Is Outgroup Prejudice Fundamental?

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IS OUTGROUP PREJUDICE FUNDAMENTAL?

EXPLORING INTERGROUP BIAS IN THE MINIMAL GROUP PARADIGM

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of

Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

Michael John McCaslin, M.A.

Graduate Program in Psychology

The Ohio State University

2010

Dissertation Committee:

Richard E. Petty, Advisor

Russell H. Fazio

William A. Cunningham

Michael John McCaslin

2010

ABSTRACT

Previous research using the minimal group paradigm (MGP) has shown that group categorization per se is sufficient to elicit a preference for one’s ingroup over the outgroup (Tajfel et al., 1971). Social psychologists have generally believed this relative bias to be the result of ingroup favoritism rather than outgroup derogation, but the lack of an appropriate control group in prior studies has made it difficult to definitely determine the direction of bias. Making this methodological adjustment in the current research revealed evidence indicating that explicit (Experiments 1 and 2) and implicit (Experiment

3) intergroup bias are a function of both ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation. In addition, results from Experiments 1 and 2 showed that less favorable outgroup attitudes were most likely to be reported by those low in outgroup identification, a variable that has received relatively little attention in the literature. Together, these findings suggest that outgroup derogation is an important determinant of intergroup attitudes, particularly for certain individuals.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would first like to extend my deepest gratitude to those who served as faculty in the Social Psychology Area during my time at Ohio State. Thank you for creating an intellectually supportive environment that encouraged the pursuit of excellence. In particular, I would like to thank the members of my committee, Russ Fazio and Wil

Cunningham, for their time and effort. And a special thank you is given to Tim Brock, whose efforts helped ensure that I could come to Ohio State in the first place. In addition, I would like thank the members of the Petty lab and the Group for Attitudes and

Persuasion for their insightful suggestions and comments throughout the various stages of development of this research. I greatly appreciate all your helpful feedback.

I would also like to thank my advisor, Rich Petty, for his steadfast guidance and generous support over the last several years. Rich, your commitment and dedication to your students is unparalleled, and I feel extremely fortunate to have been mentored by someone as willing to share his time, resources and intellectual knowledge as you have been. I could not ask for a better advisor and colleague.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife and family, whose love and support is matched only by their patience and understanding. Jamie, Mom, Teresa, Sarah, and Phil

– thank you for everything. iii

VITA

May 13, 1980...... Born – Omaha, Nebraska

2003...... B.A. Psychology, Saint Louis University

2003-2004...... University Fellow, The Ohio State University

2004-2005...... NIMH Predoctoral Trainee, The Ohio State University

2005...... M.A. Psychology, The Ohio State University

2005-2009...... Graduate Teaching Associate, Department of Psychology, The Ohio State University

2009-2010...... Graduate Research Associate, Nationwide Center for Advanced Customer Insights

PUBLICATIONS

McCaslin, M. J., & Petty, R. E. (2007). Persuasion. In R. Baumeister & K. Vohs (Eds.), Encyclopedia of social psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 665-669). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Briñol, P., Petty, R. E., & McCaslin, M. (2009). Changing attitudes on implicit versus explicit measures: What is the difference? In R. E. Petty, R. H. Fazio, & P. Briñol (Eds.). Attitudes: Insights from the new implicit measures (pp. 285-326). New York, NY: Psychology Press.

McCaslin, M. J., & Petty, R. E. (2009). Attitude change. In D. Matsumoto (Ed.), Cambridge dictionary of psychology, Cambridge University Press.

Petty, R. E., Briñol, P., Loersch, C., & McCaslin, M. J. (2009). The need for cognition. In M. R. Leary & R. H. Hoyle (Eds.), Handbook of individual differences in social behavior. New York: Guilford Press.

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Psychology

Specialization: Social Psychology

Minor Fields: Quantitative Psychology, Consumer Psychology

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract...... ii

Acknowledgements...... iii

Vita...... iv

List of Tables...... viii

List of Figures...... ix

Chapters:

1. Introduction...... 1 Minimal Group Studies...... 3 Limitations of Prior Research...... 5 Control Group Studies...... 9 Current Research...... 13

2. Experiment 1...... 18

Method...... 19 Participants and Design...... 19 Procedure...... 19 Independent Variables...... 20 Dependent Variables...... 21 Results...... 22 Attitudes...... 22 Identification...... 22 Moderation Analyses...... 23 Discussion...... 24

3. Experiment 2...... 29

Method...... 30 Participants and Design...... 30 Procedure...... 30 Independent Variables...... 30 Dependent Variables...... 31

Results...... 32 Attitudes Toward Group Categories...... 32 Attitudes Toward Group Members...... 32 Identification...... 33 Moderation Analyses...... 34 Discussion...... 36

4. Experiment 3...... 40

Method...... 40 Participants and Design...... 40 Procedure...... 41 Independent Variables...... 41 Dependent Variable...... 41

Results...... 42 Discussion...... 43

5. General Discussion...... 45 Future Directions...... 49

Notes...... 53

References...... 55

Appendices:

A. Alternative Moderation Analyses for Experiments 1 and 2...... 65

B. Illustrations...... 69

C. Sample Materials from Experiment 1...... 84

D. Sample Materials from Experiment 2...... 91

E. Sample Materials from Experiment 3...... 101

vii

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Multiple-choice allocation matrix with MD + MIP and MJP as opposing orientations...... 70

viii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Mean explicit attitude ratings toward group categories in Experiment 1...... 71

Figure 2. Mean explicit attitude ratings toward group categories in Experiment 2...... 72

Figure 3. Mean explicit attitude ratings toward group exemplars in Experiment 2...... 73

Figure 4. Mean category outgroup derogation as a function of ingroup and outgroup identification in Experiment 2...... 74

Figure 5. Mean exemplar outgroup derogation as a function of ingroup and outgroup identification in Experiment 2...... 75

Figure 6. Implicit attitudes toward group categories as indicated by mean response latencies on the Brief IAT in Experiment 3...... 76

Figure 7. Mean attitudes toward the ingroup vs. control (ingroup favoritism) as a function of ingroup identification in Experiment 1...... 77

Figure 8. Mean attitudes toward the outgroup vs. control (outgroup derogation) as a function of outgroup identification in Experiment 1...... 78

Figure 9. Mean attitudes toward the ingroup vs. control (ingroup favoritism) as a function of outgroup identification in Experiment 2...... 79

Figure 10. Mean attitudes toward the ingroup vs. control (ingroup favoritism) as a function of ingroup identification in Experiment 2...... 80

Figure 11. Mean attitudes toward the outgroup vs. control (outgroup derogation) as a function of outgroup identification in Experiment 1...... 81

Figure 12. Mean attitudes toward ingroup members vs. control group members (ingroup favoritism) as a function of ingroup identification in Experiment 2...... 82

Figure 13. Mean attitudes toward ingroup members vs. control group members (ingroup favoritism) as a function of outgroup identification in Experiment 2...... 83

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Psychologists have long understood that forming relationships with other people

satisfies a number of basic human needs, and research has shown that people from

different cultures have a strong drive to cultivate and maintain associations with others

(Gardner, Pickett, & Brewer, 2000; Manstead, 1997). One way individuals connect with

others and derive a sense of belonging is by affiliating with a group. However, although

group membership can confer a number of advantages to those within a group, it might

also lead to prejudice against those outside the group. Indeed, membership in a group

often appears to be a catalyst for the kind of negative attitudes that lead to wars,

genocide, hate crimes, political and economic oppression (e.g., Sidanius, 1993), and other

hostile discriminatory behaviors (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961).

Given the devastating social conflict that seems to come at the hands of group-

based prejudice, a great deal of work in psychology and beyond has focused on

investigating the underlying processes and consequences of social categorization (e.g.,

Tajfel, 1969). Over the years, different perspectives have emerged regarding the role that

mere categorization plays in fueling prejudice and discrimination. On the one hand,

some have argued that affiliation with an ingroup (a group to which one belongs) by definition engenders antagonism and aggression toward an outgroup (a group to which

one does not belong). For example, in his discussion of the nature of ethnocentrism,

Sumner (1906) concluded that the positive sentiments typically attributed to one’s ingroup are paralleled by feelings of negativity and hostility toward outgroups. That is, prejudice against outsiders is an unavoidable aspect of identifying with an ingroup. This perspective fits with the evolutionary principle of adaptive conservatism, which holds that people are predisposed toward distrusting anything unfamiliar or different

(Henderson, 1985; Mineka, 1992). As a result, it may be that anyone outside the familiar bounds of the ingroup is viewed with dislike and suspicion.

In contrast, social psychologists have generally rejected the position that ingroup love and outgroup hate are reciprocally related (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). For instance, drawing on the postulates of Allport (1954), Brewer (1999) proposed that, at a fundamental level, ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation are orthogonal constructs that arise under distinct circumstances. Since humans are social beings who require the cooperation of others for long-term survival, Brewer (1999) argued that people are characterized by an obligatory interdependence. In order to survive, individuals must rely on others for information, assistance, and shared resources – and be willing to share each in return. This kind of cooperative system requires that people trust one another, but it is potentially dangerous to trust indiscriminately. Forming ingroups, however, is one way of creating an environment where the risks of non-reciprocation are minimized. By limiting the extension of trust only to mutually acknowledged ingroup members, people are more likely to cooperate with those who will return the favor. In this view, trust is not extended to outgroup members – but neither is any form of fundamental hostility.

Rather, it is argued that additional factors, such as a sense of moral superiority (Sidanius,

1993) or perceived intergroup threat (for a review of various potential sources of

perceived threat, see Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006), must be present to elicit negative

attitudes toward the outgroup.

Due to the importance and primacy of the ingroup (Allport, 1954), the process of

group formation is believed to involve a differentiation of the ingroup from the outgroup,

rather than the outgroup from the ingroup (Brewer, 1979). So, if one were to imagine a

baseline situation where an individual sees himself/herself as distinct from an

undifferentiated group of others, creating ingroup and outgroup boundaries would lead to

a realignment of perceptions such that ingroup members would be drawn psychologically

closer to the self (less differentiated from the self than before), but the distance between

the self and outgroup would remain constant. Based on this logic, when groups are

formed, ingroup members are seen as more positive, but outgroup members are viewed

no more negatively than they had been before group labels were introduced (Brewer,

1979; 1999).

