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Decisive Factors for the Acceptability of Congestion Pricing

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Decisive Factors for the Acceptability of Congestion Pricing Decisive factors for the acceptability of congestion pricing Carl J. Hamilton CTS Working Paper Keywords: congestion pricing; acceptability JEL Codes: R41, R42, R Centre For Transport Studies SE-100 44 Stockholm Sweden www.cts.kth.se Decisive Factors For congestion pricing acceptability ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In planning the Field work For this paper, designing the survey, carrying it out, gathering the data, and discussing its implications, I have had invaluable help From an international team consisting of Jonas Eliasson, Karin Brundell-Freij, Kati Kiiskilä, Jenny Källström, Charles Raux, Stephanie Souche, and Juha Tervonen, all whose expertise and experience Far overshadows my own. Without the support From these magniFicent people, this paper would not have been. The work has been Funded by ERA NET Transport and its Funding programme Surprice, dedicated to road pricing. 1 INTRODUCTION Among transportation economists and traFFic planners, there is broad support For congestion pricing. Most professionals in the Field recognise that the beneFits in terms of trafFic Flow and welFare improvements can be substantial, and that given low costs oF operation the policy instrument can be socially beneFicial. Still however, when speciFic schemes are being suggested, public acceptance turns out to be a critical issue, oFten preventing the systems From being implemented. Over the last decades a vast literature has sought to understand the causes oF the low level of acceptance. Several Factors have been identiFied as being inFluential, including the expected costs to the driver (e.g. Schade and Schlag, 2003), the stated use of the revenue (e.g. Schlag and Teubel, 1997), as well as practical experience of a congestion pricing system (e.g. Brundell-Freij and Jonsson, 2009). Most previous studies have however Focused on only one or a small set oF explanatory variables, and on a single population. In this study, a wide range oF explanatory Factors is tested by a common survey design used in three diFFerent cities, with varying degrees oF experience From congestion pricing. Respondents are asked For their preFerence to congestion pricing, and the influence of other factors on this ordinal dependent variable is then tested (mainly) by ordered logit regression. Thereby the diFFerent Factors can both be compared as to their relative inFluence on attitude, as well as tested For generality (by comparing across the three populations). The three cities used For comparison are Stockholm (Sweden), Helsinki (Finland) and Lyon (France). They are similar-sized European cities, but with distinctly diFFerent experiences oF congestion pricing. In each oF the three cities, a uniFied comprehensive survey has been issued, covering a wide array of questions. In the light oF previous research, the contents oF the survey can roughly be categorised in Four groups oF factors: a) Factors related mainly to selF-interest, including how much people pay or expect to pay in congestion charges, how much one values not being delayed 2 Decisive Factors For congestion pricing acceptability when travelling, and how the revenues From the system are recycled and made useFul For the population b) Factors related to perceived Fairness of the charging system, including the eFFect on income equity (rich-versus-poor), as well as the Fairness oF principles oF allocation and pricing (e.g. polluter pays or user pays principle). c) Factors related to other attitudes of principle or political inclination, including the natural environment and the role oF the state. d) Factors related to own experience From congestion pricing and belieF in its efFects. This categorisation is not without ambiguity. What is here labelled selF-interest – amount paid, time saved, and where the money is spent – may For some people be determined more by a concern For other people’s money, time, and useFulness oF government spending, thereby representing not selF-interest but a more general preFerence For justice. Likewise, what is labelled as Fairness here is overlapping with political inclination. Bearing these limitations in mind however, the categorisation made is convenient For analysis and allows For comparison with results previously published in the field. ReFerences to the existing literature are given in section 3, in conjunction with the results From the survey. BeFore that, in section 2, the method is presented in detail, followed by a brieF background oF the three cities together with some descriptive statistics to summarise the opinion and attitudes in each of the cities. In section 4 finally, the results are discussed. 