election years.

Political Conditions and Administrative Rhetoric: Approval Ratings By using presidential rhetoric to communicate their policies Whitford and Yates (2009) can signal subordinates by emphasizing programs that the White House considers a priority, but also structure their comments in order to target multiple audiences. In discussing broader theoretical applications of their work they doubt that the president can use rhetoric to control the public policy agenda. But presidents should be able to focus attention on a particular issue and frame their priorities in efforts to improve the station of the country, or a constituent group (Whitford and Yates 2009). In general, the president may be limited in their ability to change public opinion whenever they want, or persuade other political actors to follow their policy agenda (Edwards 1989, 2003; Barrett 2004; Cohen and Powell 2005; Kernell 2007; Rottinghaus 2010). But presidents are not limited in how they use rhetoric to best serve their political needs. This requires the consideration of timing, audience, format, and political conditions which all contribute to the tone in their signing statements (Medhurst 2007; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Cohen 2010; Kelley and Marshall 2010; Rottinghaus 2010; Conley 2011; Evans 2011). In addition to communicating administrative guidance to bureaucrats, they may also use their remarks to improve their public standing, or prime a policy issue so that its saliency can be used as leverage against Congress (Canes-Wrone 2006; Edwards 2009; Whitford and Yates 2009).

In protecting his “power to persuade” congressional members and executive branch bureaucrats, Neustadt (1960) states that the president needs to have the public’s support (41). Even though favorable ratings are no indication that other political actors will follow the president, when the president lacks the public’s approval government officials are more inclined to exhibit “resistance” to his leadership (Neustadt 1960, 92). Signing statements can be utilized by the White House as a way to shore up lagging approval ratings (Kelley and Marshall 2009). Unlike other unilateral tools, Kelley and Marshall (2008, 2009, 2010) understand signing statements as a means for the president to persuade the other institutions, including the federal bureaucracy depending on its rhetorical characteristics. One way is as a signal to voters and bureaucrats (Kelley and Marshall 2010; see also Cooper 2005; Korzi 2011). The other is to use signing statements as a way to increase the president’s public standing because, according to Beasley (2010), “high popularity also protects a unitary executive” against “challenges to the administrative power of the executive office (29).” In The Public Presidency, Edwards (1983) argues that public approval of the president’s policies hinges on their assessment of the government’s ability to function and deal with the problems facing the nation. One way to do this, according to Edelman (1964), is for a president to communicate to voters that he is accountable for the work of his agents, and that he accepts this responsibility. By doing so the president conveys to the public that he is up to the task of managing bureaus as they execute public policy, and sends a message to subordinates that he is the “leader” and is the principal who “should be followed (Edelman 1964, 79; Denton and Kuypers 2008; Whitford and Yates 2009).” Due to the signing statement’s malleable nature, presidents can incorporate his legislative achievements into its rhetoric and educate the public on efforts the administration has taken to meet their demands (Howell 2003; DiIulio 2007; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010; Korzi 2011). In examining the timing of major presidential policy speeches, Smith (2000) found that presidents are more likely to go public when they can control how and when their messages are delivered. More recently, Eshbaugh-Soha (2010) found evidence that suggests when the president’s approval ratings are low their response is to increase their policy-centered public speeches. In addition to relaying his policy priorities and decisions, signing statements may be one way a president can appear responsive to the public in order to earn prestige which can strengthen their executive influence and ability to manage the executive branch (Neustadt 1960; 86

Kelley and Marshall 2009; Beasley 2010; Korzi 2011). Since the White House can evaluate the president’s political conditions, control when it is beneficial for the president to issue a signing statement, and modify its language I argue that there should be a correlation between approval rating and the tone of the president’s administrative rhetoric in signing statements. For example, George H.W. Bush came into office following Reagan, who was extremely gifted in communicating with constituents, whose staff was well aware of the need and execution of presidential public relations, and was active in cutting social welfare funding (Barilleaux and Rozell 2004; Edwards 2009; Siegel 2012). Despite serving under a president who finished his final year in office with a 63% approval rating, Bush I assumed command of the Oval Office with only 51% of the public supporting his election (Barilleaux and Rozell 2004; Edwards 2009; Gallup 2012; Woolley and Peters 2012). Lukewarm public approval ratings, along with his administration’s desire to establish itself apart from Reagan’s, may have been a few of the motivating factors for Bush I when his administration chose to issue signing statements like the one for the Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act of 1989 (Bush 1989b). The introductory paragraphs of his signing statement commended Congress on the addition of a provision that will help the numerous women and children that benefit from the programs promotion of good nutrition (Bush 1989b). His statement also noted that Congress added a last minute provision, and indicated that it followed a policy priority that was outlined in his Inaugural Address (Bush 1989b). From there the president isolates the nationalization of the States’ competitive bidding systems for baby formula and notes that the program should save the government approximately $40 million dollars. His signing statement proceeds to commit the savings to fund other WIC programs (Bush 1989b). Then, twice within the signing statement’s concluding paragraph, the president underscores the policy’s execution and the role of a Cabinet head by announcing: “We will implement competitive bidding as quickly and effectively as possible so that thousands of poor, nutritionally deficient women, infants, and children may receive the help they need. The Secretary of Agriculture will make speedy implementation of this initiative a top priority. The results of the many State competitive bidding experiments

will also be evaluated for their value in increasing participation in the nationwide WIC system (Bush 1989b, 1726).”26

Overall, Bush II’s (1989b) signing statement works to center the Secretary’s, and the States’, attention onto a particular program, and provides a summary of what it entails. But it also frames the Republican president as empathetic and responsive to an issue and constituency group that is typically associated with the Democratic Party (Bush 1989b; Petrocik 1996). His rhetorical frame is also interesting because it could be viewed as uncharacteristic for a president who was regarded as more concerned with matters involving foreign policy (Aberbach 1991; Rockman 1991; Barilleaux and Rozell 2004; Siegel 2012).27 The week prior to the signing ceremony the president’s approval rating had dropped from 67% down to 59% (Gallup 2012; Woolley and Peters 2012). In the weeks following the ceremony, Bush I’s approval rating rebounded and was frequently 63% or higher until July the following year (Gallup 2012; Woolley and Peters 2012). A second example from President Clinton builds upon his predecessors’ use of the signing statement to highlight issues vital to his policy agenda, and follows Bush I’s manner of interpretive rhetoric. Clinton’s (1998c) signing statement for the Charter School Expansion Act also provides evidence that the White House had a firm grasp on this unilateral tool’s potential for rhetorical governance (Druckman and Holmes 2004; Wayne 2009). Part of this potential could be related to the White House’s continual efforts to maintain popular support for the president (Neustadt 1990; Dickinson 2000; Canes-Wrone 2004; Druckman and Holmes 2004). The president began his comments with a standard compliment of Congress, but he also took part in extensive credit claiming. Clinton (1998c) announced that the bill was “consistent with my goal” of increasing the number of charter schools which he had “long championed” in order to provide better public education and more “accountability (2093).”28 He also informed

26 H.R. 24, Statement on Signing the Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act of 1989, P.L. 101-147, November 10, 1989. 27 Because the president elaborated on the State bidding program and its evaluation process, and informed the Secretary of Agriculture that it was to be implemented as soon as possible this signing statement was coded as interpretive. 28 Quotes taken from Clinton’s (1998) Statement on Signing the Charter School Expansion Act which was a written signing statement. The president also commented on his legislative success, and spoke about congressional actions with a mixture of praise and criticism during his Remarks on Adjournment of Congress which were delivered during a ceremony on the South Lawn. 88 his audience, in this case the general public, of his effectiveness as president and policy leader by noting that when he was first elected to the office only one charter school had been established. Clinton (1998c) followed this by announcing that under his administration “more than 1,000” charter schools were established which offered parents a choice so their child could receive a better education (2093). Administratively, Clinton informed the widely recognized Department of Education that it is statutorily required to prioritize funding and favor States that evaluate the performance of charter schools “at least once every 5 years (Clinton 1998c, 2093).” In addressing the States, he stated that charter school review measures should be identical to other public schools. Additionally, he noted that the bill “will reward States” for increasing the number of “high- quality, accountable charter schools (Clinton 1998c, 2093).” Despite a Congress controlled by the GOP the president’s administrative rhetoric stressed the importance of the new program to the president’s agenda, and was purposive in identifying and detailing the Department of Education’s statutory responsibility (Clinton 1998c). Prior to Clinton’s signing of the bill his public approval rating hovered around a respectable 63-65% for four weeks (Gallup 2012; Woolley and Peters 2012). However, approval ratings are vulnerable to waxes and wanes due to a fickle public (Neustadt 1990; Light 1999; Heith 2011). Surprisingly, Clinton’s approval rating continued to stay between 65-69% in the ten weeks following his Statement on Signing the Charter School Expansion Act (Clinton 1998c; Gallup 2012; Woolley and Peters 2012).29 During that time the president issued 28 signing statements. Symbolic rhetoric is typically associated with attempts to fortify, or increase, the president’s public standing (Edwards 2003; Heith 2011). Understanding the need to maintain public support, and how arbitrary approval can be, it appears the rhetoric of this signing statement was partially designed to promote the president. Reinforcing his leadership and public approval was especially important since the midterm election was only days away. Not only did the president need to act as party leader but the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the midterm elections may have contributed to shifts in his tone.

29 H.R. 2616, Statement on Signing the Charter School Expansion Act, P.L. 105-278, October 22, 1998. 89

But it was his high approval ratings that afforded him the opportunity to limit bureaucratic discretion by stressing the conditions for the Department of Education’s evaluations (Clinton 1998c). Therefore, the conditions that favor more decisive executive leadership were present and could have contributed to the interpretive tone of Clinton’s administrative rhetoric (Edelman 1964; Edwards 1989, 2003; Whitford and Yates 2009; Wayne 2009; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010). Altogether, Clinton’s signing statement was directed toward multiple audiences, and served the president politically and administratively. He does this by commending a Republican controlled Congress, reminding the public of his campaign promises, citing the legislation as his administration’s achievement of improving the nation’s educational system, sends a message to the States, and interprets how the Department of Education should allocate program funds amongst the States (Clinton 1998c).30 Approval ratings can serve the president despite the increased competition from congressional members following the president’s comments with their own, Domke, Graham, Coe, John, and Coopman’s (2011) examination of Bush II’s strategic communications provided evidence that suggests the timing of presidential rhetoric can shield his policy preferences against the threat of other political actors. By taking into account his political environment, and acting unilaterally through signing statements, presidents can actively direct the bureaucracy. Essentially, during periods in which the president has the advantage of high public approval presidential administrative rhetoric should be significantly more interpretive or commanding because during these periods Congress is more likely to be deferential and allow the president to have “the only voice (Hoffman 2010, 33; Kelley and Marshall 2010; Domke, Graham, Coe, John, and Coopman 2011). Conversely, when the president’s approval ratings are low his signing statements should feature more symbolic references in an effort to reclaim public support for his administrative and governing leadership (Eshbaugh-Soha 2010; Korzi 2011).

H8: The president’s administrative rhetoric in signing statements should vary systematically with public approval.

30 The actual legislation specifically makes the Secretary of Education responsible for monitory the program and prioritizing funding (Charter School Expansion Act of 1998, H.R. 2616, 1998). 90

Political Conditions and Administrative Rhetoric: United vs. Divided Government This control variable was tested based on previous signing statement research that suggested the political conditions of united or divided government did influence their rhetorical content (Kelley 2003; Cooper 2005; Berry 2009; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010; Conley 2011; Evans 2011). Due to increased party polarization and the political investment that members have in the federal bureaucracy, Congress may write legislation with provisions that counter the president’s policy agenda or previous unilateral administrative actions (T. Moe 1989; Edwards and Wood 1999; Sinclair 2006; Kelley and Marshall 2010; MacDonald 2010; Evans 2011). Thus, having to work within a divided government can motivate the White House to try and wrestle control away from the president’s rivals in Congress and centralize policy discretion through various administrative strategies, such as issuing signing statements (Heclo 1977; Nathan 1983; Barilleaux 1988; Moe and Howell 1999; Burke 2000; Kelley 2003; Kelley and Marshall 2010; Evans 2011). Therefore, the last testable hypothesis relates to the political condition of united versus divided government.

H9: The tone of the president’s administrative rhetoric in signing statements should vary under the political conditions of united or divided government.

Summary The rhetorical administrative presidency links the president’s communication strategies with the institutional requirement of executing the law and administrative practices. Policy implementation is delegated to executive branch departments and agencies but, ultimately, it is the president who is held accountable (Waterman 1989; Neustadt 1990; Arnold 1998; Cronin and Genovese 2004; Weingast 2005; Patterson 2008; Lewis and Moe 2010). But how presidents have fused their rhetorical and administrative roles has been a process of building on the practices of previous administrations while tailoring it to fit their political circumstances and leadership styles (Heclo 1977; Nathan 1983; Light 1999; Burke 2000; T. Cook 2005; Jones 2005; Ponder 1999, 2005; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010). However, the underlying motivator for merging these two aspects of the presidency is to establish leadership and primary authority over public policy matters - from decision-making to execution (Stuckey 1991; Light 1995;

Zarefsky 2002; Aberbach and Peterson 2005b; Rudalevige 2005b; Weingast 2005; Waterman 1989, 2009; Eshbaugh-Soha 2008; Patterson 2008; Evans 2011; Marshall 2012). After the New Deal the federal government expanded its involvement in providing public services and the president was looked upon as the national caretaker. Additional departments, agencies, and White House staff positions were created in order to “help” the president manage these new programs and meet the demands of the people (Brownlow, Merriam, and Gulick [1937] 2006, 91; Arnold 1998; Burke 2000). A consequence that paralleled the nationalization of social services was the disconnection between public expectations place on the president and the public’s understanding of the institution’s constitutionally defined role (Lowi 1985; Langston 1995; Jones 2005; Healy 2008). These new and unrealistic demands on the institution have been compounded by the changes in presidential rhetoric and the media focusing its political news coverage on the White House (Lowi 1985; Tulis 1987; Langston 1995; Howell 2003; T. Cook 2005; Healy 2008; Shaiko 2008). By redefining the institution, a presidency-centered system has been created and generally accepted by the other branches, the public, and the press (Grossman 1995; Gregg 2000; T. Cook 2005; Jones 2005; Healy 2008). As such, modern era presidents are motivated to use as many tools available, including unilateral actions, in order to protect and achieve their policy goals. An additional means of managing the executive branch can be accomplished through their rhetoric which can enable them to communicate to thousands of bureaucrats and maintain a strong image of leadership (Jamieson 1992; Maltese 1992; Light 1995, 1999; Cooper 2002; Kelley 2007; Medhurst 2007; Pious 2008; Whitford and Yates 2009). The broad, public-centered rhetorical aspects of the presidency in the early days of the republic were regarded by the press, citizenry, legislators, and even the presidents, as beneath the office and an undignified manner in which to govern. During this period Congress was the primary branch of government because of their responsibility to create public policy (Tulis 1987; Eastland 1992). But Hoffman (2010), and others, claim that the presidency has always been a rhetorical institution (Zarefsky 2002; Medhurst 2007). But because studies on presidential rhetoric have typically narrowed the definition to presidential oral commentary it is regarded as a recent phenomenon that coincided with advancements in media technology (Tulis 1987; Eastland 1992; Lucas 2002; Zarefsky 2002; Kernell 2007; Medhurst 2007; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Laracey 2009; Hoffman 2010). Rather, presidents have always engaged in executive rhetoric 92 but not explicitly so because it was delivered in less conspicuous written formats which includes unilateral measures such as proclamations, executive orders, and signing statements (Denton and Hahn 1986; Cooper 2002; Lucas 2002; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Laracey 2009; Hoffman 2010). Presidential rhetoric and unilateral action, like the overall interpretation of the office, has progressively evolved with each administration (Tulis 1987; Moe and Howell 1999; Ponder 1999; Kagan 2001; Cooper 2002, 2005; Kelley 2003; Howell 2003; Zarefsky 2004; Marshall and Kelley 2010). As Nathan (1983) and others note, the development of the presidency is a continuous process and presidents build upon the precedents and interpretations of constitutional powers of their predecessors (Tulis 1987; Ponder 1999; Burke 2000; Rudalevige 2002; Jones 1998, 2005; Zarefsky 2004; Kernell 2007; Durant 2009b; Edwards 2009). Engaging in rhetorical appeals, and expanding and developing unilateral administrative strategies have not only become institutionalized characteristics of the office, they have intertwined (Canes-Wrone 2009; Waterman 2009; Beasley 2010; Korzi 2011). This chapter has suggested that variation in the administrative tone of signing statements should be related to organizational structure, public versus private context, and political conditions. Light (1995) and Cronin (1960) have suggested that the president’s management efforts reflect the structure of the executive branch. Eshbaugh-Soha (2010) provides evidence that suggests approval rating can influence the overall number, and content of, presidential speeches (see also Edwards 1989, 2003, 2009; Kernell 2007; Medhurst 2007; Wayne 2009; Whitford and Yates 2009). Ponder (2005) found that when presidents hold a stronger position in the political arena than Congress they are less likely to engage in broad public appeals related to governing and more likely to resort to administrative strategies (see also Kelley and Marshall 2010). Another condition rests on the president’s electoral concerns, both his and congressional members. The election calendar can influence the way in which the legislative branch and the president interact, and also dictate how the president’s fulfills his role as symbolic party leader (Neustadt 1960; Light 1995; Arnold 1999; Radin 2002; Kernell 2007; Edwards 2009; Kelley and Marshall 2010; Miroff 2010). These conditions as they relate to signing statements have already been empirically tested and the results support the expectation that they will provide some

93 explanation for the tone that the president chooses to use when discussing the bureaucracy’s role (Kelley 2003; Cooper 2005; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010; Evans 2011). Furthermore, initial work on the rhetorical presidency primarily focused on broad national appeals (Tulis 1987; Kernell 2007). But subsequent studies have shown that presidents have routinely used written messages to appeal to the public or other government officials (Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Laracey 2009; Hoffman 2010; Kelley and Marshall 2010). Presidents have also narrowed their communication strategies to select audiences by increasing the number of minor public addresses, or through presidential directives (K. Mayer 2002; Cooper 2002; Ponder 2005; Kernell 2007; Pika and Maltese 2010; Cohen 2010; Rottinghaus 2010; Eshbaugh-Soha 2010, 2011). Cohen’s (2010) work revealed that presidents have recently shifted away from broad national appeals in which to convey their messages in favor or “going local” in order to narrow their focus to a particular audience (2). This strategy has gained momentum because there are fewer competing voices thus increasing the potential of the president’s messages to reach its target, and have the intended effect (Cohen 2010; see also Rottinghaus 2010; Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2011). Since signing statements are considered part of the president’s rhetorical strategy it allows struggling presidents to go public by narrowing the medium and the message. By doing so they may be more effective in reaching their target audiences while minimizing the opportunity for political opponents counter their message (Light 1995; Medhurst 1996; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Cohen 2010; Rottinghaus 2010; Eshbaugh-Soha 2011; Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2011; Kelley, Marshall, and Watts 2011). To summarize, the organizational variations of the federal bureaucracy should motivate presidents to utilize signing statements for rhetorical administrative strategies. But presidents must also try to persuade other government officials into following their policy agenda. Presidents can exploit the versatility of signing statements by delivering them during public signing ceremonies or privately. Finally, political conditions such as the election cycle, the president’s approval rating, and united or divided government should influence variation in the tone of a signing statement’s administrative rhetoric. Because of its unique character, signing statements allow presidents to choose between broad or narrow rhetorical platforms in order to supplement their administrative capabilities. Overall, this unilateral device can be modified to serve the political and administrative needs of 94 the president (Edelman 1964; Levine 1986; Waites 1987; Hart 1987; Hinckley 1990; Van de Walle, Kampen, and Bouckaert 2005; Garrett, Thurber, Fritschler, and Rosenbloom 2006; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010; Whitford and Yates 2009; Conley 2011; Evans 2011). In order to test these hypotheses, the following chapter will offer empirical analyses of the presidential administrative rhetoric utilized in bill signing statements.

Chapter 4 The Rhetorical Administrative Presidency and Signing Statements: Changes over Time and Effects of Political Conditions

This chapter empirically tests the hypotheses outlined in the previous chapter. It begins with a description of the data set and research design. Then the chapter offers an empirical analysis and discusses the implications for the hypotheses.

Data and Research Design The data begins with Reagan’s first term and ends with George W. Bush’s second, 1981- 2008. The Reagan Administration is an important starting point because they took the initiative to shape signing statements into a more powerful unilateral device. This study’s data concludes with Bush 43’s presidency because the Obama Administration will not have completed a full term. However, President Obama’s use of signing statements will be discussed in the concluding chapter. Following Kelley (2003), signing statements will be defined as both written and verbal comments delivered by the president prior to signing legislation into law. This operational definition differs from The American Presidency Project which limits signing statements to only written commentaries (Woolley and Peters 2012). Coding will be based on signing statements obtained from U.S. Government Printing Office’s Compilation of Presidential Documents, the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, LexisNexis, and HeinOnline. They will serve as the primary sources. A keyword search using the terms “statement on signing” or “remarks on signing” was used to identify public remarks or written statements issued by the president prior to signing legislation.31 Just over 1,200 signing statements have been identified and coded for this research out of the 7,305 total number of bills signed into law during this time period. Of the 7,305 bills passed between 1981 and 2008, a dummy variable was assigned to each; bills without a signing statement were coded as 0, and those with a signing statement were coded as 1.

31 The two terms were used due to the variation of how they were listed in the Federal Register, LexisNexis, and HeinOnline. However, despite this slight difference all follow this dissertation’s operational definition and were issued by the president prior to signing a bill into law.

In order to capture a more comprehensive evaluation of signing statements as an administrative tool this dissertation will use a mixed methods approach. Basic descriptive statistics will provide summaries of time series analysis of the changes to presidential administrative rhetoric by individual presidents. Then, the empirical work employs cross-tab analysis to test the specific hypotheses. Cross-tab analysis can discern the direction and strength of correlations for nominal or ordinal level dependent and independent variables. The dissertation supplements this empirical chapter with a qualitative chapter (Chapter 5) that illustrates key ways that rhetorical administrative communication can be used in a bill signing statement.