Minimal Group Studies

In an effort to understand group bias in its most fundamental form, much research

has explored the link between categorization and prejudice using an experimental tool

known as the Minimal Group Paradigm (MGP; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971;

Tajfel & Billig, 1974). Because the dynamic between most real-world ingroups and outgroups is confounded with a number of factors (e.g., a prior history of conflict or ongoing competition for resources), it is often difficult to determine if existing intergroup

prejudice or discrimination is based on categorization per se or some other variable(s).

The MGP was developed as an attempt to examine prejudice and discrimination in a

“pure” setting free of the elements that frequently accompany real groups.

In the most commonly used form of this procedure, participants are brought into

the lab and assigned to one of two groups, ostensibly on the basis of some arbitrary

characteristic. In some studies, for example, participants are led to believe that their

placement in a group is based on a tendency to over- or underestimate the number of dots presented in a visual perception task, or a preference for paintings by the artist Klee to those of Kandinsky (e.g., Tajfel et al., 1971). In actuality, group membership is determined by random assignment. To ensure that the groups created in the lab remain minimal, the researchers also isolate each participant so that he/she has little or no interaction with members of either the ingroup or outgroup. Thus, participants have no pretext other than their group label to form impressions of ingroup and outgroup members.

After being categorized into one of two minimal groups, participants are most commonly asked to rate ingroup and outgroup members on various evaluative dimensions (e.g., Brewer & Silver, 1978) or divide specific resources (e.g., points, money) between ingroup and outgroup members (e.g., Tajfel et al., 1971; Tajfel & Billig,

1974). Across a substantial number of studies using the MGP (Brown, 1995; Tajfel &

Turner, 1986), participants have tended to rate ingroup members more favorably than outgroup members and/or give more resources to ingroup targets than to outgroup targets.

The dramatic implication of these results is that prejudice and discrimination appear to be

elicited from group categorization alone (c.f., Diehl, 1990; Gaertner & Insko, 2000;

Rabbie & Horwitz, 1969). By simply being placed into groups, even ones that have no apparent meaningful basis, people seem willing to view or treat certain people differently from others.

Limitations of Prior Research

The findings from the original MGP studies provided the foundation for the development of Tajfel and Turner’s (1986) Social Identity Theory (SIT), which states that people perceive their group as better than the outgroup in an effort to feel good about themselves. In addition, this work helped spur a long-standing interest in the consequences of categorization and the cognitive processes involved in stereotyping and prejudice (Fiske, 1998; Park & Judd, 2005). However, despite the contributions of the initial MGP studies and those that followed, the specific nature of the bias observed under minimal group conditions remains ambiguous. In particular, although a relative preference for the ingroup over the outgroup has been well established, it is unclear whether this bias is driven by ingroup favoritism (Allport, 1954; Brewer, 1979; 1999), outgroup derogation (Sumner, 1906), or some combination of both. This is because the experimental designs used in existing MGP studies make it difficult to definitively determine the direction of this effect. In a typical MGP experiment, participants are asked to rate or distribute resources between an ingroup and outgroup target, but no appropriate control group is included to decompose the relative bias in attitudes or behavior that emerges.

Instead researchers have primarily used different measurement approaches to try to infer the nature of the bias. For example, one of the most common dependent measures used in MGP studies is the allocation matrix (Tajfel, et al., 1971). Here, participants are presented with a two-row matrix of values representing resources (e.g., money or points) to be divided between two other individuals in the experiment.

Participants indicate how much they wish to allocate to each target by circling one column of the matrix, and the values are arranged so that choosing a particular column over others represents a specific distribution strategy. Through repeated allocations, general orientations in the way participants award resources to ingroup and outgroup members can be derived. Four orientations are possible (Bourhis, Sachdev, & Gagnon,

1994): 1) fairness/parity – equally distribute resources to ingroup and outgroup members,

2) maximum joint profit (MJP) – maximize resources given to both ingroup and outgroup members, 3) maximum ingroup profit (MIP) – award highest absolute number of resources to ingroup members regardless of what is given to outgroup members, and 4) maximum differentiation (MD) – maximize difference in resources in favor of the ingroup over the outgroup, but at a cost to maximum ingroup profit.

In general, participants tend to choose allocation strategies that favor ingroup members over outgroup members (e.g., Tajfel et al., 1971). However, the matrices are designed in a manner that confounds certain orientations (Bornstein, Crum, Wittenbraker,

Harring, Insko, 1983; Brewer, 1979). Specifically, participants are always asked to choose betweens columns that reflect one orientation and columns that confound two other orientations. For example, the dominant allocation strategy that emerges is one

based on choices that confound the MIP and MD orientations (as in Table 1). This makes it difficult to determine whether participants are motivated to favor the ingroup, discriminate against the outgroup, or possibly both.1 Despite this ambiguity, however, the allocation strategy that confounds MIP and MD has confusingly been defined in the literature at times as ingroup favoritism (e.g., Bourhis et al, 1994).

Some researchers have also tested to see if categorization can lead to outgroup derogation by having participants rate group targets on negative dimensions (e.g.,

Mummendey, Otten, Berger, & Kessler, 2000; Otten & Wentura, 2001) or distribute negative outcomes to group members (e.g., Amiot & Bourhis, 2003; Mummendey, et al.,

1992). The thinking here is that if participants feel hostile toward the outgroup, they should rate the outgroup more negatively than the ingroup and allocate more negative outcomes (e.g., punishments) to the outgroup than the ingroup. When such measures are used, however, the bias typically observed in MGP studies disappears or is much less pronounced (Buhl, 1999; Mummendey & Otten, 1998). This apparent reluctance to directly disparage or harm the outgroup has contributed to the belief that categorization per se is insufficient to arouse outgroup prejudice (e.g., Brewer, 1999). It is important to note, however, that even if participants’ assessment or treatment of the outgroup is not negative in an absolute sense, it is still possible for them to hold a bias against the outgroup. That is, the formation of social categories could result not only in a boost in positivity toward the ingroup, but also a decrease in favorability toward the outgroup.

This decrease in outgroup attitudes would indicate a clear bias against the outgroup, even if evaluations of the outgroup were neutral or positive in absolute terms.2

In addition to providing evidence of intergroup bias in the MGP on conscious,

explicit measures of attitudes and behavior, some research has also examined attitudes

using implicit measures designed to capture automatic evaluative reactions to groups (see

Petty, Fazio, & Briñol, 2009, for a review). Notably, research using these measures has

shown that a relative preference for the ingroup over the outgroup also exists at a

relatively automatic level (e.g., Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2001; Castelli, et al., 2004, Van

Bavel, Packer, & Cunningham, 2008). Moreover, as was the case with explicit measures,

a number of studies suggest that the bias observed on implicit measures is driven entirely

by ingroup favoritism. For example, Otten and Wentura, (1999) found that participants

made fewer errors in categorizing positive words when they had been subliminally

primed with their ingroup category label than when primed with the outgroup label.

Furthermore, the percentage of errors committed when participants were primed with

neutral words was significantly greater than when the ingroup was primed but was no

different than when the outgroup was primed. These results were interpreted as evidence

of 1) an implicit preference for the ingroup over the outgroup that 2) is driven solely by

ingroup favoritism. That is, implicit positivity is extended to the ingroup, whereas the

outgroup is associated with neutrality. However, although the outgroup might be

implicitly evaluated as neutral in an absolute sense, it is still possible that the inclusion of

a control group could reveal evidence of bias against the outgroup. That is, priming

participants with a control group category label in the Otten and Wentura (1999) procedure could have yielded error rates that were significantly smaller than the outgroup prime error rate (and perhaps even the same as the ingroup prime error rate). This pattern

of results would indicate that although the outgroup may be considered objectively

neutral (i.e., similar to a neutral prime), the difference between implicitly measured

ingroup and outgroup attitudes is based in part (or perhaps entirely) on outgroup

prejudice.

Otten and Moskowitz (2000) found evidence of implicit ingroup favoritism using

a paradigm measuring spontaneous trait inference (Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz,

1996). The authors showed that reading sentences describing behaviors performed by a

minimal ingroup member facilitated the inference of positive, but not negative, traits implied by the sentences. In contrast, reading sentences about behaviors performed by a minimal outgroup member did not facilitate the inference of implied traits, regardless of the valence of the behavior. This pattern of results was interpreted as evidence of implicit positivity toward the ingroup and a lack of implicit negativity toward the outgroup. However, as noted earlier, a bias against the outgroup could still exist, even if the outgroup was not viewed negatively in absolute terms. For instance, reading about positive behaviors performed by a non-affiliated person could facilitate the inference of

positive traits, which would indicate prejudice against the outgroup. Indeed, if the degree

of facilitation of positive traits was the same for control and ingroup targets, then one

would conclude that the implicit intergroup bias was driven solely by outgroup prejudice.

Control Group Studies

In sum, without a control group for comparison, it is difficult to fully discern the direction of the explicit and implicit intergroup bias observed in the minimal group situation. But there a few cases where a control group has been implemented in the

MGP. For example, Van Bavel and Cunningham (2009, Experiment 2) assigned

Caucasian participants to minimal groups and measured both their implicit and explicit

evaluations of mixed race ingroup, outgroup, and unaffiliated targets. A preference for

the ingroup over the outgroup emerged on both types of measures. Control group

attitudes were statistically no different from outgroup attitudes, which indicated that this

relative difference was driven by ingroup favoritism alone. However, the focus of this

work was on understanding how currently relevant social categories might influence

automatic race bias, and the salience of race in this study may have produced effects that

obscured what would normally occur in a context in which minimal groups were the only

basis of differentiation. That is, in the absence of an automatic race bias, participants

may have evaluated the group targets differently. For instance, implicit attitudes toward

both the outgroup and control group were characterized by a preference for White vs.

Black targets. In fact, white outgroup members seemed to be rated the most favorable of

all White targets (whereas attitudes toward Black outgroup members appeared close to

neutrality, and unaffiliated Black targets seemed to be evaluated the least favorably of all

Black targets (whereas attitudes toward unaffiliated white targets appeared close to neutrality). If the influence of the race bias could be stripped away, attitudes toward the outgroup might be less positive than attitudes toward the control group, which would indicate outgroup prejudice. Similarly, the lack of a bias against the outgroup on explicit attitude measures could be due to a reluctance to derogate White outgroup members. In either case, it is not clear if the pattern of results observed by Van Bavel et al. (2009)

would generalize to a situation in which minimal group membership was not crossed with race identity.