2 BACKGROUND AND METHOD 2.1 Survey and data To collect data on people’s attitude to congestion pricing a generic survey has been designed, from which some deviations were made to adapt to local circumstance for the three cities. In addition to questions directly related to congestion pricing, respondents are asked For their opinion on a wide range oF topics, mostly pertaining to transport, but also a Few oF more general nature, such as preFerences related to taxation and environmental issues. In each survey a detailed congestion pricing scheme was presented, describing the charging area, and prices For driving in the system. In the case of Stockholm, the scheme presented was identical to the one in use; in Helsinki it was in line with a charging scheme put Forward and widely debated in media; while in Lyon, a scheme similar to the one used in Stockholm was presented, which was purely hypothetical and had not been up For debate in the general population. Then opinions about the scheme presented were solicited, and a question about how the respondent would vote iF there were a reFerendum on implementing (or in the case oF Stockholm, abolishing) such a scheme today. 3 Decisive Factors For congestion pricing acceptability In the survey, the questions are sorted in groups to make sense to the respondent, to cause less cognitive load when answering, as well as to reduce inclinations to answer strategically or to abandon the survey altogether. Sprinkled across the survey are questions pertaining to the key topics For this study, such as selF-interest, fairness, political inclination, expected eFFects oF a scheme etc. The survey was developed collectively by the three participating research teams, situated in Stockholm, Helsinki, and Lyon. In Stockholm and Helsinki, the survey was issued by post during Spring 2011 to a random sample of people 18-65 years of age in each city. AFter three weeks, one postal follow-up was made to non-respondents. The final response rate was 43% (N=1837) in Stockholm and 39% (N=1178) in Helsinki. In both places, a small but clear response bias was visible, with women and the elderly more likely to return the questionnaire. In Lyon, where a postal survey was ruled out based on previous experiences with very low response rates, a telephone survey was conducted instead. It was designed to meet predetermined quotas For, among other things, age and gender, thereby managing the response bias already at the collection stage. In order to ensure a suFFicient share oF respondents perceiving the survey as relevant, a deliberate additional bias was also introduced, by oversampling frequent car users and people living inside the hypothetical charging zone, to higher shares than would have been the case in a randomized sample oF the population oF Lyon. A total oF 10,241 calls were initiated, out oF which 53% picked up to answer. Out oF those answering, 37% agreed to start answering questions aFter having been introduced to the purpose of the call. Then, as the interview went along, some calls were prematurely terminated, either on request by the respondent, or when the caller system detected that some answer placed the respondent outside one oF the predetermine quotas. When 1,500 calls had led to a complete survey being answered and all quotas met, the calling was complete. When discussing attitudes and other attributes as shares of respondents answering in speciFic ways, each of the three local data sets has been reweighted to counterbalance the known biases. This has been done by giving a higher weight to respondents oF the under-represented groups (gender and age in Stockholm and Helsinki; car usage and inner city inhabitants in Lyon), so that their proportional weight in the response data is equal to their weight in the general population. Hence, the results are projections aiming to represent the true nature of each population, their attitudes, and habits. Data of this kind dominates section 2.2 and table 1, and appear to a lesser extent in section 3. 2.2 Quantitative analysis The majority oF the analysis in section 3 is made using ordered logit (proportional odds logistic regression) as implemented in the statistics program R (R Development Core Team, 2010) and its package MASS (Venables and Ripley, 2002). The dependent variable used is the answer to the question How would you vote if there was a referendum on the introduction (in Stockholm, abolishing) of congestion pricing today?, 4 Decisive Factors For congestion pricing acceptability and the options are Certainly yes, Leaning towards yes, Undecided, Leaning towards no, and Certainly no. In this part oF the analysis, the data is used as it is, each city population on its own and in combination, making no corrections for response biases. Throughout the analysis, a dummy category has been created to capture both those who tick the No opinion box oF a question and those who skip the question altogether. The coeFFicients For this dummy are leFt out oF the results table, as it lacks explanatory power in most cases. The beneFit oF treating skipped questions with a dummy category is that the remaining answers from that respondent can still be used. In one question oF the survey, respondents were asked first how they would vote today if there were a referendum on congestion pricing.
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