Dependent Variables After identifying bills with signing statements, the remarks were then denoted by a simple dummy variable. Signing statements that did not mention the executive branch bureaucracy in general or specific terms were assigned a value of 0 while signing statements mentioning the bureaucracy were assigned a value of 1. The dependent variable was coded from all signing statements that mention the bureaucracy. In particular, the dependent variable was categorized into three distinct tones of communication and is coded so that 0=symbolic, 1=interpretive, and 2=command. The tone of the president’s administrative rhetoric was identified through an initial content analysis and labeled as symbolic, interpretive, or command. Signing statements were then coded according to the strongest tone in the president’s comments. After collecting the data, some bills had two signing statements, one delivered by the president during a signing ceremony and the other in written form. In these cases the president’s administrative rhetoric was coded for the written statement. The written version is presumed to be the White House’s attempt to narrow the president’s audience to only government officials (Kagan 1996; Campbell and Jamieson 2008). In addition, there are only a small number of signing statements with both a ceremonial and written versions. Symbolic administrative rhetoric is defined as a general comment made by the president that does not go beyond simple praise or using the bureaucracy as a symbol. Interpretive tones identify a specific provision in the bill and the responsibility assigned to a department or agency. Command rhetoric occurs when the president uses a signing statement to issue a direct order. 97

This tone reflects the president’s desire for subordinates to respond to a new policy, but the action requested is not a found in the statutory legislation. Command administrative rhetoric that will be of greater interest is when the president directs the bureaucracy to ignore a provision or implement it according to his construal. The latter type of command is generally, but not always, found under the category of constitutional signing statements. Unlike symbolic and interpretive tones, command rhetoric was coded only when a subordinate or agency was specifically identified by name. This restriction was applied during the coding process because this point is emphasized in the presidency and administrative communication literature as crucial for stimulating responsiveness (Dorsey 1957; Nathan 1983; Denton and Hahn 1986; Waterman 1989; Neustadt 1960, 1990; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006, 2008; Whitford and Yates 2009). Therefore, signing statements in which the president restructured a provision through his reading, but made only a general reference to the executive branch were coded as interpretive. Only when a signing statement specifically ordered a department or agency to ignore statutory requirements, or take some other action such as drafting a proposal for future legislation, was it coded for command rhetoric. The following section discusses these operational definitions in greater detail.

Symbolic Administrative Rhetoric Symbolic tones are the most basic and lack substantive administrative rhetoric concerning statutory responsibilities that are assigned to a bureau. This type of language in the signing statement could generally be characterized as providing the president’s audience with cognitive shortcuts (Hart 1987; Hinckley 1990; Pika 1999; Edwards 1983, 2009; Miroff 2010). Under this category of presidential administrative rhetoric the target audiences are voters, interest groups, or Congress, and departments or agencies are used as signals. The bureaucracy can add to campaign-style governing when the president’s policy comments simply express support for an agency and the contributions that they have made, or how the new legislation will enhance public services (Van de Walle, Kampen, Bouckaert 2005; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Vermeer 2008; Conley 2011). Typically symbolic administrative rhetoric has fallen under the classification of rhetorical signing statements and presumed to be a public relations strategy rather than an administrative one (Kelley 2003; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Pfiffner 2009a). But occasionally agencies are 98 used as symbols to accentuate the president’s objections and direct additional public pressure toward legislators. Such was the case when George H. W. Bush (1989a) criticized Congress for ignoring the Department of Interior’s suggestion for an area study prior to settling on a location for the Ulysses S. Grant National Historic Site. President Bush (1989a) concluded his statement by noting that the next time Congress considers adding national parks members should confer with the National Park Service. By relying on the agency’s expertise the president stated that policymakers would engage in “better decision-making” resulting in better legislation to “protect the integrity and viability of the National Park System (Bush 1989a, 1495).32 A symbolic tone can also be coded when the bill is framed in the signing statement as something that will help a department improve public services or as preventing administrators from effectively performing their job. The next two examples of signing statements fall under the classification of symbolic administrative rhetoric and the bureaucracy is used to reinforce the president’s main objective for commenting on the bill. However, even though Reagan and Clinton both use symbolic tones, they use their signing statement to communicate contrasting presidential signals. In signing legislation that would provide disaster relief aid to farmers, Reagan (1988) repeatedly directed credit toward his Secretary of Agriculture, Dick Lyng. After his final acknowledgement of the Cabinet member’s “leadership throughout this legislative effort” during the Rose Garden ceremony, Reagan overheard a compliment a congressional member gave to his Agriculture Secretary while they were still on stage (Reagan 1988, 1056). After signing the bill the president quoted Senator Bob Dole (R-KS) and concluded the ceremony by reiterating, “We spell relief L- y-n-g (Reagan1988, 1056).”33 Politically, this signing statement congratulated Congress for their bipartisan legislative efforts, and promoted a policy that benefitted a powerful lobbying constituency. Administratively, the repeated praise for the Secretary of Agriculture worked to draw considerable public attention and credit to Reagan’s administration through his display of governing competence and leadership. On the opposite end of the spectrum is a signing statement with symbolic administrative rhetoric that chastises Congress for its failure to complete appropriations legislation which

32 H.R. 1529, Statement on Signing the Bill Establishing the Ulysses S. Grant National Historic Site in St. Louis County, Missouri, P.L. 101-106, October 2, 1989. 33 H.R. 5015. Remarks on Signing the Disaster Assistance Act of 1988, P.L. 100-387, August 11, 1988. 99 resulted in a partial government shutdown (Clinton 1996a). In assuming a symbolic tone the president’s administrative rhetoric pointed out that the “shutdown continues to affect the Departments of Commerce, Education, Health and Human Services (HHS), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Interior, Justice, Labor, State, and Veterans Affairs (Clinton 1996a, 24).” In the same statement the president concluded with “this is no way to run the Government and deliver services and benefits to millions of Americans (Clinton 1996a, 24).”34 Overall, symbolic administrative rhetoric could be a sign from the White House that the administration supports a department or agency. But, more importantly, the president’s comments could have communicated to the clientele groups represented by the departments that they were victims of congressional incompetency (Cronin 1980; Hinckley 1990; Lowery and Brasher 2004; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Whitford and Yates 2009; Carpenter 2010; Tedin, Rottinghaus and Rodgers 2011). Despite the differences in the three presidents’ framing of the bureaucracy, these three signing statements exemplify symbolic administrative rhetoric because the rhetorical references were intended to frame their messages rather than provide policy instruction.

Interpretive Administrative Rhetoric Unlike symbolic administrative rhetoric, an interpretive tone explicitly addresses a department’s or agency’s statutory duties. This noticeable shift in the substance of the president’s language is that it is structured for policy guidance, rather than merely using the bureaucracy as a token associated with governing actions. An interpretive communication strategy explicitly draws attention to a task or section of the bill and its execution by a specific department or agency, the Cabinet, or the executive branch. As such, interpretive administrative rhetoric conforms to previous literature that single out signing statements as another way for presidents to provide policy direction to bureaucrats (Kagan 2001; Cooper 1997, 2002; Kelley 2007; Magill 2007; Kelley and Marshall 2008; Hedge 2009; Evans 2011). For example, when signing a bill a month prior to his re-election Reagan (1984) issued a signing statement that interpreted several provisions relating to marine sanctuaries. In his signing statement the president announced that “new requirements” had been added to programs

34 H.R. 1358, Statement on Signing the Seventh Continuing Resolution, P.L.104-91, January 6, 1996. 100 that were established by an earlier piece of legislation “that the Secretary of Commerce must consider when designating a marine sanctuary (Reagan 1984, 1578).”35 Despite hinting that some provisions could violate the Constitution “unless the act is given a careful narrowing construction” Reagan (1984) notes that he approves of the new procedures (1578). Specifically, the president states that any new fishing regulations will originate from the State government appointed Regional Fishery Management Councils per 16 U.S.C. 1852. Following the councils’ recommendations the Secretary is required to formally submit it “as a proposed regulation “unless [he] finds the Council’s action fails to fulfill the purposes and policies of this title and the goals and objectives of the proposed designation (Reagan 1984, 1578).”” Again, Reagan (1984) cites another provision from the original bill signed in 1972, and finishes his interpretation by restating that “it is the Secretary, not the Councils who must make the final decisions” regarding new regulations for fishing within the nation’s Fishery Conservation Zone (1578). In outlining some specifics of the regulatory policy Reagan (1984) was able to strengthen the statute’s provision that centralized control over new proposals under his political appointee. But his comments also sent a message to the States and environmental groups, and possibly reassurance to business interests who may try to influence a department’s decision making. Interpretive statements do not always involve a constitutional objection. True to his noted talent for permanent campaigning, Clinton’s signing statements occasionally assumed a commanding tone by issuing a direct order to a department or specific political appointee (Arnold 1999; Waterman, Wright and St. Clair 1999; Heclo 2000; Jones 2000; Kumar 2003; Kernell 2007). However, upon inspection of the various bills’ text, the president’s demands for action by the bureaucracy were already required by law. In his Statement on Signing the National Highway System Designation Act, Clinton lamented the “repeal of certain key safety measures (Clinton 1995e, 2064).” Later in the statement he specifically mentions that one of the provisions eliminated the “national maximum speed limit.” The president follows by recounting that he has already “instructed the Secretary of Transportation to develop an action plan to

35 S. 1102, Statement on Signing a Bill Concerning Marine Sanctuaries and Maritime Safety, P.L. 98-498, October 19, 1984; In his signing statement Reagan (1984) referred to the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972. 101 promote safety consistent with my Administration’s continuing commitment to highway safety (Clinton 1995e, 2065-2066).”36 At first glance it appears that Clinton is dictating an additional task for his Cabinet official as a response to the congressional repeal of the nationally mandated speed limit. Despite his posturing, section 347 of Public Law 104-59 already required the Secretary of Transportation to conduct a safety study in conjunction with any of the States that chose to raise their speed limits and present the final report to Congress.37 The caveat added by the president’s signing statement is that the report should be “consistent” with his Administration’s policy preferences (Clinton 1995e, 2066). This statement is coded as interpretive because it directs the Secretary’s attention to one particular assignment within the 68-page bill. An additional signal reminds the Secretary of Transportation to keep the administration’s agenda in mind when carrying out the mandated task. On rare occasions the president uses his prerogative power to interpret legislation and support the statutory mandates issued by Congress. In signing H.R. 3914, Reagan (1983) reminded the Secretary of Agriculture that he vetoed an earlier version of the bill because it did not allow the Cabinet official “sufficient time to collect and evaluate critical information on the harvest” prior to making changes to departmental wheat, and feed grain programs (1362). But the president informed the Secretary that the bill he was signing gave him ample time, specifically 30 days, to gather the information necessary for making the appropriate adjustments (Reagan 1983). 38 Other times the president needs to use his executive power to determine which agency Congress meant to name in a provision before he can proceed with disassembling the new statute. Such was the case when George W. Bush (2002a) pointed out that “section 2(4)(G) of the Act defines as a Federal law enforcement agency the “Coastal Security Service.” Because no such agency exists, and the principal agency with coastal security functions is the U.S. Coast Guard, the executive branch shall construe the provision as referring to the Coast Guard (795).”39 After pointing out the legislators’ blunder, and confirming for the Coast Guard that it was indeed

36 S. 440, Statement on Signing the National Highway System Designation Act of 1995, P.L. 104-59, November 28, 1995. 37 Ibid. 38 H.R. 3914, Statement on Signing H.R. 3914 Into Law, P.L.98-100, September 29, 1983. 39 H.R. 3525, Statement on Signing the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, P.L. 107-173, May 14, 2002. 102 the organization responsible for the new policy’s execution, the president proceeded to challenge the constitutionality of three other provisions (Bush 2002a). Presidents can also adapt their interpretive tone and delivery depending on their prerogative. Another one of Clinton’s signing statements followed the previously mentioned example of Reagan and was perhaps more coy in its delivery, which is also why it was coded as interpretive and not command rhetoric (see also Savage 2008, 235).40 For example, in his objections to the appointments process of a new commission Clinton is less assertive by stating that: “If this provision were construed to require the Secretary of the Interior to appoint employees of specified agencies to the Commission, it would violate the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. Accordingly, I will interpret this provision as merely requiring that the Secretary’s appointees represent these agencies by endeavoring to understand and convey the agencies’ concerns to the Commission. Under this construction, section 403 will not impermissibly restrict the Secretary’s discretion to select and appoint the members of the Commission (Clinton 1998a, 2278).”41

It has been argued that these types of signing statements go beyond mere interpretation and effectively alter the law and violate the Constitution by rewriting legislation (May 1998; Cooper 2005; Pfiffner 2008; Bumgarner and Newswander 2011; Spitzer 2012). However, the key difference is that these contributions to the literature are assessing the signing statement as a whole. The operational definition for ‘interpretive’ in this study is narrowly defined and is applied only to signing statements that draw the attention of executive branch subordinates to an isolated provision or required action. Under this strict operational definition any presidential construal of legislation that sounds more like a suggestion, rather than the president explicitly ordering subordinates to refrain from following the provision as written, will be coded as interpretive. Moreover, as demonstrated by the Clinton examples, an interpretive tone is not exclusive to signing statements containing constitutional objections.

40 A similar point was made by Savage (2008) when describing the differences between Reagan, Clinton, and the George W. Bush administration’s use of signing statements. 41 H.R. 3910, Statement on Signing the Automobile National Heritage Area Act, P.L. 105-355, November 6, 1998; In his signing statement, Clinton (1998a) was referring to the Delaware and Lehigh National Heritage Corridor Commission that was created in order provide representation for State agencies as specified in section 403(a)(2) of H.R. 3910. 103

Command Administrative Rhetoric An initial reading from a sample set of presidential signing statements revealed that bureaucrats may be ordered to take a course of action on behalf of the president. A command tone is coded when the president exercises his position and authority and directs specific executive branch secretaries or agencies to engage in a task beyond what is specified in the legislation. For this type of command, the bill was accessed through Thomas.gov or the Government Printing Office (GPO), and the provisions in question were reviewed in order to determine whether a signing statement should or should not fall under this category. In other instances command rhetoric from the president included orders for a department or Cabinet head to submit an additional report to the White House, draft new legislation, or consult with the Attorney General prior to implementation. Command statements may also take the president’s interpretation or objection beyond providing administrative guidelines or highlighting policy preferences. These types of signing statements are what have caused concern among scholars because they explicitly direct subordinates to refrain from following the law as written (Cooper 2005; Krent 2008; Pfiffner 2008; Evans 2011; Spitzer 2012). However, these authors were looking at the constitutional objections by the president, whereas this dissertation is more concerned with finding clearly stated directives. While several command statements are found in what have been categorized as a constitutional signing statement, there were a few instances when presidents issued a directive in those classified as “rhetorical (Kelley 2003, 49; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010).” For example, following their objections to Congress’s inclusion of a legislative veto, Reagan and Clinton both instructed their Cabinet heads to disregard the provisions they declared unconstitutional. In his signing statement Reagan declared that the “Secretary of Transportation will not, consistent with this objection, regard himself as legally bound” by section 114(e) (Reagan 1981b, 1207).42 Similarly, Clinton instructed his Secretary of Transportation “to regard any lists submitted pursuant to section 31134(c)(2) as advisory” because the “Constitution prohibits the Congress from sharing in the power to appoint officers” with the exception of confirmation by the Senate (Clinton 1994, 1142). Then, in the next paragraph Clinton directed

42 S. 1192, Statement on Signing the Union Station Redevelopment Act of 1981, P.L. 97-125, December 29, 1981. 104 his Secretary of Labor to “disregard section 42104(c)” because of a legislative veto that Congress included in the provision (Clinton 1994, 1142).”43 This form of command is interesting due to the concern over constitutional objections and the subsequent implications for bureaucratic subordinates following George W. Bush’s administration (Cooper 2005; Savage 2006, 2008; Pfiffner 2008; Waterman 2009). While Bush 43’s use of signing statements to redefine legislation were excessive, previous administrations were, more often, clearer on what provisions were not to be enforced and which officials should heed their orders. However, commands may serve the president in other respects, such as making recommendations for future legislation or schedule meetings with members of Congress to reaffirm the president’s policy position. Bush 41 rolled both strategies into a signing statement that conveyed his concern over an appropriations protocol that would allow an organization to collect money from a fund if Congress did not allocate appropriations within a certain time period. Bush I’s protest asserted that this procedure bypassed the standard practice of appropriations and could establish an undesirable and unacceptable precedent (Bush 1990). The response provided by his signing statement simultaneously included an order to subordinates that interact with legislators and a warning to Congress: “I have directed the Secretary of the Interior, the Attorney General, and others to communicate in the future a firm policy against the inclusions of such provisions in future legislation, the violation of which will lead to Executive disapproval (Bush 1990, 1842).”44

Along the same lines as his father, Bush II ordered the Director of OMB to “submit immediately on my behalf” recommendations for future legislation correcting a subsection of the Department of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (Bush 2003, 1502). The president notes that the particular subsection mentioned in the bill does not exist in the United States Code (Bush 2003). He continues his order by stating that “if corrective legislation is not enacted before execution” the Attorney General is to provide legal consultation to the Secretary of the Interior on proceeding to implement the policy despite “the errors it contains (Bush 2003,

43 H.R. 1758, Statement on Signing Transportation Legislation, P.L. 103-272, July 5, 1994. 44 H.R. 5308, Statement on Signing the Fort Hall Indian Water Rights Act of 1990, P.L. 101-602, November 16, 1990. 105

1502).”45 As these examples show, command administrative rhetoric occurred across all four of the administrations, from Reagan to Bush II, with variation in the commands being given. From the signing statements coded as issuing a “command,” the analysis delves into examples that illustrate the way in which this unilateral device is employed as an administrative tool. If the president is successful, the target agency will have carried out the order given in the signing statement. This part of my analysis should support or alleviate the concerns some scholars have regarding the potentially negative effects signing statements have on policy implementation (Tiefer 1994; Cooper 2005, 2007; Fisher 2006; Pfiffner 2009a; Barilleaux 2012). While interpretative tones serve the purpose of centralizing control and limiting bureaucratic discretion, they do not require subordinates to act outside of what is written in the statues. However, the commands that are explicitly delivered in a president’s signing statement have the potential to put the bureaucracy at odds with the ethos of public administration, or place an agency in a precarious position between Congress and the president. Pfiffner (2009a) has written that signing statements are used to increase presidential power, but they also require bureaucrats to violate administrative ethics. In contrast, Rudalevige (2009a) has been reserved in making an assumption that signing statements affect bureaucratic behavior without additional study.

Independent Variables While several scholars have contributed to the literature on signing statements and provided observations about their use as an administrative tool, few have provided detailed empirical evidence (Cooper 2005; Kelley 2007; Magill 2007; Durant 2009a; Pfiffner 2008, 2009a; Rudalevige 2009a; Waterman 2009; Bumgarner and Newswander 2011; Evans 2011; Korzi 2011; Marshall 2012). The hypotheses and key independent variables from Chapter 3 revolve around three main conditions. These relate to the structure of bureaucratic organization, the context of the signing statement (public ceremony vs. private signing), and political conditions, all of which may affect the tone of the president’s administrative communication.

45 H.R. 2691, Statement on Signing the Department of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2004, P.L. 108-108, November 10, 2003. 106

Results Frequencies and Descriptive Statistics: 1981-2008 Overall, the results show that presidents use signing statements sparingly considering the thousands of bills passed during their terms in office. Of the 7,305 total number of bills passed from 1981-2008, only 1,207 or 17%, prompted the president to issue a statement upon signing them into law. Of those bills that were marked for commentary, only 36% fall under the category of constitutional signing statement. More often than not, it seems that signing statements have been utilized more for their rhetorical benefits than to challenge Congress or assert the president’s authority (Kelley 2003; Korzi 2011). The raw data in Table 1 provide a clearer and more balanced picture of signing statements as an administrative tool. Of all the signing statements issued between 1981 and 2008, 75% make some mention of executive branch bureaucracies. The remaining 303 signing statements issued during this period did not mention the executive branch bureaucracy in specific or general terms. Considering the relatively even split between rhetorical and constitutional signing statements that mention the federal bureaucracy there is evidence that the presidents consistently used signing statements to send policy signals to multiple audiences or communicate policy guidance to subordinates. But, while these numbers are interesting the results also indicate that categorizing signing statements as rhetorical or constitutional, like previous studies, it is largely unnecessary for this dissertation’s topic (Dessayer 1990; Herz 1994; Kelley 2003; Cooper 2005; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010; Pfiffner 2009a; Evans 2011). As Table 1 shows, presidential administrative rhetoric is not exclusive to one type of signing statement. The table suggests there is important variation in bureaucratic communication across both types of signing statements.

Table 1: Signing Statements that Mention the Executive Branch Bureaucracy, 1981-2008 Total No. Signing Statements that Rhetorical Constitutional of Signing mention the Bureaucracy Signing Statements, Signing Statements, Statements mention Bureaucracy mention Bureaucracy 75% 57% 43% 1,207 (n=904) (n=517) (n=387) *Percentages were rounded up

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Of the four presidents, Table 2 demonstrates that George W. Bush delivered the highest percentage of signing statements that address executive branch subordinates in some manner. However, given that the institution is built upon precedent, and given the Bush II Administration’s adherence to the unitary executive theory, the numbers are not surprising (Cooper 2005; Jones 2005; Kelley 2006, 2007; Pfiffner 2008, 2009a; Adler 2011; Ellis 2012).

Table 2: Signing Statements that Mention the Bureaucracy by Administration, 1981-2008 Reagan Bush I Clinton Bush II Totals Mention 69% 75% 74% 85% 75% (n=221) (n=177) (n=312) (n=194) (n=904) No Mention 31% 25% 26% 15% 25% (n=98) (n=60) (n=110) (n=35) (n=303) Totals 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% (n= 319) (n=237) (n=422) (n=229) (n=1207) *Percentages were rounded up

Figure 1 illustrates the percentage of symbolic, interpretive, and command tones in signing statements issued from 1981-2008. As such, it provides insight the first hypothesis, namely that the percentage of signing statements that mention executive branch bureaucracies has increased over time. This consistency is also presented in Table 2 which suggests that signing statements have become a tool that serves the needs of the rhetorical administrative presidency. The argument that signing statements are used by the White House as a means for administrative communication is especially supported by the data because out of 1,207 bill signing statements that have been issued between the Reagan and Bush II Administrations, 75% mentioned the federal bureaucracy. Figure 1 also provides support for the second hypothesis, because the percentage of interpretive signing statements did increase during most of this period, whereas the use of symbolic and command rhetoric remains relatively consistent over the years.

