Domestic Policy Actors and Australian Foreign Policy
A public policy approach to analysing the making of Australian foreign policy
Cain Norman Roberts
orcid.org/0000-0001-9197-3112
Submitted in total fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of PhD in Philosophy
January 2017
School of Social and Political Sciences
The University of Melbourne
Abstract
Foreign policy making in Australia is complex. It has linkages into myriad domestic and international policy contexts. Yet despite this, the system of making foreign policy in Australia remains highly concentrated; a relatively closed policy system that is often impenetrable by many domestic policy actors.
This study examines how Australian foreign policy is made and establishes the roles played by domestic policy actors in setting Australia’s international agenda. It shines a spotlight on some otherwise under- researched elements of Australian foreign policy and describes some of what occurs within the “black box” of foreign policy decision making. It does this by developing a public policy framework to assist our understanding in how Australian foreign is made and by whom. The framework is then applied to three case studies - the 1957 Trade and Commerce Agreement with Japan; the Australia-China Free Trade Agreement and; the Australia India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.
This study argues that there are three distinct categories of domestic policy actors in Australia foreign policy making – public decision makers, policy insiders and policy outsiders. Australian foreign policy making is dominated by the first two categories, which typically consists of elite political and bureaucratic policy actors. Conversely, non-state domestic policy actors do not usually play a pivotal part in the processes that make foreign policy in Australia and tend to be policy outsiders. Even large and well-resourced non-state actors that have access to public decision makers do not necessarily translate this into a significant policy making role. This lack of access and influence is exacerbated for smaller or poorly resourced policy actors. In most cases, non-state actors are incapable of meaningfully engaging with the processes that underpin Australia’s international agenda let alone affect lasting change.
Declaration
This is to certify that:
i. the thesis comprises only my original works towards the PhD;
ii. due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used; and
iii. the thesis is fewer than 100,000 words in length, exclusive of tables, maps, bibliographies and appendices
Cain Norman Roberts
Acknowledgements
I owe thanks to many people for their support, patience and good humour throughout the thesis writing process.
To my primary supervisor, Pradeep Taneja, thank you for your many years of guidance, patience and insightful comments on my work. And to my secondary supervisor, Brian Galligan, thank you too for your input and advice. Thank you both for sticking with me.
To my family, thank you for your continued faith in me and encouragement. Without it, I would never have persevered to completion. A particularly big thanks to Mum for your eagle-eyed proof reading skills.
To my friends, thank you for keeping me sane, putting up with my antics and for keeping me going when I felt like doing the opposite.
And to my wife, Liv, I thank you most of all. Thank you for putting up with me, guiding me, humouring me, supporting me and most importantly, loving me. I could never have completed this work without you.
Table of Contents
Introduction ...... 1 Research Questions ...... 3 Methodological Approach ...... 4 The Argument ...... 8 Thesis Structure ...... 10 Part A ...... 12 Chapter 1 ...... 13 History, Traditions and Themes in Australian Foreign Policy Making ...... 13 A Brief History of Australian Foreign Policy Making ...... 14 Concluding Remarks ...... 36 Chapter 2: Conceptualising Foreign Policy as a Public Policy ...... 37 State of the Policy Sciences – stages, fragmentation and the death of grand theorising? 39 Public Policy and Foreign Affairs ...... 45 Policy Frameworks Suitable to an Australian Foreign Policy Context ...... 49 Institutional Analysis and Design Framework ...... 49 Advocacy Coalition Framework...... 55 The Multiple Streams Framework ...... 62 Concluding Remarks ...... 69 Chapter 3: A Public Policy Framework for Analysing Australian Foreign Policy ...... 70 A Hybrid Framework ...... 71 Unit of Analysis: Policy Sub-system ...... 75 Focusing Attention: The Action Arena ...... 76 Providing Structure: Exogenous Variables ...... 77 Examining Multiple Levels: Three Streams of Focus ...... 79 A Typology of Policy Actors ...... 80 Australian Foreign Policy Actors at the Domestic Level...... 83 International Relations Theory and Domestic Policy Processes ...... 84 Concluding Remarks ...... 88 Part B ...... 89
Chapter 4: Trade and Commerce with Post-War Japan ...... 90 The Policy Sub-System ...... 92 Australia-Japan Policy Sub-System ...... 92 Post-War Trade Policy Sub-System ...... 97 Variables ...... 101 Action Arena ...... 102 Politics Stream ...... 102 Policy Stream ...... 111 Problems Stream ...... 123 Concluding Remarks ...... 128 Chapter 5: Negotiating a FTA with China ...... 130 The Policy Sub-System ...... 131 Australia-China Policy Sub-System ...... 131 International Trade Sub-System – a preference for FTAs ...... 134 Variables ...... 136 Action Arena ...... 138 Politics Stream ...... 139 Policy Stream ...... 150 Problem Stream ...... 160 Concluding Remarks ...... 168 Chapter 6: Selling Australian Uranium to India ...... 169 The Policy Sub-System ...... 170 Australia-India Policy Sub-System ...... 170 Australia’s Uranium Export Regime ...... 175 Variables ...... 178 Action Arena ...... 183 Politics Stream ...... 183 Policy Stream ...... 195 Problem Stream ...... 199 Concluding Remarks ...... 203 Chapter 7: ...... 204 The Role of Domestic Policy Actors in Australian Foreign Policy Making ...... 204 Public Decision Makers ...... 204 Policy Insiders ...... 210
Policy Outsiders ...... 215 Concluding Remarks ...... 217 Conclusion ...... 218 References ...... 224 Primary Sources ...... 224 Secondary Sources ...... 241
Acronyms
ACCI Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
ACF Advocacy Coalition Framework
ACFo Australian Conservation Foundation
ACMA Associated Chamber of Manufacturers of Australia
ACTU Australian Council of Trade Unions
AFTINET Australian Fair Trade and Investment Network
AICECA Australia-India Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement
AIG Australian Industry Group
ALP Australian Labor Party
ANA Australian National Archives
ANZUS Australia New Zealand United States Security Treaty
APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
APC Asia Pacific Community
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASNO Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office
AUA Australian Uranium Association
BCA Business Council of Australia
CFMEU Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union
ChAFTA China-Australia Free Trade Agreement
CHOGM Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings
COAG Council of Australian Governments
DAFF Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
DCA Department of Commerce and Agriculture
DCT Department of Customs and Tariffs
DEA Department of External Affairs
DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DoT Department of Trade
DPM&C Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet
DRET Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism
FOE Friends of the Earth
GDP Gross Domestic Product
IADF Institutional Analysis and Design Framework
IAEA International Atomic Energy Association
FTA Free Trade Agreement
G20 Group of 20
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GFC Global Financial Crisis
IDC Interdepartmental Committee
JSCOT Joint Standing Committee on Treaties
MCA Minerals Council of Australia
MCIT Ministerial Council of International Trade
MFN Most Favoured Nation
MoC Ministry of Commerce (China)
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MSF Multiple Streams Framework
NAM Non-Aligned Movement
NFF National Farmers’ Federation
NGO Non-Government Organisation
NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSCC National Security Committee of Cabinet
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
TPP Trans Pacific Partnerships
UN United Nations
US United States
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WWI World War One
WWII World War Two
WTO World Trade Organization
Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1 Structural Overview of the IADF
Figure 2.2 Structural Overview of the ACF
Figure 2.3 Structural Overview of the MSF
Figure 3.1 Structural Overview of the Hybrid Framework
Figure 5.1 Australia’s Participation in Regional Economic Architecture
Table 4.1 Deep Core Beliefs and Policy Core Beliefs
Table 4.2 Deep Core Beliefs and Policy Core Beliefs
Table 4.3 Deep Core Beliefs and Policy Core Beliefs
Table 5.1 Deep Core Beliefs and Policy Core Beliefs
Table 5.2 Deep Core Beliefs and Policy Core Beliefs
Table 5.3 Deep Core Beliefs and Policy Core Beliefs
Table 5.4 Agricultural Industries Supportive of ChAFTA
Table 5.5 Australian Exporters’ Attitudes to the FTAs
Table 6.1 Deep Core Beliefs and Policy Core Beliefs
Table 6.2 Deep Core Beliefs and Policy Core Beliefs
Table 6.3 Deep Core Beliefs and Policy Core Beliefs
Introduction
It can be difficult to define a concrete foreign policy. Unlike domestic public policy that produces roads, schools and hospitals, international policy is often less tangible. At best, it can take the form of a treaty or a formal agreement, but it can often be as simple as a statement or a handshake. Many decisions are made in secret, with the reasons for deciding one approach over another and the method for arriving at that decision clouded in mystery. The “black box” of foreign policy makes it difficult to assess how foreign policy is made.1 This is particularly true in the Australian context. Scholarly effort is seldom expended in trying to ascertain how foreign policy is made in Australia and the roles played by those that make it. This thesis seeks to contribute to filling the void in this area by investigating who makes Australian foreign policy and by beginning to unpack how it is made.
In many respects, understanding who makes Australian foreign policy should be an easy undertaking as the Constitution of Australia unequivocally assigns the responsibility for the external affairs of the nation to the Commonwealth Government.2 The federal government alone has the right to engage with foreign governments on foreign policy matters on behalf of Australians and in pursuing the national interest. Yet, for a nation that was determined to fashion a unique polity and public policy tradition at Federation, Australia was at first reluctant to embrace foreign policy both in terms of content and in its actual making, satisfied that foreign policy was best made by Great Britain.3 Even the most nationalistic of our early leaders, Alfred Deakin, said: “there is no pretence of claiming the power of peace or war, or exercising power outside our territories”.4 Consequently, the tradition of foreign policy making in Australia started much later than those in other areas of government activity – the Commonwealth simply did not have the motivation to establish the infrastructure required to formulate a sophisticated Australian foreign policy. Nor did it consider diplomacy and international relations appropriate realms for the newly federated nation to engage. The same could be said of our understanding of Australian foreign policy, particularly with respect to how foreign policy is made and by whom.
1 The term ‘black box’ in relation to foreign policy is discussed in Allison, Graham. 1971. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Little Brown 2 Section 51 (xxix) of the Australian Constitution gives the Commonwealth Parliament of Australia the right to legislate with respect to external affairs (or foreign policy). 3 There are many examples of early leaders deferring foreign policy decision to Great Britain in Greenwood, Gordon and Grimshaw, Charles (eds.). 1977. Documents on Australian International Relations 1901-1918, Melbourne, Australian Institute of International Affairs. See also Hudson, W.J. and Sharp, M.P. 1988. Australian Independence: Colony to Reluctant Kingdom, Carlton (VIC), Melbourne University Press 4 Quoted in Thompson, Roger C. 2000. ‘First Steps in Diplomacy’, in Bridge, Carl and Attard, Bernard (eds.), Between Empire and Nation: Australia’s External Relations from Federation to the Second World War, Melbourne, Australian Scholarly Publishing, p. 6
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There has been much scholarly attention on the content of Australia’s foreign policy and why certain policies exist, but little as to how that policy is actually made. 5 In essence, much is known about the ‘what’ of Australian foreign policy, some is known about the ‘why’, but little about the ‘who’ and ‘how’. Whilst the academic focus on other areas of government activity has focused both on the content and underpinning processes of the policy under investigation, foreign policy scholarship in Australia has seldom done the same. Even less attention has been focused on the role played by domestic policy actors in its formulation – a focus upon international actors, notably nation states, has dominated academic inquiry into Australian foreign policy.6 As McDonald points out, ‘(Australian) political science scholarship [tends] to approach the study of foreign policy as a sub-discipline of international relations rather than an additional dimension of public policy or domestic politics.’7
A lack of academic understanding of Australia’s foreign policy making processes is problematic in a complex policy space where international and domestic policies are increasingly intertwined. This is particularly so given Australia’s system of making foreign policy is highly centralised; a closed policy system focused on elite political and bureaucratic policy actors clustered at the highest levels of government. This makes engagement with the process difficult for non-government domestic policy actors, but also for government actors to leverage expertise and resources from outside its own agencies when formulating and implementing policy options – a problem compounded by years of funding cuts and resourcing issues brought about by consecutive Commonwealth Governments.8
Definitions of what constitutes foreign policy differ and are contested.9 This study adopts the view that foreign policy increasingly encompasses non-traditional foreign policy elements – that is areas of government activity that were formally domestic in nature. This study shares the view of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in defining foreign policy in a broad sense:
‘[It] is necessary to develop and implement whole-of-government policy on key international and globalised challenges, including the global financial crisis,
5 For overviews of Australia’s approach to foreign policy analysis see McDougall, Derek. 2009b. ‘Foreign Policy Studies in Australia’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 55, No. 3 and; Cumpston, Ina Mary. 1995. History of Australian Foreign Policy 1901-1991, Canberra, I.M. Cumpston. Key documents from the early years of the Commonwealth are in Meaney, Neville. 1985. Australia and the World: A Documentary History from the 1870s to the 1970s, Melbourne, Longman Cheshire. 6 The focus on the nation state in Australian foreign policy literature is evident in an overview of the literature by McDougall, 2009b, op. cit. 7 McDonald, Matt. 2013. ‘Issues in Australian Foreign Policy – January to June 2013’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 59, No. 4, p. 616. 8 See for example Lowy Institute. 2009. Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit: Reinvesting in our instruments of international policy, Sydney, Lowy Institute and; Australian Public Service Commission. 2013. Capability Review: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia 9 This debate is usefully analysed in Gyngell, Allan, and Wesley, Michael. 2007. Making Australian Foreign Policy, Port Melbourne, Cambridge University Press, pp.16-34
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terrorism, pandemic influenza, trade liberalisation and behind-the-border economic reform, border security, and Australia’s climate change and energy policies’.10
The thesis argues that any area of domestic public policy can be a part of Australia’s foreign policy and as such, mechanisms to utilise policy making structures and expertise at the domestic level need to be a part of Australia’s foreign policy making system.
This thesis therefore examines Australian foreign policy as a public policy. Instead of examining foreign policy solely by its content and relationship with the broader international system, it looks at the role of domestic policy actors in shaping its content. In particular, it looks at the role played by myriad domestic policy actors in engaging with Australia’s processes of foreign policy making. The Constitution may give the legal power to make foreign policy to the Commonwealth Government, but how does this manifest in terms of actors, processes and structures in Australia’s contemporary political environment? Conceptualising this manifestation as a public policy helps to answer this question. In addition, this thesis attempts to examine how Australian foreign policy is made by situating the domestic policy actors into the processes and structures that underpin Australia’s foreign policy making.
Research Questions
This study examines the ‘black box’ of Australian foreign policy making and, in particular, establishes the roles played by a swathe of domestic policy actors in setting Australia’s international agenda. It shines a spotlight on some otherwise under-researched elements of Australian foreign policy and describes some of what occurs within this black box. It is by no means exhaustive – foreign policy making is by its very nature secretive with access to information tightly controlled – yet it is the first known attempt at unpacking Australia’s foreign policy using a dedicated public policy lens.11
As such, this thesis attempts to answer the following two questions. Firstly:
• What is the role played by domestic policy actors in the making of Australian foreign policy?
This question clearly denotes this study has a public policy bias, focusing on the policy actors, processes and institutions of foreign policy making, not just the content. By examining how Australia makes its foreign policy, it becomes easier to elucidate the roles played by domestic policy actors. This
10 DFAT. 2009b. Submission to the Advisory Group on Reform of Australian Government Administration, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, pp. 1-2 11 Some scholars such as Gyngell and Wesley, and Grant and Evans have examined foreign policy as a policy, but do not utilise public policy theories, frameworks or models to test their hypotheses, referring to policy making in the abstract. To the knowledge of the researcher, no Australian investigation exists that utilises a public policy framework to examine Australian foreign policy making. See in Gyngell and Wesley, 2007, op. cit., and; Evans, Gareth and Grant, Bruce. 1991. Australia’s Foreign Relations: In the World of the 1990s, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press.
3 thesis argues that the policy sciences provide different and useful analytical tools to examine policy processes when compared with more traditional methods of foreign policy investigation.
With this in mind, the thesis addresses a second question:
• Do the underpinning structures shaping Australia’s foreign policy adequately accommodate engagement with domestic policy actors outside the formal institutions of government?
Answering both of these questions is a complex task, requiring the unpacking of multiple processes and actors across many policy contexts. In order to make these two central questions manageable, the thesis pursues two secondary aims:
• the development of a public policy framework suitable for analysing Australian foreign policy making; and • the identification of the domestic policy actors present, both state and non-state, in the making of Australian foreign policy.
This study, therefore, seeks to explore how Australian foreign policy is made by the actors and processes that enable it at the domestic level, rather than the international events to which foreign policy often responds. Further, it is interested in the role played by domestic policy actors in these processes and whether the processes underpinning our system of foreign policy making accommodate engagement with these actors.
Methodological Approach
This study employs three methodological techniques – case studies, qualitative interviews and document analysis – in order to address the research questions and to facilitate the testing of the public policy analytical framework developed in Part A of this thesis. The value of employing more than one methodological technique is that it allows the research to triangulate results allowing for ‘a broader range of historical, attitudinal and behavioural issues’ to be addressed.12 More importantly, it allows the researcher to develop ‘converging lines of inquiry’, making the results more likely to be convincing and accurate than if stemming from one method alone.13
Firstly, this study will employ three case studies to help unravel the complex relationships between the institutions, actors and processes that participate in and govern the foreign policy making process in Australia. There are a number of advantages inherent in using case studies. Firstly, the use of case studies allows us to understand specific policy situations in depth whilst simultaneously recognising the holistic and complex nature of the greater context in which it is situated.14 The inductive nature of
12 Yin, Robert. 1994. Case Study Research Design and Methods, Thousand Oaks (CA), SAGE Publications, p. 92 13 Ibid., p. 92 and; Robson, Colin. 1993. Real World Research: A Resource for Social and Practitioner- Researchers, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, p. 272 14 Punch, Keith. 1998. Introduction to Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, London, SAGE Publications, pp. 150-157
4 projects that utilise case studies assist in identifying a very extensive set of data through a strict focus on ‘contemporary phenomenon within a real life context’ whilst retaining ‘the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real life events’.15 This is of key importance to this study given the lack of scholarly research dedicated to this area. There is a critical shortage of strong, nuanced, qualitative data available on foreign policy making, particularly in an Australian context. This makes focusing on one single case very difficult.
A further advantage can be found through comparing results across cases studies. The analysis of multiple case studies allows the researcher to identify the unity of distinct categories of interactions and the deconstruction of seemingly unified behaviours.16 This will be useful for this study as it allows comparison across different policy sub-systems, domestic actors and processes, testing both the central research questions and the appropriateness of the selected analytical frameworks across multiple policy contexts. It should be noted this is not an attempt to generalise case study findings, the problems with which are discussed below. To use Robson’s analogy, it ‘is more like doing multiple experiments.’17
There is no scholarly agreement on the appropriate usage of case studies and there are several distinct disadvantages. One such disadvantage is the limited ability of case study research to be generalised and applied.18 The common argument here is that it is difficult to make scientific generalisation from a single case; the particulars of the case under examination may not represent the standard set of behaviours or observations once the scope broadens. Indeed this is a problem that confronts the policy sciences quite regularly, with scholarly attention devoted to critiquing the bespoke approach of many public policy frameworks applicable only to certain policy contexts, locations and systems of government.19 Nonetheless, Yin has responded to the broader criticism of case studies by suggesting they are generalisable to a theoretical level, but not an entire population.20 Esterberg also argues that case studies provide the researcher with the ability to ‘form the basis for the development of more general, nomothetic theories.’21 This is important for this study given it is attempting to create a snapshot of some of the more typical processes, actors and institutions involved in the making of Australian foreign policy.
There are also a number of examples where case studies have been successfully used to conduct similar research to this thesis. For example, Hirschi used a comparative case study approach to analyse the usefulness of applying the Advocacy Coalition Framework in helping to understand Swiss
15 Burns, Robert. 2000. Introduction to Research Methods, London, SAGE Publications, p. 460 16 Ragin, Charles and Becker, Howard. 1992. What is a Case? Exploring the foundations of social inquiry, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 170 17 Robson, 1993, op. cit., p. 161 18 Yin, 1994, op. cit., pp. 9-11 19 This is a recurring theme across multiple chapters of Sabatier, Paul (ed.). 2007. Theories of the Policy Process, Boulder (CO), West View Press. 20 Yin, 1994, op. cit., p. 10 21 Esterberg, Kristin. 2002. Qualitative Methods in Social Research, Boston, McGraw-Hill Higher Education
5 foreign policy decisions regarding sanctions against Iraq and South Africa.22 The use of two case studies in this instance was important in highlighting the different advocacy coalitions that had formed within two similar policy sub-systems that resulted in the Swiss government making different foreign policy decisions. Another example is the work of Dietrich, who used a case study of the Clinton Administration awarding Most Favoured Nation status to China to examine the role business and interest groups played in influencing the US Government’s decision.23 Guidance from public policy literature is also useful, with an important theorist for this thesis, Elinor Ostrom, claiming that ‘examination of individual cases offers opportunities to develop concepts and theory, identify the limits of general relationships and disprove deterministic hypotheses, control confounding effects through within-case comparisons, and disentangle causal processes’.24 This helps theorists make sense of complex processes – Australian foreign policy making being one such complex process.
Furthermore, the consistencies across the case studies help with the validity process of the research design, contribute to internal and external research validity as well as the research reliability of both cases studies and project.25 Additionally, the use of multiple case studies with clear commonalities provides evidence that is viewed as ‘more compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust.’26 As a consequence, the three case studies chosen have distinct similarities in context – trade with an Asian nation at time when the trade and deeper bilateral relationship was being established.
The second methodological technique employed – and first to support the case studies – is qualitative interviews. The researcher conducted semi-structured interviews with a fixed set of main questions allowing enough flexibility to improvise and explore unexpected areas as prompted by the interviewee. This approach allows an interviewer to gather responses to the desired topics and areas of interest, but provides the interviewee an element of control to explore areas important to them and express these ideas in their own words.27 Additionally, this technique is important in managing the power relations
22 Hirschi Christian and Widmer, Thomas. 2010. 'Policy Change and Policy Stasis: Comparing Swiss Foreign Policy toward South Africa (1968-94) and Iraq (1990-91)', Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 38, No. 3. 23 Dietrich, John. 1999. 'Interest Groups and Foreign Policy: Clinton and the China MFN Debates', Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 2, p. 280. Pross also explores the appropriateness of using case studies analyse the interactions of interest and business groups with government in Pross, Paul. 1986. Group Politics and Public Policy, Toronto, Oxford University Press, p. 86. Sobeck uses a case study approach to test the usefulness of both the ACF and IAD in Sobeck, Joanne. 2003. ‘Comparing Policy Process Frameworks: What Do They Tell Us About Group Membership and Participation for Policy Development’, Administration and Society, Vol. 35, No. 3 24 Poteete, Amy, Janssen, Marco and Ostrom, Elinor. 2010. Working Together: Collection Action, The Commons, and Multiple Methods in Practice, Princeton, Princeton University Press, p. 33 25 Yin, 1994, op. cit., pp. 33-38 and; Kiddler, L and Judd, C. M. 1986. Research methods in social relations, New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, pp. 26-29 26 Yin, 1994, op. cit., p. 45 27Arksey, Hilary and Knight, Peter. 1999. Interviewing for Social Scientists, London, SAGE Publications, p. 8 and; Taylor, S. and Bogdan, R. 1984. Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods, New York, Wiley, p. 77
6 between the researcher and the interviewee, affording the latter ‘equal status to the research in the dialogue rather than being a guinea pig.’28
Overall, interviewees were hard to secure, particularly those willing to speak on the record. Nonetheless the interview process mainly sought to uncover data surrounding:
• how the organisation/individual saw their role in foreign policy making and what value they felt was placed on their involvement by the government; • what rules and structures the organisation saw in defining their role and whether this changes across policy sub-systems and governments; • how the organisation behaves when engaging in foreign policy making; • what role they see key state actors playing in this process and how it impacts their ability to engage with the process; and • potential improvements to accessing the foreign policy making process.
Whilst more than 40 organisations and individuals were approached for interview, the researcher was successful in conducting 17 interviews, 12 of which were made on the record. As such, where respondents agreed to have their name or organisation published, they have been listed in the bibliography. Where they have not, the thesis does not refer to a specific person or organisation, instead referring to the respondent in the abstract, such as ‘one policy officer’ or ‘one NGO’ to ensure the requested anonymity. In some cases where reference would infer the source, no reference is made and the information provided has been used to inform the direction of the study and the veracity of the case studies, rather than as a verifiable source of evidence.
In order to mitigate the impact of certain groups not providing interviewees or appropriate data, the third research method employed – and second to support the case studies – was document analysis. This approach included examination of public records, official documents, media releases, publications, reports and relevant scholarly literature. Indeed, the availability of primary documents informed the selection of the case studies given the secretive nature of much foreign policy making, made access to many documents difficult – indeed for contemporary cases, it verges on the impossible. Two of the case studies are contemporary issues, and as such, the 30-year rule for public disclosure does not apply, making the documentary analysis of official documents impossible. Fortunately, both of these case studies have involved significant public submission and consultation processes, allowing for the review of documents provided to government by a multitude of domestic policy actors interested in engaging in the foreign policy making process. The analysis of all hardcopy and electronic documents created by government and non-state policy actors was based upon hermeneutical techniques that ‘situate the [document] both in the context in which it was made and produced.’29 Additionally, content analysis was applied as the key analytical technique to all primary data sources collected. Content
28 Burns, 2000, op. cit., p. 425 29 Esterberg, 2002, op. cit., p. 119
7 analysis is appropriate in this instance as the research seeks to discern the actions and methods developed by key influences in foreign policy development.
The Argument
This thesis argues there are three distinct categories of domestic policy actors in Australia foreign policy making – public decision makers, policy insiders and policy outsiders. The first group, public decision makers, are the most important determinants of Australia’s foreign policy. The group consists of the prime minister, foreign minister and trade ministers, and on occasion, DFAT and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPM&C). The second group, policy insiders, consists of actors that can access and influence public decision makers to varying degrees and include DFAT, DPM&C, other Commonwealth agencies, businesses, business associations and unions. The final group, policy outsiders, operate on the periphery of Australian foreign policy making due to their ideology not being aligned with the government or by actively choosing to influence government policy outside formal structures of policy making. Groups that fit into this category can include non-government organisations focused on a given foreign policy issue, and businesses trying to engage areas in which they are not typically significant stakeholders at the domestic level.
The thesis further argues that domestic non-government policy actors (particularly smaller organisations) do not typically play a pivotal part in the process of making foreign policy in Australia. Even large and well-resourced non-state actors that have access to public decision makers do not necessarily translate this into a significant policy making role. Instead, non-state actors are typically relegated to highlighting issues associated with Australia’s foreign policy agenda that they feel strongly about or providing expertise to help inform the decisions of public decision makers. However, in most cases, non-state actors are incapable of meaningfully engaging with the processes that underpin Australia’s international agenda let alone effect lasting change. This is due in no small part to the structure of how Australian foreign policy is made and the power it affords to government policy actors, both political and bureaucratic. Whilst these actors for the most part do not actively discourage input and participation from outside the formal structures of government, they operate within processes, routines and institutions that by their nature make it difficult to include outsiders. It is a system of exclusivity by design, not necessarily by policy actor choice, and one that has evolved over time. Australia’s foreign policy making history still has significant influence on contemporary foreign policy making practices. It is also a policy making system where secrecy abounds, with much of the information available to public decision makers restricted to their eyes only on national security grounds.
As such, this study has found the role of domestic policy actors is greatly dependent on whether the actor resides within or outside the formal structures of the state. Non-state actors, or those outside formal government structures, typically fulfil the role of a policy outsider, with some larger and powerful actors – such as large businesses – operating as policy insiders depending on the context under investigation. This is opposed to domestic state actors, who are almost always policy insiders, and in cases where the actor is a member of the political or bureaucratic elite, can be public decision makers.
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30 A highly centralised and restrictive policy community ensures that access to the foreign policy making process is controlled by state actors that have historically dominated the policy space.
This argument has been developed as a result of the analysis of three case studies. The following three case studies have been chosen and have had the public policy framework developed for this study applied to assist in their analysis:
• the 1957 Trade and Commerce Agreement with Japan; • the Australia-China Free Trade Agreement; and • the Australia India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.
These case studies were chosen for the following reasons:
• each represents a relationship with an Asian power at a time when Australia’s bilateral relationship was undergoing change or development; • all have publicly accessible documents due to the passage of time or public consultation processes – without such data, detailed analysis would not be possible given the secrecy surrounding foreign policy decision making; and • each case has a certain level of controversy surrounding the central issue, meaning significant amounts of policy actors with varying perspectives are more likely to seek to engage decision makers.
Analysis of these case studies shows the Australian foreign policy making environment increasingly includes domestic policy areas. This is problematic as the historic institutions responsible for making Australian foreign policy have not traditionally had the expertise or access to policy networks required to address new policy areas. Further, Australia’s foreign policy infrastructure is already under stress addressing traditional foreign policy concerns. As identified in a report by the Lowy Institute, Australia is suffering from a diplomatic deficit. 31 Years of budget cuts and decreased resourcing from consecutive governments of both political persuasions has meant that Australia now employs fewer diplomatic staff overseas than all G20 nations except Saudi Arabia and all but four OECD nations.32 If Australia’s diplomatic footprint remains this small, and the processes of making foreign policy fail to engage more comprehensively with non-state policy actors, addressing the growing amount of increasingly complex foreign policy issues will be all the more difficult. The foreign policy making environment in Australia simply does not currently have the resources to expand into new areas of policy responsibility. In the absence of an increase in the resources in the short to medium term, opening-up the environment to new actors with useful expertise might be a low-cost alternative to a diplomatic footprint expansion.
30 Public decision maker, policy insider and policy outsider are explained in Chapter Three. 31 Lowy Institute, 2009, op. cit. 32 Ibid., p. 19
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Thesis Structure
The thesis consists of two parts. Part A, consisting of three chapters, examines the existing Australian foreign policy literature, appropriate public policy literature and the existing literature interrogating policy actors within the Australian foreign policy making environment.
Chapter 1 critically evaluates the literature around Australian foreign policy making and the gaps within which this study sits. Given most of the existing literature dealing with Australian foreign policy making examines the content rather than the process of making said policy, it looks at the historical roots of Australian foreign policy making and the key events and relationships within. This allows for the elucidation of the institutions and structures important in governing how Australia sets its international agenda in later chapters. Examining the academic literature on Australian foreign policy identifies the key elements of the policy environment with which the analytical framework developed needs to contend.
Chapter 2 moves this discussion to the world of public policy, examining the state of the literature and a number of existing public policy examinations of foreign policy cases – although unfortunately, no Australian case was discovered. After examining the state of play within the policy sciences, the chapter describes and examines three well-used and validated public policy frameworks that form the basis of the hybrid framework developed and used in this study – the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IADF), the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF). These three frameworks represent three approaches that have undergone significant theoretical development and testing, resulting in three of the more robust approaches developed in the post-stages heuristic and top-down bottom-up movements within the policy sciences.
Chapter 3 develops a hybrid public policy framework for analysing Australian foreign policy making. It describes the key framework elements and their role in helping to understand how Australia comes to a foreign policy decision. The chapter introduces the typologies of policy insider, policy outsider and public decision maker to describe the roles played by domestic foreign policy actors. This chapter also establishes the key domestic foreign policy actors in Australia. By the end of this chapter, the thesis has established the existing state of play within the literature, a suitable public policy framework of analysis and a list of domestic policy actors to analyse,
Part B consists of four chapters, the first three of which are three case studies examining major Australian foreign policy decisions and processes – the 1957 Trade and Commerce Agreement with Japan; the Australia-China Free Trade Agreement and; the Australia India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. A final chapter outlines the role of domestic policy actors in Australian foreign policy making, and answers the central research questions listed above.
Chapter 4 examines the Trade and Commerce Treaty with Japan, a policy process that saw both influential political and bureaucratic policy actors dominate. Set against the backdrop of the post-WWII
10 world and the developing Cold War, this case study examines historical documents and personal accounts of how Australia’s wartime enemy became, until recently, Australia’s largest trading partner.
Chapter 5, a more contemporary case study, examines the negotiations between Australia and China for a FTA during the Howard, first Rudd and Gillard governments.33 As Australia’s largest trade partner, the Australia-China relationship during the first two decades of the twenty-first century represents a difficult balancing act for Australian policy makers in ensuring trade expands yet does not undermine Australia’s traditional alliance with the US.
Chapter 6 looks at another major Asian nation, India, and the changing status of New Delhi as an approved destination for the export of Australian uranium. Again, it will examine Howard, first Rudd and Gillard governments. This case is of particular interest as whilst most of the policy making occurred at a political level, unlike in the previous two cases it involves significant and strong positions of non- state policy actors that fit into a broader policy space around nuclear disarmament and nuclear energy. India’s refusal to sign-up to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in its present form adds further complexity to this case as the decision to sell uranium first by John Howard and later by Julia Gillard involved a significant reversal of Australia’s long-standing policy of only exporting to NPT signatories.
The final chapter outlines the roles of domestic policy actors across the three cases studies and compares them using the policy actor typology introduced in the third chapter. The classification of public decision maker, policy insider and policy outsider is used to explain the varying roles domestic policy actors play in the making of Australian foreign policy, and how the category they fit into impacts their ability to engage and influence Australia’s international agenda.
33 It is noted this FTA was concluded by the Abbott Government. This thesis will not consider the Abbott Government’s role in the FTA due to employment restrictions of the researcher. This does not, however, manifestly alter the findings of the case study.
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Part A
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Chapter 1 History, Traditions and Themes in Australian Foreign Policy Making
In 1948, Sir Paul Hasluck observed that Australian foreign policy was often unconnected to Australian domestic politics:
“In recognising this simple fact of the relationship between domestic and foreign policy, I think that we will have to recognise too that, in the world today, it is not simply a matter of deciding within Australia what we want to do and trusting in the magic of our own wishes to ensure that we can do it. In the act of shaping our domestic policy we have to calculate our own capacity to succeed in it”.34
Hasluck went on to argue that irrespective of the domestic policy and political concerns of the day, policy makers need to understand the international policy dimension and Australia’s capacity to operate within it. Hasluck believed that too often Australian decision makers believe in their own ability to influence events outside their realm of control; a disconnect between what Australia’s domestic politics wants to achieve internationally and Australia’s realistic capacity to achieve its policy goals. 35
While Hasluck was referring to a disconnect in the policy making arena, a similar disconnect can be observed in the academic analysis of Australian foreign policy, which too often ignores the domestic politics of the day. As will be explored below, analysis has tended to focus on the content of Australian foreign policy, particularly with regard to key bilateral relationships and international events. The ability of Australian policy makers to domestically shape Australian foreign policy has largely been overlooked, with the connection between the domestic and international realms brushed over. This is particularly true when considering the role of foreign policy making institutions and domestic policy actors. The focus has been, to a large extent, on the impact of international pressure on Australian foreign policy makers rather than the domestic.
This chapter examines how Australian foreign policy has been traditionally viewed, both in terms of what have been the frequent topics of analysis and how these topics have typically been investigated. It does this by providing a historical overview of Australian foreign policy making. It looks at the tendency to view Australian foreign policy through the lens of international relations or political history and establishes the foundations for an argument that such approaches may not be nuanced enough to examine the complexities of contemporary foreign policy making. It situates the research by highlighting that the existing body of literature has had limited engagement with what is occurring underneath the international level of Australia’s foreign policy.36 In the few cases where it does consider the domestic
34 Quoted in Grant, Bruce. 1972. The Crisis of Loyalty: A Study of Australian Foreign Policy, Sydney, Angus & Robertson, p. 29 35 Hasluck, Paul. 1980. Diplomatic Witness: Australian Foreign Affairs 1941-1947, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press 36 Some exceptions (discussed in subsequent chapters) include Gyngell and Wesley, 2007, op. cit. and; Evans and Bruce, 1991, op. cit.
13 level, the focus has been on the political elite and their interaction with the international level. Very little attention has been given to policy actors situated outside formal structures of government operating in a domestic context. While foreign policy may be conceptualised by those responsible for its development based on international events and the associated policy pressures, it is the domestic structures, policy actors and processes that ultimately formulate policy responses.
As such, this chapter uses existing literature to examine the history of Australian foreign policy making. This is important for two reasons. Firstly, it establishes the historical context of Australia’s foreign policy making institutions and structures, providing guidance for the key elements of policy making a public policy framework suitable for application in an Australian case needs to include. Secondly, the chapter highlights how existing literature has dealt with Australian foreign policy analysis. It will do this by identifying the key issues the literature examines, the key relationships it focuses on and the key policy actors to which it gives attention. By providing a narrative of Australia’s foreign policy making history as drawn from the existing literature, this chapter will show the absence of any meaningful focus on domestic policy actors or any attempt at conceptualising foreign policy as public policy.