In a more standard minimal group experiment, Valdesolo and DeSteno (2007) had participants rate hypocritical behaviors committed by either an ingroup member, outgroup member, or an unaffiliated individual. Hypocritical acts by outgroup members were perceived as more unfair than those committed by ingroup members, but equally unfair as those performed by unaffiliated targets. These findings again suggest the influence of ingroup favoritism rather than outgroup derogation, but it is possible that the fairness measure was not sensitive to participants’ feelings of prejudice toward the outgroup. Attitude items tapping liking may be more likely to capture the absence of positive affect toward the outgroup (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). Also, even if the observed intergroup bias is characterized by ingroup favoritism overall, there may be moderators that could be used to identify any individuals who are showing a bias against the outgroup.

For instance, a number of factors have been shown to amplify or attenuate intergroup bias (see Hewstone et al., 2002, for a review). Previous studies have found, for example, that heightened feelings of attachment with the ingroup tend to be associated with more positive ingroup attitudes and stronger intergroup bias, even under minimal group conditions (e.g., Gagnon & Bourhis, 1996; Mummendey et al., 2000; Perreault &

Bourhis, 1999). These findings are anticipated by SIT (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994) and have been interpreted as evidence that ingroup identification is related to ingroup favoritism. However, given the ambiguity of the direction of intergroup bias in the MGP,

it is unclear if ingroup identification also predicts outgroup prejudice in minimal group contexts, as it can when factors like perceived threat are present (e.g., Branscombe &

Wann, 1994).

Furthermore, although ingroup identification has received considerable attention in the literature, social psychologists have rarely tried to measure participants’ degree of identification with the outgroup. And in those few cases where outgroup identification has been assessed in the MGP, no attempt has been made to directly link this variable with participants’ attitudes. Instead, measures of outgroup identification have been used only as manipulation checks of the minimal group induction (Mummendey, et al., 2000;

Otten & Moskowitz, 2000). However, there is evidence to suggest that outgroup identification could be an important predictor of intergroup bias. In one study, Zhong,

Phillips, Leonardelli, and Galinsky (2008, Study 2) found that participants in a MGP who were induced to focus on their non-affiliation with the outgroup (negational identity), rather than their affiliation with the ingroup (affirmational identity), reported more negative attitudes toward the outgroup than the ingroup on negative trait ratings items.

Findings from follow-up studies suggested that when a negational identity is emphasized, people tend to contrast the self away from the outgroup, which leads to outgroup derogation. That is, focusing on a negational identity may elicit feelings of detachment from the outgroup that, in turn, foster prejudice against the outgroup. However, forcing participants to focus on a particularly type of identity (negational vs. affirmational) may have led to effects based on demand. Consequently, it would be useful to see if outgroup prejudice can be obtained when identity is not made salient. In addition, it would be

useful to measure outgroup identification to see if there are some people who naturally

hold a negational mindset. If so, perhaps those individuals are more are more likely to

exhibit outgroup prejudice. Finally, given that ingroup identification can predict

outgroup derogation in at least some situations (such as when threat is present, e.g.,

Branscombe & Wann, 1994), it would also be interesting to see if outgroup identification

is related in any way to ingroup favoritism.

Current Research

Although prior MGP studies have been able to demonstrate that categorization can lead to a relative difference in the way individuals view and treat ingroup and outgroup members on explicit and implicit measures, it is unclear whether this bias is the result of ingroup favoritism, outgroup derogation, or a joint impact of both. The methods of measuring intergroup prejudice and discrimination employed in previous studies seem unable to definitely determine the direction of this effect. A critical factor missing from

most prior MGP studies is the inclusion of an appropriate control group to compare to the

ingroup and outgroup targets. And as noted, previous studies that did include a control

group also contained other features that rendered the results ambiguous. Having

participants evaluate a group of unaffiliated individuals would provide a baseline for

determining the impact of ingroup and outgroup labels and allow for a concrete test of

whether preference for ingroup over outgroup members represents ingroup favoritism,

outgroup derogation, or both.

If participants evaluated the control group no differently than the outgroup, then

the relative ingroup-outgroup bias would be interpreted as ingroup favoritism. In

contrast, if attitudes toward the control group were equivalent to evaluations of the

ingroup, then one would conclude that the bias was based on outgroup derogation.

Finally, if the control group was evaluated as less positive than the ingroup but more

positive than the outgroup, then it would be apparent that that bias was bi-directionally driven by both ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation. The use of a control group in this manner has been very helpful in gaining a clearer understanding of other phenomena, such as the impact of similarity/dissimilarity on attraction/repulsion effects (e.g.,

Rosenbaum, 1986; Singh & Tan, 1992) and whether being physically attractive or unattractive has a greater influence on how one is perceived and treated by others (Griffin

& Langlois, 2006).

The main purpose of the current research, therefore, was to replicate the minimal group situation and include an appropriate control group to test whether the observed intergroup bias is due to ingroup favoritism, outgroup derogation, or a combination of both. In this work, ingroup favoritism was conceptualized as greater positivity toward the ingroup relative to the control group, and outgroup derogation was defined as decreased positivity toward the outgroup compared to the control group.3 The minimal

group information provided to participants was the only group information available and

was not combined with any other details about the group. In Experiment 1, participants

were assigned to hypothetical minimal groups using a procedure developed by Pinter and

Greenwald (2004). Following the group assignment, participants were asked to report

their attitudes toward the ingroup, outgroup, and a group of individuals who were not

affiliated with either group (control). In Experiment 2, participants were assigned to

ostensibly real minimal groups and again instructed to provide their evaluations of the three target groups.

In both of these experiments, we also tested to see if participants’ degree of identification with the ingroup and outgroup might impact intergroup bias in the MGP.

Prior research suggests that greater ingroup identification leads to more positive ingroup attitudes and larger intergroup bias (e.g., Gagnon & Bourhis, 1996; Mummendey et al.,

2000; Perreault & Bourhis, 1999), and we hypothesized that higher levels of ingroup identification would be associated with increased ingroup favoritism in Experiments 1 and 2. We also tested to see if those higher in ingroup identification were more likely to express outgroup derogation. In addition, although previous research has not directly explored the relationship between outgroup identification and group attitudes in the

MGP, research by Zhong et al. (2008) suggests that making negational identities (i.e., group non-memberships) salient can lead to disidentification with the outgroup, and subsequently, outgroup derogation. But it is not clear if some people spontaneously disidentify with the outgroup and whether such individuals are more likely to show a bias against the outgroup in a minimal group context. Therefore, we measured participants’ level of outgroup identification to see if those who felt less identified with the outgroup would exhibit greater outgroup derogation. Finally, because so little is known about outgroup identification in the context of minimal groups, we also examined whether this variable was distinct from ingroup identification and if it was related in any way to ingroup favoritism.

In addition to showing that people prefer their ingroup to the outgroup on explicit measures of prejudice and discrimination, previous research has also shown that being placed into minimal groups can elicit intergroup bias on implicit measures (e.g.,

Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Monteith, 2001; Castelli, Zogmaister, Smith, & Arcuri, 2004;

Otten & Moskowitz, 2000; Otten & Wentura, 1999). The results of these studies suggest that preference for the ingroup over the outgroup occurs at a relatively automatic level.

Therefore, to provide a full test of the direction of intergroup bias in the MGP, in

Experiment 3 we measured implicit attitudes toward the ingroup, outgroup, and a control group to determine whether implicit intergroup bias is based on ingroup favoritism, outgroup derogation, or both and to see if that implicit bias would correspond to any explicit bias observed in the first two experiments. For example, perhaps people will express prejudice when they consciously think about the outgroup, but only favor the ingroup on an automatic level. Or perhaps people will correct for outgroup bias and appear non-prejudiced in their self-reported attitudes (Wegener & Petty, 1997; Wilson &

Brekke, 1994) but still exhibit prejudice in their implicit evaluations, where the ability to correct is limited. Or maybe both explicit and implicit measures will reveal the same type of bias. In any case, by including a control group in the MGP and measuring both explicit (Experiments 1 and 2) and implicit attitudes (Experiment 3), we hoped to gain a richer and more complete picture of minimal group bias than what is currently offered in the literature.

Taken together, the aim of these studies was to address the critical limitations of prior MGP studies and provide a clearer understanding of the nature and antecedents of prejudice arising from mere categorization.

CHAPTER 2: EXPERIMENT 1

In order to determine the direction of intergroup bias elicited by social

categorization, participants were assigned to minimal groups and asked to report their

attitudes toward not only the ingroup and outgroup, as is typically the case in MGP

studies (e.g., Brewer & Silver, 1978), but a non-affiliated control group as well.

Participants were randomly assigned to one of two hypothetical groups using a procedure from Pinter and Greenwald (2004), which has been shown to be an effective deception-

free minimal group induction that elicits the classic relative preference for the ingroup

over the outgroup (Pinter & Greenwald, 2010). After imagining themselves as a member

of either the Green group or the Blue group, participants reported their attitudes toward their ingroup, the outgroup, and a collection of individuals who were described as not belonging to any group. One of the challenges in developing an appropriate control to compare to the ingroup and outgroup involves defining a target that is not merely a third minimal group. In fact, intergroup bias seems to disappear in the context of a three- minimal group structure, presumably because an “us vs. them” distinction is less salient

(Hartstone & Augoustinos, 1995). Therefore, in Experiment 1 we attempted to introduce a control target that closely resembled the pre-categorization, unaffiliated individuals described by Brewer (1979). We then compared ratings toward this baseline with ratings

toward the ingroup and outgroup to determine if the relative preference in favor of the ingroup is based on ingroup favoritism, outgroup derogation, or a joint influence of both.

In addition, we sought to identify potential moderators of ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation by measuring participants’ feelings of identification with the ingroup and outgroup. Prior work suggests that ingroup identification is positively related to ingroup attitudes and a stronger intergroup bias (e.g., Gagnon & Bourhis, 1996;

Mummendey et al., 2000; Perreault & Bourhis, 1999). Degree of identification with the outgroup is a construct that has not been directly linked with group attitudes in the MGP but plausibly is an antecedent to outgroup prejudice, given prior research on negational identities (Zhong et al., 2008). Thus, we hypothesized that higher levels of ingroup identification would be associated with greater ingroup favoritism (Oakes et al. 1994) and that lower levels of outgroup of identification would be associated with increased outgroup derogation.

Methods

Participants and Design

A sample of 72 introductory psychology students at Ohio State University completed the experiment in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (Group label: Green vs. Blue) X 3 (Target: Green vs. Blue vs. No Group) mixed design.

