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Article: Lazuras, L., Ypsilianti, A., Powell, P. et al. (1 more author) (2019) The roles of impulsivity, self-regulation and emotion regulation in the experience of self-disgust. Motivation and Emotion, 43 (1). pp. 145-158. ISSN 0146-7239 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11031-018-9722-2

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ORIGINAL PAPER

The roles of impulsivity, self-regulation, and emotion regulation in the experience of self-disgust

Lambros Lazuras1 · Antonia Ypsilanti1 · Philip Powell2 · Paul Overton3

© The Author(s) 2018

Abstract Self-disgust is a distinct self-conscious emotion that is characterized by disgust appraisals directed towards the self. Recent studies have demonstrated the negative efects of self-disgust on physical and mental health, but little is known about the psychological characteristics that are associated with self-disgust experiences. The present study assessed the direct and indirect efects of impulsivity, self-regulation, and emotion regulation on self-disgust. Overall, 294 participants (M age = 21.84 years, SD = 4.56) completed structured and anonymous measures of trait impulsivity, self-regulation, emo- tion regulation strategies, and self-disgust. Path analysis showed that non-planning impulsivity and expressive suppression (positively) and cognitive reappraisal and self-regulation (negatively) predicted self-disgust. Intervening variable analysis showed that attentional and non-planning impulsivity had signiicant indirect efects on self-disgust via emotional regulation strategies and self-regulation. Our indings provide, for the irst time, evidence about the association between self-disgust and individual diferences in impulsivity, self-regulation, and emotion regulation, and have implications for the psychological phenomena that may lead to self-disgust experiences in non-clinical populations.

Keywords Self-disgust · Self-conscious · Self-regulation · Emotion regulation · Impulsivity

Disgust is a universal emotion that serves survival in humans developed as an aversion to physical parasites, and socio- by alerting the body to potential contamination and exposure culturally developed as aversion to social parasites. Support- to biological (Rozin et al. 2000). In this respect, ing evidence has also shown that disgust sensitivity is dif- disgust has been primarily associated with food and body ferentiated across domains pertaining to exposure, products (Rozin and Fallon 1987), and other stimuli that sexuality and moral violations (Tybur et al. 2009). Simpson serve as primes for and pathogen exposure (Curtis et al. (2006) demonstrated that disease-related and socio- and Biran 2001; Curtis et al. 2004). The disease and patho- moral disgust stimuli had some unique distinctive proper- gen avoidance model of disgust posits that the core mecha- ties (e.g., temporal duration). In support of this view, recent nism of disgust has been developed to bias behaviour against evidence from showed that a single primes of disease, and through social development, this neural region (the insula) may serve the three domains of mechanism triggers disgust towards moral and disgust sensitivity (Vicario et al. 2017), and that core and violations (Oaten et al. 2009). Similarly, Curtis and Biran moral disgust stimuli provoke similar facial motor activity (2001) argued that the emotion of disgust has biologically (Chapman et al. 2009). While disgust is meant to serve an adaptive function to the biological and the socio-moral self, abnormal levels of dis- * Lambros Lazuras [email protected] gust reactivity to a range of elicitors (e.g., measured by higher scores in proneness to disgust in self-reported surveys) has 1 Department of Psychology, Sociology & Politics, been associated with mental health problems, such as , Sheield Hallam University, 42 Collegiate Crescent, mood, and eating disorders (e.g., Fox 2009; Ille et al. 2014; Sheield S10 2BQ, UK Olatunji et al. 2010), and may represent a risk factor for sui- 2 Department of Economics, University of Sheield, Sheield, cidal ideation (e.g., among people with eating disorders; Chu UK et al. 2015). Power and Dalgleish (2008) argued that a special 3 Department of Psychology, University of Sheield, Sheield, form of disgust directed to the self (i.e., self-focused disgust UK