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Figure 1:Figure Administrative 1:Distribution Rhetoric Bureaucratic and Tone: OvertimeTone in Signing Percentages, Statements, 1981-200 1981-20088

1982 1986 1992

1980 1984 1988 1990 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 Year

symbolic interpretive command

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Figure 2: Signing Statements and Tone of Administrative Rhetoric: Frequencies, 1981-2008

Figure 2 shows the raw frequencies of signing statements for all three categories with the president’s tone noticeably varying from year to year. Again, the second hypothesis is supported until the last two years of Bush II’s presidency. As illustrated in Figure 2, there is a dramatic falloff in the number of signing statements with interpretive administrative rhetoric at the end of his second term. This remarkable shift could be attributed to initial newspaper articles written by journalist Charlie Savage in 2006, devoted to Bush II’s use of signing statements, and the subsequent avalanche of media reports that followed. The increased attention by the press may have prompted the White House to alter their use of this unilateral tool as a means for presidential administrative communication (Moe and Howell 1999; Savage 2006; Kelley 2007; Kelley and Marshall 2010). In 2006, Bush II delivered 32 signing statements that were identified with administrative rhetoric and 22 were coded as interpretive. In each of his last two years in

110 office, he only issued 11 administrative signing statements, with most falling under the category of symbolic.

Table 3: Administrative Rhetoric by President, 1981-2008 Reagan Bush I Clinton Bush II Totals Symbolic 52% 31% 50% 36% 44% (n=115) (n=54) (n=157) (n=69) (n=395) Interpretive 38% 54% 43% 55% 46% (n=85) (n=96) (n=133) (n=106) (n=420) Command 10% 15% 7% 9% 10% (n=21) (n=27) (n=22) (n=19) (n=89) Total Number 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% (n=221) (n=177) (n=312) (n=194) (n=904) *Percentages were rounded up

Table 3 offers a breakdown of communication tone by the four presidential administrations covered in this analysis. The data suggests that Reagan and Clinton preferred to use references to the bureaucracy in their signing statements for symbolic purposes. Bush I and Bush II’s signing statements featured more substantive administrative communication and used this medium to interpret legislation or communicate direct orders to subordinates. But due to their flair for public governing and rhetorical abilities, it is no surprise that Reagan and Clinton’s signing statements were higher in symbolic references to the bureaucracy. Symbolic administrative rhetoric is coded when the president praises a department or agency or notes how it is affected by the legislation. On the surface, this category could be viewed as lumping in references to the bureaucracy with various other political buzz words tested by polling focus groups (Tulis 1987; Jamieson 1988; Maltese 1992; Kumar 2003; Medhurst 2007; Heith 2011). But the symbolic tones of presidential administrative rhetoric can frame policy disputes between the president and Congress and perhaps improve their public standing (Neustadt 1960, 1990; Howell 2003; DiIulio 2007; Denton and Kuypers 2008; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2009, 2010; Korzi 2011). For example, Clinton used the Department of Defense (DOD) to pressure the Republican controlled Congress for legislation giving him line-item veto authority (Clinton 1995c; Petrocik 1996). In his statement Clinton accused Congress of wasteful spending by announcing that he was “concerned” because “Congress has chosen to spend $70 million on unneeded projects 111

(Clinton 1995c, 1761).” The president elaborated his point by announcing that the “Defense Department has not identified these projects as priorities, and they will not help improve the quality of life for our service members (Clinton 1995c, 1761).”46 In using the DOD, Clinton was able to negatively frame the Republicans and link his legislative appeal to a well-known and visible department. The symbolic tone surrounding the DOD also allowed the Democratic president to present himself as more concerned with unnecessary government spending and the well-being of military personnel than his congressional counterparts of the GOP, who are typically understood by voters as fiscally conservative and supportive of Defense (Clinton 1995c; Petrocik 1996). The latter observation is further supported by the president’s rhetoric which claims that the bill meets his “full request for” construction and improvements to military family housing projects (Clinton 1995c, 1761). Two other signing statements in which Clinton lobbied for the line-item veto authority made general references to his commitment to “shrink the Federal bureaucracy,” and that one of his first acts in office was to issue an executive order that prohibited “Federal agencies from imposing non-statutory unfunded mandates” onto “State and local governments without consultations first (Clinton 1995a, 73, 1995b, 382).”47 Both were delivered during signing ceremonies. Incidentally, prior to these types of frames Clinton’s approval rating hovered around 45% (Gallup 2012; Woolley and Peters 2012). Over the following weeks, his public approval steadily rose into the mid to high-50s, and he signed the Line Item Veto Act six months later. Therefore, even when it is used simply as a cue to alert voters and Congress, the president’s administrative rhetoric may be used to accumulate political leverage (Neustadt 1960, 1990; Zarefsky 2004; Denton and Kuypers 2008; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2009, 2010; Korzi 2011). Even though symbolic tones were more prominent in the two presidents’ signing statements, Figure 2 shows that Reagan and Clinton finished their tenures by becoming more assertive in using signing statements for administrative communication. Reagan issued more signing statements with administrative rhetoric during his last year in office, compared to his

46 H.R. 1817, Statement on Signing the Military Construction Appropriations Act, 1996, P.L. 104-32, October 3, 1995. 47 S. 2, Remarks on Signing the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, P.L. 104-1; January 23, 1995; S. 1, Remarks on Signing the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, P.L. 104-4; March 22, 1995. 112 previous years, and over 40% featured interpretive policy comments.48 In comparison, Clinton issued his second highest number of signing statements that mentioned the bureaucracy during his last year in office with 54, and over half of them employed interpretive administrative communications.49 Overall, the variation between and within each administration suggests that there are conditions that affect the president’s administrative communications in signing statements. Furthermore, while constitutional signing statements are heavily associated with executive branch management, this medium’s symbolic administrative rhetoric should not be dismissed because it could provide some insight into the presidency and public governing (Cooper 2005; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Pfiffner 2009a; Durant 2009a; Evans 2011; Korzi 2011). Now the empirical analysis moves to test hypotheses related to organizational structure, signing statement context, and political conditions.

Organizational Conditions and Administrative Rhetoric: Agency Level, 1981-2008 The first variable related to executive branch organization tests whether or not signing statements are used aid the president in influencing policy execution despite the numerous layers of the federal government. Light (1995, 7) referred to this as the “thickening” of the executive branch and subsequent research suggests that presidents use rhetorical appeals in order to overcome this administrative barrier (Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Whitford and Yates 2009). For administrative communications that addressed provisions involving the EOP and Cabinet bureaus the data was coded with a 0.50 For signing statements in which the president’s strongest tone was directed at a sub-Cabinet or independent agency only, or involved multiple, unrelated bureaucratic organizations ranging in level, with overlapping jurisdictions a value of 1 was assigned. Generic references to the executive branch were coded with the value of 9.

48 Also shown in Figure 1. 49 Clinton delivered 56 signing statements that mentioned bureaucratic subordinates in 1996, during his bid for re- election. 50 This variable also included instances when the president’s rhetoric involved a Cabinet department and a sub- Cabinet agency that fell under its authority. 113

Table 4: Organizational Conditions and Administrative Rhetoric: Agency Level, 1981-2008 EOP/Cabinet Sub/Ind/Multiple Totals Symbolic 42% 48% 45% (n=175) (n=195) (n=370) Interpretive 42% 46% 44% (n=175) (n=186) (n=361) Command 16% 6% 11% (n=64) (n=25) (n=89) Totals 100% 100% 100% (n=414) (n=406) (n=820) *Percentages were rounded up Pearson’s χ2=44.623, p<0.000 and Cramer’s V=.157

As expected the Pearson’s chi-square supports the third hypothesis and there is a significant relationship between the tone used in a signing statement and agency level. However, as Table 4 also shows, it is a weak relationship with a Cramer’s V score of only .157. Nonetheless, the data suggests that president utilize signing statements in order to sort out jurisdictional overlap and “stop fires” before they start when legislation requires that various bureaucratic organizations work together (Neustadt 1990, 131). The percentages in Table 4 also suggest presidents reserve command rhetoric for subordinates that are close to the Oval Office and can monitor the actions taken by agencies that fall under his Cabinet Secretaries’ authority. The frequent occurrence of signing statement administrative rhetoric devoted to Cabinet-level bureaus validates the examination of these departments as a potential predictor variable.

Organizational Conditions and Administrative Rhetoric: Inner vs. Outer Cabinet Departments, 1981-2008 The second independent variable related to the organization of the executive branch follows Cronin’s (1980) definition of Inner and Outer Cabinets. In The State of the Presidency, he presents a case explaining the variation between the executive branch departments and refers to them as “a cabinet of unequals (Cronin 1980, 274).” His overall point is that due to their organizational missions, Inner cabinets such as Defense and State are more attuned to the president’s policies (Cronin 1980). Conversely, Outer Cabinets are more likely to be torn between the president, Congress, and interest groups due to their “advocacy” roles and representation of the nation’s clientele groups (Cronin 1980, 283; see also T. Moe 1989).

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Therefore, the data is expected to show that presidents take advantage of the unilateral and administrative nature of signing statements to wrest discretion from Outer Cabinets. After coding for the strongest tone identified in signing statements that mention the bureaucracy, the data was then coded according to the highest ranking department related to that specific tone. Inner Cabinet departments and Secretaries are coded with the value of 0, and consist of organizations whose missions span across domestic and foreign policies. Within this grouping established by Cronin (1980) are the departments of State, Justice, Defense, and the Treasury. Because it is responsible for national security, and conforms to the characteristics of the other bureaus under this category, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was also included in this category. Outer Cabinet departments and Secretaries were assigned the value of 1. These departments represent clientele groups supported by domestic policies, and include Agriculture, Interior, Transportation, HHS, Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Labor, Commerce, Energy, and Education (Cronin 1980, 277). Since the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) was moved to the Cabinet in 1989, and has a strong client base, it was added as an Outer Department (U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs 2012). All other signing statements in which the strongest tone taken by the president did not involve a Cabinet department were coded with a value of 9.

Table 5: Organizational Conditions and Administrative Rhetoric: Inner vs. Outer Departments, 1981-2008 Inner Departments Outer Departments Totals Symbolic 44% 43% 43% (n=130) (n=119) (n=249) Interpretive 39% 50% 45% (n=117) (n=138) (n=255) Command 17% 7% 12% (n=52) (n=19) (n=71) Totals 100% 100% 100% (n=299) (n=276) (n=575) *Percentages were rounded up Pearson’s χ2 =16.66, p<.000, and Cramer’s V=.17

The empirical test results offer mixed support for the fourth hypothesis and are presented in Table 5. The data suggests that there is a weak, but highly significant, relationship between the tone of the president’s administrative rhetoric and whether or not he is communicating with

115 an Inner or Outer department. As predicted, the president is significantly more likely to use interpretive administrative rhetoric when an Outer cabinet department is involved in the policy he is signing. Interpretive signing statements were expected for Outer Cabinet subordinates because of their relationship with clientele groups, and congressional members’ electoral interests in domestic policy (Cronin 1980; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; T. Moe 1989; Meier 2000; Tichenor 2010). The results in Table 5 also suggest that the president is more likely to issue commands in his signing statements when communicating with Inner departments. These results may reflect the importance of these departments based on their respective involvement with national security, foreign, and economic policies which are widely viewed by the Oval Office, and the public as the modern and post-modern president’s domain (Rossiter 1960; Wildavsky [1966], 1969; Cronin 1980; Foyle 1999; Wood 2004; Barilleaux 1988, 2005; Kernell 2007). However, the results could also relate to the work by Evans (2011) who found that presidents will issue signing statements for legislation that restricts the activities of agencies involved in foreign or defense policies. The high percentage of signing statements with symbolic rhetoric that mention Inner and Outer departments could be evidence of the White House using these bureaus for campaign-style governing so an individual president could appear strong and “presidential (Cronin 1980; Wood 2004, 573).” Along with policy areas that the public associates with presidential leadership, Inner departments are also widely recognized which would make them viable symbols for presidential administrative rhetoric (Hart 1987; Foyle 1999; Wood 2004). Visibility and clientele relations could explain the why presidents also use Outer Cabinet departments for symbolic messaging in their signing statements (Cronin 1980; Edwards and Wayne 1985; Van de Walle, Kampen, and Bouckaert 2005).

Context and Administrative Rhetoric: Public Ceremonies vs. Private Signings, 1981-2008 An independent variable was also coded for the contexts in which presidents can deliver their signing statements. At times the White House will combine campaign-style governing strategies to unilateral action by staging a signing ceremony. In order to determine if the context of the medium affects the tone of the president’s administrative communication, signing statements were coded and assigned a value of 0 if the president’s comments were delivered as 116 part of a signing ceremony. By doing so presidents are choosing to publically display their governing leadership (Cooper 2002; Howell 2003; Medhurst 2007; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Cohen 2010). However, the president can also choose to narrow his message and quietly issue a written signing statement. To represent this variable, written signing statements were assigned a value of 1. In cases where the president issued two signing statements, one delivered during a signing ceremony and another privately and in written form, the president’s rhetoric was coded for the written signing statement. This follows academic and government research which has also opted to examine the written version because the president will use this format for more substantive remarks about a new policy (Campbell and Jamieson 2008; GAO 2007a, 2007b, 2008; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2009, 2010; Woolley and Peters 2012). The decision is also based on this dissertation’s coding for the strongest tone associated with a presidential signing statement’s administrative rhetoric. Signing statements delivered during a ceremony are expected to be significantly higher in symbolic administrative rhetoric compared to written signing statements. Presidents are expected to reserve the majority of their interpretive and command administrative rhetoric for written signing statements which have been noted as more “technical” in nature (Campbell and Jamieson 2008, 205).

Table 6: Context and Administrative Rhetoric: Public Ceremonies vs. Private Signings, 1981- 2008 Symbolic Interpretive Command Totals Public Ceremony 31% 2% 9% 15% (n=122) (n=10) (n=8) (n=140) Written 69% 98% 91% 85% (n=273) (n=410) (n=81) (n=764) Total Number 100% 100% 100% 100% (n=395) (n=420) (n=89) (n=904) *Percentages were rounded up Pearson’s χ2 =129.5565, p<.000, and Cramer’s V=.3786

Table 6 presents results that support hypothesis 5. There is a highly significant relationship between the signing context and type of administrative rhetoric. Still, the relationship between ceremonial versus written signing statements and the president’s administrative tone is relatively weak. Nonetheless, symbolic administrative rhetoric occurs far more often in verbal signing statements issued at public ceremonies than it does in the written 117 context. The president may mention an agency in order to send a message to interested constituent groups that his administration supports their policy mission, and expects political backing in return. As illustrated in the examples given earlier involving Bush I (1990) and Clinton (1996c), the president may also use departments or agencies to frame his policy agenda against a recalcitrant Congress. However, presidents have also used public signing ceremonies to commend the work of the executive branch. By doing so the president can use the public platform to curry favor from departments or agencies that may be resistant to the administration, signal powerful lobbying groups, or both. This may have been the case when Reagan showered praise upon his Agriculture Secretary during a Rose Garden ceremony (Reagan 1988). But the White House is not the only location for signing ceremonies. Of all the public ceremonies within this data set, there were 12 occasions on which the president used an agency’s headquarters as the setting for signing, and commenting on new legislation. By travelling to his subordinates’ home turf the president adds another dimension to the message he is sending to the public and the federal government’s civil service personnel (see Medhurst 1996, 2007; Cohen 2010). The results in Table 6 also suggest that presidents reserve the use of written signing statements to communicate more detailed policy guidance for bureaucratic subordinates. Both interpretive and command administrative rhetoric occurs predominately within this staging context. By taking a more private approach to delivering policy direction the president can narrow his audience and the structure of his administrative rhetoric. It also allows the president to challenge provisions and instruct bureaucratic actions in public, albeit limited, view in order to claim transparent governing practices and protect the administration against possible criticism in the future (Cass and Strauss 2007; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Korzi 2011; Barilleaux 2012). This position is supported by the majority of written signing statements that feature command rhetoric. Under this category, the administrative tone taken by the president may violate public administration ethics or manipulate the Constitution by ordering a subordinate to refrain from implementing a provision as it was written (Cooper 2005; Pfiffner 2009a). The benefit of giving this type of policy direction through a written signing statement may be that it publicizes to the agent, and rest of the executive branch, that a directive that has been given which is essential for compliance according to Neustadt (1960, 1990).

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Surprisingly, 69% of all signing statements coded for symbolic tones were delivered without a public signing ceremony. While this initial examination of the rhetorical administrative presidency cannot fully explain this result, this result could simply be the president narrowing his signal to advocacy groups on policy that may not have broad public appeal. Since signing statements have become institutionalized the president may also be using this format and a laudatory symbolic tone to inform the executive branch of his support. Again, by taking this tone the president could use an agency to frame a policy dispute with Congress, and as Weingast (2005) states, place bureaucrats in the center of inter-institutional battles. Additional research will be taken in order to determine which executive branch organizations are the target of these types of written signing statements. Based on the results of Wood and Waterman (1994), who found that the tone of the president’s speeches had an effect on responsiveness, signing statements may be a way for the president to exercise persuasion (see also Pious 1979; Neustadt 1960, 1990; Waterman 1989; Arnold 1998; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Whitford and Yates 2009; Kelley and Marshall 2010). If the president is reserving symbolic rhetoric for bureaus whose loyalties are suspect, such as Outer departments or independent agencies, it may be a subtle attempt to persuade these organizations to accept their leadership.

Political Conditions and Administrative Rhetoric: Election Years, 1981-2008 Presidents try to make the most of their rhetorical opportunities whether they are trying to exhibit strong leadership for re-election, congratulate allies in Congress during midterm election years, or boost their public image during their last year in office. Signing statements provide them this opportunity, as well as work to secure the president’s policy agenda during years ripe with uncertainty (Neustadt 1960, 1990; Dickinson 2003; Howell 2003; Kelley and Marshall 2010). Years in which the public go to the polls could result in presidents winning or losing their office, change the partisan makeup of Congress, or when the president is serving the end of a second term and the Oval Office may be won by the opposition party could affect the policy functions of the executive branch. As such, the conditions associated with election years could motivate presidents to engage in executive leadership rhetoric (Neustadt 1960; Jamieson 1992; Langston 1995; Kelley 2003; Kernell 2007; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Patterson 2003; Canes- Wrone and Shotts 2004; Thurber 2009; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010). Therefore, election years were the fourth independent variable to be tested as a predictor for changes in the 119 president’s administrative rhetoric. Using a dummy variable, non-election years were assigned a value of 0 and both presidential and midterm election years were coded with a value of 1.

Table 7: Political Conditions and Administrative Rhetoric: Election Years, 1981-2008 Symbolic Interpretive Command Totals Election Years 59% 63% 72% 62% (n=234) (n=264) (n=64) (n=562) Non-Election 41% 37% 28% 38% Years (n=161) (n=156) (n=25) (n=342) Totals 100% 100% 100% 100% (n=395) (n=420) (n=89) (n=904) *Percentages were rounded up Pearson’s χ2 =5.1156, p<.077, and Cramer’s V=.0752

The results of Table 7 show there is no conspicuous difference in the percentages of signing statements used to communicate with the bureaucracy with respect to tone and the election cycle. So the null was accepted for the sixth hypothesis. To determine if there was a difference within the election cycle an additional variable for election years coded for presidential, and midterm election years. Research on presidential rhetoric and unilateral action has presented evidence that suggests that this political condition can influence presidential behavior (Light 1995, 1999; Howell 2003; Barrett 2004; Kernell 2007; Berry 2009; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2009, 2010). In order to analyze the effect of the election cycle on presidential administrative rhetoric for presidential election years and midterm election years were coded and assessed separately. Surprisingly, this condition still had no significant effect on the tone of the president’s administrative rhetoric as predicted in this dissertation’s seventh hypothesis. The analysis for presidential election years yielded a Pearson’s chi-square of 1.82, with a Cramer’s V of .045. The analysis for midterm election years yielded a Pearson’s chi-square of 1.13 with a Cramer’s V of .0354. Together, these results could suggest that signing statements are viewed by the White House as a unilateral management tool that should be used consistently. By regularly using this approach to executive communication presidential administrations could capitalize on the institutionalization of signing statements. Keeping subordinates attuned to presidential instruction with the passage of new legislation seemingly takes priority irrespective of the

120 election calendar (Kagan 2001; Cooper 2002; Kinkopf 2006; Kernell 2007; Magill 2007; Whitford and Yates 2009).

Political Conditions and Administrative Rhetoric: Presidential Approval Ratings, 1981-2008 The last variable expected to have a significant effect on the tone of a signing statement’s administrative rhetoric was the president’s approval rating. A significant result would provide evidence supporting the signing statement as a way for president’s to demonstrate executive leadership and influence bureaucratic responsiveness, and also public support. This is important because Neustadt (1960, 1990) and others have stated that it is easier for the president to influence compliance from subordinates when his policies are strongly endorsed by voters (Light 1995; Arnold 1998; Eshbaugh-Soha 2008; Whitford and Yates 2009; Beasley 2010; Rottinghaus 2010). By varying the tone of his policy comments the president can attempt to improve his public image as the nation’s Chief Executive. Adjusting his administrative communication according to current public approval ratings may require symbolic references in order to signal his supporters that his administration is concerned about their interests (Feldman and March 1981; Hinckley 1990; Hubbell 1991; Neustadt 1960, 1990; Golden 2000; Van de Walle, Kampen, Bouckaert 2005; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Garrett, Thurber, Fritschler, and Rosenbloom 2006.; Whitford and Yates 2009). But when the president has political capital to spare he may use the public’s support to unilaterally advance his policy agenda (Light 1999; Edwards 1989, 2003, 2009; Kelley and Marshall 2010; Domke, Graham, Coe, John, and Coopman 2011). For this dissertation the presidential approval ratings were divided into four groupings. The lowest ratings, 0-25% were assigned a value of 0, and when the president’s approval fell within the ranges of 26-50% that data was coded with a 1. When the president’s approval rating was relatively high and fell between 51-75% it was coded a value of 2. During the rare instances when approval numbers fell within the highest range of 76-100% the approval variable was coded a 3. The presidents’ approval rating for this study reflects the most recent Gallup poll data available prior to the bill signing. The most recent approval ratings were chosen because of the White House’s keen attention to such reports, and the ability of the communications staff to respond quickly to changes in public opinion and adjust the president’s rhetoric accordingly

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(Kumar 2003; Edwards 1989, 2003, 2009; Eshbaugh-Soha 2010; Kelley and Marshall (2008, 2009, 2010; Gallup 2012).