Procedure

All materials were presented with MediaLab software (Jarvis, 2006). Participants were led to the laboratory and randomly assigned to one of several personal computers

visually isolated by partitions. Then, screen instructions guided participants through the minimal group manipulation, where participants were assigned to either the Green or

Blue group and given information about a no group control. Next, participants reported their attitudes toward each of these three targets. Following this, all participants indicated their level of identification with the Green and Blue groups. Finally, the participants were debriefed and released.

Independent Variables

Group label. To manipulate group membership, participants were assigned to minimal groups using an adapted version of a procedure developed by Pinter and

Greenwald (2004). First, participants were asked to imagine that they were members of either the Green Team or the Blue Team (determined by random assignment), who were competing in a campus scavenger hunt. After imagining themselves as members of a hypothetical group, participants were shown the names of five fellow group members and given 45 seconds to memorize them. To strengthen group associations, participants then completed a self-group association task, where they were shown, one at a time in random order, the five names of their ingroup, fives names of the outgroup, as well as words related to self (i.e., I, me, myself) and words related to other (i.e., other, them, they).

Across two blocks of 48 trials, participants were told to categorize each word that appeared using one of two response keys on the keyboard. One key (‘F’) corresponded to

“self” words and names of ingroup members, while the other key (‘J’) corresponded to

“other” words and the names of outgroup members. The response keys were reversed in

the second block of trials. Participants were instructed to respond quickly while trying to

avoid mistakes. Response errors required correction for the program to continue.

Target group. Following the self-group association task, participants were presented with a list of names described through screen instructions as “students who are not on either the Green or Blue Team. They represent individuals who are not competing in the scavenger hunt.” This information was intended to create the perception of a hypothetical, non-affiliated control target. After receiving these statements, participants reported their attitudes toward the Green group, the Blue group, and those not in any group.

Dependent Variables

Attitudes. To assess their evaluations of each group, participants indicated on a 1 to 7 scale the extent they agreed with the following items (adapted from Pinter &

Greenwald, 2004), presented in random order: “I like the ____ group” and “I think the

____ group is good.” Participants completed each pair of items for the Green group (α =

.55), the Blue group (α = .86), and the control target (α = .63), which was represented as

“those not in a group.” The two items were then averaged together to create separate

attitude indices for each target group. Participants’ assessments of the Green group and

Blue group were then recoded (based on their group assignment) as evaluations of their

ingroup and outgroup.

Identification. To assess their level of identification with the Green and Blue

groups, participants indicated on a 1 to 7 scale the extent they agreed with the following

items (adapted from Pinter & Greenwald, 2004), presented in random order: “I feel

attached to the ____ group” and “I identify with ____ group.” Participants completed each pair of items for both the Green group (α = .69) and the Blue group (α = .63). These items were then averaged to create separate indices of identification for each group.

Participants’ degree of identification with the Green and Blue groups were then recoded

(based on their group assignment) to reflect their level of identification with their ingroup and outgroup.

Results

Attitudes. Participants’ evaluation of the ingroup, outgroup and control group were submitted to a within-subjects repeated measures ANOVA, which revealed a significant effect of target group, F(2, 142) = 21.13, p < .001 (see Figure1). Separate repeated measures ANOVAS were then conducted to compare each pair of groups. In line with prior MGP studies, participants rated the ingroup (M = 4.76, SD = 1.29) more positively than the outgroup (M = 3.60, SD = 1.07), F(1, 71) = 28.13, p < .001. In addition, participants evaluated the ingroup more favorably than the control group, (M =

3.87, SD = 1.08) F(1, 71) = 22.86, p < .001, partial η2 = .24, which indicates that the relative difference in attitudes toward the ingroup and outgroup is based on a preference for the ingroup. However, participants also rated the outgroup as marginally less favorable than the control group, F(1, 71) = 3.17, p = .08, partial η2 = .04, which suggests that the ingroup-outgroup discrepancy is partly driven by outgroup derogation, as well.

Identification. Participants’ assessments of their level of identification with the ingroup and outgroup (which were uncorrelated, r = -.03) were first submitted to a within-subjects repeated measures ANOVA. As expected, participants felt more

identified with their ingroup (M = 4.53, SD = 1.47) than the outgroup (M = 3.01, SD =

1.16), F(1, 71) = 45.88, p < .001 (e.g., Mummendey et al., 2000; Pinter & Greenwald,

2004). Next, we examined the relationship between the degree of group identification and group attitudes. Replicating prior research (e.g., Mummendey et al., 2000), ingroup identification was positively correlated with ingroup attitudes (r = .61, p < .001) but was not associated with outgroup attitudes (r = -.19). In addition, outgroup identification was correlated with outgroup attitudes (r = .49, p < .001) but not ingroup attitudes (r = -.15).

Moderation analyses. Next, we investigated the potential moderating role of ingroup and outgroup identification on each component of the observed relative intergroup bias (i.e., ingroup favoritism, outgroup derogation). First, attitudes toward the control target were subtracted from attitudes toward the ingroup to create an index of ingroup favoritism where larger values represent greater ingroup positivity. We then conducted a regression analysis with ingroup identification, outgroup identification, and their interaction term predicting ingroup favoritism. In line with SIT (e.g., Oakes et al.,

1994), a significant main effect of ingroup identification emerged, ß = .61, t(68) = 5.37, p

< .001, where those who felt more identified with their ingroup expressed greater ingroup favoritism. Neither outgroup identification nor the ingroup X outgroup identification interaction significantly predicted ingroup favoritism, ps ≥ .07.

Next, we created an index of outgroup derogation by subtracting outgroup attitudes from control attitudes (larger values equal greater bias against the outgroup).

We then conducted a regression analysis with ingroup identification, outgroup identification, and their interaction term predicting outgroup derogation, which revealed a

significant effect of outgroup identification, ß = -.30, t(68) = -2.63, p = .01. Thus, those

who were less identified with the outgroup expressed greater outgroup derogation.

Neither ingroup identification nor the interaction of ingroup and outgroup identification

had a significant impact on outgroup derogation, ps ≥ .50. (See Appendix A for

alternative moderation analyses).

Discussion

Previous studies exploring the effects of social categorization indicate that the creation of group boundaries elicits a fundamental bias in favor of one’s ingroup (over an outgroup), even if the basis for categorization is arbitrary (e.g., Tajfel et al., 1971).

However, although a relative preference for the ingroup has been well-documented, prior research has been unable to definitively determine whether the bias is fueled by ingroup favoritism, outgroup derogation, or both. Limitations in the existing MGP work simply do not permit a clear test of this question. Therefore, in Experiment 1, we attempted to clarify the direction of the bias by including a control group in the minimal group situation. By comparing participants’ attitudes toward a baseline group of unaffiliated individuals to their evaluations of the ingroup and outgroup, we were able to decompose the intergroup bias into its component parts.

Specifically, Experiment 1 found that the control group was rated as less positive than the ingroup, but there was a tendency for unaffiliated individuals to be rated more positively than those in the outgroup. The latter finding suggests that the difference between ingroup and outgroup attitudes was driven in part by ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation. The prevailing view among social psychologists has been that

categorization elicits ingroup positivity but not necessarily outgroup derogation (Brewer,

1979; 1999; Hewstone et al., 2002). In support of this position, our findings indicate that the observed intergroup bias is primarily based on ingroup favoritism (partial η2 = .24).

However, the data from Experiment 1 suggest that outgroup derogation (partial η2 = .04) also seems to contribute to the relative difference in ingroup and outgroup attitudes. If replicable, this finding would indicate that outgroup derogation, like ingroup favoritism, could be a basic psychological phenomenon (Sumner, 1906).

In addition to providing a clearer picture of what drives intergroup bias in the

MGP, we were also able to identify important predictors of ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation. Replicating prior research, we showed that increased identification was associated with more positive ingroup attitudes and greater ingroup favoritism.

More importantly, we showed that decreased identification with the outgroup was related to less favorable outgroup attitudes and greater outgroup derogation. That is, those who disidentifed with the outgroup were the most likely to show a bias against the outgroup.

Taken together, these findings suggest that intergroup bias is likely to be greatest for those who are simultaneously highly identified with their ingroup and highly disidentified with the outgroup.

It is important to note that the consequences of outgroup identification (which appears to be distinct from ingroup identification, r = -.03) on intergroup attitudes and behavior are often not considered by researchers (e.g., Mummendey et al., 2000; Otten &

Moskowitz, 2000), but the results of Experiment 1 suggest that this variable is a potentially important predictor of outgroup derogation. In particular, this variable may be

useful in identifying a bias against the outgroup where none seems to be. As noted

earlier, most MGP studies lack an appropriate control target for comparison. But in the

few cases when a control target is present, the observed intergroup bias often appears to

be driven solely by ingroup favoritism (e.g., Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2007). However,

measuring outgroup identification could help researchers identify those individuals who

do feel prejudiced against the outgroup, despite the arbitrary nature of the group

boundaries.

In sum, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that researchers could detect biases

against the outgroup in a minimal group situation if they were to include a control target

to decompose the relative intergroup bias and measure factors to help identify those most

likely to exhibit outgroup derogation. However, before considering these results to be definitive, several cautions should be noted. First, the minimal groups used in this study were hypothetical. Participants only imagined that they were members of the Green or

Blue group; they were not actually assigned to any group. As a result, it is possible that

their attitudes were based on how they thought they might feel toward each of the target

groups, but not necessarily how they would actually feel if they were made part of a real

group. Prior research has shown that the bias displayed by participants in the MGP can

be influenced by salient norms and scripts (e.g., Gaertner & Insko, 2001; Hertel & Kerr,

2001). Thus, participants might have imagined they would hold a bias against the

outgroup (an effect that was only marginal), but if they had actually been assigned to

minimal groups, perhaps only a norm to favor the ingroup would be activated. To

address this issue, participants in Experiment 2 were assigned to non-imaginary minimal groups.

Second, the groups participants were asked to hypothetically join were described as two different “teams” competing against each other in a campus scavenger hunt.

Previous studies have shown that certain factors, such as competition for resources, can lead to outgroup prejudice (e.g., Sherif et al., 1961; Worchel, Andreoli, & Folger, 1977).

Therefore, the marginal bias against the outgroup revealed by the implementation of a control target in Experiment 1 could be the result of the competition element described in our minimal group procedure. In the absence of perceived competition, perhaps attitudes toward the outgroup would have been no different than attitudes toward the control target, suggesting only the presence of ingroup favoritism. To explore this possibility, in

Experiment 2 we removed all traces of competition from our MGP. This change allowed us to see if a significant outgroup derogation effect emerged in a more pure, competition- free intergroup setting.

