Dutch Policies and Activities Directed at Peacebuilding

n WAGENINGEN UNIVERSITEIT WAD ENINO ENB—

DUTCH POLICIES AND ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AT PEACEBUILDING

CONTRIBUTION TO THE JOINT UTSTEIN STUDY OF PEACEBUILDING

GEORG FRERKS, KOENRAAD VAN BRABANT AND MARCEL SCHOLTEN

DISASTER STUDIES, WAGENINGEN UNIVERSITY, THE NETHERLANDS

AUGUST 2003

Commissioned by the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs

for the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding

conducted with the Evaluation Departments of the German Federal Ministryfor Economic Cooperation and Development, the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the UKDepartment for International Development

O.Bo x2006 1- 250 0E BTh e Hague- Th eNetherland s DISASTER STUDIES,WAGENINGE N UNIVERSITY, THE NETHERLANDS

DUTCH POLICIES AND ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AT PEACEBUILDING

ACONTRIBUTIO NT OTH EJOIN T UTSTEINSTUD Y OF PEACEBUILDING

BY GEORG FRERKS, KOENRAAD VAN BRABANT AND MARCEL SCHOLTEN

IOB I WORKINGDOCUMENT I AUGUST200 3

Preface

Theen do fth eCol dWa r didno t bringth eag eo f peacean dprosperit ytha twa s hopedfor . Thenumbe ro fviolen t conflicts inth eworl d increased inth e1990s . Various initiativeswer etake nt oste mth erisin gtid eo f conflicts."Peac ebuilding " was introduceda sa ter mb yth e United Nationst osignif y activitiest oeithe r buildstabl e peacei na countr yo rpreven t conflictsfro mturnin gviolent . Duringth e 1990speac e buildingwa spu t higho nth e policy agendao f multilateral andbilatera lagencies .T o learnfro ma decad eo fexperiences , Norway initiated ajoin t studywit h its(then ) Utstein partners Germany,Th e Netherlands andth e UK.Th estud yaim st oloo ka t thepolicie so fth efou rdono rcountrie s andth esuppor tt o peace building inte n partnercountries .Th ejoin t study isbase do nfou r donorcountr ystudies .

Thisdocumen tcontain sth e resultso fth e Dutchstudy . PartA outline sth epolic y contexto f Dutchpeac ebuildin gactivities .Par t Bprovide sth e resultso fth esurve yo f Dutchfinance dpeac e buildingactivities . Everypar tend swit hconclusions ,polic y implications and/or recommendations.Th e resultso fthi sstud yan do fth eoveral ljoin t studywil lchalleng e policymakers tomak estrategi c decisions basedo nconflic t analysisan dt o improvemonitoring ,evaluatio n anddono r coordinationo fth eman y activities inpartne rcountries .

Asmal ltea mo f researchers conductedth estud y byorde r of IOB.Th etea m consistedo f prof.dr. Georg Frerks (Wageningen University), Koenraadva nBraban t (consultant) and MarcelScholte n(researc hassistant) .O nbehal f of IOB,inspecto r dr. Otto Hospesacte da sth esuperviso r andreade ro fth eteam , butfina l responsibility forth erepor t restssolel ywit hth eauthors . IOBals ofacilitate da consultatio n meeting todiscus sa nearlie r draftwit hsenio r staff ofth eNetherland s Ministryo f Foreign Affairs andth e leadconsultan t forth eoveral lstudy .Thi s report ispublishe di nth e IOBserie so f"workin gdocuments" ,i nwhic hconsultant s reports aremad eavailabl e toa large raudience .

RobD .va nde nBer g Director IOB

HI IV Table of Contents

Preface "i

Listo fTable s andBoxe s vii

Listo fAbbreviation s ix

Part A Dutch Policies Directed at Peacebuilding 1

1 Introduction 3 1.1 Background 3 1.2 The Needt oContextualiz e DutchPeacebuildin gActivitie s 3 1.3 ResearchQuestion s 3 1.4 Methodology 4 1.5 Terminology 4 1.6 Limitations 5

2. DutchConflict-relate d PolicyInitiative s inth e Early 1990s 7 2.1 International Developments 7 2.2 White Papers 8 2.3 Other Policy Documents 10 2.4 Further Developments - 10

3. Dutch Policy Initiatives 1997-2001 13 3.1 Introductionan d InstitutionalArrangement s 13 3.2 Policy Documents and Priorities 14 3.3 Regionalan dCountry-leve l Policies 18 3.4 Summary 21

4. Recordo f Evaluation Studies 23

5. Conclusions andDiscussio n 25

Part B Dutch Activities Directed at Peacebuilding 29

1. Introduction 31 1.1 Background 31 1.2 TheJoin t UtsteinStud yo f Peacebuilding 31 1.3 TheObjective s ofth e DutchSurve y 32 1.4 ConceptualAspect s 32 1.5 Methodology ofth e DutchSurve y 33

2. Quantitative Overview 37 2.1 TheTota l DutchProjec t Portfolio and Peacebuilding Projects 37 2.2 The Distribution of Peacebuilding Projectsove r Different Peacebuilding Categories 39 3 Qualitative Analysiso nth e Basiso fth e Profiles 45 3.1 Project Namean dLocatio n 45 3.2 Categoryo f Peacebuilding 46 3.3 Project Phasing and Duration 46 3.4 Total Budget and DutchContributio n 48 3.5 Other Donors 48 3.6 Project Implementation Partners 50 3.7 Summaryo fAi man dObjective s 51 3.8 Strategic Perspective 53 3.9 Cross-cutting Themes inAims/Objective s 54 3.10 ImpactAssessmen t 54 3.11 FinancialAssessmen t 55 3.12 Organisational Efficiency Assessment 59 3.13 OverallConclusion s on Projects'Contributio nt o Peacebuilding 59 3.14 Projects'Contributiont o Peacebuilding 60

4 Conclusions andRecommendation s 61

Listo f References 65

Annex 1 Listo f Participants Roundtable Discussion 67

Annex 2 Sub-categories of peacebuilding activities 68

vi List of Tables and Boxes

Tables A Dutch Policies and Institutional Arrangements inth e Period 1991-2002 22

1 Total Dutch Project Portfolio and Number and Percentage of Peacebuilding Projects per Country for the Period 1997-2001 37 2 Budget of Total Portfolio and Peacebuilding Projects per Country for the Period 1997-2001 38 3 Average Budget of Portfolio and Peacebuilding Projects per Country for the Period 1997-2001 39 4 Projects by Size of Financial Allocation 39 5 Distribution of Projects over Peacebuilding Categories 40 6 Projects per Main Peacebuilding Category and Recipient Country in Numbers and Percentages 40 7 Financial Commitment per Category per Country 41 8 Average Budget of Projects per Different Peacebuilding Category 42 9 Number and Percentage of Peacebuilding Projects per Peacebuilding Subcategory 42 10 Financial Commitment per Subcategory per Country 43 11 Examples of Multi-donor Projects 49

Boxes

1 Variables Covered in Project Profiles 32 2 International Projects 46 3 Centre for the Study of Human Rights at Colombo University, Sri Lanka 47 4 Corefunding Legal Aid of Cambodia 47 5 The Asghabad Forum 48 6 General Project Aims 51 7 Aim and Objectives of the Mine-Action Programme inAfghanista n 52 8 Strategic Perspectives for Peacebuilding Activities 53 9 Forensic Inquiry in Bamyan, North Afghanistan 54 10 Narrative Statements in Evaluation Reports 56 11 Lessons Learned Drawn at the Asghabad Forum 57 12 'Positive' Lessons Learned in Peacebuilding Projects 57 13 'Negative' Lessons Learned in Peacebuilding Projects 58

vu vin Listo fAbbreviation s

3R(-framework ) Relief,Rehabilitatio n and Reconciliation Framework (SriLanka ) ADHOC Cambodian HumanRight san d Development Association ASEAN Association ofSout h EastAsia nNation s BBC British Broadcasting Corporation BSG Office ofth e Secretary-General CARERE CambodiaAre a Rehabilitation and Regeneration Project CBO Community-Based Organisation CIDA Canadian International DevelopmentAgenc y COBADES Community-Based Development Services (Kenya) CP (Dutch Department of)Conflic t Prevention DAC DevelopmentAssistanc e Committee(OECD ) DCH Directorate ofCrisi sManagemen t andHumanitaria nAi d DDR Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration DFID (UK)Departmen tfo r International Development DMV/VG (Dutch) Directorateo f HumanRight san dPeacebuilding / Peacebuilding andGoo dGovernanc e DRP Demobilisation andReintegratio n Programme (Cambodia) DSI Socialan d Institutional Development Department EC EuropeanCommunit y EU EuropeanUnio n GMV GoodGovernance ,Huma nRight san dPeacebuildin g (countrieso rsupport ) GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft fürTechnisch e Zusammenarbeit (GermanAi dAgency ) HH (Dutch Department of) HumanitarianAi d IAG InterAfric a Group ICCO Interchurch Organisationfo r Development Co-operation IDA International DevelopmentAssociatio n IDP Internally Displaced Person INGO International Non-governmental Organisation IOB Policyan dOperation s Evaluation Unit KBE Smallest Budget Unit (inDutc hsystem ) KHRC Kenya HumanRight s Commission LAC LegalAi dt oCambodi a LTTE LiberationTiger so fTami lEela m MAP Mine-Action Programme (Afghanistan) MATRA (Dutchacronym )fo r SocialTransitio n MIDAS Management Inhoudelijk DocumentairActiviteite n Systeem (Dutch Management Information andDocumentar yActivitie s System) MRA HumanRight sAmbassado r MFO (Dutch)Co-Financin g Organisations NATO NorthAtlanti c Treaty Organisation NCRV NederlandseChristelijk e RadioVerenigin g (DutchChristia n RadioAssociation ) NGO Non-governmental Organisation NMFA Norwegian Ministryo f ForeignAffair s NOVIB Netherlands Organisationfo r International Development Co-operation ODA Official Development Assistance

IX OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OHCHR Office for the High Commissioner of Human Rights OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe PRIO International Peace Research Institute PRP Peace and Rehabilitation Project (Kenya) PSO (Dutch Organisation for) Capacity Building in Developing Countries RDRP Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme SCF Save the Children SIDA Swedish International Development Agency SSR Security Sector Reform UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund UNIPTF United Nations International Police Task Force UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Aid UNOHCHR United Nations Office for the High Commissioner of Human Rights USA United States of America UXO Unexploded Ordnance WB World Bank WFP World Food Programme WHO World Health Organisation PartA

Dutch Policies Directed at Peacebuilding

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

The Evaluation Departments ofth eMinistrie so f Development Co-operation and/oro f ForeignAffair s ofth efou r UtsteinCountrie s (Germany,Th e Netherlands, Norwayan d The UnitedKingdom ) decidedt o implementa nexplorator y studyo fthei rcountries ' recent peace-building experiences1.Th emai npar to ftha tstud y isa surve yo f33 6 projects oractivitie sfunde do rcarrie dou t bythes edonor s in 13recipien tcountrie si n theperio d 1997-2001i nth ehop eo f achieving policy-relevant conclusions thatcoul d beshape dint oguideline sfo r peacebuilding strategybase do nexperience .Unde rth e guidanceo fth e Peace Research InstituteOsl o(PRIO) ,a commo nresearc h approachan dsurve ydesig nwer edeveloped .Eac hevaluatio ndepartmen twa s responsiblefo r surveying itsow ncountry' sactivities . Forth e Dutchstudy ,th ePolic y andOperation s Evaluations Department sub-contracted Disaster Studieso f Wageningen Universityt ocarr y outthi ssurvey .Th e Dutchsurve y resultswil lb e presented inPar t Bo fthi sworkin gdocument . Thesurvey so nth efou r Utstein countries haveserve da sa nimportan t basisfo rth eoveral lsynthesi s report prepared byPRIO .

1.2 The Needt oContextualiz e DutchPeacebuildin g Initiatives

Indiscussin gth eoveral lresearc happroach ,i twa sargue dtha t asimpl edescriptio n of Dutchpeacebuildin g activitiesper se would not besufficien t toallo wa ta prope rin - depth understanding ofth enatur ean dbackgroun do f Dutch peacebuilding experiences. Itwa sdeeme d necessarytha tthes eactivitie s bepu tint othei r historical andpolic ycontex t inorde rt ogras pwh yan dho wthe ycam e intobein gove rth e years. Inthi sway ,i tcoul dals o beestablishe dwhic htyp eo fconsideration s had playeda rol ea tth epolitica lan dpolic y levelcausin gth eactivitie st ob eembarke d upon.Thi s isth emai nthrus to f PartA o fthi sworkin gdocument .

1.3 ResearchQuestion s

This policy reviewstud ywil lexamin eth efollowin g researchquestions :

1 Whichconflict-relate d policyinitiative swer etake n byth e Dutchgovernmen t prior toth estud yperio d (asdocumente d inWhit e Papersan dothe r policy documents)? 2 Whichconflict-relate d andpeacebuildin g policy initiativeswer etake nb yth eDutc h government duringth estud y periodo f 1997-2001? 3 Whichspecifi c policies havebee ndefine d inth eare ao f peacebuilding? 4 Whatchange s haveoccurre dwithi nth e institutional arrangements atth e Ministry? 5 Whichevaluatio n policy hasbee ndesigne di nth efiel do fconflict-relate d and peacebuilding policies andactivitie s respectively? 6 What overallconclusion s canb edraw nfro mth eovervie w of Dutchconflict - relatedan dpeacebuildin g policy initiatives?

1Utstei ni sa collaborativeventur eo fth eDevelopmen tMinister so fNorway , The United Kingdom,German yan d TheNetherlands , whoar econvince do fth enee d ofconcerte d action. 2Refer st oa n originalstud yincorporate di n thisworkin g document. 1.4 Methodology

Thispolic y note isbase do na perusa lo f policydocument s andMinistr yfile sa swel l aso fsecondar y sources.A novervie wo fthi smateria l isgive n inth e listo f references. Inaddition ,feed-bac k hasbee nreceive dfro m keyinformant swithi nth e Ministryan dfro moutsid e informants onth ebasi so fa roundtabl e discussion heldo n 21Ma y2003 .A listo fthos e present isattache da sAnne x 1.

1.5 Terminology

Inthi srepor t adistinctio n ismad ebetwee nconflict-relate d andpeacebuildin g activities.Th eauthor sconside r conflict-related activities as aver y broadcontaine r concepttha tencompasse s everyactivit y relatedt ocontemporar y conflict inth e widest possible sense.Thes e mayinclud eal lactivitie sdiscerne d byU NSecretary - General Boutros Boutros-Ghali inhi swell-know n 'Agendafo r Peace'(1992) ,rangin g from preventive diplomacy (including internationalthir d partymediation) ,peace keepingan dpeace-enforcemen t to peacebuilding.Conflict-relate d activities mayals o include humanitarianaid ,reconstructio n or rehabilitation aid,an dconflict-prevention , defineda sactivitie sspecificall y undertakenwit hth eai mo f preventingth eoutbrea k of hostilities. Finally,th eter mcover sal lactivitie stha tar e presenteda s peacebuilding andreconciliation .Thes ear eexplicitl y undertaken ina post-conflic t settingwit hth e aimo f redressing damagecause d byth econflict ,ofte nwit hth eintentio n helpingt o prevent any re-occurrence.

Inth e latter circumstances,th edistinctio n between peacebuilding andconflic t prevention isa ver ythi n line.Eve n'normal 'developmen t activities mayb eregarde d asconflict-related ,fo r example,i fthe yar econducte d under post-conflict conditions withth eobjectiv eo ftakin gawa yo ra t leastinfluencin gth eorigina l rootcauses . Development activities mayals ob ecarrie dou tdurin gconflic t inorde rt oestablis h some preconditions for reconciliation,a sargued ,fo r example inth e notiono f 'Development-for-peace'develope d byth eforme r Dutchdevelopmen t MinisterJa n Pronk.

Allthi s brings intoquestio nth eforme rtendenc yt o link particular conflict-related activitiest o particular phaseso fth e'lif ecycl eo f conflict'. Itha sno wbee n establishedtha t nosuc hchronologica lorde ro rsequencin g existsan dtha t linkages amongvariou s phasesan dactivitie s aremor evariegated .I nthi sconnection ,conflict - preventiveo r peacebuilding activities needno tb erestricte dt o pre-o r post-conflict phases,bu tca ni nprincipl e becarrie dou tdurin g allphase so fth econflict .

Donors,academic s andpractitioner s dono tappl ya clearl ydelineate d conceptual framework, andther eare ,als oconsiderabl e differences amongvariou sframework s anddefinitions .Althoug h itwoul dtheoreticall y bepossibl et o reachworkin g definitions ofth edifferen t concepts used3,ther ear e inpractic e multipledefinition s withdifferen t 'shadeso f interpretation',i f notmutua lcontradiction .A pragmatic solution hasther efor e beenchose nfo r inth estud ycarrie dou tfo r IOB.Conflict - relatedactivitie s are infac t anything undertaken/funded bya dono r ordono r government whichhav et od owit hcontemporar y conflict. Peacebuilding onth eothe r

3W ema yrefe rt odefinition suse di n theAgend afo rPeac eo rb yacademic ssuc h as Michael Lund,Nic kLewer , JohanGaltung , ori npublication sb yth eConflic tResearc hUni to fth e NetherlandsInstitut eo fInternationa lRelation s 'Clingendael'. hand, is used in a more limited sense to denote activities to support peace before, but normally during or after conflict. Which activities exactly qualify as peacebuilding is not easy to determine in advance. Consequently, we follow here a contextual approach, as suggested by PRIO, and work ina n exploratory fashion with the help of a checklist of 17 possible categories provided bytha t institute.4

A final note to be made here is that the major focus of the Joint Utstein Study was on a survey of project activities. Political and other dimensions of peacebuilding were not elaborated upon, but where relevant on the related report in order to achieve on adequate overview. More details on those activities are included in part B of this working document.

1.6 Limitations

Only minor limitations occurred inth e accessibility of material and co-operation by interviewees. It proved difficult to obtain some material from the Dutch embassies. One country initially included inth e study was eventually dropped, due to lack of co operation by the embassy in question.A few selected projects were also dropped due to lack of clarity on the whereabouts of files, caused by recent transfers between archives and inconsistency of file numbers. New projects were selected, based on the same selection criteria, but with special attention for file accessibility.

The only 'real' problem that hampered the writing of the present study was that hardly any policy document has been devoted to the topic of peacebuilding exclusively, comprehensively or completely. Dutch peacebuilding policy, in fact, had to be reconstructed from fragments scattered over a multitude of sources.

4 Ina contextua l approachth eobjectives ,design ,rationale ,use ,o roveral l surrounding conditionso fa nactivity ,determin ewhethe r itqualifie sa speacebuilding .Inten tan dcontex t determinewhethe ro rno ton etalk s aboutpeacebuilding .I nth eliteratur ethi scontextua l approachha sals obee nadvocate dfo rth e notiono fconflic t prevention.I na consultativ e meetingo nth edraf tversio no fthi s report,th eobjectio nwa sraise dtha tth econtextua l approachallow sfo ra ver ybroa drang eo factivitie st ob esee na speacebuilding .Wh othe n ownsth eissu ean dwh oset sth eagenda ?Thi sissu ewa sacknowledge d byth eresearc htea m andth e PRIOrepresentative ,bu twa sconsidere dt ob ea logica lan dnecessar y consequence ofhavin gt oreac ha unifor mapproac hfo rth edifferen t participating Utsteincountries .

2 CONFLICT-RELATED POLICY INITIATIVESTAKE NB YTH E NETHERLANDSI NTH EEARL Y 1990S

2.1 International Developments

Conflict-related policy initiativestake nb yth e Netherlands inth eearl y 1990shav et o bejudge dagains t thebackgroun d of larger internationaldevelopment s inth efiel do f waran dpeace .

Firstly,th efal lo fth e BerlinWall ,th edemis eo fth e Soviet Union,th een do fth eCol d War andth eemergenc e ofa worl ddominate d byon esuperpowe r notonl ychange d realitieso nth eground ,bu tals oha da pervasiv e impact onperception s of peacean d security.Wherea sth emai nemphasi s hadpreviousl y beeno n East-West relations andmilitar yaspects ,a broade r perspectiveo nsecurit y issues nowemerged . Conflicts inth eSout han di ncountries-in-transitio n were increasinglyfocusse dupon . Although manyo fthes econflict s hada fairl y longhistory ,the y hadofte n been subsumed under East-West contradictions. Fewha dbee nstudie do rapproache do n the basiso fthei r owncharacteristic s andcontext ; now,however ,the ybecam ea n issue inan do fthemselves .

Second,man yo fthes econflict s drewpubli c interestdu et oth eenormou shuma n suffering thatthe yinvolved .Picture swer ebroadcaste d throughoutth eworld .Ther e wasals owidesprea d concerntha tdecade so fdevelopmen t investmentswoul db e annihilatedan dtha tth eeconomi c anddevelopmenta l setbackswoul dtak eyear st o overcome.Assiduou sattempt s madet odea lwit hth econflict s bybilatera lan d multilateral, andgovernmenta lan dnon-governmenta l agencies,coincide dwit ha renewed belief inth epossibilitie s ofth e UnitedNation s (UN).'Agend afo rPeace ' (1992)an d'Agend afo r Development' (1994),authore d byU Nsecretary-genera l Boutros-Ghaliwer e key-documentstha t reoriented UNapproache st oth econflict s andviolenc e prevailing aroundth eworld .Th eus eo f military meansfo r humanitarian operations becameaccepte d practice,eve nthoug h itwoul dfrequentl y leadt ofailur e anddisappointment .

Third,th e roleo fdevelopmen t co-operation indealin gwit hquestion so f peacean d warcam et o bewidel y seena sindispensabl e for solvingth e root-causes ofconflict . Amor ecomprehensiv e viewo nconflic tan dpeac ecam e intobeing ,transcendin g the purely militaryapproach .Conflict swer esee na semanatin gfro ma variet yo f economic, political,social ,cultural ,religious ,ecologica lan dmilitar yfactor s in(o r outside)th ecountrie sconcerned .Thi s newvisio n reverberated inothe rfor asuc ha s NATO,OSCE ,OECD-DA Cetc .Apar tfro mth etraditiona l militaryan dperhap s politicalaspects ,intervention swer esee nt ofocu s increasingly, ifan dwher e applicable,o nsuc hissue sa shuma nrights ,démocratisation ,governance ,economi c andtrad e regimes,poverty ,exclusio nan ddiscrimination ,environmenta ldegradation , etc.