This chapter demonstrates a gap in the existing literature when it comes to Australian foreign policy analysis focused on domestic actors, structures and processes. Further, the historical discussion will assist in the elucidation of the key analytical elements, such as variables and rules, with which such an approach needs to contend. Both of these elements will be incorporated into the design of the public policy analytical framework suited to Australian foreign policy developed in the following two chapters.
A Brief History of Australian Foreign Policy Making
In June 2011, the then-Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd said that “the business of Australian foreign policy is to make a difference in shaping the international events that in turn shape our nation’s future”.37 Rudd’s view was a significant leap from that of his ministerial predecessors in the newly federated Australia, who did not want the responsibility of making foreign and defence policies; feeling secure as a part of the British Empire, Australia had been happy to abdicate such responsibilities to London.38 What follows is an account of how Australia’s humble foreign policy making beginnings transformed into the current system of engaging with the international system Australia employs today. 39 The
37 Rudd, Kevin. 2011. Australia’s foreign policy priorities and our candidature for the UN Security Council, speech to the National Press Club, Canberra, 1 June 38 For example, Edmund Barton and John Forrest’s willingness to defer to London is discussed in Reynolds, John. 1999. Edmund Barton, Melbourne, Bookman Press, p. 200 39 There are foreign policy considerations pre-dating Federation, particularly in areas of defence and security focused on French, German and later Japanese expansion in the Pacific. Australian participation in conflicts including the Boer War and the Boxer Rebellion also confronted colonial leaders. This chapter will only consider Australian foreign policy making post-Federation. For discussion of earlier events see Hudson and Sharp, 1988, op. cit.; Cochrane, Peter. 2001. ‘British-Australian relations’ in Davison, Graeme et al. (eds.), Oxford Companion to Australian History, South Melbourne, Oxford University Press; Bennett, Scott (ed.). 1971. The Making of the Commonwealth, Melbourne, Cassell Australia; Meany, Neville, 1985, op. cit. and;
14 development of foreign policy making infrastructure, key policy actors and key issues dealt with by the literature will be examined. The following attempts to focus on the elements of the existing literature critical to assessing foreign policy as a public policy – it is not an all-encompassing history of Australian foreign policy but rather an attempt to examine how foreign policy making has been analysed in the past and what have been the key foci of academic endeavour in the century since Federation. By doing so, the key elements of Australian foreign policy making that need to be incorporated into a useful public policy framework will be elucidated.
Much of the early coverage of Australian foreign policy involves the relationship between Australia and Great Britain, along with discussion of Australia’s role within the British Empire. In the decades following Federation, Australia maintained no real diplomatic infrastructure, the Department of External Affairs flowed in and out of existence and foreign policy making largely consisted of communication with the Colonial Office. The new Australia had neither the wherewithal nor the desire to make and execute its own foreign policy.40
Yet despite this reluctance and lack of capacity, a specific reference to Australian control over the external affairs of the nation was written into the Australian Constitution.41 At that time, this was an odd thing for the colonial governments to have pursued, as responsibility for external affairs had never been a colonial responsibility and thus difficult to surrender to a federal authority.42 It is likely therefore, that the inclusion of an external affairs provision into the constitution was for the purposes of implementing Imperial treaties and relaying issues in the Pacific to London.43 Any notion that Australia would develop its own foreign policy and diplomatic infrastructure was fanciful. Hudson identifies ‘the authors of the Constitution did not envisage any independent Australian activities in the field of foreign affairs’. 44 In many of the writings by and on Australia’s early prime ministers, particularly from Barton through to Fisher, this sentiment is clearly evident.45 It was a period of cultural dependence whereby Australia was willing to accept the world as defined by Britain and rely on Pax Britannica for security and trade.46
Had the Commonwealth Government desired to execute its power over external affairs, the legal powers enshrined in the Constitution may have been difficult to implement in the context of London’s control of Imperial foreign policy. As Stark outlines, Australia’s position within the British Empire prescribed the powers that it had and did not have in the years following Federation:47
Benians, E.A. 1933. ‘The Western Pacific, 1788-1885’, in Rose, J. Holland (ed.), Cambridge History of the British Empire, Cambridge (UK), Cambridge University Press 40 There are many examples of this in Greenwood and Grimshaw, 1977, op. cit. and; Meany, 1985, op. cit. 41 Constitution of Australia, Section 51, Clause (XXIX) 42 Hudson and Sharp, op. cit., p. 30 43 Ibid. p. 18 44 Hudson, W.J. 1967. Towards a Foreign Policy 1914-1941, Melbourne, Cassell Australia, p. 22. See also Meany, 1985, 1970s , op. cit. pp. 14-15 45 See Reynolds, 1999, op. cit., p.200 and; Murdoch, Walter. 1999. Alfred Deakin, Melbourne, Bookman Press. For discussion of these leaders in a foreign policy context, see Fraser, Malcom and Roberts, Cain. 2014. Dangerous Allies, Carlton (VIC), Melbourne University Press and; Hudson and Sharp, 1988, op. cit. 46 Meany, 1985, op. cit, p. 8 47 Stark, Joseph. 1965. The ANZUS Treaty Alliance, Carlton (VIC), Melbourne University Press, p. 346
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• Australia had no genuine capacity on the international stage in foreign affairs; • Australia only had a semi-independent status in negotiations with foreign nations regarding commercial treaties, with discussions conducted through London; • Australia could not negotiate on matters of high foreign policy or defence with foreign nations; • Australia could put forward issues of strategic and foreign policy concern to the Imperial Government for consideration; and • Australia enjoyed only limited rights of representation in trade and technical matters with foreign nations.
Ostensibly, therefore, Australia may have had the constitutional power to make policy over its external affairs, but its position within the British Empire and a lack of political will meant early federal governments were content to leave foreign policy making to London. In terms of accessing foreign policy information important to Australia, the government relied on both the Colonial Office and Foreign Office, only ever joining other members of the Empire to discuss foreign policy issues at Colonial and later Imperial Conferences.48
There was particular dependence on the Colonial Office. This was a source of irritation for early leaders, who had no direct contact into the Foreign Office, relying instead on Colonial Secretaries to filter relevant diplomatic and security information back to Australia.49 The nation simply did not have the diplomatic infrastructure to gather information any other way, despite the Department of External Affairs being one of the original seven Commonwealth departments established at Federation.50 Whilst the Department took an interest in issues in New Guinea and the New Hebrides, the Commonwealth did not treat it as a Foreign Office and ‘did not look to it for systematic analyses of world events or even of Pacific affairs’.51
Consequently, in the first decade post-Federation, and led particularly by Alfred Deakin, the Commonwealth attempted to carve a role for itself within Imperial decision making. Indeed, more broadly, the period from Federation until 1939 is characterised not by an evolving Australian foreign policy, but rather ‘Australian sensitivities about being – or rather, about not being – consulted by the British’. 52 For example, at the 1907 Colonial Conference, Deakin spoke of the need for greater coordination over Imperial policy making:
“…fired by the idea of a great political fabric, the like of which the world has never seen, an Empire ‘on which the sun never sets,’ not, however, like the Empires of the past, controlled from a single centre or held together by a despotic authority, but a free union of independent though related States, responsible for the peace
48 Cumpston, 1995, op. cit., p. 3 49 See chapters one and two in Fraser and Roberts, 2014, op. cit. 50 DoE did not act as a typical foreign office as major policy areas were controlled by the DoT. At times, DoE was incorporated into the Prime Minister’s Department. See DFAT. History of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia. 51 Meany, 1985 , op. cit., p. 21 and; Benians, 1933, op. cit. 52 Evans and Grant, 1995, op. cit. p. 20
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and good government of nearly one-third of mankind, conscious of a common destiny, and animated by a common patriotism.”53
Deakin’s aspirations were not welcomed by London, yet they symbolise much of the Commonwealth thinking at the time – a desire to have a say in Imperial policy making, particularly defence, trade and foreign policy, but to remain deeply loyal to, and reliant on, Imperial ambition.54 The Commonwealth wanted to be consulted on major issues of Imperial policy, but did not want the sole responsibility for policy formulation and particularly, implementation. The 1907 Conference also put forward the idea of a ‘planning body designed to assist cooperation between the military forces of the dominions and Britain in defence of the empire’ with which Australia agreed, culminating in the formation of the Australian general staff in early 1909.55 The link between foreign policy concerns and military forces was strong. This was particularly so as Australian leaders were increasingly concerned about non-British expansion in the South Pacific and wanted to create something of a cordon sanitaire along the nation’s northern coastline.56 Yet still, no independent foreign policy making capacity was considered necessary; faith remained in the protection brought about by loyal Imperial membership.
During this period the prime minister had the greatest level of responsibility for external affairs as they were responsible for the relationship with Great Britain.57 The Prime Minister was usually the sole representative of the Commonwealth at Colonial and Imperial Conferences and after the position was established in 1910, the High Commissioner to London reported directly to the Prime Minister’s Department. As former foreign minister, Gareth Evans notes, ‘[i]t is a mark of Australia’s relaxed attitude to foreign policy that early foreign ministers…were neither politically notable nor especially active.’58 This early tradition of prime ministerial involvement in foreign policy making established a norm that is perpetuated throughout Australia’s foreign policy history and continues to contemporary times.
With this backdrop in mind, the first major foreign policy issue that confronted early Australian leaders was WWI. Casey argues that Britain’s declaration of war did not involve consultation with the Dominions, either in the negotiations prior to the declaration or the declaration itself – despite committing all parts of the Empire to war.59 Nonetheless, Hudson makes a good point in that WWI was ‘the catalyst which embroiled dominion leaders in the making of Empire policy’.60 Arguably for the first time, Australia was required to formulate a foreign policy, albeit still within the context of Imperial
53 Quoted in Murdoch, 1999, op. cit., p. 241 54 See chapters one and two in Fraser and Roberts, 2014, op. cit. 55 McKernan, M. and Browne, M. 1988. Australia: Two Centuries of War and Peace, Canberra, Australian War Memorial and Sydney, Allen & Unwin, p. 129 56 Meany, 1985, op. cit., p. 14. Meaney also discusses Australia wanting to create a ‘Monroe Doctrine’ for the South Pacific, and wanting to encourage Britain, and then in later decades the US, to underwrite such a proposal. 57 Meany, 1985, op. cit., p. 14. See also Weller, Patrick. 1985. First Among Equals: Prime Ministers in Westminster Systems, Sydney, Allen & Unwin. 58 Evans and Bruce, 1995, op. cit., p. 19 59 Casey, Richard. 1938. ‘Australia’s voice in imperial affairs’ in Duncan, W.G.K. (ed.). Australia’s Foreign Policy, Sydney, Angus & Robertson and Australian Institute of Political Science, p. 43 60 Hudson, W. J. 1978. Billy Hughes in Paris: The Birth of Australian Diplomacy, Melbourne, Thomas Nelson Australia, p. 7
17 membership and without its own diplomatic infrastructure. The role of Australia during WWI has been well documented and to examine it in any greater depth would not be relevant here, yet it should be stressed that the need for a greater ability to gather and analyse diplomatic and security information began to crystallise for Australian leaders as a result of WWI.61
For example, in the immediate post-WWI period, Billy Hughes used his position as prime minister to influence the foreign policy debate within Australia but also through Imperial mechanisms. He was a vocal participant at the Versailles Peace Conference, pushing for a heavy penalty on Germany and upsetting the Japanese by refusing to accede to a racial non-discrimination clause in the League of Nations’ preamble.62 Hughes abolished the Department of External Affairs, incorporating its limited functions into his own department, setting up a Pacific branch “to study the affairs of the countries of the Far East and of the Pacific insofar as they may…affect the foreign relations or domestic affairs of the Commonwealth”.63
Hughes would seek Australian representation at the Washington Naval Conference, in the League of Nations and would re-establish the Department of External Affairs during the 1920s, yet he assigned the role of foreign minister to himself and ‘failed to appoint any additional staff, with the exception of an officer in charge of League of Nations’ material’.64 The lack of new staff for external affairs would continue until the Bruce Government appointed Richard Casey as liaison officer to the British Foreign Office in 1924.65 The position was an attempt to provide Australia with a greater role in Imperial coordination, as Bruce said on the issue:
“if Australia is to be part of the Empire, and responsible for some share in its defence, Australia must have every reasonable opportunity to criticise and to help in formulating the foreign policy of the Empire as a whole”66
Yet this was not a move to assert Australia’s independent foreign policy making credentials, rather Bruce wanted the Dominion voices heard by the Foreign Office and incorporated into their thinking.67 As Grey argues, by and large, Australia still did not enact an independent foreign policy during the
61 See Bean, C.E.W. 1993. Anzac to Ameins, New York, Penguin Books Australia; Beaumont, Joan. 1995. Australia’s War 1914-1918, St Leonards (NSW), Allen & Unwin and; Dennis, Peter et al., 1995. The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, Melbourne, Oxford University Press. The Australian War Memorial also lists a number of useful materials – see < https://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/ww1/>. 62 Bridge, Carl. 2011. William Hughes: Australia, London, Haus Publishing, pp. 84-85; Lake, Marilyn and Reynolds, Henry. 2008. Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality, Melbourne, Cambridge University Press, p. 293 and; Shimazu, Naoko. 1998. Japan, Race and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919, London, Routledge, p. 125. 63 Meany, 1985, op. cit., p.22. The NAA reference to the original document is AA, CP447/3, item No. SC12 ‘Eastern Question’. 64 Hudson, 1967, op. cit., p. 37. Hughes failed to achieve independent Australian representation at the Washington Naval Conference as the Americans treated all British Dominions as one-and-the-same, under one British Empire delegation. Hughes was more successful with the League, with Australia becoming a founding member and importantly, listed as a separate member to Great Britain. 65 Cumpston, 1995, op. cit, pp. 9-10 66 Quoted in Hudson, W.J. 1970. Australian Diplomacy, Melbourne, Macmillan Australia, p. 20. 67 Cumpston, 1995, op. cit, p. 10
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1920s and 1930s, failing to enact policy making capacity and relying on the Imperial alliance system and its perceived protection for direction, with the benefits of this approach ultimately:
‘…squandered by a generation of conservative politicians who used the theory of Imperial defence as an excuse for doing little or nothing to maintain and develop Australia’s own forces, aided and abetted by a Labor Party which professed a belief in collective security through the League of Nations but which opposed any measure which might create military forces capable of implementing it.’68
Leaders, such as Bruce, wanted a greater participation and coordination efforts over Imperial foreign policy, but nothing more.69 The lack of desire for control over an independent foreign policy remained, with the Commonwealth still refusing to use the power granted to it by the Constitution.70 Further, this sentiment played well to the electorate, with the public largely uninformed on international affairs as Australia had ‘no tradition that the government should take the people into its confidence, or encourage them to engage in lively discussion of such matters’.71
Yet such wilful acquiescence to London by both the polity and the public was a sentiment not shared by a number of other British Dominions. The 1930 Imperial Conference was significant in terms of Australia’s ability to conduct its own affairs over foreign policy, with Canberra’s hand being forced by demands for greater independence within Empire. Pushed heavily by Canada and South Africa, the Dominions and Great Britain agreed to greater independence for the former colonies through the Balfour Declaration and the subsequent Statute of Westminster. This meant London could no longer make laws for and over Australia, at least not without its consent. Symbolic of Australia’s reluctance to take control over its own foreign affairs, the Commonwealth did not adopt the Statute of Westminster until 1942.72 Regardless, the foundation for an independent ability to both make and enact a distinctive Australian foreign policy was now in place.
In 1935, a more permanent Department of External Affairs was established, with a wider policy making remit and separation from the Prime Minister’s Department. Only during the 1940s did Australia begin to establish its own diplomatic network and source its own advice, almost two decades after Canada, Ireland and South Africa.73 Meaney argues the decision to roll-out posts was not an expression of a desire for greater autonomy or independent national status from Britain; rather, it was a response to the
68 Grey, Jeffrey. 1990. A Military History of Australia, Melbourne, Cambridge University Press, p. 125 69 Cumpston, 1995, op. cit, pp. 6-7 70 Hudson, 1967, op. cit., p. 24 71 Andrews, Eric Montgomery. 1970. Isolationism and Appeasement in Australia: Reactions to the European Crises, 1935-1939, Canberra, Australian National University Press, p. 5 72 Evans and Grant, 1995, op. cit., p. 19. See also Lewis, David. 1998. ‘John Latham and the Statute of Westminster’, paper presented at Looking Ahead: New Directions in Postgraduate Historical Research, University of Newcastle, 3 July 1998. 73 Meany, 1985, op. cit., p.15 and; Evans and Grant, 1995, op. cit., p. 19, suggest the French influence in Canada and Afrikaans-Dutch influence in South Africa lessened the bond between those two nations and Britain.
19 deteriorating international situation.74 Waters highlights it was also a response by Menzies who felt Whitehall had underestimated the threat Japan posed to Australia and that London had not handled the German provocations in Europe well, complaining “[f]rankly, I have not been impressed with British diplomacy of late”.75 Legations were therefore set up in Washington, Ottawa, Tokyo and Chongqing, then the centre of Chinese government. These missions would complement the existing High Commission in London, which between 1933 and 1945, was headed by former Prime Minister Stanley Bruce.76 Despite Bruce’s effectiveness in London, the expansion of Australia’s diplomatic footprint was done reluctantly, with Menzies declaring:
“Little given as I am to encouraging the exaggerated ideas of Dominion independence and separatism which exists in some minds, I have become convinced that, in the Pacific, Australia must regard herself as a principal providing herself with her own information and maintaining her own diplomatic contacts with foreign powers.”77
In the years leading to WWII, Australia would also begin to push for a greater collective defence arrangement in the Pacific region. Whilst Australia had pushed for collective arrangements within the British Empire, it was a first attempt at trying to devise and implement regional defence and diplomatic architecture designed, first and foremost, to serve Australian interests. A distinctive Australian foreign policy had begun to emerge, although it would take the devastation of WWII for it to become truly manifest.
The first 40 years of Australian foreign policy, therefore, saw much of the decision making abdicated to London or at least conducted under the auspices of the British Empire. Whilst Australian leaders confronted issues of strategic importance such as WWI, the Chanak Crisis, the Abyssinia Crisis and the Munich Incident, by and large, their role in policy making in these areas was limited.78 The focus of early Australian political efforts was on domestic public policy and when it came to international events, Australia’s role was to support the overarching Imperial position through both solidarity and when necessary, military commitments. As such, the strong public policy making traditions found in other areas of Commonwealth Government activity took longer to manifest in the foreign policy space. Whilst a nascent foreign policy capacity was emerging in the years leading up to WWII, Australia remained
74 Meany, 1985, op. cit., pp. 22-23 75 Waters, Christopher. 2012. Australia and appeasement: imperial foreign policy and the origins of World War II, London, I.B. Tauris, p. 2 76 See Cumpston, 1995, op. cit.; Edwards, Cecil. 1965. Bruce of Melbourne: Man of Two Worlds, London, Heinemann and; Lee, David. 2010. Stanley Melbourne Bruce: Australian Internationalist. London, Continuum Press. 77 Menzies quoted in Evans and Grant, 1995, op. cit., p. 19 78 See Eggleston, P. 1933. ‘Australia and Empire, 1855-1921’ in Rose, J. Holland (ed.). Cambridge History of the British Empire, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Sales, Peter. 1971; ‘W.M Hughes and the Chanak Crisis of 1922’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 17, No. 3; Carlton, David. 1972. ‘The Dominions and the British Policy in the Abyssinian Crisis’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 1, No. 1; Bridge, Carl. 2006. ‘Australia and the Italo-Abyssinian Crisis of 1935-6’, Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, June 1 and; Fraser and Roberts, 2014, op. cit., pp. 62-63.
20 reliant on Britain for foreign policy expertise, information and strategy. Trade was the dominant policy concern, for as Millar notes ‘much of the Australian Government’s attention, and that of scholars concerned with its overseas position, was concentrated upon trade, not upon international political questions’.79 Yet in the post-WWII era and during the tensions in the Cold War, this focus would change. Australia would need to develop a policy making capacity to inform its own foreign policy, particularly as Britain, its long term protector and guide, would have neither the capacity nor the political will to continue to fulfil these roles.
As WWII raged and Britain was under siege, Australia’s security came under direct threat after the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbour. Reliance on London had resulted in a situation where Australia was isolated and incapable of defending itself. As such, in an end of year announcement in 1941, then Prime Minister John Curtin made arguably the most important public statement of his prime ministership and one that would have implications for Australian foreign policy for decades to come:
“Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.”80
In this simple announcement, Curtin transferred Australia’s reliance on the UK for defence and foreign policy to the US; switching Australia’s strategic outlook from one ‘great and powerful friend’ to another. Australian foreign and defence policies were combined in an approach known as ‘forward defence’, a policy exacerbated by the fall of Singapore and the bombing of Darwin.81 Forward defence would remain a constant in Australian political discourse for decades to come, still present in the foreign policies of both the Whitlam and Fraser governments.
The literature of this period focuses on the role of two key political actors: H.V Evatt and Robert Menzies. Firstly, Evatt, foreign minister between 1941 and 1949 and Leader of the Opposition between 1949 and 1966, was unlike many who predated him in the portfolio:
‘Evatt came to External Affairs with virtually no experience in that field and with few overseas contacts…[h]e had a tiny department with a handful of experts to support him…[h]e also brought a left-wing approach to international affairs, a suspicion of imperialist colonial powers, and a determination to succeed.’82
Evatt’s personal impact on Australian foreign policy and how it was constructed was profound. This was particularly so in the negotiations with US over the Japanese Peace Treaty as well as Australia’s engagement with the establishment of the United Nations (UN). Indeed Evatt saw the UN as an agent
79 Miller, J.D.B. 1983. ‘The Development of International Studies in Australia 1933-83’, Australian Outlook, Vol. 37, No. 3, p. 139. See also McDougall, 2009b, op. cit. pp. 377-378 80 Curtin, John. 1941. ‘The Task Ahead’, in The Herald (Melbourne), 27 December 81 Evans and Grant, 1995, op. cit., p. 22 and; Fraser and Roberts, 2014, op. cit., pp. 141-142 82 Harper, Norman. 1987. A Great and Powerful Friend: A Study of Australian American Relations Between 1900 and 1975, St. Lucia (QLD), University of Queensland Press, p. 342
21 of social and economic reform that could assist in Australia’s security by guaranteeing global stability.83 Evatt was, arguably, Australia’s most vocal agent on the international scene since Federation. Given Ben Chifley’s lack of interest in overseas affairs, Evatt was allowed to dictate Australia’s international agenda. At the conclusion of the WWII, Evatt established an expansive set of objectives for Australia’s foreign policy, including adherence to the UN Charter, development of a Commonwealth security apparatus in cooperation with the US and importantly, development of a capacity to ‘ensure effective Australian diplomatic, consular and commercial representation’. 84 Indeed Evatt’s success on the international stage saw him elected as President of the UN General Assembly, a significant outcome given less than two decades earlier Australia still viewed foreign policy through a window in London.
The other, and perhaps most important role, was that of Menzies, whose leadership between 1949 and 1966 saw the nation continue to place its faith in ‘great and powerful friends’. Menzies had long been a supporter and devotee of Great Britain and indeed, upon his first visit to England in 1935 as Attorney General, he would write in his diary as the white cliffs of Dover came into view “[a]t last we are in England…[o]ur journey to Mecca has ended”.85 Evidently, Menzies’ love of England and the British Empire would be a significant influence on his prime ministership and Australia’s foreign policy under his leadership. During the 1950s and 1960s, Australia was required to balance its historic relationship with the UK against its new defence partner, the US. For example, Anglo-American views were not aligned during the Suez Crisis in 1956, and Australia, under Menzies, attempted to urge ‘a middle way which would unite its “great and powerful friends”.86
The later conservative prime ministers had their foreign policies ‘jolted’ by events breaking with tradition, particularly by Britain’s decision to enter the European Common Market87 Harold Holt particularly had to address an increasingly critical Asian audience, but also worked hard at deepening Canberra’s relations with Washington, culminating in two visits to Australia by American president, Lyndon Johnson.88 Indeed many of the events of this period focused on in the literature are all tied to the broader Cold War dialectic.89
83 Evans and Bruce, 1995, op. cit., p. 23 84 Cumpston, 1995, op. cit, p. 41. Cumpston uses the official records of this period to summarise Evatt’s foreign policy agenda, with the relevant NAA reference being APD 189 15 November 1946 346-7. 85 Quoted in Davison, Graeme. 2005. ‘The Colonial Strut: Australian Leaders on the World Stage’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 51, No. 1, p. 10. See also Martin, A. W. 1993. Robert Menzies: A Life, Vol. 1 1894-1943, Carlton (VIC), Melbourne University Press. 86 Meany, 1985, op. cit., p. 15. For more on Australia’s response to the Suez Crisis, see Ball, W. Macmahon. 1957. ‘The Australian Reaction to the Suez Crisis: July-December 1956’, Australian Journal of Politics and History Vol. 2, No. 2. 87 Davison, 2005, op. cit, pp. 12-13 88 The second visit was for Holt’s funeral. 89 See Tennant, Kylie. 1970. Evatt: Politics and Justice, Sydney, Angus and Robertson; Dennis, Peter & Grey, Jeffrey. 1996. Emergency and Confrontation: Australian Military Operations in Malaya and Borneo 1950-66, St Leonards (NSW), Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial; Woodard, Garry. 1998. ‘Best practice in Australia’s foreign policy: “Konfrontasi (1963-1966)”, Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 1; Edwards, Peter. 1992. Crises and Commitments: The Politics and Diplomacy of Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948-1965, Sydney, Allen & Unwin and; Fraser and Roberts, 2014, op. cit., pp. 103-118.
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Gough Whitlam’s election in 1972 heralded changes to Australia’s foreign policy approach, particularly for Labor governments, as it represented ‘a future in which Australia both retain[ed] and move[d] beyond its traditional British and American allies to engage with the exciting new world of its region.’90 In the early period of his government, Whitlam would hold the roles of prime minister and foreign minister concurrently, and his desire to ‘reassess a whole range of Australian foreign policies and attitudes’ manifested in the recognition of China, Australia’s final withdrawal from Vietnam and a general desire for a more independent foreign policy.91 Pemberton outlines a number of key feature of Whitlam’s (and Labor’s more broadly) approach to foreign policy, including:
• assertion of a more independent foreign policy; • greater emphasis on the Asia Pacific; • support for the United Nations; and • support for decolonisation.92
The desire for a more independent foreign policy was a move away from the previous conservative governments’ staunch support for US and UK foreign policies, particularly on China.93 This was not aimed at pulling Australia out of the Western alliance, but rather a mechanism to expand Australia’s bilateral connections. 94 On China specifically, Whitlam perceived Beijing’s foreign policy as being increasingly independent of Moscow, viewing it as an independent country recognised by the UN General Assembly rather than through a rigid Cold War lens.95 The recognition of China was also aimed at developing a working relationship with the Soviet Union, and to that end, Whitlam maintained an even-hand in the Sino-Soviet disputes of the 1970s.96 Recognising China and ending official diplomatic relations with Taiwan would be the defining foreign policy decision of the Whitlam Government.
Whitlam was also influential in crafting his government’s policy towards East Timor, with McDougall arguing Whitlam dealt with the issue on his own, and minimised the involvement of other government members. 97 Ensuring Australia remained on good terms with Indonesia was the major factor in Whitlam’s thinking, although his distaste for microstates left him with a preference for longer Portuguese control until Dili could manage its own affairs or be peacefully absorbed into Indonesia.98
90 Johnson, Carol, Ahluwalia, Pal and McCarthy, Greg. 2010. ‘Australia’s Ambivalent Re-imagining of Asia’, Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 45, No. 1, p. 63 91 Hocking, Jenny. 2012. Gough Whitlam: His Time, Carlton (VIC), Miegunyah Press, p. 21 and McDougall, 1998, op. cit., p. 10 92 See Pemberton, Gregory. 1997. ‘Whitlam and the Labor Tradition’ in Lee, David and Waters, Christopher (eds.). Evatt to Evans: the Labor tradition in Australian foreign policy, St Leonards (NSW), Allen & Unwin 93 Ross agrees with Whitlam’s desire for a more independent foreign policy, see Ross, Ken. 2014. ‘Projecting Canberra’s international goals’, New Zealand International Review, Vol. 39, No. 6, p. 8 94 Hocking, 2012, op. cit. pp. 91-92 95 Johnson, Ahluwalia, and McCarthy, 2010, op. cit., p. 64. See also Whitlam, Gough. 1985. The Whitlam Government, 1972-1975, Ringwood (VIC), Viking, p. 57 96 McDougall, 1998, op. cit., p. 185 97 McDougall, 1998, op. cit., p. 213 98 Ibid., pp.213-214 and Whitlam, Gough. 1980. ‘Australia, Indonesia and Europe’s Empires’, Australian Outlook, Vol. 34, No. 1.
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Following Whitlam’s dismissal in 1975, the government of Malcolm Fraser would not continue the ALP’s even-handed approach to Sino-Soviet conflicts. Fraser’s staunchly anti-Soviet views resulted in his leaning towards China as a way to apply pressure on Moscow.99 Indeed the Soviet Union would be the ‘bogey man that animated much of Fraser’s prime ministership’ along with a deep commitment to ANZUS, which would change in the years after he left office.100 Nonetheless, Fraser would continue more of Whitlam’s policies than he would reverse, particularly towards China, Japan and Indonesia.101 Dobell describes this as cementing Australia’s ‘Great Asia Project’ - started by Whitlam, locked-down by Fraser and adhered to by every government that followed in one way or another.102
In power, the Fraser Government followed ‘four essential’ foreign policy components:
• the Western alliance; • regionalism; • the Commonwealth; and • strengthened relations with middle powers.103
The Western, and ANZUS in particular, were pivotal to Australia’s foreign policy under Fraser. The Cold War framed Fraser’s world view and the alliance offered ‘the ultimate guarantee of ‘[Australia’s] security should a direct threat…ever eventuate’.104 The alliance ensured the global strategic balance, and Australia’s place within it. Fraser was a Cold War warrior par excellence.
Fraser gave greater prominence for the Commonwealth in Australian foreign policy thinking, primarily as a mechanism to deal with political crises in then Rhodesia and South Africa. Fraser established the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting to ensure the Commonwealth had a body that could deal with major events and not ‘simply skirt around them…[or] talk about peripheral issues of secondary importance’.105 Greater focus on the Commonwealth was also intended to give Pacific island nations a voice on global matters, feeding into the government’s regionalism and middle powers foreign policy pillars. Fraser would be the last Australian prime minister to view the Commonwealth as a major instrument of Australian foreign policy.106
Bob Hawke’s foreign policy leadership during the 1980s was characterised by global upheaval, including the collapse of the Berlin Wall, disintegration of the Soviet Union and end of institutionalised apartheid in South Africa.107 Australia’s own immediate region also caused significant issues for the
99 McDougall, 1998, op. cit., p. 185 100 Dobell, Graeme. 2015. ‘Malcolm Fraser: realist to radical and the great Asia project’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 6, p. 625. For Fraser’s later views, see Fraser and Roberts, 2014, op. cit. 101 Edwards, Peter. 2015. ‘Malcolm Fraser and the American Alliance’, The Strategist, March 26 102 Dobell, 2015, op. cit., p. 633 103 Outlined by Fraser in the Australian Parliament in September 1980 and quoted in ibid., p. 625-262. 104 Fraser quoted in ibid., p. 626. See also Edwards, 2015, op. cit. 105 Fraser, Malcolm. 2005. ‘Liberals and Australian Foreign Policy’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 51, No. 3, p. 337 106 Dobell, 2015, op. cit., p. 627 107 Mills, Stephen. 1993. The Hawke Years: The Story from the Inside, Melbourne, Penguin Books Australia Ltd, 1993, p. 154
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Hawke Government, most notably the Fijian military coup and the massacre in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. 108 Policy makers during the 1980s believed the Australia’s traditional identity and role in international affairs no longer suited the emerging order in the Asia Pacific.109
Despite this, Trood sees the first years of Hawke’s prime ministership as dominated by domestic based tax and economic reform, resulting in a drift of power towards then-Foreign Minister Bill Hayden.110 This was not to last and as the international events listed above unfolded throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, unusually in Australian politics, foreign policy became a central pillar of the Hawke Government’s policy agenda. The corollary of this being that the prime minister became actively involved, favouring an ‘issue-oriented style of policy management.’111 In the early years of the Hawke Government, these issues were largely discussed (and vigorously debated) between Hawke and Hayden. Despite the tense political relationship between Hawke and Hayden – a result of a leadership challenge by Hawke prior to the 1983 election – there was an amicable working relationship through ‘mutual restraint’.112 Hayden recalls that Hawke had a propensity to ‘fine tune the major trouble spots of the world’ and despite often having differing opinions, the foreign minister carried out the prime minister’s directives.113
Trood maintains that Hawke’s defining characteristic in developing Australian international agenda was consensus over personal control.114 Indeed Hawke’s desire for political consensus on foreign policy issues manifested in the Security Committee of Cabinet becoming the main vehicle for foreign policy decision making.115 Hawke himself points to the importance of consensus in foreign policy decision making and he utilised the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings (CHOGM) to affect this mandate on international issues such as transitional arrangements in black majority-ruled Zimbabwe.116 Collins agrees with the central role of consensus politics and indeed expands this to all areas of his polity, arguing that Hawke’s style of governance exemplified a sense of Australian utilitarianism.117
In forming a consensus, Hawke believed personal negotiations between leaders was the preeminent method for achieving international agreement. Indeed, Mills argues that Hawke ‘believed foreign policy was directed by the leaders of nations, face to face; their capacity to do so was one of the most important responsibilities of their jobs as leaders.’118 Hawke’s personal relationships with leaders in CHOGM, South Africa and Israel were pivotal in negotiations affecting these nations and institutions. Mills also
108 Ibid., p. 154 109 Jones, David and Smith, Mike. 2000. ‘Misreading Menzies and Whitlam: Reassessing the Ideological Construction of Australian Foreign Policy’, The Round Table, No. 355, p. 388 110 Trood, Russell. 1992. 'Prime Ministers and Foreign Policy', in Weller, Patrick. Menzies to Keating: The Development of the Australian Prime Ministership, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, p. 173 111 Ibid., p. 174 112 Hayden, Bill. 1996. Hayden: An Autobiography, Sydney, Angus & Robinson, pp. 378-386 113 Hayden uses the Kampuchea incident in Indo-China and Israeli-Palestinian relations as two examples where there were differences in opinion between prime minister and foreign minister. See Ibid., pp. 378-386 114 Trood, 1992, op. cit., p. 175 115 Ibid. p. 165 116 Hawke, Bob. 1984. The Hawke Memoirs, Melbourne, William Heinemann Australia, pp 315-316 117 Collins, Hugh. 1985. 'Political Ideology in Australia: The Distinctiveness of a Benthamite Society', Daedalus, Vol. 114, No 1, p. 153 118 Mills, 1993, op. cit.
25 points out that given Hawke’s penchant for direct negotiations, Australia’s post-Cold War role often ‘bore the stamp of Hawke’s personal priorities and commitments.’
Evans, foreign minister in the last years of the Hawke government, largely agrees with the notion of Hawke’s desire to reach consensus by direct leader-to-leader contact. Evans sees Hawke’s prevailing feature during his time as prime minister as being his ‘strong personal commitment to external policy matters.’119 This manifested in Hawke having a hands-on role in foreign policy development and on an operational basis, formalising extensive meetings with Evans to thrash out Australia’s international agenda and responses to longer term issues.120
Thakur argues that the reorientation of Australia’s foreign policy towards Asia, whilst commenced under Whitlam, was vigorously pursued during the Hawke prime ministership in responding to a number of reports - including the Fitzgerald Report on immigration and the Garnaut Report on relations with Northeast Asia.121 This is a view shared by many scholars including Gyngell and Wesley who suggest that Hawke’s belief that Australia could adapt to the cultural differences in its region through ‘sensitivity and diplomatic agenda’ heralded a dramatic shift in Australia’s perception of its place in the world.122 Gurry further argues Hawke changed the orthodoxy of Australia’s prime ministers by extending ‘Australia’s post-colonial idiom’ and talking of ‘Australia’s central role as part of the vibrant and fast- growing region of the Asia-Pacific.123 For Gurry, this idea manifested itself in rhetoric used by the government in describing Australia as a ‘part of the region’ and moving away from describing Australia as being ‘close to the region.’124 The redefinition of Australia as an Asia-Pacific nation under Hawke was best exemplified by the establishment of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).125 Yet more broadly, this also exemplified Hawke’s commitment to a multilateral system of global governance, spanning both trade and security issues. It was a far cry to the cultural dependence on Britain in the early years of the Commonwealth.