Third, in Experiment 1, we introduced a control group into a minimal group situation that was described as individuals who were not members of any group. The goal was to provide a baseline target that represented unaffiliated individuals (Brewer,

1979), rather than simply an additional minimal group. As noted earlier, prior work has shown that when more than two minimal groups are manipulated, intergroup bias disappears (Hartstone & Augoustinos, 1995). The fact that we were able to replicate the classic minimal group effect (i.e., relative bias in favor of the ingroup) suggests that the control group used in Experiment 1 was not perceived by participants as a third minimal

group. Nevertheless, we wanted to further demonstrate that the control target of

unaffiliated individuals serves as an effective baseline target to compare to the ingroup

and outgroup.

In Experiment 2, we first asked participants to rate each of the three group

categories (i.e., ingroup, outgroup, and control) and then report their attitudes toward

individual members of each group. Mixed in among the (randomly presented) names of

the target group members were the names of brand new individuals participants had not

seen before and who had not been linked with any category label. Ratings of these new

names provided a manipulation check of the effectiveness of our control group. Thus, if

our control group represents a true baseline, attitudes toward the unaffiliated individuals

were predicted to be no different than attitudes toward the brand new individuals. It was

expected that implementing these new procedures would allow us to replicate and extend

the findings of Experiment 1 and rule out potential alternative explanations. In addition, we included measures of ingroup and outgroup identity to replicate the moderating influence of these variables.

CHAPTER 3: EXPERIMENT 2

Participants in Experiment 2 followed a procedure that was very similar to the one

used in Experiment 1, but with several critical changes. First, we dropped the self-other

categorization task and gave participants the opportunity to memorize the names of all

three target groups. This was done to ensure that participants’ had equal exposure to each

of the groups. Second, participants were assigned to actual (rather than hypothetical)

minimal groups to see if the outgroup bias observed in Experiment 1 would still emerge

if participants believed they were a member of a real group. Third, the minimal group

procedure was altered to eliminate the possibility that perceived intergroup competition

could account for any findings indicating the presence of outgroup derogation. Finally,

in addition to rating each group category, participants reported their attitudes toward

individual members of each group and toward a set of brand new individuals. This

change allowed us to test the effectiveness of our control target and see if the findings of

Experiment 1 could be extended to the exemplar level. Specifically, we hypothesized

that the inclusion of a control target in our MGP would reveal the presence of both

ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation on both category- and exemplar-level attitudes, and that the ingroup and outgroup attitudes would be influenced by ingroup and outgroup identification, respectively.

Method

Participants and Design

A sample of 121 introductory psychology students at Ohio State University completed the experiment in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (Group label: Green vs. Blue) X 3 (Target: Green vs. Blue vs. No Group) mixed design.

Procedure

All materials were presented with MediaLab software (Jarvis, 2006). After being led to the laboratory, participants completed a procedure similar to that used in

Experiment 1. First, participants were assigned to either the Green or Blue group and given information about a no group control. Next, participants reported their attitudes toward the three target groups, as well as the individual members of each group.

Participants then indicated their level of identification with the Green and Blue groups before being debriefed and released.

Independent Variables

Group label. Upon entering the laboratory, participants were informed that they would be randomly assigned to one of two groups: the Green group or the Blue group.

To determine which group they would join, participants were instructed to select one of two boxes on the computer screen. Each box was said to represent one of the groups, but they were unmarked so that participants did not know which box belonged to which group. After making their pick, participants were told they were now a member of the

Green or Blue group. (Membership was determined by random assignment, regardless of

which box was selected). Next, participants were presented with the names of five

ingroup members and given 45 seconds to memorize them (for the ostensible purpose of

recalling them later in the experiment). This memorization task was repeated for the

names of five outgroup members and five individuals described as not being affiliated

with any group (just as in Experiment 1).

Target. As in Experiment 1, participants reported their evaluations of three

different targets: the Green group, the Blue group, and those not in any group.

Dependent Variables

Attitudes toward group categories. To assess their evaluations of each group at

the category level, participants completed the same attitude measures used in Experiment

1. Responses to the Green group (α = .95), Blue group (α = .95), and control group (α =

.71) items were highly consistent, and thus, averaged together to create separate attitude indices for each group. Overall attitudes toward the Green group and Blue group were then recoded as evaluations of the ingroup and outgroup, as was done in Experiment 1.

Attitudes toward group members. Participants also reported their attitudes toward each individual member of the Green group, the Blue group, and those not in a group

(presented in random order) on a seven-point scale: (-3) dislike to (+3) like. To examine whether “those not in a group” was an effective control, participants also rated five new individuals whose names had not been presented earlier. Ratings of the members of the

Green group (α = .89), Blue group (α = .90), control group (α = .83), and New group (α =

.87) were highly consistent within each category, and thus, averaged to create separate

attitude indices for each target group. Finally, the Green and Blue group indices were

recoded to reflect participants’ evaluations of their ingroup and outgroup members.

Identification. To assess their level of identification with the Green and Blue

groups, participants completed the same pair of identification items used in Experiment 1.

Responses to the Green (α = .91) and Blue group (α = .88) items were highly consistent, and thus, averaged to create separate indices of identification for each group. These identification scores were then recoded to reflect identification with their ingroup and outgroup, as was done in Experiment 1.

Results

Attitudes toward group categories. Participants’ evaluation of the ingroup, outgroup and control group categories were first submitted to a within-subjects repeated measures ANOVA, which revealed a significant effect of target, F(2, 240) = 84.18, p <

.001 (see Figure 2). Follow-up repeated measures ANOVAS were then conducted to compare each pair of targets. As in Experiment 1, participants rated the ingroup (M =

5.64, SD = 1.24) more positively than both the outgroup (M = 3.79, SD = 1.41), F(1, 120)

= 101.68, p < .001, and the control group, (M = 4.16, SD = 1.18), F(1, 120) = 96.82, p <

.001, partial η2 = .45. In addition, participants reported less favorable attitudes toward the

outgroup than the control group, F(1, 120) = 11.10, p = .001, partial η2 = .09. Together,

these findings replicate the results of Experiment 1 indicating that the classic minimal

group effect is jointly driven by ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation.

Attitudes toward group members. First, to determine whether the control target

used in this study provided an effective baseline, we submitted participants’ attitudes

toward the unaffiliated persons and the new individuals to a within-subjects repeated

measures ANOVA. No significant difference between the two targets was found F < 1,

which suggests that our control target does in fact represent a baseline target, rather than

simply a third minimal group. And given that the control and new name indices were not

statistically different, we collapsed them into a single control target to compare to the

ingroup and outgroup.

Entering participants’ attitudes toward members of the ingroup, outgroup, and

combined control group into a within-subjects ANOVA revealed a significant effect of

target, F(2, 240) = 42.96, p < .001 (see Figure 3). Separate repeated measures were then

performed to examine differences between each pair of targets. Replicating the classic

minimal group effect, participants rated ingroup members (M = 1.01, SD = 1.19) more favorably than outgroup members (M = -.15, SD = 1.22), F(1, 120) = 46.81, p < .001. In support of our view that this discrepancy is driven by both a preference for the ingroup and a prejudice against the outgroup, control individuals (M = .14, SD = .91) were evaluated more less positively than ingroup members, F(1, 120) = 48.17, p < .001, partial

η2 = .29, and more positively than outgroup members, F(1, 120) = 13.32, p < .001, partial

η2 = .10.

Identification. A within-subjects repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to

compare participants’ feelings identification with the ingroup and outgroup (which were

weakly correlated, r = -.29, p = .001). As in Experiment 1, participants felt more

identified with their ingroup (M = 5.34, SD = 1.36) than the outgroup (M = 3.10, SD =

1.38), F(1, 120) = 125.03, p < .001. In addition, ingroup identification was strongly

correlated with ingroup category (r = .70, p < .001) and ingroup exemplar attitudes (r =

.43, p < .001) and weakly correlated with outgroup category attitudes (r = .20, p = .03).

Outgroup identification was positively associated with outgroup category (r = .58, p <

.001) and outgroup exemplar attitudes (r = .41, p < .001) and weakly negatively

correlated with ingroup category (r = -.23, p = .01) and ingroup exemplar (r = -.28, p =

.002) attitudes.

Moderation analyses. We first examined whether ingroup and outgroup

identification would impact ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation at the category

level. As in Experiment 1, control category attitudes were subtracted from ingroup

category attitudes to create an index of ingroup favoritism at the category level. A

regression analysis was then performed with ingroup identification, outgroup

identification, and their interaction term as predictors of ingroup favoritism. This

analysis revealed a significant effect of both ingroup identification, ß = .46, t(117) = 5.75, p < .001 and outgroup identification, ß = -.23, t(117) = -2.57, p = .01, such that higher levels of ingroup identification and lower levels of outgroup identification were associated with greater ingroup favoritism. The interaction term was not significant, p =

.82.

Next, an index of outgroup derogation at the category level was created by

subtracting outgroup category attitudes from control category attitudes, as in the previous

study. Entering outgroup derogation into a regression analysis with ingroup and

outgroup identification and their interaction term as predictors yielded a marginal effect

of ingroup identification, ß = .17, t(117) = 1.92, p = .06, and a significant effect of

outgroup identification, ß = -.26, t(117) = -2.67, p = .009. These findings indicate that

increased ingroup identification and decreased outgroup identification were both

associated with greater outgroup derogation. A significant ingroup X outgroup

identification interaction also emerged, ß = -.23, t(117) = -2.50, p = .01, which was

interpreted using procedures recommended by Aiken and West (1991). Decomposing the

interaction one standard deviation above and below the mean of the ingroup identification

index revealed a significant effect of outgroup identification on outgroup derogation for

those high in ingroup identification, ß = -.49, t(3117) = -5.01, p < .001, but not for those

low in ingroup identification, ß = -.03, t(117) = -.17, p = .86.

We then examined the influence of ingroup and outgroup identification on

ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation at the exemplar level. First, control

exemplar attitudes were subtracted from ingroup exemplar attitudes to create an index of

ingroup favoritism. Then a regression analysis with ingroup identification, outgroup

identification, and their interaction term as predictors of ingroup favoritism was

conducted, which revealed significant main effects of both ingroup, ß = .21, t(117) =

2.41, p = .02, and outgroup identification, ß = -.27, t(117) = -2.77, p = .006, but no

significant interaction, p = .22. That is, as with the category level attitudes, stronger

identification with the ingroup and weaker identification with the outgroup predicted

enhanced ingroup favoritism. Next, we created an index of exemplar-level outgroup derogation by subtracting outgroup exemplar attitudes from control exemplar attitudes.