Vol.:(0123456789)1 3 Motivation and Emotion or, simply, self-disgust) is more relevant to certain psycho- were frequently mentioned as contributing factors to the pathologies, and that self-disgust can explain the association genesis of self-disgust (Powell et al. 2014). These indings between dysfunctional thought patterns, such as rumina- suggest that self-disgust requires some sort of self-awareness tion and negative evaluations of the self and the world, and and a symbolic representation of the self, a feature that is resulting depressive mood. Indeed, in his original, inluential not necessary for the experience of basic emotions (e.g., writings on , Beck (1967) argued that self-critical , , , disgust), but plays an important role in and maladaptive self-focused cognitions elicited negative the experience of more complex, self-conscious emotions, self-directed , which eventually resulted in depressive such as , , and (Power and states. The role of afect was critical in this process, and was Dalgleish 2008; Tracy and Robins 2004). In particular, a conceptualised by Beck as explicitly involving disgust: “the main distinctive feature of self-conscious emotions is that of self-dislike is stronger and may to a feeling they entail self-evaluation, self-relection, and self-repre- of disgust with himself” (Beck 1967, p. 18). sentation. People are aware of and relect on their actions In support of this argument, Overton et al. (2008) devel- and evaluate them against socio-cultural and moral norms oped a self-report measure of self-disgust (the Self-Disgust and standards, and accordingly experience a variety of self- Scale [SDS]) and showed that self-disgust mediated the conscious emotions (Leary 2004; Tracy and Robins 2007). association between dysfunctional thoughts and depressive Evidence has also shown that compared to other , symptoms, a inding that was supported by subsequent stud- social species that are capable of experiencing self-aware- ies (albeit with more complex structures; e.g., Powell et al. ness (e.g., primates) are also capable of displaying emotional 2013; Simpson et al. 2010). In their conceptualization and reactions that are similar to self-conscious emotions, such as measurement of self-disgust, Overton et al. (2008) identi- pride, shame, and embarrassment (Tracy and Robins 2004; ied two dimensions of self-disgust: the “disgusting self”, Weisfeld and Dillon 2012). Because self-conscious emotions which relects disgust towards the self (e.g., “I ind myself require self-referential appraisals as well as an appreciation repulsive”), and “disgusting ways”, which represents dis- of other people’s emotions and thoughts, they are said to gust towards one’s own actions and behaviour (e.g., “the emerge later in development as compared to basic emotions way I behave makes me despise myself”). The two-dimen- that are experienced from childbirth (Izard 2007; Muris and sional structure of self-disgust and the conceptual distinc- Meesters 2014). tion between self/personal and behavioural disgust were Cognitive complexity is another distinctive feature of validated in another study that used an alternative measure self-conscious emotions. While basic emotions can involve of self-disgust (i.e., the Questionnaire for the Assessment more complex cognitive processes, they do not necessitate of Self-Disgust [QASD]; Schienle et al. 2015). Although them in the same way as self-conscious emotions do (e.g., there are alternative explanations about the development de Hooge et al. 2010; Tracy and Robins 2007). Self-con- and adaptation of the basic disgust emotion towards physi- scious emotions (e.g., shame, guilt, pride) typically involve cal and “social” parasites (Curtis and Biran 2001), much more complex cognitive perquisites and processing than less is known about the psychological antecedents of self- basic emotions (e.g., anger, fear), including a need for self- disgust—in other words, how and why people become to awareness; an awareness of others’ appraisals; an under- feel disgusted with aspects of their self. Partly, this may be standing of social standards, norms and rules; the causal attributed to the relatively more recent development of self- attribution of actions and goals to social actors, including disgust research, and to the focus of this research on the things like intent; and an understanding of the surrounding efects of self-disgust on mental health and well-being (e.g., situational and contextual factors during the emotion elicit- Azlan et al. 2017; Brake et al. 2017; Overton et al. 2008). ing experience (de Hooge et al. 2010). The same degree Exploring the psychological origins of self-disgust, how- of cognitive complexity is present in the conceptualization ever, presents a compelling and equally important domain of self-disgust as a psychological phenomenon that entails of research inquiry (Powell et al. 2015). In this paper, we “an enduring (or repetitive) disgust reaction elicited by par- particularly focus on the role of self-regulatory failure and ticular aspect(s) of the self, which are deemed signiicant impulsivity as potential explanatory variables of the self- to an individual’s of self, and appraised as relatively disgust experience. constant and/or not easily changeable” (Powell et al. 2015, p 0.5). Given the shared features between self-disgust and other self-conscious emotions, some researchers have argued Self‑disgust as an emotion schema that self-disgust represents a distinct self-conscious emotion (Roberts and Goldenberg 2007), or that it represents a spe- Qualitative research into the subjective experience of self- cial form of shame (Power and Dalgeish 2008). Powell et al. disgust showed that social comparison processes and the (2015) provided an encompassing deinition of self-disgust internalization of other people’s reactions and criticisms as an emotion schema (see also Izard 2007), or an enduring 1 3 Motivation and Emotion cognitive-afective orientation towards the self, involving an and behavioural outcomes, such as substance use, impulsive afective component similar to the emotional experience of purchase behaviour and overspending, school underachieve- disgust, with relevant cognitive and higher-order appraisals ment, relationship problems, violence, sexual risk-taking, (e.g., “my body is revolting”). In their deinition, Powell and long-term unemployment (Baumeister 2003; Carey et al. et al. (2015) emphasized the self-referential dimensions of 2004; Daly et al. 2015; DeWall et al. 2007; Rafaelli and self-disgust, as well as the dynamic interaction between the Crockett 2003; Tangney et al. 2004; Vohs and Faber 2007). emotional experiences of (self-directed) disgust, associ- Succumbing to impulses is perhaps one of the most obvi- ated self-referential cognitive content, such as thoughts and ous expressions of self-regulatory failure (DeYoung and beliefs about one’s actions and physical body, and related Rueter 2016), and behavioural impulsivity has been recog- behaviours (e.g., avoidance and rejection). nized as one of the key components of inadequate self-reg- While self-disgust is thought to be often concomitant ulation (Baumeister and Heatherton 1996; Baumeister et al. with other negative self-directed afective phenomena, such 2007). According to Carver et al. (2009), trait impulsivity as shame (Powell et al. 2014), Powell et al. (2015) argue for involves the presence of an urge or , and the inabil- unique, identifying properties, such as the phenomenological ity to self-regulate, inhibit, and control that impulse. Trait state of revulsion, a discrete expressive proile (e.g., facial impulsivity has been associated with psychopathology (e.g., expression), links with contamination and the laws of con- Granö et al. 2007; Peluso et al. 2007; Whitesire and; Lynam tagion and similarity, and speciic appraisals (e.g., “yuck, 2001), and studies on children with ADHD have indicated that is repulsive”). Shame, on the other hand, is largely a positive association between childhood impulsivity and concerned with hierarchical submission and evaluations of later development of depression (Brodsky et al. 2001). reduced social rank (Gilbert 2007). A small body of research Trait impulsivity has also been positively associated with a has also conirmed independent predictive validity for self- range of adverse behavioural outcomes, such as unhealthy disgust over and above other self-conscious emotions such eating and overeating (e.g., Jasinska et al. 2012), sexual as shame (e.g., Olatunji et al. 2015; Penley and Tomaka risk-taking (e.g., Kahn et al. 2002), as well as substance- 2002). While there is scope for more research to empirically related and behavioural addictions (e.g., Lee et al. 2012; support the diferentiation between self-disgust and other Verdejo-García et al. 2008). According to Barratt’s three- self-conscious emotions it is equally important to identify factor model impulsivity relects three main characteristics: the experiences and psychological processes that may lead greater motor activation (motor impulsivity), such as acting people to experience self-disgust (Powell et al. 2015). In this at the spur of the moment; less to the task at hand paper, we strongly emphasize the cognitive self-referential (attention impulsivity); and a reduced ability to plan actions aspect of self-disgust and we argue that self-disgust partly (non-planning impulsivity; Patton et al. 1995; Stanford et al. stems from people’s capacity (or the lack thereof) to resist 2009). Empirical support for this model has come from stud- impulses and exercise regulation of their thoughts, actions, ies using self-reported measures, such as Barratt’s Impul- and emotions. siveness Scale (BIS; Patton et al. 1995), as well as studies showing a positive correlation between the BIS and objec- tive neuropsychological and laboratory behavioural meas- Self‑disgust as self‑regulatory failure ures of impulsivity, event-related potentials (e.g., reduced P300 amplitude) and fMRI studies (Asahi et al. 2004; Ding Self-regulation is deined as people’s capacity to focus on et al. 2014; Moeller et al. 2001; Russo et al. 2008; Spinella their long-term goals and resist temptation and impulses for 2007). immediate gratiication (Carver and Scheier 2016). As such, Importantly, self-regulation and impulsivity have self-regulation involves the ability to alter thoughts, actions, been diferentially associated with the experience of self- and emotions in a way that serves goal striving, whether the conscious emotions. In particular, Tangney et al. (2004) goal is by the self, the society or both. Self-regulation reported a signiicant positive correlation between higher has gained considerable research and media attention over self-regulation scores and guilt, and a signiicant negative the last 15 years, and some researchers have even proclaimed association between higher self-regulation and shame, even it as humanity’s greatest strength, and as the key to success after controlling for the efects of social desirability. Another in life (Baumeister et al. 2002). Indeed, a large body of evi- study showed that self-regulation failure in an exercise con- dence has shown that higher self-regulation is associated text (i.e., missing an exercise session) was associated with with better academic and work performance, good interper- the experience of shame and guilt (Streuber et al. 2015). sonal relationships, better mental health outcomes, emo- In a similar vein, Sheikh and Janof-Bulman (2010) found tional well-being, and life satisfaction (Hofmann et al. 2014; that inadequate self-regulation (e.g., failing to restrain exces- Tangney et al. 2004). Accordingly, self-regulation failure has sive eating, gambling, and overspending) were signiicantly been associated with a whole host of adverse psychological associated with shame. Carver et al. (2010) reported that