Fourth,a ta conceptua l levelthes emor ecomprehensiv e approacheswer e encapsulated innotion ssuc ha s'Huma nSecurity 'coine db yth e UNDP,'Positiv e Peace'a sintroduce d byJoha nGaltung ,o rth e 'Development-for-Peace'approac h coined byth e DutchMiniste rfo r Development Co-operation JanPronk .A concomitant trendwa st o movefro mth eleve lo f 'highpolitics 't oth e localan dgrass roots level,includin g non-governmental actors,civi lsociet yan dwomen .Apar tfro m those so-called developmentalist approaches to conflict and conflict resolution, there was also recognition of the fact that ill-designed development interventions inth e past had brokered conflict or had at least raised tension inth e societies concerned.

A fifth trend was an intensive and sometimes controversial and contested academic and policy debate on the nature and characteristics of the 'new wars'. Itwa s not easy to reach a common or widely-shared understanding of those wars or to agree on the appropriate remedy. The novelty of these policy approaches and the lack of documented experiences and evaluation studies made most policy formulations somewhat tentative and exploratory, while many interventions in practice were rather experimental.

2.2 White Papers

These issues were also reflected in Dutch policies of the time. Far-reaching and influential policy changes were effected through the publication in 1991o f the White Paper 'A World of Difference' under responsibility of the Dutch Minister for Development Co-operation at that time, Jan Pronk.5 The document tried to come to grips with a post-Cold War world with 'fading frontiers', 'increasing interdependence', 'mutual vulnerability' and 'greater risks'.Th e development process and development policies were in crisis and new thinking and approaches were required, according to the Minister. The document therefore aimed at providing a new framework for Dutch development co-operation in the 1990s. Conflict had not yet become a major topic. In relation to conflict, the author thought there would probably be less manipulation of internal conflict, but also less interest inwha t happens inth e poorest countries. 'De- ideologisation' would accompany decreased concern for, and a drop in aid to, the poorest countries. The paper stresses however, that Dutch humanitarian aid and rehabilitation support would be available for all countries, including those with whom the Netherlands does not maintain a bilateral aid relationship. This also applied to those whose policies contradict international rules intha t they violate human rights. Apart from these considerations, the White Paper is not explicit on the issue of conflict. With regard to humanitarian aid,th e emphasis is mainly on natural disasters and to some degree on refugee aid.Th e document recognises, however, the danger of negative side effects; for example, when aid ends up inth e hands of armed groups or suppressive regimes, or when it leads to aid dependency. Care should be taken that aid does not support or legitimise objectionable regimes and that it benefits the target groups for whom it is intended without substituting for national expenditure.6 If provision through government channels (or multilateral channels that can only dissociate themselves from regimes to a limited extent) becomes problematic, aid should be given through non-governmental channels. The document formulates a number of concrete recommendations and policy measures bywhic h to avoid abuse of aid.7 Another salient characteristic is the emphasis on the 'active' and 'positive' promotion of human rights, especially economic, social and cultural rights, as part of the development co-operation agenda.8 The document also argues for better

5 Ministryo fForeig nAffairs ,Developmen t Cooperation Information Department (1991)A World ofDifference. The Hague:SDL )Publisher s 6Th eWhit e Paperi si nfac ta fairl y earlyprecurso ro flate rdiscussion s onhumanitaria nai db y DavidKeen ,Prendergast , DeWaal ,etc. ,an dpresen tdebate so n'economie so fviolence 'b y PaulCollier , PeterUvin ,Malone ,Smilli ean d others. 7 Ministryo fForeig nAffairs ,Developmen t Cooperation Information Department (1991)A World ofDifference. The Hague:SD UPublishers ,p .305 . 8 Ibidem,p.306-7 . international donor co-ordination,a bette r identificationo f requirements inth efield , andinvolvemen t ofth etarge tgroup .

Asubsequen t policydocumen t 'AWorl d inDispute '(1993 )an dpolic y memorandum 'HumanitarianAi dbetwee nConflic t and Development' (1993)elaborat e ingreate r detailo ncontemporar y conflict andth erol eo fdevelopmen t co-operationtherein .I n theprefac et o' AWorl di nDispute ' Minister Pronkobserve stha t momentous international developments havechange dth eappearanc eo fth eworld . Notonl ywer e thedevelopmen t processan ddevelopmen t policy incrisis ,a sobserve d in' AWorl do f Difference', butdisorde ran ddisput e inth eworl d itself hadbecom eth epredominan t concern.' AWorl do fDispute 'i ssubtitle d' ASurve yo fth eFrontier so f Development Co-operation'.Presentin ga broa danalysi so fth epost-Col dWa rera , itelaborate so n andredefine sth epriorit yarea sfo r co-operation policy.Th edocumen tsketche sa general perspective of 'WorldOrde r andDisorder' ,an dreflect sth egrowin gnumber s ofdispute san dconflict s inth eworld : betweenan dwithi nstates ;betwee npeopl eo f different ethnic andreligiou s backgrounds,an dabou tth edistributio n ofscarc e resources andrespec tfo r humanrights . Itals oelaborate so nth enewl yemergin g patterno finternationa l relationsan dth edisintegratio n ofth estat ethroug ha variet y of processes.Th emai nthrus t ofth edocumen t istha t aco-ordinate d approacht o development co-operationan dothe r dimensionso fforeig nan dinternationa l policyi s required,an da 'de-compartmentalisation 'o fapproache san dpolicie swit hwhic ht o dealwit hth ecomple xhumanitaria nemergencie so fth eday .Thi simplie sno tonl y thatth eclassi c boundaries between humanitarian aid,rehabilitatio n anddevelopmen t aidhav et odisappear .A coordinate d approachi sals onecessar yt oachiev ea n integrated policytha tencompasse s defence,foreig n policy anddevelopment . Itwa s realisedtha t humanitarianai dan drehabilitatio nwer e pointless ifthe ywer eno t combinedwit heffort s to increasesecurit yan dt o reacha politica lsolutio no fconflicts . Duringth eformatio no fa ne wCabine t in 1994i twa stherefor e decidedtha t development co-operationan dforeig npolic yshoul db efurthe r integratedthroug ha re-assessment and'decompartmentalisation 'exercise .

Thepolic y memorandum,'Humanitaria nAid : BetweenConflic tan dDevelopment ' outlines updatedpolicie so nhumanitaria nai di nman-mad ean dnatura ldisaste r situations andstresse sth e increasing number of emergencies andth e needfo r resourceswit hwhic ht odea lwit hthem . Itals o notesth e rapidchange s inth efiel d andargue sfo r aflexibl eapproac ht oaccommodat ethese .Th ememorandu m suggeststha tconflict s canperhap sb esolve di f there isbette r internationalco operation. Inthi sconnectio n itstresse sth e interrelationship between peace,securit y anddevelopmen t ingenera lterms .Th epolic y memorandum proposes ane w approach bywhic ht o increaseth eeffectivenes s ofai di nemergencie s andway sb y whichsuc hemergencie s might beprevented . Itdiscusse sth ecapacitie srequired , but isals oawar eo fth elimitation stha t impinge upona preventiv eapproach .Th e linkage between prevention,conflic t management, rehabilitationan dlong-ter m development isals oelaborate d upon. Thevariou saspect saspect so fconflic tar e discussed,an dals oth e international legalframewor k anddevelopment swithi nth e UN,th e EUan dth e NGOworld .Th enee dfo r better co-ordination anddelineatio no f tasks isemphasised . Inth efiel do fcrisi s preventionan dpeacebuilding ,th e memorandum quotesextensivel yfro m Boutros-Ghali's 'Agendafo r Peace',stressin g thenee dfo rth e integrationo f peacekeeping,peacebuildin g and rehabilitation measures.Concret e policy proposals madei nth ememorandu m relatet oa nincreas e infundin gan dbette r effectiveness throughflexibl efun d management. Inthi srespect , thereshoul d bea minimu mo fcondition s combinedwit h properfeedbac ko n implementation,experienc eevaluation ,an dconcludin gframewor k agreements.

2.3 Other PolicyDocument s

Another policy documentfro mbefor eth estud y period iswort h mentioning,i.e .th e so-called Princetonspeec hb yMiniste r Pronk, whostresse dth elesso nt ob edraw n fromth e Rwandaevaluatio ntha t"Humanitaria n actioncanno t substitutefo r political action."A slon ga spolitica lmediation ,militar y andsecurit yoperations ,an drelie fan d development assistance,operat e independently,th einternationa l responsewil lb e incoherent andineffective .Violenc ewil lcontinu e becauseth e underlying rootcause s ofth econflic t areno taddressed .Pron k mentionsthre echallenges :integratio no fth e various policy instruments,co-ordinatio no f externalactor swithi nth e UNa swel la s betweenth e UNan dgovernment s andNGOs ,an dth ealignmen t ofexterna l assistancewit hloca lefforts . Heemphasise s thenee dfo r preventive actionan dth e necessityt owor k onpeac ewhil eth econflic t istakin g place.A mor e long-termvisio n isneeded ,particularl y invie wo fth efac ttha t manycountrie s remain ina positio no f semi-war/semi-peace.A peacesettlemen t andth ecessatio no fviolenc eshoul dno t beawaite d beforereconciliatio n programmes arestarte da tth ecommunit ylevel . Pronkargue stha t iti spossibl et o identifygroups ,organisation s andactivitie swit h specific reconciliatoryobjectives ,tha t seekway st odisengag efro mwa ran dt o rebuild linkswit hothe r groups insociety ,thu sstrengthenin g localcapacitie sfo r peace.10Accordin gt o Pronk,grass-root s development shouldb etake nseriousl ya sa building blockfo rpeace .

2.4 Further Developments

Ininstitutiona l terms,severa ldirectorate s ofth e Ministryo f ForeignAffair s have traditionally dealtwit hforeig n policy, humanright san ddefenc e issues,while ,withi n the Directorate-General of Development Co-operation,th e DMP/NHdepartmen tdeal t basicallywit h relief aidafte r (natural)disasters . Inth eearl y 1990sDMP/N Hwa sa smallset-u pcomprisin gtw oo fthre eofficial s anda nadequat ethoug h modestbudge t fromwhic ht o providedisaste r assistance.Th egrou pwa sstretche dt oth e limitwhe n called upont odea lwit hth ecomple x politicalemergencie s ofth eearl y 1990san dth e newpolic ydevelopment s outlinedabove .I n 1996a ne wdirectorat eo fCrisi s Management and HumanitarianAi dwa sse tup ,comprisin g adepartmen tfo rCrisi s Management and Prevention (DCH/CP)an don efo r HumanitarianAi d(DCH/HH) . Apartfro mth e needt ofocu s moreexplicitl yo ncontemporar y conflict,thes e institutionaldevelopment s also reflectedth edesir et o integrateth evariou s instruments andt oattai ngreate r coherence. DCHreporte dt obot hth e Ministero f ForeignAffair s andth e Minister for DevelopmentCo-operation .

Inth eearl y 1990sth e Dutchcontinue dt owor k alongdiplomati c andpolitica llines , almostalway swithi n larger internationalo r multilateralframework s sucha sth eEU , the UN,OSCE ,NATO ,etc . Insom ecase sther ewer e morefocuse d bilateral activities,ver yofte na resul to f initiativestake n byMiniste r Pronk,wh ogav e considerable attentiont oth econflict s inSudan ,Liberia ,Afghanista nan dRwanda , etc.Attempt swer efrequentl y madet ose tu po rt otak epar t incoalition so fthir d countries inth efor mo fth e 'Friends-of-arrangements' .Th e Dutchals oengage di n

9Pronk ,J.P .(1996 )Developmen ti nConflict :Speec h forth eUNHCR-Conferenc e'Healin g the Wounds:Refugees , Reconstructionan dReconciliation' .Princeton , pp.1- 5 10Pron krefer sher et oth ewor kb yMar yAnderson .

10 electionmonitorin g aroundth eworld . Inth esecurit ysphere ,Dutc hmilitar ytoo kpar t inU Nan dNATO-le d peacemissions . Inthi sconnectio nther ewa sals oattentio nfo r so-called 'cimic' initiatives (civil-military co-operation).

11 POLICY INITIATIVES1997-2001

3.1 Introduction and Institutional Arrangements

With respect to the research period a distinction can be made for the years 1997 and 1998 and 1999 - 2001. Until mid-1998 Dutch policies on conflict management and peacebuilding were based on policy documents that dated from before the research period. Jan Pronk, long-time Minister for Development Co-operation, had formulated several policies (see chapter 2) and, until the elections in 1998, emphasis was placed on the implementation of those policies.

A new cabinet was installed after those 1998 elections, and Ms Eveline Herfkens was appointed as the new Minister for Development Co-operation. Some important changes made intha t period influenced development policies in general and the prevailing views and policies on conflict management and peacebuilding. In November 1998, Minister Herfkens announced that structural bilateral assistance would be concentrated by reducing the number of recipient countries. This was considered necessary inorde r to ensure effectiveness and quality. Three criteria were used to select countries entitled to Dutch structural development aid, i.e. the level of poverty, the quality of macro-economic policies, and the quality of public administration (good governance). Dutch assistance would be based on the requests and responsibility of the recipient country, and would be the result of intensive consultation (to ensure ownership) and an integrated strategy. A sectoral approach was also advocated: in other words, the recipient government formulated a policy with regard to a specific sector (e.g.healthcare ) to which all concerned should commit for several years. Isolated project initiatives were to be discouraged, as project-based assistance was supposed to be limited to activities that were functionally related to the overall country policy framework.

Inadditio n to countries selected for 'regular' bilateral assistance, a number were given assistance aimed specifically at good governance, human rights and peacebuilding; the so-called GMV-countries. The main criterion for country selection here is the chance of successful government-to-government co-operation. Peacebuilding inthi s context is defined as the entire spectrum of aid activities aimed at preventing and helping to solve armed conflicts,whil e being consistent with international policy development. In addition,th e Netherlands was also prepared to fund human rights and peacebuilding activities in a number of countries where the above conditions did not (yet) prevail.Thi s support, however, would not be channelled through the respective governments, but bedirecte d towards NGOs. In all cases, GMV-countries, bilateral structural assistance and assistance through NGOs, added value is a key concept for Dutch involvement. Some other institutional changes should also be noted. First of all, in 1999th e decision was made to appoint a special human rights ambassador who was to stimulate the integration of human rights inal l aspects of foreign policy and development assistance. Furthermore, the ambassador should explore options for dialogue,join t missions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister or (later) State Secretary for Development Co operation, and instigate explorative missions. The human rights ambassador was also expected to promote attention to the subject of human rights within Dutch society. In 2000 a new directorate was established,dedicate d to human rights and

11 Theperio dselecte dfo rth eJoin t UtsteinStud yo fPeacebuilding .

13 peacebuilding(DMV) .T oachiev eth etrinit yo f 'humansecurity-huma n rights-human development',th eharmonisatio no f policies andresource swa saime dat .T oachiev e this, DMVhope dt opromot eth eco-ordinatio no f humanitarian assistance andissue s concerning peacebuilding,goo dgovernanc e andconflic tprevention .

A prominent featuredurin gthi s periodwa sth ecreatio ni n200 0o f aPeac e Fund, on the initiativeo f Parliament.Th ePeac e Fundsupport sactivitie s inth eare aof :

• (non-UN)peac eoperation s bydevelopin g countries; • peacedialogue ; • crisiscontainment ; • conflict preventionan dmediation ; • civil-militarycooperation ; • peacebuilding.

Thisals oencompasse s activities inth eare ao f Disarmament, Demobilizationan d Reintegration (DDR),suppor tfo rforma lan dinforma lnegotiatio n processes,dialogu e inpost-conflic t situations,suppor tt onationa lan dregiona lcapacitie sfo r peacekeeping bydevelopin g countries (e.g.b ytechnica lassistance ,materia lsupport , militarytraining) ,suppor tt omilitar yexercise s inth eligh to f peacekeepingoperations , capacity building inth eare ao fcivil-militar y cooperation,an denlargin gth e participationo fcivi lsociet y inconflic t preventionan dconflic tnegotiation .

In200 1eleve nactivitie swer esupporte dfo r atota lamoun t ofove r€ 8 million,an d2 0 activities in200 2fo r atota lo falmos t€1 0million .Thes e includedth eNigeria narmy' s participation inAfrica npeacekeepin g operations,trainin go fAfrica nsoldiers , restructuring ofth e Bosnianarmy ,suppor tt oth eAfgha narm yan dpolice , educational projects andreconciliatio nwork .

Policychange s duringthi sperio dwer eformulate d ina numbe ro fWhit ePapers . Nevertheless,a noveral l policydocumen to nDutc hconflic t management and peacebuilding policy isstil llacking .Instead ,th eWhit e Papersdea lwit hvariou s aspectstha t havet o bepiece dtogethe r andanalyse d ininterconnection .Thi smake s that Dutchpolic yappear sfairl yfragmente d interm so fdocument san dWhit ePapers . Thereis ,however ,a goo ddea lo fattentio nfo r coherence andsynerg ya swil lb e indicated inth enex tsections .Accordingly , belowa 'Capit a Selecta'approac hi s followedgivin ga goo d indication ofth econten t anddirectio no fth emajo r relevant Dutchpolicies .

3.2 Policy Documentsan d Priorities

Thissectio nwil l briefly review Dutchpolic yprioritie swit h regardt oconflic t management andpeacebuildin g asstate d inpolic ydocument sdurin gth eperio d 1997-2001.Th e keydocument s inthi s respect areexplore d inorde rt ogai na n overviewo f Dutchpolicy .Thes eWhit e Papers broadlyoutlin etha t policy,leavin g latitudefo r interpretation andflexibility .Th eoutline s aremad emor econcret e atth e regionalan dnationa l levels,mostl y inth efor mo f project-basedactivities .

In199 9a ninterna l policy paperwa swritte no nConflic t Management, set inth e context of increasing conflictafte r theCol dWar .Thi s introduceda numbe ro f conceptstha twoul d beelaborate d uponi nlate rWhit e Papers.I twa s notedtha t policies concerning conflict preventionwer efailin gt omee tthei r targets; moreover,

14 thatth e influencetha t canb eexerte do nconflic t situations isver y limited.Variou s factors mustb econsidered ,suc ha sth estructura l causeso f conflicttha tar ever y hardt ochange ,th efocu so f international lawo ninterstat econflict s andspillove r effects.Th epape r recommendedtha tth eprinciple so f 'EarlyWarning 'an d'Earl y Action' bepromoted ,multinationa l capacities increased,an da broad ,integrate dan d coherentstrateg yt oconflic t management andpeacebuildin g be applied.

In200 1a Whit e Papero nHuma n Rights policieswa spresented .Thi sdi dno timpl y thatsignifican t changes inha doccurred ,requirin ga ne wdocument . Humanright s policieswer estil lgrounde do nth edetaile dvie wo nhuma nright s presented in197 9 byth e Ministerso f ForeignAffair s andDevelopmen t Co-operation.Th e200 1pape r wasintende dt ogiv ea 'stat eo fth eart 'vie wo f humanright s policiesan dt o propagateth efurthe r integrationo f humanright s intoforeig n policy,als ocalle d 'mainstreaming'.Development s sucha sth een do fth eCol dWa ran dprocesse so f globalisationwer etake n intoaccount . Moreover, somespecifi cfield s ofattentio n were identified (freedomo freligion ,fightin g racism,bannin gtorture ,right so fth e child).

A newelemen t inth e200 1Whit e Paperwa sth especifi c interconnection,i fno t integration,o f humanright san ddevelopment , andhuma nright san dconflict . Integration inthi srespec t issee na spar to fth elong-ter mapproac ht oconflic t prevention.Achievin g equitableeconomi cdevelopmen t will, inman ycases ,reduc e diminishth ebreedin ggroun dfo r conflict. Inth eshorte rterm ,accordin gt oth eDutc h government,th e international community isoblige dt o respondt owarnin gsignal sa s wella st ocontribut et o peacean dstabilit y inpost-conflic t situations.Th efoca lpoin t for Dutchhuma nright spolicie s hasgraduall y shiftedfro msettin g international standardst o implementingthem .'Earl ywarnin gsystems' ,incorporatin gth e monitoring of humanrights ,shoul db einstalle dan deffectivel y leadt o'earl yaction' ,i f required.

The paperals ostate dtha tth e Dutchgovernmen twil lcontinu et oparticipat eactivel y andconstructivel y inmultinationa lfor ao nhuma nrights .Thes e multinational structuresca npromot ehuma nright smos teffectivel y bya combinatio no fsevera l instruments.Th eNetherland s propagatesth e 'Righto fComplaint ' regarding statesa s aninstrumen t of humanright sprotection .

Dutchhuma nright s policies areprimaril ytargete dtoward sthre ecategorie so f countries:

• thosetha tseriousl yan dmassivel yviolat e humanrights ; • thosetha twan tt ojoi nth eEU ; • thosetha t havea nhistori co rotherwis e specialrelationshi pwit hth eNetherlands .

Withregar dt obilatera ldevelopmen t assistance,huma nright stak ea prominen t position inthre eways :

• thehuma nright ssituatio n ina countr y isa nintegra lpar to fth egoo dgovernanc e criterion,considere dwhil eassessin g acountry' s eligibilityfo r structural bilateral assistance; • aspecia lselectio n ismad eo fcountrie stha tar egive nassistanc e specifically targetedtoward sgoo dgovernance , humanright san dpeacebuildin g (GMV- countries);

15 • poverty reduction beingth ecentra lgoa lo fdevelopmen t assistance,serve sa sa n impulsefo r humanrights ,especiall y (butno texclusively )wit h regardt oeconomic , socialan dcultura lrights .

TheDutc hgovernmen t seeks newpartner s init ssearc hfo r abroadly-base dhuma n rights policy.Thi sstarte dwit hth eso-calle d 'GlobalCompact' ,includin g both multinationalcorporation s andcivi lsociety . Multinationals should systematically implement international standards regarding humanrights .Huma nright s 'defenders' fromcivi lsociet y shouldb esupporte d inthei r effortst oinstigat e bottom-upchange s withincountrie swit ha ba dhuma nright srecord .