Then a regression analysis was performed with ingroup and outgroup identification and their interaction term predicting outgroup derogation. This analysis revealed a significant

effect of ingroup identification, ß = .26, t(117) = 2.99, p = .003, a marginal effect of outgroup identification, ß = -.17, t(117) = -1.70, p = .09, and a significant ingroup X outgroup identification interaction, ß = -.23, t(117) = -2.42, p < .02, which was decomposed with the same simple slopes analysis described previously (Aiken & West,

1991). The two main effects replicated the findings for the category level measure, as did the interaction. That is, as with the category level attitudes, the results of these analyses indicated that the expression outgroup derogation was influenced by outgroup identification, but only when ingroup identification was high, ß = -.39, t(117) = -3.98, p <

.001, and not when it was low, ß = .06, t(117) = .36, p = .72. (See Appendix A for alternative moderation analyses).

Discussion

As in Experiment 1, participants reported more favorable attitudes toward the ingroup than the outgroup, and the inclusion of a control group for comparison revealed that this difference was based on a bi-directional influence of ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation. This pattern of results emerged not only for category-level attitudes, but also for evaluations of ingroup and outgroup exemplars. As in Experiment

1, the difference between ingroup and outgroup attitudes was primarily driven by ingroup favoritism, but there was also an effect for outgroup derogation, though it was smaller in magnitude. This pattern of results is consistent with prior work arguing that a preference for the ingroup is primary (Brewer, 1979; 1999), but it also suggests that minimal group categorization per se can elicit bias against the outgroup.

In addition, participants’ feelings of identification with the ingroup and outgroup influenced their expression of ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation. As in

Experiment 1, greater ingroup favoritism (at both the category and exemplar level) was observed for those who reported higher levels of ingroup identification. But in contrast to the previous study, ingroup favoritism (at both the category and exemplar level) was also stronger among those with lower levels of outgroup identification. Replicating the results of Experiment 1, participants who felt less identified with the outgroup also exhibited greater outgroup derogation in their assessments of both the group categories and group exemplars (although the latter effect was marginal), but this was only the case when ingroup identification was high. This finding indicates that those who disidentify with the outgroup are the most likely to show a bias against the outgroup and that this is particularly true for those who feel strongly attached to their ingroup. Taken together, these results highlight the usefulness of measuring ingroup and outgroup identification in providing a more complete understanding of ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation.

Importantly, we found evidence of outgroup derogation with actual (vs. hypothetical) minimal groups and in the absence of intergroup competition. This indicates that the outgroup bias we observed is likely not based on participants’ lay theories of how they might feel in an intergroup situation or a sense of threat aroused by perceived competition (e.g., Sherif et al., 1961; Worchel et al., 1977). Moreover, participants rated new individuals they had never seen before and control group exemplars in a similar fashion, which provides evidence that our control group is being perceived as a non-affiliated target, rather than simply a third minimal group.

Together, the findings from the first two experiment provide more compelling

support for the position that mere categorization is sufficient to elicit bias against the

outgroup. However, a number of studies have shown that a relative preference for the

ingroup over the outgroup can be observed at a relatively automatic level (e.g., Ashburn-

Nardo et al., 2001; Castelli, et al., 2004, Van Bavel, Packer, & Cunningham, 2008), and

recent work investigating implicit minimal group bias suggests that this effect may be

driven entirely by ingroup favoritism (e.g., Otten & Moskowitz, 2000; Otten & Wentura,

1999). The discrepancy between the results of Experiments 1 and 2, which show

evidence of outgroup derogation at an explicit level, and studies suggesting only the

influence of ingroup favoritism at an implicit level could be explained by several

different possibilities. First, perhaps it is possible to construct reasons to be biased

against the outgroup when thinking about the group targets at a conscious level, but on a

relatively automatic level, only favor the ingroup. Or maybe the outgroup derogation

documented in our first two experiments was due to demand effects that would be less

likely to influence responses on an implicit attitude measure. Indeed, prior research has

shown that the participants in MGP studies can be influenced by experimenter demand

(Berkowitz, 1994). Perhaps the inclusion of the control group in our minimal group

induction led people to infer that we were anticipating them to exhibit outgroup

derogation, and they responded accordingly in their self-reported attitudes.

A third possibility is that a bias against the outgroup exists at both the explicit and implicit level and that limitations in prior research have made it difficult to observe outgroup derogation on implicit measures. As described earlier, MGP studies using

implicit measures contain many of the same weaknesses as those employing explicit

measures. For example, many studies lack a control target to disambiguate the observed

relative preference for the ingroup over the outgroup (e.g., Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2001;

Castelli, et al., 2004). In other cases, researchers have concluded that the difference

between implicit ingroup and outgroup attitudes is based only on ingroup favoritism

because participants’ evaluations of the outgroup were objectively neutral (e.g., Otten &

Moskowitz, 2000; Otten & Wentura, 1999). That is, because ingroup attitudes were

positive and outgroup attitudes were not negative, the implicit intergroup bias that

emerges in the MGP has been assumed to be driven solely by liking for the ingroup.

However, as we explained before, the inclusion of a control group could reveal the

presence of bias against the outgroup, even if the outgroup is not evaluated negatively in

absolute terms. If implicit attitudes toward the outgroup were less favorable than

attitudes toward the control group, that would suggest that the relative intergroup bias is

based at least in part on outgroup derogation.

Therefore, to provide a full test of the direction of the minimal group bias effect and see if a bias against the outgroup also emerges at a relatively automatic level, in

Experiment 3 we assigned participants to minimal groups and measured their evaluations of the ingroup, outgroup, and control group using an implicit attitude measure. Evidence of outgroup derogation on an implicit measure will also help rule out the possibility that the results of the previous experiments were due to experimenter demand.

CHAPTER 4: EXPERIMENT 3

In Experiment 3, participants were assigned to minimal groups with the same procedure used in Experiment 2. But this time, we measured participants’ evaluations toward each of the three target groups with an implicit attitude measure (i.e., Brief IAT,

Sriram & Greenwald, 2009). Capturing participants’ (relatively) automatic evaluations of a control group in addition to their evaluations of the ingroup and outgroup was expected provide a more clear test of the nature of implicit intergroup bias in a minimal group situation. Given the pattern of results observed on explicit attitude measures in

Experiments 1 and 2, we predicted that the results of Experiment 3 would show that the implicit bias in favor of the ingroup would be also be driven by both ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation. In addition, because the implicit attitude measure requires speeded responses that make conscious deliberation more difficult, the evaluations participants provided in this experiment were less likely to be influenced by demand.4

Methods

Participants and Design

A sample of 106 introductory psychology students at Ohio State University completed the experiment in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Participants

were randomly assigned to a 2 (Group label: Green vs. Blue) X 3 (Target: Green vs. Blue vs. No Group) mixed design.

Procedure

All materials were presented with MediaLab and DirectRT software (Jarvis,

2006), and participants followed a procedure similar to those used in the first two experiments. As before, participants were randomly assigned to either the Green or Blue group and given information about a no group control. But in this experiment participants’ evaluations toward the three target groups were assessed with an implicit rather than explicit attitude measure. Following these procedures, participants were debriefed and released.

Independent Variables

Group label. Participants were randomly assigned to either the Green or Blue group using the same minimal group procedure employed in Experiment 2.

Target. As in the previous two experiments, participants were presented with three different targets: the Green group, the Blue group, and those not in any group.

Because Experiment 2 showed that attitudes toward unfamiliar names were the same as those not assigned to any group, this control condition was dropped.

Dependent Variable

Implicit attitudes. After being assigned to minimal groups, participants completed an adapted version of the Brief IAT (Sriram & Greenwald, 2009). Across four 32-trial blocks, participants were presented with different word stimuli and directed to press one response key (labeled on screen) whenever the stimulus matched one of two target

categories and to press a second key (not labeled on screen) for “anything else.” The

participants’ response latencies on each trial were recorded. Following a practice block,

participants completed three blocks designed to assess their implicit evaluations of the

ingroup, outgroup, and control group, respectively. In this part of the task, participants

were presented with positive and negative words and the names of members from each

target group. Participants were instructed to press one key (‘F’) whenever the stimulus

was a “Good” word or a member of a focal target group (for example, Green). They

were told to press another key (‘G’) for anything that did not match one of these

categories (in this example, negative words and the names of Blue group and control

group members). For each of the three critical blocks, a different target group was

categorized on the same response key as the good words, in a counterbalanced order.

Participants were instructed to respond quickly during the task while trying to avoid

mistakes. Errors required correction before the program could proceed to the next trial.

Prior to analysis, response times were averaged across all trials within each critical block

and recoded (based on participants’ group membership) as mean latencies for an ingroup,

outgroup, and control group block. Faster response times reflect more favorable

evaluations of the focal target group.

Results

Participants’ mean response latencies (in milliseconds) for each target block were first submitted to a within-subjects repeated measures ANOVA, which revealed a significant effect of target, F(2, 210) = 9.66, p < .001 (see Figure 4). Additional repeated measures ANOVAs were then performed to compare each pair of blocks. Participants

responded more quickly when ingroup members and good words were categorized on the same response key (M = 749.38, SD = 202.94) than when outgroup members and good words were paired together (M = 824.31, SD = 231.42), F(1, 105) = 21.51, p < .001, which suggests that participants evaluated the ingroup more favorably than the outgroup.

In addition, average response times when the control group was the focal target (M =

787.50, SD = 247.31) were significantly slower than when the ingroup was paired with good, F(1, 105) = 4.38, p = .04, partial η2 = .04, and significantly faster than when the outgroup was paired with good, F(1, 105) = 4.86, p = .03, partial η2 = .04.

IAT D scores were also calculated for each pair of blocks using procedures recommended by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003). These analyses indicated that participants favored the ingroup over the outgroup (D = .20) and control group (D = .10) but preferred the control group to the outgroup (D = .14). All D scores were significantly different from zero, ps < .05. This pattern of relationships corresponds to the analyses conducted with the mean response latencies in suggesting that the difference in ingroup and outgroup attitudes is based on both ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation.