Table 8: Political Conditions and Administrative Rhetoric: Approval Rating, 1981-2008 Symbolic Interpretive Command Totals 0-25% Approval .2% .5% 0% .3% (n=1) (n=2) (n=0) (n=3) 26-50% Approval 39% 32% 36% 35% (n=152) (n=134) (n=32) (n=318) 51-75% Approval 57% 65% 58% 61% (n=227) (n=270) (n=52) (n=549) 75-100% Approval 4% 3% 6% 4% (n=15) (n=14) (n=5) (n=34) Totals 100% 100% 100% 100% (n=395) (n=420) (n=89) (n=904) *Percentages were rounded up Pearson’s χ2 =5.818, p<.444, and Cramer’s V=.0567

The results of Table 8 suggest no support for the eighth hypothesis by demonstrating that the tone of the president’s administrative rhetoric does not vary systematically with approval rating. Even though the results presented in Table 8 were not significant for this variable, there are still noticeable shifts that occurred between the four presidents upon examination of the overall numbers in Figure 2. In comparing the four presidents’ approval ratings as their terms were ending, Reagan, and Clinton left the office with respectable public support ratings, with over half the nation approving of their job performance (Gallup 2012). However, both Bush I and II each left office with less than 50% of the nation supporting their job performance (Gallup 2012). While Bush I devoted well over half of his signing statements to interpretive or command administrative rhetoric, there was a substantial increase in the president’s use of symbolic bureaucratic references during his last two years in office. Bush II suffered even lower approval ratings, which began to slide in 2005, and left the office with only a 34% approval rating (Gallup 2012; Woolley and Peters 2012). In addition to the increased press reports regarding his use of signing statements, this could be another reason for the drastic shift in the 43rd president’s administrative rhetoric (Savage 2006; Kelley 2007; Wayne 2009; Domke, Graham, Coe, John, and Coopman 2011).

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During his first six years in office, in which the president enjoyed high public approval ratings, 62-78% of his signing statements were coded as interpretive or command (Gallup 2012; Woolley and Peters 2012). But during the 110th Congress, that came under control of the Democrats due in part to the president’s growing unpopularity, 78% of Bush II’s signing statements were symbolic in tone. This, and the presence of administrative rhetoric in four out of five signing ceremonies held in 2007, and seven out of the ten signing ceremonies held in 2008, suggests that Bush II attempted to use the executive branch bureaucracy during public displays of governing leadership (Edwards 2009; Eshbaugh-Soha 2011). Despite this consideration, the evidence indicates that the president’s approval rating alone is not a good predictor for significant changes in the administrative communication found in signing statements.

Political Conditions and Administrative Rhetoric: United vs. Divided Government, 1981-2008 For the last hypothesis an independent variable for united and divided government was coded. This variable was included as a control since previous research on signing statements has found that the condition of unified or divided government can significantly affect the tone of the president’s message (Kelley 2003; Cooper 2005; Devins 2007; Berry 2009; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010; Kelley, Marshall, and Watts, 2013). However, this condition’s effects may be minimal based on a general, yet consistent, assumption in the administrative presidency literature is that all presidents attempt to exert control over the federal bureaucracy (Heclo 1977; Pious 1979; Nathan 1983; Waterman 1989). Nonetheless, changes in the tone of presidential signing statements were expected to occur under the conditions of united and divided government. Under the condition of united government the president’s rhetoric should be significantly more interpretive. Conversely, under divided government the president’s administrative rhetoric should be significantly more symbolic or commanding. Coded as a dummy variable, periods when the president faces a divided government were assigned a value of 0, and the condition of unified government is coded with the value of 1.

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Table 9: Political Conditions and Administrative Rhetoric: United vs. Divided Government, 1981-2008 Symbolic Interpretive Command Totals United 19% 22% 21% 20% Government (n=77) (n=93) (n=19) (n=189) Divided 81% 78% 79% 80% Government (n=318) (n=327) (n=70) (n=715) Totals 100% 100% 100% 100% (n=395) (n=420) (n=89) (n=904) *Percentages were rounded up Pearson’s χ2 =.8756, p<.645, and Cramer’s V=.0311

The Table 9 results suggest no relationship between type of administrative rhetoric and the conditions of unified and divided government as predicted in the ninth hypothesis. So, unlike previous empirical research on signing statements, the condition of united and divided government does not appear to substantially influence the tone of the president’s signing statements (Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010; Berry 2009; Rice 2010). Rather, Figure 2’s basic summary of the data reveals that the shifts in tone occur throughout a president’s term whether or not he serves during periods of united or divided government. Despite the acceptance of the null hypothesis for all three political conditions, the overall evidence suggests that signing statements are legitimate sources for presidential administrative communications.

Summary The empirical analysis in this chapter yielded mixed results. While there is a relatively steady increase in the percentage of signing statements that mention the executive branch bureaucracy, the president’s administrative rhetoric did become more interpretive over time. Of the conditions that were used as predictors for changes in the tone of the president’s signing statements, the results suggest that communication is influenced by the organization of the executive branch, and not the political environment. First, the president was significantly more likely to use interpretive rhetoric in signing statements for provisions that required action from sub-Cabinet or independent agencies by themselves or a multitude of organizations within the executive branch. The president’s interpretive language could suggest an attempt to sort out the potential conflicts over statutory responsibilities prior to implementation. Symbolic and command administrative rhetorical tones occurred more often when the president mentioned offices within the EOP or Cabinet departments. The results for symbolic tones could relate to 124 campaign-style governing and the need to mention agencies that are recognizable to the general public (Hart 1987; Hinckley 1990). Command tones in signing statements could be a response to congressional interference or the president’s expectation of compliance from political appointees (Heclo 1977; Light 1999; Evans 2011). Significance was also found with the second condition related to organization of the executive branch. As expected, signing statements were more likely to interpret provisions for Outer Cabinet departments. By doing so the president’s unilateral action could be used to counter the influence of Congress or advocacy groups that also have a vested interest in policy implementation, and communicate his instructions first (Cronin 1980; Magill 2007; Kelley and Marshall 2010). On the other hand, command rhetoric was significantly higher when the president addressed the actions of Inner departments. Presidents are also more likely to engage in symbolic administrative rhetoric when the White House stages a signing ceremony. Of the 140 signing statements that were delivered under the ceremonial context, 31% feature symbolic tones which could indicate that the president’s language is modified and the bureaucracy is used to frame his message. Conversely, written signing statements are more likely to feature interpretive or command administrative policy remarks. By issuing a signing statement without the spectacle of a ceremony, the president can narrow his audience and offer more substantive policy direction to his subordinates. The highly significant but weak results of these three conditions, and variation in the tone of a presidential signing statement emphasizes the need to build on the research of this dissertation and unilateral administrative communication. The null hypothesis was accepted for all three political conditions; presidential approval rating, election years, and united versus divided government. No significant variation was present even when the election cycle was divided into presidential and midterm election years. Despite this surprise, the results could be used to underscore the importance of both rhetorical and constitutional signing statements as a unilateral administrative tool and consideration for the president’s audience in future signing statement research. As demonstrated in Figures 1 and 2, variation does occur within, and between, presidential administrations suggesting that environmental conditions can influence the tone of signing statements. The results of this chapter’s empirical analysis provide some insight regarding executive branch communications. But it also supports the need for additional 125 qualitative analysis of the four presidents, their individual approaches to signing statement rhetoric, and executive management communications (Aberbach 1991; Griscom 1992; Muir 1992; Tiefer 1994; Golden 2000; Jones 2000; Lammers and Genovese 2000; Murphy 2002; Medhurst 2003; Barilleaux and Rozell 2005; Durant 2006; Yenerall 2006; Pfiffner 2008; Greestein 2009; Conley and Saas 2010; Ellis 2012; Siegel 2012). Chapter 5 features substantive evidence that presidential signing statements have an effect on bureaucratic responsiveness. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) investigated George W. Bush’s signing statements and issued reports to Congress in 2007, and 2008. The publications outlined the investigation regarding signing statements attached to appropriations bills, and whether or not they influenced an agency’s activities. Of the 29 provisions that were investigated, they determined that only nine were not implemented as intended by Congress (GAO 2008). It is important to note that the GAO (2007a) acknowledged in its report that the agency did not address the “merits” of the president’s communication during its investigation (2). However, this admitted shortcoming advances the purpose of this dissertation by allowing a comparison of the president’s administrative rhetoric and the bureaucratic agents’ responsiveness to Congress or the president. Even though the president’s signing statements can outline his objections or interpretations, how he wants the policy to be implemented or which agency is being addressed may not be clear enough to affect bureaucratic responsiveness. Since presidential signing statements do not have the force of law, additionally, a preliminary review indicates that Bush 43’s statements simply directed orders to “the executive branch” this could be one explanation for the results of the GAO’s (2008) report (Kelley 2006, 2007).51 By digging deeper into these particular signing statements this dissertation will be able to provide additional evidence regarding the potential effects of the rhetorical administrative presidency’s signing statements on bureaucratic action.

51 Quotation marks added by author for emphasis. 126

Chapter 5 Was it Something I Said?: Illustrative Examples of Presidential Administrative Rhetoric, and Signing Statements

This chapter presents several examples in order to illustrate when, and why a president may choose to issue a signing statement. It also offers an examination of who is listening to the president, and the lasting effect a signing statement can have on policy execution. Finally, it examines the relationship between bureaucratic responsiveness and the clarity of the president’s administrative rhetoric. Institutionally, the Executive Branch has a limited formal role in the policy process; the president can communicate their agenda annually in the State of the Union, convene or adjourn Congress, and veto legislation. Yet, presidents since Washington have used oral or written rhetoric in various ways to branch out from the confines of the Constitution (Tulis 1987; Zarefsky 2002; Healy 2008; Hoffman 2010). Going beyond the general, persuasive aspect of rhetoric Riker (1986) promoted the concept of heresthetic, one aspect of which is strategic rhetoric. Because of the various tools at their presidents can try and gain political leverage, as well as, “structuring the world,” or in this case, policy, so they can “win (Riker 1986, ix, 8; Howell 2003; Fine and Waterman 2008; Pfiffner 2008).” The ability to adapt the content of bill signing statements makes them an attractive as a political tool. But it is the timing of the president’s comments on new policies and programs that also makes them a viable administrative device (Kagan 2001; Cooper 2002; Kelley 2007; Magill 2007; Pfiffner 2009b; Lewis and Moe 2010). As the empirical evidence showed, campaign-style governing and narrowcasting does have an effect on the president’s administrative rhetoric. The tone of a signing statement’s language also changes when he is communicating with client-centered Outer cabinet departments, or the presidency-centered Inner Cabinets (Cronin 1980). Combined, the results suggest that presidents modify their rhetoric to send symbolic signals to constituents or limit the bureaucratic discretion through the interpretation of statutes for subordinates whose loyalties are divided. The analysis also shows that presidents are significantly more likely to use signing statements to order the departments closest to the Oval Office to reject their statutory duties when a provision violates the administration’s agenda. Command rhetoric may reflect times in 127 which the president has exhausted his ability to “persuade,” or acts of persuasion were not successful. As a result, a president may fall back on his executive authority and issue a direct command via a bill signing statement. In other words, for the rhetorical administrative presidency there is evidence that suggests signing statements are used in an attempt to “win (Riker1986, 8).” As a whole, signing statements have the potential to serve the president as a unilateral administrative communication device because they are linked directly to the president. Typically, the president begins by announcing that he has signed a bill into law. The delivery of a bill signing statement can occur during a public ceremony or in written form. During public signings, presidents usually compliment members of Congress and use the bureaucracy as symbols to reinforce their policy position. The language is also structured so the president can appeal to the general population (Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Kelley and Marshall 2010; Korzi 2011). However, a privately issued written signing statement often features more official language or legal terminology which indicates that the president is narrowing his audience to government officials, or policy wonks (Campbell and Jamieson 2008). Based on the significant use of interpretive rhetoric directed at clientele departments, presidents may be altering both context and policy direction as a response to the presence of multiple principals (Kagan 2001; Campbell and Jamieson 2008). But, no matter how it is delivered the dual documentation of signing statements increases its potential to grab the attention of bureaucrats when they access a bill’s legislative history or refer to the Federal Register (May 1998; Cooper 2002; Kelley 2003, 2007). The tone, language, and actions taken to develop and establish formal filing of presidential signing statements supports the notion that there is a political strategy, in addition to an administrative one, behind the use of this unilateral rhetorical administrative device (Carroll 1995; Kagan 2001; Kelley 2003; Cooper 2005; Yenerall 2006; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Kelley and Marshall 2008; Waterman 2009; Conley 2011; Marshall 2012). In order to support this assumption, this chapter presents illustrative examples that demonstrate how signing statements may be used by president to confront political challenges. The first section examines the use of symbolic administrative rhetoric as policy guidance, but also as a way to signal key constituent groups through signing statements. Using signing statements from George W. Bush and Bill Clinton, these examples demonstrate how the 128 president’s words can signal support for a policy issue, or defend the president’s decision to sign legislation. Even by saying a few words, the president’s symbolic governing can provide bureaucrats with an idea how to proceed with implementation. This is especially true when Congress has neglected to communicate their programmatic expectations in the bill, or through other legislative means. The Clinton example also provides an account of decision making in the White House with respect to the language, and delivery of this unilateral tool. The second section reviews the use of commands in the administrative rhetoric of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. They were selected because of their relatively frequent use of command tones found in their signing statements and because the high number of orders were given during turbulent periods in their presidency. As my initial examination of empirical data revealed, the president’s approval rating and the election cycle does not appear to have an effect on the presidents’ administrative rhetoric. But in looking at the few instances when the presidents did choose to issue a command statement, there seems to be an increase when the political tides have turned against them. In the cases of Bush I and Clinton, the number of signing statements with command rhetoric increased when the presidents faced numerous threats to their policy agenda, and reputation as a leader. More forceful administrative rhetoric may also reflect the president’s failures in negotiating policy. Future research efforts may include looking at the different types of commands found in signing statements. In several instances the president will order a department or agency head to submit a legislative proposal that corrects provisions that the president finds disagreeable. Other times, as scholars and journalists have protested against in writing about Bush II’s signing statements, the president will order a subordinate to ignore the provision as written in favor of his restructuring (Cooper 2005; Savage 2008; Pfiffner 2009a; Barilleaux 2012). George H.W. Bush’s commands typically instructed agency heads to work with Congress in drafting corrective amendments to the bill he was signing. Whereas, most of Clinton’s command rhetoric directed bureaucrats to implement the law according to his interpretation, or consult with the Attorney General prior to any efforts to execute the provision.52 The differences between the types of commands issued by the two presidents reflect their approach to public administration and

52 Of the 15 command tones coded for 1990 and Bush I, 10 instructed agency heads to submit a proposal for corrective legislation to Congress. Out of the 8 commands coded in 1996, four ordered the bureaucracy to implement the law according to Clinton’s interpretation and three directed officials to consult with the Attorney General on how to execute the provision. 129 governing, but it may also be a glimpse into each administration’s approach to working with Congress. The third section will offer select illustrative examples of the presidents’ use of administrative rhetoric, and how their subordinates responded to their signing statements. This qualitative analysis offers supporting evidence that signing statements can affect bureaucratic action by looking at departmental memos, White House communications, and department manuals. In one instance, Reagan’s signing statement demonstrates how the president can provide policy guidance when a bureau is confronted with conflicting statutes. Additionally, the Reagan example also supports the claim that signing statements can have a long term effect on policy execution. Then the section reviews the administrative rhetoric of the remaining provisions listed in the GAO (2007a, 2007b, 2008) reports on Bush II’s signing statements. By comparing the president’s language and the report’s determination on bureaucratic responsiveness this review will offer some support for the theoretical arguments that stress clarity when executives communicate policy guidance (Neustadt 1960, 1990; Denton and Hahn 1986; Waterman 1989; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006). The GAO’s (2007a, 2007b, 2008) reports are important for qualitative analysis because of its mission, the resources available to the office, and its ability to access agency officials can provide information that would be unavailable otherwise. As I have argued throughout and supported through empirical analysis, there is a purpose and strategy to presidential administrative rhetoric. This chapter offers qualitative analysis in order to foster a richer understanding of the bill signing statement as a bridge between the rhetorical and administrative presidencies.

Presidential Signaling and Administrative Rhetoric Signaling and Symbolic Administrative Rhetoric In addition to individual citizens, the president’s symbolic administrative rhetoric can benefit departments, and organized interest groups in reporting their progress, or contributions to public policies. In a report to Congress on the efforts to establish a National Child Abuse Registry the Department of Health and Human Services (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2009) pointed out that section 633, the provision requiring the database, provided little guidance. The department also reminded Congress that legislators had not conducted any 130 hearings, or included any committees’ statements about the registry in the in the bill’s legislative history that would aid in bureaucratic decision making. In concluding their brief review of the bill’s legislative history, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS 2009) cited the press release of Bush II’s signing statement for the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act. The president commented on the registry explaining that the National Sex Offender Registry would combine “the information in State sex offender registry systems” and make sure “that law enforcement has access to the same information across the United States (Bush 2006b, 1396).” The president added that, “…these improvements will help prevent sex offenders from evading detection by moving from one State to the next. Data drawn from this comprehensive registry will also be made available to the public so parents have the information they need to protect their children from sex offenders that might be in their neighborhoods (Bush 2006b, 1396).”53

The department reported that the president’s comments “signaled support for the registry,” and was its only source of information that helped “resolve ambiguities in the statute (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2009, 7).” Even though the president had plummeted in public support, his signing of the legislation was lauded by child advocacy groups.54 For example, the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC) and Childhelp, both nationally known non-profit child advocacy groups, featured excerpts of Bush II’s comments made during the Rose Garden ceremony on their web sites. Childhelp founders were also noted as guests at the signing, as well as NCMEC co-founders and Adam’s parents, John and Revé Walsh on their respective organization’s online press releases (Childhelp 2006; NCMEC 2006). While neither group mentioned the Attorney General, who was also in attendance and praised by Bush II or HHS’s role in implementation, both web sites featured the national registry as one of the highlights of the bill (Childhelp 2006; NCMEC 2006).

53 H.R. 4472, Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, P.L. 109-248, July 26, 2006. 54 According to a Gallup poll taken the week before the signing ceremony the president’s public approval rating was 37%. The week following the bill signing it slightly rose to 40% before dropping back into the 30’s (APP 2012); As a side note, the Department of Health and Human Service’s report (2009) also remarked that Congress had yet to appropriate funds for the registry. 131

Other scholars have noted the interest advocacy groups have taken in policy administration which has increased the president’s need to engage in unilateral action to wrest control over bureaucrats from interest group influence (West and Cooper 1990; Kagan 2001; West 2006; Evans 2011). But signing ceremonies may also rely on the presence of interest group leaders to serve as a visual cue for the public and promote presidential support among their members (Barilleaux 2005; Kelley, Marshall, and Watts, 2013). Future research could explore this relationship in greater detail. However, for the purpose of this dissertation it is the recognition and impact of a signing statement’s executive communications that is important.