1 3 Motivation and Emotion authentic pride (e.g., feelings of accomplishment and coni- whereas the latter represents a response-focused strategy dence) was positively associated with self-control, whereas that aims to modulate emotional responses after they have hubristic pride (e.g., feelings of arrogance) was associated occurred by inhibiting expressive behaviour (e.g., modulat- with impulsivity. Finally, an experimental study on con- ing anger by suppressing it; Gross 2013, 2015). sumer behaviour showed that participants with higher trait Both cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression impulsivity succumbed to more impulsive purchase behav- are commonly used to down-regulate emotions but they iours than consumers with lower impulsivity scores, and this have diferential consequences on various levels of human self-indulgence was associated with experiencing negative functioning. At a cognitive level, expressive suppression is purchase-related self-conscious emotions, such as guilt and associated with poorer memory for the situation that elic- (Ramanathan and Williams 2007; Experiment 1). ited the emotional response, whereas cognitive reappraisal Taken together, these indings highlight the role of self- has been associated with improved memory and exam per- regulatory capacity (or the lack thereof) in the experience formance (Sheppes and Gross 2011). Similarly, cognitive of self-conscious emotions in a simple but profound way. reappraisal, but not expressive suppression, attenuated the When people succumb to impulsive behaviour and fail to efect of negative emotions (e.g., disgust, fear) on decision- regulate their actions according to ideal self-representations making (Heilman et al. 2010). At a social level, suppression or standards, they are likely to experience shame, guilt, and has been associated with less liking from interacting part- hubristic pride, whereas adequate self-regulation is associ- ners, whereas cognitive reappraisal does not seem to have an ated with authentic pride (Carver et al. 2010). Possibly, these adverse impact on interpersonal relationships (Butler et al. associations can be attributed to the self-representational 2003; Gross and John 2003). At an afective level, cognitive and cognitive complexity of self-conscious emotions: people reappraisal is associated with decreased negative emotional relect on how well they can regulate their behaviour, evalu- experiences and the increase of positive ones, but expres- ate their behaviour against personal or societal expectations sive suppression decreases positive emotional experiences and standards, and accordingly experience self-conscious and leaves negative ones unchanged (Gross and John 2003; emotions. Self-disgust is also characterized by self-repre- Gross and Thompson 2007). Similarly, a cross-cultural study sentation and cognitive complexity (e.g., Powell et al. 2015), showed that cognitive reappraisal was associated positively and this makes it theoretically plausible to anticipate an with life satisfaction and trait positive afect, and negatively association between self-regulation, trait impulsivity, and with depressed mood and trait negative afect, and the oppo- self-disgust. People may experience more self-disgust from site pattern of associations was observed for expressive sup- succumbing to impulsive behaviour and failing to self-reg- pression (Haga et al. 2009). Finally, expressive suppression ulate, and less self-disgust when adequate self-regulation is has been positively associated with higher scores in mental exercised and impulsive behaviour is restrained. Neverthe- health symptoms, such as anxiety, PTSD, and depression less, no study has addressed this question thus far. (Moore et al. 2008). Despite the abundance of studies on the efects of cog- nitive reappraisal and expressive suppression on various Emotion regulation and self‑disgust aspects of human functioning, there is limited evidence about the efects of those emotion regulation strategies on Emotion regulation represents a group of automatic or con- the experience of self-conscious emotions, such as self- trolled processes by which people try to modify their emo- disgust. This is an important omission for the following tions in order to achieve a desired goal (Aldao et al. 2010; reasons. First, the conceptualization of self-disgust as a Gross 2013; Webb et al. 2012), and this goal may entail self-conscious emotion schema involves a lasting appraisal increasing (up-regulation) or decreasing (down-regulation) of the self (or its actions) as disgusting and repulsive, and the magnitude or the duration of emotional responses (Gross this appraisal may be activated by speciic beliefs, situations 2013). According to the process model of emotion regula- or events (Powell et al. 2015). As an antecedent-focused tion (Gross and Thompson 2007) people can regulate their strategy, cognitive reappraisal may counteract the efects emotions before (antecedent-focused emotion regulation) of relevant eliciting events, thoughts, or situations before or after (response-focused emotion regulation) the emo- self-disgust is experienced, and accordingly lead to lower tional response, and diferent emotion regulation strategies levels of self-disgust. Support for this argument comes from have diferent consequences (Gross 2013). Cognitive reap- studies that have demonstrated how appraisals (e.g., causal praisal and expressive suppression represent two distinct and attributions) can inluence the experience of self-conscious widely studied emotion regulation strategies. The former is emotions, such as shame and guilt (Tracy and Robins 2006). an antecedent-focused strategy and involves the cognitive Furthermore, as a response-modulation strategy, expressive re-interpretation of events or situations in order to alter the suppression will require a great deal of resources to modu- emotional response or reduce its impact before it occurs, late self-disgust once it is experienced (Sheppes and Gross