When Keating ousted Hawke in an internal leadership spill in 1991, the strategic outlook that the former inherited strongly indicated that the Cold War was over and that economic growth across Northeast Asia had vindicated Hawke’s strategy of regional engagement. However, Henry argues that despite this trajectory, Keating came in to the prime ministership with little, if any, of his foreign policy ideas or world views known to the electorate.126
119 Evans and Grant, 1995, op. cit., p. 29 120 Ibid., p. 47 121 Thakur, Ramesh. 1998. 'Australia's regional engagement', Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 20, No. 1 122 Gyngell and Wesley, 2007, op. cit., p. 276. See also Higgott, Richard and Nossal, Kim. 1997. 'The International Politics of Liminality: Relocating Australia in the Asia Pacific', Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 2, p. 169; Henry, Adam. 2006. 'Keating: the man who discovered Asia?’, ISAA Review: Journal of the Independent Scholars Association of Australia, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 21 and; Evans and Grant, 1995, op. cit., p. 26. 123 Gurry, Meg. 1995. 'Identifying Australia's 'Region': From Evatt to Evans', Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 1, p. 27 124 Ibid, p. 28 125 Ibid, p. 29 126 Henry, 2006, op. cit., p. 21
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Former Keating advisor Allan Gyngell notes ‘Keating saw the world in terms of realpolitik…Keating was interested in the big picture, the size of GDP and the source of national power and influence.’127 Kelly supports this, suggesting that Keating saw foreign policy in a nineteenth century ‘from the Palace’ style, focusing on the roles of leaders and politicians and their relationships with their foreign counterparts.128 This view is also upheld by Goldsworthy, claiming that Keating’s foreign policy decisions were always driven by grand visions of the international system.129 These visions firmly ensconced Keating as a ‘national interest realist’ in his approach to foreign policy, rejecting the notion that shared values were required to maintain close ties with regional neighbours – a theme Howard would pick up after the 1996 election. 130 No such vision would take more of Keating’s time than his dual strategy to cement Australia’s position in the emerging identity of the Asia-Pacific and to ‘integrate the US alliance’ into this new identity.131
Much like during Hawke’s tenure, Asian engagement was central to the Keating prime ministership, with McDougall arguing that it was under Keating (with great assistance from Evans) that a ‘clearly articulated strategy for Australian engagement with the Asia-Pacific emerged.’132 Henry adds that Keating invested much more politically in Asia than Hawke, attempting to ‘marry divisive cultural symbolism to his economic vision’ culminating in APEC becoming the key to his ‘[e]ngagement paradigm.’133 Keating’s desire to increase the role of national leaders within APEC represents another similarity with his prime ministerial predecessor, who shared this style of foreign policy development. Evans highlights this by describing the early years of the Keating Government during which the prime minister embarked on an ambitious schedule of international travel, establishing personal relationships with key regional leaders.134
APEC would become Keating’s foreign policy baby and he was ‘pivotal in elevating APEC from a talkfest for economic ministers to a forum for the region’s leaders.’ 135 Indeed Keating himself recalls then Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa describing APEC as ‘your baby’.136 The importance of APEC to Keating was profound, describing it as an ‘opportunity to generate new ideas, subsume old enmities, and establish new ways of doing things within a regional framework.’137 This clearly highlights Keating’s penchant for multilateral institutions as a method for building regional economic prosperity and providing
127 Gyngell quoted in Kelly, Paul. 2009. The March of Patriots: The Struggle for Modern Australia, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, p. 159 128 Ibid., p. 160 129 Goldsworthy, David. 2001. 'An Overview', in Cotton and Ravenhill (eds.), The National Interest in a Global Era: Australia in World Affairs 1996-2000, South Melbourne, Oxford University Press, p. 10 130 Kelly, 2009, op. cit. p. 159 131 Ibid, p. 159 132 McDougall, Derek. 2009a. Australian Foreign Relations: Entering the 21st Century, Frenchs Forest (NSW), Pearson Education Australia, p. 99 133 Henry, 2006, op. cit., p. 26 134 Evans and Grant, 1995, op. cit., p. 31 135 Megalogenis, George. 2006. The Longest Decade, Carlton North (VIC), Scribe Publications Pty Ltd, p. 123 136 Keating, Paul. 2000. Engagement: Australia Faces the Asia-Pacific, Sydney, Macmillan Australian Pty Ltd, p. 87 137 Ibid., p. 80
27 a stable security environment.138 It is also representative of embracing Australia’s middle power status, a concept also endorsed by the then-foreign minister stating that what middle power’s ‘may lack in economic, political or military clout, they can often make up with quick and thoughtful diplomatic footwork.’139 The importance of middle power diplomacy was used by Evans to argue the importance of the role Australia played in establishing APEC as ‘it is generally acknowledged that APEC would have had much more difficulty in getting off the ground if the US or Japan had been the instigator.’140
Higgott and Nossal point out that the push into Asia eventually caused irreparable domestic political backlash for the Keating government, culminating in the defeat of the government in March 1996 at the hands of the Coalition lead by John Howard.141 This discussion is important for this study as it suggests that electoral backlash can be caused by foreign policy issues – in this case a sense of the ‘Asianisation’ of Australian society and that the electorate’s views on Asian engagement may not have been fully understood by the Keating government. Megalogenis adds to this, suggesting that ‘Australia’s real Asian debate occurred in the 1990s: not over immigration, but engagement.’142 As a result, Howard would use this issue to ‘rewrite Keating’s foreign policy record’, claiming Keating’s focus on Asia came at the expense of the alliance with the US and it was this relationship with America, not Asia, that quickly became Howard’s early foreign policy focus.143
In a similar vein to interpretations of the early Hawke years, Wesley notes there is a widespread view that during the first three years of Howard’s prime ministership, he played little part and was generally not interested in foreign policy, leaving policy direction, design and implementation to then foreign minister, Alexander Downer.144 Highlighting this, Kelly describes Howard as an inexperienced diplomat, without regional networks and lacking relationships with foreign leaders. 145 Yet much like his predecessors, Howard had to contend with a number of major world issues during his four terms as prime minister, most notably the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the ensuing War on Terror, the peace-keeping intervention into East Timor and a rising China. Howard’s world view would be the catalyst for defining and contending with these issues.
Garran suggests that Howard’s world view was an extension of his political outlook, resulting in a steadfast belief in the predominance of the ANZUS alliance, the nation state as the single most important actor in the international system and a wariness of international multilateral institutions.146 For Garran, Howard took an instrumental approach to foreign policy whereby the worldview
138 See for example Cotton, James, 2008. 'Asian regionalism and the Australian policy response in the Howard era', Journal of Australian Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1, p. 116. 139 Evans and Grant, 1995, op. cit., p. 347 140 Ibid., p. 357 141 Higgott and Nossal, 1997, op. cit., p. 169 142 Megalogenis, 2006, op. cit., p. 124 143 Ibid., p. 124 144 Gyngell, and Wesley, 2007, op. cit., p. 33 145 Kelly, 2009, op. cit. p. 429 146 Garran, Robert. 2004. True Believer: John Howard, George Bush & the American Alliance, Crows Nest (NSW), Allen & Unwin, 2004, p. 17
28 underpinning foreign policy development was a given, with no ‘need for sophisticated explanations or fancy models of the international system.’147
Several scholars suggest that Howard has had a profound impact on the way the public conceives the role of the prime minister with regards to foreign policy. This impact has manifested in changes in institutional arrangements that cement prime ministerial power over decision making. For example, Kelly argues Howard transformed ‘the prime ministership, creating new but enduring expectations about the role of the prime minister as “national security chief”.’ 148 This was particularly so in the area of national security and defence, where Howard reconstituted the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSCC) making it the ‘peak political decision-making body in Australian government on security-related policy, strategy and resources.’149 Kelly, along with Jennings, sees this as distinctive consolidation of the role of the prime minister as the ultimate source of power in security and defence related foreign policy decisions. 150 Jennings adds that the management structure of NSCC and the increasingly important role of the DPM&C in these decision processes, further increased the power of the prime minister vis-à-vis other members of the cabinet and institutions of government.151 Tiernan agrees with this summation adding that the arrangements achieved ‘a long-term goal of the Coalition parties – a focus on coherent and consistent policy, based on a wider conception of national security and a decisive role for the Prime Minister in driving policy and decision making.’152
Gyngell and Wesley extend the consolidation of prime ministerial control during the Howard years to foreign policy more generally, arguing that Howard increased prime ministerial involvement to the point of creating a ‘presidential style’ of foreign policy development in Australia.153 Tiernan agrees with this, pointing out that although similar statements have been made about every prime minister since Menzies, there is ‘no doubt however, that over recent decades there has been a significant accretion of power and resources to the agencies that serve the first minister.’154 Going even further, Verrier argues Howard’s dominance over foreign policy extended to the parliament, purposefully pushing policy through the house in an agenda based on values and not interests.155 According to Verrier, Howard took the parliament for granted, flaunting his foreign policy successes with the Australian electorate whilst showcasing ‘his growing status as an international statesman, illustrated by the waves of visits of heads of states.’156
147 Ibid., p. 17 148 Kelly, Paul. 2006b. 'Re-thinking Australian Governance: The Howard Legacy', in Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 65, No. 1, p. 19 149 Tiernan, Anne. 2007. 'The learner: John Howard's system of national security advice', Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 61, No 4, p. 491 150 Kelly, Paul. 2008. The end of certainty: power, politics and business in Australia, Crows Nest (NSW), Allen & Unwin, p. 21 and; Jennings, Peter. 2004. 'The Policy Shift the Media Missed', Policy, Vol. 20, No. 2, p. 37 151 Ibid., pp. 36-37 152 Tiernan, 2007, op. cit., p. 491 153 Gyngell and Wesley, 2007, op. cit., p. 89 154 Tiernan, 2007, op. cit., p. 495 155 Verrier, June. 2007. 'Parliament and Foreign Policy', in Cotton, James and Ravenhall, John (eds.), Trading on Alliance Security: Australian in World Affairs 2001-2005, South Melbourne, Oxford University Press, p. 322 156 Ibid., p. 324
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Despite this show of power, it should be noted that under Howard’s leadership the then-Foreign Minister Downer did attempt to increase the amount of non-government input into the policy making process by increasing the role of the parliament in treaty ratification and establishing the Foreign Affairs Council.157 Downer described the council as a mechanism through which the government could access ‘distinguished Australians working in business, in academia and the media in developing its foreign policy.’158 Goldsworthy does state however, that whilst these initiatives were received well in academic and political circles, they ‘had little bearing on the central issues of power and control in making and implementing policy.’ 159
Just as there were structural changes to the mechanics of foreign policy making under Howard, there were significant shifts in foreign policy substance. Centrally, and unlike the previous two prime ministers, Howard viewed Asian engagement more cautiously and whilst not explicitly rejecting it he believed it did not require ‘the abandonment of essential values and traditions – understood in terms of transparency and the rule of law’ to be successful and serve the national interest.160 For Aulich and Wettenhall, this translated into an abandonment of the Asian enmeshment project pursued by Hawke and Keating and a stark countering of the sense of Asian values with a distinctive set of Australian values. 161 Advocacy of these values became a hallmark of Howard’s leadership, with Johnson suggesting Howard did not see a need to choose between history and geography, instead choosing to emphasise a Western-centric identity and value set for Australia irrespective of the compatibility with the notion of how Asia viewed itself.162 As Downer notes, ‘Australia had moved from an Asia-only focus to an Asia-first focus, but that its pre-eminent relationship was with the US’.163
The abandonment of the Asian enmeshment project did not equate to an abandonment of pursuing Australian interests in Asia; rather, it resulted in a change of tactic. Most notable was Howard’s insistence that the state be regarded as the prime actor in the international system and that there were considerable limitations to the efficacy of multilateral institutions.164 Goldsworthy agrees, arguing that Australia’s multilateral objectives under Howard were always measured against whether they could be closely aligned to the national interest and that they should not be utilised to appease of sense of global idealism.165 A major test of this philosophy was managing the Australia-Indonesia relationship during the Australian-led Timor Leste intervention, acceding to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the declining relevance of APEC. With particular regard to Indonesia, Sulistiyanto points out that Howard had to contend with a number of major issues in addition to Timor Leste: the fall of Suharto and
157 Goldsworthy, 2001, op. cit., p. 15 158 Downer, Alexander. 1997. Establishment of Foreign Affairs Council¸ media release, 18 December 159 Goldsworthy, 2001, op. cit., p. 15 160 Cotton, 2008, op. cit., p. 118 161 Aulich, Chris and Wettenhall, Roger. 2005. Howard's Second and Third Governments: Australian Commonwealth Administration 1998-2004, Sydney, University of New South Wales Press Ltd, p. 189 162 Johnson, Carol. 2007. 'John Howard's 'Values' and Australian identity', Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 42, No. 2, p. 200 163 Downer quoted in Vicziany, Marika and Weigold, Auriol. ‘Security in South Asia: outsider perspectives’, Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 12, No. 2, p. 169 164 Cotton, 2008, op. cit., p. 118 165 Goldsworthy, 2001, op. cit., p. 11
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Indonesian democratisation; the Bali Bombings; the Asian tsunami and; separatist issues in Aceh.166 Despite these challenges, Woolcott identifies that towards the end of the Howard prime ministership, he had managed to solidify bilateral relations between Australia and Indonesia (and other ASEAN nations) as well as deepening the relationship with China.167
The impact of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on the US is also important. In Washington on the day of the attacks, Howard would claim that, because of shared values, an attack on America was an attack on Australia, precipitating the greatest alignment of interests between Canberra and Washington and personal intimacy between leaders since Holt and Johnson.168
The significance Howard afforded to Australia’s relationship with the US and enhancing the ANZUS alliance throughout his prime ministership is indicative of his penchant for bilateralism. Cotton argues that for both the prime minister and the foreign minister, ‘the maintenance and strengthening of the relationship with the US was ostensibly the most important policy objective.’169 DeBats describes this as a relationship rebalancing, a process that gained particular traction given the personal relationship between Howard and US President George W. Bush.170 Edwards agrees and adds that the invoking of ANZUS after the attacks symbolised the beginning of an intimate period in Australia-American relations, exemplified by Australia’s support for the War on Terror (particularly through participation in both Iraq and Afghanistan), the signing of a FTA and, as already mentioned, the personal friendship between Howard and Bush.171
The change in foreign policy and focus between the Hawke/Keating years and the Howard years are quite distinct. Indeed, the refocusing of the multilateral efforts of the former leaders by Howard to a bilateral focus dramatically challenged the way Australia had engaged its geographic region. Howard’s value and identity driven foreign agenda clearly raises questions for this study as to how influential the prime minister was in establishing Australia’s foreign policy direction during his tenure. It would seem, prima facie, that Howard was the driving force a lot of the time and the selected case studies during Howard’s prime ministership will test this perception.
Unlike when Howard became prime minister in 1996, the prime ministership of Kevin Rudd would be marked by an active role in foreign policy making and designing Australia’s international agenda.
166 Sulistiyanto, Priyambudi. 2010. 'Indonesia-Australia Relations in the Era of Democracy: The View from the Indonesian Side', Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 45, No. 1, p. 118. For East Timor overview and associated bilateral issues see Woodard, Garry. 1999. 'Australia's Foreign Policy after Timor', International Journal, Vol. 55, No. 1. 167 Woolcott, Richard. 2005. 'Foreign policy priorities for the Howard government's fourth term: Australia, Asia and America in the post-11th September world', Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 59, No 2, p. 68 168 Quoted in Davison, 2005, op. cit., p. 14 169 Cotton, 2008, op. cit., p. 119 170 DeBats, Donald, McDonald, Tim and Williams, Margaret-Ann. 2007. 'Mr Howard Goes to Washington: September 11, the Australia-American Relationship and Attributes of Leadership', Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 42, No .2, p. 232 171 Edwards, Peter. 2005. 'The Liberals as Managers of the Australian-American Alliance', Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 51, No. 3, p. 452
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Perhaps unsurprisingly given Rudd’s previous diplomatic career, he added a level of expertise to the prime ministership that most of his predecessors had not – particularly with respect to China being a noted Sinophile. Rudd described three pillars that would form the basis for Australia’s foreign policy under his leadership – the alliance with the US, membership of the UN and a policy of comprehensive Asian engagement.172
The Economist described the transition of Australia in its relationship with the US under Rudd from that of a deputy sheriff to that of a partner.173 For Fullilove, this strengthened the public perception of the alliance in Australia, as it was ‘redefined around ideas and interests rather than misty-eyed enthusiasm.’174 Indeed Rudd himself affirmed this notion stating that support for the ANZUS alliance did not equate to an automatic ‘compliance with every element of US foreign policy.’175 For Kelton, this move was domestically very popular and seen to respond to the ‘disquiet of an electorate increasingly concerned with the consequences of the unilateralism of the George W. Bush administration.’176 This represented a clear break with the policies towards the US implemented by Howard and in particular, a more independent foreign policy vis-à-vis the White House.
The second pillar of foreign policy under Rudd was Australia’s renewed commitment to the UN. For Manne, Rudd’s commitment to the UN is an example of the long-standing Labor foreign policy tradition of making Australia an active, yet independent voice on the world stage through ‘creative middle-power diplomacy’. 177 This return to middle-power diplomacy by the Rudd Government represented a commitment to supporting an international system based on rules that affords smaller nations greater bargaining power and political security against more powerful countries.178 Leaver adds that Rudd’s intention to secure Australia a seat on the UN Security Council was the firmest indication that multilateralism was back in the foreign policy vocabulary and would be quickly followed by new international initiatives covering issues from nuclear proliferation to Asian regionalism. 179 Rudd’s support for an international agreement on climate change and support for the role of the G20 group of nations as the driving force behind stabilising the world economy in face of the global financial crisis, also add to this pattern of multilateralism.
The Rudd prime ministership also saw a return to a pan-Asian idea in the form of the Asia-Pacific Community (APC). Rudd saw this initiative as extending the work undertaken by both Hawke and Keating in establishing APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum as well as undoing the reactive rather
172 Rudd, Kevin. 2007. 'Leading, not following: the reneweal of Australian middle power diplomacy', in Sydney Papers, Vol. 19, No. 1, p. 1 173 The Economist. 2009. 'Rudd floats an Asian balloon', in The Economist (US), Vol. 390, No. 8624 174 Fullilove, Michael. 2010. ‘Foreign policy attacks in fantasy land’, in The Australian, 18-19 September 175 Rudd, 2007, op. cit., p. 2 176 Kelton, Maryanne and Leaver, Richard. 2009. 'Issues in Australian Foreign Policy', Australian Journal of Politics & History, Vol. 55, No. 2, p. 248 177 Manne, Robert. 2008. 'What is Rudd's agenda?', The Monthly, November, p. 24 178 Rudd, 2007, op. cit., p. 2 179 Leaver, Richard. 2008. 'Issues in Australian Foreign Policy', Australian Journal of Politics & History, Vol. 54, No. 4, p. 605
32 than proactive regional foreign policy initiatives of the Howard years. 180 Indeed for Rudd, this represented the ‘central characteristic of Australian middle power diplomacy…coalition building with like-minded states in order to create the political momentum to bring about multilateral diplomatic outcomes.’181 Burke also argues that the Rudd proposal stems from a concern that the current regional architecture is inadequate to deal with the economic, security, political, human rights and environmental issues facing East Asia.182 The response to this proposal was mixed, with the US only committing to being involved in discussions and nothing more concrete despite a sustained lobbying effort by Rudd.183 Nonetheless, Rudd led from the front, using his position as leader to stamp his foreign policy outlook on Labor’s policy agenda.
Multilateralism, particularly after the lukewarm response by the region for the APC, was not the sole foreign policy tool of the Rudd prime ministership - he also focused strongly on certain bilateral relations in Asia. Fluent in Mandarin, Rudd’s affinity with China was a major theme of his prime ministership. Tubilewicz argues that Rudd ‘did not want to be just another China sycophant, but China’s true friend, who “offers unflinching advice and counsels restraint”.’184 Tubilewicz contents that, unlike Howard, Rudd did not shy away from critiquing China’s human rights record or waver in expressing concern over Chinese military build-up (as evidenced by the defence white paper released during his leadership).185 White suggests Rudd understood China better than any other Western leader, but this intimate knowledge and cultural understanding became a political liability domestically – particularly with regard to Chinese ownership of key resource assets.186 Manicom goes even further, suggesting that Rudd’s connection to China was not received particularly well by the region, particularly in Japan. Tokyo considered Rudd’s enthusiasm for expanding Canberra’s relationship with Beijing as symbolic of Australia’s view of the role a rising China might play in the region and a move towards China’s sphere of influence.187 This was further confirmed with the decision by the Rudd Government that Australia would cease its involvement in the Quadrilateral Dialogue with Japan, India and the US.188
With regard to trade policy, Leaver argues that the Rudd government marked a return to Hawke-style support of multilateral negotiations. This manifested in a transferral of funding from bilateral negotiations over preferential trade agreements with nations such as China and Japan, to efforts in the Doha round of WTO negotiations and a reaffirmation of middle power diplomacy. 189 Capling also highlights this transition from Howard’s preference for bilateral negotiation, arguing that the favouring
180 Rudd, 2007, op. cit., p. 5 181 Ibid. p. 5 182 Burke, Anthony. 2010. 'Questions of Community: Australian Identity and Asian Change', Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 45, No. 1, p. 76 183 The Economoist, 2009, op. cit. 184 Tubilewicz, Czeslaw. 2010. ‘The 2009 Defence White Paper and the Rudd Government’s Reponse to China’s Rise’, Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol 45, No. 1, p. 151 185 Ibid., p. 151 186 White, Hugh. 2009. 'Comment: Rudd's China policy', The Monthly, Dec 2009-Jan 2010, pp. 11-12 187 Manicom, James and O'Neil, Andrew. 2010. 'Accommodation, realignment, or business as usual? Australia's response to a rising China', The Pacific Review, Vol. 23, No. 1, p. 24 188 Ibid., p. 24 189 Leaver, 2008, op. cit., p. 602
33 of multilateral trade negotiations by Rudd is symptomatic of Labor’s long held view that multilateralism offers Australia the best opportunity to secure better trading conditions with major trading partners.190
Rudd’s approach to foreign policy involved considerable concentration of decision making in the prime minister’s office, constituting a significant drift towards policy micro management and the filling of any policy space available.191 Indeed, McDonald points out that Rudd’s personal intervention in many areas of foreign policy and an expanded international role for Australia resulted in a diplomatic deficit in the foreign affairs department.192 Going even further, Gyngell argues that Rudd ‘dominate[d] foreign policy more than any Australian prime minister before him.’193 Rudd kept firm control over foreign policy development and, indeed, increased the power of the prime ministerial office considerably.
Julia Gillard’s initial forays into foreign policy were more trepidatious than her predecessor, with no specific background in international relations and having been known to send advisors to national security council meetings when deputy prime minister.194 Admitting that foreign policy was not her passion, Gillard spent much of her premiership focused on domestic policy issues resulting from the hung parliament after the 2010 election.195 Indeed the parlous state of domestic politics meant a number of foreign policy issues spilled over into the domestic domain, notably uranium sales to India, recognition of Palestine, and the cancellation of the Australia Network television contract tendering process.196 However, Gillard would make a number of notable foreign policy gains, particularly with respect to the bilateral relationships with the US and China. As Dobell argues, history will be kind to Gillard’s time as leader, particularly given the number achievements in only three years in office.197
Firstly, the relationship between Gillard and US president Obama was warm – strengthened during her 2011 visit – with commentators comparing the relationship to that between Howard and George W Bush.198 On China, Dobell argues that Gillard had a much stronger record than Rudd as ‘she benefited
190 Capling, Ann. 2008. 'Australia's trade policy dilemmas', Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 2, pp. 229-230 191 Jensen, Erik. 2013. ‘Kevin Rudd’s Unrelenting Campaign to Regain Power’, The Monthly, May; Trood, Russell. 2010. ‘Kevin Rudd’s Foreign Policy Overshoot’, in Quadrant, 1 November and; Grattan, Michelle. 2010. ‘Relations in foreign territory’, in The Age, September 25 192 McDonald, Hamish. 2010. ‘Diplomats are learning to do more with less’, in The Age, 12 May 193 Referenced in The Economist, 2009, op. cit. 194 Hundt, David. 2011. ‘Issues in Australian Foreign Policy – July to December 2010’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 57, No. 2, p. 271. 195 Curley, Melissa and Moores, Dane. 2011. ‘Issues in Australian Foreign Policy – January to June 2011’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 57, No. 4, p. 598; Bisley, Nick. 2012. ‘Issues in Australian Foreign Policy – July to December 2011’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 279 – 281 and; Hundt, 2011, op. cit., p. 272 196 Bisley, 2012, op. cit., pp. 279-281 197 Dobell, Graeme. 2013. ‘Julia Gillard’s foreign policy – part 1’, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, August 5; Gillard, Julia. 2011a. Address to the Congress of the United States, speech, Washington, 9 March; Curley and Moores, 2011, op. cit., pp. 597-598; Grattan, Michelle. 2011. ‘Gillard finds a friend in Obama’, The Age, November 12 and; Dowling, Tim. 2011. ‘Barack Obama and Julia Gillard: a new special relationship’, The Guardian, 18 November. 198 Dobell, Graeme. 2013. ‘Julia Gillard’s foreign policy – part 3’, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, August 12
34 from not being Rudd’.199 Curley and Moores agree, with Gillard’s ‘step-by-step’ approach to managing the relationship with Beijing resonating with Chinese leaders, particularly when compared to Rudd’s critical speech on China’s human rights during a visit to Peking University.200 Arguably Gillard’s greatest diplomatic coup as leader came in April 2013 when she managed to secure annual talks between Australia’s and China’s leaders.201 Finally, it was during Gillard’s term as leader that Australia was elected to the UN Security Council for a two year term as a non-permanent member, the first time since 1985-6. The renewed focus by Australia on the UN, started under Rudd and continued by Gillard, marked a stark departure from the Howard years.202
It is also worth briefly mentioning the foreign policy practices of Australia’s two major political parties, the ALP and Liberal Party. Some authors point to the more realist tendencies of Liberal governments, particularly under John Howard, while the more internationalist policies, including on trade, of the ALP are highlighted by others.203 Whilst some historical accounts of the two major parities’ foreign policy approaches have been written, Gyngell and Wesley question whether a major divergence between the two exists.204 They point to bipartisan support for issues around the US alliance and the relationship with Japan, and in their survey of DFAT officers, they found that more than 75 per cent of officers thought Australian foreign policy was bipartisan.205 This does not preclude of course some major disagreements – the Vietnam and Iraq wars as example – or oppositions pointing out government foreign failures, but it does support Gyngell and Wesley’s assertion that there is a ‘lack of genuine, sustained debate on foreign policy issues’ between the two major parties. 206 Overall, McDougall concludes that ‘the direct influence of political parties on foreign policy is limited’.207
This examination of the history of Australian policy assists the development of a public policy framework through which to analyses this history – it highlights the critical policy elements that need to be considered by the framework. Whilst the account above focuses on the prime ministers and their government, it represents the focus of Australia’s scholarly literature that has historically examined Australian foreign policy by focusing on the leader and events.
199 Dobell, 2013, op. cit. 200 Curley and Moores, 2011, op. cit., p. 604 201 McDonald, 2013, op. cit, p. 607 202 Gyngell, Allan. Ambition: The Emerging Foreign Policy of the Rudd Government, Sydney, The Lowy Institute, p. 12 203 See for example Smith, Gary and Lowe, David. 2005. ‘Howard, Downer and the Liberals’ Realist Tradition’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 51, No. 3; Ungerer, Carl. 2007. ‘The “Middle Power” Concept in Australian Foreign Policy’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 53, No. 4 and; Capling, Ann. 2001. Australia and the Global Trade System: From Havana to Seattle, Melbourne, Cambridge University Press. 204 For the ALP see Lee, David, and Waters, Christopher (eds.). 1997. Evatt to Evans: The Labor Tradition in Australian Foreign Policy, Sydney, Allen & Unwin and; Albinksi, Henry. 1977. Australian External Policy under Labor: Content, Process and the National Debate, Brisbane, University of Queensland Press. For the Liberal Party, see Bongiorno, Frank. 2005. ‘The Price of Nostalgia: Menzies, the “Liberal” Tradition and Australian Foreign Policy’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 51, No, 3 and; Fraser, 2005, op. cit. 205 Gyngell and Wesley, 2007, op. cit., pp. 149-151 206 Ibid, p. 150 207 McDougall, 1997, op. cit., p. 28
35
Concluding Remarks
As is evidenced by the above literature review, academic inquiry into Australia’s foreign policy has focused on events and political elites, preferring description or analysis through an international relations or political history lens than an in-depth analysis of foreign policy as a public policy. The review of the literature found very little mention of domestic policy actors aside from prime ministers, foreign ministers and few other cabinet ministers. It found no substantial examples of historic Australian foreign policies or decisions analysed through a public policy lens.
The review is instructive for the development of a public policy framework suitable for the analysis of Australian foreign policy. Firstly, the review highlights the need to incorporate elite world views – the focus on the role of the prime minister from Barton to Gillard in the literature emphasises this point. Secondly, in order to look below the elite political level, the framework also needs to contend with the role of institutions, which began to emerge as a foreign policy influence after WWII with the expansion of the then Department for External Affairs. Thirdly, the focus of scholars on key events shows that the international system cannot be ignored or that Australian foreign policy making cannot be viewed as an entirely separate policy making system. Finally, the focus on elite policy actors emphasises the need to build into any framework an ability to examine multiple levels of policy making activity – that is, policy making outside the centre of government and by both bureaucratic and non-political actors.
The chapter that follows takes these four elements and establishes the theoretical ground work for a hybrid framework explained in Chapter 3.
36
Chapter 2: Conceptualising Foreign Policy as a Public Policy
Lasswell, one of the early advocates of the policy sciences, argues that the policy sciences are concerned with the knowledge of and the knowledge in the decision making processes of public and civil life.208 He asserts that the policy sciences are both theoretical and practical, tasked with theorising whilst also responsible for providing knowledge ‘to improve the practice of democracy’. 209 In other words, the Laswellian view of the policy sciences involves not only examining the details of a given policy, but also developing knowledge that can be applied to understand the structures, processes and contexts through which the policy came to exist.210 Indeed, Laswell’s insights drive at the heart of this study. Examining the content of Australian foreign policy and a few elite political actors alone is simply insufficient if we are to understand how Australia’s foreign policy has been developed. As Rivlin noted in the 1980s, ‘[n]o debate on any serious issue…takes place without somebody citing a public policy study’.211 Given the seriousness and importance of foreign policy, why should policy of the international be any different?
As the previous chapter highlights, the literature on Australian foreign policy does not focus on the processes, actors and interactions that underpin that policy. The Australian literature is predominantly focused on events and political elites, with the underpinning elements of how Australia sets its international agenda largely overlooked.
As such, this chapter sets the theoretical groundwork for a hybrid public policy framework aimed at drawing out this information in an Australian foreign policy context proposed in Chapter 3. In the Laswellian tradition of the policy sciences, it will theorise a way forward for the analysis of Australian foreign policy but also deepen our knowledge of the underpinning actors, processes and institutions that make it. It will provide a platform from which a snapshot can be taken of how Australian foreign policy is made, by drawing from the body of work focused on how to understand policy making and how to make good policy.
208 Lasswell, Harold. 1971. A Pre-view of Policy Sciences, New York, American Elsevier Publishing 209 Lasswell, Harold. 1951. ‘The Policy Orientation’, in Lerner, Daniel and Laswell, Harold (eds.). The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Methods, Stanford, Stanford University Press, p. 15 210 For an explanation of this distinction see Marinetto, Michael. 1999. Studies of the Policy Process, Hemel Hempstead, Prentice Hall Europe, pp. 5-8 211 Riviln, Alice. 1984. ‘A public policy paradox’, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 18-19.
37
From the examination of Australian foreign policy conducted in Chapter 1, it is apparent that in order to perform a robust analysis through a public policy lens, four key factors need to be considered:
1. Elite world views are important – the narratives constructed by government and leading politicians, notably the prime minister and foreign minister, will always be representative of a particular world view and set of policy beliefs. So will values, in terms of views on how the world operates, how a given issue is conceptualised and what should be Australia’s foreign policy priorities, need to be incorporated into any framework of analysis.
2. Institutions are important – the role of DFAT as the dominant bureaucratic institution cannot be underestimated both in terms of its influence on the direction of Australia’s international agenda, but also as the nexus of foreign policy expertise, information and resources. DFAT is at the heart of Australia’s foreign policy making community and brings together all the important policy actors, including Australia’s intelligence agencies that provide information critical to the decision-making process.
3. The international system is important – whilst this thesis is primarily an analysis of the domestic elements of foreign policy, the international system cannot be ignored and needs to be included in any framework. The influence of the international system on the choices available to foreign policy makers needs to be understood and how it impacts the ‘foreign policy space’ needs to be considered.
4. Multiple levels of activity are important – given the highly centralised nature of foreign policy making, it is likely that many policy actors wishing to engage in the process of foreign policy making will reside outside this centralised policy community. As such, multiple levels of analysis will need to be considered in order to ascertain which actors are present in the centre and which are on the periphery, and what this means for the foreign policy making process as a whole.
With these requirements in mind, this chapter does three things. Firstly, it provides a broad overview of where the policy sciences are at, examining the prevailing theoretical approaches and the dominant frameworks within the literature. As will be shown, the last two decades have seen a decline in ‘grand theorising’ around the policy making process and further fragmentation of an already disparate sub- discipline of political science. Much of the literature laments the so-called ‘demise’ of the policy sciences,212 but this thesis argues such calls are premature, although acknowledges the search for causal, predictive and parsimonious theories of the policy process will ultimately be a difficult endeavour. Increasing complexity across all areas of policy makes this task only more problematic and has resulted in a large quantity of work developing bespoke approaches to policy analysis.
212 See for example, Pielke Jr, Roger. 2004. ‘What future for the policy sciences’, Policy Sciences, Vol. 37, No. 3 and; a recurring theme across the chapters of Sabatier, Paul (ed.). 2007b. Theories of the Policy Process, Boulder (CO), Westview Press.
38
Nonetheless, the importance of good policy to public life makes the development of better and more robust approaches a worthy endeavour.
Secondly, the chapter examines the rather brief literature on the application of public policy analytical approaches to foreign policy contexts – the scarcity of this literature being one of the key reasons for pursuing this study. As will become apparent, there is no Australian specific literature that deals with foreign policy analysis in this way.
Thirdly, the chapter explores three key public policy frameworks that will form the basis of the hybrid theoretical approach developed and employed for this study: the Institutional Analysis and Design Framework (IADF), the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF). All three of these frameworks have undergone significant testing within the literature and theoretical reworking since their initial development. All three have been chosen as they have elements that are complementary to the analysis of Australian foreign policy, particularly in relation to the four factors outlined at the beginning of this chapter. By combining elements of these three approaches, the thesis will be able to provide a public policy framework that is capable of unpacking some of the processes, actors and structures that underpin Australia’s foreign policy.
State of the Policy Sciences – stages, fragmentation and the death of grand theorising?
Before examining the state of the public policy literature, it is necessary to acknowledge that policy itself is a contested concept. Much of the conceptualisation of what policy actually is can be traced back to Laswell’s comment that ‘politics is about who gets, what, when and how’.213 This is put into an Australian context by Fenna, who argues that ‘public policy is about what governments do, why, and with what consequences’.214 Althaus et al., again in an Australian context, suggest that policy attracts a multitude of definitions, but can broadly be categorised as an authoritative choice of government, a hypothesis of cause and effect or an objective of governmental action.215 Alternatively, Pressman and Wildavsky note that policy can be treated as a broad statement of goals and objectives on the one hand, and the equivalent of actual behaviour on the other.216 So be it an allocation of resources, a statement of intent, a process or a determination of behaviour, policy is a concept with a variety of definitions and application.
For the purpose of this study, this thesis will adopt the broad definition of policy and policy making provided by Sabatier: ‘In the process of public policymaking, problems are conceptualised and brought to government for solution; governmental institutions formulate alternatives and select policy solutions;
213 Lasswell, 1951, op. cit. 214 Fenna, Alan. 2004. Australian Public Policy, 2nd ed., Frenchs Forest (NSW), Pearson Longman, p. 3 215 Althaus, Catherine, Bridgeman, Peter and Davis, Glyn. 2012. The Australian Policy Handbook, 5th ed., Crows Nest (NSW), Allen and Unwin, chapter one 216 Pressman, Jeffrey and Wildavsky, Aaron. 1984. Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington are Dashed in Oakland, Oakland, University of California Press, p. xxiii
39 and those solutions get implemented, evaluated and revised’. 217 Further, this thesis borrows from Weible et al. in defining research of the policy process as ‘the study of the development of public policy over time and the context, events, and individuals surrounding this development.’218
Much of the early work in policy studies derived from Lasswell, whose work focused on policy making as a series of interrelated ‘stages’ involving discrete policy actors.219 Easton was also an influential voice in this regard, arguing that political activity is a system of related processes that can be broken down into discrete stages.220 The ‘stages heuristic’ or ‘stages approach’ that emanated from Lasswell and Easton’s work is still in many ways the dominant approach to examining public policy.221 The advantage that this model has is that it ‘offers a way of chopping up…a complex and elaborate process’. 222 Further, as a teaching resource, the stages approach has utility in introducing both students and practitioners to policy making and highlights the various areas of attention contemporary policy making demands.223 As Althaus et al. state, ‘a simple model helps order reality and provide some sense of direction…identifying patterns in apparent chaos, helping participants build understanding and their own critical judgement’.224 This is of particular use for practitioners without a background in policy making or grounding in politics or public administration. When treated as a heuristic, the stages approach has useful application.