Public Ceremony vs. Written: Welfare Reform, Immigration, and Administrative Rhetoric Presidents can sometimes explain their assessment of a new policy, and communicating with a strong constituent group is one of the motivating forces behind these types of public appeals. The political pressures, planning, and eventual signing of welfare reform in 1996, provides a strong example of the process that can prompt an administration’s decision to engage in unilateral action. A signing statement was one of the responses by Clinton to ease the disapproval from the female supporters and objections to welfare reform, and counter the Republicans efforts to appeal to voters during a presidential election year (Lieberman 2000; Greenstein 2009; Pfiffner 2009b). Less than a month prior to the ceremony his staff was alerted by Betsy Myers (1996), of the Office of Public Liaison who also served as the Administration’s adviser on women’s issues, on some potential backlash (Norton and Morris 2003). In her July memo she wrote, “As anticipated, women leaders are reacting to the President’s decision to sign the welfare bill with considerable unhappiness. In order to make this bill more palatable to women, it would help -- by sending the right signal -- if the President would verbally acknowledge women’s concerns in the welfare debate (Myers 1996, 42).”55

She followed the advice by noting that the Republicans had already made appeals to women about the issue and how the proposed legislation would benefit women who need government assistance (Myers 1996). Furthermore, the Reagan Administration’s precedent of using “human

55 The text is underlined in the original document written by Myers. 132 props” in order to add a personal and visual element to public policy was followed and the Clinton White House added this element to the signing ceremony’s defense of welfare reforms (Maltese 1992; Waterman, Wright, and St. Clair 1999; Barilleaux 1988, 2005, 502). In a memo from Lyn Hogan of the Progressive Policy Institute, the think tank’s domestic policy analyst provided “a list of possible employers, welfare recipients, and job placement organizations that might take part in the welfare reform signing ceremony,” as requested by Clinton’s advisers (Hogan 1996b, 1). The next month, Clinton (1996b, 1996c) issued two separate signing statements for the Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act of 1996, both detailing the positive and negative aspects of the legislation as identified by his administration.56 Adhering to the suggestions made by staffers, the signing ceremony was held in the Rose Garden and featured a single mother that was able to transition from welfare to work during Clinton’s time as the Governor of Arkansas (Hogan 1996a; Myers 1996). Clinton (1996b) began by thanking Vice- President Gore, Cabinet members that worked getting the bill passed, State governors, and congressional members that were in attendance.57 In communicating with constituents, the president reminded the audience that he had vetoed two earlier versions of the welfare reform bill because they did not provide adequate benefits to children or provide incentives for welfare recipients to enter the workforce (Clinton 1996b). He then noted that the bill featured several aspects that he and his administration approved of such as the continuation of food stamps, federal health care benefits for the elderly, disabled, children, and those who were currently on welfare (Clinton 1996b). Clinton (1996b) also informed attendees that new policy allowed States to become more proactive helping to reform the system, would help women through more aggressive enforcement in the collection of child support, and sustained the availability of food stamps and school lunches. The president publically distanced his administration from other provisions such as cuts made by the “congressional leadership” that affected national nutrition requirements and aid to legal immigrants (Clinton 1996b, 1326). Overall, this public signing ceremony was

56 H.R. 3734, Remarks on Signing the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 and an Exchange with Reporters, P.L. 104-193, August 22, 1996; H.R. 3734, Statement on Signing the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, P.L. 104-193, August 22, 1996. 57 In her memo to White House staff on welfare reform talking points Hogan (1996a) suggests highlighting the “flexibility” the bill will give to Governors to their State’s needs (2). 133 structured to benefit the president’s re-election. It responded to the concerns that were voiced by advocacy groups and voters from key demographic groups, used private citizens to personalize the new policy, and made use of the institution’s high profile to publicize the signing (Hart 1987; Waterman, Wright, and St. Clair 1999; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010; Korzi 2011). The second signing statement, written and issued without any fanfare, reiterated the same points but added that the bill would require underage mothers to stay at home and in school (Clinton 1996c). The written signing statement provided more detail about the provisions that ran counter to Clinton’s preferences (Clinton 1996c). During the public signing ceremony the president made a general announcement that indicated the Food Stamps program was not affected by the reform bill. However, in his written statement which would be expected to fall under more scrutiny from interest groups, the president announced that eligibility standards had been changed (Clinton 1996b; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Whitford and Yates 2009; Carpenter 2010; Tedin, Rottinghaus and Rodgers 2011). Similarly, during the Rose Garden ceremony the president mentioned that Congress cut programs that benefitted legal immigrants (Clinton 1996b). In the written version, Clinton (1996c) dedicated more rhetoric that detailed the failings of the legislation. As response to the cuts made by Congress, the president also used the written signing statement in order to communicate with executive branch subordinates. Managing beyond the legislation the president announced he would “direct the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to accelerate its unprecedented progress in removing all bureaucratic obstacles” that prevented the agency from naturalizing eligible legal immigrants (Clinton 1996c, 1488).58 The president’s administrative rhetoric was characterized as a command tone because he ordered bureaucratic action that was not included in the bill, requiring the agency to act beyond its statutory responsibilities. According to the INS yearbooks for fiscal years 1996, and 1997, the agency appears to have responded to the president’s administrative efforts. The organization reported that the number of naturalizations in 1994 and 1995, were approximately 430,000 and 488,000, respectively (INS 1997). However, during FY1996, INS set a record and naturalized 1,044,689 of those eligible for citizenship (INS 1997). Citing “a backlog” of pending cases the agency

58 This signing statement was coded with a “command” tone in the data set. 134 reported that the number had dropped to just under 600,000 naturalized citizens for the following year (INS 1999, 134). While there is no way to determine the impact of the president’s signing statement on the responsiveness of the INS, this case is interesting due to the additional unilateral action taken by the president on the same day as the bill signing. Per the literature on presidential management that recommends the simultaneous use of multiple administrative strategies, Clinton (1996b) reinforced his signing statements with additional unilateral action (Moe and Howell 1999; Cooper 1997, 2002; Rudalevige 2002; Howell 2005; Jones 2005). Communications between the president and his Cabinet heads indicated that additional unilateral action would centralize control over the reforms to social welfare policy (Kagan 1996). The morning before the president was scheduled to sign the bill, Kagan’s (1996) memo to Clinton’s Chief of Staff noted that the written signing statement made reference to additional presidential directives. She hinted that the written version of the signing statement also served as a signal to subordinates to anticipate additional administrative instruction from the president (Kagan 1996). Specifically, Clinton (1996c) followed his command rhetoric with an announcement that he would “take any possible executive actions to avoid” problems that may arise regarding food stamp benefits and naturalization (1488). The order given in Clinton’s (1996c) written signing statement was clarified in a memorandum that listed actions that would facilitate subordinates meeting his policy objectives. Although the president issued two memoranda related to welfare reform, only one provided guidelines for his initial directive regarding INS’s naturalization process. This memorandum was addressed to the Attorney General, the Secretary of HHS, and “other Heads of Executive Agencies,” and outlined his administration’s expectations, and what specific actions should be taken by the agencies in meeting them (Clinton 1996d, 1330). The second was directed at the Secretary of Agriculture and the bill’s provisions dealing with the eligibility of immigrants participating in the Food Stamp program (Clinton 1996e). Following Neustadt’s (1990) rule that the president’s orders should be publicized, these supplementary unilateral directives were released by the White House Press Secretary the next day (see also Waterman 1989; Eshbaugh- Soha 2006). Clinton’s welfare reform bill was a defining, albeit controversial, piece of legislation for his administration and was a focal point during a presidential election year (Lieberman 2000; Greenstein 2009; Pfiffner 2009b). The flurry of communications between White House officials, 135

Cabinet heads, and advocacy groups or supporters, was followed by two bill signing statements and demonstrates the flexibility of this unilateral tool (Cooper 2002; Kelley and Marshall 2010). The first signing statement delivered during a Rose Garden ceremony was designed to quell the concerns of women’s advocacy groups (Abramowitz 2004; Petrocik, Benoit, and Hansen 2004). Whereas the second, issued in written form, served the president’s administrative needs and directed bureaucratic subordinates to take necessary actions to meet the White House’s policy goals. As a whole, the unilateral action taken through bill signing statements, the strategic use of presidential rhetoric, and the variation in their delivery served the president on multiple levels both politically and administratively.

Context and Command Administrative Rhetoric George H.W. Bush and Command Statements In evaluating tonal variation using the presidents’ political history, 1990 seemed to be a turbulent year during Bush I’s time in office. The promise of “no new taxes” pledge during his acceptance speech at the 1988 Republican National Convention came back to haunt him (Barilleaux and Rozell 2004; Pious 2008; Shaiko 2008). After compromising with congressional Democrats in order to secure the Budget Enforcement Act, Bush I was criticized in the press as indecisive and weak. Rather than provide substantive details about the legislation or logic behind the compromise, the media followed its preference for framing legislative battles in parochial terms, and designating winners and losers (Barilleaux and Rozell 2004; Jones 2005; Pious 2008; Shaiko 2008). Subsequently, the public was left with competing impressions of the 41st president. Rather than Bush I gaining political capital and credit for his part in reforming the budget, he was portrayed as instigating the tax increase and inept on matters of domestic policy (Langston 1995; Hess 1996; Barilleaux and Rozell 2004; Jones 2005; Pfiffner 2005; Pious 2008; Shaiko 2008; Rubin 2010). Not only did the media coverage and mishandling of the event by the White House damage Bush I’s leadership and public image, it also prompted conservative GOP voters to reject him (Pious 2008; Shaiko 2008). Compounding the public relations disaster of his budget agreement the Republican minority in the House, led by Newt Gingrich, organized party members to publically oppose the president (Zarefsky 2002; Barilleaux and Rozell 2004; Jones 2005; Sinclair 2006; Pious 2008). 136

Since presidential leadership is inextricably tethered to the institution and the individual due to the lack of formal authority and the rise of the rhetorical president, public support is vital to executive leadership (Neustadt 1960; Tulis 1987; James 2005; Jones 2005; Farrar-Myers 2007; Kernell 2007). This was firmly understood by Gingrich and other members of the president’s party in Congress. In order to distinguish themselves from a sinking president and protect the conservative reputation of the party, ambitious congressional GOP members chipped away at Bush I’s public image (Pious 1979, 2008; Fisher 1998; Barilleaux and Rozell 2004; Sinclair 2008; Pika and Maltese 2010). Pious (2008) observes that the House Republicans knew that “the budget deal was nominally about taxes and spending” which are always “negotiable” but what “was not negotiable were questions of character, of promises, of attitude (171).” Also during that year, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. While Bush I was viewed as suspect on domestic policy, his public support for foreign policy leadership was secure. His approval ratings during the Gulf War hovered around 90% and it was an area in which Bush 41 appeared more at ease and presidential (Stuckey 1991; Langston 1995; Jones 2005; Gallup 2012). The loss of Republican support in Congress on domestic policy, and the public’s positive response to his use of prerogative power in foreign affairs may have served as motivators for Bush I’s more aggressive use of administrative rhetoric in 1990. The role of Chief Magistrate was one that the president embraced. Secondly, Bush I needed to make a strong effort in order to reestablish his leadership (Edwards 1989, 2007; Maltese 1992; Zernicke 1994; Langston 1995; Lammers and Genovese 2000; Jones 2005; Burns 2007; Rodman 2009; Siegel 2012). This is evident in the timing of the commands given to administrative subordinates. Two command statements were issued prior to the midterm elections. The remaining thirteen were issued after the midterms and it was clear that Bush I was going to finish his term with a Democratic majority in Congress. Of the fifteen bills in question, six were accompanied by two different signing statements issued by Bush I. The first versions of the signing statements were given during a ceremony in order to attract media attention which was then followed by a written version of the signing statement. The administrative rhetoric of written signing statements is typically more mechanical or contains more detail about the president’s policy expectations. Two other command statements were issued in written form only but, unlike the others, were later released by the Office of the Press Secretary. So, eight of the fifteen signing statements during this time appear to be efforts to go public and attract attention toward the 137 president’s accomplishments. Also, the majority of the signing statements that featured a command tone in 1990 addressed environmental policy which was central to the president’s agenda (Quirk and Nesmith 1999; Lammers and Genovese 2000; Barilleaux and Rozell 2004). Attempting to regain his executive leadership status during a presidential election year may also partially explain the ten signing statements in 1992 that feature a command tone (Edwards 2007; Medhurst 2007). Particularly, since all but one were issued between September and the end of October and dealt with some key issues for the administration such as the economy and the environment (Barilleaux and Rozell 2004).59 However, true to assessments of Bush I’s reluctance to engage in public governing only one of these bills were signed during a ceremony; followed by the written signing statement with command rhetoric (Tulis 1996; Barilleaux and Rozell 2004; Siegel 2012). The remaining nine signing statements with command rhetoric were in written form, and only two were released later by the Office of the Press Secretary in what may have been an attempt to increase bureaucratic responsiveness (see Neustadt 1990).

William J. Clinton and Command Statements Like Bush I, Clinton also issued more signing statements commanding bureaucratic action outside of related statutory responsibilities while working through a hostile and turbulent environment. However, unlike his predecessor whose troubles were the result of political shortcomings, Clinton’s were based on personal failings. In 1996, the president was not only up for re-election but also trying to outmaneuver the media and congressional Republicans amidst two potentially career ending scandals; an affair with a White House intern and accusations that the president and the First Lady participated in fraudulent investment practices while in Arkansas (Murphy 2002; Jones 2005; Siegel 2012). Clinton survived the scandals due to a personality that is well-suited to the public nature of the modern presidency, and significantly more skill in maneuvering through public relations (Jones 1998, 2002; Waterman, Wright and St. Clair 1999; Murphy 2002; Barilleaux and Rozell 2004; Heclo 2011; DiClerico 2013). Given Clinton’s preference for permanent campaign-style governing and symbolic administrative rhetoric, the increase in his command statements in 1996 are all the more obvious

59 The tenth command signing statement was issued the day after the election. 138

(Waterman, Wright and St. Clair 1998; Jones 1998, 2005; Yenerall 2006). Like Bush I, Clinton was faced with a Congress that was controlled by the opposition party. However, they both faced challenges from House Republicans led by Newt Gingrich. During this time of high political conflict, Clinton’s administrative rhetoric contained more commands. But in his public relations and policy battle with GOP leaders, Clinton was more successful in controlling the agenda and maintained his standing with voters (Greenstein 2009; Quirk 2010; Tulis 2010; Heith 2011). Of the eight signing statements issued with a command tone in 1996, four were delivered during a signing ceremony, and one was preceded by a ceremony. Rhetorical administrative strategy was not the only area in which the White House increased presidential actions. Clinton and his administration exhibited a variety of controlled, yet assertive, set of public governing activities in 1996 (Kurtz 1998; Edwards 1999; Murphy 2002; Jones 2000, 2005). The ability to survive the scandal, win a second term, and maintain public support are a testament that the Clinton Administration was a force to be reckoned with in battles over control of the policy and communications agenda. In seeking his second term, and competing for public support against the opposition, Clinton and his advisers strategically selected domestic policy areas that played to the president’s strengths and were central to the Republican’s Contract with America (Farrier 2009; Lewis and Moe 2010; Pika and Maltese 2010). Efforts to influence the policy agenda also included coordinated and consistent public messages that portrayed the GOP as uncaring and dishonest. His messaging strategies also reoriented the media’s news coverage (Kurtz 1998; Jones 2000; West 2005; Greenstein 2009; Wayne 2009). Again, Clinton’s (1996b, 1996c) rhetorical administrative strategy is demonstrated by his two signing statements for the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act. In the Rose Garden signing ceremony, Clinton takes the opportunity to subtly chastise the Republican majority by stating that his administration thinks “that the congressional leadership insisted on cuts in programs for legal immigrants that are far too deep (Clinton 1996b, 1326).” But in his written statement, his rhetoric is less concerned about assigning blame, and more concerned with communicating to a narrower constituency group (Clinton 1996c). The president is also more direct on the administrative aspects of the new policy and what he expects concerning the reduction in services for legal immigrants. In this signing statement Clinton (1996c) uses command rhetoric when he writes, 139

“Legal immigrants and their children, however, should not be penalized if they become disabled and require medical assistance through no fault of their own. Neither should they be deprived of food stamp assistance without proper procedures or due regard for individual circumstances. Therefore, I will direct the Immigration and Naturalization Service to accelerate its unprecedented progress in removing all bureaucratic obstacles that stand in the way of citizenship for legal immigrants who are eligible. In addition, I will take any possible executive actions to avoid inaccurate or inequitable decisions to cut off food stamp benefits—for example, to a legal immigrant who has performed military service for this country or to one who has applied for and satisfied all the requirements of citizenship, but is awaiting governmental approval of his or her application (Clinton 1996c, 1329).”

As noted earlier, Clinton issued two memoranda on the same day, both of which were also released by the Office of the Press Secretary. The first, Memorandum on Naturalization, was addressed to “the Attorney General, Secretary of Health and Human Services, and Other Heads of Executive Agencies.” The memo reiterated what was expected of INS, listed additional or expanded bureaucratic activities to meet the president’s target number of “one million new citizens (Clinton 1996d, 1330).” Clinton also directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services to consult with appropriate agencies and submit policy recommendations to him for additional measures by the end of the year (Clinton 1996d). The second, Memorandum on the Eligibility of Aliens for Food Stamps, was addressed to the Secretary of Agriculture directing him to notify and direct State agencies in extending certification for immigrants enrolled in the program (Clinton 1996e). Additionally, Clinton was successful at preserving his power over the agenda and public support through excessive travelling. In 1996, Clinton made more public appearances around the nation than he did in Washington (Han 2005). This strategy was to promote his agenda, as well as, his public approval rating (Han 2005; Jones 2005; Pika and Maltese 2010). This is supported by the results presented in Table 3, from the previous chapter, and suggests that Clinton preferred to use signing statements as a venue for campaign-style governing since most of them fell under the category of symbolic administrative rhetoric.

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It was only during Clinton’s last two years in office that the number of signing statement coded for interpretive rhetoric was greater than his symbolic administrative communication. However, this trend was also found with Reagan’s signing statements, another president who had a penchant for public governance. By expanding the data set, future research may reveal that other presidents follow this pattern as a way to protect their legacy in office (Wayne 1999; Renshon 2000; Healy 2008; Greenstein 2009). Of the four presidents in this study, Clinton had the highest number of bills that featured two signing statements, one ceremonial and one written.60 The majority of which were issued in 1996.61

Is Anyone Listening? Reagan: Interpretive Administrative Rhetoric Two bills with similar provisions regarding the Army Corps of Engineers’ procedure for removing structures, such as docks, were signed into law by Reagan (1981a) his first year in office. Upon signing them, the president issued a signing statement that dealt with the issue. Reagan (1981a) clarified which bill he expected the Army Corps to follow by proclaiming “I will sign enrolled enactment S. 1493 before I sign H.R. 779, thereby making section 6 of H.R. 779 the provision to govern Corps management practices (Reagan 1981a, 1427).”62 In his statement the president was clear that his audience was the Army Corps of Engineers. Reagan’s (1981a) administrative rhetoric also identified the bills by number and the provision that he expected the Army Corps to follow. Furthermore, the president supported his decision by referring to the House and Senate floor statements regarding the legislation (Reagan 1981a). Subsequent bureaucratic communications related to H.R. 779, and section 6 provides modest support for the expectation that signing statements can institutionalize bureaucratic action. Evidence that the Reagan signing statement reached managing officials within the Army Corps of Engineers were found in memos that were distributed within the Department of the Army regarding project implementation. On February 11, 1982, the Director of Civil Works distributed a memo to regional commanders with the subject title, “Implementation of Section 6,

60 During his two terms Clinton issued two signing statements for the same bill 52 times. His successor, George W. Bush was second with 34, followed by Bush Sr. with 28, and Reagan with only 7 bills found to have two signing statements. 61 In 1996, a total of seventeen bills were accompanied by two separate signing statements. 62 H.R. 779 and S. 1493, Statement on Signing H.R. 779 and S. 1493 Into Law, P.L. 97-140 and P.L. 97-128, December 29, 1981. 141

P.L. 97-140 (Heiberg 1982).” In addition to informing ranking officials of the Army Corps about the new implementation procedures, the director also mentioned Reagan’s signing statement and provided copies to the commanders. While presidential rhetoric influencing policy implementation has been proven, at least in the short term, I have argued that the administrative rhetoric found in signing statements may lengthen the life-span of the president’s preferences (Wood and Waterman 1993; Golden 2000; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006, 2008; Whitford and Yates 2009). Eleven year later in 1993, the Acting Commander of the Corps division in Mobile, Alabama stated in his memo that a project plan had been submitted for approval and was expected to be implemented sometime in June (Quesenberry 1993). The West Point Lake Shoreline Management Plan, which was written “to provide guidance and information specific to the effective management” of the project cited Public Law 97-140, Section 6 in its list of references (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 1993, 1). More recently, a 2005 shore management plan for Cheatam Lake in Nashville also cited the provision that Reagan had proclaimed should guide the Army Corps of Engineers when executing new policy related to water reservoir or lake projects (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Nashville District 2005). In 1981, Reagan openly announced in a signing statement that the Army Corps was to follow “section 6 of H.R. 779” rather than the “similar” provision found in “section 8 of S. 1493 (Reagan 1981a, 1427).” In two subsequent management plans, 11 and 24 years later, section 6 is still cited in as part of the military organization’s implementation guidelines. While these examples are not enough to make a definitive claim that bill signing statements is another way in which the president can impact policy implementation long after their tenure in office, the evidence does offer some support for this notion. This assertion was also echoed by Justice in its report following the Clinton Administration. The DOJ’s (2001) account of its accomplishments, as well as over 30 other bureaus, is featured as part of the Clinton Presidential Library. In the document’s section dedicated to the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), it lists the contributions the organization has made to the work of the executive branch and its involvement with the president’s use of signing statements (DOJ 2001). Along with signing statements, and other unilateral and legal actions, the report claims that the policy guidance crafted under the watch of the OLC “will remain binding in future years (DOJ 2001, 79).” 142

Center Stage: How Signing Statements Gained Mass Attention under George W. Bush Signing statements have been used to varying degrees since the Monroe Administration and were plucked from the bottom of the president’s toolbox and refined by Reagan’s advisers because of its political and administrative potential. But, it was not until George W. Bush’s time in office that this unilateral device was widely viewed as cause for alarm within the political system (May 1998; Kelley 2003; Cooper 2005; American Bar Association 2006; Fisher 2007a; Pfiffner 2008; Savage 2008). The reason Bush II’s signing statements caused such a stir was not because the president objected to portions of the bill on constitutional grounds since previous administrations had done the same. The reason the 43rd president’s signing statements are viewed as an exercise in hyper-prerogative power is due to the absurd number of constitutional objections that were made, within single signing statements and overall, compared to his predecessors (Cooper 2005; Eggspuehler 2007; Pfiffner 2008; Kelley and Marshall 2010; Barilleaux 2012). Despite having issued the fewest number of signing statements since Reagan, Bush II issued the most that cited at least one constitutional objection. Kelley and Marshall (2010) found that by the end of his two terms in office, the president had challenged a total of 1,143 provisions. In their report to Congress the GAO (2007a) found that for fiscal year 2006, eleven appropriations bills were accompanied by a signing statement. But within those few signing statements there were 160 provisions that were objected to by the president (Bush 2005d, 1563; GAO 2007a; Rudalevige 2010b). The justification for the president’s excessive objections was rooted in the unitary executive theory that, like the signing statement, was developed during the Reagan administration. According to this theory, Article II grants the president sole jurisdiction over the executive branch and supports the use of prerogative power in order to fulfill the institution’s constitutional duties. Even if it means refusing to execute legislation as it is written by Congress because the president is also assigned the responsibility to “protect” the Constitution (Cooper 2005; Heclo 2008; Barilleaux and Kelley 2010; Pika 2010; Marlowe 2012). Taken together, the logic of the unitary executive acts as a shield against the system of checks and balances (Barilleaux and Kelley 2010; Fisher 2010; Pika 2010; Genovese 2012). Linked to the claims that Bush II, and his advisers, set a dangerous precedent and threatened the separation of powers is the concern that presidents will use signing statements to 143 alter the programmatic intentions of legislation. As such, the president’s interpretation may require bureaucrats to violate the ethics of public administration (Berry 2009; Pfiffner 2009a; Lewis and Moe 2010; Rudalevige 2010b; Barilleaux 2012). Pfiffner (2009a) states that even if the policy guidelines found in signing statements conflicts with what executive branch subordinates would recommend, they will still comply with the president’s construal. Given the efforts by Reagan, and subsequent administrations, to maximize the utility of signing statements it may be the White House’s own choice of language and not just the competition from other influences, which prevents bureaucratic compliance. After reviewing the GAO’s (2007a, 2007b, 2008) reports on select signing statements and policy execution there is evidence that suggests its weakness as an administrative tool may be a result of the president failing to identify which bureaucracy is being addressed, and/or clearly communicating his interpretation of new policy.