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2011), and studies have shown that suppression is an inef- judge their actions against their self-ideals (or ideals fective strategy in undoing the efects of negative emotional posed by the society or referent others), and accordingly states (Gross and John 2003; Gross and Thompson 2007). experience self-disgust. According to Powell et al. (2015), Therefore, if cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppres- self-disgust involves a lasting appraisal of the self as dis- sion have diferential efects on the emotional experience gusting, and the proxy factors that can elicit self-disgust (Gross 2015; Gross and Thompson 2007), then it is theoreti- experiences may involve individual characteristics and cally plausible that they would be diferentially associated traits or other important aspects of the self (e.g., “the way with self-disgust, with cognitive appraisal negatively associ- I act makes me feel sick”). Relatedly, self-appraisals of ated and expressive suppression positively associated with one’s own behaviour and actions is an important aspect of self-directed disgust responses. However, this assumption self-disgust, and this is relected in the way self-disgust has not been empirically examined as yet. has been operationalized and measured in relevant quan- titative studies (e.g., “the way I behave makes me despise myself”, “I feel good about the ways I behave”, and “my The present study behaviour repels other people”; Overton et al. 2008). Poor self-regulation and higher impulsivity appear to be Over the last decade a growing body of research has exam- the cornerstones of a wide range of problem behaviours ined the association between self-disgust and physical and (Baumeister et al. 2002; Tangney et al. 2004), and should mental health outcomes in various domains (e.g., Azlan provide the factual basis for negative self-evaluations of et al. 2017; Brake et al. 2017; Ille et al. 2014; Overton et al. one’s own actions. Therefore, it is theoretically plausible 2008). Nevertheless, the psychological characteristics and that people should experience lower levels of self-disgust processes that may give rise to self-disgust experiences have if they lived up to their ideal self-standards by exhibiting not been empirically investigated as yet. The focus of this adequate self-regulation and restraining impulsive behav- paper is on the psychological characteristics that may lead iour, and higher levels of self-disgust if they failed to self- people to experience self-disgust, and more speciically, on regulate and succumbed to impulsiveness. the roles of self-regulation, emotion regulation and impul- Secondly, emotion regulation strategies can diferentially sivity in this process. The existing evidence supports the inluence the experience of self-disgust. People who adopt contention that self-disgust represents a self-conscious adaptive emotion-regulation strategies, such as cognitive emotion schema that incorporates some of the key features reappraisal, are allowed to re-construe and reinterpret the of other self-conscious emotions (i.e., cognitive complex- outcomes of their actions and, accordingly, the experience of ity and symbolic self-representation); emerges from the self-disgust will be attenuated. In contrast, the use of mala- complex interaction between , emotion, apprais- daptive emotion regulation strategies, such as expressive als, and cognition; and can be triggered or “elicited” by a suppression, is focused on inhibiting the emotional response relection on psychological or physical characteristics of that ensued from impaired self-regulation and is insuicient the self (Powell et al. 2015). With this conceptualization in to modulate the negative experience of self-disgust. Finally, mind, we propose a model of self-disgust that particularly the ability to regulate one’s emotions has been associated addresses the roles of impaired self-regulation, maladaptive with reaching behavioural goals, whereas the lack of such emotion regulation, and high impulsivity as key psychologi- ability is often associated with self-regulatory failure and the cal characteristics that may elicit self-disgust experiences. expression of impulsive behaviours (Roberton et al. 2012). It is important to note that, within the context of the present Also, models of self-regulation posit that higher (vs. lower) study, the elicitation of self-disgust is not discussed as a self-regulation act protectively against impulsive urges on stimulus–response process, such as the automatic activa- behavioural outcomes (e.g., Baumeister and Heatherton tion of revulsion and disgust following exposure to disgust- 1996; Baumeister et al. 2007), and research has shown that related stimuli (e.g., faeces). Rather, following from Powell the adverse efects of impulsivity on behavioural and men- et al. (2015) we refer to the elicitation of self-disgust as the tal health outcomes can be mediated by emotion regulation cognitive, afective and physiological response to lasting fea- strategies and self-regulation (e.g., d’Acremont and Van der tures of the self. This conceptualization is consistent with Linden 2007; Liau et al. 2015). It is sensible to argue that Izard’s (2007, 2009) contention that emotion schemas, such emotion and self-regulation could also play an intervening as self-disgust, can be activated by certain environmental role and explain the association between impulsivity and triggers (i.e., external stimuli), as well as “internal” stimuli, self-disgust. Based on these contentions, the following such as thoughts, memories and self-appraisals. hypotheses were formed: Our model is based on two contentions. First, the sym- bolic self-representation and cognitive complexity aspects H1 Higher self-regulation and lower trait impulsivity will of self-disgust allow people to relect on their actions, be associated with lower levels of self-disgust.