Discussion

Prior research investigating implicit intergroup bias in the MGP yielded evidence of a relative preference for the ingroup over the outgroup (e.g., Ashburn-Nardo et al.,

2001; Castelli, et al., 2004) that, at least in some cases, seemed to be driven solely by ingroup favoritism (e.g., Otten & Moskowitz, 2000; Otten & Wentura, 1999). However, the lack of an appropriate control group in these studies made it difficult to definitively rule out the influence of implicit outgroup derogation in this phenomenon. Therefore, in

Experiment 3, we assigned participants to minimal groups and measured their attitudes toward the ingroup, outgroup, and control group with an implicit attitude measure. In support of previous literature, the results of this experiment indicate that people implicitly favor their ingroup. However, evidence suggesting that they are implicitly prejudiced against the outgroup also emerged. This pattern of results replicates our findings from the explicit attitude measures used in Experiments 1 and 2 and suggests (given the nature of the implicit attitude measure we used) that those prior results were likely not due to demand.

CHAPTER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION

From ethnic cleansing in Nazi Germany to contemporary terrorist attacks, many of the most tragic instances of social conflict across human history plausibly can be linked in some way to group identity and bias. In recognition of this relationship, one of the most vibrant and enduring research traditions in social psychology has focused on investigating the fundamental processes and consequences of social categorization (Fiske,

1998; Park & Judd, 2005). A critical finding from this domain is that categorization per se is sufficient to elicit intergroup prejudice and discrimination. That is, group membership, even when it is based on some arbitrary pretext, can lead people to favor those in their ingroup over those in the outgroup (e.g., Tajfel et al., 1971). Importantly, social psychologists generally believe that this bias is fueled by ingroup favoritism and not outgroup derogation, unless other hostility instigating factors are present, such as competition for resources (Brewer, 1979;1999).

However, prior studies that have attempted to examine this phenomenon within the confines of a “pure,” minimal group setting have relied on methodological designs, procedures and dependent measures that make it difficult to tell if the relative bias is indeed solely the result of ingroup favoritism or if some degree of outgroup derogation also plays a role. In particular, most prior research has not employed an appropriate

control group to help discern the direction of the minimal group effect, or if a control

group was used, other factors in the experimental design rendered the results ambiguous.

In addition, many researchers have assumed that no outgroup derogation existed because

outgroup attitudes were not objectively negative. The purpose of the present research

was to shed light on the nature of intergroup bias by introducing a control target into the

MGP – one that could reveal prejudice against the outgroup even if outgroup attitudes were not negative in an absolute sense. Therefore, we implemented a baseline target

(which we showed in Experiment 2 was not simply a third minimal group) that allowed us to make the type of comparisons necessary to decompose the relative intergroup bias that emerges in the MGP. With this methodological tool, we were able to show across three experiments and on both explicit (Experiments 1 and 2) and implicit (Experiment 3) attitude measures that the classic MGP effect is a function of both ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation.

Of the two types of bias, ingroup favoritism seems to carry more weight in driving the effect, which fits with current theories regarding the underlying motivations and consequences of social categorization (e.g., Brewer, 1979; 1999; see Hewstone et al.,

2002, for a review). But the fact that outgroup derogation also contributes to the bias suggests that the seeds of group-based conflict can take shape as soon as groups are formed – and without the influence of other factors known to incite outgroup prejudice.

This finding is not often anticipated by researchers, but neither is it necessarily contradictory with existing theory. For example, social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner,

1986) states that individuals are inherently motivated to elevate and protect the status of

the ingroup. Devaluing the outgroup (at least a little) would seem to be one effective way

of pursuing these goals. Also, the fact that outgroup derogation was evident on both

explicit and implicit measures suggests that our results are likely not due to experimenter

demand and points to the fundamental nature of outgroup bias. That is, mere categorization is sufficient to elicit prejudice against the outgroup at a relatively

automatic level. This finding is critical given that some of the best evidence that

intergroup bias in the minimal group situation is based on ingroup favoritism alone

comes from MGP studies that employ implicit measures (e.g., Otten & Moskowitz, 2000;

Otten & Wentura, 1999). By including a more appropriate control target in Experiment

3, however, we were able to show for the first time that implicit outgroup derogation can

be elicited in a minimal group context.

In addition to clarifying the direction of intergroup bias in the MGP, we also

investigated potential key predictors of ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation.

Existing literature suggests that greater identification with the ingroup leads to more

positive ingroup attitudes and a larger intergroup bias across a variety of domains (e.g.,

Fleming & Petty, 2000; Gagnon & Bourhis, 1996; Mummendey et al., 2000; Perreault &

Bourhis, 1999). However, because prior research has not included an effective control

target in the MGP, it has not been possible to directly examine the relationship between

ingroup identification and ingroup favoritism. In contrast, the results of Experiment 1

and 2 showed that higher levels of ingroup identification predicted stronger ingroup

favoritism.

Furthermore, we were also able to identify a new variable that was useful in determining who is most likely to exhibit a bias against the outgroup. Although ingroup identification has received considerable attention in the literature (Hewstone et al., 2002), few studies measure participants’ degree of identification with the outgroup, and no study has attempted to link this variable with intergroup attitudes in the MGP. Rather, in rare cases when this variable has been captured, it has been used as a manipulation check of the effectiveness of the minimal group induction (e.g., Mummendey et al., 2000; Otten &

Moskowitz, 2000). But previous research exploring the impact of taking a negational vs. affirmational group identity suggests that outgroup identification is a plausible antecedent of outgroup bias. Specifically, Zhong et al. (2008) found that inducing participants to focus on a group membership they did not hold (negational identity) led them to derogate that outgroup, presumably because they were inclined to psychologically distance themselves from the outgroup. However, it is possible that the outgroup bias observed in their studies was due to demand from their identity manipulation, and we were interested in determining if some people spontaneously disidentify with the outgroup and whether lower levels of outgroup identification would predict outgroup derogation. Measuring outgroup identification and including a control target in our studies allowed us to test this possibility, and results from Experiments 1 and 2 indicated that those who felt less identified with the outgroup exhibited greater outgroup derogation. Identifying such individuals could be very useful to researchers, particularly in cases where, overall, participants seem to be motivated only by ingroup favoritism (e.g., Halevy, Bornstein, &

Sagiv, 2008; Valdesolo & De Steno, 2007). Finally, in Experiment 2, outgroup

identification also predicted ingroup favoritism, and there was only an impact of outgroup identification on outgroup derogation when ingroup identification was high, which points to the importance of measuring both ingroup and outgroup identification in gaining an understanding of the factors that contribute to ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation.

Future Directions

By having participants evaluate a baseline control group and measuring their level of identification with the outgroup, we have been able provide a richer understanding of the bias that occurs under minimal group conditions. However, a number of important questions remain. For example, no link between explicit outgroup identification and implicit outgroup derogation was found in the current research, but future work should investigate whether implicit outgroup identification predicts implicit outgroup derogation. Nevertheless, our work suggests that those who naturally disidentify with the outgroup are more likely to derogate the outgroup in a minimal group setting (at the explicit level at least), and it will be useful for future research to investigate factors that may potentially promote or inhibit outgroup identification. For instance, certain personality variables, like social dominance orientation (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1988), that seem to have little impact on ingroup identification (e.g., Reynolds et al., 2007; c.f. Perrault & Bourhis, 1999) may be strongly associated with outgroup disidentification. On the other hand, individuals high in egalitarianism (Schwartz, 2004) might feel more attached to any outgroup and, as a result, be less likely to express outgroup derogation.

It will also be important to explore how the effects observed in the current

research relate to different downstream consequences and outcomes. For example,

behavioral measures were not included in our studies, but presumably, the bi-directional

attitudinal bias we captured would predict corresponding discriminatory behaviors. For

instance, individuals might be more/less willing to use or accept some product or object

that is associated with the ingroup, outgroup, or a control group (White & Dahl, 2006).

Also, those who are less identified with the outgroup in a minimal group situation might

chronically disidentify with real outgroups as well. That is, those who identify less with

a minimal outgroup might pervasively feel detached from any outgroup. If this is the

case, then those who report feeling less identified with the outgroup in a MGP may be

particularly likely to exhibit prejudice toward actual outgroups outside the laboratory.

In addition, because group differentiation occurs at a perceptual level as well as an evaluative and behavioral level (Doise, 1976), it would be interesting to see how a control group might shed light on different perceptual processes. For example, Van

Bavel et al. (2008) found greater neural processing of ingroup faces than outgroup faces,

following a minimal group induction, which indicated that the ingroup was perceptually

more relevant than the outgroup. Adding a control group to this study, however, could

provide additional understanding of these effects. For instance, if control faces received

the same degree of processing as outgroup faces, that would suggest the relative ingroup-

outgroup processing bias is based on the enhanced relevance of the ingroup label. On the

other hand, if control faces are processed to the same degree as ingroup faces, that would

indicate that it is the irrelevance of the outgroup label that accounts for the ingroup-

outgroup difference. Or perhaps control faces would receive the least amount of

processing of the three target groups, which would suggest that any type of affiliation is

more relevant than no affiliation, though perhaps for different reasons (i.e., because you

like the ingroup and fear the outgroup).

It would also be worthwhile to identify factors that could potentially exacerbate,

attenuate, or lead to a reversal of the bi-directional bias observed in the current research.

For instance, there could be cases where people wish to leave their ingroup and become a

member of a particular outgroup. In this type of situation, ingroup favoritism and

outgroup derogation could be replaced by outgroup favoritism and ingroup derogation.

For example, an individual could have a strong desire to become a member of a different

community because it is perceived as better in some way (e.g., more affluent, safe,

diverse, etc.) than the one to which he/she currently belongs. As a result, this person

might report more favorable attitudes toward the outgroup and less favorable attitudes

toward the ingroup (relative to a control group). Presumably, such effects would be

moderated by ingroup and outgroup identification. That is, those who feel less identified

with their ingroup should be most likely exhibit ingroup derogation, and those who feel

most identified with the outgroup should show the greatest degree of outgroup favoritism.

Of course, the control group provides diagnostic value only to the extent that

groups are favored or derogated relative to the control, and there may be situations in

which all groups are valued more or less than those who are unaffiliated. There could be

cases, for example, where individuals prefer both ingroup and outgroup members

significantly more than unaffiliated individuals. For instance, people might rate fans of

their favorite sports team and fans of a rival team more positively than those who are not

fans at all. In this situation, rooting for any team is perceived as preferable to rooting for

no team.5

In contrast, there could be cases where people prefer unaffiliated individuals to

both the ingroup and the outgroup. For example, believing that non-affiliation is a reflection of an admired trait like independence could lead people to evaluate the unaffiliated control group more favorably than either the ingroup or the outgroup. In this situation, being a member of no group is perceived as preferable to being a member of any group. It is important to note, however, that the scenarios described here seem most likely to arise with real world groups that are more than minimal in nature. Within the context of the minimal group situation, an unaffiliated control group should provide an appropriate comparison point for identifying group favoritism and derogation.