Theprotectio no f humanright s playsa nimportan t rolei nth efiel do fconflic t management.Variou sactivitie s havebee ninitiate dwhic hfocu so nhuma nright s violations duringconflicts ,varyin gfro mpolitica lpressur e anddiplomac yt otechnica l andfinancia lassistance . Inadditio nt oconcret e activities,policie s havebee n formulatedt o helpi nth eoperationalizatio n of humanright s policies.Th eWhit e Paper onsanctionin g (2000)wa sinstrumenta l inthi s respect.Th e Netherlands alsotrie dt o starta ninternationa ldiscussio no nth e legitimacy of military interventiono n humanitariangrounds . Itwa sdeeme d importantt o renewth e respectan dattentio n for humanright s inpost-conflic t situations:n opeac ewithou tjustice .

In200 1a Whit e Papero nconflic t prevention presentedt o Parliament byth eMiniste r of ForeignAffair s statedtha t conflict prevention isa cor etas k of Dutchforeig npolic y ina broa dsense .Violen t conflictsdeman da broad ,wel lco-ordinated ,internationa l approach.Th e Dutchgovernmen ttherefor e propagatestha tth ecentr eo fgravit yi n conflict prevention should beo ninternationa lco-operation ,rathe rtha no ndevelopin g specific national policies.Furthermore ,a nintegrate d multi-track approach iscalle d for. Instruments sucha sdiplomacy , economic aid, humanitarianai dan dpossibl y militaryactivitie s havet o beutilised ,wit hspecifi cattentio nfo r coherence.Th e200 1 White Paperals odistuinguishe s betweenstructura l long-term prevention,i nth efor m of pro-poor development, andshort-ter m 'operational'prevention .Th epromotio no f goodgovernance ,democrac y andhuma nright s must bea tth ehear to fever y strategyfo r conflict prevention.Fo rthi s reason,bilatera lassistanc e andassistanc e givent oGMV-countries , bothfocu so ngoo dgovernance ,participatio nan d empowerment. Ownership isanothe r centralconcept ,especiall ywit h regardt o internalconflict .Th eopposin g parties insuc ha conflic t mustb eth eone st osee ka solution.Th einternationa l community canhel pt ofacilitat ethi s process butcanno t dictate asolution .I ncross-borde r conflict aregiona lapproac h isofte ncalle dfor , directedthroug happropriat e internationalfora .T o sumup ,th e principleso f Dutch conflict prevention policyare :

supportfo rth e international ruleo flaw ; 'earlywarning 'an d- ifcalle dfo r- 'earl yaction' ; well-co-ordinated andcoheren t useo f nationalan dinternationa lresources ; active useof ,an dsuppor tfor , multilateralfora ; broadpovert y reductiont otackl e long-term causeso f conflict; specialattentio nfo r goodgovernance ,démocratisatio nan dhuma nrights , includingth eprotectio no fminorities ; localownershi p andparticipation ; a regionalapproac ht o prevent 'spill-over' effects.

16 In200 2a Whit e Papero n Post-Conflict Reconstructionwa s presented.Althoug h publishedafte r the research period it iso f interestfo rthi sstudy .Wherea sth e200 1 conflictpreventio npape rdeal twit h(pre-)conflic t situations,th ereconstructio npape r discusses post-conflict situations,i.e . post-conflict physical,economic ,socio-cultura l andpolitica ldevelopment . Inothe rwords ,physica l reconstruction andpeacebuilding . Itsanalysis ,base do nexperience ,i sintende dt o helpshap e newpolicies .Politica l stabilityan dth econsolidatio no f peacean dsecurit y areprim econcern s inpost - conflict conditionsan drequir einternationa lsupport . However,ownershi po fth e peaceproces s mustresid ewit hth ecommunity , i.e.wit hth epartie sdirectl y involved inth econflict . Ifpossible ,fund sshoul d bechannelle dthroug hloca linstitutions .

Quickfixe sar eno tviabl e insituation so fconflict :th e international community should beprepare dals ot oprovid e longer-termsupport .Coherenc e andco-ordinatio nar e deemedver yimportant ,bot hwit h regardt oothe rdono r countries andt oth evariou s aidorganisations , helpingt oclos eth ega p between humanitarianassistanc ean d structuralform so fdevelopmen t co-operation.Again ,th e regionalcharacte ro f conflicts should betake nint oaccoun twhe nattemptin g the reconstructionprocess . Thechance so f re-occurrence also necessitatetha ta nearl ywarnin gan dactio n approachb eadopte d inpost-conflic tsituations .

Onthei r own, Dutchpolicie sca ninfluenc e post-conflict reconstruction attemptsonl y toa ver ylimite ddegree .Th e internationalcommunit y shouldtherefor etak eth elea d inthes e processes.Th e Dutchgovernmen t expressesa preferenc efo rfinancin gan d co-ordinating reconstruction effortsthroug h multilateralfora .Th e policy insuc h effortswil lfocu so nstrengthenin g localadministratio n andcivi lsociety ,an do n economic reconstruction andsuppor tfo r basicservices .Withi ntha tcontext ,specia l attention shouldb egive nt o participation,gende r issues,improvin g humanrights , disarmament, demobilisation,an dth e reintegration ofex-combatants .

Other policydocument sdea lwit h moreperiphera l conflict-related issues,lik etha to n decentralisation,an dthemati c paperso nchil dsoldiers ,smal lweapon s anddemining , forexample .

TheWhit e Papero ndecentralisatio n hast o besee ni nth econtex to fgoo d governance anddémocratisation . Decentralisation andloca lcapacit y buildingai ma t achievinggreate r efficiency andeffectivenes s inpubli cadministration .Th e rationale forthi s istha tdecentralisatio n reducesth ega p betweenth e peoplean dpubli c administration,thereb y increasingtransparenc y andaccountability . Insituation so f conflictthi s mayreduc etension ,becaus e moreattentio n canb egive nt oth especifi c needso f regionsan dminorities .

Nospecifi cWhit e Papero nchil dsoldier s hasbee nwritte nbu tth eDutc hgovernmen t triest oincreas eattentio nfo rthe m ininternationa lfora ,fo rexample ,th eSecurit y Council.A partnership-programme with UNICEFdedicate s specialattentio nt o children involved inarme dconflicts . Programmesfo r demobilisation,rehabilitation , reintegration,famil y reunionan dtraumatolog y aresupporte d bilaterally.Afric a hasa priority inthi scontext .

Theproliferatio no f smallarm s isdefine da sa seriou sthrea tt o humansecurity .Thei r availability caneasil ycaus eth eescalation ,intensificatio n andprolongatio no fconflict . The Dutchgovernmen t dealswit hthi sissu ethroug ha pro-activ e bilateralan d multilateralapproac hwithi nth e EU,th e OSCE,NAT Oan dth e UN.I tha sals ohelpe d

17 to launchan dsuppor t anumbe r of initiatives. In 1997,fo r example,a nE U programmeo npreventin g andfightin g theillega ltrad e inconventiona lweapon swa s adopted,o nth einitiativ eof , andunde rth echairmanshi p of,th e Dutchgovernment .A politicaldeclaratio nwa sadopte d byth e EUo nth e issueo f illegalarm strad et oan d withinth eGrea t Lakes Region.Workshop s and(ministerial ) debateswer eorganise d inth eOSCE ,NAT Oan dth e UN.Finally ,ther e isintensiv e co-operation betweenth e Dutchgovernmen t and NGOso nth e issueo fsmal larms ,bilatera lsuppor tfo r projectsdealin gwit hthei r proliferation.Recently ,th eDMV-directorat e hasshow na policy interest inth e institutional aspects of security sector reform byhavin ga securitysecto rassessmen ttoo lformulate d byth e Netherlands Instituteo f International Relations'Clingendael' .

Onth esubjec t ofhumanitaria nmin eactio na themati c policyframewor kwa s presented in2001 . This resultedfro meffort s in 1997t o banth eproduction , trade, storagean dus eo fanti-persona l minesworld-wide ,throug hth eso-calle dOttawa - Treatywhic hbecam e effective on 1Marc h 1999.Countrie stha t havesigne dth e treaty havemad ea commitmen t tosuppor tth ecost so f mineclearanc e andothe r aspects of so-called mineaction .Th e Netherlands hasbee nmai ndono r inthi sfiel d since 1996.Financin ggoe st oproject stha t complywit hth e MineAction Guidelines of UNMAS(Unite d Nations MineActio nService) .Thi sinclude s raising consciousness regardingth e presenceo f mines,ris k reductionfo r inhabitants,hel pfo rvictims , strivingfo r acomplet e bano nth e useo f mines,an dloca lcapacit y building.I n principle,onl ysignatorie s toth eOttaw aTreat yca nappl yfo rfinancia l supportfro m the Dutchgovernment . Priority isgive nt ocountrie stha t havea bilatera l development relationshipwit hth e Netherlandso rt othos etha t receivesuppor taime da tgoo d governance,huma nright san dpeacebuildin g (GMV-countries).

Explanatory noteso nth enationa lbudget sfro m 1996t o200 1sho w increasing attentionfo r conflict management andpeacebuilding .Agains t abackgroun do f changing international relations sinceth e ColdWar , increasingdivision s andrifts , newinformatio ntechnologie s andth e integrationo fworl d markets,a strateg yfo r peacebuilding andconflic t managementtake sshape .I nth e 1996budge tth efocu s seemst o havebee no ninternationa lfor afo r peacean dsecurity ,wit h humanright s beingdeal twit h ina separat e section.I nsubsequen t yearsth e integrationo fconflic t management andpeacebuildin gwit h humanitarian assistance,huma nrights ,goo d governance anddémocratisatio nha sbee nstressed .Th e200 0not edeal twit hth e subject ofsecurit y ina separat echapte ro ngoo dgovernance ,démocratisatio nan d humanrights .Th ene wdirectorat efo r humanright san dpeacebuildin g isreferre dt o asa nimportan t instrumentwit hwhic ht ocreat ecoherenc eamon geffort s towards conflict prevention,peacebuilding ,crisi s management, goodgovernanc ean dgoo d policy. Mentioni sals omad eo fth especia lambassado r onhuma nright swh oi st ob e instrumental inmainstreamin ghuma nrights . In200 1on echapte r inth eexplanator y note isdedicate dspecificall y toth esubjec to f peace,securit yan dconflic t management, incombinatio nwit h humanitarianassistanc ean dgoo dgovernance , humanright san dpeacebuilding .Thes esubject s havereportedl y allbee nintegrate d intoon eapproac h ina neffor t toattai na cor eobjectiv eo f Dutchforeig npolicy , namelyth e promotiono f peace,securit yan dstability .Th evariou s notest oth e budgets havestresse dth e importanceo fa coheren tapproac han do fconcept ssuc h asownershi pan dparticipation .Althoug h internationalfor afo r conflict management continuet ob ever yimportant ,th eframewor kfo r Dutchpolic yi sbecomin g increasinglyarticulated .

18 3.3 Regional andCountry-leve l Policies

Theoutlin e provided byth eWhit e Papers ismad emor especifi c inth efe wregiona l paperspublishe do ndifferen t areas.Tha t regardingAfric a (1999) isth emos t elaborate.Ther e isals oon eo nth eGrea t Lakes Region.Additionally ,ther ear e paperso nth e Balkansan da preparator y oneo nSoutheas tAsia .

TheAfric a paper isse tagains tth ebackgroun do fvariou s conflicts andrelate d problems,includin g refugees,chil dsoldier san dth eproliferatio no fsmal larms .Tw o maingoal sfo r policiesoriente dtoward sAfric aar e indicated.Firstly ,th epromotio no f peacean dstability ;second , thepromotio no fgoo d(macro-economic ) policyan d goodgovernance .Th e'interna lcapacity 'o fAfric a should beth eprimar ydrivin gforc e for peacean dstability . Dutchpolic y initiativesca nstimulat edevelopmen t andhel pt o createa framework , butonl yt oa limite ddegre ean donl yi na nassistin grole . 'Ownership'an d'participation 'ar ecrucial .Initiative sfo r peacean dsecurit yshoul d preferably besupporte dthroug hAfrica n regionalorganisations ,e.g .th e Organisation ofAfrica n Unityan dSADC ,thu senablin g'ownership 't o remainwit hth ecountr yi n question.

Sustainabledevelopmen t andsecurit yar e mutually reinforcing policygoals :securit y andstabilit y promotedevelopmen t andvic eversa .Th enee di sstresse dfo ra n integratedAfrica npolic yframewor k inwhic hpolitical ,economi can ddevelopmen t instruments areinterconnected .Conflic tan dpovert yar esee na scorrelate d problems that canonl y betackle d properlythroug ha nintegrate dan dcoheren tapproach . Policiesshoul dfocu sno tonl yo ncountrie stha t receive bilateralassistance ,bu tals o onthos etha t lackgoo dgovernanc e ando nthos etha t canhav ea stabilisin geffec t on the region,du et othei r regionalsignificance .

Coherence indealin gwit hAfric a issough t inmultilatera l EUan dU Nframeworks .I n theformer ,th e Netherlands supports stronger EUinvolvemen t andpromote sa common policytoward s 'warringcountries' . In 1999an d2000 ,th e Netherlandswa sa non-permanent membero fth e UNSecurit y Councilan dpromote da nintegrate dan d coherent approacht odevelopmen t inAfrica .Withi n bothth e EUan dth eUN ,th e Netherlandsdedicate sconsiderabl eattentio nt oth eissu eo fth eproliferatio n ofsmal l arms.Th eAfric a paper reiteratesth eoveral l Dutchpolic y principleselaborate dupo n above,whic hobviousl yappl yt oth eAfrica nregion .

A papero nth e Great Lakes regionwa s presented in2001 .Th e pointso fdepartur e for policies inthi s regionar egenerall yth esam ea sfo rth e resto f Sub-Saharan Africa,i.e . countries areprimaril y responsiblefo r endingthei r conflicts;ownershi pi s crucial ifa solutio n ist ob efound ;a regiona lapproac h isneeded ;th e UNan dE U should participate actively; Dutchfundin g isconcentrate do nmultilatera lframeworks ; co-ordinationan dcoalitio nbuildin gshoul db euse dt orealis ea coherent ,multi - facetedapproach ;specia lattentio nwil l begive nt ohuma nright san dt o programmes ondisarmament ,demobilisatio n andreintegration .

Apape ro nth e Balkanswa spresente d in200 1an dfurthe r specified in 2002.Th e maingoa lo f Dutchpolicie s inthi sare a ist opromot esustainabl e regionalstability , démocratisation(includin gth e 'ruleo f law'),respec tfo r humanright san dminorities , andimprovemen t of livingstandards .Point so fdepartur efo r Dutchpolicie s regarding thisregio n includeth e improvement of bilateralrelation san dth e integrationo f Balkan countries into Europeanan d Euro-Atlantic structures,a swel la sth epromotio no f

19 security and stability e.g. prevention of migration flows and cross-boundary criminal activities). Integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures will also serve long- term conflict prevention. The Dutch effort will in general be made through multilateral frameworks, or bilaterally if there is added value. The burden must be shared among donors. The coming decade will be crucial for integrating the region with the rest of Europe, and policies should combine political, military, economic and development instruments. The main focus should be on problems associated with transition. Dutch involvement with regard to security and peacebuilding is intended to guarantee a 'safe and secure environment' and should reward 'ownership'. Military presence in the Balkan region should bethoroughl y reviewed. Suggested options are for a more central role to be given to EU or NATO. Other points for attention include mine clearance, the repatriation of refugees, promoting the 'rule of law', and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. The promotion of good governance, local capacity building, participation and transparency, are also put forward as logical extensions of peacekeeping activities. Macro-economic support has already been provided to several nations inth e region with the explicit intention to aid recovery and to guarantee stability. Macedonia is an example of such support. Also, the Dutch-funded MATRA programme includes activities focusing on topics that are relevant to peacebuilding in a post-conflict or transitional situation.Th e programme supports societal transformation processes intransitio n countries. Subjects covered include good governance and democracy, civil society, the rule of law, human rights and minorities.

A paper on South-east Asia, presented in 1999, is not very specific on conflict management and peacebuilding. This paper was written in preparation for a regional conference and intended as a starting point for an integrated Dutch policy framework for ASEAN countries. The background of the paper indicates that the Asian crisis might threaten stability inth e region.Co-operatio n with ASEAN countries is mostly through the EL).ASEA N and other regional frameworks are regarded as an important factor in promoting security and stability. Human rights is a point of concern, especially with regard to Burma.Th e Dutch viewpoint on the human rights situation is usually communicated through the EU.Th e Netherlands will increasingly promote attention for human rights in multinational fora and bilaterally (e.g.wit h Cambodia). Political liberalisation and good governance will be promoted more intensively. The broad outline of policies towards the region indicates a broad process of economic development as the long-term strategy for security and stability.

With regard to the countries selected for this study, Dutch policies indicate the following issues:

Afghanistan does not receive bilateral assistance from the Netherlands. Since 1990, contributions for humanitarian aid have been channelled through various UN departments, the International Red Cross and several NGOs. This assistance has focused on basic needs, such as food and healthcare. In rural areas, aid has concentrated on mine clearance, the rehabilitation of agriculture,wate r and sanitation, basic healthcare and primary education. Capacity building and gender issues are also high on the agenda.

Cambodia also does not receive bilateral assistance, a great point of concern being the human rights situation. Dutch funding is given to several human rights activities. The Netherlands was involved with the Cambodian elections through the EU.Afte r this monitoring mission, EU countries formulated ajoin t declaration towards

20 Cambodia, stating that all parties should assume a constructive and peaceful attitude and calling on them to refrain from any activity that could renew tension.

Sri Lanka has been given bilateral assistance since 1975, praticularly for the environment, rural development and relief, rehabilitation, and reconciliation. Relief work was prominent during the study period,whil e rehabilitation and reconciliation have moved higher on the bilateral agenda since the cease-fire agreement of February 2002.

In 1999th e Netherlands decided to terminate over a three-year period the bilateral assistance to Kenya because of poor governance. Funding will continue to be given to activities regarding good governance, human rights, and conflict prevention.

Since 1994, Dutch aid to Rwanda has steadily developed a bilateral assistance relationship starting in 2001. After a large initial donation for humanitarian and rehabilitation aid in 1996, support to Rwanda became more structural. Points of attention for support are good governance, decentralisation, human rights, and the rule of law.

Bilateral support to Sudan has gradually been terminated,onl y humanitarian still being given.Th e latter involves support to victims of the internal conflict and of environmental disasters. Conflict management activities are also supported, both locally and nationally. Dutch funding is channelled through the UN and NGOs and involves food, healthcare, sanitation and education.A n important issue is the involvement of women inth e peace process.

Mozambique is one of the countries that receive bilateral assistance, with Dutch support concentrating on social sectors, water and sanitation, and the environment. Attention is also given to other issues, such as good governance (security sector reform and support to Parliament), mine clearance and debt relief. The efforts of nine donors to Mozambique are co-ordinated through a framework under the 'Joint Donor Programme' the efforts of nine donors to Mozambique are co-ordinated.

Guatemala is given Dutch support as GMV-country. In 1997 Dutch funding doubled in comparison to 1996, due to of the signing of Peace Accords. In addition to support for good governance, human rights and peacebuilding, Guatemala gets support for environmental projects and private sector development. Additional relief and reconstruction aidwa s given after hurricane Mitch devastated the country.

Bosnia-Herzegovina receives bilateral support from the Netherlands, focused on three points. Firstly, macro-economic support (through theWorl d Bank), second, support for the repatriation of minorities, and third for implementation of the peace process. Special attention is given to the victims of Srebrenica and to the International Commission on Missing Persons.

3.4 Summary

Table A provides an overview of major Dutch policy documents on conflict issues and relevant institutional arrangements from 1991 until 2002, as dealt with in chapters 2 and 3 of this part of the working document.

21 Table A: Dutch Policies and Institutional Arrangements inth e Period 1991-2002

Critical Dutch Policy Documents and Initiatives Some institutional arrangements Early 1990s: Small department (DMP/NH) concentrating on relief aid after natural disasters

1991: A World of Difference: conceptualisation of post-Cold War world characterised by fading frontiers, increasing interdependence, mutual vulnerability and greater risks

1993: A World of Dispute calls for de-compartmentalisation: -Boundaries between humanitarian aid,rehabilitatio n and development have to disappear -Integrated policy encompassing defence,foreig n policy and development, is needed:a s long as political mediation, military and security operations and relief and development assistance operate independently, the international response will remain incoherent and ineffective

1993: Humanitarian Aid between Conflict and Development: -Interconnection of peace, development and security -Coordination between actors -Flexible funding and management mechanisms

1996: New directorate on Crisis Management and Humanitarian Aid was set up consisting of two departments, one for Crisis Management and Prevention, another for Humanitarian Assistance

1997: Start of research period Utstein study [1997: Start of research period Utstein study]

1998: New overall policy: 1998: New Minister for Development -Concentration of bilateral assistance to the 17+3 countries, Cooperation meeting criteria in terms of good governance and level of poverty/ sectoral approach -Support of peacebuilding, good governance and human rights in non-17+3 countries -Assistance through NGOs where chance of success for govt- to-govt cooperation is low

1999: Internal paper on conflict management 1999:Appointmen t of human rights ambassador

2000: New directorate on Human Rights and Peacebuilding to work on the trinity of human security, human rights and human development

2001: White Paper on human rights policies (based on white paper of 1979),whit e paper on conflict prevention

2002: White Paper on post-conflict reconstruction 2002: New Cabinet; no Minister, but a State Secretary for Development Cooperation

22 RECORD OFEVALUATIO NSTUDIE S

So far the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not undertaken any evaluation research inth e field of peace building, conflict prevention or conflict management. In 1994 it published a fairly comprehensive study on humanitarian aid to Somalia that comprised both relief aid and activities inth e field of rehabilitation. That study, however, did not focus on peacebuilding per se, although it reflected onth e nature and challenges resulting from a complex political emergency, and the population's vulnerability and entitlements were central issues of analysis. On the basis of the present Utstein study, the Department hopes to develop a more articulated approach and programme towards evaluating Dutch-funded peace building and conflict-related activities or issues for the future. In mid-2003 an evaluator was appointed to work inth e field of peace and security. She will probably start an evaluation of small arms.

