How Will the Latin American Electoral Year Play out in 2016?

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How Will the Latin American Electoral Year Play out in 2016? : SPECIAL REPORT How will the Latin American electoral year play out in 2016? Madrid, February 2016 BARCELONA BOGOTA BUENOS AIRES LIMA LISBON MADRID MEXICO CITY MIAMI PANAMA CITY QUITO RIO J SAO PAULO SANTIAGO STO DOMINGO HOW WILL THE LATIN AMERICAN ELECTORAL YEAR PLAY OUT IN 2016? 1. INTRODUCTION In 2016, Latin America will experience a much less intense electoral 1. INTRODUCTION year than 2014 or 2015. However, the year will still be very significant 2. IS LATIN AMERICA and highly politically charged. While there were seven presidential EXPERIENCING A CHANGE IN THE POLITICAL CYCLE? elections in 2014 and only two in 2015, three will take place in 2016 (Peru, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua). There will also 3. 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS be municipal elections in Brazil and Chile, mayoral elections in 4. CONCLUSIONS Venezuela and in 12 Mexican states, and a referendum to decide whether Evo Morales is eligible for re-election in Bolivia. If political-electoral changes set the tone of elections in Argentina and Guatemala in 2015, we can expect ruling parties to maintain their holds in 2016. This is also the case in the Dominican Republic, where current President Danilo Medina is the clear favorite to win the presidential election. It seems as though there will be continuity in Nicaragua as well, where the Interoceanic Canal, economic stability, Chinese investments and Sandinista political system led by Daniel Ortega (who has been president since 2007) have positioned the existing head of state as the strong favorite to remain in power. Peru is the only country where change is expected because the ruling party does not have the option of running again, making opposition leaders Keiko Fujimori and Pedro Pablo Kuczynski favorites to win the election. As it is, change is the only constant in the Andean nation, because since the fall of Alberto Fujimori in 2000 no political party has been re-elected. It seems this will happen again in 2016, as shown in Figure 1. Figure 1. Ruling Parties in the Government of Peru President Party Possible Peru Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006) (Perú Posible) Peruvian Aprista Party Alan García (2006-2011) (APRA, Partido Aprista Peruano) Nationalist Party Ollanta Humala (2011-2016) (Partido Nacionalista) Keiko Fujimori –Fuerza Popular, Fujimorist– Pedro Pablo Kuczynski –Alliance for Favorite candidates for the Great Change (PPK)– the second round César Acuña –Alliance for Progress (APP, Alianza Para el Progreso)– Alan García (APRA) Source: Compiled by author 2 HOW WILL THE LATIN AMERICAN ELECTORAL YEAR PLAY OUT IN 2016? The pages that follow examine Marti National Liberation the heterogeneous political Front (FMLN, for its Spanish “The 2015 year was situation in Latin America in acronym), led by Salvador general and analyze the electoral Sánchez Ceren, as well as certainly one of change” processes in the three countries Colombia, which re-elected holding presidential elections Juan Manuel Santos. in 2016, as well as Bolivia, which will hold a referendum with a The 2015 year was certainly clear plebiscite focus. one of change, witnessing the opposition’s victories in 2. IS LATIN AMERICA Argentina, with Mauricio EXPERIENCING A SHIFT Macri; Guatemala, with Jimmy IN ITS POLITICAL CYCLE? Morales; and Venezuela, with the Democratic Unity The idea that began to spread Roundtable in its legislative after the 2014 elections, and elections. In 2016 however, especially after the 2015 continuity is expected to elections, is that we are prevail in the Dominican witnessing a change of cycle. Republic and Nicaragua, while Following the shift toward the change should triumph in left that took place 10 years Peru. ago, the region has taken a new turn and is now shifting Latin America is experiencing toward the right. However, a combination of two elements this theory is misleading. rather than a uniform shift. 2015 represented an island One has a homogeneous of change in the midst of nature and regional scope the ocean of continuity that and is defined by the common characterized 2014 and will background of nearly all likely define 2016, at least countries in the region: in part. In 2014, presidential economic problems and social elections were held in seven unrest. The other element countries: Brazil, Bolivia, is more heterogeneous and Colombia, El Salvador, is related to the marked Uruguay, Panama and Costa differences and distinct Rica. The opposition was only political-electoral dynamics able to win in Costa Rica, taking place internally in each with Luis Guillermo Solís, and nation. On a broad regional Panama, with Juan Carlos scale, we can see how the Varela. However, change did political landscape is being not materialize in Brazil, where affected by the economic Dilma Rousseff´s Workers’ downturn, as well as growing Party (PT, for its Spanish social dissatisfaction with acronym) was ratified, or the party system. Discontent Uruguay, which