GAO Reports: Bureaucratic Responsiveness to Bush II’s Administrative Rhetoric Due to the implications that signing statements may have on the bureaucracy, House and Senate congressional committees called on the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to investigate certain provisions that were challenged by the president. The concern of the legislative branch was that the president was rewriting legislation through his interpretations. In their report the GAO (2007a) mentions the “almost identical” rhetoric found in Bush II’s signing statements (13). For this section I review the administrative rhetoric of certain provisions that were featured in the GAO’s (2007a, 2007b, 2008) reports. I will also compare provisions in which the office determined that the law was not executed as it was written by Congress when the section in question was coded in this dissertation’s empirical data set as a command. The GAO’s (2007a, 2007b, 2008) conclusions do not provide absolute evidence that the president’s signing statements affected bureaucratic responsiveness during policy implementation. But their conclusions do support claims that signing statements have a strong potential as an administrative tool (Cooper 2002, 2005; Kelley 2007; Magill 2007; Pfiffner 2009a, 2009b; GAO 2007a, 2007b, 2008). A review of the administrative rhetoric for provisions that were implemented according to the law versus those that were not could offer additional qualitative

144 support for research asserting that what the president says matters (Neustadt 1960, 1990; Denton and Hahn 1986; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Whitford and Yates 2009). Whether or not the president was successful in persuading the bureaucracy, Congress was sufficiently agitated to utilize the GAO (GAO 2007). Bush II tried to expand presidential power and authority through the unitary executive theory and signing statements, but the GAO reports (2007a, 2007b, 2008) suggest mixed results on his success. In 2007, the agency issued two reports to Senator Byrd and Representative John Conyers, Jr. followed by the GAO’s General Counsel testifying before House oversight committees in 2008. Together, the GAO (2007a, 2007b, 2008) researched 29 provisions that had been cited by President Bush as unconstitutional in his signing statements. After contacting the departments or agencies that were responsible for implementing the respective provisions, the GAO (2008) found that “in 16 cases the agencies had taken actions to execute the provisions as written (1).” In 5 cases they “found that the provisions were not triggered” which meant that the legislation only required action following certain conditions (GAO 2007a, 2007b, 2008, 1). But in 9 cases the GAO (2008) concluded “that the agencies had not yet executed the provisions or had not executed the provisions as written (1).” 63 In using the reports and testimony to House committees, this dissertation examined the rhetoric of the 16 provisions that the GAO (2008) determined had been executed by the agencies as they were written, and the 9 that were not. Three of the provisions from the GAO (2007a, 2007b, 2008) publications were omitted from this dissertation’s examination of the president’s administrative rhetoric. Two were excluded from this study because the GAO (2008) reported that the agency did not experience any interference from the administration rather than a fixed conclusion that the policy had been “executed” or “not executed” as written by legislators (1). The third one was left out because even though the GAO concluded that the agency executed the law as written, it did not do so until two years after the bill became a law, and was contacted by the GAO for their report to Congress (GAO 2007b).64 Then, from the list of 22 provisions in which the GAO was firm in its conclusion, I completed a content analysis of the president’s

63 One provision involved two different agencies, which explains why the case numbers add up to 30 (GAO 2008). 64 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) adhered to the requirement that employees be informed updated whistleblower protections. In his signing statement President Bush clearly identified the NRC and Department of Energy. He also challenged section 629 by claiming that the provision violated his authority to supervise the executive branch bureaucracy (Bush 2005b). 145 rhetoric in order to ascertain whether or not the president was direct in his administrative communication. Finally, rather than simply rely on the sections of Bush II’s signing statements that were included in the GAO’s (2007a, 2007b, 2008) publications, I will refer to the president’s original signing statements. Reviewing the entire paragraph should provide a more reliable assessment of the president’s administrative rhetoric that surrounds the provisions in question.65 The results tend to support the argument that presidents must be clear in their directions to bureaucrats in order to reach their policy objectives.

GAO Report: 13 Provisions “Executed as Written” Surprisingly, most of the provisions that were selected by congressional members and investigated by the GAO (2008) were implemented as written in the legislation. While the oversight agency did look into the execution of the statute, it does acknowledge that it did not take into consideration the quality of the president’s rhetoric and interpretation of the law (GAO 2007a). The literature on presidential rhetoric states that the Chief Executive must make their message accessible to their audience, clearly communicate what they want, and who is responsible (Dorsey 1957; Waterman 1989; Neustadt 1960, 1990; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006, 2008; Whitford and Yates 2009). Based on the criteria necessary for effective presidential administrative rhetoric, the 13 provisions that were “executed as written” by Congress should contain ambiguous language (Denton and Hahn 1986; Waterman 1989; Neustadt 1960, 1990). Vague administrative rhetoric would make it difficult for agencies to determine if 1) they are the target audience, or 2) what actions they should take (Cooper 2005; McCarthy 2010). Conversely, the 9 provisions that were not carried out by the bureaus as written in the statute should contain presidential administrative rhetoric that makes it obvious which agency is intended recipient, and what action the president wants taken during the implementation phase of the policy process. One of the most interesting aspects of the provisions that were executed accordingly is the list of departments and agencies that did not follow Bush II’s interpretation of the statute. Many are Inner Cabinet departments or housed within the Executive Office of the President

65 The full text of the paragraphs that were examined can be found in the Appendix. 146

(EOP) which are assumed to be the most responsive to the president’s policy preferences and administrative control (Cronin 1980; Wood and Waterman 1994; Arnold 1999; Burke 2000; Van Horn, Baumer, and Gormley 2001). This list of bureaus contacted by the GAO (2007a, 2007b, 2008) for their report includes the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Defense, State, Treasury, and Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It also includes a few lower level agencies and Outer Cabinet departments, such as Housing and Urban Development (HUD) (Cronin 1980; Burke 2000; GAO 2007a, 2007b, 2008). As for the president’s administrative rhetoric, Bush II violates almost every recommendation by scholars on how the president’s rhetoric needs to be structured in order to effectively communicate their policy preferences (Waterman 1989; Neustadt 1960, 1990; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006). First, it is unclear in most of the provisions that were executed as written who the president intended as his target audience because he only made a generic reference to “the executive branch (see Bush 2004c, 3120; GAO 2007a).”66 Only three of the 13 provisions that were identified as properly executed mentioned a specific agency in the same paragraph as his interpretation of the law. In order for a government official to know that the president was speaking directly to them they would have to make a connection between the signing statement’s instructions and the legislation. This violates Neustadt’s (1990) “third factor favoring compliance” which is a subordinate’s “awareness” that he has been given a directive (20). When the president clearly identifies a subordinate it increases their “awareness of others” and that non-compliance may result in pressure from peers and other officials (Neustadt 1990, 20). In using a generic reference to subordinates Bush II may not have gotten the attention of his agents. Likewise, overly general administrative rhetoric loses the potential for additional bureaucratic peer pressure (Neustadt 1990; Cooper 2005; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006, 2008; Whitford and Yates 2009; McCarthy 2010). In the few exceptions in which the president did identify a specific department, he lacks clarity in what action he expects to be taken. For example, in his signing statement for H.R. 3058, the president comments that sections of the bill violate “the bicameral passage and

66 S. 2845, Statement on Signing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, P.L. 108-458, December 17, 2004. 147 presentment requirements of the Constitution (Bush 2005i, 1796).”67 Although not explicitly naming the department he does identify it by mentioning that violation can be found under a portion of the bill titled, ‘‘Department of Housing and Urban Development, Management and Administration, Salaries and Expenses (Bush 2005i, 1796).’’ The GAO (2007a) reported that the provision in question called for HUD to allocate grants using the guidelines listed in the statement of managers. Rather than following the president’s signing statement, HUD reported that it did distribute grant money as provided in the more detailed instructions given by Congress (GAO 2007a). Citing constitutional violations instead of providing more straightforward instructions regarding the execution of certain provisions was found in all 13 cases in which the law was implemented as written (Cooper 2005; McCarthy 2010). Therefore, it is possible that the president was using his signing statements to communicate constitutional arguments and not policy direction. Overall, for the provisions that the GAO concluded that executive branch agents did not deviate from their statutory duties as directed by the president’s signing statement, there were consistent themes. A possible explanation is that the president did not articulate which department was expected to heed his message, or he did not clearly communicate how he wanted the law executed, or both (McCarthy 2010). An exception that was overlooked by the GAO (2007a) could be found in his Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006 (Bush 2005b). The report notes that the Department of Justice (DOJ) did meet with congressional staffers as required by the legislation, and the Office of Justice Programs did allocate grant funds accordingly (GAO 2007a). However, the report does not mention that Bush II sanctions bureaucratic discretion in his statement by announcing that “the Attorney General shall, as a matter of comity between the executive and legislative branches, seek and consider the views of appropriate committees in this matter as the Attorney General deems appropriate (Bush 2005b, 1902; GAO 2007a).”68 Therefore, it is less surprising that the GAO (2007a) learned the Department of Justice met with congressional staff three times and funds were properly allocated shortly thereafter.

67 H.R. 3058, Statement on Signing the Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, P.L. 109-115, November 30, 2005. 68 H.R. 2863, Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, P.L. 109-148, December 30, 2005. 148

GAO Report: 9 Provisions “Not Executed as Written” The clarity of the president’s orders, or which agency he was speaking to, was suspect in the 13 provisions in which the bureaucracy executed the law as written by the legislative branch. But in cases that the GAO (2007a, 2007b, 2008) concluded that the president’s signing statements did seem to affect implementation, the president’s administrative rhetoric should be more straightforward and make it clear what the president wants. The nine provisions that were not executed as written should include the name of the agency that the president is directing, the location of the provision he is challenging, and some substantive information on how it should be implemented (GAO 2007a, 2007b, 2008). Meeting these three standards would provide some support for the rhetorical administrative presidency theory presented in this dissertation. However, a review of the president’s administrative rhetoric that were not executed to the letter of the law, presented an inconsistent pattern (GAO 2007a, 2007b, 2008). In four of the provisions the president was either clear in which agency he was talking to, or which provision was problematic and its corresponding administrative remedy. But in five of the provisions, Bush II was clear about both his intended audience and how he wanted them to proceed. 69 However, the provisions were not selected by Congress based on the clarity of the president’s administrative rhetoric (GAO 2007a, 2008). As such, a definitive pattern that parallels this dissertation is not present mainly because of a disparity in methodologies (GAO 2007a). For example, in the case involving the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the tonal value was coded as interpretive in the data set. While the president did clearly mention the two organizations, his administrative rhetoric informing the bureaus to execute the law “in a manner consistent with the President’s constitutional authority to supervise the unitary executive branch” was too vague to be considered as a command tone per my original operational definition (Bush 2005b, 1315).70 Moreover, in this dissertation’s data set, agencies were only coded if it was named by the president and not referred to as part of the title of the legislation. An example of this is found in the signing statement for H.R. 3010, in which the president announces,

69 Emphasis added by author. 70 H.R. 6, Statement on Signing the Energy Policy Act of 2005, P.L. 109-58, August 8, 2005. 149

““The executive branch shall construe certain provisions of the Act that purport to require congressional committee approval for the execution of a law as calling solely for notification, as any other construction would be inconsistent with the constitutional principles enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States in INS v. Chadha. These provisions include sections 103, 208, and language under the heading ‘‘Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation Fund (Bush 2005k, 1903).’’”71

The signing statement was coded for the federal bureaucracy in the most general terms, and not the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation Fund. While some of the provisions that were investigated either did not perfectly conform to this dissertation’s coding criteria, a few stood out for other reasons. Notably, one which supports Neustadt’s (1990) claim that “publicity spurs execution” and was included in the second GAO (2007b) report (22). In recounting its investigation of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Department of Energy (DOE) due to the president’s dissection of section 629 in his Statement on Signing the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the GAO (2007b) stated that the NRC took steps to implement the provision but only after they became aware of an investigation, the DOE did not (Bush 2005b). Like the other signing statements that were followed by federal agencies, Bush II (2005b) aimed this portion of his signing statement directly at the NRC and DOE, and was clear in which section troubled the White House and why. Section 629, as written in Public Law 109-58, updated section 211 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 which outlined the bureaus’ whistleblower protections. In his signing statement the president declared that, “The executive branch shall construe the amendments to section 211 of the Energy Reorganization Act made by section 629 of the Act, as they relate to dissemination of official information by employees of the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in a manner consistent with the President’s constitutional authority to supervise the unitary executive branch (Bush 2005b, 1315).”72

71 H.R. 3010, Statement on Signing the Department of Labor, Health and Human Services and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, P.L. 109-149, December 30, 2005. 72 H.R. 6, Statement on Signing the Energy Policy Act of 2005, P.L. 109-58, August 8, 2005. 150

The GAO (2007b) reported that the NRC confirmed they did inform employees of the expanded whistleblower protections. In providing some context the report pointed out that the bill had been signed into law over two years prior to the investigation into the president’s signing statements (GAO 2007b). Giving empirical credence to Neustadt (1990), the office also noted that the NRC did not take actions until administrators had been contacted by GAO (2007b) officials researching the execution status of section 629. The DOE did not have the same reaction as the NRC. Even though the department acknowledged that it should take measures to update its web site and printed materials for employees it did not have a specific timeframe for doing so (GAO 2007b). The assumed impact of Bush II’s signing statements on both organizations could fuel concerns that scholars have expressed regarding the negative impact signing statements could have on civil service ethics and public policy (Tiefer 1994; Cooper 2005, 2007; Pfiffner 2009a). In one of several signing statements where the president’s challenged a legislative veto, he mentions the Supreme Court’s INS ruling on the matter and that the offending provision was section 716. Bush II (2005e) began this paragraph with the very familiar, “The executive branch shall construe…(1697).”73 Despite failing to name his target audience the Department of Agriculture (USDA) did not execute this provision (GAO 2007a). Upon contacting the USDA, the GAO (2007a) was informed that the department followed “past practices” that had been in place “since at least the 1980s (31).” This could have meant the department’s manual detailing instructions to “prepare, review, or clear legislative reports” that was published in 1984, and replaced in 2002 (USDA 2002, 1). The USDA (1984, 2002) manuals state that administrators are notified when the legislation significantly affects the department’s policies. Depending on the impact the legislation may have on the organization, officials may choose to submit a draft signing statement or veto message or could be instructed to do so by OMB (USDA 1984, 2002). Guidelines order representatives of the department to refrain from direct contact with Congress unless it is approved by the department’s Secretary or OMB (USDA 2002). The Office of General Counsel (OGC) is noted as having the authority to review any legislative proposals originating from the department. Prior to submitting departmental proposals to OMB, the OGC evaluates them so drafts are “consistent with USDA policy (USDA 2002, 8).”

73 H.R. 2744, Statement on Signing the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, P.L. 109-97, November 10, 2005. 151

Past practices may also have been established through other channels. In 1996, the USDA’s General Counsel contacted the Justice Department (DOJ) about a legislative veto in section 726 of the department’s appropriations bill. In their response an attorney from the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) reminded the USDA about the Supreme Court’s 1983 ruling, and quoted Clinton’s signing statement in which the president proclaimed that “section 726 raises constitutional concerns (Clinton 1995d, 1691; Shiffrin 1996, 2).”74 Based on past cases and court rulings, the OLC attorney (Shiffrin 1996) informed the USDA that the provision was severable and appropriated funds could not be subjected to congressional committee approval. The GAO (2007a) report was also useful for comparison purposes. The Department of Defense (DOD) was investigated for two separate provisions that were mentioned in the same signing statement. However, one provision was “executed as written” and the other was not (GAO 2007a, 9). The final report determined that section 8100, which required the DOD to submit a report to Congress justifying its budget for military operations was not followed (GAO 2007a). The statute required that the report include data on “troop strength” for both Active and Reserve military personnel, and the estimated costs of all weaponry and military operations (Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act 2006, 2721; GAO 2007a). But in his Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, Bush II (2005j) suggests differently. He notes that section 8100 is located under the heading “Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide,” and affects the Defense Department’s “future budget requests (Bush 2005j, 1901).” In responding to Congress’s encroachment on his administrative authority the president concludes the paragraph by announcing that, “The executive branch shall construe these provisions relating to planning and making of budget recommendations in a manner consistent with the President’s constitutional authority to require the opinions of the heads of departments, to supervise the unitary

74 H.R. 1976, Statement on Signing the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1996, P.L. 104-37, October 27, 1995. 152

executive branch, and to recommend for congressional consideration such measures as the President shall judge necessary and expedient (Bush 2005j, 1901, 1902).”75

The GAO (2007a) reported that the DOD did provide a report to Congress for the following year’s budget but severely limited the data included in the report to military “operations in the Balkans and Guantanamo Bay (24).” The department informed the GAO (2007a) that additional data for military operations in the Middle East was not included in its report because the level of uncertainty prohibited any meaningful budget estimations. Therefore, the congressional research office concluded “that DOD did not execute this provision as written (GAO 2007a, 24).” Conversely, the GAO (2007a) determined that the DOD properly executed Section 8020, the second provision investigated from this signing statement. In this part of the statute $8 million were reserved for the DOD to offer monetary incentives to contractors so they would extend business opportunities to Native American organizations or businesses, as defined by the Indian Financing Act of 1974 (25 U.S.C. 1544; GAO 2007a). Like other signing statements that were listed as “executed as written,” Bush II began with “the executive branch shall construe….” and listed section 8020 between two other provisions that he objected to using the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause (Bush 2005j, 1902; GAO 2007a, 36). Specifically, the signing statement’s administrative rhetoric declared that, “The executive branch shall construe provisions of the Act relating to race, ethnicity, gender, and State residency, such as sections 8014, 8020 and 8057, in a manner consistent with the requirement to afford equal protection of the laws under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment (Bush 2005j, 1902).”76

The president does mention Defense early in his signing statement but linked the department with completely different sections of the bill (Bush 2005j). The DOD confirmed that they used almost all of the funds to provide incentives for contractors to buy supplies or hire subcontractors that were owned or run by Native Americans (GAO 2007a). Therefore, in

75 H.R. 2863, Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, P.L. 109-148, December 30, 2005. 76 Ibid. 153 comparing the two paragraphs and sections there are fundamental differences in the president’s administrative rhetoric. First, Bush II (2005j) named the DOD in his reading of section 8100 whereas he only addressed “the executive branch” in his commentary on section 8020. He also provided more elaborate justification supporting his interpretation of the statute which included implementing section 8100’s “planning and making of budget recommendations in a manner consistent” with the powers granted by Article II to require opinions from department heads and recommend legislation (Bush 2005j, 1901). By citing the specific powers of Article II the president’s signal could be understood as reminding the DOD that the White House possesses the authority to request budget proposals from executive branch subordinates, not Congress (Cooper 2002; Rudalevige 2002; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Durant 2009b; Whitford and Yates 2009; Korzi 2011). In commenting on section 8020, which was implemented per the legislation, the president only offered the Due Process Clause as a foundation for bureaucratic decision-making in executing the provision (Bush 2005j). While it may be a stretch to claim that these differences in the president’s administrative rhetoric factored into the actions of the DOD, it is curious that this “Inner” Cabinet department reported two separate responses even though the president commented on the provisions within the same signing statement (Cronin 1980, 281; Bush 2005j; GAO 2007a). The two most perplexing cases, with respect to administrative rhetoric as presented thus far, involve FEMA. In stark contrast to Bush II’s (2006a) signing statement on the agency’s housing programs, the one issued for H.R. 5441 fails to link his interpretation of sections 623 and 697 “of the Act relating to race, ethnicity, and gender” to FEMA (Bush 2006e, 1743).77 Instead, the president began this paragraph with “the executive branch (Bush 2006e, 1743).” Furthermore, he made a relatively open-ended determination that the provisions should be implemented “in a manner consistent with the requirement of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution to afford equal protection of the laws (Bush 2006e, 1743; see Cooper 2005; McCarthy 2010).”

77 H.R. 4939, Statement on Signing the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006, P.L. 109-295, June 15, 2006; H.R. 5441, Statement on Signing the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, P.L. 109-295, October 4, 2006. 154

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments have been used interchangeably in presidential signing statements since Reagan. Recently, the Bush II White House has developed a blueprint for their respective constitutional objections. When the president’s communication becomes rote Cooper (2005) states that “very important points can easily be lost on even experienced readers of signing statements (520).” Based on this and the fact that FEMA is not mentioned in the same paragraph as sections 623 and 627, Bush II’s administrative rhetoric appears to lack the necessary information required to draw the agency’s attention. Even so, FEMA did not implement this provision as Congress intended (GAO 2008). However, Pfiffner’s (2008) position may provide an explanation. He states that the power of signing statements lie with the precedents that presidents set, which is why the Bush II Administration opted to use broad references to the executive branch and repetition in his construal of certain provisions (Pfiffner 2008). The Reagan Administration’s actions increased the visibility and accessibility of signing statements so that subordinates would heed the president’s preferences during the implementation phase. By altering his administrative rhetoric, Bush II may have been attempting to prime subordinates and frame the president’s authority through repetitious administrative rhetoric and constitutional references. While these strategies are typically used by presidents attempting to set the nation’s policy agenda, these approaches could be applied to communicate White House’s policy preferences. But instead of broad appeals, use their prerogative power to reach the federal government’s numerous bureaucracies and drown out competing voices (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Kurtz 1998; Edwards 1989; Jones 2005; Halstead 2007; Kernell 2007; Pfiffner 2008; Hoffman 2010). Nonetheless, the investigation conducted by the GAO (2007a, 2007b, 2008) suggests that the vagueness of Bush II’s signing statement administrative rhetoric may have limited its potential as an administrative device (Cooper 2005; McCarthy 2010).