At the project level,th e responsible departments DCH/CP and DMV/VG have over the years commissioned a number of evaluation studies inth e field of rehabilitation and/or peace building. No exhaustive overview of evaluation reports on peacebuilding has been maintained, however. An inventory of available archival records shows that DMV/VG initiated six such evaluation studies inth e period 1997-2001. These focused on a media project, an arms control activity, a women's reconciliation project, the activities of a large conflict prevention NGO, an educational and a civil society project in conflict countries. The reasons for starting an evaluation varied from learning objectives, to solving problems or assessing impact and effectiveness. No overview has ever been made of evaluations undertaken by, or at request of, Dutch Embassies or MFOs, NGOs, or multilateral agencies that receive Dutchfunding .

Although some lessons have been learned regarding individual activities and projects, no attempts have been made to develop a broader scheme or to reach conclusions at the meta-level. DMV/VG has not yet articulated an evaluation policy at the project or programme level. Most evaluations, therefore, remain somewhat adhoc. DMV/VG is working with other donors and in the OECD/DAC framework on the development of indicators and on methodological and other difficulties inthi s field of expertise and hopes to carry out a comparative study on media activities in2003 .

CONCLUSIONS

Main PolicyIssues 1. Iti sonl yrecentl ytha tpeacebuildin g hasbecom ea salien ttopi can dha sbee n subjectedt osystemati c policyattention . Nevertheless,withi nth e DutchMinistr yo f ForeignAffair sther e isa nongoin g practice basedo nstrategi c decisions andth e interpretations of involvedofficers . 2. Sofar , noexplicit ,systemati c andcomprehensiv e policyo npeacebuildin g has beendesigned .Relevan t statements arescattere dove rdifferen t documents,an d policies havet o bereconstructe dfro mthos edocument s andfro mdail y practice androutin e rathertha nderive dfro mspecifi ctexts . 3. Conflict-related terminology isuse di na broa dan dfairl y non-specific manneri n thevariou s policy papers.N odefinitio n of peacebuilding isavailabl ea s understood inth e Dutchpolic ycontext . 4. Thisrelativ e lacko fformalisatio n however, permitsth e possibilityt ooperat e flexiblyan dt omak eth ebes to fone' s intentions ina situatio ntha t isofte ndrive n byunpredictabl e contextualconsiderations .

Policies andPolicy Papers 5. The Dutchgovernmen t hasformulate d anumbe ro f policydocument so n contemporary conflict inrespons et opost-Col dWa r globaldevelopment san d policy initiatives inth e UNframework , especiallyth e'Agend afo r Peace'.A number of important if notsemina ldocument swer edraw n upi nth eyear s199 1 and 1993,prio rt oth eemergenc eo fth e notiono f peacebuilding ininternationa l discourse andals o priort oth e researchperio dselecte dfo rth epresen t descriptiono factivities .Thos eearl ydocument shav ebee nver yimportan tfo rth e furtherdevelopmen t ofpolicie s inthi sfield . Majorsubsequen t documentsdi dno t appear until200 1an d2002 :accordin gt oobservers , these mainly re-asserted existing policies or reiteratedgenera ldevelopmen t policyprinciples . 6. Theearl y policydocument swer eembedde d inbroade r analyseso fgloba l'orde r anddisorder' , thedisintegratio n ofth estate ,ne wcharacteristic s of present-day conflict,an ddevelopment s inmultilatera l institutions and(legal )frameworks . 7. Theyshowe dwa sa stron gfocu so nth edevelopin gworld ,an dth emajorit yo f initiatives camefro mth eMiniste rfo r Development Co-operationwit hth e participation of Ministers of Defencean do f ForeignAffairs . 8. TheWhit e Papersan dothe r policy documentsfocu so nbroa dan dmor especifi c issues inrelatio nt ohuma nrights ,conflic t prevention,humanitaria naid , rehabilitation'an dpeacebuilding . 9. The Dutchgovernmen t hasals opublishe d paperso nrelate dsubject s sucha s childsoldiers ,smal larms ,min eclearanc e andsanctions . 10. With regardt ohuma nright s policiesdatin gfro mth elat e 1970s;hav ebasicall y beencontinue do r updated;perspective s andapproache s onothe rtheme swer e mainlyformulate d inth e 1990s,whil egoo dgovernanc e issuesgaine d prominence inrelatio nt o(post-)conflic t management. 11.Catchword s ofth e newmillenniu m includecoherence ,ownershi pan d transparency alongsideth eearlie r notions of participation,governance ,dono rco ordination,conflic t preventionan dearl ywarning ,whic hcontinu et oreceiv e priority. 12.I nth efiel do f post-conflict rehabilitation andpeacebuilding ,politica l stabilisation andth e restoration of peacean dsecurit y aresee na spriorities .Participation , gender, humanright san d DDRar e important crosscutting issues.

25 Modalities ofAid 13.I nregional ,countr y orannua l plans,an di nth eexplanator y notest oth eannua l budget,overai rpolicie sar eoperationalise d intoconcret e programmeso r activities.Thes ear estil lfairl y superficial,however , and,fro ma polic y pointo f view,contai nhardl yan yne winsights . 14.Dutc hconflict-relate d aidi sdistribute dove rdifferen t categories: - structuralaid (generall yfo r poorcountrie swit hgoo dpolicie s andgoo d governance); - aidspecifically aimed at good governance, human rights andpeacebuilding (therecipien t countriesfac eproblem s inthos eareas ,bu ta goo dgovernment - to-government relationship isstil lpossible ;otherwis e aidi schannelle d throughNGOs) ; - reliefor (modest) rehabilitation aid(recipien t countriesviolat e humanright so r havepattern s of 'badgovernance') . 15.Mos tpeacebuildin g activitiesobviousl yfal l underth esecon dcategory ,althoug h somear efoun d under bothfirs t andsecon dcategories :som e'structura laid ' countries arestil lengage d in,o remergin gfrom ,conflict ,e.g .Mozambique , Rwandaan dSr iLanka . 16.Th e DutchGovernmen t does not implement activities onit sown ,bu talway s worksthroug h partnerswhos e programmes arefunded .Th etraditiona l Dutch preference isfo r international co-operationalon g multilateral channels,a swel la s co-operationwit hcivi lsociet yan d NGOs.Som ecarefu lattempt sar e madet o involveth e publicsector . Incertai ncases ,activitie s havebee ncarrie dou twit h regionalorganisations ,whil e local levelo rgrassroot s initiatives arefrequentl y implementedthroug hth eco-financin gchannel . 17. Apartfro mtraditiona l ODAproject san dprogrammes , peacebuilding activities occura tth e political level,th e Peace Fund,unde rth e MATRAprogramm ean d variousform s of macro-economic assistancetha t canb econsidere dt o havea peacebuilding impact.

InstitutionalAspects 18.I nmos tpolicie s andpolic y papersther e hasbee na stron gfocu s onth e developingworld ,an dmos tinitiative s camefro mth e Ministerfo r Development Co-operationwit hparticipatio no fth e Ministerso f Defencean do f ForeignAffairs . 19.Th e Dutchgovernment , however, hasargue dtha t closer integrationo fth e instruments ofdevelopmen t co-operation,defenc ean dforeig n policy isneede dt o providea nadequat e responset ofutur echallenges .Thi s hascoincide dwit ha 'decompartmentalisation'exercis e atth einstitutiona l level,wit h concomitant changes inorganisation ,managemen t andfunding .Severa lobserver shav e indicatedtha tth eintegratio no fdifferen t substantive andinstitutiona l perspectives hasremaine dsomewha to fa bottleneck , if it hasno tfaile dt oa considerabl e degree. 20.A concomitan t institutional changewa sth egrowt han dever-broadenin g scopeo f thedirectorate s anddepartment s involved,a swel la sth eappointmen t ofa specialAmbassado r for HumanRight swit ha vie wt o promotingan d mainstreamingth esubject . 21. Institutionaltheme stha t occur inth e policydocument s studied includeth ecal lfo r a betterdelineatio n oftask s andfo r co-ordination among internationaldonors ,th e involvement ofth etarge tgroup ,improve dfeedbac k andevaluation ,an dgreate r flexibility.

26 22.A nevaluatio n policywit h regardt o peacebuilding hasno tye t beenarticulated . Although incidental evaluations havetake nplace ,ther e isneithe r asystemati c overviewno r havelesson s learned beenidentifie d andsynthesised .

Finalremark Asnote dabove ,o na numbe r ofsubject s aclea r andexplici t policyframewor kexists , buto nother s it isstil llackin go ronl yjus t emerging. Effectively, thestatu san dnatur e of policy isonl yon easpec ttha t hast o beconsidered .Equall y if not moreimportant , arestrategi c decisions andaction stake nb yinvolve dresponsibl eofficers ,wh oar e expectedt o'translate 'polic yguideline s intoactio no rt odefin eactio ni nth eabsenc e ofclea r policy guidance. Iti srecommende dtha tfollow-u pstudie s shouldfocu smor e in-deptho nthes eissues ,a sthe yar efel tt oexplai ndonors 'behaviou r andimpac t bettertha nth eelucidatio n of policydocument salone .

PartB

DutchActivitie s Directed at Peacebuilding

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Thissurve y ispar to fa large r study:th eJoint Utstein Studyof Peacebuilding. 'Utstein' isa collaborativ eventur e amongth e Development Ministers of Germany, TheNetherlands , Norwayan dth e United Kingdom,wh oar econvince do fth enee d for concertedaction .I na meetin g heldo n 15Februar y2002 ,th e Evaluation Departments ofth e respective ministriesdecide dt ocarr y outa nexplorator y studyo f their countries'recen t peace-building experiences.Thi s resultedi nth eJoint Utstein Studyof Peacebuilding. Individualcountr ystudie s byth eparticipatin gcountries ' respective evaluationdepartment s formedth e building blockso fth ejoin t study, culminating ina synthesi s studyb yth eOslo-base d International PeaceResearc h Institute (PRIO). Inth e nextsectio nth e larger Joint Studyan dsurve ydesig nwil lb e introduced briefly,whil eth e remaining sectionso fthi schapte rwil l providespecifi c informationo nth e Dutchsurvey .

1.2 TheJoin t UtsteinStud yo f Peacebuilding

The Utsteinpartner s havegaine dconsiderabl e ofexperienc e insupportin g peacebuilding activities ina numbe ro f countries.Th e partnersconsidere di t appropriate reviewthei r experiences andknowledge ,an dt odra wsom econclusion s about lessons learnedan dth emos tproductiv e pathsfo rfutur e policydevelopment . TheJoin t Studytherefor e aimeda tcontributin gt oth efurthe r refinement and strengthening of peace-building operationsthroug hanalytica l explorationa swel la s policydevelopment . Toaddres sthi saim ,severa lresearc heffort swer eplanned .I t wasexamine dwha tshoul d becategorise d aspeacebuildin g efforts andho wth e activities andactor sinvolve dcoul db echaracterised . Peacebuilding experiences wereexplore dan dth e lessons learnedfro mthos eexperiences . Finally,a nattemp t was madet oidentif y policyconclusion s andt odra wu pa nagend at ofurthe r knowledgethroug hevaluation .

The(draft )Term so f Referencefo rth eJoin t Studywer e basedo nth econclusion so f the Utstein partners'meetin go n 15Februar y2002 .Th eJoin t Studycomprise dtw o elements:A 'typological 'surve yo fth efou r countries'experience s insuppor to f peace-building activitiescarrie dou tfro m 1997unti l2002 ,an da n international seminar basedo nth eresearc hfindings .Th e Evaluations Sectiono fth e Norwegian Ministryo f ForeignAffair s carriedoveral l management responsibilityfo rth eJoin t Study. PRIOcontribute dt oa commo n researchapproac h among involvedcountr y teams bydevelopin g ashare danalytica l andmethodologica l framework.

Themai nthrus to fth eJoin t Studywa sa surve yo fth etota lo f 336project so r activitiesfunde do rcarrie dou t byth efou r Utstein partners inth efive-yea r period 1997-2001,includin g someproject s of aregiona lo r moregenera lscope .Th e1 3 countries selected hadbee npar to fa majo r peacebuilding commitment, inwhic ha t leastthre eo fth efou r Utsteincountrie s hadbee nactive .The y representeda geographical spreadacros s Europe,th e Middle East,Sub-Sahar a Africa,Asia ,an d Centralan dSout hAmerica ,variou s politicalsource so fconflict ,degree so f political

31 crises, and depths and bases of international involvement12. The survey provided the empirical basis for the Joint Study, apart from the perusal of documents and interviews.

Four main categories of peacebuilding activities were identified in the survey: 'security', 'socio-economic', 'political' and 'reconciliation'. These again subdivided into 17subcategorie s of activities, as listed inAnne x 1.Th e survey focused on the completion of standard, pre-formatted 'profiles' for each project or activity, covering 14 quantitative and qualitative variables, as shown in Box 1.Thes e (sub) categories and variables also provided the format for the Dutch survey.

Box 1 Variables Covered in Project Profiles

1 Project Namean dLocatio n 2 Category 3 Startan dEn dDate so f Project 4 TotalBudge tan dDutc hContributio n 5 OtherDonor s 6 Project Partners 7 Summaryo fAim san dObjective s 8 Strategic Perspective 9 Cross-cuttingTheme s inAims/Objective s 10 Evaluation 11 ImpactAssessmen t 12 FinancialAssessmen t 13 Organisational EfficiencyAssessmen t 14 OverallConclusion so nProjects 'Contributio nt oPeacebuildin g

1.3 The Objectives of the Dutch Survey

The objectives of the Dutch Survey were derived from the general framework developed for the Joint Utstein Study by PRIO and concluded by IOB. The first objective was to provide a statistical overview and categorisation of peacebuilding activities financially supported by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a selection of countries. The second objective was to draft profiles of a selection of peacebuilding activities. These would be made available to PRIO for further analysis, and used for presenting case-material (in boxes) and drawing some preliminary conclusions inth e present document.

Work on the Dutch study started mid-October 2002 and was finalised inAugus t 2003. Before discussing the methodology, the next section will deal with some conceptual aspects in relation to that study.

1.4 Conceptual Aspects13

The expression peacebuilding only became an integral part of international conflict resolution terminology after the United Nations (UN) introduced the notion inth e early 1990's. In an 'Agenda for Peace' written byth e then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the concept of peacebuilding was distinguished from 'preventive

12Th e numbero fcountrie sselecte dpe r Utsteinpartne rvaried ,dependen to nth ehistor yan d geographicalcoverag eo fth epeacebuildin g programmes. 3Thi ssectio ndraw son ;Utstein PartnerCountries' Joint Study of Peacebuilding, Draft Terms ofReference, April2002 , whileaddin gsom especifi cobservation sfo rth eDutc hstudy .

32 diplomacy', 'peacemaking'an d'peacekeeping' .Sinc e publication of 'AnAgenda for Peace', peacebuilding hasgaine dgloba l prominence andi sfrequentl y mentionedi n policydocuments , includingthos efro mth e Dutchgovernment ,togethe r withothe r concepts usedi nth e prevailing discourseo ncontemporar y conflict,suc ha shuma n rights,conflic t prevention,humanitaria n aid,rehabilitatio n andgoo dgovernance 14. Peacebuilding generallytrie st oencourag eth edevelopmen t ofstructura lconditions , attitudes andmode so f political behaviourtha t permit peaceful,stabl ean dultimatel y prosperous,socia lan deconomi c development. Experience showstha t peacebuilding activities rangebroadl yan ddi gdeepl y intoth esocia lfabri co f countries inwhic hthe y arecarrie dout .Du et oth ecomplexit y ofth ematter , peacebuilding necessarily encompasses anumbe ro f interrelated activities. Forexample ,economi c infrastructure, healthservice s andeducation ,goo dgovernanc ean dhuma nrights , nott o mentionsecurit y sector reforman dsecurit yoperations .Som eo fthes e activities canb eclassifie d asgenera l instruments of development co-operation,whil e othersar ehighl y specialised.Consequently ,th edefinitio no fth eter m peacebuilding remains somewhat elusivean dvague .

Intryin gt osolv ethi sproble mo fconceptua l ambiguity inpreparatio no fth eJoin t Studyan dconstituen t country studies,ha sbee nth efac ttha t peacebuilding shouldb e defined byreferenc et o itsactivitie s andobjectives ,an dth econtex t inwhic h iti s applied.Thi scontex t ison eo fcrisi san dconflict .Th eobjectiv eo f peacebuilding is restrictdamage ,haste nrecovery ,an dpreven t reversion.Suc hactivitie s aredesigne d to helpt oen do ravoi darme dconflict . For mostsuc hactivities ,therefore ,th eoveral l context rather thanth enatur eo fth eactivitie sthemselve s servest ocategoris ethe m aspeacebuildin g initiatives.Th eWageninge n researchtea madopte dsuc ha contextualapproac h inth e Dutchcountr ystudy 15.

Intryin gt osolv ethi s problemo fconceptua l ambiguity, PRIO- inconsultatio nwit h theevaluatio n departments ofth e Utsteincountrie s- proposedtha t peacebuilding shouldb edefined .Activitie s included inth e Utsteinstudy ,suc ha s humanitarian mine-action,o rth e repatriationan dretur no fdisplace d people,ar etypicall y considered 'humanitarian aid'b yth e Dutchai dadministratio n andno texplicitly linke d to peacebuilding. Ina sense ,then ,th e broaderconcep t of peacebuilding usedi nth e UtsteinJoin t Study leadst omor e projects being identified aspeacebuilding ,tha n would beth ecas efollowin g 'Dutchlogic' .

1.5 Methodology ofth e DutchSurve y

Selecting Countries Basedo nth e pre-selectiono f countries byPRI Ofo rth eoveral lJoin t Study,th e following ninerecipien tcountrie swer echose nfo rfurthe r analysis underth eDutc h countrystudy :Afghanistan ,Bosnia-Herzegovina , Cambodia,Guatemala ,Kenya , Mozambique, Rwanda,Sr iLank aan dSudan .

Identifying the Projects The Dutchai dadministratio n disposes ofa nelectroni c Management Informationan d DocumentaryActivitie s System (MIDAS)whic hcontain sa brie f summary (twot o three lines)o fal lfunde d projects. 'Project' isunderstoo d herea sa separat efinancia l

14See , forrelevan tDutc h policydocuments : op.cit,Par tA ,Chapte r2 and 3. 15Ibid , section1. 5Terminology' .

33 commitment, rathertha n interm so fwha t it represents inreality . Hence,fo rth esam e ongoingactivit yo nth eground ,i t ispossibl et ofin dsevera l (e.g.annual )financia l commitments byth e Dutchgovernmen t identifiedwit hdifferen t codes.Th e evaluationso fsuc hactivitie s haveofte n beenth esubjec t of separatefundin g decisions and,therefore ,als oappea r inth e MIDASsystem .Th e MIDASprintou tno t onlyinclude scountry-specifi c those,bu tals o projectswit ha regiona lo rworld-wid e scopetha ttak eplac e inth ecountr yconcerned .Th e MIDASsyste mdoe s notallo wa searcho nke yword s (e.g.chil dsoldiers ,smal larms) .O nth eothe r hand,th e databaseso fth earchive s ofth erespectiv edirectorate s inth eMinistr yo f Foreign Affairs doallo w sucha search .

Iti spossibl et oas kth eMIDA Ssyste mt oprin tou tal lproject sfo r agive ncountr yfo r theyear so f interest. Inth ecas eo fth e ninecountrie s selectedfo r the Dutchcountr y study,project s initiated inth e period 1997-2001totalle dt o 1844.Th enex tste p inth e procedurewa st oselec tthos eproject stha t qualifieda speacebuildin g activities.

Short-listing thePeacebuilding Projects Onth e basiso fth eMIDA S project summariesan dadditiona l informationfro m directoratefiles ,th e potential peacebuilding projectswer e identified.Fo reac ho f these,a nadministrativ e profile(comprisin g usually 1.5 to2 page so f information)wa s printed,makin g itpossibl et oconfir mwhethe ro r notthe yqualifie da speacebuildin g projects. Ifth eadministrativ e profilewa sno tconclusive ,th eful l projectfil ecoul db e consulted,bu tthi sprove d hardly necessarya tthi sstage .Th eexercis e resulted ina totalo f21 3peacebuildin g projectsfo r thenin eselecte dcountries .Thes e21 3 projectsforme dth e universeo f peacebuilding projectsfro mwhic ha further , purposive sampleo f6 7wa sdraw nfo rth e profiling exercise.Th equantitativ etable s presented inchapte r 2ar e basedo nth etota lunivers eo f21 3projects ,a sth etyp eo f information requiredwa sreadil y availableo rcoul deasil y begenerate dfo r all peacebuilding projects.Chapte r 3,i ncontrast ,draw sfro mth emor edetaile d informationderive dfro mth e purposive sampleo f 67profile san dhas ,consequently , asmalle r empirical basis.Th emanne r inwhic hthi ssampl ewa sdrawn ,i soutline d below.

Selecting Projects forthe Profiling Exercise Inth eoveral lguideline sfo rth eJoin t Studyi twa s recommendedtha ta maximu mo f ten projects beselecte d percountry . Insom ecase s underth e Dutchcountr ystudy , e.g. SriLanka ,th enumbe r of projectstha t couldplausibl y berelate dt o peacebuilding totalled lesstha nten 16.Al lrelevan t projectswer ethe nstudied .I nothe r cases,e.g . Rwanda,o f relevant projectswher emuc hmor e numerous.The na furthe r selection wasthe nmad eo nth ebasi so fth efollowin gcriteria :

1 theselectio ncovere dth e rangeo fproject s ina give ncountr y(diversity) ; 2 the project hadbee nevaluated ; 3 the projectexplicitl yaime da tpeacebuilding ; 4 projectswit hmor estructura l aimso r ambitionswer egive nprecedenc eove r shortero r'lighter ' activities; 5 projectswit h larger budgetswer efavoure dove rthos ewit hsmalle r budgets; 6 innovative projects (inth e Dutchcontext )wer esingle dout .

16 Mostpeacebuildin gactivitie si nSr iLank astarte dafte rth econclusio no fa ceasefire agreementbetwee n theGovernmen to fSr iLank aan d theLiberatio nTiger so fTami l Eelam (LTTE)o n 23Februar y2002 . Therefore, theyfal loutsid eth estud yperiod .

34 Selectedsurve y projectstha t resulted ina profil e reacheda financia l coverageo f 75.6%o r€ 177.9millio no fth etota lbudge tfo r peacebuilding activities inth eselecte d countries (€235. 2million) .