saw the victory is also directed at inefficient of Tabare Vazquez’ Frente state systems unable to offer Amplio. El Salvador followed appropriate responses to suit with the Farabundo citizen demands in terms 3 HOW WILL THE LATIN AMERICAN ELECTORAL YEAR PLAY OUT IN 2016? of providing quality public questioned until the last services and ensuring minute. This dynamic was “Throughout 2014 and transparency in the fight much stronger in 2015, as the against corruption. ruling parties were defeated 2015 we saw signs that in four of the five elections the ruling parties are This is a common reality that took place - presidential running out of steam” throughout the region, but elections in Guatemala and if we focus on the specific Argentina and legislative circumstances of each elections in El Salvador individual country we see that and Venezuela. Only the the dynamics are actually very Institutional Revolutionary heterogeneous, with some Party (PRI, for its Spanish nations opting for continuity acronym) was able to stay in while others shift toward power by winning Mexico’s political change. The 2014 legislative elections. Latin American elections were weighted toward continuity, The increased competitiveness especially in South America, of the electoral process and where the ruling parties won difficulties faced by the in five of the seven countries ruling parties began in 2014. holding elections and two For example, in El Salvador, presidents were re-elected. Salvador Sanchez Ceren won The most recent results in the presidential election by 2014 and 2015 suggest the a margin of only 6,000 votes. political cycle inaugurated at The FMLN candidate received the beginning of last decade 50.11 percent of votes, while is either entering a new era or the opposition’s Norman its final stretch. Throughout Quijano from the Nationalist 2014 and 2015 we saw signs that Republican Alliance (ARENA, the ruling parties are running for its Spanish acronym) out of steam, undermined obtained 49.89 percent, a by a social and generational difference of only 0.22 points. transformation they have been unable to handle in the midst In Colombia in 2014, Juan of the changing economic Manuel Santos did not receive context. the most votes in the first round, as he was surpassed RULING PARTIES ARE LOSING by Uribe’s protégé Oscar Ivan GROUND Zuluaga. Santos ended up winning the election by only The ruling parties struggled five points after a strong effort to win in 2014 and were to mobilize votes, particularly defeated in 2015. Several of in the Atlantic and Pacific the ruling party victories of Coasts. 2014, especially in El Salvador, Colombia, Brazil and, to a In Brazil, Dilma Rousseff had certain extent, Uruguay, were to fight hard in the first and highly competitive, being second rounds, with polls that 4 HOW WILL THE LATIN AMERICAN ELECTORAL YEAR PLAY OUT IN 2016? were sometimes extremely This was the case in 2014, and adverse, and her final victory the dynamic has been much was the tightest since the PT more pronounced in 2015 won for the first time back in with Kirchnerism losing the 2002 when Lula da Silva beat presidency in Argentina and José Serra by 22 points. In 2010, Chavism losing legislative Dilma Rousseff beat Serra control in Venezuela. In both by just slightly more than 12 countries, the opposition has “By 2014, a majority points. been able to bring together of the ruling parties the scattered voters against There were exceptions to this the ruling party, putting an were starting to show theme of political competition, end to 12 years of the Kirchner signs of weakness and such as in Bolivia, where administration and 15 years their opponents were a Evo Morales edged out his of Chavism, which previously opponent, Samuel Doria, by 35 dominated the National step closer to possible points; and Costa Rica, where Assembly with absolute victory” the ruling party’s candidate, majorities. Johnny Araya, dropped out in the second round; as well as the SOCIAL AND GENERATIONAL Uruguayan election. However, CHANGE by 2014, a majority of the ruling parties were starting to show As Manuel Alcantara, professor signs of weakness and their at the University of Salamanca, opponents were a step closer to Spain, pointed out, ‘ruling possible victory. As pointed out parties are beginning to run by Daniel Zovatto, the regional out of steam because they director for Latin America and are unable to connect with the Caribbean at International the younger generations, IDEA, “It is increasingly evident who have not experienced that ruling parties are finding any government other than it harder to win elections Lulism in Brazil since 2003, comfortably. This has happened Kirchnerism in Argentina since in El Salvador and Colombia, 2003, Chavism in Venezuela and has occurred once again since 1999, Correism in Ecuador in Brazil. However, it is also since 2007 and Evo Morales true that it is not easy for the in Bolivia since 2006.’ These opposition to defeat the ruling governments did not fully party, as efforts this year have channel the requirements failed in El Salvador, Colombia, of those sectors.
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