Yet the approach is not without its detractors, who often highlight the theoretical simplicity with which the heuristic views policy making. Scholars, particularly the likes of Colebatch225 and Sabatier226, argue that conceptualising policy in stages represents an idealised version of the practice of policy making that seldom occurs in practice. As Parsons notes, the heuristic has the potential to be misleading in
217 Sabatier, Paul. 2007. ‘The Need for Better Theories’, in Sabatier, Paul (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process, 2nd Ed., Cambridge (MA), Westview Press, p. 3 218 Weible, Christopher, Heikkila, Tanya, deLeon, Peter and Sabatier, Paul. 2012. ‘Understanding and influencing the policy process’, Policy Sciences, Vol. 45, No. 1, p. 2 219 Lasswell, 1951, op. cit. and; Lasswell, 1971, op. cit. Nakamura discusses the influence of Lasswell on a number of early scholars in Nakamura, Robert. 1987. ‘The Textbook Policy Process and Implementation Research’, Policy Studies Review, Vol. 7, No. 1 220 See Easton, David. 1965a. A Framework for Political Analysis, Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice Hall and; Easton, David. 1953. The Political System, New York, Knopf. 221 See, Althaus et al., 2012, op. cit.; deLeon, Peter. 1999. ‘The Stages Approach to the Policy Process: What has it Done? Where is it Going’, in Sabtier, Paul (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process, Boulder (CO), Westview and; Weible et al., 2012, op. cit. 222 Hill, Michael. 2013. The Public Policy Process, 6th ed. Harlow (Essex), Pearson Education Limited, p. 154 223 There have been a number of recent publications on the stages approach including Althaus et al. 2012, which examines various stages of Australian policy making. For North American approaches, see Hill, 2013, op. cit.; Kraft, Michael and Furlong, Scott. 2012. Public Policy: Politics, Analysis and Alternatives, 4th ed., Washington, CQ Press and; Howlett, Michael and Ramesh, M. 2003. Studying public policy: policy cycles and policy sub-systems, Don Mills (Ont.), Oxford University Press. 224 Althaus et al., 2012, op. cit, p. xiii 225 Colebatch, Hal. 2006. Beyond the Policy Cycle: The Policy Process in Australia, Crows Nest (NSW), Allen and Unwin. 226 Sabatier, Paul. 1991. ‘Toward Better Theories of the Policy Process’, PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 24, No. 2. Many of his critiques and theoretical initiatives, along with those of other scholars sceptical of the stages heuristic, are contained in Sabatier, 2007b, op. cit.
40 terms of what actually occurs when policy is made, how interactions transpire and the policy actors involved – things are never as simple or neat as the model suggests.227 Whilst proponents argue that a policy cycle is a starting point, an ‘ideal type from which reality curves away’ that helps formulate a way forward for policy problem solving,228 detractors such as Colebatch and Sabatier cannot overlook the impact of simplifying an inherently complex, if not chaotic, system. Indeed, such criticism has inspired a theoretical and framework development movement away from the stages approach to policy making, due in no small part to the inability of such models to contend with the complexity problem.229 While the stages heuristic still has its place as a valuable teaching tool and guide for policy practitioners, the division of government activity into discrete stages is an overly simplistic division of bureaucratic activity. It is in some cases arbitrary and theoretically un-complex, with no predictive power or causal explanation derivable from using the stages approach.
A poignant example of the arbitrary division criticism is made by leading policy scholar Charles Lindblom, who argues that implementation and evaluation particularly, cannot be reliably distinguished from one another or from the other steps in the policy making process.230 From Lindblom’s perspective, both implementation and evaluation can result in new policy problems, requiring new attempts at formulating solutions and options for government to pursue. This does not easily fit within a cyclic model of interconnected stages – where does one policy end and another begin? John mirrors this separation problem, arguing that to understand any one so-called ‘stage’ of policy making, the policy process as a whole needs to be understood and as such, it is simply not possible to separate the stages of policy formulation, policy implementation or policy evaluation. 231 Looking at implementation specifically, John goes on to conclude that whilst implementation at a conceptual level is a useful tool to examine success and failure, ‘the project of creating implementation analysis as a separate field of study had largely failed.232 The same could be said of any of the stages outlined by the heuristic’s proponents.
Lindblom and John are not alone in critiquing the stages approach for its seemingly arbitrary division of tasks within a policy making process into discrete stages. Whilst there has been no scholarly agreement as to a suitable replacement for the stages approach, more holistic conceptualisations of the policy
227 Parsons, Wayne. 1995. Public Policy, Aldershot, Edward Elgar, pp. 79-80 228 Althaus et al., 2012, op. cit., p. xiii 229 Colebatch, 2006, op. cit. and; Sabatier, 2007b, op. cit. See also John, Peter. 2003. ‘Is There Life After Policy Streams, Advocacy Coalitions, and Punctuations: Using Evolutionary Theory to Explain Policy Change?’, The Policy Studies Journal, Vol, 31, No. 4, p. 483. 230 Lindblom, Charles and Woodhouse, Edward. 1993. The Policy-Making Process, 3rd ed., Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice Hall, p. 11 231 John, Peter. 1998. Analysing Public Policy, London, Continuum, p. 30. For an overview on separating implementation, see Hill, Michael and Hupe, Peter. 2009. Implementation Public Policy, 2nd ed., Los Angeles, Sage. 232 John, 1998, op. cit., p. 30
41 process such as the ACF233, the IADF234, MSF235 and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory236 have emerged. All of them share Lindblom’s division concerns with the stages heuristic, yet emphasise different elements of policy making as being more important than others. As Hill and Hupe identify ‘[o]nly very seldom are decisions self-executing, implying that there is no separate implementation stage’,237 with the same being able to be said for any individually identified stage within the stages approach. Despite it being a useful tool for teaching and practitioners, the stages approach glosses over the intricacies of policy making and fails to grapple with the complexity inherent in modern public policy. Yet whilst this criticism has merit, it has not resulted in the kind of robust theoretical development seen in other areas of political science, for example, neoclassical realism and neoliberal institutionalism in international relations. Further, the cohort of theorists and theoretical improvement that such development often inspires is lacking in the policy sciences.
Theorists have questioned the direction of the policy sciences and lamented the lack of integrated theory underpinning the discipline since the 1990s. For example, deLeon wrote in 1994 that ‘there is no coherent body of theory upon which to base the causal relationships that underline policy recommendations’.238 This was problematic as there were no agreed research and inquiry guidelines and no way to ‘test and validate or reformulate postulates’. Developing bespoke approaches to individual policy cases or systems of policy making undermines the broader applicability of the discipline. This is particularly so when attempting to solve policy problems in varying policy contexts and jurisdictional settings. Coupled with policy complexity and an over reliance on instrumental rationality, deLeon argued the policy sciences lacked a striking record of discernible success and was becoming increasingly technocratic and undemocratic. He called for a revision of the paradigm, incorporating democratic procedures and focusing more on policy definition and design. 239 The
233 Sabatier, Paul and Jenkins-Smith, Hank (eds.). 1993. Policy Change and Learning, Boulder (CO), Westview Press and; Sabatier, Paul and Weible, Chris. 2007. ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Innovations and Clarifications, in Sabatier, Paul (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process, Boulder (CO), Westview Press. 234 Ostrom, Elinor. 2005. Understanding Institutional Diversity, Princeton, Princeton University Press and; Ostrom, Elinor. 2007. ‘Institutional Rational Choice’ in Sabatier, Paul (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process, Boulder (CO), Westview Press. 235 Kingdon, John. 1995. Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, 2nd ed., New York, Harper Collins; Zahariadis, Nikolaos. 2003. Ambiguity and Choice in Public Policy: Political Manipulations in Democratic Societies, Washington, Georgetown University Press and; Zahariadis, Nikolaos. 2007. ‘The Multiple Streams Framework – Structure, Limitations, Prospects’, in Sabatier, Paul (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process, Boulder (CO), Westview Press. 236 Baumgartner, Frank and Jones, Bryan. 1993. Agendas and Instability in American Politics, Chicago, University of Chicago Press and; Baumgartner, F., Breunig, C., Green-Pedersen, C., Jones, B., Mortensen, P., Nuytemans, M and Walgrave, S. 2009. ‘Punctuated Equilibrium in Comparative Perspective’, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 53, No. 4. 237 Hill, Michael and Hupe, Peter. 2014. Implementing Public Policy: An Introduction to the Study of Operational Governance, 3rd ed., Los Angeles, SAGE, p. 7 238 deLeon, Peter. 1994. ‘Reinventing the policy sciences: Three steps back to the future’, Policy Sciences, Vol. 27, No, 1, p. 81. See also deLeon, Peter. 1992. ‘The democratization of the policy sciences’, in Public Administration Review, Vol. 52, No. 2 239 Ibid., p. 83
42 importance of encompassing the entire policy process from inception to implementation to evaluation was, deLeon stressed, important to the future of the discipline. deLeon’s article was sagely timed, with the discipline fragmenting into a number of frameworks focusing on the individual elements of policy making soon after – agenda setting, policy change, consultation, policy design, evaluation and problem solving have all been addressed in one fashion or another.240 For example, Birkland’s work on agenda setting, Hood and Margetts’ work on policy instruments and Rhodes’ work on policy networks contribute to various elements of public policy making.241 Yet such fragmentation goes nowhere towards addressing the problems identified by deLeon – whilst analysing the individual elements of making government policy is useful, it does not provide any advance on paradigmatic shifts required to incorporate the whole policy making process. This has been further complicated by the changes in governance and approaches to bureaucracy that occurred during the 1990s, impacting the role of the policy sciences in improving the function of government. For example, Barrett points to the rise of the New Right during the late 1980s and the New Public Management of the 1990s as another reason for the malaise in the theoretical development of public policy research242 This transition instilled concepts of strategic management and business management within the broader discipline; analysis of the various elements of policy making, such as the implementation process, became ‘superseded by emphasis on change management and performance targets’.243
The influence of economic management and fiscal restraint also increased the role of finance and economics in policy making, restricting the options available to policy makers and role the discipline played in informing best practice policy.244 Much like the nadir the end of the Cold War caused for international relations realists, new ways of doing ‘the business of government’ sidelined the policy sciences. Economists overtook policy experts as the major source of policy advice to government; ‘fiscally responsible policy’ overtook ‘best practice policy’ as the lexicon of choice. In order to overcome this, these new patterns of government need to be appreciated by the policy sciences and incorporated into new theory and framework development.
This has seemingly not happened, with a dearth of scholarly development in recent years. Writing in 2003, John argues that it had been a decade since the last major advance in public policy theory – by and large John’s analysis is still current more than ten years on, although some existing theories and
240 Weible et al., 2012, op. cit., p. 2 241 See, Birkland, Tom, A. 1997. After disaster: Agenda setting, public policy, and focusing events, Washington, Georgetown University Press; Hood, Christopher. 1983. The Tools of Government, London, Macmillan; Hood, Christopher and Margetts, Helen. 2007. The Tools of Government in the Digital Age, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan and; Rhodes, R.A.W. 1997. Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability, Buckingham, Open University Press. 242 Barrett, Susan. 2004. ‘Implementation Studies: Time for a Revival? Personal Reflections on 30 Years of Implementation Studies’, Public Administration, Vol. 82, No. 2, p. 257 243 Ibid., p. 257 244 See Hirschman, Daniel and Popp Berman, Elizabeth. 2014. ‘Do economists make policies? On the politics effects of economics’, Socio-Economic Review, Vol. 12, No. 4
43 frameworks have had revisions made by various authors.245 Whilst this has pushed the discipline forward, it is still a long way from deLeon’s desire for a strong theoretic base on which to build the discipline. The focus of scholars on new frameworks rather than broader theory has contributed to the theoretical stagnation.
Frameworks differ from theories in that they organise inquiry ‘but they cannot in and of themselves provide explanations for, or predictions of, behaviour and outcomes’.246 Causal power, prediction and explanation are derived from theories and models, not frameworks. However, as will be expanded upon in Chapter 3 in relation to the framework adopted for this study, frameworks do explicitly note types of policy actors, posit a series of restricting variables, specify a unit of analysis and maintain ability to focus analysis at multiple levels.247 In terms of what separates one theory or framework from another, John argues that it is the ‘primacy attached to certain core social processes, which often act as a set of determinants of others and to social and economic outcomes’.248 Theories will always differ in their applicability, but they are ultimately linked by their aim to generalise and to generate models, which ‘are more restricted assumptions about social and political relationships from which hypotheses can then be derived and tested’.249 There has thus been a move towards more reductionist theories of public policy.
As a consequence of these developments, there are many public policy frameworks focusing on different elements of the policy making process – agenda setting, policy instruments choice, policy change, implementation and evaluation are pertinent examples. Despite the problems the policy sciences are currently facing, the scholarly insights that they provide and the building they have done on Laswell’s original premise of who gets what, when and how, can make a meaningful contribution to the study of foreign policy. As Hill rightly argues ‘we must continue to try and understand the policy process – however irrational or uncontrollable it may seem to be – as a crucial first step towards trying to secure effective policy making’.250
The task for this study is therefore to analyse the frameworks available and identify which framework is most appropriate for the Australian foreign policy process. Whilst it acknowledges the stagnation in grand theoretical development within the policy sciences and the ensuing problem of predictive and powerful model development, lamenting the death of the discipline is premature, with a number of robust frameworks capable of providing sophisticated policy analysis and critique of policy processes. The
245 The two publications containing new theoretical advances that John refers to are Baumgartner and Jones Agendas and Instability in American Politics and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s Policy Change and Learning. See John, 2003, op. cit, p. 481. In terms of revisions, Sabatier’s edited collection includes revisions and advances on a number of approaches including the ACF, IADF, MSF, network approaches and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory. See Sabatier, 2007b, op. cit. 246 Schlager, Edella. 2007. ‘A Comparison of Frameworks, Theories, and Models of the Policy Process’, in Sabatier, Paul (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process, Boulder (CO), Westview Press, p. 293 247 Ibid., pp. 312-315. See also Sobeck, 2003, op. cit. 248 John, 2003, op. cit. p. 482 249 Ibid., p. 482 250 Hill, 2013, op. cit. p. 6
44 next section helps to identify the most appropriate framework for analysing Australian foreign policy by investigating the literature in which public policy approaches have been applied to foreign policy contexts.
Public Policy and Foreign Affairs
It is important to remember that public policy is a distinctively problematic area of investigation for, unlike empirical subtopics that form most of the broader political science discipline, researchers of public policy are not concentrated on one institution, activity and area of subject matter.251 Rather they include in their analysis ‘all political activity and institutions – from voting, political cultures, parties, legislatures, bureaucracies, international agencies, local governments, and back again, to the citizens who implement and evaluate public policies’.252 The vast difference from policy system-to-policy system, issue-to-issue and society to society considerably complicates this task.
For public policy scholars, the link between all of these domestic elements is obvious and is well established in the scholarly literature of domestic public policy. But at the international level, foreign policy discourse rarely gives the link much attention, preferring to focus on external influences on foreign policy. Putnam provides some insight as to the problem of contemporary foreign policy analysis in this regard:
“Domestic politics and international relations are often somehow entangled, but our theories have not yet sorted out the puzzling tangle. It is fruitless to debate whether domestic politics really determine international relations, or the reverse. The answer to that question is clearly “Both, sometimes”. The more interesting questions are “When?” and “How?”’.253
Lentner usefully adds:
‘Policy studies scholars tend to be divided between those concerned with domestic matters and those focused on foreign affairs. They seldom employ one another’s literature, and they largely draw on different traditions within political science. In universities foreign policy analysis and public policy courses are taught by different instructors, each set of whom largely ignores the literature of the other.’254
Fortunately, however, there are a few exceptions to this norm that provide some guidance on a suitable approach for this study, Howard Lentner being one such exception. Lentner provides a useful
251 John, 2003, op. cit. p. 82 252 Ibid., p. 83 253 Putnam, Robert. 1993. Making democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy, Princeton, Princeton University Press, p. 431 254 Lentner, Howard. 2006. ‘Public Policy and Foreign Policy: Divergences, Intersections, Exchange’, Review of Policy Research, Vol. 23, No. 1, p. 169
45 introduction to using a public policy approach to analyse foreign policy issues, calling for ‘increased cross-fertilization’ between the public policy and international relations sub-fields.255 The problem has traditionally been that there is a dichotomy between the two fields, creating a conflict at the intersection. Nonetheless, Lentner draws from Nelson, who posits that public policy is distinguished by four intellectual imperatives – holism, consequences, usefulness and democracy.256 Lentner argues that these four imperatives are as useful to foreign policy as they are to domestic public policy matters. The connections between societal components in foreign policy making circles exist just as they do in the domestic policy space. Further, the consequences of foreign policy decisions – at times involving war and conflict – clearly satisfies Nelson’s second imperative and the third, usefulness, is adequately represented in the tension to produce easily applicable versus theory building approaches in both foreign policy analysis and the public policy field. Finally, democracy is present in foreign policy analysis both in terms of the need to consider a democratic participation in the actual making of a national foreign policy, but also its role as a guiding principle of that foreign policy, particularly in nations like the US.257 This occurs at both the domestic and international level.
Despite this, the intersection problem remains. Attempts at overcoming this intersection, such as Putnam’s258 two-level games where foreign policy makers are interlocutors between international and domestic constituents and Keohane and Nye’s259 complex interdependence that introduces ideas such as agenda setting and implementation, only go so far. The disciplinary gulf between the two arenas remains. The bridging of these gulfs is increasingly more important given the redefinition of issues and key policy actors in an increasingly complex foreign policy context.260 Unfortunately, Lentner fails to provide any concrete ways as to how this might be achieved. He suggests, however, that the two disciplines need to engage with one another’s literature, with the policy sciences learning from the benefits of robust, grand theoretical development of international relations – particularly realism and neoliberal institutionalism - and foreign policy scholars learning from structured and sequential approaches such as those proposed by Kingdon, Lindblom and Baumgartner and Jones.261 Through such cross-fertilization, Lentner argues the intersection problem may begin to diminish. Such a position is reflective of the arguments discussed earlier in this chapter regarding the combination of approaches within the public policy discipline – cross fertilization or combination, whilst complex, may result in plugging some of the gaps present when individual approaches are used in isolation.
255 Ibid., p. 169 256 Nelson, Barbara. 1996. ‘Public policy and administration: an overview’, in Goodin, R.E and Klingemann, H. (eds.), A new handbook of political science, New York, Oxford University Press, p. 552 257 Lentner, 2006, op. cit., pp. 170-171 258 Putnam, Robert. 1988. ‘Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games’, International Organisation, Vol. 42, No. 3 259 Keohane, Robert and Nye, Joseph. 1989. Power and interdependence, Glenview (IL), Scott, Foreseman 260 Lentner, 2006, op. cit., pp. 176-177 261 Kingdon, 1995, op. cit; Lindblom, Charles. 1980. The policy-making process, Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice- Hall and; Baumgartner, Jones, 1993, op. cit. .
46
A second exception is Allison’s study into the Cuban missile crisis. Allison’s investigation puts forward the notion of ‘conceptual lenses’ or models – the rational actor model, the organisation behaviour model and the government politics model. Importantly, Allison acknowledges the problem of conceptualising national governments as purposeful individuals:
‘Treating national governments as if they were centrally coordinated, purposive individuals provides a useful shorthand for understanding problems of policy. But this simplification – like all simplifications – obscures as well as reveals. In particular, it obscures the persistently neglected fact of bureaucracy: the “maker” of government policy is not one calculating decision maker but is rather a conglomerate of large organisations and political actors.’262
In other words, the notion of government is inherently more complex than a homogenous decision making body with a shared purpose. To deal with this problem, Allison argues that most analysts of foreign affairs think in terms of ‘largely implicit conceptual models’.263 These conceptual models direct the thoughts of the analysts and help explain particular actions. Allison contends that the rational actor model - whereby nations will base actions on calculating the most rational thing to do given specific objectives - is the most common conceptual model employed by analysts. Yet this model ignores the bureaucratic intra-national mechanisms from which government actions emerge.
As such, Allison proposes two other conceptual models that analysts may employ. Model two is based on organisational theory and emphasises processes and procedures within government.264 Under this model, outputs stemming from the organisational context and procedures within established organisations are used to explain and predict an event. Model three, alternatively, has a focus on the politics of a government. In this model, events are not caused by choice or outputs, but rather ‘various bargaining games among players in the national government.265 Explanation of an event is provided by understanding who did what to whom, whilst predictions are generated by ‘identifying the game in which an issue will arise, the relevant players and their relative power and skill’.266
Allison’s work came at a time when other scholars were attempting to define the international system in ways that were more familiar in the analysis of domestic political contexts, particularly through systems analysis. For example, Easton’s approach argues that the international system could be ‘analysed, described and compared with all other systems’ as it operated on societal values, value allocation and interactions within an environment.267 In a similar space, Kaplan sees the international system as a null political system (a system without clear jurisdiction for decision-making and conflict
262 Allison, 1971, op. cit, p. 3 263 Ibid. p.4 264 Ibid. p.4 265 Ibid. p.4 266 Ibid. p.5 267 Easton, David. 1965b. A Systems Analysis of Political Life, New York, Wiley, p. 485.
47 settlement268), and one that falls into six different categories for the purpose of comparison, but all sharing common characteristics such as boundaries, internal structures, actors and rules.269 Whilst both Easton and Kaplan’s contributions attract criticism, they attempt to conceptualise the international system in ways that scholars such as Laswell, Pressman and Wildavsky were doing in the domestic context during the same period.270 Yet it was Allison’s contribution that provided the first real attempt to bridge the divide and examine how foreign policy decisions were made and it is this tradition that this study aims to follow.
Thirdly, Hirschi and Widmer also provide useful guidance by utilising the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) in comparing Swiss foreign policy towards South African apartheid between 1968 and 1994 and the Swiss position towards Iraq post its 1990 invasion of Kuwait. They found the application of the ACF helped explain why Swiss foreign policy towards apartheid and Iraq differed, despite both falling under Switzerland’s long tradition of neutrality and non-interference. They found that in the South African case a strong advocacy coalition against sanctions and a lack of external events prevented policy change, instead providing a policy sub-system that was stable and worked within the well-established Swiss foreign policy norms.271 Alternatively, the lack of a ‘hegemonic’ advocacy coalition within the Iraq policy sub-system, the invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing international condemnation created the opportunity for the Swiss to change their foreign policy towards Iraq.272
Despite declaring the ACF as a useful tool, Hirschi and Widmer suggest approach was more ‘useful framework or a heuristic instrument to understand policy change over longer time periods than as a coherent theory.’273 They found that to identify beliefs, particularly at the organisation level, was difficult and consequently, aggregating policy actors into coalitions, central to the ACF’s approach to policy making, proved hard. Whilst noting these issues, the authors also conceded that such problems exist in the analysis of domestic policy and so overall, the ACF proved to be as useful a mechanism for analysing policy change in Swiss foreign policy as it was in certain areas of Switzerland’s domestic policy agenda.
Finally, Gyngell and Wesley’s work, whilst not strictly employing a public policy approach, provides the best example of a conceptualisation of Australian foreign policy as a public policy. Their work, Australian Foreign Policy Making, is a descriptive text, examining the individual elements of Australian foreign policy yet failing in any detailed way to explore how all the elements link together, affect one another and are restricted by the processes and structures of foreign policy making.
268 Keane, Edward. 2005. International Political Thought: An Historical Introduction, Cambridge, Polity Press, p. 197 269 Kaplan, Morton. 1957. System and Process in International Politics, New York, Wiley 270 Critique of both can be found in Jones, Roy. 1970. Analysing Foreign Policy: An introduction to some conceptual problems, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 119-143 271 Hirschi and Widmer, 2010, op. cit., p. 557 272 Ibid., p. 557 273 Ibid., p. 557
48
That said, the authors describe four levels of foreign policy making relevant to the Australian context.274 Firstly, the strategic level is a series of relationships and commitments between Australia and the outside world, usually outlined by official government statements (such as white papers) or by ministers. Secondly, the contextual level represents the influence of foreign policy making by the context of the issue being addressed, particularly whether it occurs internationally or domestically. Context assigns costs, benefits, constraints and opportunities associated with a goal, decision or approach to resolving an issue. Thirdly, the organisational level represents bureaucratic and political structures that are resourced to making foreign policy and respond to issues. This could also be described as the institutional level of foreign policy making. Finally, the operational level is where ministers, diplomats and bureaucrats implement foreign policy. It is a level focused on detail and micro policy making. Gyngell and Wesley’s study remains the closest piece of Australian literature to a public policy analysis of Australian foreign policy making.
Policy Frameworks Suitable to an Australian Foreign Policy Context
The next section examines three public policy frameworks from which the hybrid framework is drawn. It will provide an overview of the most important elements of these three frameworks – each of which is complex in its own right – relevant to the four key factors important in analysing Australian foreign policy making listed at the start of this chapter. These frameworks have also been chosen based on the parameters established by Sobeck, who, along with Ostrom, outline what a robust framework should entail: restricting variables, specified unit of analysis and multiple levels. 275 Not all three frameworks have equal strength in all three areas. As such, the following will focus on the most useful elements of the IADF, ACF and MSF to understanding Australian foreign policy making and the hybrid framework proposed in Chapter 3.
Institutional Analysis and Design Framework
The IADF has its roots in traditional rational choice theory that posits that public policy should be conceived as an institutional arrangement: ‘rules permitting, requiring or forbidding actions on the part of citizens and public officials’.276 Under this interpretation of public policy, a change in a given policy is brought about by the actions of rational individuals ‘trying to improve their circumstances by altering institutional arrangements’.277 Much of the scholarly work on institutional rational choice in public policy
274 Gyngell and Wesley, 2007, op. cit., pp. 23-31 275 Sobeck, 2007, op. cit. and; Ostrom, 2007, op. cit. 276 Schlager, Edella and Blomquist, William, 'A Comparison of Three Emerging Theories of the Policy Process', Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 3, 1996, p. 653. Development of the IADF stemmed from Ostrom’s work on common pool resources and her accalde work around the tragedy of the commons. See Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action, Cambridge (MA), Cambridge University Press and; Poteete et. al., 2010, op. cit 277 Bromley, Daniel. 1989. Economic Interests and Institutions: The Conceptual Foundations of Public Policy, New York, Basil Blackwell, p. 252
49 making can be traced back to Kiser and Ostrom’s work in attempting to develop a framework that analyses how institutions affect the behaviour of individuals through incentives and restraints.278
Indeed, for some scholars, the definition of policy making is found in the institutions in which decision making structures are constructed and embedded. Considine, for example, asserts that ‘much of policy making is embedded in the routine practices carried out by government agencies employing well-worn repertoires of action.’279 In this interpretation of institutionalism, interactions between political actors become habitual and follow normative concepts of customs and rules and are institutionally framed. Dye provides a much narrower definition of the institutional approach, suggesting policy making is representative of institutions authoritatively determining, implementing and enforcing a given policy.280 The structural characteristics defined by an institution will, therefore, also structure policy making by allowing varying degrees of access to governmental power to certain groups or individuals over others.281 This adds to Lentner’s assertion that analysis of foreign policy lends itself to the rational choice approach.282 The role of rational choice then, in an Australian foreign policy context where institutions, both bureaucratic and political, are of the upmost importance needs to be acknowledged.283
With this in mind, whilst all the different strains of institutionalism have different conceptualisation of the rules that govern the structural characteristics of policy making and the level of access various policy actors have to key policy making institutions, they ‘all consider institutions as sets of rules that guide and constrain the behaviour of individual actors.’ 284 The study of the impact of institutional arrangements on the policy process therefore helps unpack a ‘complex composite of rules’ that govern the actions of individuals in decision making situations.285 These rules govern who and what is included in decision making, how information is structured, what actions can and cannot be undertaken and how individuals coalesce around issues and aggregate over collective decision making.286 The IADF takes these ideas and creates a framework in which institutions provide a structure for the interaction of individuals, taking into consideration the restrictions and incentives faced by individuals when deciding upon a course of action.287 The IADF is a well-tested and often cited example of rational choice and
278 See Kiser, Larry and Ostrom, Elinor. 1982. ‘The Three Worlds of Action: A Metatheoretical Synthesis of Institutional Approaches’, in Ostrom, Elinor (ed.), Strategies of Political Inquiry, Beverly Hills (CA), Sage 279 Considine, Mark. 2005. Making Public Policy, Cambridge, Polity Press, p. 2 280 Dye, Thomas. 1995. Understanding Public Policy, Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice Hall, p. 19 281 Ibid., p. 20 282 Lentner, 2006, op. cit., p. 172 283 Bureaucratic institutions in this context include organisations such as DFAT, DPM&C and Australia’s intelligence agencies. Political institutions refer to bodies such as the office of the prime minister, rather than the individuals occupying the offices. 284 Arts, Bas and Tatenhove, Jan Van. 2004. 'Policy and Power: A Conceptual Framework between the 'Old' and 'New' Policy Idioms', Policy Sciences, Vol. 37, No. 3, p. 342 285 Kiser and Ostrom, 1982, op. cit., p. 179 286 Ibid., p. 179 287 Schlager, Edella. 2007. 'A Comparison of Frameworks, Theories, and Models of Policy Processes', in Theories of the Policy Process, Sabatier (Ed.), Boulder, Westview Press, p. 309. Institutions defining policy is also discussed in Page, Edward C. 2006. 'The Origins of Policy', in Moran, Robert, Rein, Michael and Goodin, Martin (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 207-223
50 institutionalism within the public policy discourse and, as such, will be utilised to explore the role of institutions in Australian foreign policy making.288 What follows is an overview of the key elements and benefits of the IADF in terms of analysing foreign policy in this study.
Structural Overview of the IADF
The IADF is best conceptualised as ‘a metatheoretical, conceptual map that identifies an action situation, patterns of interactions and outcomes, and an evaluation of these outcomes’.289 The original proponent of the IADF, Elinor Ostrom, notes there are two key aspects to the original IADF framework: firstly it makes a distinction between three tiers of decision making: the operational tier, the policy tier and the constitutional tier.290 Secondly, the framework allows for the ‘elucidation of the fundamental elements that can be used for analysis of outcomes and their evaluation at any of the three tiers of decision making.’291 These two distinctions are still important to the IADF twenty years after its initial inception and remain key elements of the more contemporary manifestations of the framework used by this study.
Figure 2.1: Structural Overview of the IADF292
Regarding the first aspect, the IADF’s three tiers of decision making reflect the American genesis of the framework, and as will be discussed in subsequent section of this chapter, a more generic multi-level model of decision making is more appropriate to the Australian case. The second aspect is more useful for this study as enabling the analysis of outcomes and evaluation aspect of the IADF involves
288 See table of selective studies using the IADF at Ostrom, 2007, op. cit., p. 52 289 Poteete et al., 2010, p. 40 290 Ostrom, 2007, op. cit. p. 22 291 Ibid., p. 36 292 Ostrom, 2007, op. cit¸ p. 27
51 identifying ‘the major types of structural variables present to some extent in all institutional arrangements’.293 In order to do this, Ostrom posits two key elements of a given policy making system that need to be elucidated in order to understand the system: description of an action arena, which is composed of participants (policy actors) involved in action situations that affect policy decisions, and a set of exogenous variables that structure the action arena. These two elements are discussed in further detail below.
The Action Arena
The action arena is a complex conceptual unit composed of two sections - actors and an action situation.294 The IADF requires that both sections be present to ‘diagnose, explain, and predict actions and results.’295 The action arena therefore becomes a social space in which individuals interact, goods are exchanged, decisions are made and problems are resolved.296 Importantly, and linking back to Sobeck’s requirements of a framework, the action arena is the conceptual unit or unit of analysis for the IADF. Understanding the structure of the action arena is pivotal in understanding factors impacting public policy making.
The first key area for analysis within the action arena is the action situation, which occurs ‘whenever two or more individuals [actors] are faced with a set of potential actions that jointly produce outcomes’.297 Ostrom notes there are seven key aspects that structure the action situation and that form the basis for describing and analysing the specific situation298:
• a set of participants; • the positions that the participants fill; • the possible outcomes; • the set of allowable actions and functions allowing these actions; • control of individuals over the function facilitating allowable actions; • the information available to participants; and • the costs and benefits of actions and outcomes.
A distinctive feature of the IADF is that it conceives all possible action situations, be they bureaucratic, market, legislative or otherwise, as consisting of the same seven aspects.299 These seven variables are therefore givens in IADF analysis and provide a level of consistency to the analytical lens applied to any number of action situations.
293 Ibid., pp. 26-27 294 Ibid., pp. 28-44 295 Ibid., p. 29 296 Ibid., p. 28 297 Ostrom, 2005, op. cit., p. 32 298 Taken from Ibid., p. 32. See also Ostrom, 2007, op. cit., p. 29 and; Ostrom et al., 1994, op. cit., p. 29 299 Ostrom et al., 1994, op. cit., p. 28
52
The second key area for analysis within the action arena is the actor, with an actor being anything from an individual to a nation state, corporation or interest group.300 Actions undertaken by actors within the action arena are human behaviours ‘to which the acting individual attaches a subjective and instrumental meaning’. 301 In order to predict how an actor will behave in an action situation, assumptions need to be made about the actor.302 A key challenge to institutional analysis is to ‘select the appropriate assumptions about human behaviour that fit the type of situation under analysis.’303 Implicitly, the IADF assumes that an actor is a rational entity304 and consequently, places most of the explanatory weight on the variables listed above rather than the internal processes of the individual or institutional actor.305
The rational choice underpinnings of the IADF also attract much of the criticism directed at the framework. As Kingdon asserts, if policy makers were operating according to rational models, such as that described by the IADF, they would:
‘…first define their goals rather clearly and set the levels of achievement of those goals that would satisfy them. Then they would canvass many (ideally, all) alternatives that might achieve these goals. They would compare the alternatives that might achieve these goals. They would compare the alternatives systematically, assessing their costs and benefits, and then they would choose the alternatives that would achieve their goals at the least cost…such a model does not very accurately describe reality.’306
For critics such as Kingdon, this level of rationality is not humanly possible, particularly given many policy actors drift in and out of the policy making process, making ‘the kind of rationality that might characterise a unitary decision-making structure…elusive’. 307 This is poignant in a foreign policy context, where domestic actors routinely disengage at various points of a policy’s development and may not reengage if the policy development becomes protracted, which in many cases, is routine.
This is a distinctive difference between the IADF and the ACF, with the latter’s emphasis on the internal decision making and belief systems of the actor, described later in this chapter, being a key point of divergence. It is also a point of variance for this study as whilst the structure of policy making described by the IADF has a certain ‘neatness’ to it that is easily applied, the lack of belief systems included in its analytical framework is problematic for analysing foreign policy which, as discussed earlier, can be
300 Ostrom, 2005, op. cit., p. 38 301 Ostrom, 2007, op. cit., p. 30 302 See Ostrom et al., 1994, op. cit., p. 33 303 Ostrom, 2005, op. cit., p. 7 304 For discussion on rationality and the individual in the IADF and other frameworks see Schlager, 2007, op. cit. 305 Lubell, Mark. 2003. 'Collaborative institutions, belief-systems, and perceived policy effectiveness', Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 3, p. 310 306 Kingdon, 1995, op. cit, p. 82 307 Ibid., p. 82
53 easily influenced by world views.308 As John identifies, the IADF has trouble identifying where policy preferences come from and is much better at explaining decisions once preferences have been made by participating actors.309 Accordingly, this study will look to the ACF to address this concern.
Nonetheless, of the three reference frameworks discussed, the IADF best manages the role of institutions. As stated at the start of this chapter, the role of institutions in Australian foreign policy making is key and any framework of analysis suitable for Australian foreign policy needs to include them in a meaningful and robust manner. The IADF does this better than most common public policy frameworks and when coupled with its exogenous variables described below, is a powerful tool for examining the role of institutions in policy making, despite its reliance on rational choice.
Exogenous Variables
The second element of the IADF of most use to this study is its set of exogenous variables. The term exogenous variables in the IADF relates to three variables that affect the structure of the action arena: biophysical world attributes that are acted upon; the structure of community in which the action arena is situated and; rules that order participant relationships.310 These variables all impact upon the types of actions that individuals can make and the subsequent success and impact of the outcomes stemming from these actions.