A numbero f issuesaros edurin gth eselectio n process. Firstly, Dutchprojec t codes represented afinancial-administrativ e decision.Wha t appearedt ob esevera l 'projects'wit hdifferen t codes,migh t infac t havebee ndifferen t financial commitments toth esam eongoin g projecto nth eground . Insuc hinstances ,th e 'real' projectwa stake na sth euni to f research byjoinin gth evariou sfinancia lcontributions . Asa consequence , manyfile s hadt o beconsulte dfo r suchprojects . Frequently,on e project comprisedfro mthre et osi xcommitments ,exceptionall y eveneigh to rnine . Second,a numbe r of longer-term projectswit hsevera lfinancia lcommitment s inth e studyperio dstarte d before 1997.I twa sthe ntrie dt ocaptur e Dutchinvolvemen twit h theprojec tfro mth ebeginning .Finally ,on eshoul db eawar etha tth etim efram efo r project selection mightproduc ea certai ndistortion .Th e peaceagreement s in Mozambique,Cambodi a andGuatemala ,fo r example,dat efro mth eearl y 1990s.I ti s quiteprobabl etha t moreo rdifferen t peacebuilding activitiestoo k place before 1997. Onth eothe r hand,th eprospec to f peace inSr iLank a isver yrecent . Duringth e period 1997-2001Eelam WarIII continue dunabate dan dfe wi nSr iLank aha d peacebuilding asa nexplici t aim.A significan t number ofproject swit hsuc haim s havereceive d Dutchfundin gfro m2002 ,onwards ,bu tthes efal loutsid eth estud y periodan dlittl e information onthe m isavailable ,le talon eo nthei rresults .

LogisticProblems Thecompilatio no f basicinformatio n about projects accordingt ostandar dprofile s wascomplicate d bya numbe r offactors :

1 Notal l projectfile swer eavailabl e inth eNetherlands ; manywer elocate dwit hth e embassies inth ecountrie s concerned,an di ttoo k muchtim et oobtai ncopie so f allrelevan tdocuments . Moreover, apre-selectio no f relevant documents hadt o bemad eb yembass y personnel,implyin ga certai n risko f bias.Th eembass yi n Maputo,Mozambique ,refuse dt oco-operat e duet ohig hwor k pressurean dt o their involvement insimila r researchcommitments . 2 Therewa softe n moretha non ephysica lfil e perproject , particularly iffile so n different fundingdecision sfo rth esam eongoin g projectwer ecombined .Th e number andbul k ofal lthos efile stogethe r was huge.Extractin gth e required informationwa sa time-consumin g tasktha twa s initially underestimated in planningan dprogrammin g the Dutchcountr ystudy . 3 Somedetails ,notabl yth etota lbudge tfo r aprojec t andth econtribution s ofothe r donors,wer ehar dt oget .Th eelectroni cadministrativ efile so fth edatabas edi d notinclud ethi s information,whic hwa sals oofte n lacking inth epape r documentation inth efiles . Forsom eothe r data categories informationwa sals o scarce,especiall y datao nimpact ,financia lan dorganisationa l efficiency. 4 Moreover,th e majorityo f projects hadno t beenevaluated ;i nconsequence ,the y lackeddetaile d reportso nresult s andprocess . 5 Anunexpecte d changeo f personnel inWageninge n University's consultancy teamcause ddelay s infinalisin gth estudy .

Representativeness ofthe Project Sample Atthi sjunctur e iti simportan tt o notetha tth edefinitio no fth e unito f researchfo rth e survey inth efor mo f 'projects',an dth e resulting sampling procedure basedo n certainrecipien t countries,underestimate s thenatur ean dnumbe r of peacebuilding

35 activities undertaken byth e Dutchgovernment . Inexaminin g project aidonly ,th e survey coversonl ypar to fth eeffort s byth e Dutchgovernment . Clearly, notal l peacebuilding activitiescom e inth efor mo ffunde dprojects .

Thisals oapplie st o macro-economic orsectora lsupport .Th e Netherlands further operates aPeac e Fundtha t does notappea r inth efile s studiedfo rth e Dutchcountr y study17. Diplomatic demarches,whethe r atth eleve lo fth e UNSecurit y Council, the EuropeanCommission ,regionall y or in-country,d ono tappea r inprojec tfiles .I n principle,however ,the y couldb emor esignifican tfo r Dutchinvolvemen twit ha country inconflic ttha nfunde dprojects .Anothe rexampl e isth e roleo fth eDutc h governmentwhe nchairin g internationalorganisation s orcommittees ,suc ha sth e OSCEChairman-in-Offic e tenuredurin g2003 .Ther ema yals ob ea numbe ro f expenditures for projectactivitie stha td ono tcom e underth epurvie wo fth e Ministry of ForeignAffair s but undertha to fth e Ministryo f Defence.Th e Ministryo fDefence , for example,deal swit hsom e 'security sector reform'activitie s and post-conflict peacekeepingwor k carriedou tb yth e military (e.g. inBosnia-Herzegovina) .Th e Dutchgovernmen t alsocontribute s to peacebuilding byco-fundin g anumbe ro f international organisations (e.g.Internationa lAlert ,Transparenc y International,th e Netherlands Institutefo r Multiparty Democracy,th e International Institutefo r Democracyan d ElectoralAssistance) , international projects (e.g.War-Tor n Societies Project, Humanitarianisman dWa r Project),workin g groups (OECD/DACTas k Force onPeace ,Conflic tan d Development Co-operation) andinternationa l conferences.I t furthercontribute s to programmes thatd ono t havea nimmediat e countryfocus . These include UNDP'sAccountability ,Transparenc y andAnti-Corruptio n Programme,Globa lWitness 'campaig no ntransparenc y andaccountabilit yo f corporations andth eStrengthenin g UNCapacitie sfo r Conflict Prevention Programmeo fth e International PeaceAcademy .Th e Dutchhav eals osupporte dth e productiono fa Handboo k onMedi aan d Peacebuilding byth e€pea n Platformfo r Conflict Preventionan dth e Reflecting on PeacePractic e byth e Lifean dPeac e Institute.

Duet oth emethodolog yfollowed ,suc h initiatives haveno t beencovere d bythi sstud y andn ofurthe r primarydat a havebee ncollected ,althoug hsevera l Dutchpolicie san d non-project instruments havebee ndiscusse d inreviewin gth e policy contexto f Dutch peacebuildingactivities .

17Fo ra descriptiono fth ePeac eFund , see:3. 1 ofPar tA .

36 QUANTITATIVE OVERVIEW

This chapter provides statistical information on 213 peacebuilding projects in nine selected countries, brought together in 10tables 18. Firstly, the total Dutch project portfolio inthos e countries is presented, together with the relative share of peacebuilding projects in project numbers and budgets (Tables 1-4). Second, the distribution of these projects over various peacebuilding categories is given,agai n in terms of numbers and budgets (Tables 5-10). In addition to presenting these data, the authors have added observations and raised questions of interest to policy makers.

2.1 The Total Dutch Project Portfolio and Peacebuilding Projects

Table 1show s that the Netherlands implemented a total of 1844 projects in the selected countries during the study period 1997-2001. The number of activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Mozambique is relatively high (>300), followed by Rwanda, Sri Lanka and Sudan (between 150 and 300) and Afghanistan, Cambodia, Guatemala and Kenya (<150).

Of the total portfolio, 213 projects or almost 12%wer e classified as peacebuilding projects according to the PRIO-defined criteria used for the survey. Bosnia- Herzegovina had the highest number (43),followe d by Rwanda (36). Mozambique, Cambodia, Sudan and Kenya each had between 20 and 30 projects, while Guatemala, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka had 15, 11 and six respectively. Looking at the percentage of peacebuilding projects within the country portfolio, Cambodia had the highest figure (33%),followe d by Rwanda (21%). Kenya and Guatemala had a percentage of around 15, while all other countries circled around ten percent, except for Sri Lanka that had a low two percent.

Table 1 Total Dutch Project Portfolio and Number and Percentage of Peacebuilding Projects per Country for the Period 1997-2001

Total projects Number of Peacebuilding Peacebuilding projects as % of projects total Afghanistan 116 11 (22)na 9 Cambodia 84 28 (39) 33 Sri Lanka 300 6 (6) 2 Guatemala 97 15 (28) 15 Bosnia-Herzegovina 423 43 (85) 10 Kenya 132 23 (35) 17 Rwanda 171 36 (47) 21 Sudan 211 22 (23) 10 Mozambique 310 29 (36) 9 Total 1844 213(321) 12

18A spercentag efigure s inth etable sar erounde dof fth etota lpercentag e mayb edifferen t from 100. 19Number s indicatedbetwee nbracket s aretota lfinancia ldecisions .

37 Table 1 further showstha tfinancia l decisionswit hregar dt othes e21 3peacebuildin g projectstotalle d 321, indicating anaverag eo ftw ofo r everysecon d peacebuilding project.

Thetota l budgetfo r allproject s andfo r peacebuilding projects percountry , isshow n inTabl e2 .

Table2 Budget ofTota l Portfolio andPeacebuildin g Projects perCountr yfo r the Period 1997-2001

Total budget of all Total budget of Peacebuilding projects (n=1844) peacebuilding budget as %o f projects (n=213) total budget Afghanistan 83,027,471 33,393,001 40 Cambodia 28,408,989 19,330,307 68 Sri Lanka 165,529,000 4,374,028 3 Guatemala 75,078,147 20,484,744 27 Bosnia-Herzegovina 302,042,047 110,222,685 36 Kenya 59,100,310 9,073,749 15 Rwanda 104,700.496 18,033,269 17 Sudan 77,682,306 4,763,361 6 Mozambique 257,201,621 15,539,781 6 Total 1,152,770,387 235,214,925 20.4 %

Thetota lbudge t involvedfo rth ewhol eportfoli o inth eselecte dcountrie swa s€ 1,152,770,387.Tota lcountr y budgets rangedfro mabou t€ 2 8t o 302millio nan d roughlyfollo wth edistributio n inprojec t numbers,thoug hth e mutualdifference s are slightlyles s prominent. Bosnia,Mozambiqu e andSr iLank awer eth elarges t receivers,followe da ta distanc e byRwand aan dAfghanistan . Lookinga tth e percentageo fth e budget usedfo r peacebuilding projects,Cambodi a hadth ehighes t figure (68%),followe d byAfghanista n (40%),Bosnia-Herzegovin a (36%)an d Guatemala (27%).Keny aan dRwand aeac hha dabou t 15%, while Mozambiquean d Sudanha donl ysi x percenteach . InSr iLanka ,th ethir d largest receiver, peacebuilding projectsaccounte donl yfo rthre epercent' " .20

All peacebuilding projects inth eselecte dcountrie stogethe r represent 20.4 %o fth e totalbudget .Thi s ismor etha n might havebee nexpecte do nth ebasi so ftota l projectswhic hamounte dt oonl y 12%o fth etota l portfolio.Thi s indicatestha tth e average peacebuilding project must belarge r inbudgetar yterm stha nth eaverage , 'normal' project.Tabl e3 show sth eaverag e budgetsiz efo r bothnorma lan d peacebuilding projects percountry .Th eaverag e budgetfo r aprojec tfro mth etota l portfolio ranges between€ 0. 3 and0. 8 millionpe rcountry ,whil etha to fa peacebuilding projectvarie s between€ 0. 2 and3. 0 millionpe rcountry . Foral l countriestogether ,th eaverag e portfolio project hasa budge to f€ 0. 6 million,whil e anaverag e peacebuilding project cancoun to n€ 1.1million .

Iti sstrikin gtha t allAfrica ncountrie s exept Kenya havepeacebuildin g budgetstha t aresmalle rtha nth eaverag e portfoliothi s incontras tt ocountrie s elsewhere inth e world. Iti sdifficul t toexplai nwh ythi sshoul d beth ecase . Itcertainl ycanno tb e

20 Thereaso n forthi slo wfigur eha s been explainedi n section1.5 .

38 explained byth e fact that peacebuilding assistance is not urgently needed inAfrica . Has a type of donor fatigue set inwit h regard to Africa? Or is it a smiliar tendency as shown in humanitarian aid,wher e the Western public tends to spend more on problems closer to home and on people they feel they can identify with? Or is it simply a question of absorption capacity?

Table 3 Average Budget of Portfolio and Peacebuilding Projects per Country for the Period 1997-2001

Average budget (in m€) of Average budget (in m€) of portfolio projects (n=1844) peacebuilding projects (n=213) Afghanistan 0.7 3.0 Cambodia 0.3 0.7 Sri Lanka 0.6 0.7 Guatemala 0.8 1.4 Bosnia-Herzegovina 0.7 2.6 Kenya 0.4 0.4 Rwanda 0.6 0.5 Sudan 0.4 0.2 Mozambique 0.8 0.5 Average 0.6 1.1

Apart from the average size of the budget, the size of individual financial project allocations was ascertained.Tabl e 4 provides the distribution of projects in the universe byth e financial size of allocation. It shows that 45%o f project allocations were less than € 100,000,whil e the largest category of over € 1millio n covered about one seventh of the total. The two categories in between together represent almost two-fifths of the sample.

Table 4 Projects by Size of Financial Allocation

Financial allocation No. of projects (n=213) Percentage of projects <€ 100,000 95 45 € 100-500,000 60 28 € 500-1,000,000 24 11 >€ 1,000,000 34 16

2.2 The Distribution of Peacebuilding Projects over Different Peacebuilding Categories

Table 5 indicates the distribution of the 213 projects over the four main peacebuilding categories, as identified inth e format for the Utstein study. There was a preponderance of political activities21 (111), followed at a distance by security-related (40) and reconciliation (25) activities. Socio-economic activities with an explicit peacebuilding focus were relatively insignificant.

21Th ewor dpolitica li suse dher ea sshorthan dan dimplie sal ltype so fgovernanc eissues , humanright san dth erul eo flaw .

39 Table 5 Distribution of Projects over Peacebuilding Categories

Peacebuilding category No. of projects (N=213) % of total Security 40 18 Socio-economic 13 6 Political 111 52 Reconciliation 25 12 Others 24 11

Table 6 shows the distribution per country, and demonstrates that political activities were the most important overall. In almost all countries, political peacebuilding activities approximated 50%,reachin g even 61% and 60% in Cambodia and Guatemala respectively.

Table 6 Projects per Main Peacebuilding Category and Recipient Country in Absolute Numbers and Percentages (between brackets)

Security Socio- Political Reconciliation Other Economic Afghanistan (n=11) 2(18) 3(27) 5(45) 1(9) 0 Cambodia (n=28) 7(25) 2(7) 17(61) 2(7) 0 Sri Lanka (n=6) 1(17) 1(17) 3(50) 1(17) 0 Guatemala (n=15) 0 1(7) 9(60) 5(33) 0 Bosnia-Herzegovina 5(12) 6(14) 20 (47) 6(14) 6(14) (n=43) Kenya(n=23) 0 0 13(57) 1(4) 9(40) Rwanda (n=36) 8(22) 0 17(47) 6(17) 5(14) Sudan (n=22) 4(18) 0 11 (50) 3(14) 4(18) Mozambique (n=29) 13(45) 0 16(55) 0 0 Total(n=213) 40(19) 13(6) 111 (52) 25(12) 24(11)

Security activities were most important in Mozambique with 45% of its Dutch-funded peacebuilding projects intha t category. In Guatemala and Kenya this category was lacking, while in Bosnia-Herzegovina it 'scored' a low 12%. In all other countries the share of security represented one-fifth to one-quarter of the total. Reconciliation activities constituted one third of all activities in Guatemala and played a modest to insignificant role in other countries. The category of socio-economic peacebuilding did not appear at all inAfrica n countries and played only a modest role in other countries, except inAfghanistan ,wher e it represented over a quarter of all Dutch peacebuilding activities.

These findings are to some degree surprising,a s they seem to contradict the traditional emphasis on socio-economic issues expected in Dutch development co operation. On the other hand,the y are in line with some major trends in Dutch conflict-related policies and may very well be indicative of an institutional trend towards de-compartmentalisation as well as of improved co-ordination, coherence and integration of different fields within the ministry (see Part A of this working document). It may be recalled that the new directorate for human rights and peacebuilding (DMV) was created in order to achieve this purpose . In a recent debate on integrated foreign policy itwa s suggested that the field of 'conflict and

22 Fora descriptio no fthes einstitutiona ldevelopments :se e3. 1 ofPar tA .

40 peace'wa sperhap son eo fth efe wforeig n policyarea swit ha successfu l integration of policies.T oascertai nwhethe r this isth ecase ,however ,woul d requirefurthe r analysis,a sth evie wdoe s notsee mt o begenerall yshared .

Therear egoo dreason st oconside r thepolic y implications for Dutchpolic yo fthi s distributiono f peacebuilding efforts overth evariou s categories. Itsuggest stha ta further concentration of effortwoul db elogical ,i f not necessarythroug hassessment , analytical andevaluativ ework , learning lessonsfro mth epast ,developin gtool san d deriving bestpractice s inthi sfield . Itma yals o implyth elogica lconclusio ntha t relatively 'empty'categorie scoul db emor efull y posteriorisedt oobtai n efficiency effects or 'economieso fexpertise' . Ineffect ,thi swoul dentai la furthe r specialisation orlimitatio nt oth esecurit ysecto r andt o politicalwor k andperhap st oreconciliation .

Table7 give sa financia ltranslatio no fth e items inTabl e6 . Itshow stha t securityan d politicalactivitie sar eth e largestcategorie s inmos tcountries .Als oi ncategor y'other ' showsa heav yconcentratio n offundin g resulting almostexclusivel y from allocations madefo r Bosnia-Herzegovina, i.e.a hug econtributio nt oa n IMFan dWB-manage d Reconstruction andRehabilitatio nFund .

Table7 FinancialCommitmen t perCategor y perCountr y

Security Socio Political Reconciliation Other economic Afghanistan 12,632,644 8,689,891 11,998,042 72,423 0 Cambodia 9,794,846 4,834,808 4,284,446 416,208 0 Sri Lanka 214,773 251,850 679,385 3,228,020 0 Guatemala 0 4,217,665 12,147,875 4,119,203 0 Bosnia- 8,174,590 3,961,703 7,430,578 3,508,975 87,146,839 Herzegovina Kenya 0 0 3,363,883 5,074,436 635,430 Rwanda 6,218,994 0 9,701,271 536,047 1,576,956 Sudan 497,689 0 3,351,650 34,349 879,672 Mozambique 10,844,476 0 4,695,305 0 0 Total 48,378,012 21,955,917 57,652,435 16,989,661 90,238,897

Althoughther ear efo r moreo f political projects,th esecurit y budget (€48. 4 million)i s highi ncompariso nwit htha tfo r political projects (€57. 7 million). Infou r countries,i n fact iti slarge rtha ntha to f anyothe r category.Th efinancia l outlayfo rth efe wsocio economic peacebuilding activities isals oconsiderabl e invie wo fthei r small number. Spendingo npolitica lan dreconciliatio nactivitie sseem st ob eless ,comparativel y speaking.

This isconfirme dwhe nth eaverag e budgetfo r different peacebuilding categoriesi s calculated (seeTabl e8) .Thi sshow sthat ,apar tfro mth ecategor y 'others'th e average security andsocio-economi c projectswer efa r greatertha nth eaverage - sizedpeacebuildin g projecto f€ 1.1 million.Politica lan dreconciliatio n projectstraile d behindwit ha naverag e budgeto fabou t€ 500,000 .B ywa yo fexplanation ,i t ismor e difficult tospen dlarg eamount s inthi styp eo fwork ,whil ether e mayals ob ea certai n reluctancet o invest in'softer 'domain so f peacebuilding,wher e it ismor edifficul t to achievean dsho wtangibl eresults .

41 Table8 Average Budgeto f Projects per Different Peacebuilding Category

Peacebuilding category Average budget ( in m€) Security (n=40) 1.2 Socio-economic (n=130 1.7 Political (n=111) 0.5 Reconciliation (n=25) 0.6 Other(n=24) 3.8 Average (n=213) 1.1

Table9 give sa breakdow no ftota l peacebuilding projects per peacebuilding subcategory, asdistinguishe d byPRI Ofo rth esurvey .

Table9 Numberan dPercentag eo f Peacebuilding Projects per Peacebuilding Subcategory

Name and Code No of Projects (n=213) Percentage of Projects 1.1 Hum. Mine-Action 23 11 1.2DD R 1 - 1.3DD R Children 2 1 1.4SS R 9 4 1.5SS R Small Arms 5 2 2.1 Reconstruction 3 1 2.2 Infrastructure 2 1 2.3 Health & Education 1 - 2.4 Repatriation & Return 7 3 3.1 Démocratisation 46 22 3.2 Good Governance 26 12 3.3. Institution Building 19 9 3.4 Human Rights 20 9 4.1 Dialogue/Leadership 3 1 4.2 Dialogue/Grassroots 1 - 4.3 Bridge building 15 7 4.4.Trut h & Reconciliation 6 3 Others 24 11

Apartfro mth esubcategor y 'others',onl ysi xo fth e remaining 17subcategorie s score above5% ,i.e . humanitarian mine-action,al lsubcategorie s inth e politicalfiel d (démocratisation,goo dgovernance ,institutio n buildingan dhuma n rights)an d societalbridgebuilding . Mostproject s arefoun dwithi nth e subcategory 'démocratisation',followe d bygoo dgovernanc ean dmine-action .Thi sma ysuggest , at leastfro ma Dutc hperspective ,tha tth esub-categorie s ofgoo dgovernanc ean d démocratisationma yb efurthe r subdivided,whil ecategorie s 1.2 and 1.3, and4. 1an d 4.2 might becombined .Thi sals oapplie st o2. 1an d2.2 .

Table 10show sa breakdow no fth etota lbudge tove rth evariou s subcategories as suggested byPRI Oforma tfo rth e Utsteinstudy . Humanitarian mine-action programmes werecarrie dou t insi xcountrie s representing avalu eo fove r€ 2 7 million.Demobilisation , Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR)programme swer e onlyfunde di nRwanda ,wit hth eexeptio no fon esmal l initiative inSuda nfocuse do n childsoldiers .A sa consequence , DDRseem st ob ea fairl y insignificant typeo f peacebuilding activityfo rth e Dutch,representin g onlyabou t€ 2 million .