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H2 Adaptive emotion regulation strategies (i.e., cogni- thinking or reasoning about their actions. It consists of tive reappraisal) will be associated with lower levels of three sub-scales that relect attentional (e.g., “I don’t pay self-disgust. attention”), motor (e.g., “I say things without thinking”), and non-planning (e.g., “I am future oriented” reverse H3 Maladaptive emotion regulation strategies (i.e., expres- scored item) impulsivity. Calculating a total “impulsiv- sive suppression) will be associated with higher levels of ity” score is not recommended psychometrically (Coutlee self-disgust. et al. 2014). Responses are coded on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = rarely/never, 4 = almost always/always). Following H4 The ability to regulate thoughts, emotions, and behav- reverse scoring of 8 items, a mean score is computed for iour (i.e., emotion regulation and self-regulation) will indi- each subscale and higher scores indicate higher impulsive- rectly account for (intervene in) the association between ness. The reliability and validity of the ABIS has been impulsivity and self-disgust. reported by Coutlee et al. (2014). In the present study, the internal consistency reliability coeicients (Cronbach’s α) for each ABIS subscale was acceptable (ABIS non-planning Methods α = 0.74; ABIS motor α = 0.75; ABIS attention α = 0.67).

Participants Emotion regulation Overall, 450 individuals were approached face to face by Emotion regulation was measured with the Emotion Regula- a trained research assistant. Four hundred and thirty-one tion Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross and John 2013). The ERQ participants agreed to take part in the study and, of them, is a 10-item measure that assesses individual diferences in 294 cases were completed and eligible for analysis in the emotion regulation strategies. It consists of two sub-scales present study (inal response rate = 65.3%). Only complete that relect expressive suppression (e.g., “I control my emo- cases were used in analyses due to the ethical right to with- tions by not expressing them”) and cognitive reappraisal draw from the survey at any time. Missing data analysis (e.g., “When I want to feel positive emotion (such as or showed that non-completers did not difer signiicantly from ), I change what I’m thinking about”). Responses the 294 cases, and that the missing cases could be classi- are given on 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, ied as MCAR (Little’s test p > .05). Participants were aged 7 = strongly agree). A mean score is computed for each scale between 17 and 51 years (M = 21.84, SD = 4.56), 60.5% were and higher scores indicate higher emotion regulation. The females, and 89.5% had a British background, and included reliability and validity of the ERQ have been reported in undergraduate and postgraduate students from three univer- previous studies (Gross and John 2003). In the present study sities in South Yorkshire, England. The research was carried the internal consistency reliability for the ERQ sub-scales out in accordance with the Code of Human Research Ethics was high (cognitive reappraisal α = 0.81; expressive suppres- of the British Psychological Society, and participants were sion α = 0.72). provided with forms to complete, and were duly informed about their participation rights (i.e., voluntary and anonymous participation; no penalties for withdrawing from Self-regulation the study at any stage without previous notice). Self-regulation was measured with the 31-item Short Self- Measures Regulation Questionnaire (SSRQ; Carey et al. 2004). The SSRQ is the shorter version of the Self-Regulation Ques- Demographics tionnaire (SRQ; Brown et al. 1999) and relects diferent aspects of people’s self-regulatory capacity, such as goal- Demographic characteristics were assessed with open-ended setting and monitoring (e.g., “I set goals for myself and keep questions asking participants to indicate their age (i.e., how track of my progress”), self-control (e.g., “I am able to resist old are you?), gender, and nationality. temptation”), and deliberate thinking/reasoning of actions (e.g., “I usually think before I act”). Responses are given Impulsivity on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). A sum score is generated and higher scores relect Impulsivity was assessed with the Abbreviated Impul- greater self-regulatory capacity. The reliability and validity siveness Scale (ABIS; Coutlee et al. 2014). The ABIS is of the SSRQ has been reported previously (e.g., Carey et al. an 11-item measure of trait impulsivity, that is, people’s 2004) and in the present study the internal consistency reli- tendency to act spontaneously and “on impulse” without ability coeicient was high (α = 0.92).