Biophysical world attributes are variables routinely referred to by political economists as goods and services that are produced, consumed and allocated within a given situation.311 This in turn impacts the actions that are physically possible, the outcomes that can be produced, how actions link to any produced outcomes and the information provided to actors.312 Consequently, for political economists, this variable can have significant structural impacts on the institutional arrangements affecting the development of particular policies.
The second exogenous variable, the attributes of the community, relates directly to the structure and behavioural beliefs of the society in which the decision making process is being undertaken. These attributes combine to become a form of social capital that can be applied to assist in structuring cooperative solutions to problems within the action arena.313 Accordingly, these attributes can be defined as culture.314 The importance of culture in impacting the structure of an action arena is that it ‘affects the mental models that participants in a situation may share.’315 This in turn allows the smoother
308 See Lejano, Raul. 2006. Framework for Policy Analysis: Merging Text and Context, New York, Routledge. 309 John, 2003, op. cit, p. 485 310 Ostrom, 2005, op. cit, p. 15. See also Kiser and Ostrom, 1982, op. cit., pp. 179-182 311 Ostrom, 2005, op. cit., p. 22 312 Ibid., p. 22 313 Ostrom et al., 1994, p. 45 314 Ostrom, 2007, op. cit., p. 43 315 Ostrom, 2005, op. cit., p. 27
54 distribution of goods based on a shared common set of values as the probability of agreeing to rules and norms to regulate distribution and consumption is greater.316
Finally, institutions establish a set of rules used by individuals in making a decision. The IADF defines rules as a shared understanding between participants about ‘enforced perceptions’ regarding actions and outcomes that are required, prohibited or permitted.317 These rules are not always written nor are they always legal procedures, instead institutional rules are often developed by individuals to alter the structure of repetitive situations and improve the outcomes the situation is attempting to influence. Institutional arrangements therefore represent the complex set of rules ‘that exist in a language shared by some community of individuals rather than as the physical parts of some external environment.’318
Advocacy Coalition Framework
The second framework to be utilised is the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). The ACF has its origins in early attempts to characterise policy and policy implementation through top-down and bottom- up approaches.319 Much of the ACFs foundation can be found in the work of Sabatier and Mazmanian, whose work on policy implementation in the 1980s focused on the synthesis of these two conceptualisations of implementation.320 In effect, it was an attempt to move away from the dominant stages heuristic models that both the top-down and bottom-up approaches advocated, breaking the policy process down to distinct sub-processes.321
The original proponents of the ACF, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, conceptualised the framework as a method for combining the best elements of both the top-down and bottom-approaches to policy inquiry. As such, the ACF integrates most of the stages of the policy cycle models into a system-based framework that can incorporate change, information and belief systems.322 Further, the ACF is an attempt to simplify the ‘staggering complexity of the policy process’ in order to make some sense of the actors, interactions and institutions that are important. 323 At its core, it conceptualises policy making as ‘competition between coalitions of actors who advocate specific beliefs about policy problems and solutions’.324 The ACF is specifically designed to examine policy change, particularly policy change
316 Ostrom, 2007, op. cit., p. 43 317 Ostrom, 2005, op. cit., p. 19 and Kiser and Ostrom, 1982, op. cit., p. 191. 318 Kiser and Ostrom, 1982, op. cit., p. 179 319 For more on top-down and bottom-up approaches to implementation, see Hill and Hupe, 2014, op. cit. 320 See Sabatier, Paul and Mazmanian, Daniel. 1983. Can Regulation Work? The Implementation of the 1972 California Coastal Initiative, Boston, Springer US and; Sabatier, Paul. 1986. ‘Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches to Implementation Research: A Critical Analysis and Suggested Synthesis’, Journal of Public Policy, Vol 6, No. 1 321 For proponents and discussion on the stages approach, see Althaus et al. 2012, op. cit.; Kingdon, 1995, op. cit.; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984, op. cit. and; Lasswell, 1951, op. cit. 322 Weible et al., 2012, op. cit., p. 122 323 Sabatier, Paul, Theories of the Policy Process, Boulder, Westview Press, 1999, p. 4 324 Hirschi and Christian, 2010, op. cit., p. 540
55 that happens over a decade or more, as it assumes ‘the beliefs of policy participants are very stable over such a period and make major policy change very difficult’.325
There have been, however, concerns highlighted by scholars such as Rhodes and Parsons as to how well the ACF applies outside the American governmental system. 326 Whilst there has been no application of the ACF in an Australian foreign policy case, there are number of articles that suggest the ACF is suitable to analysing Australian policy, albeit in the domestic policy context and often in partnership with an additional analytical framework. For example, Nagel uses the ACF in examining bureaucratic engagement of stakeholders to achieve policy change,327 Chen uses the ACF in helping to understand issues and coalitions within the online censorship debate328 and finally, Bulkeley uses the ACF as part of an analysis of coalitions within Australian climate change networks. 329 When compared with Hirschi and Windmer’s review of Swiss foreign policy, it becomes apparent certain elements of the ACF favour Australia policy more than others.
Structural Overview of the ACF
The ACF is premised on three ‘foundation stones’330:
• Macro level stone – an assumption that policymaking ‘occurs among specialists within a policy sub-system but that their behaviour is affected by factors in the broader political and socioeconomic system’. Policy sub-systems are the main unit of analysis for the ACF. • Meso level stone – a belief that ‘the best way to deal with the multiplicity of actors in a sub- system is to aggregate them into “advocacy coalitions”’. These actors can come from a variety of sources including government officials, researchers and business people. • Micro level stone – the model of the individual in a policymaking process should be drawn from social psychology and actors within a policy sub-system will act on beliefs as ‘the principle heuristic to simplify, filter and sometimes distort’ policy information and stimuli. Beliefs are the ‘causal driver for political behaviour’.
325 Sabatier and Weible, 2007, op. cit., p. 192 326 Rhodes, 2006, op. cit., p. 437 and Parsons, Wayne. 1995, op. cit., p. 201 327 Nagel, Peter. 2006. ‘Policy Games and Venue-Shopping: Working the Stakeholder Interface to Broker Policy Change in Rehabilitation Service,’ Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 65, No. 4. Bagel also uses Scharph’s Actor-centred Institutionalism framework to conduct his analysis. See Scharph, F.W. 1997. Games Real Actors Play: Actor Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research, Boulder CO, Westview Press. 328 Chen, Peter. 2000. Australia’s Online Censorship Regime, PhD Thesis, Canberra, Australian National University. Also Rhodes, 1997, op. cit. 329 Bulkeley, Meredith. 2000. ‘Discourse coalitions and the Australian climate change policy network’, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Vol. 18, No. 6. Also Hajer, Maarten. 1995. The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological and Modernization and the Policy Process, Oxford, Clarendon Press and; Hajer, Maarten. 1993. ‘Discourse coalitions and the institutionalisation of practice: the case of acid rain in Britain’, in Fischer, F and Forester, J (eds.), The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning, London, UCL Press 330 Sabatier and Weible, 2007, op. cit., pp. 191-192; and also Weible et al., 2009, op. cit. p. 122
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Figure 2.2 – Structural Overview of the ACF331
The three foundation stones are effectively the ACF’s set of external parameters and, when combined, policy and belief change occurs through the four pathways outlined above.332 These parameters can be both stable, such as constitutional structure, and unstable (listed as external events in Figure 2.2), such as changes in public opinion. One of the key elements of the ACF is the distinction between the policy sub-system and the broader political environment as defined by the stable and unstable parameters.333 The ACF does this as the broader political environment must contend with myriad policy issues, compelling policy actors to specialise in one or a small number of policy contexts given the complexity a given policy problem usually entails.334 As Shannon highlights:
‘The environment in which policy is made and implemented is described by the ACF as an overarching system, while the particular set of individuals and groups concerned with an individual policy area are described as a sub-system within this larger context. Policy change can result from either sub-system activity or systemic changes.’335
331 Weible et al., 2009, op. cit. p. 123 332 Sabatier and Weible, 2007, op. cit., p. 192 333 Weible et al., 2009, op. cit. p. 123 334 Ibid., p. 123 335 Shannon, Elizabeth. 2009. ‘Advocacy Coalitions in Tasmanian Health Policy’, Public Administration Today, October-December Issue, p. 50
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Noticeably, the ACF does not directly contend with the influence of institutions or the rules and restrictions such institutions bring to policy making. The ACF does not dismiss the importance of institutions but instead incorporates beliefs and values into decision making, reflecting Putnam’s argument that ‘social context and history profoundly condition the effectiveness of institutions.’336 That being said, authors such as Real-Dato have pointed out the lack of attention institutions are given by the ACF. Indeed, in the final major revision of the ACF prior to Sabatier’s death, the author noted that a major shortcoming of the ACF was ‘the absence of clearly conceptualised and operationalised institutional variables that structure coalition formation and behaviour’.337 Sabatier points to the IADF as a framework that can guide variable development for the ACF in this regard. As such, the three foundations stones listed above will be incorporated within the more institutionally focused elements of the IADF in the hybrid framework of analysis adopted by this study.338
What follows is a description of the role and make-up of the three ‘foundation stones’ – the macro level, the meso level and micro level – along with the external factors impacting the ACF, with all three having relevance to this study.
Macro Level – Policy sub systems
The ACF assumes that to be influential, participants must be specialised. 339 For this to happen, policy is broken into policy sub-systems made up of specialised participants who ‘regularly seek to influence policy’ relating to a specific area.340 The ACF therefore argues that the most useful aggregate for analysing policy change and decision making is not just the particular government institution, but rather the policy sub-systems situated within the broader policy problem.341 This moves analysis away from the typical ‘iron triangle’ of academic focus – administrative agencies, legislative committees and interest groups – and brings in actors from all levels of government involved in policy advocacy, making, implementing and evaluating.342These sub-systems are made up of a functional or substantive factor as well as a geographically limiting factor and draw participants from a variety of sources including traditional governmental actors, interest groups, academics and journalists.343 All participants are assumed to hold strong beliefs regarding the policy area and a desire to transform these beliefs into a new policy or modification of existing behaviours. These beliefs are akin to implicit theories on how to
336 Putnam, 1993, op. cit. 337 Sabatier and Weible, 2007, op. cit., p. 209 338 See Real-Dato, Jose. 2009. ‘Mechanisms of Policy Change: A Proposal for a Synthetic Explanatory Framework’, in Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, Vol. 11, No. 1. 339 Sabatier and Weible, 2007, op. cit., p. 192 340 Ibid., p. 192 and Kingdon, 1995, op. cit. 341 This is not to diminish the role of an institution in the policy process but rather to highlight that there are other factors at play. See Sabatier, Paul. 1988. 'An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of policy-oriented learning therein', Policy Sciences, Vol. 21, No. 2, p. 131 342 Sabatier, Paul. 1993. ‘Policy Change over a Decade or More’ in Sabatier, Paul and Jenkins-Smith, Hank, Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach, Boulder (CO), Westview Press, p. 17 343 Sabatier and Weible, 2007, op. cit., p. 192 and Sabatier, 1993, op. cit., p. 17
58 achieve policy objectives and involve perceptions on a variety of policy making elements including causal relationships and policy instruments.344 The ACF also assumes that in order to modify the beliefs of participants, contextual expertise, research and information are all required and, accordingly, these become pivotal parts of the policy process and increase the importance of specialisation and academic input into a policy debate.345 The focus on policy sub-systems moves policy enquiry away from the traditional political science focus on the ‘iron triangle’ of single level government actors or institutions to that of a cross-sectoral approach to understanding policy formulation, and in particular, policy change.346
The ACF is designed to examine policy change over a decade or more as it assumes that participants’ beliefs are difficult to change and are therefore relatively stable. This helps delineate ‘mature policy sub-systems from nascent ones’ as the longer the sub-system has been around, the greater the specialisation and autonomy of the participants engaged.347 Further delimiting the scope of a policy sub-system can be difficult, however, as the scope also needs to take into consideration ‘overlapping and nested’ sub-systems, particularly at the international level. 348 Given the unit of analysis within the ACF is the policy sub-system, successfully defining its boundaries is very important. To facilitate drawing definitions, the rule “focus on the substantive and geographic scope of the institutions that structure the interaction” has been developed by the framework’s proponents to help the process of limiting the boundaries of the sub-system under investigation.349 The concept of the policy-sub-system is a useful heuristic for this study, as it allows for the drawing of boundaries around specific elements of Australia’s foreign policy.
Meso level – advocacy coalitions
Within a policy sub-system, actors aggregate into numerous advocacy coalitions based on shared normative and causal beliefs, allowing them to act in concert in forming and responding to policy innovations.350 Belief systems are considered to be relatively consistent across the coalition and can be classified as deep core, policy core and secondary aspects.351 These groupings are termed by the ACF as advocacy coalitions and form the meso level tenet of the framework.
344 Sabatier, 1993, op. cit. p. 17 345 Sabatier and Weible, 2007, op. cit., p. 192 346 Sabatier, 1991, op. cit., p. 147 347 For further discussion on mature and nascent policy sub-systems, see Sabatier, Paul and Jenkins Smith, Hank. 1999. ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment,’ in Sabatier, Paul (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process, Boulder, Westview Press, p. 135. 348 Sabatier and Weible, 2007, op. cit., p. 193 349 Ibid., p. 193 and Sabatier, Paul, 1993, op. cit., p. 24 350 Sabatier, 1988, op. cit., p. 133 and; Sabatier1993, op. cit., p. 18 351 Sobeck, 2003, op. cit., p. 354
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The ACF maintains that in order for participants to assert their beliefs into policy successfully, they need to form networks of likeminded and important participants who share causal and normative beliefs.352 The ACF assumes that policy participants will naturally ally themselves with likeminded participants, preferably those with influence and expertise, and coordinate their policy objectives by forming an advocacy coalition.353 In order to be most effective, these coalitions then need to ‘share resources and develop complementary strategies’ before their opponents do to ensure that policy decisions reflect their shared policy core beliefs.354 The ACF ‘argues that advocacy coalitions provide the most useful tool for aggregating the behaviour of organisations and individuals in a policy sub-system’ when the focus of study is more than a decade and when it is assumed that in most policy sub-systems, two to five advocacy coalitions will generally be active.355
Micro level – individuals and their belief systems
The major difference between the ACF and the IADF is found at the micro level, or more specifically, in its model of the individual.356 The ACF posits that normative beliefs ‘must be empirically ascertained and does not a priori preclude the possibility of altruistic behaviour.’357 Consequently, policy change can prove difficult as normative beliefs are difficult to alter and ‘the tendency for actors to relate to the world through a set of perceptual filters composed of pre-existing beliefs’ can be equally as hard to change.358
The perceptual filters used by actors influence the way in which information is used in policy making, causing mistrust between actors in competing coalitions.359 Furthermore, the ACF argues that actors are more likely to value loss over gain, meaning that defeats become more memorable than victories.360 The corollary of these two issues is that they intersect to form a ‘tendency for actors to view their opponents as less trustworthy, more evil, and more powerful than they probably are’.361 Appreciating this intersection allows the ACF to explain policy conflict and escalation of disputes amongst participants within a policy process.
In order to analyse agreement and compromise amongst actors from differing coalitions, however, the structure of the belief systems of individuals needs to go deeper. As such, the ACF conceptualises a ‘three-tiered hierarchical structure’ of an actor’s underpinning belief system. The broadest belief in this structure is the deep core belief that considers ‘normative and ontological assumptions about
352 Ibid., p. 352 and Sabatier and Weible, 2007, op. cit., p. 196 353 Sabatier and Weible, 2007, op. cit., p. 196 354Ibid., p. 196 355 Sabatier and Weible, 2007, op. cit., p. 196 356 See discussion in Schlager, 2007, op. cit. 357 Sabatier and Weible, 2007, op. cit., p. 194 358 Ibid., p. 194 359 Ibid., p. 194 360 Ibid., p. 194 361 Ibid., p. 194
60 human nature’.362 These beliefs are formed at childhood and through adolescent socialisation, making them difficult to change and thus fairly constant during policy debate.363
The second tier in the ACF’s individual belief structure is the policy core belief which applies to a specific policy sub-system. These beliefs represent ‘basic normative commitments and causal perceptions across an entire policy domain or sub-system’.364 The ACF assumes that policy participants are highly familiar with their relationships within a given policy sub-system and are therefore willing to attempt to apply their deep core beliefs to develop an acceptable set of policy core beliefs within a given policy sub-system.365 These two tiers may not always correspond as the idiosyncrasies of the specific policy sub-system may require a slight reorientation of beliefs to achieve an outcome, particularly if compromise is required.366 Nonetheless, policy core beliefs are still difficult to change as they deal with fundamental policy choices regarding a policy area that is important to the individual and often involve a high level of specialisation and expertise.367
The final tier of the ACF’s belief structure consists of secondary beliefs that are much narrower in scope as compared to the other two levels. 368 Secondary beliefs tend to focus on ‘detailed rules and budgetary applications’ within a specific element of a policy sub-system, such as legislation, a budget or a set of guidelines. 369 Changing secondary beliefs is significantly simpler than changing deep core or policy core beliefs as their narrow scope ‘requires less evidence and fewer agreements among sub- system actors’ to induce agreement.370
There are, however, some concerns with the micro-level and its belief system. Firstly, as Hirschi and Widmer contend, discovering the belief systems of actors can be methodologically challenging and that assigning participants based on these beliefs to coalitions can also prove problematic.371 Hajer and Laws go further in suggesting this difficulty is compounded as the belief structure proposed by the ACF fails to capture how policy makers and their assigned coalition deal with ambiguity.372
Whilst the elucidation of beliefs might be difficult, particularly in ambiguous policy settings, this study argues that the assigning of beliefs to policy actors, despite the difficulties, helps untangle the relationship between policy participants and policy proposals. The ACF’s classification of deep core beliefs and policy core beliefs is useful for this study as it provides the normative and ontological
362 Ibid., p. 194 363 Ibid., p. 194 364 Sobeck, 2003, op. cit., p. 354 365 Sabatier and Weible, op. cit., p. 195 366 Ibid., p. 195 367 Ibid., p. 195 368 Ibid., p. 196 369 Ibid., p. 196 370 Ibid., p. 196 371 Hirschi and Widmer, 2010, op. cit., p. 557 372 Hajer, Maarten and Laws, David. 2006. 'Ordering through Discourse', in Moran, Robert, Rein, Michael, and Goodin, Martin (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 256
61 underpinning as well as the contextual and accepted processes for individuals involved in making Australian foreign policy. Deep core beliefs will be useful for deciphering the world view of the prime minister and other high level political participants as well as linking these ideals to their policy core beliefs.
External Factors
Similar to the IADF, the ACF has a number of external factors that influence the policy sub-system. These factors are difficult to change and therefore encourage actors to change their strategising behaviour accordingly.373 The most useful external factor for this study is the notion of dynamic systems events, or shocks, that impact the policy sub-system on an intermittent basis. The first of three such events involves changes in socioeconomic conditions and technology that impact the causal assumptions and policy support within a policy sub-system.374 The second involves changes in the dominant governing coalitions, and although rare, have ramifications for policy viability, particularly if change occurs at higher levels of government at multiple times.375 Finally, policy decisions and impacts from other sub-systems will impact policy options available within a given policy sub-system as sub- systems are only partially autonomous.376
The Multiple Streams Framework
The original proponent of the MSF, John Kingdon, developed the term ‘policy streams’ in 1984 as a way of conceptualising ‘the conjoining of multiple tributaries of events and actors to generate a flow of policy activity’.377 The beginnings of the MSF can be traced back to Cohen, March and Olsen’s garbage can model of organisational behaviour.378 They wrote:
‘A key to understanding the process within organisations is to view a choice opportunity as a garbage can into which various problems and solutions are dumped by participants.’379
373 Sabatier, Paul, 1993, op. cit., p. 20 374 Ibid., p. 22 375 Ibid., p. 22 376 Ibid., p. 23 377 Howlett, Michael, McConnell, Allan and Perl, Anthony. 2013. ‘Reconciling Streams and Stages: Avoiding Mixed Metaphors in the Characterization of Policy Processes’, paper presented at 1st International Conference on Public Policy, Grenoble, June 26-28, p. 6 378 Cohen, Michael, March, James and Olsen, Johan. 1972. ‘A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice’, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 1 379 Cohen, Michael and March, James. 1974. Leadership and Ambiguity: The American College President, New York, McGraw Hill, p. 81 quoted in Robinson, Scott and Eller, Warren. 2010. ‘Participation in Policy Streams: Testing the Separation of Problems and Solutions in Subnational Policy Systems’, Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 38, No. 2, p. 201.
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As Robinson and Eller identify, the term ‘dumped’ implies a certain level of ambiguity in the decision making process, as policy makers cannot predict when various elements underpinning an opportunity to make or change policy will converge.380 Kingdon therefore took Cohen, March and Olsen’s work in organisational behaviour and developed the MSF to deal with policy making in an environment involving ambiguity. In applying the learnings of the garbage can model, Kingdon envisages three streams of actors and processes running through the policy making environment: a politics stream consisting of elected officials; a policy stream involving potential solutions to policy problems and; a problem stream involving problem related data and definitions. 381 The MSF conceptualises policy making at the systemic level, meaning that either an entire system or an individual decision can be the unit of analysis for any given situation.382
Figure 2.3 – Structural Overview of the MSF383
Another major scholar of this framework, Nikolaos Zahariadis, observes there are three key assumptions that guide the MSF. First, individuals process information in a serial, systemic and parallel fashion, meaning that the number of issues an individual can contend with is limited. Second, those policy actors charged with making policy face significant time restraints, meaning decision are often made swiftly and attention to a given issues is limited, both in terms of how many issues reach the
380 Robinson and Eller, 2010, op. cit, p. 201 381 Sabatier, 2007a, op. cit., p. 9 382 Zahariadis, 2007, op. cit., p. 66 383 Zahariadis, 2007, op. cit., p. 71
63 attention of policy makers and the time they spend on said issues. Finally, each of the three streams acts independently of the other with each conceived as ‘having a life of its own’.384
Structural Overview of the MSF
There are five key structural elements to the MSF – three streams (problems, policies and politics), policy windows and policy entrepreneurs.385 The descriptiveness and explanatory nature offered by these streams has been a powerful influence on the policy discipline, with the terminology and vocabulary emulated and adapted by numerous scholars since its original publication.386 The three streams identified by the MSF are the most important elements to this study as will be explained below in greater detail.
The final two elements, policy windows and policy entrepreneurs, are in many ways analogous to elements of the IADF and ACF, yet less theoretically advanced and less suited to the Australian foreign policy context. For example, policy windows are periods when the three streams are coupled or joined together. These windows represent a fleeting “opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special problems”.387 In order for a window to open, a problem needs to be compelling or events unfold in the political stream sympathetic to the issue at hand. This is in many ways similar to the concept of the action situation described by the IADF but without the rules-based structuring of how a window might open, what occurs once a window opens or who can participate in decision making once the window has opened. Indeed, the MSF suggests windows ‘are opened by compelling problems or by events in the political stream’.388 The IADF covers such incidents with greater clarity and explanatory power.
Likewise regarding policy entrepreneurs, the ACF’s three-tiered belief system and concept of advocacy coalitions provides for a much more nuanced description of how, when and why various policy actors work together, and what underpins their policy positions. As such, the following discussion will be limited to the most useful element of the MSF to this study – the three streams.
384 Ibid., pp. 68-69 385 Ibid., p. 70 386 Howlett et al., 2013, op. cit., p. 7. For examples of adaptation, see Lober, Douglas. 1997. ‘Explaining the Formation of Business-Environmentalist Collaborations: Collaborative Windows and the Paper Task Force’, Policy Sciences, Vol. 30, No. 1 and; Sharp, Elaine. 1994. ‘Paradoxes of National Anti-Drug Policymaking” in Rochefort, David and Cobb, Roger (eds.), The Politics of Problem Definition: Shaping the Policy Agenda, Lawrence (KS), University Press of Kansas 387 Zahariadis, 2007, op. cit., p. 73 quoting Kingdon, 1995, op. cit., p. 165 388 Zahariadis, 2007, op. cit., p. 74
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Problem Stream
The first stream developed by the MSF is the problem stream, within which government focuses on one particular problem over another and efforts on how to solve them, both prospective plans and past attempts. A number of mechanisms, including indicators, focusing events and feedback elevate one problem over another in the eyes of government policy makers.389 These operate in a similar fashion to the rules and exogenous variables described by the IADF and the external parameters developed by the ACF. Further, it is in this stream in which the problems of the policy actors inside the policy system are articulated and where problem definitions differ.390
According to Kingdon’s original work, problems come to the attention of government decision makers through indicators – deaths, disease rates, prices and various other activities and statistics monitored by government and nongovernment actors.391 Indicators are not primarily used to determine whether or not a problem exists, but rather the magnitude of a problem and any changes occurring within the problem, with change being considered more problematic than continuity. 392 Change in an indicator is therefore considered a change in the state of a system by policy makers, which in turn, is defined as a problem. Thus, a change in an indicator and its subsequent definition as a problem can have profound effects on the policy agenda depending upon its position within the body politic.393 Demonstrating suitability of a favoured solution to a problem therefore becomes a preoccupation for actors within the policy process.
At times, certain problems are not self-evident and require elevation by events such as disasters or crises to gain attention – Kingdon defines such occurrences as focusing events. These events can be anything that direct attention to a specific dimension of a problem and can be caused by a variety of occurrences.394 Yet these events may never result in policy change or solutions to the problems presented. Birkland, for example, identifies the September 11 attacks in the US as a major focusing event, but as the threat of terrorism was well established in the policy stream, policy change was only possible through pre-existing ideas.395 As such, focusing events rarely carry a problem on to the policy agenda themselves, let alone a solution, and often require a catalyst to bring the issue to prominence.396 Furthermore, feedback, both formal and informal, also brings problems to the attention of government policy makers – poorly performing programs, implementation issues or unintended consequences all focus attention on a given problem.397
389 Zahariadis, 2007, op. cit., p. 70; Kingdon, 1984, op. cit., p. 119 390 Zahariadis, 2007, op. cit. p. 69 391 Kingdon, 1984, op. cit., p. 95 392 Ibid., p. 96 393 Ibid., p. 97 394 Zahariadis, 2007, op. cit., p. 72 395 Birkland, 2004, op. cit., p. 182 396 Kingdon, 1984, op. cit., p. 119 397 Ibid., p. 106
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Importantly within this stream, values are key in defining problems and people will define problems requiring policy action by ‘letting their values and beliefs guide their decisions, by placing subjects under one category than another, but comparing current to past performance, and by comparing conditions in different countries’.398 Ultimately, there is much to be politically gained and lost by problem definition as some will benefit whilst others will suffer based on how a given problem is defined by government policy makers.399 Whilst assigning an amount of explanatory power to values, the MSF is not as descriptive as the ACF in defining what these values might actually be and where they come from.
Policy Stream
The next stream posited by the MSF is the policy stream within which proposals are developed, debated and considered. The policy stream focuses on solutions to problems that are typically developed by narrowly defined policy communities.400 Policy communities consist of specialists in a specific policy area, such as foreign policy, and such specialists can exist inside or outside government structures.401 The solutions or ideas with a policy community compete to win attention, with only a few of the significant number of ideas floating around every gaining acceptance by the policy community. 402 Kingdon originally described policy communities as a primeval soup – ‘[g]enerating alternatives and proposals in this community resembles a process of biological natural selection’.403 Much like many molecules are possible in primeval soup when different atoms collide, many policy ideas and solutions float around and fade in and out of prominence, ‘[s]ome ideas survive and prosper; some proposals are taken more seriously than others.’404
Specialists within a policy community have common interactions, are familiar with one another’s ideas and in some cases, know one another personally. 405 Importantly, the policy community operates irrespective of administrative or political change or changes in pressure from the electorate. Whilst the policy stream will invariably interact with the political stream, the forces driving the two are different and as such, each is independent of the other.406
Across policy areas, policy communities can vary in terms of their cohesiveness, with some proving exceptionally closed whilst others are fragmented. The outcome of this is that in fragmented policy communities, fragmented policy is likely to occur.407 As will be discussed in the subsequent chapter, this thesis contends fragmentation is not usually a problem for Australian foreign policy making given it
398 Zahariadis, 2007, op. cit., p. 71 399 Kingdon, 1984, op. cit., p. 115 400 Zahariadis, 2007, op. cit., p. 69 401 Kingdon, 1984, op. cit., p. 123 402 Zahariadis, 2007, op. cit., p. 72 403 Kingdon, 1984, op. cit., p. 122 404 Ibid., p. 123 405 Ibid., p. 123 406 Ibid., p. 124 407 Ibid., p. 125
66 is an exceptionally tight knit, highly centralised policy community and is largely a policy of continuity over change, even under different governments. This suggests commonality in policy outlook, orientations and conceptualisation of Australia’s position in the world is likely amongst community members. 408 A lack of fragmentation also results in stability, both in terms of policy community membership and consistency across policy. Nonetheless, within the policy community a large number of ideas and proposals are considered, discussed and advocated. Further, according to Robichau and Lynne, the MSF considers bureaucrats as a key element of the policy community within the policy stream.409
Advocates for policy ideas and proposals are classified as ‘policy entrepreneurs’ by Kingdon. As with the broader membership of the policy community, policy entrepreneurs can be found inside or outside government structures and share the defining characteristic of ‘their willingness to invest their resources – time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money – in the hope of a future return’.410 Personal interests, values, shaping a policy debate or an enjoyment for advocacy all provides incentives for policy entrepreneurs to act on behalf of one option over another.411 As such, policy entrepreneurs do not follow rational decision-making methods and the process of why some ideas survive and others fail becomes evolutionary, reliant on conditions and structures through which proposals are formed and how advocacy occurs.412
In order to push an idea forward, policy entrepreneurs ‘soften-up’ the policy community and the broader public into accepting a policy proposal. This can involve public education campaigns, initiating policy trials or getting a political champion to spruik your idea. Such initiatives can be necessary for a policy proposal to be taken seriously and thus survive in the policy stream. According to Kingdon, once a proposal ‘has risen to the top of the policy primeval soup’, the policy community produces a short list from which policy makers consider the most viable policy options.413 This list does not necessarily represent consensus within the policy community, but is rather ‘an agreement that a few proposals are prominent’.414 Persuasion is key to achieving consensus within the policy stream.
408 For discussion on why cohesive policy communities are more likely to share common positions rather than divergent ones, see Ibid., p. 126 409 Robichau, Robbie, and Lynn, Laurence. 2009. ‘The Implementation of Public Policy: Still the Missing Link’, The Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 37, No. 1, p. 29 410 Kingdon, 1984, op. cit., p. 129 411 Ibid., pp. 129-130 412 Ibid., pp. 130-131 413 Ibid., p. 147 414 Ibid., p. 151
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Political Stream
The final stream in the MSF is the political stream, which contains the narrative or political discourse within which a policy is developed, involving both politicians and public opinion.415 It is important to realise that policy making and political events are not mutually exclusive – whilst the two streams may operate independently, the two are explicitly linked. Key factors within the political stream include the national mood, organised politics and interest group pressure and, of course, government itself.416
Firstly, changes in the national mood are not confined to policy communities; it has a much greater reach. Changes in the national mood can mean some policy ideas will rise to prominence whilst others will be restrained.417 Sensing the national mood therefore becomes an important activity for those wishing to push a policy onto the agenda, it can either suit your ambition, require you to reassess your proposal or wait until the national mood shifts again to a direction more suited to your aims.
Additionally, organised political forces feed into the political stream. The key to understanding how these forces work is knowing how interest groups feed into the political stream and, more importantly, ‘how people in and around government perceive and react to various organised activities’.418 If key political decision makers consider all interest groups to be advocating for a certain policy outcome, then the system provides a powerful impetus to push the agenda in that direction.419 Conversely, where interest groups diverge, political leaders need to balance their position. How political leaders manage this balance and which side of the policy argument they ultimately fall on is an imprecise determination, yet invariably, one interest group will win a leader’s attention and support over another.420 Political leaders need to carefully deliberate over the potential cost of siding against a well-resourced, well-organised and vocal interest group as an opponent.
Government itself is the third element within the political stream; administrative changes within the government machinery such as changes in the elected government, bureaucratic restructuring and the turnover of key personnel are all important influences on the political stream. As Kingdon states ‘[a]gendas are changed because some of the major participants change, and agendas are markedly affected by the drawing of jurisdictional boundaries and by battles over turf’.421 Turnover will not only produce new items for the policy agenda, but will remove other items that may have previously been firmly ensconced. Similarly, bureaucratic fights over policy turf post-organisational change within
415 Zahariadis, 2007, op. cit., p. 69 416 Kindgon, 1984, op. cit., p. 170 417 Ibid., p. 154 418 Ibid., p. 157 419 Ibid., p. 157 420 Kindgon goes into greater depth as to why this may be the case in his original work, relying on interview research to suggest that often ‘the squeaky wheel gets the oil’ when it comes to interest group pressure on political leaders. See Ibid., pp. 157-160 for more discussion. 421 Ibid., p. 160
68 government structures can also elevate policies on to the agenda or again, relegate those already there.
Despite these three influences, much like in the policy stream, consensus also occurs within the politics stream ensuring policy ideas survive. Unlike the policy stream in which consensus is brought about through persuasions, the political stream requires bargaining to reach mutual agreement.422 Coalitions are built within the stream, ‘built through the granting of concessions in return for support of the coalition, or as actual or potential coalitions members make bargains.’423 Being a member of a winning coalition becomes politically important – the cost of failing to do so can be high.
Concluding Remarks
This chapter has established the theoretical groundwork for the hybrid public policy framework developed in the next chapter. It examined the state of the public policy literature and argued that claims of the demise of the policy science are premature, and that there is much useful contemporary work in framework development that can assist in the analysis of public policy. This examination included discussion of four key pieces of literature that viewed foreign policy through a public policy lens: Lentner, Allison, Hirshi and Widmer, and Gyngell and Wesley. Finally, the chapter introduced three key reference frameworks suitable to the examination of Australian foreign policy making – the IADF, the ACF and MSF. Utilising elements of these three frameworks will allow for the analysis of the case studies taking into account of the need to consider elite world views, institutions, the international system and examine multiple levels of activity.
422 Ibid., p. 167 423 Ibid., p. 167
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Chapter 3: A Public Policy Framework for Analysing Australian Foreign Policy
The previous two chapters have examined how the academic account of Australia’s foreign policy making has focused on events, bilateral relationships and elite political actors; limiting engagement with how foreign policy is made and the role of domestic policy actors. Further, investigation of both the Australian foreign policy and international public policy literature has highlighted that with a few notable exceptions, the policy sciences have failed to apply frameworks, let alone theories, to understanding and improving foreign policy.
This chapter will outline a public policy framework that is suitable for analysing Australian foreign policy making. It should be noted that it is seldom possible to distil the exact point of decision making in Australian foreign policy. While the cabinet may have the final say on major government policies, the iterative process that makes these policies invariably involves numerous policy decisions made by myriad policy actors. Pinpointing exactly which policy actor was most determinative in deciding the final design of a foreign policy is therefore extremely difficult. While ministers may ultimately select from a range of policy options, these options have already gone through several steps of decision making by bureaucratic policy actors. Further, the secrecy surrounding foreign policy decision making makes accessing official communication between state-based foreign policy actors impossible when studying contemporary policies. Nonetheless, the framework below is a tool to understand this decision making process.
The framework has been designed to allow for a discussion of the roles of domestic policy actors, and will combine the most useful and appropriate elements of the three frameworks discussed in Chapter 2 to create a hybrid framework suitable for the analysis of Australian foreign policy. This approach also draws heavily from a “synthetic” approach to public policy analysis developed by Jose Real-Dato, an approach that also brings elements of these three frameworks together.424 By adopting a combined analytical approach, this thesis counteracts the perceived weaknesses and criticisms that each framework attracts in isolation, whilst addressing the needs of the Australian foreign policy context more holistically. This approach is supported within the public policy literature as some scholars have suggested that a combination of existing approaches - either comparatively or in hybrid form - may provide the best approach for policy analysis.425
424 Real-Dato also includes Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) in his research. This study does not include PET given the highly American-centric nature of the theory. For further reading on PET, see True, James, Jones, Bryan, and Baumgartner. 2007. ‘Punctuated-Equilibrium Theory: Explaining Stability and Change in Public Policymaking’, in Sabatier, Paul (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process, Boulder (CO), Westview Press and; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, op. cit. 425 See for example Real-Dato, 2009, op. cit and Zahariadis, 2007, op. cit
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It is worth reiterating here the four key factors of Australian foreign policy drawn from the relevant literature that this framework must address:
1. elite world views are important; 2. institutions are important; 3. the international system is important; and 4. multiple levels of activity are important.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, none of the three frameworks discussed can contend with these four areas in isolation, hence the need for a hybrid approach. Further, this chapter will also introduce the typology of policy insiders, policy outsiders and public decision makers, drawing from Maloney et al., as a way to describe the role these domestic policy actors play in Australian foreign policy.426 Such a typology is critical to address the central research question of this thesis and for the elucidation of the roles played by domestic policy actors in Australian foreign policy making. The chapter will also introduce the foreign policy actors present in Australian foreign policy making. This will allow for the application of the Maloney et al typology to categorise domestic policy actors and their roles in Australian foreign policy making towards the end of the thesis.