42 Table 10 FinancialCommitmen t perSubcategor y perCountr y

Security Socio Political Reconciliation Other economic Afghanistan 1.1 12,632,644 2.1 635,292 3.1 2,268,901 4.3 72,423 2.4 8,054,599 3.3 9,632,940 3.4 96,201 Cambodia 1.1 6,313,586 2.2 4,834,808 3.1 735,903 4.3 4,538 1.4 3,094,860 3.2 1,850,555 4.4 411,670 1.5 386,400 3.3 1,511,707 3.4 186,281 Sri Lanka 1.1 214,773 2.1 251,850 3.1 26,936 4.3 3,228,020 3.3 552,953 3.4 96,496 Guatemala 2.3 4,217,665 3.1 6,276,714 4.3 705,805 3.2 5,779,405 4.4 3,413,398 3.4 91,756 Bosnia- 1.1 3,673,607 2.3 3,207 3.1 6,101,004 4.3 3,508,975 87.146.839 Herzegovina 1.4 4,500,983 2.4 3,958,496 3.2 854,610 3.3 200,412 3.4 274,553 Kenya 3.1 1,528,753 4.3 5,074,436 635.430 3.2 1,473,724 3.3 231,471 3.4 129,936 Rwanda 1.2 1,828,143 3.1 1,324,539 4.2 33,625 1.576.956 1.4 4,329,545 3.2 7,777,866 4.3 154,687 1.5 61,305 3.3 598,866 4.4 347,735 Sudan 1.1 5,026 3.1 2,939,807 4.3 34,349 879.672 1.3 212,383 3.2 99,171 1.5 280,280 3.3 3,721 3.4 308,951 Mozambique 1.1 4,162,649 3.1 4,381,976 1.4 6,681,827 3.2 80,381 3.4 232,948

Security Sector Reform programmes,i ncontrast ,wer ecarrie dou t infou r countries, representing about€ 19million .Th e Dutchma yconside r concentrating fullyo n issues,leavin g involvement inth e DDR-sector toothe rdonors .Ther ewer eonl ytw o minorproject s insmal larms ,suggestin gtha t Dutchpolic ystatement s onsmal larm s haveno tbee naccompanie d byseriou sactivit yo nth eground .Th esam eapplie s prima facie toth ethem eo fchil dsoldiers .

Inalmos t halfselecte dcountrie s nosocio-economi c peacebuilding activitiestoo k place.Thi smake s itdifficul t todescrib e any patterns. Itma yb ewondere dwh ysuc h activitiesshoul d becontinue dwhe nther ear es ofew ,althoug hthei rfinancia lsiz e tendst ob eabov eaverage .Ar esocio-economi c peacebuilding activitiesalread y sufficiently covered byothe r partso fth eDutc hdevelopmen t budget? Dosuc h projects perhaps notfi t institutionally underth epeacebuildin g banner? Dothe yhav e little policy priorityo rdoe sth e Dutchgovernmen t lackth enecessar yexpertis et o identifyo rdesig nthem ?O rar esuc hproject s askedfro mothe r donorsan di sth e Dutchcorporat esecto r notpursuin gthe mvigorousl y enough,a sma yb eth ecas efo r otherdonors ? Dependent onth eanswer st othes equestions ,i tcoul db econsidere d whetherthi scategor yo factivit yshoul db eabandone daltogethe r inth esearc hfo r moreefficienc y andspecialisation .

Inth e politicalcategory ,al l recipientcountrie swer eoffere dactivitie sfocuse do n démocratisation. Humanright sprogramme s werepursue d ineigh t countries.Seve n

43 hadactivitie s inth efiel do fgoo dgovernanc e aswel la sinstitutio n building.Th e implacationi stha tthes esubcategorie s hadalmos t complete coverage inth e countries understudy ,despit eobviou svariation s infinancia l project size. Inan do f itselfthi scall sfo r anadequat e analyticalan dconceptua l approachtha twil lrecognis e themultifacete dlinkage s betweenconflic tan dpeac e issueso nth eon ehand , and democracy, humanright san dgovernanc eo nth eother . Issueso f coherenceamon g thesepolitica laspects ,an dwit h regardt oothe r subcategories likeSSR ,ar eo fth e essence.Th epolic y analysis hasshow ntha tther ear estil lpossibl earea sfo r improvement here .

Thereconciliatio nsub-categorie s havebee nonl ypartiall y covered.Despit ebein g givenconsiderabl e policyattention ,th e promotiono fdialogu ea tth e leadership level iscompletel y lacking,whil edialogu e atth egrassroot soccure donl y inRwand ao na negligible budget. Bridgebuilding atsociet y levelthroug hdivers e programmesha s beencarrie dou t ineigh to fth e ninecountrie swit hvaryin gfinancia l amounts,rangin g fromsmal lt o relatively large.Trut han dreconciliatio nactivitie s havebee nsupporte d inCambodia ,Guatemal a andRwanda .

23 Ibid. Part A. Chapter 5.

44 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS ON THE BASIS OF THE PROFILES

For each of the 67 projects inth e purposive sample a profile has been extracted from the project files covering 14variable s predetermined by the PRIO. The results with regard to these variables are given below together with some observations, are added, if and when relevant. In a number of instances, however, the same subject has already been dealt with in Chapter 2 inwhic h quantitative data were presented for the whole universe of peacebuilding projects. Insuc h cases a separate discussion for a more limited sub-sample of the universe would be superfluous and reference will only be made to the relevant sections or tables of Chapter 2.

3.1 Project Name and Location

This part of the profile comprises basic information with which to retrieve and identify the project. In addition to name and location,th e profile gives the project's code (and file number) and the (Dutch) so called KBE number. Project names normally provide an initial clue as to its contents, frequently, however the names are quite general and, conceal the precise nature of activities. Names such as 'National Capacity Development for Sustainable Return' (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia), 'Co operative Strategy for Peace in Eastern Equatoria Africa (South Sudan), 'Peace and Rehabilitation Project' (Kenya) or 'Northern Uganda Peace Initiative' disclose little information on their contents and nature. Others are more specific, for example, 'Radio Voice of Hope', 'Seminar Constitutional Perspectives for Sudan', 'Programme suivi des détentions dans les cachots communaux' (Rwanda).

The locations mentioned referred to the places where projects were implemented. Sometimes there was no information in this respects or itwa s 'unspecified'. In many cases the documents merely mentioned the country (The State of Bosnia- Herzegovina, Kenya) or sometimes the capital (Nairobi, Kabul). This frequently occured when the recipient organisation worked on the national level,e.g . government ministries or national NGO umbrella organisations. Quite frequently, the location was described as 'nation-wide', 'the national territory of Rwanda', 'Government-controlled part of Sri Lanka', 'Sri Lanka as awhole' , or simply as 'national'. At first sight this suggests that project implementation was nation-wide, although closer scrutiny would be needed to confirm this. A second large group of cases specified the location atth e regional level (North and Eastern of Sri Lanka, Nuba Mountains, North and South Sudan). A last group of project documents mentioned locations in greater detail: 'Kracheh Province, Snuol District, Snuol Commune, Sim Commune, Svai Chreas Commune, Sre Char Commune and Pir Thnou Commune', 'Jaffna' or 'Kwanza, Kapenguria and South Mugirango'.

The profiles indicate that almost 17% of Dutch funded-projects had a nation-wide nature, indicating that the projects were implemented throughout the country. Another 40% were of national significance and usually implemented in the capital. They aimed, for instance, at institutional strengthening or capacity building of organisations operating inth e country as a whole or for the population at large, e.g. human rights organisations or police forces. Activities in the field of legislation and governance were frequently concerned.A third category, amounting to 23%,include d projects in certain regions of the country in question, local-level projects comprised only 8% of the total. A surprising category covering 10% of the total was formed by projects that

45 could be called 'international'. These were implemented (partially or completely) outside the target country, as shown in Box 2.

Box 2 International Projects

Projectsdealin gwit hth eretur no fAfgha nrefugee soperate dfro m Pakistan,Iran , Turkmenistan andTadjikista nrespectively . RadioVoic eo fHop ecoverin g South Sudan, operatedfro m Uganda;th e InternationalCommissio no nth e Inquiryt oInvestigat eArm s Deliveriesworke di nEurope ,th eGrea tLake sAre aan dth e Horno fAfrica .Som eproject s focusingo nSout hSuda neffectivel y operatedfro mNairobi ,whil eth eSuda nUgand aPeac e Initiativewa slocate di nSout hSudan ,Norther nUganda ,Khartou m andNairobi .Th esemina r on'Constitutiona l Perspectives forSudan ' washel di nth eU Kan dth eAsghaba dForu mo n Afghanistan inTurkmenistan .

Project names and locations might have been taken from the documents were submitted to the Dutch government or to the Embassies for funding. Not inal l cases, however, can they be considered sufficiently informative or detailed to allow conclusions about the nature or precise location of the activity. This has to be kept in mind when trying to categorise projects only on the basis of name or location. Further verification of data is usually needed,a s has been done inthi s study.

3.2 The Peacebuilding Category

The distribution of the 213 peacebuilding projects over the sub-categories of peacebuilding was dealt with in section 2.2 (Tables 5-10). The findings, conclusions and observations with regard to the universe invariably apply to any sub-sample thereof, and nofurthe r discussion is needed here.

3.3 Project Phasing and Duration

As selection criterion,th e start of the project or (for the Dutch study) the date on which the financial allocation was made, had to fall inth e 5-year period 1997-2001. The profiles show that the activities varied intw o aspects. Many projects comprised, several subsequent phases (varying from 2 to 9) to which different allocations was made. Another and related aspect is the duration of the project itself this varied from two months to the whole five years period.Th e profiles included examples of assistance given to organisations or programmes over more than ten years, e.g. support to the Peace and Rehabilitation Project (PRP) in Kenya and to the Centre for the Study of Human Rights (CSHR) of Colombo University in Sri Lanka (see Box 3).

46 Box 3 Centre for the Study of Human Rights at Colombo University, Sri Lanka

CSHRwa sestablishe d in 1991a spar to fColomb o Universityalthoug hi tenjoy sa considerabl e degreeo fautonomy . Itsorigina lai mwa st opromot ehuma nright seducatio nan dt oestablis ha researchprogramm e inthi sfield .CSH Rwante dt obecom eth eleadin ghuma nright sstud y centrei nSr iLanka .I nth econtex to fth eSr iLanka nconflict ,emphasi sgraduall yshifte dt o outreachprogramme s intendedt oincreas eth eawarenes san dknowledg eo fnationa lan d international ruleso nth eprotectio no f humanrights .Th eCentr eals ohope dt ohel pincreas e thelega lsecurit yo fSr iLanka ncitizens ,t odecreas e impunityan dt oinfluenc e humanright s policymakin gi nth ecountry .CSH Rha seducate da variet yo ftarge tgroup sfro mschool st o communitycentres ,an dfro mlawyer st omember so fth earme dforces .A nevaluatio nrepor t statestha tit sdisseminatio n policyha sbee nexcellent ;throug hlibraries ,radi oprogrammes ,a humanright shotline ,manuals ,educationa lmateria lan dworkshops .Th efirs t Dutchsuppor tt o theCentr ewa sa five-yea r core-fundinggran to f€ 96,49 6i n1992 ;fo r asecon dphas eu pt o mid-2002€ 378,00 8wer emad eavailable .A tth etim eo fthi sstud yth eDutc hembass ywa s consideringa thir dcontributio n invie wo fth egoo dresult sattaine db yCSH Rprogramme san d ina nattemp tt oconcentrat e itshuma nright seffort s inSr iLank acountr yo nsom emajo r initiatives.Durin gth eten-yea rperio dth eDutc hcommissione dthre eevaluatio nstudies , on whichfurthe rfundin gdecision swer ebase dan dwhic hals ole dt oadjustment s inCSHR' s programmesan dorganisation .Th eNetherland swa sth eonl ydono rt oprovid ecore-fundin gt o CSHR.Projec tfunding ,however ,however ,bee nreceive dfro mth eAustralia ngovernment , CIDA,th e EuropeanRight s Foundation,SID Aan dUNICEF .

Many programmes have received follow-up contributions after an initial Dutch grant. The Mine-Action Programme (MAP) inAfghanistan , for instance, received seven Dutch contributions totalling almost € 11 million between 1997 and 2002,whil e the five allocations to the Sudanese Women for Peace project covered a period of seven years from 1997 until 2003. Many of the long-lasting initiatives were broad multi- donor programmes carried out by multilateral (UN) agencies, INGOs or (large) NGOs. In Rwanda, for example, UNDP was involved inth e Rwandan Communal Police Force Project, while both UNDP and World Bank co-operated in implementing of Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (RDRP). In such cases, funding was often channelled via Trust Funds. In Sudan, the Dutch INGO Pax Christi implemented two projects. The Legal Aid to Cambodia is an example of a five-year Dutch and multi-donor support relationship with a local NGO (see Box 4).

Box4 Corefundinq Legal Aid to Cambodia

LegalAi dt oCambodi a (LAC)provide sfre elega lassistanc et oth epoor .LA Cha soffice si n nineprovinces ,fro mwhic hmos to fth eothe rtwelv eprovince s areals ocovered . LACaim st o promoteth erul eo fla wan da democrati c andlegitimat esociet yi nCambodia ,especiall y throughrestoratio nan dimprovemen t ofth ejudicia lsyste man drespec tfo rth eConstitutio n andinternationa llaw .I tpromote spubli c understanding byprovidin gtraining .Mor especifically , LAChope st obrin ga huma nright sorientatio nt ocrimina lan dlan dlaw ,whil ei tfurthe rha s singledou tjuvenil ean dwomen' s rightsa spriorities .Respec tfo rth erul eo fla wi sessenctia li n ordert ostabilis eCambodia' s post-conflict societyan dma ythu scontribut et olong-ter m peacebuilding.Th eDutc hhav econtribute dfiv egrant ssinc e 1999,totallin g€ 532,242 .Othe r donorsinclud eth eAsi aFoundation ,Lawyer sfo r Lawyers,NOVIB ,Oxfam ,Sav eth eChildre n Norway,Re dBarna ,SIDA ,an dUNOHCHR .I nnarrativ eannua lreport s LACelaborate so nth e rangeo factivitie s undertakenan dtask s accomplished,bu tn oindependen t evaluationha s beenundertake nt oestablis h its impacto rit scontributio nt opeacebuilding .

Projects of a short duration are mostly one-off events, like the organisation of seminars, international meetings, fora, missions, visits, investigations or support to election monitoring.A n example of such a short-term project was the support given to

47 the Asghabad Forum.Th e allocation covered the period 20 January - 20 March 1997 (see Box 5).

Box 5 The Asghabad Forum

The International Forumo nAssistanc et oAfghanistan ,targetin gth e internationalcommunit y andU Npolitica lan dspecialise dagencies ,wa shel di nAsghabad ,Turkmenistan .I twa sa n attemptt odefin estrategie sfo r providing humanitarianassistanc et oAfghanista n underth e prevailingpolitical ,social ,economic ,militar yan dhuma nright scondition s (Taliban). Itals o aimeda tachievin ga bette rco-ordinate deffor t interm so feffectivenes s andefficiency ,a swel l aswit hregar dt oth epromotio no finternationa lstandards .Ther ewa sa desir et og obeyon d thedeliver yo fmer ehumanitaria nai dan dt oinclud epreparation sfo r rehabilitationan d reconstruction under'continuousl yvolatile 'circumstances .

3.4 Total Budget24 and the Dutch Contribution

Financial allocations varied enormously. Table 4 in above gave the distribution of all 213 peacebuilding projects over four main financial categories. The profiles facilitate a closer look behind those figures by giving concrete examples of projects inth e four categories. Starting with 'smaller' projects, for instance, the Dutch government contributed € 6,807 to the Durham Seminar to create a more permanent dialogue about constitutional developments in Sudan.Anothe r smaller project was the provision of observers for the Parliamentary Elections in Sri Lanka in 2001, amounting to€ 15,457 and the 'awareness creation' on political prisoners in Kenya to which the Dutch contributed € 13,592. Other small projects included a National Disarmament Evaluation and Planning Workshop in Phnom Penh (€ 23,376) and a contribution of € 31,342 to the Ombudsman's Field Office in Gorazde, Bosnia- Herzegovina.

Major donations included € 5,445,362 to UNHCR's Refugee and Return Programme inAfghanista n and over € 9 million to establish the Afghan Interim Authority. Almost € 4.5 million was made available for the UN International Police Task Force (UNIPTF) in Bosnia and over five million for the Rwandan Communal Police Force.A s has been observed inTabl e 8, the budgets for security and socio-economic projects were greater than that for the average peacebuilding project (i.e.€ 1.1 million), while the budgets of political and reconciliation projects were on average smaller. There were also large differences between average project budgets per country (see Table 3).

3.5 Other Donors

Projects were funded solely either byth e Dutch Government or by several donor agencies together. In a number of projects it was difficult to obtain precise financial information on the role or exact contributions of other donors. It is safe to conclude, however, that the Dutch funded a project activity independently in less than 10% of the projects studied .Ninety percent of cases studied for the profiles were reportedly

24I navailabl e project informationorigina ltota lbudget san dbudge tline sar eofte nexpresse di n US$o rsometime s inrecipien tcountries 'loca lcurrencies .Althoug h Dutchcontribution sper se areno wusuall yconverte d intoEur o(eve nretrospectively) ,thi si softe n notth ecas efo rth e totalbudge to rbudge tline s linesquote di nUS $i nth eorigina lproposal .A sconversio nrate s betweenth edollar ,th e Dutchguilde ran dth eEur ohav ebee nsubjec tt ochang ethroughou tth e studyperiod ,th eorigina lamount s inUS $ar equote di fn oequivalen t amounts inEur oar e mentioned inth eprojec tdocumentation .

48 co-funded byothe r donors.Thes e included bilateralo r multilateraldonors , international or DutchNGOs ,o ran ycombinatio no fthese .Som eexample s ofco - funded projects aregive ni nTabl e 11.

Table1 1 Exampleso f Multi-donor Projects

Project Total Budget Dutch Contribution Other Donors Mine-Action US$117.8 million € 10.9 million Australia,Austria , Programme Belgium, Canada, Afghanistan Cyprus, Denmark, EC Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA, Repatriation of US$ 43 million € 1.8 million Canada, EC,Finland , Afghan Refugees France,Japan , Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA, private donors Demobilisation & US$42. 3 million € 2.6 million Cambodia, Canada, Reintegration Germany, IDA,Japan , Programme Sweden, WFP Cambodia Rwanda US$ 39 million € 1.8 million Austria, Norway, Demobilisation & Rwanda,Sweden , Reintegration Switzerland, UK, Programme UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, WFP Mine-Action Pilot US$ 5.2 million €214,773 Ausaid, British High Project Jaffna Commission,EU , UNDP, WB Radio Voice of Hope US$ 974,579 € 403,524 Cordaid, ICCO, Sudan NCRV, PSO Kenya Anti-Corruption US$ 925,000 € 354,050 Danish Embassy, Authority DFID, GTZ, Swedish Embassy Civil Society US$ 846,832 € 249,779 CAFOD, Caritas New Development Rwanda Zealand, EC, Manos Unidos, SIDA, Trocaire Human Rights US$ 353,080 € 297,998 Bilance, ChristianAid , Monitoring Northern DanChurch, Dutch Sudan Interchurch Aid, IAG

Inles stha n 10%o fco-funde d projectswa sther ea multilatera l co-funding arrangementwit h UNagencies ,W Bo r EUexclusively .Th e remainder showeda n almostdivisio no f about 30%eac hamon g bilateralco-operation ,co-operatio nwit h international and/or DutchNGOs ,an da combinatio no fthos eforms .

Inmos tcases ,no tonl yon eo rtw oothe r partnerswer e involved,bu ta whol e consortium ofothe rdonors ,frequentl y numbering 10t ofifteen .On ereaso nfo rthi s co-funding practicewas ,perhaps ,th ecusto m inhumanitaria n assistancet owor ko n the basiso fappeals ,somethin g that couldb eobserve d ina numbe ro fcase s reported uponhere .Anothe r reasonwa sobviousl yth e largeamoun to ffund s needed for someo fth eoperation sconcerne d andth esometime s long-term natureo f

49 peacebuildingwork .Th etota l budgets manyproject s inth esampl ewer eindee d considerable,a ssom eexample s inTabl e 11indicate ,an devidentl y surpassedth e financial possibilities ofa nindividua ldono ro ra particula r country.Th e multi-donor approachwa sals oofte nfollowe dfo r projectswit h relatively smallbudgets ,however , reflecting apparently apreferre d modeo foperatio n onth e basiso f moretha n financial criteriaalone .

Finally,i tcoul db etha tth e politicalnatur e andsensitivitie s involved inpeacebuildin g workcaus edonor st oop tt owor ktogethe r ratherthe ni nisolation .Together ,the y couldexer tgreate r influenceo nth e protagonists,especiall ywhe nprogramme swer e implemented ina situatio n ofongoin gconflic to r 'fragile peace'.Fo rth e Dutch, co operation (bothi nfundin gan dimplementation ) withothe r partners inpeacebuildin g wasan di sa polic ypreference . Itca nindee db econclude dfro mth e profilestha tthi s policyguidelin ewa slargel yimplemented .

Ata mor egenera l level,th equestio narise so fwha t implications amulti-dono r approach hasfo r project implementation,supervision ,co-ordination ,monitorin gan d reporting andfo r policy influencean dcoherenc eo nth e parto fth e Dutch government.Th e profiles provide noinformatio nwit hwhic ht oanswe rsuc h questions.Thi swoul drequir ea specia lstudy .

3.6 Partners inProjec t Implementation

Likewit h regardt oco-donors ,projec t or implementing partners showeda ric hvariety . The Dutchgovernmen t does not itself implement projects,bu tonl yfund s initiatives carriedou t byothers .Loca lgovernment s andnon-U N multilateraleac haccounte d for lesstha n 10%o f implementing agencies. Dutchan dinternationa l NGOsmad eu p about 15%each ,whil e local NGOswer e implementing partners inone-quarte ran d the UNi none-thir d ofcase s respectively.Approximatel y 10%showe da combinatio n of implementing partners.