“Command” Administrative Rhetoric and the GAO Reports: Provisions “Not Executed” Only three out of the nine signing statements in that were not executed met this dissertation’s coding standards for a command tone. Of those three, the president clearly identified a specific department or agency, the provision, and what steps were expected from subordinates. The first example is found in the president’s Statement on Signing the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006. The president took exception to Congress 155 mandating that the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) move their checkpoints in Tucson, Arizona at least once over the course of a week (Bush 2005d).78 In the statute, Congress provided detailed information and the legislative branch’s rationale for adding the measure. The rotation of checkpoint sites was “designed to prevent persons subject to inspection from predicting the location of any such checkpoint (Department of Homeland Security Appropriations 2005, 2067).” But in his reading of the provision Bush II claimed that Congress was trying to usurp the president’s executive power because such decisions entail “execution of the laws” by federal law enforcement, in this case CBP (Bush 2005d, 1563). As such, he announced that the provision should be considered “advisory rather than mandatory (Bush 2005d, 1563).” Incidentally, CBP had been given the same order in an appropriations bill the year before (Bush 2004a).79 The GAO (2007a) testified that the CBP’s responded to their inquiry by stating that they did make efforts to comply with “the advisory provision” of H.R. 2360 (35). The second case involves FEMA which, like CBP, was included in the executive branch’s reorganization and creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (Hastedt 2005; Zegart 2006; Light 2007). As part of the government’s response to Hurricane Katrina the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was assigned the task of providing emergency housing, and developing an “alternative housing pilot program” in two separate sections of the bill (Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery 2006, 459, 460; GAO 2007a). But the projects were subjected to the possibility of legislative vetoes following the agency’s mandated expenditure reports. In his signing statement Bush II (2006a) cited the section of the bill and contested the legislative veto. The president also mentioned FEMA, along with DHS and its Secretary, in the same paragraph (Bush 2006a).80 Through his signing statement, Bush II informed the two organizations that they should understand the section and submission of a “housing proposal and expenditure plan for congressional committee approval as calling solely for notification, as any

78 H.R. 2360, Statement on Signing the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006, P.L. 109-90, October 18, 2005. 79 H.R. 4567, Statement on Signing the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005, P.L. 108-334, October 18, 2004. 80 H.R. 4939, Statement on Signing the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006, P.L. 109-295, June 15, 2006. 156 other construction would be inconsistent with the constitutional principles enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States in INS v. Chadha (Bush 2006a, 1159).” The GAO (2007a) determined that FEMA failed to implement the law as written because it did not report to Congress prior to spending appropriated funds for disaster relief. Similarly, the agency briefed congressional staffs before issuing grants for the Alternative Housing Pilot Program, but FEMA did not submit the required proposal or expenditure plan to the appropriate congressional committees (GAO 2007a). The failure to document the estimated cost of the Alternative Housing Pilot Program was commented on 5 years later in a report by the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (OIG). The Inspector General (IG) remarked that any efforts to improve the program would be difficult because FEMA was unable to produce any “detailed cost data (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General 2011, 32).” During the GAO’s (2007a) investigation, FEMA claimed it was too difficult to estimate the cost for the housing program because they were unsure how many citizens would require assistance. However, this does not explain why the agency was unable to produce the information several years later. Especially since the OIG reported that, as part of actions to implement the pilot program, FEMA’s staff was in the process of contacting “all eligible families” about available housing (OIG 2011, 9). The third provision that was investigated by the GAO and coded as a command, involves the DOD’s failure to execute a provision as it was written. In his Statement on Signing the Military Quality of Life and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, President Bush (2005h) announced that, “Section 126 of the Act purports to require Department of Defense officials to respond in writing within 21 days to any question or inquiry from certain legislative subcommittees. The executive branch shall construe this section in a manner consistent with the President’s constitutional authority to supervise the unitary executive branch and to withhold information the disclosure of which could impair foreign relations, the national security, the deliberative processes of the Executive, or the performance of the Executive’s constitutional duties (1794).”81

81 H.R. 2528, Statement on Signing the Military Quality of Life and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act , P.L. 109- 114, November 30, 2005. 157

Not only did the president identify the section and the department, he also detailed specific information related to the provision (Bush 2005h). His construal suggests that the White House was giving Defense permission to “withhold information (Bush 2005h, 1794; see Campbell and Jamieson 2008).” Upon contacting the DOD, the GAO (2007a) was informed that the department had received two inquiries from congressional committees related to section 126. But the department only replied to one of the requests and failed to do so within the 21 day window as dictated by section 126 (GAO 2007a). The illustrative examples in this section substantiate claims of bureaucratic responsiveness and the administrative communications of signing statements (Cooper 2005; Kelley 2007; Magill 2007; Pfiffner 2009a; Kelley and Marshall 2010). The example involving Reagan’s signing statement and the Army Corps of Engineers also supports this dissertation’s theoretical assumption. Specifically, when unilateral action is coupled with straightforward administrative rhetoric the president’s policy preferences should continue long after his administration has left office. Based on official departmental documents, the steady use of signing statements and familiar administrative rhetoric by Reagan and his successors may extend White House control across administrations. By becoming ingrained in the executive branch’s bureaucratic culture as a source for presidential communications, this unilateral device can serve individual presidents, as well as, the institution (Schall 1983; T. Moe 1993; Light 1999; Meier 2000; Durant and Warber 2001). Even with the good fortune of locating some official records and White House communications, the GAO’s reports (2007a, 2007b, 2008) were invaluable to the qualitative analysis of presidential administrative rhetoric. Through the office’s investigation into Bush II’s signing statements, this dissertation could evaluate the merits of the president’s administrative rhetoric. By applying the literature’s criteria for effective executive messaging to the provisions investigated by the GAO (2007a, 2007b, 2008) and the reported bureaucratic responses, this dissertation was able to strengthen the bridge between the rhetorical and administrative presidencies.

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Summary Signaling, Context, and Administrative Rhetoric As Medhurst (2007) states, the president can choose among a wide variety of “rhetorical instrumentalities” that will best serve him in “affecting the demands of the situation” and use the available “choices” in order to exert “rhetorical leadership (71).” The distinctive characteristics of signing statements are supported by two examples presented in this dissertation. In both cases the president faced extreme conditions that threaten their leadership. George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton increased the forcefulness of their administrative rhetoric during times when their ability to serve as a strong Chief Executive was being questioned. The Clinton example also demonstrates the flexibility of signing statements as rhetorical and administrative tools, which is evident in the context they were issued (Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010; Conley 2011; Evans 2011). Clinton followed his ceremonial signing statement with a written version. This strategy allowed the president to communicate with vastly different audiences. During the Rose Garden event, the president was able to supplement the ceremony with visual and political cues. The added elements helped the president convey his message to the public, and defend signing the bill into law (Clinton 1996b; Barilleaux 2005; Campbell and Jamieson 2008). The presidential administrative rhetoric of Clinton’s written (1996c) Statement on Signing the Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act was also exceptional. 82 First, his signing statement featured command administrative rhetoric. Then the president informed bureaucrats that he would be taking “any possible executive” action (Clinton 1996c, 1329). While Clinton did not specify what action he would take, his remark stands out because presidents in this study rarely admitted in their signing statements plans to use additional unilateral tools. In 1,207 signing statements there were only 35 instances in which the president informed government officials that they had, or intended to, issue more directives. Of the four presidents, Clinton used signing statements to announce the exercise of presidential unilateralism 21 times during his two terms. Taken together, the Clinton administration covered numerous bases with signing statements on welfare reform. Through unilateral communications the president responded to supporters and critics, and directed subordinates (Clinton 1996b, 1996c). The White House took an additional step to ensure the president’s message was received

82 H.R. 3734, Statement on Signing the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, P.L. 104-193, August 22, 1996. 159 because the Office of the Press Secretary issued press releases of the president’s two memoranda (Clinton 1996d, 1996e). Signing statements have also been released by the Office of the Press Secretary periodically. This practice was unusual during Reagan’s tenure, but noticeably increased over time. Time constraints or prior commitments may prompt a press release of a signing statement as the White House continues to balance the public and administrative presidencies (Light 1999; Durant 2009a; Rudalevige 2009a; Whitford and Yates 2009; Beasley 2010). But the White House’s decision to issue of press release of a signing statement may be related to organization of the executive branch, political conditions, or policy type. This development will be considered in future research.

Bush II, Signing Statements, and Bureaucratic Responsiveness In order to evaluate presidential administrative rhetoric and bureaucratic responsiveness this dissertation reviewed the selected provisions from the GAO (2007a, 2007b, 2008) reports and congressional hearing testimony. Like Neustadt (1960, 1990) outlined decades earlier, the president needs to be clear on who is being addressed and what is to be done. The publications support arguments that presidential administrative rhetoric must be explicit in order to provoke bureaucratic action (Waterman 1989; Neustadt 1990; GAO 2007a, 2007b, 2008). Out of 29 provisions challenged by Bush II in his signing statements, there were only 9 instances in which an agency clearly deviated from the statute, whereas the reports firmly concluded that 13 provisions had been implemented as written by Congress (GAO 2008). More often than not, the examples in this review suggest that the level of clarity in the president’s administrative rhetoric may have affected bureaucratic compliance (Wood and Waterman 1994; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Whitford and Yates 2009). Even though Bush II was more aggressive in communicating constitutional challenges, his language may have limited the effect of his signing statements as an administrative tool (Dorsey 1957; Denton and Hahn 1986; Waterman 1989; Cooper 2005; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; McCarthy 2010). Based on this dissertation’s theoretical foundations and argument that the institution has evolved into the administrative rhetorical presidency, there is good reason to take a closer look at presidential communication and bureaucratic responsiveness (Edwards and Wayne 1985; Neustadt 1960, 1990; Medhurst 1996, 2007; Whitford and Yates 2009; Evans 2011; Marshall 2012).

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While there is no way to definitively prove the impact of signing statements, these illustrations provide some evidence that underscores the potential of presidential administrative rhetoric, as well as its shortcomings. Signing statements are intended to aid the president in managing the federal government. Their effectiveness is supported when the president’s unilateral action is cited or discussed at length in department manuals, government publications, and executive branch communications. Future research should attempt to locate operating manuals since these types of government documents are more readily available. As with the Army Corps of Engineers and the USDA, agency publications could provide evidence that the president’s subordinates are listening.

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Chapter 6 Conclusion

The Institution and Presidential Rhetoric The ambiguity of Article II can partially be attributed to disagreement over the institution’s design. Even though they created the American government system together, the Framers did not reach a consensus regarding the role and power of the presidency. Because of their varying notions of what the office could, and should be, a loosely defined institution was written into the Constitution allowing individual presidents to influence its evolution and role within the system (Edwards and Wayne 1985; Landy and Milkis 2010; Pika and Maltese 2010). Unlike Congress, presidents are not fenced in by several enumerated powers. Rather, they are free to roam due to the ability to broadly interpret their office, power, and duties as long as they also consider the reactions of the other two branches (Howell 2003; Barilleaux 2006). Barilleaux (2006) states that the ambiguity of Article II motivates presidents to engage in venture constitutionalism, which are measures taken for the purpose of expanding the institution’s scope of executive power and authority beyond what is provided by the Constitution. This theory includes the establishment and use of unilateral devices, such as signing statements, in order to affect public policy without interference from the other branches (Barilleaux 2006, 2012). Expanding institutional power is pursued because the Chief Executive’s reality is replete with competing forces and hurdles throughout the policy process. This holds true for anyone elected to serve in the Oval Office. Congress and organized interest groups try to influence the policy actions of federal agencies, and the executive branch bureaucracy has grown exponentially since the New Deal. Modern presidents are also confronted by a public that expects more from the individual president than the institution can deliver. As a result of these political and institutional conditions presidents have numerous reasons to “contemplate unilateral action (Kagan 2001; Kelley 2003; Howell 2005, 422; Barilleaux 2006; Waterman 2009).” But these circumstances have served to advance the rhetorical nature of the presidency which was also built upon the institution’s constitutionally granted executive power (Hamilton [1788] 1982; Denton and Hahn 1986; Eastland 1992; Landy and Milkis 2010; Rudalevige

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2010a). Despite the lack of detailed structure that is characteristic of Article I and the creation of the legislative branch, Article II does not invest a lot of detail toward the powers and authority of the president. The first sentence of Article II declares that “the executive power shall be vested in a president of the United States (U.S. Constitution 1788).” But there is little detail on how expansive the office’s executive powers are, and does not provide any guidelines that presidents can follow in order to serve as a skilled administrator (Eastland 1992; Arnold 1998; Barilleaux 2006; Bessette and Schmitt 2009; Landy and Milkis 2010; Rudalevige 2010b; Genovese 2012). To fulfill this role, presidents must develop ways to communicate their decisions and guide the programmatic actions of the federal government. Either through layers of bureaucratic agencies or against the efforts of competing principals, such as Congress (Nathan 1983; T. Moe 1987; Waterman 1989; Light 1995; Arnold 1999; Meier 2000; Whitford 2005; Whitford and Yates 2009).

Presidential Leadership, Rhetoric, and Unilateralism Presidential executive leadership deviates from the mutually exclusive categories of Weberian ([1946] 2006) authority; traditional, charismatic and rational-legal because it relies on all three types of authority simultaneously (Rockman 1984; Denton and Hahn 1986; Hargrove 1998; Ragsdale 2000; Farrar-Myers 2007; Fry and Raadschelders 2008; Genovese 2012).83 According to Weber ([1946] 2006) traditional and charismatic authority figures have their leadership accepted on a personal level by other individuals. Leaders are followed as a matter of an established status quo or they possess a character trait that inspires loyalty. Conversely, rational-legal leaders exert authority through a fixed set of rules and procedures of their respective office or institution (Weber [1946] 2006; Wilson 1995; Hargrove 1998; Fry and Raadschelders 2008; Kettl 2012). Rational-legal authority is the most stable and bureaucrats are expected to follow the president based on the institution’s executive governing authorities (Waterman 1989; Wilson 1995; Fry and Raadschelders 2008; Kettl 2012). However, because of the office’s weak boundaries and system of checks and balances, presidents have relied on

83 In his work Wilson (1995) condenses executive leadership into two categories; patrimonial administration encompasses Weber’s ([1946] 2006) traditional and charismatic authority, whereas both present similar perspectives on legal authority. 163 precedents and their public personalities in order to fortify the executive branch’s institutional authority (Neustadt 1960; Rockman 1984; Hargrove 1998; Ragsdale 2000; Farrar-Myers 2007; Kernell 2007; Healy 2008; Genovese 2012). Washington set several enduring precedents for the office when he firmly positioned the president as the central figure regarding foreign policy matters. He also defined the role of Commander-in-Chief, withheld information from Congress based on the claim of executive privilege, and exercised unilateral authority through proclamations and executive orders (Phelps 1989; K. Mayer 2002; Cooper 2002; Barilleaux 2006; Cairo 2006; Hoffman 2010; Pika and Maltese 2010; Conley 2011). While some of these initial methods for presidential governing remain, such as utilizing various unilateral tools, others have been modified or abandoned. This includes categorizing presidential public appeals as improper demagoguery, or reverence for Congress’s role in a separated system (Phelps 1989; Jamieson 1992; Nichols 1994; Tulis 1987; Burke 2000; Rudalevige 2002; Jones 2005; Kernell 2007). Overtime, public rhetorical appeals have become the norm and the Chief Executive’s interaction with the other institutions has been modified (Tulis 1987; Phelps 1989; Langston 1995; Burke 2000; Jones 2005; Kernell 2007). Once the public became misguided and unable to properly hold elected representatives accountable, especially presidents, the lines that distinguished legal authority and charismatic power begin to blur (Tulis 1987; Langston 1995; Jones 2005; Farrar-Myers 2007; Healy 2008). Compounding the problem has been Congress’s delegation of power to the president over tasks like budgeting or deference during times of war (Corwin 1984; Waterman 1989; Burke 2000; Wildavsky and Caiden 2004; Barilleaux 2006; Farrar-Myers 2007; Fisher 2007a; Pious 2008; Farrier 2009; Marshall and Haney 2010). These developments have redefined presidential leadership which is now based on both, the constitutionally defined institution and habitual compliance by the other two branches and the public (Corwin 1984; Lowi 1985; Jones 2005; Barilleaux 2006; Farrar-Myers 2007; Healy 2008, 2011; Pious 2008; Ceaser 2009). As a result, presidents must engage in various types of communication in order to meet the new demands of the office and changes to their political environment (Tulis 1987; Waterman, Wright, and St. Clair 1999; Kernell 2007; Healy 2008). This includes managing the federal bureaucracy through presidential administrative rhetoric and unilateralism (Waterman 1989; Howell 2003; Barilleaux 2006; Canes-Wrone 2006; Durant 2009b; Whitford and Yates 2009; Evans 2011). 164

Signing statements can benefit the president administratively because their comments on new policy enable them to transcend the complex network of federal government bureaucracies through timing, attachment to a bill’s legislative history, and publication in the Federal Register (Light 1995; Kagan 2001; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006, 2008; Cronin 2009; Rodman 2009; Whitford and Yates 2009). The government’s execution of policy relies on decision makers identifying and connecting their objectives to the actions of the subordinates responsible for implementation. In order for a principle to facilitate the shift into action by the proper agents, clear communications must be provided regarding their preferences and priorities (Bardach 1977; Pressman and Wildavsky 1984; Edwards 1980; Jones 1984; West and Cooper 1989; Chun and Rainey 2005a, 2005b; Jacobs 2005; Krause 2009; Whitford and Yates 2009). This unilateral device is a viable administrative approach because it allows the president to direct execution prior to any bureaucratic action or competing voices and its publication narrows the focus of federal bureaucrats who have admitted to searching news reports for the president’s policy comments (Eshbaugh-Soha 2006). Concentrating his subordinates’ source for policy guidance is especially important since legislation generally contains ambiguous language, and the complexity of issues may involve several agencies (Downs 1967; Light 1995; Cooper 2002; Chun and Rainey 2005b; Kelley 2007; Magill 2007; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006, 2008; Whitford and Yates 2009; Kelley and Marshall 2010; Weimer and Vining 2011).

Discussion Summary of Results, and Contributions to the Current Literature No significant relationship was found between the tone of the presidents’ administrative rhetoric and the political conditions of the president’s public approval ratings, election years, or united versus divided government. However, significance was found regarding tone and the organization of the executive branch. Specifically, the president’s interpretive rhetoric increased when provisions involved multiple agencies, or an Outer Cabinet department. This suggests that signing statements may be issued to prevent jurisdictional battles between agencies or to limit the discretion of departments that can be heavily influenced by Congress or interest groups (Cronin 1980; Moe 1989; Neustadt 1990; Light 1995; Whitford and Yates 2009). Command tones were used more often in signing statements involving Inner Cabinet departments. The types of commands varied from the president requesting mundane tasks such as producing an additional 165 report, or submitting proposals for amendments. However, command administrative rhetoric can turn controversial when the president directs subordinates to disregard provisions that limit bureaucratic discretion or his executive authority (Cooper 2005; Pfiffner 2009a; Evans 2011). The latter being a legislative effort to exert some control over the president’s closest executive branch allies (Cronin 1980). Future research efforts will build on the significant findings related to executive branch organization. A significant relationship was also found between the tone of the president’s administrative rhetoric and context. Signing statements that were issued during a signing ceremony were overwhelmingly symbolic. The results suggest that presidents reserve substantive administrative communication for the written versions of this unilateral device. Written signing statements were more likely to contain interpretive or command tones, and were issued more frequently than those issued during a ceremony. By choosing this approach the president can narrow his audience and communicate clearer administrative guidance. But even though they largely go unnoticed, written signing statements still allow presidents to claim transparent executive administration (Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Barilleaux 2012). Future research efforts will build on these results as well. Considering the significant predictor variables and illustrative examples, the results suggest that the president does use bill signing statements for executive branch communication and management. This unilateral tool can also be quite effective as demonstrated by Reagan using his signing statement to communicate with the Army Corps of Engineers, and the GAO’s (2007a, 2007b, 2008) conclusions regarding Bush II’s signing statements and policy execution. However, this dissertation’s qualitative evaluation of the GAO reports also suggests that the White House needs to improve the clarity of the president’s message if they want compliance. This point is underscored by the GAO’s (2007a) investigation of two provisions within the same signing statement. While both provisions involved the DOD, the department executed one and not the other. Upon further examination there was a noticeable difference in Bush II’s administrative rhetoric and his comments about the two sections. In one paragraph the president identified Defense and section 8100 in his signing statement. The GAO concluded that this provision was not “executed as written (Bush 2005j; GAO 2007a, 24).” However, in the paragraph with the president’s comments regarding section 8020 Bush II only made a general reference to “the executive 166 branch (Bush 2005j, 1902).” The GAO concluded that this section was “executed as written (GAO 2007a, 1, 9).” For the majority of the provisions investigated by the GAO (2007a, 2007b, 2008) it could be argued that the clarity of the president’s administrative rhetoric did affect the bureaucracy’s responsiveness. Since signing statements do not have the legal force of executive orders, subordinates must be persuaded to follow the president’s lead (Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010). But it must be clear to agents that the president is speaking to them (Neustadt 1990). Future administrations could maximize the administrative potential of signing statements by using more direct rhetoric. To some extent this dissertation has also contributed to the literature through illustrative examples that counter empirical research on more broadly defined presidential rhetoric (Wood and Waterman 1994; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Kelley 2007; Whitford and Yates 2003, 2009). Hart (1987) cited linguist Charles Hockett’s (1960) theory which posited that spoken rhetorical signals will fade quickly. He stated that the theory appeared to hold true even when the president’s words were documented by the press. Hart (1987) concluded that this was reason presidents were motivated to speak often and with a consistent message. Yet, portions of the qualitative analysis in Chapter 5 provided evidence suggesting that presidential rhetoric has the potential to affect bureaucratic action even after an administration has left the office. This was illustrated with the example of Reagan’s signing statement that informed the Army Corps of Engineers that they were to follow section 6 of H.R. 779 instead of a similar provision that was written into S. 1493. The Army Corps of Engineers project manuals referred to H.R. 779 twenty-five years after Reagan’s comments on implementation (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 2005). The lasting effect of the president’s policy direction has been attributed to the institutionalization of signing statements by the Reagan Administration, and consistent use by his successors (Cooper 2005). This is a notable contribution because the results from previous research suggest that presidential executive communication only have a short-term effect on bureaucratic actions (Wood and Waterman 1994; Golden 2000; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006, 2008; Whitford and Yates 2003, 2009). Official government documents also support a key theoretical measure for the rhetorical administrative presidency as outlined by this dissertation. Based on executive administrative communication research, certain elements are required in order for presidents to effectively communicate with subordinates and get the desired response. This includes audience 167 identification, message clarity, and easy access to the president’s comments (Dorsey 1957; Neustadt 1960, 1990; Waterman 1989; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006, 2008; Whitford and Yates 2009). But in order to move beyond the short-term effects of presidential rhetoric, the rhetorical administrative presidency’s instructions must be formally recorded. Documentation by the federal government, rather than by individuals within an agency, should increase the longevity of their policy direction.84