Finally, the chapter will briefly examine a number of international relations approaches to foreign policy analysis, focusing on those that have some engagement with domestic processes – neoclassical realism, liberalism and constructivism. This examination will highlight how the framework put forward by this research can complement existing international relations approaches.
A Hybrid Framework
The development of public policy frameworks is a difficult task, particularly when avoiding the development of a bespoke approach suited only to one policy context. As John posits, ‘[c]oming up with theory that creates some simplicity or parsimony and that takes account of complexity is quite a challenge’.427 Parsons adds to this that ‘no one theory or model can capture or explain the complexity involved’ in contemporary public policy. 428 As has been described in the previous two chapters, Australian foreign policy making – indeed foreign policy making anywhere – is anything but simple or parsimonious. As John warns:
‘The move to simplicity may simply impose a tautology or overextend a set of plausible and partial models of political action to the whole of the policy process. But if complexity is the theme, then the models become redundant and degenerate to description—not poor description, such as lists of committees, laws, and public decisions, but “good” description, which provides an account of human action
426 Maloney, William, Jordan, Grant and McLaughlin, Andrew. 1994. ‘Interest Groups and Public Policy: The Insider/Outsider Model Revisited, Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 14, No. 1 427 John, 2003, op. cit., p. 483 428 Parsons, 1995, op. cit., p. xvii
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based on a contextual understanding of the links and transactions among decision makers, but in which social science hypothesis testing is not particularly relevant.’429
As such, the framework developed by this thesis will aim to provide ‘good’ description of the human actions in an Australian foreign policy contest. As described in Chapter 2, there is no one public policy framework that captures the required policy elements to adequately analyse Australian foreign policy making. Robert Clark’s warning from more than three decades ago is therefore a prescient guide – “A first rule should be to beware of one researcher, one method, or one instrument. The point is not to prove that the hypothesis is correct, but to find out something. To rely on a single approach is to be shackled.”430 Given that much public policy scholarship is based on systems of government other than Australia and that Australian foreign policy has not been analysed using such scholarship, Clark’s warning is highly relevant to this study. Consequently, this thesis draws from the three well tested and peer reviewed approaches to public policy analysis introduced in the previous chapter. In doing so, the elements of varying frameworks, when combined, can form clear, internally consistent and positive conceptual elements that are both broad in scope and useful in identifying causal drivers.431 Weible also provides support for this approach:
‘…policy process research—defined here as the study of the development of public policy over time and the context, events, and individuals surrounding this development— is so complex and multifaceted that the assumption that a single framework or theory can explain all its facets and effects is absurd.’432
Zahariadis also contends that ‘policy analysts have become sensitive to the limitations of using single lenses and the value added when exploring policy questions from multiple perspectives’.433 It should be noted, however, that Zahariadis further argues that synthetic lenses integrating variables from alternate approaches are limited in their applicability – a ‘menu for choosing different perspectives to explain different events’ is a preferable path forward.434 But as will be discussed below, particularly drawing from work done by Real-Dato, this thesis disagrees with Zahariadis second insight, arguing that the author’s ‘menu’ approach is in many ways analogous to incorporating variables from multiple approaches. Synthesising approaches avoids the need to analyse policy multiple times, with each time through a new lens. This complaint is particularly relevant if the variables are likely to remain consistent across the policy area, such as in Australian foreign policy. That being said, it is acknowledged that the
429 John, 2003, op. cit., p. 483 430 Quoted in Working Together, 2010:4. Original Clarke, Robert. 1977. Fundamentals of Criminal Justice Research, Lexington (MA), Lexington Books 431 These are all criteria used by Sabatier to determine a given frameworks’ acceptability from a theoretical point of view. See Sabatier, 1999, op. cit., p. 8 and; Real-Dato, 2009, op. cit., p. 137 432 Weible et al., 2012, p. 2 433 Zahariadis, 2007, op. cit., p. 86 434 Ibid., pp. 86-87.
72 framework proposed below will not be able to contend with every element of complex policy making – no framework should purport to do so as no framework can.
The challenge is, therefore, to create a framework that is both broadly applicable but also sympathetic to the idiosyncrasies of the policy making environment and structures under investigation, capturing most of the major elements. This is no small task and as such, this thesis will restrict the scope to that of Australian foreign policy making, although acknowledging this limits the framework’s broader applicability. Each policy making area is unique, employing its own array of policy actors, institutions, structures, processes, rules and restrictions. The lack of previous application of a public policy framework to Australian foreign policy, the lack of a guiding framework suitable to the Australian context and the uniqueness of foreign policy amongst the Commonwealth Government’s policy making endeavours, are all limiting factors to the development of this framework. Further, the lack of policy information – particularly given the centralised nature of foreign policy making and the highly secretive nature of much of the information contained within foreign policy – means that a more detailed framework reliant upon a substantial amount of data input, is simply not possible in the Australian foreign policy making context.
Therefore, to tease out the structures of foreign policy making, an analytical approach conducive to examining these structures, along with the actors within the policy making system, is required. As such, and to reiterate, this study turns to the policy sciences to find such an approach and invokes the Laswellian view of the policy sciences that it is important to not only examine the details of a given policy, but also develop knowledge that can be applied to understand the structures, processes and contexts through which the policy came to exist.435 Importantly, the approach outlined below is not an attempt to replace traditional and well-tested approaches to international relations and political science inquiry. Rather it is aimed at highlighting the role institutions, structures, processes and domestic policy actors have on how Australia’s foreign policy is constructed.
Importantly, given the highly centralised nature of foreign policy making in Australia, the importance of values and beliefs needs to be complemented with a structure that can also incorporate the influence of the institutional environment in which the policy is being made. Furthermore, and as will be highlighted by the case studies, the political and the operational sides of foreign policy often act in distinct ways with their own set of actors, structures and influences – this gives credence to the MSF advocated by Kingdon and Zahariadis, amongst others, that provides multiple levels of analysis through which to observe different actors. Importantly, the MSF approach advocated by these two authors avoids the American-centric division of analytical levels present in the two other frameworks adopted.436
435 Laswell, 1951, op. cit., and; Marinetto, 1999, op. cit. 436 The IADF and ACF are structured to focus on levels of analysis representing different tiers of US policy making, such as the constitutional tier in the IADF. By focusing on streams that do not relate to one particular system of government, the MSF avoids American-centricity and can be applied more broadly to other national policy making systems.
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In an attempt to synthesise the best elements of all three reference frameworks, the research draws from a similar synthetic framework and approach to policy analysis proposed by Real-Dato.437 Real- Dato’s proposal for a Synthetic Explanatory Framework combines complementary elements of the three aforementioned frameworks to provide a structure that allows robust policy analysis whilst overcoming the well-documented shortcomings of each approach, if used individually. For example, using this hybrid approach overcomes how the ACF and MSF treat institutions, which is at best, a secondary concern for these two frameworks.438 This is problematic in a foreign policy context, particularly in the Australian setting, given the extremely important role of institutions such as the cabinet, ministers and the public service in foreign policy development, implementation and overall decision-making. The IADF overcomes this issue by emphasising the ‘social explanation on actors’ interactions within the limits established by the relevant institutional structures’.439
Accordingly, this study adopts a framework similar to that of Real-Dato, although aims for greater simplicity. Real- Dato puts forward a synthetic explanatory framework that uses Ostrom’s IADF as a baseline and superimposes elements from both the ACF, MSF and a third framework, the Punctuated Equilibrium Framework, to contend with the inadequacies of each framework used in isolation to examine policy change. It builds on both the strengths and commonalities of the four approaches, ‘providing a more precise specification of the theoretical relationships among the conceptual elements’.440 Such an approach provides greater clarity to causal explanation and reasons for policy change and overcomes problems with the individual frameworks such as poor boundary relationships, inadequate causal explanation, limited explanatory scope and loosely developed conceptualisation of rules. Real-Dato’s main application of this framework has been education policy making, particularly change in policy in Spain. Real-Dato’s framework, whilst robust, is overly complicated for the purpose of this thesis and requires a level of data that is not available in an Australian foreign policy context.
As such, this thesis puts forward a simplified framework that is better suited to the preliminary public policy analysis of Australian foreign policy that this thesis undertakes. It consists of the following four parts, with each described over the proceeding pages: a policy sub-system, an action arena, a series of exogenous variables and three streams of analytical focus. Whilst what follows explains each section and relates it to the Australian foreign policy context, for a more in-depth discussion of each individual element, please refer back to the discussion of the relevant literature in Chapter 2.
437 Real-Dato, 2009, op. cit. 438 Real-Dato, 2009, op. cit., p. 119 439 Real-Dato, 2009, op. cit., p. 122 440 Ibid. p. 118
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Figure 3.1 – Structural Overview of the Hybrid Framework
Unit of Analysis: Policy Sub-system
Firstly, this framework uses the ACF’s concept of the policy sub-system as the main unit of analysis. As discussed in Chapter 2, a policy sub-system is composed of participants with a speciality in the relevant policy area. Capturing this element is important in Australian foreign policy making given the centralised nature of the policy process, with the literature suggesting traditional foreign policy specialists are mainly found within the federal public service, notably DFAT, or amongst parliamentarians, particularly the prime minister and foreign minister.
Within broader ‘foreign policy space’, exists any number of policy sub-systems. For example, a policy sub-system exists covering the Australia-China relationship, Australian participation at the UN and Australia’s negotiations at the WTO. Whilst policy sub-systems relate to a specific area of Australian foreign policy, they can be connected to other sub-systems, including sub-systems at the domestic level. To again provide an example, Australian exports of uranium are elements of both a policy sub- system relating to uranium export regulations but also a part of the policy sub-system for a given nation receiving Australian uranium exports. This positions the sub-system as a part of ‘wider policy space of analytically relevant policy interactions’.441 Establishing ‘boundary rules’ between sub-systems thus becomes important, with such rules determining acceptable policy actors as participants in policy interactions (rules relevant to this framework are expanded upon below). This allows for the drawing of boundaries around policy sub-systems whilst acknowledging that sub-systems are often linked, with actions in one impacting actions in another.
441 Real-Dato, 2009, op. cit., p. 122
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The use of policy sub-systems as the main analytical focus of the framework allows for the positioning of the sub-system within the broader Australian foreign policy space by linking related sub-systems together within an institutional context. The hybrid framework also allows for the analysis of issues within a given policy sub-system by providing a boundary for linked policy issues that relate to a given foreign policy, particularly the various issues relating to Australia’s bilateral relationships.
Focusing Attention: The Action Arena
Secondly, within a given policy sub-system exist any number of action arenas that relate to specific elements of the broader policy sub-system or specific problem facing interested policy actors within the same sub-system. As per one of the case studies adopted in this study, the sale of uranium to India exists within a particular action arena in the broader Australia-India relationship policy sub-system. By including the option of multiple action arenas within the one policy sub-system, it allows for a greater understanding of the connectedness between different arenas relating to similar, although broader policy issues. This approach is consistent with Real-Dato, who states that a ‘policy sub-system will comprehend an action arena where actively interested actors in a problem or policy interact’.442
As discussed in Chapter 2, the action arena contains an action situation and set of policy actors to ‘diagnose, explain, and predict actions and results.’443 Ostrom lists seven key aspects of an action situation:
1. a set of participants 2. the positions that the participants fill 3. the possible outcomes 4. the set of allowable actions and functions allowing these actions 5. control of individuals over the function facilitating allowable actions 6. the information available to participants 7. the costs and benefits of actions and outcomes
Given the focus of this study is on the role played by domestic policy actors, in the case studies to follow, aspects one, two, four and six are of key importance and will be foci in subsequent chapters. The set of participants will be drawn largely from the policy sub-system of which the action arena is a part, although some circumstances will facilitate participant interaction from outside the given sub- system and broader institutional context. For example, in non-traditional elements of foreign policy, such as environmental issues, policy experts are drawn into the action arena to deal with the specifics of the policy problem, returning to broader non-foreign ‘policy space’ once resolution has been achieved. The same can be said for participants drawn from the broader foreign policy institutional context that might not be typical to the given policy sub-system or action arena. As Australia’s broader foreign policy now needs to contend with many areas not defined in a traditional foreign policy sense,
442 Ibid. p. 122 443 Ostrom, 2007, op. cit., p. 43
76 understanding how these participants engage and interact is increasingly important. By adopting the concept of the action situation, this framework will be able to examine the role these participants play, along with more traditional participants, and the restrictions on their behaviour the structure of the foreign policy making space imposes.
The second element of the action arena is the policy actor. Unlike in the original IADF where such policy actors are rational, this framework utilises the three-tiered belief system posited by the ACF – deep core beliefs, policy core beliefs and secondary beliefs. The broadest belief in this structure is the deep core belief that considers ‘normative and ontological assumptions about human nature’.444 An example of a deep core belief in a foreign policy context would be a commitment to a liberal democratic system of government. The second tier in the ACF’s individual belief structure is the policy core belief which applies to a specific policy sub-system. These beliefs represent ‘basic normative commitments and causal perceptions across an entire policy domain or sub-system’.445 Such a belief in a foreign policy situation might include perspectives on whether unilateral, bilateral or multilateral approaches are best at solving complex international problems. The final tier of the ACF’s belief structure consists of secondary beliefs that are narrower in scope compared to the other two levels. Secondary beliefs tend to focus on ‘detailed rules and budgetary applications’ within a specific element of a policy sub- system, such as legislation, a budget or a set of guidelines. 446 Changing secondary beliefs is significantly simpler than changing deep core or policy core beliefs, with an example being the bargaining that occurs over items for inclusion and exclusion in a trade agreement between Australia and another nation.
By adopting this system, the framework can better incorporate how leading policy actors, such as the prime minister, foreign minister or DFAT, conceptualise issues and how such conceptualisations fit within their broader view of the world and Australia’s position within the international system. As the literature review in Chapter 1 indicates, world views of the elite are important and are a major influence in how foreign policy decisions are made, so need to be analysable by this framework. The deep core and policy core tiers will be of most utility as the data required to effectively analyse secondary beliefs was difficult to obtain for two of the three case studies.
Providing Structure: Exogenous Variables
Exogenous variables are used to structure a policy sub-system. Firstly, three variables are drawn from the IADF, consisting of rules that order participant relationships, biophysical world attribute and the attributes of the community in which the action arena is situated. The rules in use define a shared understanding among participants about ‘enforced perceptions’ on actions and outcomes that are required, prohibited or permitted.447 This limits both patterns of participation, behaviour and possible
444 Sabatier and Weible, 2007, op. cit., p. 194 445 Sobeck, 2003, op. cit., p. 354 446 Sabatier and Weible, 2007, op. cit., p. 196 447 Ostrom, 2005, op. cit., p. 19 and; Kiser and Ostrom, 1982, op. cit., p. 191
77 policy outcomes, such as restricting foreign policy making actors to those at the centre of government. It could also be international agreements to which Australia has agreed to comply with, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), that limit the policy instruments available to foreign policy makers.
The next variable, biophysical world attributes, is routinely referred to by political economists as goods and services that are produced, consumed and allocated within a given situation.448 This, in turn, impacts the actions that are physically possible, the outcomes that can be produced, how actions link to any produced outcomes and the information provided to actors.449 In a foreign policy context this could conceivably be the geo-political and strategic realities that Australia needs to contend with in the international environment. It would also include the amount of goods and services Australia could possibly trade with another nation.
Finally, the attributes of the community variable relates directly to the structure and behavioural beliefs of the society in which the decision making process is being undertaken. These attributes combine to become a form of social capital that can be applied to assist in structuring cooperative solutions to problems within the policy sub-system or action arena.450 Views of the population towards a particular nation state or community anxiety over free trade agreements or nuclear proliferation are examples of how this variable may manifest in a foreign policy setting.
In addition to these three variables from the IADF, this framework also introduces the notion of an external shock to the policy sub-system or action arena as described by the ACF. These shocks are unstable variables, occurring intermittently and on occasion, without warning. They can occur in direct connection to the policy sub-system or action arena under investigation or in linked sub-systems or action arena in broader foreign policy space. For example, the Fukushima nuclear disaster had an impact on public perceptions on nuclear safety, which fed into the debate on Australian uranium exports to India. Whilst not a direct shock on the Australia-India policy sub-systems, the flow-on effect on the domestic policy sub-systems involving uranium mining and nuclear energy impacted upon the action arena dealing with negotiations over an export regime for Australian uranium to India.
The exogenous variables reflect that foreign policy making does not occur in a vacuum – it is influenced by both domestic and international events, process and policy actors. The four variables described above allow this framework to capture these elements and assess how they limit the policy options available to policy actors, and influence which policy actors can participate in Australian foreign policy making, and which cannot.
448 Ostrom, 2005, op. cit., p. 22 449 Ibid., p. 22 450 Ostrom et al., 1994, op. cit., p. 45
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Examining Multiple Levels: Three Streams of Focus
In order to fulfil the need for multiple levels of analysis, the framework borrows from the MSF, utilising its three stream concept. This framework envisages the MSF’s three streams running in perpetuity through ‘foreign policy space’. When the three streams enter an action arena they provide the framework with an ability to examine the interactions of participants operating at three different levels – the problem level, policy level and political level. They also provide the location of many of the policy actors within the action arena, with some crossing-over multiple streams. The streams provide a lens through which three different levels of activity can be viewed. For the purposes of this thesis, the streams will be examined in the most depth when they intersect with the action arena.
Firstly, in the politics stream, the public mood and ideology are important influences on participants, with policy actors in this stream typically being elected officials. In this stream decisions are made, political narratives are constructed and policies are used as political tools. In an Australian foreign policy context, the political roles of actors such as the prime minister and foreign minister play out in this stream. Elevation of a policy problem or solution to this stream is pivotal if it is to become part of Australia’s foreign policy. Secondly, in the policy stream, policy specialists work to provide solutions to problems within an often-closed policy community dominated by policy insiders.451 Policy options are discussed, traded and negotiated and policy feasibility, acceptability and constraints are all considered. In the context of this study, the role of DFAT is pivotal in this stream as the foreign policy making nexus of the Australian system. Finally, the problems stream consists of various policy actors bringing attention to public problems usually via a combination of engaging with public servants and political appointees and in some cases, public advocacy.452
As the problem stream flows through a policy sub-system, problems are defined and pushed onto the policy agenda by policy actors. This stream is the most open to policy actors outside the formal structures of government to identify problems with existing arrangements, offer potential solutions and advocate for certain positions. For example, business wanting greater access to foreign markets or humans rights groups with concerns in a foreign country can push and define their causes within this stream.
The combination of these four elements forms the public policy framework for this study. In Part II following this chapter, three case studies are examined using this framework, with the data collected assembled in a manner consistent with what is outlined above. The next section introduces a typology to help categorise these roles.
451 Robinson and Eller, 2010, op. cit. 452 Ibid.
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A Typology of Policy Actors
The typology that this thesis will use to describe the role played by domestic policy actors will include three categories – public decision maker, insider and outsider. This typology is utilised by Real-Dato, but is largely drawn from Maloney et al. with some additional insights from Page.453 Public decision makers are ostensibly actors of the state, so in the Australian foreign policy context both elected officials and public servants fulfil this role. The position of public decision maker within a policy sub-system confers ‘structural advantages’ to these actors – legitimacy derived from control of decision making, authority assigned by being agents of the state and control over process and information.454
Given the highly centralised nature of foreign policy making in Australia, the case studies that follow this chapter will unpack how both elected officials and public servants undertake this role and whether they are public decision makers across multiple areas of foreign policy or move in and out of this category depending on the policy undergoing change. The categories of insiders and outsiders are of most use in describing the role of domestic policy actors that are not state agents. Maloney et al. point out that the terms insiders and outsiders, were first used by Schattschneider in 1935 to describe access to public decision makers:
“…the contrast is between ‘insiders’ who knew very much and ‘outsiders’ who knew very little. And this is what might have been expected, for the groups which knew their way about knew also where to go for information on their own initiative and knew how to get it. Others, oblivious to what was happening, did nothing at all or became excited only after it was too late”.455
Much of the literature that followed Schattscheinder’s observation defined insider in terms of access to consultation or more specifically, inclusion and exclusion from the consultation process.456 This is both in terms of policy actors attempting to be heard by policy makers but also as policy makers seeking out the input of policy actors whom they believe will be of assistance in policy formulation. Being heard or sought out by policy makers can occur due to the external policy actor being known to have expertise in an area, the discretion of the policy makers and notions of legitimacy attached to the policy actor by the state.
453 Maloney et al., 1994, op. cit. and; Page, Edward. 1999. ‘The insider/outsider distinction: an empirical investigation’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 2. 454 Real-Dato, 2009, op cit., p. 135 and; Cobb, Roger. and Ross, Marc (eds.). 1997. Cultural Strategies of Agenda Denial: Avoidance, Attack and Redefinition, Lawrence (Kansas), University Press of Kansas, p. 26 455 Schattschneider, E.E. 1935. Politics, Pressures and the Tariff, Hamden (CT), Archon Books, p. 166. Also quoted in Maloney et al., 1994, op. cit, p. 18 456 Maloney et al., 1994, op. cit, p. 19
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With this in mind, Maloney et al. put forward the following categories of insiders and outsiders:457
1. Insider Status i. Core Insider Group ii. Specialist Insider Group iii. Peripheral Insider Group 2. Outsider Status i. Outsider Group by Ideology or Goal ii. Outsider Group by Choice
In terms of the insider categories, firstly, core insiders are considered important sources of policy information by policy makers, maintaining regular participation across a given policy area and have ongoing relationships with policy makers.458 As Page identifies, they have ‘privileged access’ to the executive’, with frequent contacts, wide-ranging consultation and an ability to influence policy outcomes.459 Secondly, specialist insiders are more limited having ‘a more specific interest in restricted policy areas but are seen by policy makers as reliable and authoritative source of information in these niches’.460 Finally, peripheral insiders have limited or marginal influence over policy making, granted a ‘cosmetic type of status ‘of insider by policy makers by virtue of being included on consultation lists or in engagement programs.461
In terms of outsiders, those outside the core by ideology or goal are usually as such by virtue of their raison d’être not being compatible with the aims of policy makers or the consultative process.462 If such groups are incapable of incrementally changing their ideology or goals, then insider status is unlikely to ever be possible. The second group, outsider by choice, ‘make an explicit policy decision not to become (or to be perceived as) “ensnared” in a cosy relationship with policy makers’.463
Whilst it is acknowledged that classifying policy actors using this typology is an oversimplification – indeed Page goes so far as to say it may, in some cases, even be misleading 464 - it is a useful mechanism for describing the roles played by policy actors in a policy context that has not previously had any public policy investigation. By firstly unpacking the broad roles domestic policy actors play with respect to public decision makers, further research could undertake a more nuanced investigation to tease out the idiosyncrasies of individual roles played by many of these groups in Australian foreign policy making.
In terms of the specific types of behaviours and actions public decision makers, policy insiders and policy outsiders exhibit, Althaus et al provide some guidance. Drawing from Hood’s work, the authors
457 Ibid., p. 30 458 Ibid., p. 30 459 Page, 1999, op. cit., pp. 205-208 460 Maloney et al., 1994. op. cit., p. 30 461 Ibid., p. 31 462 Ibid., p. 31 463 Ibid., p. 31 464 Page, 1999, op. cit., p. 212
81 argue there are five common types of policy instruments relevant to Australia’s policy making environment:
• ‘policy through advocacy – educating or persuading, using information available to government; • policy through network – cultivating and leveraging relationships within and across government and with external partnership bodies to develop and implement desired goals and behaviours; • policy through money – using spending and taxing powers to shape activity beyond government; • policy through government action – delivering services through public agencies; • policy through law – legislation, regulation and official authority.’465
Binderkrantz also adds a useful grouping of strategies policy insiders and outsiders undertake to engage and influence public decision makers.466 Binderkrantz posits policy insiders and outsiders undertake either direct or indirect strategies, examples of which include:
• direct strategies o administrative strategies - contacting the relevant minister; using public committees and consultation process o parliamentary strategies – engaging parliamentary committees; members of parliament • indirect strategies o Media strategies – press releases; publishing research reports o Mobilisation strategies - members of parliaments and using party organisational mechanisms.
Where Binderkrantz’s work differs from existing literature is that she argues both policy insiders and outsiders use a combination of both direct and indirect strategies to influence and engage. Her findings suggest whilst insiders are more likely to benefit from direct strategies, the existing literature’s claim that insiders use direct strategies and outsiders are restricted to indirect strategies is overstated.467 What follows in the case studies in Part B of this thesis validates Binderkrantz’s claim.
465 Althaus et al., 2007, p. 89. See also Hood, 1983, op. cit. 466 Binderkrantz, Anne. 2005. ‘Interest Group Strategies: Navigating Between Privileged Access and Strategies of Pressure’, Political Studies, Vol. 53, No. 4 467 Existing literature that makes this claim includes Gais, T. L., and Walker, J. L. 1991. ‘Pathways to Influence in American Politics’, in Walker, J. L. (ed.), Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions and Social Movements, Ann Arbor (MI), The University of Michigan Press; Dunleavy, P. 1991. Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic Explanation Political Science, New York, Harvest/Wheatsheaf; Maloney et al., 1994, op. cit. and; McFarland, A. S. 1984. Common Cause: Lobbying in the Public Interest, Chatham (NJ), Chatham House Publishers
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By using the work of Althaus et al. and Binderkrantz, this thesis is able to not only categorise policy actors in Australian foreign policy making, but is also able to describe the specific actions and strategies they undertake to influence decision makers.
Australian Foreign Policy Actors at the Domestic Level
There are a number of key domestic policy actors – both inside and outside government – that are foci of this investigation.
These actors have been drawn from Making Australian Foreign Policy by Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley – arguably the most useful work on Australian foreign policy making from the perspective of this study. Derek McDougall’s Australian Foreign Relations: Entering the 21st Century also provides useful guidance as to which domestic actors to focus on, as does Grant and Evan’s Australia’s Foreign Relations. The categories of policy actors are nominated by Gyngell, Wesley, Grant, Evans and McDougall as having some role in Australian foreign policy making, although the authors stress the role played by the groups that are non-government actors is limited.
Table 3.1 – Policy Actors Present in Australian Foreign Policy Making
Policy Actor Purpose
Prime Minister The prime minister has been central to Australian foreign policy since federation, and as the legitimate head of government, is Australia’s chief representative abroad. The prime minister can exercise as much influence on foreign policy making as desired, either directly or through cabinet468
Foreign and Trade Responsible for the day-to-day decision making of Australian foreign policy Ministers and for the foreign policy bureaucracy. Australia’s chief diplomat and trade negotiator. Both represent foreign policy in the cabinet. The foreign minister is also responsible for the Australian Secret Intelligence Service.
Cabinet and other The cabinet ultimately signs-off on key foreign policy decisions. Other ministers portfolio minister may be involved in foreign policy from time-to-time depending on the issue (e.g. the environment minister and climate change negotiations; the attorney-general and national security policy etc.)
Commonwealth The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (and its earlier bureaucracy manifestations) is responsible for the day-to-day management of Australian foreign policy, along with the overseas diplomatic network. It is the key source of advice for the foreign and trade ministers. The Department of
468 See Edwards, Peter. 1983. Prime Ministers and Diplomats: The Making of Australian Foreign Policy 1901- 1949, Melbourne, Oxford University Press; Trood, 1992, op. cit.; Beaumont, 2003op. cit.; Davison, 2005, op. cit. and; Weller, 1985, op. cit.
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Prime Minister and Cabinet, particularly its International Division, advises the prime minister on foreign policy.469
Business and business Businesses and industry organisations all seek to influence government on groups foreign policy, particularly trade policy settings. They also implement foreign policy by adhering to trade rules and procedures. Much of this role stems from the structural and instrumental power business has in the Australian system of government.470
Non-business An increasing array of non-business organised interests engage Australian organised interests foreign policy making, particularly as more domestic policy areas become relevant at the international level (so-called ‘intermestic issues’).471
International Relations Theory and Domestic Policy Processes
It is worth briefly investigating several international relations theories that consider domestic-level processes of foreign policy making – namely neoclassical realism, liberalism and constructivism. As mentioned earlier, the framework outlined above is not intended to replace these well-tested and robust international relations theories. Rather, it is designed to add nuance and develop a more domestic- focused structure through which to view the process of foreign policy decision making. Many of the academic sources drawn from in Chapter 1 are situated within the existing international relations literature, so the intent of this framework is to contribute to this academic discourse on Australian foreign policy, not replace it.
Firstly, neoclassical realists draw from both the neorealist and classical realist approaches, assuming ‘politics is a perpetual struggle among different states for material power and security in a world of scarce resources and pervasive uncertainty.’472 However, neoclassical realists differ from other realist schools by arguing the scope and ambition of a nation state’s foreign policy is drawn from its relative
469 See Weller et al., 2011, op. cit. 470 See Bell, Stephen. 1995. 'Between the Market and the State: The Role of Australian Business Associations in Public Policy', Comparative Politics, Vol. 28, No. 1; Bell, Stephen. 2006. 'Institutional influences on business power: how 'privileged' is the Business Council of Australia?', Journal of Public Affairs, Vol. 6, No.2; Marsh, Ian. 1995. Beyond the Two Party System: Political Representation, Economic Competitiveness and Australian Politics, Melbourne, Cambridge University Press; Kelly, 2008, op. cit.; Keating, Michael. 2004. 'Introduction: Are markets on tap or on top?', in Keating, Michael (ed.), Who Rules? How government retains control of a privatised economy, Sydney, The Federation Press and; Wanna, John. 1992. 'Furthering Business Interests: Business Associations and Political Representation', Business-Government Relations in Australia, Bell, Stephen and Wanna (Eds.), Sydney, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers. 471 For further reading see Dietrich, 1999, op. cit.; Keen, Susan. 2006. 'Non-Government Organisations in Policy', in Colebatch, Hal, Beyond the Policy Cycle: The Policy Process in Australia, Colebatch, Crows Nest (NSW), Allen & Unwin and; Althaus et al., 2012, op. cit. 472 Taliaferro, Jeffrey, Lobell, Steven and Ripsman, Norrin. 2009. ‘Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy’, in Lobell, Steven, Ripsman, Norrin and Taliaferro, Jeffrey (eds.), Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 4
84 material power, yet that power’s impact is indirect and complex due to systemic pressure ‘translated through intervening unit-level variables such as decision makers’ perceptions and state structure’.473 These unit-level variables are located within domestic politics, and early neoclassical realist writers attempted to include them into the broader realist theoretical project.474
According to Lobell et. al., neoclassical realists use the internal characteristics of states as a guide to how that state responds to acts at the international level. 475 They add that neoclassical realism assumes a top-down conception of the state, with external forces ultimately determining a state’s external behaviour.476
Drawing upon political economy literature, neoclassical realists have begun to account for the impact on foreign policy of domestic politics, particularly in order to ‘flesh out the concept of power, the central variable in neorealism’.477 However, as Ripsman acknowledges, the neoclassical realist literature is still undeveloped on this front.478 Ripsman posits that the following five questions concerning domestic policy actors require further consideration by the neoclassical realist literature:
1. Which domestic actors matter most? 2. Under which international circumstances do they have greatest influence? 3. Under which domestic circumstances do they have greatest influence? 4. In what type of states do they matter most? 5. How does their influence become manifest?479
In Ripsman’s attempt to answer these questions, he assumes that the government executive responsible for foreign policy decisions will determine policy preference in accordance with global ‘constraints and incentives’.480 He also notes that decision-making procedures and procedural norms will influence decision makers.481 Yet no approach is offered as to how scholars may unpack these norms and procedures. Kitchen attempts to bring these unit level factors together with systemic factors
473 Rose, Gideon. 1998. ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’, World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1, p. 146 474 See Wohlforth, William. 1993. The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War, Ithaca (NY), Cornell University Press; Christensen, Thomas. 1995. Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958, Princeton (NJ), Princeton University Press; Schweller, Randall. 1998. Deadly Imbalance: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest, New York, Columbia University Press; and Zakaria, Fareed. 1999. From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role, Princeton (NJ), Princeton University Press. 475 Taliaferro et.al., 2009, op. cit., p. 22 476 Ibid., p. 25. See also Kitchen, Nicholas. 2010. ‘Systemic pressure and domestic ideas: a neoclassical realist model of grand strategy formation’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 36, p. 133 477 Rathbun, Brian. 2008. ‘A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism’, Security Studies, Vol. 17, p. 301 478 Ripsman, Norrin. 2009. ‘Neoclassical realism and domestic interest groups’, in Lobell, Steven, Ripsman, Norrin and Taliaferro, Jeffrey (eds.), Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 170 479 Ibid., p. 170 480 Ibid., p. 172 481 Ibid., p. 177
85 under the concept of ‘grand strategy’ but again does not provide detail as to how to systematically break apart the important factors and examine their policy making attributes.482 The literature tells you where to look rather than how to look at domestic politics, with Rathbun adding neoclassical realist analyses ‘generally use domestic politics and ideas in a very limited way’.483
It is on this point that the framework developed above makes its contribution – by providing a tool to breakdown some of the domestic processes and norms, and to examine which policy tools are being deployed by policy actors. The framework does not view the analytical focus on domestic politics and policy actors as a mechanism to flesh out understandings of power as neoclassical realism does, but rather a method to better understand how different policy actors participate within the process of foreign policy making regardless of their levels of power or influence. Further, the framework attempts to move analysis away from the realist top-down conception of the state, drawing instead from synthetic approaches to policy analysis that combine both the top-down and bottom-up traditions as referenced in the previous chapter.
The framework does, however, align with the neorealist assumption that foreign policy cannot be made independently of international circumstances. 484 The treatment of the international system as an important, if not the most important, determinant of foreign policy is not disputed by this research; it is simply not the focus.
Secondly, liberal international relations theory has historically assigned a much more prominent role to domestic politics than realism. For liberals, societal ideas, interests and institutions shape and influence state preferences at the international level, and as Moravcsik notes, ‘the relationship of states to the domestic and transnational social context in which they are embedded have a fundamental impact on state behaviour in world politics’. 485 Instead of the capabilities focus of realists, liberal attention is focused on state preferences. Doyle adds that ‘liberals pay more attention to domestic structures and individuals differences than do realists’. 486 Within this, the three most prominent liberal empirical theories are concerned with democracy, international institutions and interdependence.487
Moravcsik outlines three core assumptions of liberal international relations theory:
1. The primacy of societal actors – individuals and groups are the fundamental actors in international politics. They are usually rational and risk averse, organise exchange and
482 Kitchen, 2010, op. cit., p. 121 483 Rathbun, 2008, op. cit., p. 296 484 Ripsman, Norrin, Taliaferro, Jeffrey and Lobell, Steven. 2009. ‘Conclusion: the state of neoclassical realism’, in Lobell, Steven, Ripsman, Norrin and Taliaferro, Jeffrey (eds.), Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 292 485 Moravcisk, Andrew. 1997. ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics’, International Organization, Vol. 51, No.4, p. 86 486 Doyle, Michael. 2008. ‘Liberalism and Foreign Policy’ in Smith, Steve, Hadfield, Amelia and Dunne, Tim, Foreign Policy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 59 487 Richardson, James. 2007. ‘Liberalism’ in Devetak, Richard, Burke, Anthony and George, Jim, An Introduction to International Relations: Australian Perspectives, Port Melbourne, Cambridge University Press
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collection action, and promote interests. These actions are constrained by societal structures and resources. 2. Representation and state preferences – states represent subsets of domestic society. Officials act on the basis of societal preferences to define state preferences and activity in global affairs. 3. Interdependence and the international system – the configuration of interdependent state preferences is the key determinant of state behaviour.488
Despite the focus on domestic politics in the three assumptions above, as with neoclassical realism, the dominant liberal theories of international relations do not deconstruct the foreign policy making process in a nuanced fashion. Indeed, liberal theorists admit to generalising the social constructions and processes in which policy actors operate. 489 These generalisations render states ‘mere transmission belts for domestic interests’.490 The focus is thus ultimately on actions at the international level, and not necessarily on the domestic actions that led to international preferences, despite liberalism acknowledging their importance. Writing on liberalism’s democratic peace school, Hayes adds to this by suggesting academic understanding of the state-based mechanisms that lead to democratic peace remain unclear, and much work is required to unpack the processes of decision making.491 Further, and in contrast to neoclassical realism, liberalism offers a bottom-up view of foreign policy – an approach that the framework in this research seeks to move beyond.