Insevera lcases ,fund swer echannelle dthroug h intermediary structurestha tfunde d their ownimplementin g partners.Thi softe noccure d inth ecas eo f multilateral agenciestha tfrequentl yfunde dnationa lgovernment s orworke dwit hothe r local implementing partners. Similarly, many INGOsan d Dutchco-financin g agencies have their ownnetwor k of partnersoverseas . Inthi sway ,a chai no f implementing partners might beassembled .Fo rexample ,th e SriLanka nVoic e project,whic horganise d vulnerable groups inconflic t areas,wa s implementedvi ath e LocalCapacitie sfo r Peace Projectan dth e Institutefo r Multi-track Diplomacy. InSr iLank athes e organisations againworke dwit hOxfam ,Sav eth eChildre n UK,th eAsi a Foundation and3 0loca lCommunity-Base d Organisations (CBOs)an dNGO si nth e projectarea . UNOCHAan dth eMin eClearanc e PlanningAgenc y implementedth eAfgha nMine - Action Programme incombinatio nwit h 15NGOs .Thes e included HaloTrust , Handicap International,SCF/USA ,Afgha n RedCrescen t Societyan dth eBB C Afghan Education Dramaproject . Inth eAfgha n Strengthening CivilSociet y Project, NOVIBworke dwit hth e Islamabad-basedDEVFOUN D Consultants andeigh tAfgha n NGOs.

Thesecomplicate d implementation structures mayhav econsequence s forth e results ofth e programmes, inbot hpositiv e andnegativ eterms .A neviden tadvantag e isth e potentialt o mobilise expertise and(human ) resourcesfro m avariet yo fagencie san d thust oreduc eth e risk offailur e orshortage . Inthi sway ,project s mayals ohav ea

50 greater coverage and scope and may more easily attain a multiplier effect. On the other hand,ther e is a larger risk of working in an unco-ordinated and disjointed manner. The involvement of so many partners may easily lead to miscommunication and misunderstanding, if not contention or conflict about mutual roles and responsibilities and available scarce resources. The project documents and profiles drawn upfo r this study showed few indications of how multi-level and multi-actor funding and implementation structures had affected the results of peacebuilding programmes. This was due to the fact that, inth e majority of projects, no in-depth evaluations were undertaken.

3.7 Summary of Aim and Objectives

Project aims and objectives can initially be approached by examining at the (sub categories of peacebuilding inwhic h the projects have been placed (see Tables 5- 10). To understand the aims and objectives of projects in greater detail beyond this first categorisation, it is necessary to consult the profiles which provide some additional insight. Box 6 illustrates how general project aims were sometimes formulated: some were phrased as a result or outcome,whil e others reflected an activity or output.

Box 6 General Project Aims

Durablepeac ethroug ha health ycivi lsociet y(Bosnia ) Toinvestigat ean ddocumen tallege dviolation so fhuma nright san dwa rcrime s (Afghanistan) Toachiev ea durabl esolutio nfo rAfgha nrefugee sthroug hvoluntar y repatriation Short-term supportfo rth eAfgha n InterimAuthorit y Establishmento fa modern ,democrati c policeforc eoperatin gwit hrespec tfo r universally acceptedhuma nright san dcrimina ljustic estandard s (Bosnia) Tocontribut et oa well-administere delection ,includin gth etransfe ro fskill s(Cambodia ) Toset-u pa fun dfo rlega lassistanc et ovictim so ftortur e(Kenya ) Tocollec t informationan dt oinvestigat e reportso nth esale ,suppl yan dshipmen to farm s ando nabettin gth eillega lflo wo farm s(Rwanda ) Tostrengthe nth erol ean dinfluenc eo fwome ni nRwanda nsociet y Topromot e humanright seducatio nan dresearc h(Sr iLanka ) Toachiev epeac ei nNorther nUgand aan dt oen dth eactivitie so fth eLord' s Resistance Army(Sudan )

In addition, many projects specified more detailed qualitative or, more rarely, quantitative objectives and targets. Many formulations were very specific, taking into account the local context and the project's history and circumstances. There were salient differences, however: some projects remained very general and non-specific, while others tried to be as specific as possible, identifying steps, phases, measures and activities. Some closely approached the level of operational planning. Box 7 gives the detailed objectives of the Mine-Action Programme in Afghanistan.

51 Box 7 Aim and Objectives of the Mine-Action Programme in Afghanistan

Aim: • Tomak earea ssaf efo r productive usethroug hth eapplicatio no fsaf ean defficien t clearancean ddestructio ntechnologie s toremov eth ethrea to fmine san dothe rexplosiv e devices.

QuantitativeAnnual Objectivesin terms of: Surfacesurveye d Minefieldan dbattlefiel dsurface scleare d Numbero fpeopl ereache dthroug hmine-awarenes s programmes Numbero fminefiel dsurve yteam san dmin edo gset sdeploye d Numbero ftrainin gcourse s offered Numbero fmonitorin gan dsupervisor ymission s effected Increasedsafety/reduce d numbero faccident s ofmin epersonne l

Qualitative objectives interms of: Improvedcivilia n mineacciden tdat acollectio nwit hICR Can dWH O Expandedacces sfo rwome nt oawarenes strainin g Development ofconcept sfo r clearanceo flo wpriorit ymine darea s Reviewo ftrainin gmanuals ,standar doperatin g proceduresan dmine-awarenes s messages Todevelo pan dtes tne wequipmen tt oincreas eproduction ,reduc ecost san dimprov e safety Tointegrat ean dimprov emin evicti m assistance,t oencourag eagencie st oemplo y disabledpeopl ei nmin eclearanc ean dunexplode dordnanc e(UXO ) Toexpan dadvocac yt oconflictin g partiest oeliminat eus eo f minesan ddispos eo f stockpiles Tointegrat e newmine-actio ngroup san dupgrad ecommunity-base d mineclearanc e teams Toincreas e levelo fsustainabilit yan dindigenisatio n Toimprov edat aan dknowledg eo nsocio-economi c impacto fmine san dUX O

From an evaluation perspective, the more detailed type of projects seem to be more conducive to external assessment and accountability, although it remains difficult to judge at first sight whether the formulated goals and approaches are realistic and properly designed.

A more general concern is whether or to what degree proposals of Dutch ex ante appraisals are based on an appropriate conflict analysis. To intervene successfully in a conflict or post-conflict situation or to contribute to peacebuilding, a detailed understanding of the conflict history and trends is indispensable. There was little in the documents to suggest that such conflict analyses had been made or consulted during project formulation or appraisal. This corroborates earlier analyses indicating that the use of conflict analysis in Dutch policy practice is limited,althoug h recently some exploratory attempts have been made to use conflict and policy analysis for some African countries. This raises the question of whether or to what degree 'political' peacebuilding projects, for example, differ from their counterparts under the 'normal' human rights or good governance programmes of the Dutch government.

52 3.8 Strategie Perspective

Most of the projects that formed part of the profiling exercise were put into strategic perspective in order to provide a rationale for their use and potential benefits. The nature, scope and depth of these strategic perspectives varied, however. Some reports, simply assumed in a few lines that the project was of strategic importance: "[It is important] to create conditions to encourage refugees and IDPs to return home." In other cases more elaborate analyses were offered to put the initiatives into a larger strategic framework or context. Box 8 gives an overview of the types of strategic perspectives encountered inth e profiles.

Box 8 Strategic Perspectives for Peacebuildinq Activities

• Referencet oInternationa l Humanitarian Lawan dHuma nRight s • Referencet oconvention s (Conventiono nth eRight so fth eChild ; theOttaw aConvention ) • Referencet oconference s (TheFourt hWorl dConferenc eo nWome n[Beijing] ) • Referencet opeac eagreement san drelate dconference s (DaytonAgreements , International [Dublin]Conferenc eo nLa wEnforcemen tfo r Bosnia-Herzegovina) • Referencet oUNS CResolution s 1013, 1053an d 1161o nth eInternationa l Commissiono n Inquiryt o InvestigateArm sDeliverie s • Therelief-rehabilitation-developmen t linkage(debate ) • Theimportanc eo ftheme s sucha shuma nrights ,gender ,démocratisatio n • Theimportanc eo finstitutio nan dcapacit ybuildin gan dloca lempowermen t ('Afghanisation') Analysiso fspecifi cloca lcondition s (Thehistorica lrol eo fth eSudanes ewomen' s movement),a conflic tanalysi so fth eRif tValle y (Kenya),th epositio no f refugeesan d returnees (SriLanka ,Sudan ,Afghanistan) ,th erol eo freligio ni nth econflic t (Statemento f SharedCommitment , Bosnia-Herzegovina) oro fth epeac eproces s (stallednegotiation si n Sudan) Thenee dt ohav eoveral lframework s foractio nan dco-ordinatio n (the3- R Framework in SriLanka ) Referencet o Dutch(DMV )policy ,Dutc hGM Vprogramme s andfundin gcriteria ,o r Embassies'(multi- )annua lprogrammin g • Referencet ostudie san dprojec t interim reports > Referencet oprojec tdocument so row nproject' s rationaleo robjective s

Box 8 shows that widely varying strategic perspectives were mentioned in the documents, based on International Humanitarian Law and conventions or on quotations from project documentation itself. In most documents the emphasis was on the local situation, put into a larger framework where possible. Only in afe w cases was the strategic value with regard to Dutch policies highlighted,frequentl y in a fairly standard way by such phrases as: "The project is relevant invie w of Dutch policies on human rights, good governance and démocratisation."

This raises the question of how these projects infac t relate to Dutch policies.A s the majority tend to originate locally or in international fora with limited ifan y Dutch involvement, the fit with Dutch policy priorities can only be established ex post facto and must consequently usually be of a general nature. It is perhaps for this reason that in only few of the profiles explicitly mentioned Dutch policies as a strategic frame of reference.

This tendency may be strengthened byth e finding from the policy review (see Part A) that peacebuilding is a relatively new area for the Dutch,wh o have so far not formulated any explicit and comprehensive policy on the topic. This lack of

53 formalisation, on the other hand, makes it possible to operate with flexibility, as shown with regard to the strategic considerations deemed acceptable for funding decisions, representing a broad variety of relevant arguments and approaches25.

An interesting example of afaile d 'strategic' approach was a forensic inquiry into alleged violations of human rights and war crimes by civilians and fighters in Bamyan, North Afghanistan. OHCHR tried to adopt an even-handed approach in this project in order to promote dialogue and co-operation with the Taliban, but was not successful (see Box 9).

Box 9 Forensic Inquiry in Bamyan, North Afghanistan

Onth ebasi so findicativ eevidenc efoun ddurin ga nearlie rexplorator ymission ,th eU N (OHCHR)wante dt oinvestigat eallege dhuma nright sviolation san dwa rcrime s byconductin g aninquir yo nmas sgrave san dsite so f massacres.Th einquir yinclude dgrave so fTaliba n fightersa swel la so fpeopl ekille db yth eTaliba ni norde rt ounderlin e UNneutralit ytoward s theTaliban . Itwa shope dtha tthi swoul dfacilitat edialogu ean dco-operation .Th eprojec ttoo k placebetwee n3 0Apri lan d3 0Septembe r 1999.Th eDutc hcontribute d€ 96,20 1t oth eoveral l budgeto f US$419,630 .Othe rdonor s includedDenmark ,Norway ,Swede nan dth e UK. The investigationprove da failure .Th eTaliba n hadcleare dearlie r identified massgraves ,an d were notprepare dt oprovid eevidenc eo rt oproduc ewitnesses .Du et othi snon-co-operation ,th e lacko f informationan dth einconclusiv e natureo favailabl eevidence ,th eimpossibilit yo f protectingwitnesse s inTaliban-controlle d areasan dsecurit yconstraints ,th emissio nha dt ob e terminatedan dwa sunabl et oreac hdefinitiv econclusions .

3.9 Cross-cutting Themes in Aims/Objectives

In about one third of the project documents no cross-cutting themes were mentioned at all.O n balance, a wide variety of themes appeared, but itwa s not clear whether these had the status of additional objectives or were topics 'also' mentioned, or whether they could really be considered a cross-cutting theme embedded in the overall perspective and operation of the project. Topics that might qualify as the latter included gender, poverty alleviation (rarely mentioned), capacity building and community development, democracy, good governance, human rights, participation (mentioned once) and reconciliation. Other themes seemed to be of an incidental nature and included food security, rule of law, youth, demobilisation, SSR, small arms, agriculture, violence, torture, transparency and accountability, child soldiers. It was striking that some overall cross-cutting concerns in Dutch development policy were not mentioned at all (e.g.th e environment) or only very rarely (poverty).

3.10 Evaluation

About one-quarter of the projects have resulted in an interim or end evaluation. In many cases these have been ordered tojustif y the extension or renewal of the project or to reformulate or improve it. Some projects were evaluated more than once. For example, the Centre for the Study of Human Rights at Colombo University was thrice evaluated. In sections 3.11t o 3.14 some more general insights and conclusions of evaluation studies will be mentioned, although it has not been possible in all cases to retrieve the evaluation reports, as these were not available in the ministry's or embassies' archives. Care should be taken not to attached a more general significance to the findings than as regards the particular case inquestion .

25Op.cit .Par tA .

54 Asth e policy background notestates ,attempt s haveno t beenmad eb yth e Dutcht o set upa mor ecomprehensiv e evaluation policy inth efiel do f peacebuilding ,no r havemeta-evaluation sbee nmad eo nth ebasi so favailabl eevidenc ean dreports .

3.11 ImpactAssessmen t

Impactassessmen t ison eo fth emos tcomplicate d areaso f evaluationa si trefer st o aproject' s contributiont owide r goals,normall yafte r aconsiderabl e periodo ftime . Most impactassessment s encounter problems inestablishin g causalityan d intervention logic,becaus e iti sdifficul t toattribut e particular resultst o particular interventions. Iti shardl ysurprisin g that inth ecomple x politicalemergencie swit h partiallyfunctionin g institutionalstructure scovere d inthi sstudy ,rea limpac t assessments haverarel y beenmade .Th ecomplicate d project implementation structures also madei tdifficul t to investigate impact. Inman ycases ,however ,som e basic informationo nperformanc e hasbee ngathered ,enablin g (partial) conclusions regardingeffectivenes s withregar dt oth e project's goalst ob edrawn .Mos tproject s included narrative reportso nth e multitudeo factivitie s performed andspecifie dsom e lessons learned.Bo x 10provide s some illustrations ofth etyp eo f narrative statements encountered inth eevaluatio nreports .

55 Box 10 Narrative Statements in Evaluation Reports

• Onth eSudanes eWomen' s Empowermentfo r Peacei twa sstate dtha twome nha d becomeinvolve di nth epeac eproces s andthei rconcern s hadbecom evisible .I twa s learnedtha tco-ordination ,lobbyin gan dgrassroot s involvement requiredmor eattention . A reporto na predecessor-projec t 'Women'sVoic efo r Peace',o nth eothe r hand,faile dt o drawan ygenera lconclusions . • TheCommunity-Base d Development Services (COBADES)i nKeny alargel yme tit s objectives andtargets . Itcreate dawarenes so nhuma nright san ddemocrati cfreedoms .I t trainedove r20 0teacher san dreache d7,00 0student s in8 0schools ,wit hla wclub sbein g establishedi nnearl yal lthes eschools . • TheKeny aHuma nRight sCommissio n(KHRC )ha dmaintaine d itsmarke tleadershi pan d wasth eprim emove r inHuma nRight sagend asetting .I tpioneere dne wfrontier san d engagedwit hth ecommunitie s aswel la sgovernmen t institutions.Publi cawarenes sha d beenraise dan dattitude s amonggovernmen t hadimproved . • Theevaluatio no fth eCentr efo rth eStud yo f HumanRight s inColomb ostate dtha t CSHR'swor kcontribute dt oth eestablishmen t ofa mor edemocrati c andpeacefu lsociety . Yetth eCentr estil lrequire dmor einteractiv e methodologies andneede dt otailo rit s coursest oth eneed so fth epolic ean dth earme dforces . • Inth eCo-operativ e Strategyfo r Peacei nEaster n Equatoriath eevaluator scoul dno t observevisibl e results,a slevel so fviolenc econtinue dt ob ehigh .Moreover ,th eprojec t sufferedfro morganisationa lproblems . • Theprojec t'Justic epou rtou sa uRwanda 'ha dbrough tlega lassistanc et oman y defendantsan dplaintiff s andha drapidl ytraine dnon-lega l magistrates,however ,th e judicialproces s hadno tattaine dwide rsocia lsignificanc e andresonanc e andha dfaile dt o makean yimpac to nrenewe dinter-ethni c dialogue.

Some of the progress or evaluation reports were very specific and showed a breakdown of target outputs, activities and success criteria, as well as a review of bottlenecks and operational problems. The Mine-action Programme inAfghanistan , for example, provided detailed accounts on specific quantitative and qualitative objectives. Between 1989an d 1999 it cleared some 545 square kilometres of minefields and destroyed more than 1.5 million mines and UXO. Itwa s estimated that thus about one million Afghans had been saved from injury or death,whil e over 85% of cleared areas were back in productive use. Employment had been created for 9,200 farmers and primary industry workers, with total agricultural output increased till around US$ 60 million.Th e reports were more critical regarding mine-awareness training components of MAP and recommended curriculum reform include behaviour- changing training,attentio n to women, and mine-incident reporting.Anothe r mine- action project in Jaffna reported on a similar level of detail presented intabula r form with explanatory text.

With regard to bottlenecks encountered and lessons learned,th e quality of the reports varied.Th e Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC), for example,wa s commended for its honest and relatively objective introspective quality, as evidenced in a self-evaluation. The Asghabad Forum was literally set upt o define better strategies and obviously produced a number of relevant insights. Box 11give s the lessons learned drawn at the Ashgabad Forum.

56 Box 11 Lessons Learned Drawn at the Asqhabad Forum

Peacean ddevelopmen t are interdependent Peaceneed st ob ebuil tthroug hpolitica l negotiationa swel la sthroug hsuppor tt oth e population Rehabilitationan ddevelopmen t arepossibl ei n'stable 'areas ,eve ni fwa rgoe so n elsewhere Peaceneed sals ot ob ebuil tfro mth ebotto mu p Afghancommunit y leaders needt ob einvolve di ncraftin gpeacebuildin gan ddevelopmen t strategies Aidshoul dno tincreas eth estruggl efo rpowe rb yfavourin ga particula r partyan dshoul d beaime da tstrengthenin gth ecapacitie s ofloca lcivi lsociet y Keyinternationa lplayer sshoul ddevelo pa strategi cframewor k andcommo nprogrammin g principles

Other project progress reports and evaluation studies presented implementation difficulties, such as the lack of government co-operation, or conflicts that hampered implementation. Wider institutional issues and problems of sustainability were also mentioned regularly. This was the case in more successful projects such as KCHR. Boxes 12an d 13giv e an overview of the main 'positive' and 'negative' lessons learned in peacebuilding projects.

Box 12 'Positive' Lessons Learned in Peacebuilding Projects

• Connectedness andth edevelopmen to f indigenouscapacit yimprove s responsecapacit y toloca lneed san ddemand s(MAP ) • Stafftrainin gan dcapacit ybuildin gar eessentia lt orais ean dsustai noutpu t (cf. ProgrammeSuppor tfo rth e Implementationo f Decentralisation andDémocratisatio n [PSIDD]i nRwanda ) • Ownershipo fth eproces sb yloca lorganisation s contributest osucces s (Strengthening CivilSociet yi nAfghanistan ) • Tob esuccessful ,peacebuildin geffort s requirelong-ter m involvement,partl ydu et oth e complexityo fth eprocesse san dt oth econtinue dfea ro fth epopulatio n(DRP ) • Partnership betweenal lstakeholder s atth edesig nan dpreparatio nstag ecreate sgoodwill , trustan dcommitmen t andeventuall ylead st oco-ordination ,collaboratio n andefficienc y (Demobilisation andReintegratio n Programme inCambodi a [DRP]) • Someinnovativ eproject s havesucceede dpartl ydu et omotivate dfiel dworker san d accompanying researcheffort s (WorkingGrou pfo rWeapon s Reductionan dWeapon sfo r Development inCambodia ) • Inter-ethnic andinter-religiou s interactionca nb epromote di nschools ,churche san d markets • Religiousgroup sca nenhanc einformatio nsharin g • Peacea sa genera lmora lvalu eshoul db etaugh t inschool s andchurche s(DRP ) • Thepresenc ean denforcemen t ofa propert yschem epromote sth eretur nan d resettlemento frefugee s (NationalCapacit yDevelopmen to nSustainabl e Returni n Bosnia-Herzegovina andCroatia ) • Independent andimpartia l monitoringadd svalu et oth eprojec t (MAP)

57 Box 13 'Negative' Lessons Learned in Peacebuilding Projects

Lacko fco-operatio nwith ,o runderstandin gof ,conflictin gpartie s leadst oprojec tfailur e (Forensic Inquiry,Bamyan ) Lacko fcommunicatio n andunderstandin g betweenke yplayer s(donors ,implementin g agenciesan dgovernment ) leadst olac ko fsynerg yan ddivergin gprocedure san d perspectives (Rwanda Demobilisationan dReintegratio n ProgrammeRDRP ) Lacko ffemal estaf f (UNHCR)o rgender-specifi c programming (MAP)make si tdifficul t to guaranteewomen' sacces st oprogramme si nAfghanista no rth erecruitmen to fmor e womeni nBosni a (UNIPTF) Institutionsstartin gunde rinternationa ltutelag eo rprotectio nfac eproblem swhe now n governments havet oassum eresponsibilit y andtak eove rth eorganisatio n(Huma nRight s Ombudsmani nBosnia-Herzegovina) .Also ,complianc eb yth estat ewit hdecision smad e isproblemati c Policiesan dinter-ethni c andinter-religiou s problemsan drelationship s atth e nationalleve l determineand/o r hamperth epossibilitie s for localleve linitiativ ean dprogres s(Multi - religiousCo-operatio n in Bosnia-Herzegovina) Ongoingcorruptio nan dba dgovernanc ea tth emacr oleve laffec t operations andlimi tth e impacto fnationa lan dloca lorganisation s (ADHOC).Likewise ,th einvolvemen to fth e RwandanGovernmen t inth eDR Cbadl yimpacte do ndono rconfidenc e andpreparednes s tofurnis hfurthe rfund s(RDRP ) Lacko ffundin gan dstaf f onth egroun d(UNHCR )ha sjeopardise do rdelaye ddurabl e absorptionan dth ereintegratio no fAfgha nreturnee s (bothrefugee s andIDPs ) Internationalpeacebuildin g projects arehigh-cost ,especiall ydu et oheav yoverhead san d TAcost s(Huma nRight s Institutions Bosnia-Herzegovina,Cambodi aAre a Rehabilitation andRegeneratio n Project (CARERE) Internationallyo rdonor-le d programmesfac eproblem so floca linvolvemen t andcapacit y building.Financia lsurviva lonc eforeig nassistanc estop s isproblemati c (CARERE) Militaryproject sca nb estrengthene d bya stronge rfocu so n'soft 'component ssuc ha s awareness,gende ran dcommunicatio n (MAP,DRP ) Thegende rcomponen t remains underexposed inman yproject s (e.g.PRP) ; therei sa generalnee dfo rconceptualisin g 'women& conflict 'an d'wome n& peace 'issue s(PRP ) Overallconflic tanalysi s needsstrengthenin g inorde r bettert ounderstan dth econflic t situation(DRP ) Therei sa nee dfo r better linkageso fmicr oan dmacr ostrategie san dintervention s Incertai ncase s(huma nrights ,electio nmonitoring )a mor eactiv efollow-u p bywester n governments orth eE Co rCounci lo f Europe,fo r example isneede d(Sr iLank a Parliamentary ElectionObservin g2001) .