Ultimately, it is hoped that this line of research contributes to the development of effective strategies to reduce prejudice and discrimination. Based on our findings, it appears that mere group categorization is sufficient to elicit a bias against those in the outgroup on both a conscious and relatively automatic level. Additional factors known to arouse intergroup conflict, (e.g., perceived threat) do not appear to be necessary for this bias to occur, particularly for those who naturally disidentify with the outgroup. Indeed, such variables would likely serve to aggravate rather than instigate outgroup derogation.

Given the apparent fundamental nature of outgroup bias, tools to reduce prejudice seem even more needed than before.

NOTES

1 Alternative allocation measures have been proposed (e.g., Bornstein et al., 1983;

Brewer & Silver, 1978; Locksley, Ortiz, & Hepburn, 1980; Ng, 1981), but these are often criticized for having the same limitations as the Tajfel matrices (Bornstein et al., 1983) or for being susceptible to the influence of other factors, such as social norms (Gaertner &

Insko, 2001).

2 Neutral or even slightly positive attitudes toward group targets in the MGP would not necessarily be surprising, given the possibility of a positivity offset toward novel stimuli

(Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997).

3 As noted earlier, prejudice against the outgroup need not take the form of an attitude that is negative in an absolute sense. A significant difference between evaluations of the control group and outgroup, regardless of the absolute value of those ratings, is sufficient to indicate a bias against the outgroup. This is not to suggest that where outgroup attitudes objectively fall is inconsequential. Indeed, very different outcomes might result from outgroup attitudes that are negative in absolute terms than those that are neutral or

positive. The key issue is that the absence of outgroup negativity does not necessarily

indicate an absence of outgroup bias.

4 In addition, ingroup and outgroup identification were assessed in Experiment 3 with the

same measures used in the previous studies, but these variables had no impact on

participants’ implicit evaluations of the groups.

5 One could argue that this is due the formation of new group boundaries distinguishing sports fans (ingroup) from non-fans (outgroup).

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APPENDIX A

ALTERNATIVE MODERATION ANALYSES FOR EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 2

Experiment 1

To investigate the potential moderating role of ingroup and outgroup identification on ingroup favoritism, a regression analysis was conducted in which group attitudes were predicted by ingroup identification, outgroup identification, and group target (coded 0 for control and 1 for ingroup). This analysis revealed a significant effect of group, ß = .36, t(136) = 5.12, p < .001, which was qualified by an ingroup identification X group target interaction, ß = .54, t(136) = 4.75, p < .001 (see Figure 7).

Decomposing this interaction using procedures recommended by Aiken and West (1991) revealed a significant difference between ingroup and control group attitudes when ingroup identification was high, ß = .68, t(140) = 6.89, p < .001, but not when it was low,

ß = .03, t(68) = .25, p = .80. That is, participants reported more favorable attitudes toward the ingroup relative to the control group (i.e., greater ingroup favoritism) when they felt more (vs. less) identified with the ingroup. No other significant effects emerged.

To determine whether ingroup and outgroup identification had any moderating influence on outgroup derogation, a regression analysis was performed in which group attitudes were predicted by ingroup identification, outgroup identification, and group

target (coded 0 for control and 1 for outgroup). Only a significant outgroup identification

X group target interaction emerged, ß = .25, t(136) = 2.23, p = .03, which showed that

there was a significant difference between outgroup and control group attitudes among

those who felt less identified with the outgroup, ß = -.36, t(140) = -2.73, p = .007, but not for those who felt more identified with the outgroup, ß = .12, t(140) = .88, p = .38 (see

Figure 8). Specifically, participants reported less favorable attitudes toward the outgroup compared to the control group (i.e., greater outgroup derogation) when they felt less (vs. more) identified with the outgroup.

Experiment 2

First, we examined whether identification with the ingroup and outgroup moderated the pattern of ingroup favoritism observed in participants’ category evaluations. To do so, category attitudes were entered into a regression equation with ingroup identification, outgroup identification, and group target (coded 0 for control and

1 for ingroup) as predictors. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of outgroup identification, ß = .22, t(234) = 2.81, p = .005, and group target, ß = .52, t(234) = 10.61, p

< .001. These effects were qualified by a significant outgroup identification X group

target interaction, ß = -.19, t(234) = -2.42, p = .02 (see Figure 9), which indicated that those who felt less identified with the outgroup reported more favorable attitudes toward the ingroup relative to the control group (i.e., greater ingroup favoritism), ß = .74, t(238)

= 9.77, p < .001, than those who felt more identified with the outgroup, ß = .31, t(238) =

4.06, p < .001. In addition, as in Experiment 1, a significant interaction between ingroup

identification and group target emerged, ß = .38, t(234) = 5.44, p < .001, which revealed greater ingroup favoritism among those who identified more with the ingroup, ß = .83, t(238) = 12.33, p < .001, than among those who identified less, ß = .22, t(238) = 3.20, p =

.002 (see Figure 10). In sum, these results suggest that both ingroup and outgroup identification contributed to the expression of ingroup favoritism.

Second, to investigate the impact of ingroup and outgroup identification on outgroup derogation at the category level, a regression analysis was conducted with ingroup identification, outgroup identification, and group target (coded 0 for control and

1 for outgroup) predicting category attitudes. This analysis revealed a significant effect of outgroup identification, ß = .24, t(234) = 2.54, p = .01, that was qualified by a marginally significant outgroup identification X group target interaction, ß = .17, t(234) =

1.79, p = .08 (see Figure 11). Decomposing this interaction showed that the outgroup was less favorably evaluated than the control group by those who felt less identified with the outgroup, ß = -.33, t(238) = -4.07, p < .001, whereas those who felt more identified with the outgroup did not express outgroup derogation, ß = .05, t(238) = .59, p = .56.

We then tested to see if the degree of identification with the ingroup and outgroup was related to ingroup favoritism at the exemplar level. Exemplar attitudes were submitted to a regression analysis with ingroup identification, outgroup identification, and group target (coded 0 for control and 1 for ingroup) as predictors. Significant effects emerged for ingroup identification, ß = .16, t(234) = 1.94, p = .05, outgroup identification, ß = .22, t(234) = 2.37, p = .02, and group target, ß = .36, t(234) = 6.25, p <

.001. More critically, both ingroup identification, ß = .18, t(234) = 2.19, p = .03, and

outgroup identification, ß = -.23, t(234) = -2.52, p = .01, interacted with group target. As with the category attitudes, greater ingroup favoritism was observed when participants were high in ingroup identification, ß = .55, t(238) = 6.97, p < .001, rather than low, ß =

.21, t(238) = 2.61, p = .01 (see Figure 12), and when they were low in outgroup

identification, ß = .61, t(238) = 7.48, p < .001, rather than high, ß = .15, t(238) = 1.82, p =

.07 (Figure 13). These results correspond to what was found on category attitudes in this

study and suggest that both ingroup and outgroup identification moderated the extent to

which participants favored the ingroup (relative to the control group).

Next, to determine if ingroup and outgroup identification had any impact on

outgroup derogation at the exemplar level, we performed a regression analysis with

ingroup identification, outgroup identification, and group target (coded 0 for control and

1 for outgroup) predicting exemplar attitudes. This analysis revealed a significant main

effect of outgroup identification, ß = .23, t(234) = 2.29, p = .02, but no significant

outgroup identification X group target interaction was found, ß = .10, t(234) = .96, p =

.34. Thus, in contrast to the results of the category evaluations in Experiment 1 and 2,

outgroup identification did not appear to influence the degree of outgroup derogation

expressed in participants’ attitudes toward the group exemplars.

Taken together, the results of Experiment 1 and 2 suggest that researchers trying

to identify to those who are most likely to favor the ingroup and derogate the outgroup

would be aided by measuring both ingroup identification and outgroup identification.

APPENDIX B

ILLUSTRATIONS

MD MIP MJP In 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7

Out 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25

Table 1. Multiple-choice allocation matrix with MD + MIP and MJP as opposing orientations

Figure 1. Mean explicit attitude ratings toward group categories in Experiment 1

Figure 2. Mean explicit attitude ratings toward group categories in Experiment 2

Figure 3. Mean explicit attitude ratings toward group members in Experiment 2

Figure 4. Mean category outgroup derogation as a function of ingroup and outgroup identification in Experiment 2

Figure 5. Mean exemplar outgroup derogation as a function of ingroup and outgroup identification in Experiment 2

Figure 6. Implicit attitudes toward group categories as indicated by mean response latencies on the Brief IAT in Experiment 3

Figure 7. Mean attitudes toward the ingroup vs. control (ingroup favoritism) as a function of ingroup identification in Experiment 1

Figure 8. Mean attitudes toward the outgroup vs. control (outgroup derogation) as a function of outgroup identification in Experiment 1

Figure 9. Mean attitudes toward the ingroup vs. control (ingroup favoritism) as a function of outgroup identification in Experiment 2

Figure 10. Mean attitudes toward the ingroup vs. control (ingroup favoritism) as a function of ingroup identification in Experiment 2

Figure 11. Mean attitudes toward the outgroup vs. control (outgroup derogation) as a function of outgroup identification in Experiment 1

Figure 12. Mean attitudes toward ingroup members vs. control group members (ingroup favoritism) as a function of ingroup identification in Experiment 2

Figure 13. Mean attitudes toward ingroup members vs. control group members (ingroup favoritism) as a function of outgroup identification in Experiment 2

APPENDIX C

SAMPLE MATERIALS FROM EXPERIMENT 1

Minimal Group Induction (Screen 1)

Minimal Group Induction (Screen 2)

Self-Group Association Task Instructions

Team Name Targets for Self-Group Association Task

Sample Trial from Self-Group Association Task

APPENDIX D

SAMPLE MATERIALS FROM EXPERIMENT 2

Minimal Group Induction (Screen 1)

Minimal Group Induction (Screen 2)

Minimal Group Induction (Screen 3)

Minimal Group Induction (Screen 4)

Minimal Group Induction (Screen 5)

Minimal Group Induction (Screen 6)

Minimal Group Induction (Screen 7)

Minimal Group Induction (Screen 8)

Minimal Group Induction (Screen 9)

100

APPENDIX E

SAMPLE MATERIALS FROM EXPERIMENT 3

101

Brief IAT Sample Task Instructions

102

Positive and Negative Word Targets for Brief IAT

103

Sample Trial from Brief IAT

104

Sample Trial from Brief IAT

105