Finally, constructivist approaches to international relations hold that humans actively make the world in which they live, confronting ‘historically evolved conditions and institutions, which…enable certain kinds of action and…impose certain constraints on what course of action may be available, permissible or plausible’.492 Kubalkova sees utility in using constructivism to understand domestic politics in foreign policy making as the term ‘making’ resonates with the constructivists’ stress on processes of social construction’.493
Adler notes that constructivists eschew ‘methodological individualism’ as the basis for most other political science approaches including rational choice and bureaucratic politics.’494 Further, Kaarbo notes that constructivism does not consider the impact of institutions, culture and processes on foreign policy.495 Both of these points are clear divergences from the framework outlined in this chapter, which
488 Moravcisk, op. cit., pp. 516-521 489 Ibid., p. 517 and p. 524 490 Kaarbo, Juliet. 2015. ‘A Foreign Policy Analysis Perspective on the Domestic Politics Turn in IR Theory’, International Studies Review, Vol. 17 p. 196 491 Hayes, Jarrod. 2011. ‘The Democratic Peace and the New Evolution of an Old Idea’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 18, No. 4, p.782-83 492 Weber, Martin. 2007. ‘Constructivism and Critical Theory’, in Devetak, Richard, Burke, Anthony and George, Jim, An Introduction to International Relations: Australian Perspectives, Port Melbourne, Cambridge University Press, p. 97 493 Kubalkova, Vendulk. 2001. ‘Introduction’ in Kubalkova, Vendulka (ed.), Foreign Policy in a Constructed World, Armonk (NY), M.E. Sharpe, p. 19 494 Adler, Emanuel. 2005. Communitarian International Relations, London, Routledge, pp. 11-12 495 Kaarbo, 2015, op. cit., p. 201
87 assigns importance to institutions and processes in foreign policy making, and relies on elements of the rational choice public policy literature to better understand the structure of institutions.
Concluding Remarks
This chapter has outlined the hybrid public policy framework and policy actor typology for this thesis. This will allow for the investigation of three Australian foreign policy case studies in Part B. The framework developed incorporates relevant elements of the IADF, the ACF and the MSF, consistent with Real-Dato’s synthesised framework and reflecting calls from within the public policy literature for greater interaction between the discipline’s frameworks and models. Whilst the framework that this chapter sets out undoubtedly has areas for improvement, it will provide a novel approach to understanding Australian foreign policy. Also, by providing a typology for classifying the cast of domestic foreign policy actors in Australian foreign policy making, it will help to better understand the role and level of engagement these actors have in shaping Australia’s international agenda in an increasing complex policy environment. The useful contributions of Hood and Binderkrantz will allow for greater description of these roles, providing a more nuanced understanding of the role played by public decision makers, policy insiders and policy outsiders in the making of Australian foreign policy. It has also positioned the framework vis-à-vis international relations theories to highlight the key differences in approach, but also the complementarities.
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Part B
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Chapter 4: Trade and Commerce with Post-War Japan
Sir John Crawford once defined trade policy as ‘measures designed not merely to promote external viability but also to provide the trade support required by policies of economic growth’.496 By linking trade and economic growth to more traditional notions of foreign policy, Crawford understood that in the geopolitics of the post-WWII world, Australia needed to grow beyond its Imperial trade traditions.
A key example of this approach was the development of the 1957 Agreement on Commerce (the Treaty) between Australia and Japan, an initiative in which Crawford was to play a key role. The Treaty ‘marked a watershed in post-War relations between the two countries’ and in many ways formed the basis of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that would follow in 1976.497 Yet Australian policy makers responsible for negotiating the Treaty could not ignore a number of domestic policy and political concerns – failure to consider such issues would make public acceptance of the Treaty difficult.
These domestic pressures were unsurprising as the Treaty was negotiated at a time when public animosity towards Japan was still strong as a result of WWII. Further, Australia still relied on preferential Imperial trade and heavily subsidised many of its industries, imposing high level of tariffs on foreign imports – particularly those from Japan. Yet Japan was becoming an increasingly important part of the West’s machinations against the Soviet Union and a key potential trade partner for Australia – Tokyo’s rebuilding of its war ravaged economy provided new opportunities for Australian exporters. The Treaty also required negotiations over the assigning to Japan of most-favoured-nation (MFN) status by Australia, something Canberra had failed to do despite being required to under the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco (the Peace Treaty).498 This position continued even after Japan’s accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was finalised in 1955; a development to which the Treaty’s formulation was linked.
It is against this backdrop that this first case study is set; covering the making of the Treaty with Japan, describing the relevant policy sub-systems, variables and policy actors across the three stream of analysis set out in Chapter 3. This will provide the basis for analysing how the individual policy actors engaged in the making of the Treaty and an examination of their status as public decision makers,
496 Quoted in Stewart, Jenny. 1995. ‘Trade and industry policies’, in Prasser, Scott (ed.) et al., The Menzies era: a reappraisal of government, politics and policy, Sydney, Hale, pp. 185-201 497 Watt, Alan. 1972. Australian Diplomat – Memoirs of Sir Alan Watt, Sydney, Angus and Roberston, p. 263. For discussion of this treaty, see Woodard, Garry, Dee, Moreen and Suich Max. 2007. ‘Negotiating the Australia-Japan Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation: Reflections and Afterthoughts’, Asia Pacific Economic Papers, No. 362, Canberra, The Australian National University and; Dee, Moreen. 2006. Friendship and co-operation: the 1976 Basic Treaty between Australia and Japan, Canberra, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Commonwealth of Australia. 498 Walker, K.E. and Jacobs, D.H. 1979. The Australia-Japan relationship: a statistical review, Sydney, Australia- Japan Economic Institute, p. 11
90 policy insiders or policy outsiders in Chapter 7 of this thesis. The period leading up to and immediately following the Treaty’s signing are both considered in this case study, as both are important in establishing the policy environment in which the Treaty was established and implemented, as well as the policy sub-systems within which the Treaty is situated.
This case study is an example of foreign policy making when the politics and policy streams act in concert. The decision to negotiate with Japan and the political narrative surrounding the decision play out in tandem with the bureaucratic processes in the policy stream. These three areas work in unison as a result of the very strong connection between the Minister for Trade, John McEwen, and John Crawford as the Secretary of the Department of Trade. Unlike in the following case studies, this chapter demonstrates policy making occurring within two streams in almost equal part. Whilst the problem stream brings in non-state domestic policy actors both for and against the Treaty, their role was limited. That said, both the politics and policy streams do engage with many of these non-state domestic actors in ways the more contemporary cases are unable to.
Unlike the case studies in the following two chapters, this case study has relied heavily on examination of historical documents and personal accounts of the period. Many of the archival records from that period were compiled by DFAT into a compendium covering the Treaty’s development, yet it is worth mentioning Walton’s observation from his own investigation into the period that, in general, the documents from the period are difficult to locate and are scattered across the Australian National Archives (ANA).499 Further, the scarcity of surviving key actors from the makes interviewing impossible and, as such, this case study has pieced together the positions of key actors from their memoirs and various biographical resources. That said, the researcher conducted a search of the relevant archival materials at the ANA and conducted two interviews with former Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, who although was not a member of the cabinet during the negotiations, knew the key political and some of the bureaucratic actors. It is also worth noting that unlike the other contemporary cases studies, the passage of time since the conclusion of the Treaty means that many documents previously classified have been released, offering insights into the political (including within the Cabinet) and bureaucratic thinking that are simply not possible to examine in more current foreign policy issues.
499 Walton, David. 2012. Australia, Japan and Southeast Asia: Early Post-War Initiatives in Regional Diplomacy, New York, Nova Science Publishers Inc., p. 2
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The Policy Sub-System
This case study is situated predominantly in the Australia-Japan policy sub-system, which is a section of Australia’s broader foreign policy space and focused on the Australia-Japan bilateral relationship. A policy sub-system focused on a bilateral relationship is always complex, but it is particularly so in this case. The post-WII security issues that Australia confronted with respect to Japan were not typical of most bilateral relationships at that time or, indeed, in the decades that followed. The Peace Treaty codifying peace with Japan and the emerging dynamics of the Cold War heavily influenced Australia’s relationship with its recent wartime enemy. The Peace Treaty would in many ways direct and restrict the policy choices available to the Menzies Government, particularly in terms of assigning MFN and considering Japan as a part of the Western alliance against the Soviet Union. Consequently, this section of the case study will give a broad overview of the policy sub-system, examining the history of the relationship leading-up to the 1950s. Understanding the historic context of the Australia-Japan policy sub-system helps to identify the key elements that help structure the relationship in the period under investigation – particularly in understanding both government and community consternation in dealing with Japan. Without an appreciation of how the policy sub-system developed over time, it is very hard to appreciate the nuances of the relationship during the 1950s.
There is a second policy sub-system relevant to this particular case study: that relating to emerging global trade regime, including under the GATT, and the linkages to domestic economic development. As such, it is important to examine this particular, albeit broad, sub-system. Key policy decisions made in the broader trade and export policy sub-system restricted the policy options available to the policy makers negotiating the Treaty. The domestic economic settings also flow into this policy sub-system as, ultimately, the Treaty needed to deliver domestic economic benefits for it to be electorally palatable.
Embedded within both of these sub-systems of course is the Treaty itself, a remarkable document considering the period during which it was produced. The Treaty is the result of the policy work conducted within these two policy sub-systems and lays out the obligations entered into by Australia and Japan in establishing their post-War trading regime. Noticeably, there is an obligation placed in Part A of the Treaty on Japan to afford Australian imports MFN status, with further preferential arrangements for Australian agricultural products.500 But there is no reciprocal obligation placed on Australia, creating an imbalance in the trade relationship. The Treaty ultimately formed the basis from which the Australia-Japan bilateral relationship grew throughout the 1960s and 1970s, culminating in the Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (the Nara Treaty), signed in 1976.501
Australia-Japan Policy Sub-System
500 See text of the Treaty available at:
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The Australia-Japan relationship forms the major policy sub-system in which negotiation of the Treaty took place. The sub-system is complex, having evolved through decades of Australian suspicion towards and fear of Japan, the international political situation of the 1950s and, the impacts of WWII. Furthermore, Australian politics were still firmly ensconced within the White Australia Policy during the 1950s which when combined with a historic fear of Japan, the pressures of the Cold War and a still uncertain post-WII settlement, created a complicated bilateral relationship in the years directly after the WWII. It is outside the scope of this study to provide a detailed historical account of the bilateral relationship. There are, however, several factors critical to understanding this policy sub-system – race, WWII, the Peace Treaty with Japan, and the Cold War.
Race had long dominated Australian views on Japan, particularly after Tokyo’s victory over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, as it highlighted the growing strength of Japan and amplified existing Australian concerns of isolation from Britain.502 The Japanese victory gave much political oxygen to the then-Prime Minister Alfred Deakin’s long-standing view that Australia needed a naval force of its own, in addition to the Royal Navy forces in the Pacific.503 The Anglo-Japanese Alliance that followed soon after the Japanese victory did little to quell Australian concerns about Tokyo’s ambitions in the Pacific region. When the Alliance was renewed for a third time in 1911, Australia expressed concerns about Japanese desire for MFN treatment of its citizens as migrants within the British Empire; a problem for the Australian Government under the White Australia Policy.504 But geostrategic realities won, with Australia finally accepting the Alliance after a systematic assessment of Imperial defences concluded that Japan posed the only real threat to the Dominions in the Pacific.505
Despite these concerns, the Alliance ensured Japan was on the side of the British Empire during WWI.506 However, during the Paris Peace Conference following armistice, racist attitude towards Japan and fear of Tokyo’s expansion dominated the Australian delegation’s engagement at Versailles. These sentiments were expressed most vociferously by then-Prime Minister Billy Hughes, who, like Deakin, had had his suspicions of the Japanese confirmed by their victory over the Russians.507 During the peace talks, Hughes would push for limiting Japanese control over territories Tokyo captured from Germany, blocking a racial non-discrimination clause in the preamble of the League of Nations proposed by Tokyo and, finally, restricting the right of entry of Japanese citizens into Australia.508 On this last point, Hughes was particularly strident, exclaiming “Australia would fight to the last ditch rather
502 Grey, Jeffrey. 2001. The Australian Army, South Melbourne, Oxford University Press, p. 13 503 McKernan and Browne, 1988, op. cit., p. 132 504 Shimazu, 1998, op. cit., p. 128. See also Nish, I.H. 1963. ‘Australia and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1901- 1911, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 9, No. 2. 505 Ibid. p. 128 506 Fraser and Roberts, 2014, op. cit., p. 36 507 Shimazu, Naoko. 1998. Japan, Race and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919, op. cit., p. 128 508 See Lake and Reynolds, 2008, op. cit.
93 than allow Japanese to enter Australia”.509 The Japanese were unimpressed by Australia’s position. The end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as a result of post-WWI naval capability negotiations would further strain Empire-Japan relations.510
The entry in WWII of Japan on the side of the axis powers confirmed the fears of Australia’s defence planners – the Australian mainland was, for the first time, threatened from the north. The relationship between Australia and Japan during the WWII and the impact that this had on Australia has been well documented.511 But the point should be made that Japan’s actions during WWII were a significant influence on the Menzies Government’s views – and Australians more broadly – towards post-WWII Japan.512
The years following WWII have a direct bearing on how and why the Treaty came to be a foreign policy objective of the Menzies Government. The development of the Treaty is explicitly linked to the signing of the Peace Treaty in 1952, which ‘was a signal to countries like Australia that equality of treatment for Japan in trade matters was well and truly on the international agenda’.513 Leading up to the Peace Treaty, Dr H.V. Evatt, Australia’s foreign minister in the Chiefly Government, had pursued a foreign policy based on three key tenets – a strong security arrangement with the US, a permanently disarmed Japan and a significant say in the post-War settlement, especially with respect to Japan.514 Despite the election of the Menzies Government in December 1949, much of Evatt’s foreign policy agenda was continued, albeit with a greater focus on building linkages with the US. A suitable peace with Japan that enabled it to play a role in America’s Cold War ambitions would form a key part of establishing the linkages desired in Canberra with Washington.
In the March of 1950, Percy Spender, External Affairs Minister during the negotiations over the Japanese Peace Treaty, presented a ‘Statement of Foreign Policy’ to the Parliament, encapsulating much of Evatt’s earlier sentiment:
‘A satisfactory solution of the Japanese problem is of the highest importance to Australia. We have to make up our minds whether we are going to support a policy of holding the Japanese people down permanently or indefinitely, or whether we
509 Louis, Roger. 1966. ‘Australia and the German Colonies in the Pacific, 1914-1919’, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 38, No. 4, p. 412 510 Fraser and Roberts, 2014 ¸ op. cit., pp. 55-58 511 For an overview of Australia and Japan during the war period see articles at the Australia-Japan Research Project
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are going to allow them under the necessary and essential safeguards to resume a place as an industrial nation’.515
Spender’s comments highlight the foreign policy dilemma faced by the Menzies Government. On the one hand, there was a need to incorporate Japan into the community of nations, ensure its prosperity and position Australia to benefit from a resurgent Japanese economy. On the other, there was a deep- seated suspicion of providing Japan too much latitude to re-arm. As Menzies himself wrote, the war with Japan and the ‘atrocious methods of the enemy, had produced much bitterness in Australia’.516 Nonetheless, the statement encapsulates the Menzies Government’s attitude towards the Japanese in years leading-up to the Treaty.
In opposition, Menzies had argued the Peace Treaty should wait until democracy was established in Japan, but by mid-1950, he had moved closer to the US position of wanting a prompt treaty.517 Spender would stress the need to ‘allow Japan to become economically viable but which would at the same time contain proper safeguards against any recurrence of Japanese aggression’.518 Spender understood that for Japan to become a peaceful member of the international community and assuage domestic fears in Australia of rearmament, Tokyo must be allowed to rebuild its economy within a reasonable timeframe.
The Peace Treaty was also pivotal in the development of the ANZUS Treaty and, indeed, the latter was central to getting Australia to agree to the terms at San Francisco.519 Canberra’s desire to secure a guarantee to defend Australia was in large part devoted to mitigating a future where ‘Japanese militarism might revive and present a world threat’.520 There was also a second imperative that ANZUS would address – the Communist threat. As Menzies wrote, whilst the threat of revived Japanese militarism in the future was real, the more immediate danger was an aggressive Communist China ‘whose possible avenues of advance pointed in the direction of Australia and New Zealand’.521 The Peace Treaty was pivotal in both the Menzies Government’s fight against Communism, but also the domestic political need to assure Australians had a great and powerful friend in the event of a resurgent militarism in Japan.
Domestic politics limited the options available to Menzies, with the Labor Opposition sceptical of the developing Peace Treaty’s ability to limit Japan’s re-arming. The Opposition under Evatt pushed for more restrictive conditions on Japan’s economic and military, following the line they had taken whilst in
515 Spender, Percy. 1972. Politics and a man, Sydney, Collins, p. 318 516 Menzies, Robert. 1967. Afternoon light: some memories of men and events, Melbourne, Cassell Australia, p. 49. See also Golding, Peter. 1996. Black Jack McEwen: political gladiator, Carlton (VIC), Melbourne University Press, p. 173. 517 Harper, 1987, op. cit., pp. 192-193 518 Spender, 1972, op. cit., p. 319 519 See Fraser and Roberts, 2014, op. cit., pp. 94-97 and; Harper, 1987, op. cit., p. 197. 520 Menzies, Robert. 1970. The measure of the years, London, Cassell, p. 50 521 Ibid., p. 50
95 government. 522 This view was politically popular and division within the Menzies Government developed over the issue. On the one hand, Spender pushed much the same argument as William Dulles, the chief American negotiator, who wished to avoid the mistakes of Versailles in 1919 and ensure that the ‘peace terms should be such as the Japanese, a proud people, could accept with dignity’.523 On the other hand, Menzies was under pressure from his own party to finalise a treaty the Australian people would find acceptable.
Fortunately for Menzies, fear of rising Communist power in the region added impetus to finalising the peace. The Peace Treaty was seen as a key mechanism for keeping the Japanese out of the Comintern.524 It was thought that should Japan prosper from becoming an active trading member of the community of free nations, the temptation to align with the Soviet sphere and become a potential aggressor would be diminished.525 The Menzies Government would echo the policy of the US, arguing that ‘Japan would fill a vacuum as a bulwark against communism, whether from the U.S.S.R., China or other parts of Asia’.526 There was a need to chart a new course for Tokyo ‘between the two dangers of an aggressive and fully-armed Japan which could threaten Australia as before and that of a defenceless and economically prostrate Japan, falling an easy prey to Communism’.527 This played well to Menzies tactic of playing up anti-Communist foreign policy to both his party and the electorate.528 In the end, the Menzies Cabinet decided to pursue a relationship with Japan that would:
‘…be guided by the principle of allowing Japan, through co-operation with non- communist nations, to have reasonable facilities for taking a part in her own defence, for meeting her economic difficulties by expanding her export trade, and for developing her political and economic life and institutions in a way that will strengthen Japan's association with the West.’529
Australia’s obligations under the Peace Treaty with Japan obliged it to afford MFN status.530 The political problem to overcome, therefore, was how to maintain the inconsistency of protective policies that actively discriminated against Japanese products whilst simultaneously, relying on Japan as a significant export market531 This issue would become a dominant theme as the negotiations over the 1957 trade treaty intensified in the mid-1950s.
522 Menzies, 1967, op. cit., p. 267 and; Spender, 1972, op. cit., pp. 265-266. 523 Spender, 1972, op. cit., p. 266 524 Menzies, 1970, op. cit., p. 49 525 Ibid., p. 49 526 Stargardt, A. Wolfgang. 1977. Australia’s Asian policies: the history of a debate, Hamburg, Institute of Asian Affairs in Hamburg, p. 219 527 Ibid., p. 220 528 Woodard, Garry. 2000. ‘Ministers and Mandarins: the Relationship between Ministers and Secretaries of External Affairs 1935-1970’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 1, p. 87 529 Decision 53 (PM) of Prime Minister’s Committee of Cabinet, 17 August 1954, [AA: A4960/XMI, VOLUME 1] 530 Specifically, Article 12, Clause C of the Peace Treaty. See Crawford, John. 1968. Australian Trade Policy 1942-1966: A Documentary History, Canberra, Australian National University Press, p. 351. 531 Golding, 1996, op. cit., p. 173
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Japan too had a political imperative for improving relations with Australia. The Japanese Government saw Australia as a potentially important trade partner; one that had enough clout to influence the attitudes of other nations towards expanding their trade with Japan. 532 This was of particular importance for the Japanese in achieving recognition under the GATT and, indeed, links the policy sub- system around the GATT to this particular case. As Crawford opined:
[It] ‘would be quite wrong…to argue that the international political argument alone accounted for the decision to negotiate a trade treaty although it gave powerful support. The economic basis for a treaty was strong and, in the long run, sufficient cause for a treaty.’533
The economic imperative for the Treaty probably existed irrespective of geopolitical considerations. Consequently, a second policy sub-system, the post-War trade policy sub-system, is highly relevant in explaining how the Treaty was made.
Post-War Trade Policy Sub-System
The economic basis for signing a trade treaty with Japan was also strong.534 Starting late in the 1940s, the international opinion regarding trade was for further liberalisation of commerce between nations rather than an increase in protective tariffs.535 The opportunities of a significant Japanese economic revival, the evolving international trading regime codified by the GATT, and a changing trade relationship with Britain, were all significant elements of the broader post-War trade policy sub-system and the major impetus for establishing a trading framework with Japan.
Firstly, the post-War boom in the Japanese economy found its initial impetus in a desire by the US to make Japan the ‘workshop of East Asia’.536 As discussed, the development of Japan as a viable and successful capitalist economy was a hedging manoeuvre against Communism gaining a foothold in a country still suffering the consequences of wartime defeat. Key to achieving this was the cementing of democracy and its associated institutions in Japan; a task that was seen to be only achievable through the reintroduction of Japan into world economy or, as Harper put it, by creating an economic environment where ‘Japan can find a job’.537 The complementary nature of the Japanese and Australian economies meant that Australia could supply the resources to fuel Japan’s expanding industrial base, complementing Australia’s post-WWII era trade ethos of ‘Export or Expire’.538
The Menzies Government believed that if it was possible to manage Japan’s peaceful rise as a Pacific power, there would be a significant opportunity for Australia to provide the raw material needed to fuel
532 Crawford, 1968, op. cit., p. 353 533 Ibid., p. 352 534 Ibid., p. 394 535 Rix, 1984, op. cit., p. 1 536 Harper, Norman. 1955. ‘The Kyoto conference, 1954’, Australian Outlook, Vol. 9, No. 3, p.139 537 Ibid., p. 151 538 D.M.I. 1957. ‘The foreign trade policy of Japan’, Australian Outlook, Vol. 11, No. 1, p. 54
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Japan’s industrial expansion.539 Australia was well placed to provide these materials and develop a competitive position in the Japanese market vis-à-vis other providers of natural resources.540 For growth with Japan to continue and return to pre-war trading levels, the discriminatory import polices levied against Japanese imports required significant amendment. This required a new inter-governmental framework as Australian trade with Japan had recommenced after WWII without such an arrangement.541
Occurring concurrently were the international negotiations concerning the GATT. During much of the negotiations, Australia resisted US efforts to allow Japan entry into the GATT, which was ultimately signed in 1947 by the Chiefly Government. While Australia was not a significant force in shaping the overall agreement, its negotiators had some influence in terms of achieving favourable outcomes in areas such as Imperial preferences, tariff application and promotion of development for commodities- based economies.542 Despite no significant public outcry when signing-up to the GATT, discord had started to take political shape in the late 1940s, notably amongst the ranks of the Coalition Opposition. The initial four years of the post-WWII Menzies Government saw anti-GATT forces maintain the upper hand, so much so that:
‘Menzies’ scepticism of the GATT and his own hankering after closer relations with Britain…[and] added pressure by certain industry groups…led to various attempts by Australia to weasel out of its GATT commitments and culminated in a futile bid to renew and strengthen the imperial preferential system.’543
However, by the mid-1950s, Menzies became more comfortable with the increasingly likely multilateral trading arrangement.544 Menzies’ transition was evident during the GATT Review of 1954-55, where Australia actively sought a relaxation of the no-new-preference rule, flexibility to make changes to Australia’s tariffs and improvements to combat agricultural protectionism. 545 Menzies announced Australia’s participation in the review as he had been ‘far from satisfied with the operation to date’ and whilst his government had considered withdrawing, he had concluded “we cannot do better if we alone are outside [the] GATT than if we are inside it…[i]n fact, it does seem possible that we might do worse”.546 The delegation’s success was ultimately mixed, but its vigorous prosecution of Australia’s case indicated a willingness to engage on trade matters in a multilateral context – for the first time outside of the British preferential system. And whilst agreeing to the terms of the GATT framed the
539 Menzies, 1970, op. cit., p. 61 540 Crawford, 1968, op. cit., p. 352 541 Australia was part of an arrangement between the Sterling Area as a whole and Japan in the post-War period. See Drysdale, Peter. 1965. ‘Japanese-Australia trade’, in Papers on Modern Japan, Canberra, Australian National University, p. 90 542 Capling, Ann. 2001. Australia and the Global Trade System: From Havana to Seattle, Melbourne, Cambridge University Press, pp. 34-35 543 Ibid. pp. 63-64 544 Ibid. pp. 36-37 545 Ibid. p. 47 546 Quoted in Crawford, 1968, op. cit., p. 148.
98 trading rules of the game, the diplomatic efforts expended by Australia during its negotiations were indicative of ‘a far more ambitious and constructive trade policy agenda’ than in the past.547
In the context of the GATT and the growing Australia-Japan trade relationship, the issue of trade imbalance came to a head in May 1953 when the newly appointed ambassador to Australia, Haruhiko Nishi, lodged a formal complaint regarding the trading arrangements between the two nations.548 The note verbale highlights that the balance of trade was increasingly in Australia’s favour and expressed the Japanese Government’s desire to commence informal trade talks with a view to liberalising trade between the two nations.549 There were also fears on the Australian side that Japan would look to Australia’s trade competitors, particularly for the provision of wool, if the trade imbalance and discriminatory trade practices against Japanese imports were to continue.550
Whilst minor changes to import licensing arrangements ensued as a result of this complaint, discussions around a new economic framework did not begin in earnest until 1955. Those at the negotiating table needed to contend with firmly ensconced suspicions of trading with Japan in many sections of the Australian business community. Australian manufacturers were particularly concerned about the impacts granting MFN status to Japan would have on their businesses, particularly as they enjoyed significant tariff protection. Australia’s tariffs had long discriminated against Japanese exports, with the dual purpose of protecting local industry from cheap products and maintaining ‘the British competitive position in the Australian market’.551
This tradition began to manifest in the 1930s where fear amongst Australia’s manufacturers of a flood of ‘cheap, sweated labour’ imports from Japan under favourable tariffs placed political pressure on the government to oppose the opening up of trade.552 The discrimination in favour of British products was achieved by providing preferential rates in the tariff on British goods, with Britain providing Australia its biggest market for foodstuffs and fibre in return.553 As Stewart notes, however, Australian governments have traditionally followed rather than set trade patterns and practices and the drift towards a trading future with Asia and the US and away from Britain reflects the shift away from Asia and the Pacific by Britain rather than an explicit and independent policy initiative of Australia. 554 Much of Stewart’s observation was true with the early GATT negotiations as well.
Changes to Australia’s traditional trading markets were also an influence on government decision making. By the time the Menzies Government was considering opening trade negotiations with Japan, Australia’s traditional export market, Britain, was refocusing its trade towards Europe. As a signatory
547 Capling, 2001, op. cit., p. 64 548 Golding, 1996, op. cit., p. 490 549 Note Verbale from Japanese Foreign Ministry, 12 May, 1953, [AA : A609/1, 555/120/4, i]. See also Note Verbale from Japanese Foreign Ministry, 21 November, 1952, [AA: CP553/1/1, 194/B/10/35]. 550 Capling, 2001, op. cit., p. 61 551 Rix, 1984, op. cit., p. 1 552 Ibid., pp. 1-2 and; Crawford, 1968, op. cit., p. 351. 553 Stewart, 1995, op. cit., p. 186 554 Ibid., p. 192
99 to the Ottawa Agreement, Australia’s trade policy had traditionally been geared to preference Imperial trade.555 Increasingly, growth in trade between Australia and Britain was not occurring at a rate best suited to Australia’s needs and the British Government was ‘looking eagerly in the direction of the Common Market as a means of ensuring her own trade development’.556
Adding to the decline in British trade growth, by 1956 Japan was already Australia’s second largest market for exports and, importantly, the second largest purchaser of wool.557 Furthermore, not long after trade recommenced in 1947, Australia developed a favourable balance of trade with Japan, a situation that had been noted by the Japanese and one that became further entrenched by the time Treaty negotiations commenced.558 Yet despite these developments, trade between the two nations still had not returned to pre-WWII levels.559
Domestically, economic policy was increasingly being dominated by what was to become known as “McEwenism”, described by Capling and Galligan as ‘Australian protectionism writ large’. 560 McEwenism was seen as the state working in concert with ‘powerful sectors of capital’, the protectionist unions and an electorate with widespread protectionist sentiment.561 This reflected McEwen’s view that Australia’s national security would be enhanced by the expansion of jobs ‘generated by expanding manufacturing industry behind tariff walls’.562 McEwen needed the support of the manufacturing industry as the Country Party’s rural electoral base was in decline, so this protectionist position allowed him to ‘placate his rural constituency yet also emerge as the champion of urban manufacturing interests’.563 The link between this political imperative and the potential impact on manufacturing of a liberalised trade agreement with Japan should not be understated – any treaty needed to consider impacts on manufacturing to be politically palatable.
The policy sub-system around the post-WWII trading environment was complex, and whilst not a comprehensive review of the sub-system, this section has shown that Australia’s initial reluctance to embrace multilateral trading regimes, inclination to continue Imperial preferential trade and active discrimination of Japanese imports had all come under considerable pressure by the 1950s. Much of this would culminate in Australia’s acceptance of the GATT and its willingness (albeit reluctantly) to engage within it. Equally, it would culminate in the conclusion of the Treaty with Japan, which Capling described in 2001 as ‘Australia’s most important bilateral agreement since 1932’.564
555 Rix, 1984, op. cit., p. 1 556 Menzies, 1970, op. cit., p. 62; Golding, 1996, op. cit., p. 174 and; Crawford, 1968, op. cit., p. 352. 557 Drysdale, 1965, op. cit., p. 90 558 Golding, 1996, op. cit., p. 173; D.M.I., 1957, op. cit., p. 458 and; Harper, 1955, op. cit., p. 459. 559 Drysdale, 1965, op. cit., p. 89 560 Capling, Ann and Galligan, Brian. 1992. Beyond the protective state: the political economy of Australia’s manufacturing industry policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 102 561 Bell, Stephen. 1993. Australia manufacturing and the state: the politics of industry policy in the post-War era, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 33 562 Capling and Galligan, 1992, op. cit., p. 102 563 Bell, 1993, op. cit., p. 31 564 Capling, 2001, op. cit., p. 61. Free trade agreements with China and Japan may have now surpassed the Treaty in importance.
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Variables
It is not possible to provide an exhaustive list of variables in a single chapter; however, what follows captures the most important contributors to each of the four variables used in the framework structuring this case study and outlined in Chapter 3. Firstly, the major biophysical and material condition was the fact that there was an imperative to liberalise trade on account of the complementarity of the Australian and Japanese economies. As mentioned above, Japan needed resources to fuel the rebuilding of its industrial base and Australia had ample sources of coal, ferrous and non-ferrous minerals, not to mention wool and other agricultural products. The pressure on Australia to sell its goods, particularly with Britain declining as a customer, was strong.
Second, the attributes of the community variable is important in this case study as both the Australian public and certain areas of the business community were hesitant – if not vehemently opposed – to normalising trade relations with Japan. Crawford notes that the decision to engage with Japan on trade followed ‘what would now be called “agonising appraisal” in anticipation of hostile public opinion’.565 As mentioned above, WWII had caused much hesitation within the Menzies Government about the resumption of ordinary relations with Japan for fear of a public backlash. In the end, Crawford points out that the Treaty ‘aroused an even more bitter protest from manufacturers than had been expected’, but that ‘the general public demur was far less than expected’ despite the bitterness from WWII.566 However, public sentiment on development of the commerce Treaty was never far from the minds of political policy actors, and is captured in a letter to Menzies from a concerned constituent:
‘I am reluctant, personally, to see my country have any trade with Japan. Japan's rulers have not changed; Japan is ruled by the same gang, her industries owned by the same industrialists, who made war on this country and its allies only seven years ago. Her war criminals have in many cases been given their freedom. Her war potential is to be increased. It may be only another seven years, or less, before the capacity of Japan to make war, built up partially on Australian money, is sufficient for her unrepentant rulers to attempt invasion of this country once more...I shall boycott all Japanese and German-manufactured goods whenever I can buy goods manufactured elsewhere, and I shall urge everyone I know to do likewise.’567
The rules-in-use variable is important to this case, particularly in the context of the GATT. As Crawford notes in his review of the period, countries that signed-up to the GATT agreed to the ‘general aims of full employment and growing volume of real income and expansions of the production and exchange of goods’.568 In order to achieve this, each nation agreed to grant the other MFN treatment with respect to the goods they exported and imported as well as to discuss reducing tariffs and ending preferential
565 Crawford, 1968, op. cit., p. 351 566 Ibid., p. 351 567 Letter from Norma Williams to Menzies, 3 November 1951, [AA: A463/17,56/984] 568 Crawford, 1968, op. cit.,p. 128
101 arrangements.569 In Australia’s case, this did not automatically mean Imperial preference had to be eliminated as the GATT allowed existing preferential and customs arrangements to be kept in place. What it did mean, however, was that Australia had to agree to all of these conditions with respect to Japan and, as outlined in the view of the two relevant policy sub-systems above, the Chiefly and Menzies Governments were reluctant to do this. Indeed Australia had not done so despite being required to under the terms of Article XII of the Peace Treaty. Nonetheless, the binding nature of these rules codified by the GATT and expanded upon in the later Havana Charter, were considerable rules limiting the policy options to Australia’s trade negotiators.570
The final variable, external shocks, is not particularly relevant to this case study. However, as noted above, the growing Communist threat, the retreat of the British from Asia and the breakdown of Imperial preferential trade in the years after WWII were, whilst not by definition external shocks, significant changes to the international environment that influenced Australia’s trade policy.
Action Arena
The action arena brings together a number of conceptual elements required to make policy. It also focuses attention on discrete action situations. In this particular case, the action arena allows investigation of a set of participants, the positions they fill, the actions they are permitted to undertake, and the information to which they have access in a given action situation. The action situation under investigation in this case study is the activity stemming from the initial decision to normalise trade relations with Japan and the negotiations that culminate with the signing of the Treaty in 1957. The following outlines these conceptual elements by examining the politics, policy and problems streams of policy making activity.
Politics Stream
The politics stream is significant in this case study. Menzies’ strong influence over his government and McEwen’s influential voice for trade expansion meant political actors operating within this stream had a significant bearing on activity in the policy and problems stream. Further, these two men led a national narrative around why the trade relationship with Japan should be normalised, and it is through control of this narrative that both Menzies and, in particular, McEwen, stamped their authority on the policy making process that led to the Treaty.
In this stream we can see a number of deep core beliefs and policy core beliefs that guide the actions of actors, and impact the ability of actors in the policy and problem streams to engage. These are outlined in Table 4.1.
569 Ibid., p. 128 570 Crawford and Capling are both authoritative sources for investigating the rules that came about through Australia’s accession to the GATT. See Crawford, 1968, op. cit. and; Capling, 2001, op. cit.
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Table 4.1 – Deep Core Beliefs and Policy Core Beliefs
Belief Actor Preference for trade Menzies, McEwen, Casey, Deep Core Belief members of Menzies Cabinet Preference for protection Members of Menzies Cabinet Preference for opening trade McEwen, Casey, members of with Japan Menzies Cabinet Preference for Imperial trade Menzies, members of Menzies Policy Core Belief Cabinet Support for embracing post- Menzies, McEwen, Casey War Japan Suspicious of post-War Japan Menzies (at least initially), members of Menzies Cabinet
Prime Minister Robert Menzies
Prime Minister Menzies was a significant policy actor in the politics stream. Specifically, he undertook three main policy making roles:
• contributing to the political narrative around why Australia should sign a trade agreement with Japan; • selling the economic imperative for the Treaty to the Australian public; and • getting the Treaty over the line with high-level advocacy of senior Japanese politicians.