The reports contained more findings, but these were often very specific with regard to their particular context and difficult to generalise. It is not possible to combine the positive, negative and mixed results of different individual (mostly narrative) evaluation studies and to reach a more generaljudgement . A more concerted effort to draw lessons than is possible inthi s report on the basis of project profiles only, is to recommended, e.g. by commissioning in-depth desk research on available evaluation reports. Such more detailed analysis could perhaps help to identify issues that are relevant to policy makers and to come to more general statements and lessons. This would be helped tremendously by changed practices in peacebuilding evaluation. The formulation of a focused evaluation programme vis-à-vis peacebuilding projects, summarising available evaluation results and defining feed back mechanisms would definitely help in gaining better insights and to the indissemination. It is obvious, however, that this would require some additional effort to be undertaken by either IOB and/or DMV. Inthi s connection, it should be added

58 that hardlyan yinformatio n couldb efoun do nfollow-u p actionswit h regardt o (complianceto )evaluatio nfindings .

3.12 FinancialAssessmen t

Intw ocase s (Peacean d Rehabilitation Project Kenya,an dDeminin gCambodi ab y Norwegian People'sAid )ther ewer e(positive )Valu efo r Moneyo r FinancialAudi t reports. InAfghanistan ,a socio-economi c impact surveyo fth eMine-actio n Programme assertedtha tfo r anannua loutla yo f US$2 0million ,a nannua l productive outputo fabou t US$5 4millio ncoul db eobtained .I twa sals o reportedtha t mineclearanc e unitcos tha dbee nreduce dfro m US$ 1.68/sq.mete rt o US$0. 6pe r sq.meter ,whil eth ecost sefficienc y of minedo ggroup sha dimprove dfro m US$0.4 4 to0.25sq .meter .Thi styp eo fquantification ,however ,wa srarel yencountere donly . Forth e DRPi twa sreporte dtha tvariou s activities hadbee naccomplishe d atbelo w plannedcost .

Onth eCARER Eprojec t inCambodia ,o nth eothe r hand,i twa sstate dtha tcosts , especially overheads,wer ever yhig han dtha tfinancia l reporting onth especifi c Dutchcontributio nwa salmos t impossible duet o internal UNDPfinancia l procedures. Inth eAfgha nStrengthenin g CivilSociet y Projectther ewa sa nee dfo rbette r budgeting proceduresan da cleare r budget,expenditur e neededt o berelate d explicitlyt oth ebudget ,an dregula rfinancia l reportst o beproduce dregularly . In Bosnia-Herzegovina,ther ewer eanecdota l complaints about lacko ffinancia l oversight andlo wcost-consciousnes s andefficienc y among internationalagencies . Inth e LACther ewer e reportso nfinancia l mismanagement andlac ko ftransparency , leadingt omanagemen t restructuring andskill sdevelopment .Trus t Fundswer e reportedt o haveworke dgenerall ywell ,fo r example asdocumente dfo rth eUND P OpenTrus t Fundtha tfacilitate dth emonitorin g ofth e 1998Cambodi a Elections. Casesar eto ofe w innumber , however,t oallo wgenera lconclusion s to be drawn.

Project staff complained aboutfundin g problems (UNHCRAfghanistan ) orabou tslo w or irregular disbursementstha t ledt ocas hflo w problems andacut e moneyshortage s (InterimAuthorit y inAfghanistan ,Huma n RightsOmbudsma n inBosnia-Herzegovina , DRPCambodi a andRDRP) .Thi s pointst oa mor egenera lproble mtha tmus t undoubtedly becomeurgen tonc eoutsid esuppor tstops ,i.e .financia lsustainabilit yo r independence. Mostproject s probablycoul dno tsurviv ewithou t externalsupport .

Inmos tcase sther ewa sn oexplici to nsystemati cfram eo f referencefo rfinancia l assessments andinsight s hadt ob ededuce dfro mscattere dstatement so roveral l judgements oforganisationa l efficiency. Inth e majority of cases,informatio n needed forfinancia lassessmen twa slackin galtogether , eveni nth eevaluatio nreport s studied.

3.13 Organisational Efficiency Assessment

Hereth esam eapplie s asmentione d under3.12 .Althoug hth eissue so f organisational performance ando f requiredprecondition swer etake n upmor e frequently byevaluator s andals o inth e projects'ow nreporting ,thi swa smostl y haphazardan dnon-systematic .UNDP ,a sth e implementing agencyo f RDRP,fo r example,wa scriticise dfo r not being involved ina substantiv e andpro-activ ewa yi n projectmanagement. Theagenc y reportedly lacked sufficient humanresource san d expertisewit hwhic ht oguid ean dmonito rth e programme,an ddi dno tinitiat e

59 revisions when needed. In the Seeds for Peace Project in Sudan, complaints were uttered about organisational efficiency and high overhead costs. The Judicial Mentor Programme in Cambodia led to complaints byth e co-operating multilateral agencies about the unwieldy nature of its administrative and management arrangements. Despite its good overall performance, CSHR was criticised for its lack of strategic thinking and management and of long-term financial planning and sustainability.

The Ombudsman's Field Office in Gorazde was overstretched and had little time for field visits. Despite its limited capacity, itwa s able to process all applications. On Sri Lanka election monitoring, itwa s said that 'management support' had been good, but further details were lacking. COBADES in Kenya was a small and non-complex organisation that had handled bookkeeping and narrative and financial reporting successfully. One point of concern, however, was its reliance on personal contacts rather than on an institutional framework. The 'Justice pour tous au Rwanda' project was complimented for its completed dossiers and for the collection of jurisprudence in hard copy as well as on internet. In another project in Rwanda (Programme Campagne Action pour la Paix, CAP), however, funding was suspended and a 'clean up' operation was ordered, due to doubts about organisational efficiency and a breakdown of trust. One project (Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority) was closed by the government before it could deliver, while another did not receive the third instalment after a problematic start (The Litigation Fund for Torture Victims located in Nairobi). Organisations working on Sudan often operated from a dual base in Sudan and Nairobi, thus complicating operations.

Isolated statements of this kind on organisational efficiency could be extracted from project documents. It is therefore recommended that a more systematic approach be adopted, permitting evidence-based statements on financial and organisational efficiency.

3.14 Projects' Contribution to Peacebuilding

Overall conclusions were drawn for some projects. For instance, the DANI D A evaluation called the Mine-Action programme inAfghanista n one of the best managed, best co-ordinated and most cost-effective programmes inth e world, but such clear and unambiguous statements are very rare. Most programmes had both strong and weak points and a more differentiated judgement would need to begiven . The majority of reports studied did not give any overall statement, however, and did no more than to list concrete achievements. Only very exceptionally did they specify a projects explicit contribution to peacebuilding. This matter was not raised in the reports, even apart from the conceptual and methodological difficulties involved in answering such a question. It is thus also not possible here to summarise the projects' overall contribution to peacebuilding, beyond the more specific information presented above.

60 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

What policy conclusions and recommendations result from this survey? Firstly, it should be stressed that this report was not intended to be an evaluation or policy assessment. Any empirical findings, conclusions or recommendations that may result from it are thus of limited value and should be considered as exploratory than as representing a definite truth.Th e reasons for this are the methodological limitations that surround the study and the limited scope of the questions dealt with in the Utstein Study. Despite these limitations, however, we believe that the results of this study can play an important informative role infurthe r focusing the debate on evaluative follow-up work: hardly any other documented evidence on Dutch peacebuilding activities (or policies) has been assembled so far. The findings, conclusions and recommendations of this study are therefore presented below under self-evident headings, with recommendations printed in italics.

Quantitative characteristics 1. Inth e nine selected conflict or post-conflict countries, 213 out of a total of 1844 projects (12%) qualify as peacebuilding projects26. 2. The peacebuilding projects represent a value of € 235 million i.e. 20.4% of the budget for the total portfolio (€1,152 million), thus indicates that the average peacebuilding project has a higher budget (€ 1.1 million) than the 'average' development project (0.6 million) in those countries. 3. The average peacebuilding project in Africa has a smaller budget that that in other countries. It is recommended to ascertain why this is the case. 4. Among the recipient countries there are fairly large differences in numbers of projects and associated budgets, both for the total portfolio in general and for peacebuilding projects in particular.

Categories of peacebuilding 5. There is a preponderance of 'political'activitie s (111), followed at a distance by security-related (40) and reconciliation (25) activities. This is reflected in the financial significance of the categories. Socio-economic activities with an explicit peacebuilding focus are relatively insignificant. 6. A specialisation or restriction of Dutch peacebuilding activities to the security sector and political work (andperhaps reconciliation) may be considered. This would allow afurthe r concentration of efforts. Through assessments, analytical and evaluative work, drawing lessons learned, developing tools and deriving best practice, efficiency effects and 'economies of expertise' can beobtained . 7. A further focus may be introduced by selecting specific peacebuilding subcategories. Only six subcategories are significant. Of the 17 subcategories in the survey only six score above the five per cent, i.e. humanitarian mine-action, all subcategories inth e political field (démocratisation, good governance, institution building and human rights) and societal bridge building. 8. Projects inth e four 'political'subcategorie s are carried out in practically all countries under study, despite variations in financial project size. This necessitates an analytical and conceptual approach that recognises the multifaceted linkages between conflict and peace issues on the one hand,an d democracy, human rights and governance on the other. Mutual coherence among these aspects, but also with regard to other subcategories, such as SSR, is

26 Onth ebasi so fth eUtstein/PRI Odefinition san dcategories .

61 essential. Itis recommended that a strategy paper be written, inwhich those interlinkages areelaborated upon. 9. Therear eonlytw o minorproject s insmal larms ,suggestin gtha tdeclarator y policystatement s onsmal larm s haveno t beenaccompanie d byseriou s project activity.Thi sals oapplie st oth ethem eo fchil dsoldiers . Basedo nth eadmittedl y partialevidenc e providedb ythi sstudy , itmigh t beconsidere dwhethe rthes e themes merit more intensivefollow-u p byproject s onth egroun do rwhethe rthe y shouldb eabandone d completely. 10.Reconciliatio nsub-categorie s areonl ypartiall y covered.Th epromotio no f dialogue isa nactivit yo fmino r importance.Bridg ebuildin ga tsociet y level througha diversit yo f programmes hasbee ncarrie dou t ineigh tou to fth enin e countrieswit hamount svaryin gfro msmal lt orelativel y large.Trut han d reconciliationactivitie s havebee nsupporte d inCambodia ,Guatemal aan d Rwanda.It is recommended that a further intensification ofreconciliation peacebuilding activities shouldbe decided upon or, alternatively, thatthey should befully posteriorised. Atpresent ,the ysee mt o beto osmal lt ofacilitat eand/o r justify sufficient policyattentio n andinvestment .

The nature ofpeacebuilding activities 11. General project aimsar esometime s phraseda sa resul to routcome ,whil eother s reflect anactivit yo routput . 12.Mos t proposalsa swel la s Dutche xant eappraisal s dono tsee mt o bebase do n appropriate conflictanalysis .T o intervene successfully ina conflic to r post-conflict situationo rt ocontribut et opeacebuilding ,a detaile d understanding ofth econflic t historyan dtrend s isindispensable .It is recommended that the linkbetween projectformulation andappraisal be strengthened with conflictanalysis. 13. Apartfro mmor egenera laims ,project s mayelaborat e specific qualitativean d quantitative objectives andtr yt o bea sspecifi c aspossible ,identifyin gsteps , phases,measure san dactivities .Som eclosel yapproac hth e levelo f operational planning,whil eother sremai nfairl ygenera lan dnon-specific . Itis recommended thatsome standardisation inthe formulation ofaims andobjectives be achieved. 14.Nearl y 17%o f peacebuilding projects hada nation-wid e naturean dwer e implementedthroughou t thecountry .A nadditiona l40 %ha dnationa l significance andaimed ,fo r instance,a t institutional strengthening orcapacit y building,o ra t concernedactivitie s inth efiel do f legislation andgovernance .A thir dcategory , amountingt o23% ,wer eproject stha toperate d incertai nregions ,whil e local-level projects comprisedonl y8 %o fth etotal . 10%wer e implemented outsideth etarge t country. 15.Mos t projects mentionsom estrategi c perspective inorde rt o providea motive ,o r toargu efo r itsus ean dpotentia lbenefits . However,th enature ,scop ean ddept h ofsuc hstrategi c perspectives vary betweenreference st ointernationa l lawan d humanrights ,convention s and UNSCresolutions ,loca lanalyse s andquotation s fromow nprojec tdocuments . 16.I nonl yfe wcase swa sstrategi c valuewit h regardt o Dutchpolicie shighlighted , usually infairl y standardfashion . 17.Th erol eo fcrosscuttin gtheme s inpeacebuildin g projects isambiguous . Inabou t one-thirdo f projectdocuments ,crosscuttin gtheme swer e not mentioneda tall . Onbalance ,a wid evariet yo ftheme sappear , includinggender , poverty alleviation (rarely mentioned),capacit y buildingan dcommunit y development, democracy,goo dgovernance ,huma nrights ,participatio n (mentionedonce )an d reconciliation.Th estatu so fthes etheme s isno tclear ,however , it isstrikin gtha t

62 someoveral lcrosscuttin g concerns inDutc hdevelopmen t policy areno t mentioneda tal l(e.g .th eenvironment ) oronl yver yrarel y(poverty) .

Funding ofpeacebuilding projects 18.Ther ei sa nenormou svariatio n infinancia lallocation s made,rangin gfro ma fe w thousand Eurot osevera lmillion .Forty-fiv e percen to fth eallocation s areles s than Euro 100,000,whil eone-sevent h isove r Euro 1 million. 19.Man yproject s comprise severalsubsequen t phases (varyingfro mtw ot oeight )t o whichdifferen t allocations havebee nmade .Th eduratio no fth eproject svar y fromthre emonth st oth ewhol efiv eyear s period:man yhav elonge r (Dutch) funding histories,som eeve nu pt ote nyears . 20.I nles stha nabou t 10%o f projects studied,th e Dutchfunde da projec t activity independently. In90 %o fal lcase sproject swer eco-funde d byothe r donors.Co operationwit hothe r bilateraldonors ,internationa land/o r DutchNGOs ,o ra combinationo fthese ,i sth e mostfrequen t formo fcollaboration . 21.Th eco-fundin g practiceadopte d mayresul tfro mth e'appeal 'proces sfollowe db y multilateralagencies . Itma yals oaris ei fth efinancia l sizeo f projects surpasses thefinancia l possibility of individualdonors .Th e multi-donor approach isals o oftenfollowe dfo r projectswit hsmal lbudgets ,however ,an dma yi nsuc h conditions havet od owit hth e politicalsensitivit y of peacebuilding inconflic tan d post-conflictsettings .

Projectimplementation 22.Fo rth e Dutchgovernment , co-operation (infundin g andimplementation )wit h other partners inpeacebuildin g isa polic y preferencean di sfollowe dt oa considerabledegree . 23.Loca lgovernment s andnon-U Nmultilateral seac haccoun tfo r lesstha n 10% o f implementing agencies. Dutchan dinternationa l NGOseac hmak eu pabou t15 % ofcases ,whil eloca l NGOsar eimplementin g partners inon equarte ran dth eU N inon ethir do f cases respectively.Abou tanothe r 10%sho wa mixtur eo f implementing partners. Insevera lo fthes ecases ,fund s are madeavailabl evi a intermediary structurestha t intur nfun dthei row nimplementin g partners. 24.I ti sno tclea rwha t implications amulti-dono r approach hasfo r project implementation,supervision ,co-ordination ,monitorin gan dreporting ,o rwit h regardt o policy influence andcoherenc e onth e parto fth e Dutchgovernment . This seems towarrant a special study. 25.Further ,ther ear efe w indicationso f howmulti-leve l andmulti-acto r fundingan d implementation structures affectedth eresult so f peacebuilding programmes. This isrecommended as a topic for in-depth evaluation.

Projectevaluation 26.I nabou tone-quarte r of projectsa ninteri mo ren devaluatio n hasbee nheld .I n manycase ssuc hevaluation swer eordere dt ojustif y theextensio no r renewalo f the project,o rt o reformulateo rimprov e it.Som eproject s havebee nevaluate d moretha nonce . 27.Car eshoul db etake n nott oattac hmor egenera lsignificanc et ofinding stha na s regardsth ecas e inquestion .Th e Dutchhav eno tattempte dt ose tu pa mor e comprehensive evaluation policy inth efiel do f peacebuilding,no r havemeta - evaluations beenmad eo nth ebasi so f available evidencean dreport sgathere d sofar . 28.Th enatur eo fcomple x politicalemergencie s andth ecomplicate d project implementation structures make itdifficul t to investigate impact. Inman ycases ,

63 informationo nperformanc e wasgathere dan dpartia lconclusion swer edraw n regarding effectiveness with regardt oth eproject' s goals,whil e inother s lessons learnedwer especified .Full ydocumente d impact analysiswa sver yrare . 29.'Positive 'an d'negative 'lesson sca nb eextracte dfro mth e projectevaluations . Lessons learnedencompas sth echoic eo f implementation modalitiesfocuse do n localinvolvemen t andresponsibilitie s andth e needfo rtrainin g andcapacit y building.The yals ostres sth e importanceo f communication andth enee dt o involveconflictin g parties.Mor egenerally ,ther e isa nee dt otak eint oaccoun t macro-micro linkages andth edeterminan t natureo f nationalissue s inloca lscop e to manoeuvre.Man yproject s haveidentifie d scarcean dunreliabl efundin gan d irregular disbursement asa majo r problem,an dhighlighte d questionso f sustainabilityan dth e needfo ra long-ter mtim ehorizon . 30.I ti sno t possiblet ocombin eth e positive,negativ e or mixedresult so f different individualevaluation s intoa genera ljudgement . Moredetaile danalysi s isneede d toderiv efurthe r lessonsan dt o identify moredetaile d issuestha t arerelevan tt o policy makers.An in-depth deskresearch onavailable evaluation reports is recommendedto provide this information. 31.I nman ycase sther e isn oexplicit ,systemati cfram e ofreferenc efo rfinancia l assessment; information hast ob ededuce dfro manecdota lan dscattere d statementso rfro moveral ljudgement s oforganisationa l efficiency. Project information indicated bothpositiv ean dnegativ eexperience s inthi sfield . In a majorityo fcases ,however , information necessaryfo r afinancia l statementwa s lackingaltogether , eveni nth eevaluatio n reportsstudied .It is recommended that monitoring andreporting requirements beformulated toredress this omission. 32.Wit hregar dt oorganisationa l efficiency, basicallyth esam eapplie sa sfo r financial assessment.Althoug hth e issueo forganisationa l performancean d required preconditions seemt o betake nu pmor efrequentl y byevaluator s andi n the projects'ow nreporting ,thi s ismostl y haphazardan dnon-systematic . Therefore, asimilar approach shouldbe followed here asfor financial monitoring andreporting.

64 List of References

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NotitieConflictpreventie , Ministerieva nBuitenlands e Zaken,Directi e Mensenrechten enVredesopbouw , afdelingVredesopbou w enGoe dBestuu r (DMV/VG), DenHaag , 22novembe r 2001.

Notitie Decentralisatie, Ministerieva nBuitenlands e Zaken, Directie Mensenrechten enVredesopbouw , afdelingVredesopbou w enGoe d Bestuur (DMV/VG),De nHaag , 15apri l 2002.

Notitie Mensenrechtenbeleid 2001, Ministerieva nBuitenlands e Zaken, Directie Mensenrechten enVredesopbouw , afdeling Mensenrechten (DMV/MR), DenHaag , 14me i 2001.

65 NotitieWederopbou w naConflicten ,Ministeri eva nBuitenlands e Zaken,Directi e Mensenrechtene nVredesopbouw , afdelingVredesopbou w enGoe dBestuu r (DMV/VG),De nHaag ,2 4apri l2002 .

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Rijksbegroting 1997;memori eva ntoelichting ,Hoofdstu k V, Ministerieva n BuitenlandseZaken ,Tweed e Kamer,Vergaderjaa r 1996-1997,De nHaag ,1 7 september 1996.

Rijksbegroting 1998;memori eva ntoelichting ,Hoofdstu k V,Ministeri eva n Buitenlandse Zaken,Tweed e Kamer,Vergaderjaa r 1997-1998,De nHaag ,1 6 september 1997.

Rijksbegroting 1999;memori eva ntoelichting ,Hoofdstu kV , Ministerieva n BuitenlandseZaken ,Tweed e Kamer,Vergaderjaa r 1998-1999,De nHaag ,1 5 september 1998.

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66 Annex 1 List of Participants Roundtable Discussion

Robva nde nBer g(IOB ) Chrisva nde r Borgh(Universit y of Utrecht) LeniBuisma n(DZO ) Georg Frerks (Wageningen University) Otto Hospes(IOB ) Helened eJon g(IOB ) MartinKope r(DMV ) Caroline Poldermans (DWH) MarcelScholte n(Wageninge n University) DanSmit h(PRIO )

67 Annex 2 Sub-categories of Peacebuilding Activities

1 Security 1.1 Humanitarian mineActio n 1.2 DDR 1.3DD RChildre n 1.4 SSR 1.5 SmallArm s 2 Socio-economic 2.1 Reconstruction 2.2 Infrastructure 2.3Investmen t inHealt han dEducatio n 2.4Repatriatio n andRetur n 3 Political 3.1Démocratisatio n 3.2Goo dGovernanc e 3.3 Institution Building 3.4Huma nRight s 4 Reconciliation 4.1 Dialogue/Leadership 4.2Dialogue/Gras s roots 4.3Bridg ebuildin g inSociet y 4.4Trut han d Reconciliation (Others)