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Self-disgust path model. Bootstrapping is a robust alternative to standard parametric estimates, when the assumptions around the lat- Self-disgust was assessed with the Self-Disgust Scale (SDS; ter may be violated (Fox 2008). All data were analysed in Overton et al. 2008), an 18-item measure relecting disgust SPSS v. 22 (IBM Corp., Armonk, NT, USA), and AMOS v. and repulsiveness directed to the self. Six items are iller 24 (IBM Corp., Armonk, NT, USA). items (e.g., “I enjoy the company of others”) and 12 items relect self-disgust towards the self (e.g., “I ind myself repul- sive”), and towards one’s behaviour/actions (e.g., “I often do Results things I ind revolting”). Responses are coded on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly agree, 7 = strongly disagree), and The descriptive statistics and inter-correlations among after reverse scoring 9 items a total sum score is computed. the study variables are presented in Table 1. In this sam- Higher scores indicate higher levels of self-disgust. Self- ple, women reported signiicantly higher levels of physical disgust is relected in the total sum score, as well as in the self-disgust than men, rrb = 0.25, p < .001. Cognitive reap- sub-scales of “disgusting self” (or physical self-disgust) praisal was negatively associated with physical, rs = − 0.19, and “disgusting ways” (or behavioural self-disgust), and the p < .01, and behavioural, rs = − 0.19, p < .01, self-disgust. reliability and validity of this measure has been reported On the other hand, expressive suppression was positively elsewhere (Overton et al. 2008). In the present study, the associated with physical, rs = 0.15, p < .01, and behavioural, internal consistency reliability was acceptable for the total rs = 0.24, p < .001, self-disgust. The attention subscale of self-disgust scale (α = 0.88), and the subscales of behav- the ABIS was positively associated with physical, rs = 0.14, ioural (α = 0.76) and physical self-disgust (α = 0.79). p < .05, and behavioural, rs = 0.14, p < .05, self-disgust. The motor subscale had a marginally signiicant relationship with Design/procedure physical self-disgust, rs = 0.10, p < .10, and a signiicant positive relationship with behavioural self-disgust, rs = 0.13, A cross-sectional, correlational, survey-based design was p < .05. The non-planning subscale had a marginally signii- used to measure the associations between demographic char- cant negative relationship with physical self-disgust only, acteristics (age, gender, and nationality), impulsivity, emo- rs = − 0.10, p < .10. Finally, self-regulation was signiicantly tion regulation, self-regulation, and self-disgust. As part of negatively related to both physical, rs = − 0.32, p < .001, and a larger study, participants were approached and recruited in behavioural, rs = − 0.41, p < .001, self-disgust. University premises and were asked to complete an online survey (hosted on Qualtrics, http://www.qualt rics.com). Direct efects of impulsivity, emotion regulation Only participants who completed all study measures were and self‑regulation on self‑disgust included in this study, all other data were discarded. No time restrictions were applied and survey completion required The results of the path analysis are presented in Table 2. approximately 15 min. When conditioned on all other variables, the non-planning impulsivity subscale had a negative and signiicant direct Data analysis efect on physical, β = − 0.27, p < .001, and behavioural, β = − 0.20, p < .01, self-disgust. Cognitive reappraisal As some of the study variables were not normally-distrib- significantly negatively predicted physical self-disgust, uted (and regular linear regression methods resulted in non- β = − 0.12, p < .05, and had a marginally signiicant efect normally-distributed residuals), Spearman’s rho correlations on behavioural self-disgust, β = − 0.09, p = .093. Expres- were used to explore initial associations in the data, followed sive suppression signiicantly positively predicted physical, by a bootstrapped path analysis of the hypothesised rela- β = 0.17, p < .01, and behavioural, β = 0.20, p < .001, self- tionships between the constructs. Path analysis has many disgust. Finally, self-regulation was signiicantly and nega- advantages over standard regression techniques, including tively associated with both physical, β = − 0.25, p < .001, and the ability to estimate direct and indirect efects (through behavioural, β = − 0.42, p < .001, self-disgust. multiple intervening variables), and multiple dependent vari- ables, simultaneously, allowing the researcher to account for Indirect efects of impulsivity on self‑disgust the interdependence in the outcome variables (by correlat- ing their error terms). As recommended (e.g., Hayes 2009; The results of our hypothesised indirect path analyses are Hayes and Scharkow 2013), we used bias-corrected and presented at the bottom of Table 2. In combination, the accelerated bootstrapping (10,000 resamples; Mallinckrodt three regulation variables (i.e., self-regulation, emotion et al. 2006) to obtain conidence intervals (and associated regulation/cognitive reappraisal, and emotion regulation/ probability values) for all direct and indirect efects in the expressive suppression) had a signiicant intervening efect

1 3 Motivation and Emotion < .01, p – < .05, ** p < .10, * p † – † Self-Disgust Scale. Self-Disgust SDS − 0.10 † 0.58*** 0.35*** – 0.45*** – – Abbreviated Impulsiveness Scale, Impulsiveness Abbreviated ABIS 0.15** 0.14* 0.10 − 0.14* − 0.58*** − 0.36*** − 0.38*** − 0.32*** − 0.41*** – 0.24*** 0.14* 0.13* 0.01 0.64*** – ) coeicients. Φ r − 0.19** − 0.05 − 0.07 0.24*** − 0.13* − 0.08 − 0.09 – ), or phi ( rb † r 0.05 − 0.08 − 0.19** ), rank-biseral ( ), rank-biseral rs 0.25*** 0.02 0.06 – 0.00 0.15* – − 0.19** − 0.07 0.16** 0.08 0.03 21.84 0.61 0.89 27.64 14.87 11.15 9.70 8.25 14.97 14.73 107.26 − 0.05 − 0.00 − 0.08 − 0.10 − 0.20** − 0.02 − 0.31*** − 0.12* − 0.15* − 0.14* − 0.04 − 0.19** 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 − 0.03 Descriptive statistics and inter-correlations of study variables of study and inter-correlations statistics Descriptive < .001 p = 294. Correlations represent Spearman’s rho ( rho 294. Correlations Spearman’s represent = IQR 2 1 0 8 8 3 3 4 9 9 22 Median 21 1 1 28 15 11 9 8 14 13.50 108 SD 4.56 0.49 0.31 6.35 4.97 2.62 2.57 2.61 6.73 6.28 16.49 M 9. SDS self Range 17–51 0–1 0–1 6–42 4–28 5–18 4–16 4–16 5–35 5–34 50–145 8. ABIS non-planning 4. Cognitive reappraisal4. Cognitive 0.13* −0.06 −0.11 3. Nationality 7. ABIS motor 1. Age2. Gender – 11. Self-regulation 0.12* 6. ABIS attention *** Table 1 Table N 5. Expressive suppression 5. Expressive 10. SDS ways