Future Research The search for official documents that can provide additional support for the long-term effects of signing statements, and theoretical foundation of the rhetorical administrative presidency, will continue for future research endeavors. Especially, in developing case studies for Bush I and Clinton who issued the highest number of command statements as discussed in Chapter 5. Likewise, in anticipation of George W. Bush’s documents becoming open to FOIA requests next year, future research will attempt to test the predictions against his administration’s documents. Follow-up research on presidential administrative rhetoric and signing statements will also explore features of the president’s public signing ceremonies. Out of all the signing statements that were issued during the four administrations in this dataset, 140 were delivered during a signing ceremony only. Most of them were staged in and around the White House. But 12 were delivered at an agency’s headquarters and 2 bill signings statements were issued as part of a department’s internal radio broadcast. For the remaining ceremonies, presidents traveled to various locations around Washington, D.C. and the nation. A closer look, empirically and qualitatively should contribute to this dissertation’s initial effort regarding the rhetorical administrative presidency and symbolic communication. In order to build upon the significance of executive branch organization and presidential communication, future research analysis will consider if a signing statement addresses foreign or

84 Previous literature on presidential signing statements cite Edwin Meese and other Reagan advisors acknowledging that the push to add them to the legislative history of the United States Code Congressional and Administrative News and published in the Federal Registrar was to make the president’s construal readily available for the courts long after the bill had been signed into law (Garber and Wimmer 1987; Kagan 2001; Kelley 2003, 2006). Logically, this idea could also be applied to the federal bureaucracy (Jensen 1985). Especially since the same set of advisors had admitted that signing statements were also developed as an administrative tool and agencies frequently assist in drafting them (USDA 1984; Meese 1985; Tarr 1985). 168 domestic policy. This effort should add to the research on the presidency, and perhaps provide insight into important domestic and foreign policy distinctions (Barilleaux 1988; Wildavsky [1966], 1969; Edwards 1989; Foyle 1999; Lammers and Genovese 2000; Whitford 2005; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Whitford and Yates 2003, 2009; Conley 2011; Marshall and Prins 2011). It should also contribute to recent efforts regarding the president’s rhetoric, the administration of policy, and the White House taking exception to congressional interference (Whitford 2005; West 2006; Kinkopf 2006; Kelley 2007; Biller 2008; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; MacDonald 2010; Evans 2011). Likewise, appropriation bills seem to take on particular importance when it comes to administrative communication to the bureaucracy and justify closer scrutiny (especially in light of the GAO reports) both qualitatively and empirically (2007a, 2007b, 2008). The president’s administrative rhetoric with respect to other unilateral tools also merits further research. The literature notes that the president will not simply rely on one administrative strategy, but several (Nathan 1983; Light 1995, 1999; Golden 2000; Cooper 2002; Howell 2003; Aberbach and Peterson 2005a, 2005b; Kelley and Marshall 2010; Rudalevige 2010b). Between 1981 and 2008, the president used signing statements 35 times in order to inform subordinates he had taken, or planned to take, additional unilateral measures. In collecting the data it was apparent that there are several instances in which the president utilized multiple unilateral devices for the same legislation. Furthermore, while there was no significance between the president’s tone, and election cycle there was significant variation between tone and time of the year. The presidents were more likely to engage in administrative rhetoric during the months of October and November. Interpretive and command tones were relatively consistent between these two months whereas symbolic rhetoric decreased substantially in November. However, from April until September the president used symbolic rhetoric in their signing statements more often than either interpretive or command tones. These initial results could indicate the weight the White House places on rhetorical appeals leading up to an election, or budget battle. Overall, these, and other factors, will also be included for more complex modeling in my follow-up research. Finally, the Obama Administration will be added to the existing dataset. At first glance the 44th president’s signing statements and administrative rhetoric appears to mimic the styles of Reagan and Clinton since most are symbolic in tone. Of the signing statements that have been coded thus far, over half were delivered during a public signing ceremony. Obama’s signing 169 statements appear to be relatively consistent with his four predecessors since approximately 75% of them mention the federal bureaucracy, with most addressing Cabinet level departments. What could be a cause for concern are the command tones that were identified in the Obama’s administrative rhetoric. He has dropped general references to the executive branch, which were common under Bush II, and clearly informs specific Cabinet Secretaries that they are to read certain provisions as “non-binding” or only as “advisory (Obama 2009, 217, 2010, 1).” As the illustrative examples in Chapter 5 suggest, message clarity with this type of direction can be very effective in achieving bureaucratic compliance. The empirical analysis that will be completed following Obama’s four years in office could reveal that the White House has returned to the more direct communication strategies that were common under Reagan, Bush I, and Clinton.

Conclusion Given the lack of enumerated powers in Article II, organization of the federal government, competition with Congress, and public pressure the president needs to communicate policy decisions, and prevent conflicts over jurisdiction or interpretation. In order to navigate around these difficulties, and increase institutional influence, direct policy guidance is often given through unilateral actions (Kaufman 1960; Riker 1965; Denton and Hahn 1986; Neustadt 1990; Light 1995; Kagan 2001; Howell 2003; James 2005; Barilleaux 2006; Farrar-Myers 2007; Kelley 2007; Magill 2007; Whitford and Yates 2009; Dunn 2011). But unilateral action can invite charges of presidential imperialism when it is not open to public access. Also, while some unilateral devices are openly available, only a few tools accommodate modern era presidents faced with a mandate to display governing leadership (Hart 1987; Howell 2003; T. Cook 2005; Cohen 2008; 2010; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Miroff 2010; Korzi 2011; Barilleaux 2012). Therefore, it is no surprise that the parallel development of unilateralism and the rhetorical presidency has accelerated since the federal government expanded in size and scope under the New Deal (Nathan 1983; Pfiffner 1988; Michaels 1997; Burke 2000; DiClerico 2013). As Stuckey (1991) succinctly stated since FDR, “presidential leadership became, by definition, public leadership (35).” The unilateral and rhetorical advantages of bill signing statements provide a way for presidents to try and close the gap between legitimate executive responsibilities and the political 170 and institutional challenges that can threaten their leadership role (Heclo 1977; Light 1995, 1999; Golden 2000; Cooper 2002; K. Mayer 2002; Howell 2003; Kelley 2007; Magill 2007; Waterman 2009; Kelley and Marshall; Evans 2011). This is supported by the results from the graphical displays in Chapter 4 that provide a visual representation of the shifts that have occurred between and within each of the four administrations, and the various examples presented throughout. Furthermore, while the data and results provided a detailed look at presidential administrative communication through unilateral action, the results for the three different tones may require researchers to reevaluate some assumptions about signing statements. First, interpretive and command tones were not exclusive to constitutional signing statements. Of the 89 commands coded in this dataset, 24 were found within those categorized as rhetorical signing statements (Cooper 2005; Kelley 2003, 2007; Pfiffner 2009a; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2009, 2010; Evans 2011). While the majority of interpretive and command tones were found in signing statements are associated with the president’s constitutional challenges, and symbolic rhetoric was found overwhelmingly within rhetorical signing statements, there are noticeable overlaps. Future research by the author will devote more attention to the variation found between the two types of signing statements. Furthermore, symbolic administrative rhetoric was found in 44% of the signing statements that mentioned the bureaucracy. Even though substantive policy decisions need to be communicated when the president wants to limit bureaucratic discretion, there are additional reasons they may mention a department or agency in a signing statement, such as the adaptability of signing statements and potential to reach multiple audiences (Jones 1984; James 2005; Rudalevige 2005b; Weingast 2005; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2009, 2010; Weimer and Vining 2011). Presidential leadership rhetoric may refer to executive branch bureaus because the organization is well known and can be used as a political symbol. This was evident in signing statements issued by all four presidents who periodically used the bureaucracy to frame credit claims or policy battles with Congress. By choosing a symbolic tone a president can also convey policy priorities to the nation as a whole or to narrow constituency groups. Symbolic rhetoric may also be used to signal an agency’s importance to a president’s agenda, or support for their programs (Wood and Waterman 1994; Carroll 1995; Golden 2000; Waterman, Rouse, and Wright 2004; Aberbach and Peterson 2005b; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2009; Whitford and Yates 2009; Cohen 2010). This is important because as Rottinghaus (2010) 171 points out, presidents need to maintain a significant level of support among the general public in order to elicit cooperation from Congress or the bureaucracy. Conversely, research has shown that when the president’s rhetoric takes a decidedly negative tone toward departments or agencies, personnel may become overly resistant to the president’s preferences or resign from public service altogether (Pious 1979; Riley 1987; Waterman 1989; Golden 2000; Meier 2000; Waterman et al 2004; Garrett, Thurber, Fritschler and Rosenbloom 2006; Eshbaugh-Soha 2008). While signing statements could be a way for the White House to inform agents that their organization does not conform to the president’s policy agenda, in reading the documents this was rarely the case (Pious 1979; Hubbell 1991; Griscom 1992; Muir 1992). Second, while the concern over presidential prerogative power and its potential threats to administrative ethics is warranted, the examples in Chapter 5 suggest that what a president says is as important as what he does (see Schall 1983; Neustadt 1990; Medhurst 1996; Cooper 2005; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Fisher 2006; Rottinghaus 2006; Cass and Strauss 2007; Berry 2009; Durant 2009a; Pffiner 2009a; Rudalevige 2009a).85 This position is supported by the illustrative examples regarding the Army Corp of Engineers, the Health and Human Services’ progress report on the sex offender registry system, and evaluation of the the GAO (2007a, 2007b, 2008) reports. As such, a president’s construal of the law may not be enough to provoke federal civil servants into following his instructions (Neustadt 1960, 1990; Waterman 1989; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Rudalevige 2009a, 2010b). Future research on the presidency and the aggressive use of signing statements may need to take this into consideration. Overall, my dissertation topic is a response to scholars calling for increased exploration regarding presidential “public relations” efforts and how rhetorical appeals have intertwined with the management of the executive branch (Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Whitford and Yates 2009; Canes-Wrone 2009, 26; Cohen 2009; Durant 2009a). By selecting predictors from the president’s political and institutional environment, this research also followed suggestions by scholars to expand research efforts on the Chief Executive’s administrative and rhetorical uses of signing statements (Kelley 2007; Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Canes-Wrone 2009; Durant 2009a; Hedge 2009; Rudalevige 2009a; Waterman 2009; Kelley and Marshall 2010; Evans 2011; Korzi 2011; Marshall 2012). In doing so this research contributes to the existing presidency

85 Emphasis added by the author. 172 literature by taking a closer look at the executive administration function of signing statements. It does so by identifying predictors that can influence the tone of presidential administrative rhetoric and by pinpointing factors which, surprisingly, had no effect on the president’s tone. This dissertation has also contributed to the existing literature with the addition of a qualitative chapter that focused on White House administrative strategies, the clarity of presidential executive communication and the potential effects of bill signing statements. Overall, this initial effort has provided empirical and qualitative evidence that lends itself to the bridging the gap between the administrative and rhetorical presidencies. It is my hope that future research endeavors will as well.

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Appendix

Provisions Investigated by the GAO and Text from George W. Bush’s Signing Statements

Thirteen Provisions that were Executed as Written

Signing Statement Excerpt Statement on Signing the Ronald W. Reagan Section 1205: “The executive branch shall National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal construe section 1021, purporting to place Year 2005; H.R. 4200, Oct. 28, 2004 restrictions on the use of the U.S. Armed Forces in certain operations, and sections 1092 and 1205, relating to captured personnel and to contractor support personnel, in a manner consistent with the President’s constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and to supervise the unitary executive branch (Bush 2004b, 2813).”

Statement on Signing the Intelligence Reform Section 1011(a): “President substantial latitude and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004; S. in implementation of the provision. The 2845, Dec. 17, 2004 executive branch shall construe provisions of the Act that relate to race, ethnicity, or gender in a manner consistent with the requirement that the Federal Government afford equal protection of the laws under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution (Bush 2004c, 3120).”

Statement on Signing the Department of Section 516: “Section 516 of the Act purports Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006; to direct the conduct of security and suitability H.R. 2360, Oct. 18, 2005 investigations. To the extent that section 516 relates to access to classified national security information, the executive branch shall construe this provision in a manner consistent with the President’s exclusive constitutional authority, as head of the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief, to classify and control access to national security information and to determine whether an individual is suitable to occupy a position in the executive branch with access to such information (Bush 2005d, 1563).”

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Statement on Signing the Foreign Operations, Section 534(k): “The Executive Branch shall Export Financing, and Related Programs also construe certain provisions of the Act that Appropriations Act, 2006; H.R. 3057, Nov. 14, purport to make consultation with the Congress 2005 a precondition to the execution of the law as calling for, but not mandating, such consultation, as is consistent with the Constitution’s provisions concerning the separate powers of the Congress to legislate and of the President to execute the laws. Such provisions include sections 506(e), 509(b), 512, 534(k), 543(b), 564(b), 576(c), 595, and provisions under the headings ‘‘Transition Initiatives,’’ USAID; ‘‘Andean Counterdrug Initiative,’’ Department of State; and ‘‘Debt Restructuring,’’ Department of the Treasury (Bush 2005f, 1716-1717).”

Section 514: “The Executive Branch shall construe as advisory certain provisions of the Act that purport to direct or burden the President’s constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations, either by purporting to direct the content of certain international negotiations and communications or by directing the Executive Branch to collaborate with other entities in the development of foreign policy. These provisions include sections 506(a), 514, 551, 561(a) and (d), 562, 575(a), 590(b) and 593 (Bush 2005f, 1716).”

Statement on Signing the Science, State, Section 631: “The executive branch shall Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies construe as advisory the provisions of the Act Appropriations Act, 2006; H.R. 2862, Nov. 22, that purport to direct or burden the Executive’s 2005 conduct of foreign relations, including the authority to recognize foreign states and negotiate international agreements on behalf of the United States, or limit the President’s authority as Commander in Chief. These provisions include sections 405, 413, 414, 631, 637, and language under the headings ‘‘International Trade Administration, Operations and Administration’’ and ‘‘Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (Bush 2005g, 1762).’’”

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Statement on Signing the Transportation, Section 809: “Section 809 seeks to prohibit the Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, expenditure of funds for the salaries of ‘‘any the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and person for the filling of any position for which Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, he or she has been nominated after the Senate 2006; H.R. 3058, Nov. 30, 2005 has voted not to approve the nomination of said person.’’ The executive branch shall construe this provision in a manner consistent with the President’s constitutional authority to make recess appointments (Bush 2005i, 1796).”

Office of Management and Budget: “The executive branch shall construe the provisions of the Act in a manner consistent with the President’s authority to supervise the unitary executive branch and take care that the laws be faithfully executed, including the authority to direct which officers in the executive branch shall assist the President in faithfully executing the law. Specific provisions that raise this concern include language under the heading ‘‘Office of Management and Budget, Salaries and Expenses’’ relating to the review of executive branch orders, activities, regulations, transcripts, and testimony, and relating to the review of certain matters in reports to be submitted to the Congress through the Secretary of the Army (Bush 2005i, 1795).”

Community Planning and Development, Community Development Fund: “Certain provisions in the Act purport to allocate funds for specified purposes as set forth in the joint explanatory statement of managers that accompanied the Act; to make changes in statements of managers that accompanied various appropriations bills reported from conferences in the past; or to direct compliance with a committee report. The executive branch shall construe these provisions in a manner consistent with the bicameral passage and presentment requirements of the Constitution for the making of a law. Such provisions include section 710 and language under the headings ‘‘Community Planning and Development, Community Development 176

Fund,’’ ‘‘Department of Housing and Urban Development, Management and Administration, Salaries and Expenses,’’ and ‘‘Office of Management and Budget, Salaries and Expenses (Bush 2005i, 1795-1796).’’

Statement on Signing the Department of Office of Justice Programs: “Language in Defense, Emergency Supplemental Division B of the Act, under the heading Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the ‘‘Office of Justice Programs, State and Local Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, Law Enforcement Assistance,’’ purports to 2006; H.R. 2863, Dec. 30, 2005. require the Attorney General to consult congressional committees prior to allocating appropriations for expenditure to execute the law. Because the President’s constitutional authority to supervise the unitary executive branch and take care that the laws be faithfully executed cannot be made by law subject to a requirement to consult with congressional committees or to involve them in executive decision-making, the executive branch shall construe the provision to require only notification. At the same time, the Attorney General shall, as a matter of comity between the executive and legislative branches, seek and consider the views of appropriate committees in this matter as the Attorney General deems appropriate (Bush 2005j, 1902).”

Section 8020: “The executive branch shall construe provisions of the Act relating to race, ethnicity, gender, and State residency, such as sections 8014, 8020 and 8057, in a manner consistent with the requirement to afford equal protection of the laws under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment (Bush 2005j, 1902).”

Statement on Signing the Emergency Federal Highways Administration’s Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, Emergency Relief System: “Sections 7030 the Global War on Terror and Hurricane through 7033 of the Act, inclusive, purport to Recovery, 2006; H.R. 4939, June 15, 2006 make changes in or in relation to statements of managers that accompanied various appropriations bills reported from House Senate conferences in the past. Also, a 177

provision in chapter 9 of the Act under the heading ‘‘Emergency Relief Program,’’ Federal Highway Administration, Department of Transportation, purports to give binding effect to a document not presented to the President. The executive branch shall construe these provisions in a manner consistent with the bicameral passage and presentment requirements of the Constitution for the making of a law (Bush 2006a, 1159).”

Statement on Signing the Department of Section 8048: “The executive branch shall Defense Appropriations Act; 2007; H.R. 5631, construe provisions of the Act relating to race, Sept. 29, 2006 ethnicity, gender, and State residency, such as sections 8013, 8018 and 8048, in a manner consistent with the requirement to afford equal protection of the laws under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment (Bush 2006c, 1704).”

Nine Provisions that were Not Executed as Written

Signing Statement Excerpt

Statement on Signing the Energy Policy Act of Section 629: “The executive branch shall 2005; H.R. 6, August 8, 2005 construe the amendments to section 211 of the Energy Reorganization Act made by section *As discussed in Chapter 5, the Department of Energy 629 of the Act, as they relate to dissemination did not take any action on Section 629. The NRC acted of official information by employees of the on Section 629 but only after the GAO’s (2007b) inquiry. Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in a manner consistent with the President’s constitutional authority to supervise the unitary executive branch (Bush 2005b, 1315).”

Statement on Signing the Department of Bureau of Customs and Border Protection: Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006; “Under the heading ‘‘Customs and Border H.R. 2360, Oct. 18, 2005 Protection,’’ the Act purports to require the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection to relocate its tactical checkpoints in the Tucson, Arizona, sector at least once every 7 days. Decisions on deployment and redeployment of 178

law enforcement officers in the execution of the laws are a part of the executive power vested in the President by Article II of the Constitution. Accordingly, the executive branch shall construe the relocation provision as advisory rather than mandatory (Bush 2005d, 1563).”

Statement on Signing the Agriculture, Rural Section 716: “The executive branch shall Development, Food and Drug Administration, construe certain provisions of the Act that and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, purport to require congressional committee 2006; H.R. 2744, Nov. 10, 2005 approval for the execution of a law as calling solely for notification, as any other construction would be inconsistent with the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States in INS v. Chadha. These provisions include sections 705, 716, and 732, and language under the heading ‘‘Food and Drug Administration, Salaries and Expenses (Bush 2005e, 1697).’’”

Statement on Signing the Military Quality of Section 126: “Section 126 of the Act purports Life and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, to require Department of Defense officials to 2006; H.R. 2528, Nov. 30, 2005 respond in writing within 21 days to any question or inquiry from certain legislative subcommittees. The executive branch shall construe this section in a manner consistent with the President’s constitutional authority to supervise the unitary executive branch and to withhold information the disclosure of which could impair foreign relations, the national security, the deliberative processes of the Executive, or the performance of the Executive’s constitutional duties (Bush 2005h, 1794-1795).”

Statement on Signing the Department of Section 8100: “A proviso in the Act’s Defense, Emergency Supplemental appropriation for ‘‘Operation and Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Maintenance, Defense-Wide’’ purports to Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, prohibit planning for consolidation of certain 2006; H.R. 2863, Dec. 30, 2005. offices within the Department of Defense. Also, sections 8010(b), 8032, 8037(b), and 8100 purport to specify the content of portions of future budget requests to the Congress. The executive branch shall construe these provisions relating to planning and making of 179

budget recommendations in a manner consistent with the President’s constitutional authority to require the opinions of the heads of departments, to supervise the unitary executive branch, and to recommend for congressional consideration such measures as the President shall judge necessary and expedient (Bush 2005j, 1901-1902.).”

Statement on Signing the Departments of Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: “The Labor, Health and Human Services, and executive branch shall construe certain Education, and Related Agencies provisions of the Act that purport to require Appropriations Act, 2006; H.R. 3010, Dec. 30, congressional committee approval for the 2005 execution of a law as calling solely for notification, as any other construction would be inconsistent with the constitutional principles enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States in INS v. Chadha. These provisions include sections 103, 208, and language under the heading ‘‘Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation Fund (Bush 2005k, 1903).’’”

Statement on Signing the Emergency FEMA’s Alternative Housing Plan: “The Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, executive branch shall construe the provision the Global War on Terror and Hurricane in the Act under the heading ‘‘Disaster Recovery, 2006; H.R. 4939, June 15, 2006 Relief,’’ Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of Homeland Security, that purports to require the Secretary of Homeland Security to submit a housing proposal and expenditure plan for congressional committee approval as calling solely for notification, as any other construction would be inconsistent with the constitutional principles enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States in INS v. Chadha (Bush 2006a, 1159).”

Statement on Signing the Department of Section 623: “The executive branch shall Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007; construe provisions of the Act relating to race, H.R. 5441, Oct. 9, 2006 ethnicity, and gender, such as sections 623 and 697 of the Act, in a manner consistent with the requirement of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution to afford equal protection of the laws (Bush 2006c, 1743).” 180

Section 697: “Section 623: “The executive branch shall construe provisions of the Act relating to race, ethnicity, and gender, such as sections 623 and 697 of the Act, in a manner consistent with the requirement of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution to afford equal protection of the laws (Bush 2006c, 1743).”

181

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