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Table 2 Direct and indirect Model pathways β BCa 95% CI β p efects in the hypothesised path model Lower Upper

Direct path estimates Attention reappraisal − 0.06 − 0.22 0.11 0.466 Attention suppression − 0.03 − 0.18 0.13 0.736 Attention self-regulation − 0.48 − 0.60 − 0.36 0.000 Attention SDS self 0.07 − 0.09 0.23 0.418 Attention SDS ways − 0.07 − 0.23 0.10 0.418 Motor reappraisal 0.09 − 0.03 0.22 0.142 Motor suppression − 0.10 − 0.22 0.03 0.145 Motor self-regulation − 0.10 − 0.22 0.02 0.093 Motor SDS self 0.08 − 0.05 0.22 0.222 Motor SDS ways 0.09 − 0.04 0.21 0.193 Non-planning reappraisal − 0.20 − 0.36 − 0.04 0.018 Non-planning suppression 0.01 − 0.14 0.16 0.894 Non-planning self-regulation − 0.10 − 0.22 0.02 0.102 Non-planning SDS self − 0.27 − 0.40 − 0.13 0.000 Non-planning SDS ways − 0.20 − 0.33 − 0.06 0.004 Reappraisal SDS self − 0.12 − 0.22 − 0.02 0.017 Reappraisal SDS ways − 0.09 − 0.18 0.02 0.093 Suppression SDS self 0.17 0.06 0.27 0.003 Suppression SDS ways 0.20 0.09 0.31 0.000 Self-regulation SDS self − 0.25 − 0.39 − 0.11 0.000 Self-regulation SDS ways − 0.42 − 0.57 − 0.28 0.000 Indirect path estimates Attention reappraisal SDS self 0.01 − 0.01 0.04 0.326 Attention suppression SDS self − 0.01 − 0.04 0.02 0.669 Attention self-regulation SDS self 0.12 0.05 0.20 0.000 Attention ALL SDS self 0.12 0.04 0.21 0.002 Attention reappraisal SDS ways 0.01 − 0.01 0.03 0.296 Attention suppression SDS ways − 0.01 − 0.04 0.03 0.690 Attention self-regulation SDS ways 0.20 0.13 0.30 0.000 Attention ALL SDS ways 0.20 0.12 0.31 0.000 Motor reappraisal SDS self − 0.01 − 0.04 0.00 0.091 Motor suppression SDS self − 0.02 − 0.05 0.00 0.097 Motor self-regulation SDS self 0.03 − 0.00 0.06 0.055 Motor ALL SDS self − 0.00 − 0.05 0.05 0.921 Motor reappraisal SDS ways − 0.01 − 0.03 0.00 0.117 Motor suppression SDS ways − 0.02 − 0.06 0.00 0.107 Motor self-regulation SDS ways 0.04 − 0.01 0.10 0.077 Motor ALL SDS ways 0.02 − 0.05 0.08 0.619 Non-planning reappraisal SDS self 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.017 Non-planning suppression SDS self 0.00 − 0.02 0.03 0.842 Non-planning self-regulation SDS self 0.03 − 0.00 0.07 0.068 Non-planning ALL SDS self 0.05 0.00 0.11 0.050 Non-planning reappraisal SDS ways 0.02 − 0.00 0.05 0.056 Non-planning suppression SDS ways 0.00 − 0.03 0.04 0.862 Non-planning self-regulation SDS ways 0.04 − 0.01 0.10 0.085 Non-planning ALL SDS ways 0.06 − 0.01 0.14 0.077

N = 294. SDS Self-Disgust Scale. Estimates conditioned on age, gender, and nationality. Probability values determined on bias-corrected and accelerated (BCa) bootstrapped CIs (10,000 bootstrap resamples)

1 3 Motivation and Emotion between attentional impulsivity and physical, β = 0.12, on the association between self-disgust and psycho- p < .01, and behavioural, β = 0.20, p < .001, self-disgust. This pathology has signiicantly increased over the last 7 years multivariate efect was driven strongly by the self-regulation (e.g., Brake et al. 2017; Ille et al. 2014; Overton et al. 2008), scale, which was the only signiicant univariate intervening there is a paucity of research on the psychological phenom- variable in this relationship (see Table 2). There was also a ena and processes that may elicit self-disgust responses marginally signiicant indirect efect of the self-regulation (Powell et al. 2014, 2015). The present study assessed the scale and the emotion regulation subscales between non- association between self-regulation, emotion regulation, trait planning impulsivity and physical self-disgust, β = 0.05, impulsivity, and self-disgust, and examined diferent hypoth- p = .050. This efect was driven again by the self-regulation eses with respect to these associations. variable (see Table 2), but also cognitive reappraisal, which First, we hypothesized that, because self-disgust involves was a signiicant intervening variable in the relationship symbolic self-representation and cognitive complexity (Pow- between non-planning impulsivity and physical self-disgust, ell et al. 2014, 2015), people evaluate their behaviour against β = 0.02, p < .05 (see Fig. 1). their self (or social) ideals and experience lower self-disgust when their ideals are met through efective self-regulation and inhibition of impulsive behaviour; accordingly, higher Discussion self-disgust is more likely to occur when self-regulation fails and higher impulsivity is exhibited. Second, based on the Self-disgust is a self-conscious emotion schema that shares emotion regulation literature (d’Acremont and Van der Lin- common features with other self-conscious emotions, such den 2007; Gross and John 2003; Gross and Thompson 2007; as shame and guilt, but has a unique expressive and phenom- Haga et al. 2009), we anticipated that expressive suppression enological proile (Powell et al. 2015). Although research (positively) and cognitive reappraisal (negatively) would

Fig. 1 Path model explaining the efect of impulsivity in three [0.00, 0.07], p = .017 (see Table 2 for full results). Control variables domains (attention, motor, and non-planning) on self-disgust via and error terms are omitted for clarity. Estimates were conditioned individual diferences in three types of regulatory mechanisms (cog- on participants’ gender, age, and nationality. Error terms for the three nitive reappraisal, expressive suppression, and self-regulation). Self- intervening variables were correlated, as were the error terms for the regulation signiicantly moderated the efect of attention impulsivity two outcome variables. All estimates are standardised. Statistical sig- on physical (SDS self), β = 0.12, 95% CI [0.05, 0.20], p < .001, and niicance was determined based on bias-corrected and accelerated behavioural (SDS ways), β = 0.20, 95% CI [0.13, 0.30], p < .001, self- bootstrapped CIs (10,000 resamples). †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, disgust. Non-planning impulsivity had a signiicant indirect efect ***p < .001 on physical self-disgust via cognitive reappraisal, β = 0.02, 95% CI 1 3 Motivation and Emotion predict self-disgust. Our indings supported these hypotheses out the possibility of reverse causality and response bias and showed, for the irst time, that the two facets of self-dis- (e.g., socially desirable responding or self-deception; Paul- gust that were measured in the present study (i.e., disgusting hus 2002). Future studies should examine if behavioural self/physical self-disgust and disgusting ways/behavioural measures of impulsivity (e.g., disinhibition/attentional self-disgust) were diferentially associated with self-regu- tasks; Moeller et al. 2001) are related to self-disgust, and latory variables and trait impulsivity both in terms of sta- whether such an association is explained indirectly by tistical signiicance and efect size. More speciically, the self-regulation. Furthermore, our study provided indings disgusting self subscale was negatively associated with cog- about the association between self-disgust and individual nitive reappraisal and self-regulation, and positively associ- diferences in self-regulatory capacity without focusing ated with expressive suppression and attentional impulsiv- on speciic behavioural outcomes. It is possible that the ity. The disgusting ways subscale was negatively associated observed associations may be stronger in the context of with cognitive reappraisal and self-regulation, and posi- more speciic problem behaviours (e.g., dysfunctional tively associated with expressive suppression, attentional, drinking, sexual misconduct, problem gambling) that and motor impulsivity. Although the efect sizes between have been associated with poor self-regulation and higher self-disgust and the trait impulsivity and emotion regulation impulsivity, and this is something that further research subscales were small according to Cohen (1992), the efect may look into. sizes between the self-disgust subscales and self-regulation Second, a wide range of adverse psychological, behav- were moderate. This indicates that self-regulation is more ioural, and mental health outcomes have been independently strongly associated with the experience of self-disgust, as associated high trait impulsivity (Grano et al. 2007; Moeller compared to emotion regulation strategies and impulsivity. et al. 2001; Peluso et al. 2007), low self-regulation (e.g., These indings were further corroborated by path analysis Baumeister 2003; Tangney et al. 2004), and higher self-dis- which showed that self-regulation was more strongly and gust (Brake et al. 2017; Ille et al. 2014; Overton et al. 2008). directly associated with both dimensions of self-disgust, as Our indings suggest that impulsivity, self-regulation, and compared to the efects of emotion regulation strategies and self-disgust may not necessarily be independent predictors impulsivity dimensions. Our inal hypothesis was that self- of such efects. Rather, these variables seem to be associ- regulation and emotion regulation would act as interven- ated with each other in a dynamic way that may explain ing variables in the efects of impulsivity on the experience the bivariate associations described in previous research. Of of self-disgust. The results from the path analysis partially course, this process needs to be more thoroughly examined supported this hypothesis by showing signiicant indirect in future studies that incorporate measures of mental health efects of attentional impulsivity on physical and behavioural (e.g., depression) and/or adverse behavioural outcomes, as self-disgust, and signiicant indirect efects of non-planning well as longitudinal designs that will allow for more valid impulsivity on physical (but not behavioural self-disgust), assessments of temporally-unfolding associations. via self-regulation and emotion regulation strategies. Third, although the efect size of the associations between Taken together, the present study has important theoret- self-disgust and emotion regulation strategies were small ical implications. Firstly, although most research on self- they were statistically signiicant, even after controlling for disgust suggests that behavioural outcomes (e.g., being the efects of self-regulation and trait impulsivity. This is overweight) are associated with experiencing self-disgust, the irst study to demonstrate the diferential association our indings show that self-disgust may be also related to of emotion regulation strategies with self-disgust. In line the psychological characteristics (i.e., self-regulation and with previous research on the diferential efects of expres- impulsivity) that are associated with and have been found sive suppression and cognitive reappraisal (e.g., Gross and to lead to such undesirable and disgust-eliciting behav- John 2003; Gross and Thompson 2007), the present indings ioural outcomes (e.g., Tangney et al. 2004). Secondly, and showed that cognitive reappraisal was negatively associated relatedly, impulsivity dimensions, and more speciically with self-disgust; thus, suggesting that cognitive reappraisal attentional and non-planning impulsivity, seem to play can act protectively against the negative efects of self-dis- a role in the experience of self-disgust. The tendency to gust on psychological well-being. Of course this needs to behave in an automatic and non-planned manner is asso- be determined by future research that will employ speciic ciated with higher self-disgust, and this association is measures of well-being and psychological functioning. On partly explained by self-regulation, and to lesser extent the other hand, expressive suppression was positively asso- by emotion regulation strategies. This lends support to our ciated with self-disgust, and this is in accordance with pre- argument that people may experience self-disgust when vious studies which suggested that expressive suppression they fail to resist impulses and exhibit poor regulation of cannot suiciently modify adverse emotional experiences their thoughts, actions, and emotions. Our cross-sectional (Gross and Thompson 2007). Future studies may further design and the use of self-reports, however, do not rule extend our indings by assessing whether self-disgust is

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