Firstly, it is important to understand how Menzies conceptualised the Treaty and its role in executing Australia’s foreign policy objectives. Unlike McEwen, who by and large supported the Treaty from its genesis, Menzies required more convincing of its merits. In recalling the period, Menzies himself noted that his government wanted to be on good terms with Japan and bring Tokyo into the community of nations so ‘that it would have its self-respect and be a co-operative partner with full opportunities to develop and sustain its economy’.571 The broader geo-strategic element of cementing trading relations with Japan was an important factor in how Menzies viewed the potential benefits of increased trade with Tokyo. In a 1954 meeting of the Prime Minister’s Committee of Cabinet, he noted that by encouraging trade with Japan by Western nations, Australia and its allies would be better able to prevent both communist and nationalist forces from surfacing in Japan’s fragile democratic political system.572
571 Menzies, 1970, op. cit., p. 61. Menzies believed his government achieved this, describing it ‘as one of the outstanding successes of my Government’. 572 Minute 2 (PM) of Prime Minister’s Committee of Cabinet, 17 August 1954, [AA: A4906/XMI, VOLUME 1]. This minute includes greater details of the potential for Japan to be swayed into the Communist orbit, particularly with respect to China, as well as the outstanding war crimes, Papua New Guinea war graves and
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The link between trade and Japan’s role as a future friend of the West were part of the genesis of Menzies’ feelings towards a formal trade agreement.573
Importantly, it was not only the broader foreign policy considerations that influenced Menzies. Indeed from the very beginning of Menzies’ public advocacy when he made a public press statement announcing negotiations had commenced, he canvassed the potential economic gains for both nations – “for some time the Government has been giving careful consideration to the question of our trading relations with Japan, and the proposed talks should be of benefit to both countries”.574 Menzies believed that allowing Japan to develop peacefully through trade was the best mechanism against Tokyo’s re-armament, fitting into his broader belief that fair international commodity and trading arrangements was the only way for the establishment of an ‘enduring basis of peace in the world’.575 Menzies further believed that countries increasing their trade capacity through aid ‘must be provided with markets for their products at prices which will enable them to develop their capital resources and living standards’.576 This was an advancement of his earlier position during the negotiations of the Peace Treaty, where he was much less comfortable with allowing Japan to regain its industrial strength, let alone Australia providing aid to facilitate such a transition. Yet by the time his cabinet came to consider codifying trade with Japan, Menzies position had softened, with the link to potential economic benefits for Australia clear in his thinking.577 The prime minister would also highlight to the Australian people the domestic economic elements of the proposed Treaty. As early as 1953, Menzies publically acknowledged that the bilateral trade balance was tilted so far towards Australia that it ‘simply cannot go on’.578
Menzies would play an important role towards the end of the negotiations when he met with Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke during a visit to Japan. Kishi would push Menzies on a number of outstanding issues, particularly wheat and wool, and asked him to ‘try and simplify the matter’.579 In reply, Menzies noted the political difficulties that both countries faced, particularly Australia with its federal system, but noted that:
“It is very difficult and perhaps undesirable for me to go into any detail, because I am not personally taking part [in the negotiations]. The negotiations are going on
prisoner of war issues still confronting the Menzies Government leading up to the commencement of trade negotiations. 573 Submission 484 to Cabinet by Menzies, 19 July 1955, [AA: A462/20, 602/2, iv]. See section on the Australia- Japan policy sub-system above for further discussion of this point. 574 Press Statement By Menzies, 17 November 1954, [AA: A609/1, 555/120/14] 575 Menzies, 1967, op. cit. p. 148 576 Menzies, 1970, op. cit., p. 47. 577 Press Statement By Menzies, 17 November 1954, [AA: A609/1, 555/120/14] 578 Extract from Broadcast by Menzies, 16 September 1953, [AA: A571/158, 46/1931, xix] and Extract from Broadcast by Menzies, 17 March 1954, [AA: A1838/278, 3103/10/2, iii] 579 Record of Conversation between Kishi and Menzies [1], Tokyo, 12 April 1957, [AA: A1838/283, 3103/10/11/2/1, ii]
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in Canberra just now, and I do not want to say anything to interfere with the success of the talks.”580
Menzies would not be drawn on the specifics of the negotiations, but undertook to discuss Kishi’s concerns with McEwen upon his return to Australia. Whilst Menzies was happy to engage on the broad elements of the Treaty, most detail, and indeed expertise, resided with McEwen. As then Ambassador Watt wrote on Menzies’ visit to Japan, any notion that the prime minister would leave Tokyo with a new understanding of the Japanese people and a greater appreciation for the economic opportunities greater trade would bring was ‘illusionary, then, or in the future.’581 Nonetheless, Menzies high-level advocacy, sale of the economic imperative for the Treaty, and in his role in the political narrative surrounding the Treaty were all pivotal in getting accepted by both his cabinet and the Australian community.
Minister for Trade John McEwen
Much of the hard and detailed work behind the Treaty was performed, driven and directed by McEwen.582 In his own reflection on the issue, Menzies notes that McEwen was the driver of the Treaty, although in close consultation and with the backing of other colleagues.583 This is in part due to the role and influence of McEwen in the Menzies Cabinet, which was significant and deeply influenced Australia’s trade settings. The dominance of McEwen cannot be overestimated, with the minister and his Department of Trade (DoT) dominating policy making towards Japan, leading to the perception that other branches of government, notably the Department of External Affairs (DEA) and its minister, Richard Casey, took passive roles during the period in the Japan policy sub-system.584
Underpinning much of McEwen’s position toward Japan was his keen understanding of the realpolitik associated with the GATT as an instrument of global politics.585 This view also meant that McEwen, unlike Menzies, was not willing to undermine Australian economic interests for those of Britain. 586 McEwen never had the same sentimental attachment to Britain that Menzies had as prime minister.587 McEwen knew that Australia’s future could be secured through global trade and that Australian industry
580 Ibid. 581 Watt, 1972, op. cit., p. 262 582 Stewart, 1995, op. cit., p. 192 583 Menzies, 1970, op. cit., p. 61 584 Walton, 2012, op. cit., p. 1 refers to McEwen’s ‘legendary ferocity when protecting his interests’ as one of reasons he was so during the period. See also Golding, 1996, op. cit. 585 Stewart, 1995, op. cit., p. 200. McEwen’s view of the Treaty is captured in a record of conversation with an industry group in early 1957, see Record of Interview with Representatives of Rayon and Cotton Weaver’s Association, Melbourne, 5 March 1957, [NLA: Crawford Papers MS4514/9/33, Japan-Aust. Trade Negotiations 1956/57, Pt ii]. 586 Capling, Ann, Considine, Mark and Crozier, Michael. 1998. Australian politics in the global era, Melbourne, Addison Wesley Longman, p. 29. This was further verified by Malcolm Fraser to the researcher, who noted that Menzies nostalgia for Britain and desire to maintain British economic might was not shared by McEwen. 587 Fraser, interview with researcher, 7 May 2013. See also Cablegram from McEwen to Menzies, 26 June 1957, [AA: A1838/283, 759/1/7, vii].
105 and primary producers had to have a role carved out for them in any global arrangement.588 By linking the interests of producers to the national interest, ‘McEwenism’ brought manufacturers and miners under the protective umbrella of the state, a move that ultimately created ‘a powerful coalition of sectoral interests that helped keep the Coalition in power’.589 Whilst McEwen was aware of the potential for positive trade outcomes of the Treaty, the domestic political benefits of a growing economy, an expanding primary industries sector and diversifying industrial base were also clear to the minister, and became key rationales for pursing the negotiations with the Japanese.590 McEwen knew that it was important to keep domestic industry on side, noting Australia could protect its industries from cheap Japanese imports by enacting appropriate legislation and emergency powers that could be built into the Treaty.591 Such arguments were used by Crawford to convince McEwen of the need to grant MFN status to Japan, which McEwen in turn would use to convince Menzies.592
Thus, the Trade Minister can be seen to perform three roles in this case study:
• develop and advocate for a proposed trade framework with Japan, particularly within the Menzies Cabinet; • work with DoT to develop and negotiate the Treaty; and • contribute to the national narrative developed by Menzies.
In terms of the genesis of the Treaty with Japan, Golding suggests that it was a combination of Crawford and McEwen in formalising the initiative to enhance trade relations, with the former ‘carrying the idea and McEwen carrying the can’.593 Both believed that Japan had to be brought back in from the cold, although McEwen believed this for pragmatic trade reasons while Crawford believed ‘that without harmonious trade relations there could be no certainty of peace.’594 McEwen recalls in his memoirs that the idea to create a trade treaty with Japan started through discussions within DoT between himself, Crawford and Deputy Secretary, Alan Westerman.595 In his recollection, McEwen points out that the economic opportunities for increasing trade with Japan were obvious to both him and DoT:
‘I identified Japan as a country closer in its complementary economic relations, closer to the British likeness than any other. Here was a small island country, densely populated, highly industrialised and short of domestically produced food and raw materials. Japan needed imported raw materials to process for export so
588 Fraser, interview with researcher, 7 May 2013 589 Capling et al., 1998, op. cit., p. 29 590 McEwen, John. 1983. John McEwen: His Story, Melbourne, self-published, p. 53 591 Record of Interview with Representatives of Rayon and Cotton Weaver’s Association, Melbourne, 5 March 1957, [NLA: Crawford Papers MS4514/9/33, Japan-Aust. Trade Negotiations 1956/57, Pt ii] 592 Capling, 2001, op. cit., p. 62 593 Golding, 1996, op. cit., p. 173 594 Ibid., p. 174 595 McEwen, 1983, op. cit., p. 53
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that she could earn enough foreign exchange to pay her way in world trade. Australia could supply the products Japan needed.’596
As such, McEwen defined the Treaty as having two principal goals: persevering Australia’s existing stake in the Japanese market and, more importantly, to gain new opportunities in the growing Japanese economy. 597 These underpinning sentiments were contained in McEwen’s submission to cabinet outlining the Government’s objectives in negotiating a treaty with Japan. Four key benefits were outlined:
1. a fair opportunity for Australian products to enter Japan; 2. assurances on minimum quotas or exchange allocation on major Australian products; 3. appropriate tariff commitments; and 4. opportunity for prior consultation on Japanese acceptance of surplus US commodities.598
This submission outlines McEwen’s view on how important Japanese trade was to Australia, outlining the key industry sectors and their exposure to the Japanese market. He clearly states that only by giving Japanese assurance that improved Tokyo’s access to Australian markets, could Canberra realistically expect Japan to treat Australian exports favourably.599 McEwen also knew that if Australia was to continue to pursue a discriminatory trade policy against Japan, Tokyo may very well resort to restrictive trade practices in retaliation; a problematic scenario given Japan was already a key trade partner of Australia. Indeed at the time of the Treaty’s signing, McEwen stressed this point, stating:
‘If Australia were to continue discriminatory and unfair trade policies towards Japanese goods, especially in the light of such a heavy adverse trade balance as Japan is now running with Australia there would be constant risk of Japan resorting deliberately to restrictive trade practices and economic reprisals.’600
Australia was quickly becoming dependent on Japanese growth for its own economic advancement and could scarcely afford the impact of restrictive tariffs or quotas on Australian products, particularly wool. For McEwen, the opportunities inherent in pursuing a trade agreement with Japan were economic. Whilst his initial cabinet submission outlines the broader foreign policy considerations and potential impacts on British trade, they were subordinate concerns to increasing trade relations and market access.601 This complemented Menzies, whose contribution to the political narrative surrounding the negotiations highlighted both the strategic element of the deal in helping keep Tokyo on the side of the
596 McEwen, 1983, op. cit., p. 53 597 Quoted in Crawford, 1968, op. cit., p. 371. 598 Submission 174 to Cabinet by McEwen, 16 May 1956, [AA; A4926, Volume 8] 599 Ibid. 600 Quoted in Crawford, 1968, op. cit., p. 371. Australia’s trade surplus with Japan was a significant issue in trade relations between the two nations leading up to the Treaty’s singing. See Menzies, 1970, op. cit. p. 62 for further discussion on the implications of this trade imbalance. 601 Submission 174 to Cabinet by McEwen, 16 May 1956, [AA; A4926, Volume 8]
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West as well as the economic benefits. It is also a good example of policy making through networks, with McEwen utilising DoT to reinforce his policy position within the Cabinet
Former Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser recalled a particularly heated party room meeting in either late 1956 or early 1957 where, faced with a hostile backbench, McEwen ‘ripped into’ members who remained fervently against the Treaty.602 He stared them down, yelling at them that it would be they who must tell their constituents why their personal views of the Japanese had cost jobs and economic growth in their electorate. McEwen turned his opponent’s prejudices and electoral fears around on them, successfully arguing that irrespective of their views towards the Japanese, it would be suicide to oppose the Treaty on economic and thus electoral grounds. It is a popular belief that Menzies ruled his cabinet with an iron grip, but according to Fraser at least, McEwen’s temper and ‘art of not-so-gentle persuasion’ more often than not got the backbench behind his trade objectives. Fraser also felt that Menzies often let McEwen have a reasonably free reign on matters of trade – if it was successful, the government would share the glory, if it failed, enough rope had been given to McEwen to hang himself. Memories of ‘Pig Iron Bob’ were never far from the prime minister’s mind. McEwen therefore played an important role in getting both the Menzies Cabinet, but also the Coalition party room to fall-in behind the Treaty – a significant achievement given McEwen was virtually friendless when he started pushing for trade with Japan in the Cabinet.603
As negotiations drew to a conclusion, McEwen felt he had the general support of the Cabinet and it was he who would authorise Australian negotiators to conclude a deal.604 McEwen signed the Treaty in Japan and publically outlined the economic impact of the Treaty, ignoring any geo-political or foreign policy content.605 The trade minister’s role in this case study was ultimately much more involved than the prime minister’s, reflecting perhaps both men’s views on expanding trade into Asia and Japan, but also, McEwen’s excellent relationship with his policy boffins in DoT – expertise to which Menzies did not have a direct line of access.
Minister for External Affairs Richard Casey
The role of the Minister for External Affairs in this case study is not as significant as the two political actors outlined above. Indeed much of Casey’s work on the Treaty was conducted in the background, and as a contributor to the government’s overall objectives. Much of this has to do with perceptions of Casey amongst his colleagues. Despite Casey’s international reputation, he lacked credibility within the Menzies Cabinet606 Casey was also prone to making foreign policy gaffes that were often “patched up”
602 Fraser, interview with researcher, 7 May 2013 603 Golding, 1996, op. cit., p. 192 604 Letter from McEwen to Fadden, 14 June 1957, [AA: A1838/283, 759/1/7, vii] 605 Statement by McEwen, Tokyo, 6 July 1957, [NLA: Menzies Papers MS4936/21/440, Folder 18] 606 See Walton, 2012, op. cit., p. 13 and; Hasluck, Paul. 1997. The Chance of Politics, Melbourne, Text Publishing, pp. 86-87. Also Fraser, interview with researcher, 15 November 2013.
108 by officials from DoE.607 Nonetheless, Casey’s underpinning view of the international situation of the 1950s was influenced by both the Cold War and decolonisation.608 His approach to dealing with these issues was reliant on a ‘personal touch’, claiming that none of his key Cabinet colleagues had a key grasp of these issues and that his officials ‘were so pressed with day-to-day problems that they really had no time for basic thinking’.609
Yet his Cabinet colleagues had a different view, with Sir Paul Hasluck writing that ‘on foreign policy, during the time he was Minister for External Affairs, his influence on Cabinet decisions steadily declined because he was not good enough’.610 This included Casey’s influence over the development of the Treaty, resulting in him playing a secondary role to that of McEwen and Menzies despite his nominally senior Cabinet position.611 This is despite Casey having been given the permission of the Cabinet to resolve each outstanding issue with the Japanese after the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty in conjunction with the minister responsible for the policy area.612 Indeed Casey had some sympathies towards liberalising trade with Japan, noting Australia should treat Japan “in a more civilised way than in the past”.613
Casey was meant to have control of Australia’s overarching foreign policy, and this should have meant constructively working with McEwen to achieve a successful outcome to the Treaty negotiations – it did not. This is unsurprising given Casey’s tilt at the leadership in 1956 resulted in a humiliatingly large defeat in the party room – he failed to carry the Cabinet on every major foreign policy issue thereafter.614
This ineffectiveness transferred to DEA which became routinely over powered by other departments.615 Quite simply, Casey’s ability to advocate foreign policy amongst his Cabinet colleagues was poor and despite his attitude of ‘benign proprietorship’ over his departmental officers,616 his relationship with departmental secretary, Arthur Tange, was sometimes strained. Ordinarily this would have meant that his relationship with the prime minister was pivotal if his views were to carry weight within the Cabinet – prime ministerial support counts for much. Yet Casey’s and Menzies’ shared history of rivalry over the prime ministership and Casey’s decline in ministerial standing reinforced Menzies dominance over
607 Walton, 2012, op. cit., p. 13. The DEA also bemoaned Casey’s Cabinet performances, see Woodard, 2000, op. cit., p. 87. 608 Beaumont, Joan. 2003. Ministers, mandarins and diplomats: Australian foreign policy making, 1941-1969, Carlton (VIC), Melbourne University Publishing, p. 89 609 Ibid., p. 93 610 Hasluck, 1997, op. cit., p. 87 611 Verified by Fraser, interview with researcher, 15 November 2013. Furthermore, there is no mention of the Treaty in Casey’s diaries, with the only relevant entry to this case study being on the application of the GATT in 1959. See Casey, Richard and Millar, T.B. 1972. Australian foreign minister: diaries of R.G. Casey, 1951-60, London, Collins. 612 Menzies, 1970, op. cit., p. 61 613 Quoted in Hudson, W.J. 1986. Casey, Melbourne, Oxford University Press, p. 241 614 Ibid., pp. 226-227 615 Woodard, 2000, op. cit., p. 88 616 Hudson, 1986, op cit., p. 231
109 foreign policy making and Casey’s relative impotence.617 This is irrespective of Casey and Menzies sharing many similar views on the issue and, indeed, Casey did attempt to push the broader foreign policy considerations of engaging Japan through trade within the Cabinet, arguing:
‘We should therefore endeavour to avoid policies which are likely to encourage the growth of Communism or extreme nationalism in Japan. Instead, Australia should aim at encouraging a moderate Government, such as exists at present, and at helping to keep Japan in the Western camp.’618
However, Casey’s lack of influence within the Cabinet grew as the 1950s progressed, particularly vis- à-vis McEwen. This meant that control over the Treaty sat largely with DoT, rather than with DEA where it might otherwise have been if the Cabinet dynamics were reversed. So whilst for Menzies and Casey, the Treaty had a distinctive broader foreign policy aim as elucidated above, the underpinning trade and economic imperatives championed by McEwen became the more powerful element of the political narrative surrounding it and the focus of much of the policy making in the politics stream.
The Menzies Cabinet
While not a determinative actor in this case, the role of the Menzies Cabinet is worth briefly examining, as it is here where Menzies and McEwen played out much of their roles. Although both enjoyed significant influence and policy making clout within the Menzies Government, they were not above the structures and process that underpinned policy making. Both had a role in convincing members of Cabinet that the Treaty was worth pursuing. Indeed it was within the Cabinet in 1951 that the Australian Government first agreed to work towards a trade agreement with Japan.619 This decision had followed the initial cabinet submission by then Trade Minister O’Sullivan, who told Cabinet:
‘It is recognised that there are important political considerations involved in the licensing of consumer goods of Japanese origin. On the other hand there are sound economic and financial reasons for increasing the scope and volume of our imports from Japan.’620
This submission clearly demonstrates two imperatives that become important in the narrative that defined the Treaty in the politics stream – the domestic and international political considerations versus the economic and financial opportunities increased trade with Japan may unlock. Ultimately, Cabinet agreed to approach the Japanese Government on a trade agreement in September 1954 and focus on the concessions such an agreement might secure for Australian industry, including across a number of
617 Woodard, 2000, op. cit., p. 87 618 Submission 30 to Cabinet by Casey, 28 July 1954, [AA: A4906/XMI, VOLUME 1]. 619 Cabinet Decision 45, 10 July 1951, [AA: A4905, Volume 2] 620 Submission 32 to Cabinet by O’Sullivan, 16 June 1951, [AA: A4905, Volume 2]
110 key and sensitive economic areas.621 This focus would dominate the narrative, and whilst Menzies would continue to prosecute the international political elements of deepening Australia’s relationship with Japan, it was the economic argument that became paramount.
The prevailing legend is that Menzies dominated his Cabinet, but this should not necessarily imply authoritarian control. Rather, Menzies exerted a strong influence over his colleagues that has been better described as ‘pre-eminence’.622 Menzies sought consensus, yet was also forceful in putting his own position forward as prime minister. The impact of Menzies’ world view and his relationships with his ministerial colleagues are pivotal in understanding how the decision to pursue and implement the Treaty was made. This is particularly so as Menzies’ pushed for stronger connections to the British Empire and continued preferential Imperial trade within his cabinet. McEwen would oppose him. Menzies desire to maintain Imperial ties was counterproductive for increased trade with Japan, but was linked to his concerns of the potential electoral implications of pursuing policy settings that might undermine British markets in Australia.623 Nonetheless, Cabinet approved commencing negotiations with the Japanese, and it was Cabinet that finally agreed to the terms of the Treaty. While Menzies and McEwen were both powerful members of the Cabinet executive, they required collective agreement to ensure safe passage of the Treaty through Parliament.
Policy Stream
The policy stream in this particular case dealt with much of the detail of the Treaty – the text, inclusions, exclusions and day-to-day negotiations were all conducted in this stream and largely by bureaucratic policy actors. Whilst the political narrative and linkage to other policy agendas was coordinated by actors in the politics streams, the policy actors within this stream managed and developed the content of the Treaty and were responsible for its implementation. McEwen was also a dominant policy actor in this stream, guiding bureaucratic actors and facilitating their recommendations through the Menzies Cabinet. This is an important difference between this case and the two that follow that do not see the same ‘hands-on’ ministerial role in their respective policy streams. This section of the chapter will examine each of the major bureaucratic actors, focusing on their actions and links to both the politics and problem streams.
In this stream we can see a number of deep core beliefs and policy core beliefs that guide the actions of actors, and guide engagement with actors in the politics and problems stream. These are outlined in Table 4.2.
621 Cabinet Committee Decision 103, 14 September, 1954, [AA: A4906. Volume 4]. See also Submission 142 to Cabinet by Menzies, 14 October, 1954, [AA: A4906, Volume 5] and; Cablegram from McEwen and O’Sullivan to Menzies, 7 October, 1954, [AA: A1838/278, 3103/10/2, iii]. 622 See Bunting, John. 1988. R.G. Menzies, A Portrait, Allen & Unwin, North Sydney, pp. 85-95. Confirmed by Fraser, interview with researcher, 7 May 2013. 623 Letter from Tange [1] to Watt, 10 April 1956, [AA: A1838/279, 3101/10/1, iv]
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Table 4.2 – Deep Core Beliefs and Policy Core Beliefs
Belief Actor Deep Core Belief Preference for trade DoT, DEA, DPM&C Preference for protection DTC Preference for opening trade DoT, DEA, DPM&C with Japan Preference for Imperial trade DTC Policy Core Belief Support for embracing post- DoT, DEA, DPM&C War Japan Suspicious of post-War Japan DTC
Department of Trade
The first major actor in the policy stream is DoT, which was an actor both in the institutional sense but also through the actions of two of its employees - Secretary John Crawford and Deputy Secretary Alan Westerman. These two men connected DoT’s broader role to the politics stream via their relationship with McEwen, but also to the problem stream through their individual connections into industry. DoT and its leaders occupied a preeminent bureaucratic policy role, enjoying both the political imprimatur and policy responsibility to conduct negotiations, consultations and research with respect to the Treaty on behalf of the Commonwealth. At a broader level, the DoT can be seen to perform a number of roles:
• negotiate the treaty with Japanese counterparts; • liaise with political actors in the politics stream (particularly McEwen); • consult with businesses and business groups; and • coordinate across the federal public service.
These roles became integrated as the negotiations progress and as such, are discussed as a whole in the analysis that follows, with the consultation with business also discussed in the subsequent section covering the problems stream.
Much of the policy making power afforded to DoT stemmed from a 1956 review of government wide departmental functions, which saw the Department of Trade & Customs (DTC) split, with half redesignated as DoT. This new department headed by Crawford, with McEwen as the relevant minister from the outset, became responsible for the trade policy making and promotion functions of the Department of Commerce and Agriculture (DCA) as well as the import licensing, tariff and trade agreement roles of the previous DTC. This was seen to end the longstanding policy gap between one department protecting Australian industry and another securing export markets for Australian industry. For the first time, policy aimed at economic growth through industry protection and increased trade was the responsibility of one Commonwealth department – indeed it was ‘the’ place to work within the federal
112 bureaucracy during the 1950s.624 It also heralded a shift in terms of Australia’s trading relations with Japan. In the years leading up the commencement of negotiations, DTC refused to accept the need to alter Australia’s trading attitude towards Japan;625 but this view would change under Crawford and Westerman.
The development of the newly formed DoT is also important as the nexus between trade and foreign policy prevailing since federation was disbanded in the bureaucratic re-shuffle. A schism between the two areas resulted, exacerbated by a strong ministerial performer in McEwen and a veritable turf war between the two departments over the area of foreign trade negotiations. Despite being newly formed, DoT was able to leverage the long established ‘bureaucratic empires’ of the former DTC and DCA, and expanded its own system of overseas representation through a network of trade commissioners administered under the Trade Commissioner Act. 626 This network allowed DoT to establish relationships with foreign departments of trade and the relevant domestic agencies of Australia’s trading partners. DoT was a powerful administrative actor in this policy sub-system as it had the political imprimatur to lead negotiations,627 the legislative powers over the policy area and the bureaucratic resources to commit to concerted and detailed policy making.
Crawford notes that the early stages of any potential trade agreement started by a departmental official sounding out foreign governments as to the possibilities of developing an agreement. If the initial soundings were positive, a cabinet paper on the trade and political climate between Australia and the nation was developed and if favourable, Cabinet would tell the DoT to prepare a more detailed proposal for their consideration. In the case of Japan, Crawford understood the political and geostrategic imperatives of the Treaty, but also effectively argued that the economic basis for a treaty was strong and sufficient cause for a treaty by itself.628 This was despite DTC’s reluctance to increase trade with Japan in the early 1950s. Crawford also acknowledged the need to both accept the domestic political implications of such a treaty – both in terms of potential war time animosities and job losses – and as such, would fight from the outset to have strong defensive economic safeguards included in the text of the Treaty.629
After the Menzies Cabinet agreed to commence negotiations, the first meeting of the negotiations was held in Canberra with DoT, DEA, the Department of Primary Industry, Department of Customs and Exercise and the Treasury all present.630 This interdepartmental approach was reminiscent of the committee structure that provided trade policy advice to the Cabinet.631 The meeting was chaired and
624 Capling, 2001, op. cit., p. 56 625 Golding, 1996, op. cit., p. 174 626 Beaumont, 2003, op. cit., p. 17 627 This was further enhanced by McEwen enjoying the dual role of Minister for Trade and Deputy Prime Minister, giving DoT a powerful advocate in the Menzies Cabinet 628 Crawford, 1968, op. cit. p.352 629 Ibid., p. 352 630 Australia-Japan Trade Negotiations: First Meeting, 29 August 1956, [AA: A183/283, 759/1/7, iv] 631 Capling, 2001, op. cit., p. 56
113 hosted by DoT, and formal requests from the Japanese and Australian sides were exchanged. Both sides would then examine what was proposed and a further meeting would subsequently take place. Subsequent meetings would see DoT dominate policy making and negotiation, using the networks of domestic contacts maintained by the other departments when negotiating on specific items to be incorporated into the final text.
The Australian negotiating delegation was led by Westerman, who, along with his Japanese counterpart Nobuhiko Ushiba, would lead the high-level discussions in plenary meetings between the two sides in Canberra.632 Westerman would act as the conduit between the day-to-day negotiations and more strategic policy issues focused on by Crawford and McEwen. The high-level discussion during the negotiations, on topics such as general import licensing, would focus on a list of desired outcomes circulated by both sides prior to the commencement of the negotiations.633 The plenary discussions, taking place each morning, would inform working parties and committees dedicated to specific items in the afternoon. Decisions that could not be reached in the committees would be referred back to the plenary for higher-level discussions. Summaries would be made of all meetings, distributed and the press were not to be engaged without mutual approval. Information exchanges between the Australian and Japanese sides interspersed the formal meetings, providing opportunity for frank, off-the-record conversations.634
Many of the detailed and technical discussions surrounding the details of the Treaty where held in sector committees, led always on the Australian-side by a senior official from DoT. These committees considered how arrangements would be made to overcome difficulties foreseen in meeting the requests of both nations – particularly difficulties around the Australian reserve list of sensitive items that would only be removed should MFN be assigned to Japan.635 One notable committee was the Commodity Committee, in which Australian and Japanese officials bargained over how different commodities would be treated under the Treaty.636 The committees worked with high-level objectives established in the plenary discussion and applied the concepts to the specific item under negotiation. The committees would then report back to the plenary and their respective delegates, and would then reconvene the following day with responses to particular points and answers for individual requests.637 The committee
632 Australia-Japan Trade Negotiations: First Plenary Meeting, Canberra, 1 November 1956, [AA: A1838/283,759/1/7, iv]. 633 Ibid. 634 See Australia-Japan Trade Negotiations: Information Discussions, Canberra, 5 December 1956, [NLA: Crawford Papers MS4514/9/33, Japan-Australia Trade Negotiations 1956/57, pt i] 635 Australia-Japan Trade Negotiations: First Plenary Meeting, Canberra, 1 November 1956, [AA: A1838/283,759/1/7, iv] 636 See Australia-Japan Trade Negotiations: First Meeting of the Commodity Committee [1], Canberra, 1 November 1956, [AA: A1209/23, 57/5474]. Another important committee covered imports, see Australia- Japan Trade Negotiations: First Meeting of the Import Committee, Canberra, 2 November 1956, [AA:1838/283,759/1/7, iv] and; Australia-Japan Trade Negotiations: Second Meeting of the Import Committee, Canberra, 6 November 1956, [AA:1838/283,759/1/7, iv]. 637 See Australia-Japan Trade Negotiations: First Meeting of the Commodity Committee [1], Canberra, 1 November 1956, [AA: A1209/23, 57/5474]; Australian-Japan Trade Negotiations: Second Meeting of the Commodity Committee [1], Canberra, 2 November 1956, [AA: A1209/23, 57/5474]; Australian-Japan Trade
114 structure allowed negotiators to focus on the technical detail, filter agreements and enquiries up to more senior Australian officials in the plenary who could then in turn seek agreement and resolution by DoT executive staff and on important aspects, McEwen and the Menzies Cabinet
Cables were also sent to diplomats and trade officials in Tokyo who were responsible for liaising with their diplomatic and political interlocutors in-country.638 The cable exchanges highlight frictions between DoT and DEA at the Australian Embassy in Tokyo, with a trade officials cabling Canberra without Ambassador Watt’s knowledge and with political analysis with which Watt disagreed.639 The analysis pointed to the potential need for the Australians to consider delaying negotiations so that key political actors in Japan would not ‘lose face’ over making certain concessions. Watt felt the analysis was overstated and that the DoT official was representing Australian policy without authority. Consequently, the DoT acquiesced to a DEA demand that all future cables would be discussed with and cleared by Watt.640 While the negotiations were led by DoT and provided that department with a key policy making role through negotiation in Canberra, the running of the Embassy in Tokyo and representations to Japanese authorities firmly remained the remit of DEA.
After each plenary, a report would be made back to the Minister’s Committee.641 DoT controlled the information available to Australian negotiating officials, and was also responsible for passing information back to other departments interested in the progress of the negotiations.642 DoT was the conduit through which information on the negotiations would flow to the rest of the Australian public service. Two additional plenaries were led by DoT in March 1957 when the Japanese delegation once again visited Canberra. On this occasion, the Japanese delegation had been given specific instructions from their government and both sides moved towards drafting the Treaty.643 As a draft looked more likely, it was put to Menzies in a memo that:
“It would be useful…[to] give the negotiating team a clearance on the lines on which they are pursuing the negotiations, since they are rapidly reaching the stage where final decisions will be needed.”644
Negotiations: Third Meeting of the Commodity Committee [1], Canberra, 2 November 1956, [AA: A1209/23, 57/5474]; and Minute from Jones to Durie, 2 November 1956, [AA: A1209/23,57/5473]. 638 See for example Cablegram from Stuart to Department of Trade, Tokyo, 21 November 1956, [AA: A1838/283, 759/1/7, iv]. 639 Compare Cablegram from Stuart to Department of Trade, Tokyo, 21 November 1956, [AA: A1838/283, 759/1/7, iv] and; Cablegram from Watt to Department of External Affairs, Tokyo, 22 November 1956, [AA: A1838/283, 759/1/7, iv]. 640 Cablegram from Westerman to Stuart, Canberra, 22 November 1956, [AA: A1838/283,759/1/7, iv] and Minute from Jamieson to Tange and Quinn, 23 November 1956, [AA: A1838/283, 759/1/7, iv]. 641 Minute from Jones to Durie, 2 November 1956, [AA: A1209/23,57/5473] 642 Ibid. 643 See Australia-Japan Trade Negotiations: Second Plenary Meeting, Canberra, 25 March 1957, [AA: A1838/283, 759/1/7, v] and Australia-Japan Trade Negotiations: Third Plenary Meeting, Canberra, 25 March 1957, [AA: A1838/283, 759/1/7, v] 644 Minute from Durie to Menzies, 2 Spril 1957, [AA: A1209/23, 57/5475]
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Despite the ability of DoT to make technical decisions in their negotiations with the Japanese based on the broad parameters set previously by Cabinet, they required political actors in the politics stream to ultimately provide approval to push final lines with the Japanese.645 This is further exemplified by a Cabinet submission made by McEwen seeking approval for the final push towards a signed Treaty, with McEwen arguing:
“From the point of view of the Australian economy, it is essential that we reach agreement. Politically, I think that if the terms of the agreement are anything like as favourable as I have outlined to you, the conclusion of the Agreement would be manageable. So far as individual Australian industries are concerned, I believe the terms of the Agreement and our powers in respect of quota restrictions and special duties are adequate to prevent major damage but are not likely to avoid some damage to our industries at the margin.”646
Although the specifics of the Treaty were established in the policy stream, political imperatives were never far from consideration. Following the above submission, a fourth and fifth plenary were convened, with DoT again leading the negotiations with the Japanese, proceeding line-by-line through the proposed draft Treaty text, and seeking approval from the Menzies Cabinet as each major item required decision.647 Final negotiations occurred at the sixth plenary in June 1957.648
DoT also considered the potential impact of increased trade with Japan on exposed domestic industries. Crawford maintained a private list of one hundred trade sensitive items, for there was adequate reason for Australian manufacturers to fear increased Japanese imports.649 Special mechanisms were thus established to investigate and undertake actions against Japanese imports infringing upon the terms of the Treaty. Yet of the one hundred items on the list, only 14 ever required action. Nonetheless, the identification of these items meant Crawford developed strong linkages within the business community, and he used these links to build a case for the Treaty with industry.
After the signing of the Treaty, DoT established and managed a series of industry panels that formed a direct linkage between public servants managing the implementation of the Treaty and the businesses affected by its accession.650 They became a key engagement mechanism of the Menzies with the
645 For those parameters, see Cabinet Decision 203, 21 May 1956, [AA: A 1838/283, 759/1/7, iv]. 646 Submission 593 by McEwen to Cabinet, 3 April 1957, [AA: A4926, Volume 24] 647 Australia-Japan Trade Negotiations: Fourth Plenary Meeting, Canberra, 10 April 1957, [AA: 1838/283, 759/1/7, vi] and; Australia-Japan Trade Negotiations: Fifth Plenary Meeting, Canberra, 14 May 1957, [AA: 1838/283, 759/1/7, vi]. The submissions to Cabinet by McEwen was ostensibly to ascertain ministerial feelings towards the critical issues, see Notes on Cabinet Submission 593 [1], 11 April 1957, [AA: A4926, Volume 24]; Submission 643 to Cabinet by McEwen, 15 May 1957, [AA: A4926, Volume 26] and; Cabinet Committee Decision 771 (Hoc), 16 May 1957, [AA: A4926/XMI, Volume 26]. 648 Australia-Japan Trade Negotiations: Sixth Plenary Meeting [1], Canberra, 14 June 1957, [AA: A1838/283, 759/1/7, vii] 649 Crawford, 1968, op. cit. p. 354 650 Ibid., pp. 380-381
116 business community and whilst coordinated by officials at DoT, they also heavily involved utilising the industry bodies (expanded upon below) to exploit connections back into their membership base.
Department of External Affairs
The second major policy actor in the policy stream is DEA. Whilst the institution itself was an important actor, the specific influence of Secretary Arthur Tange and Ambassador to Tokyo, Alan Watt, is also notable. As observed, DEA played a secondary role to DoT in the negotiation of the Treaty and liaising with both industry and political actors. This reflects both the expanded policy making role of DoT discussed above, and the weakened position of Casey vis-à-vis McEwen in the Menzies Cabinet
In the years leading up to the negotiation of the Treaty, DEA had seen a significant expansion in terms of both its employees in Canberra and the range and size of foreign diplomatic posts.651 Indeed, upon returning from a trip to Japan in 1951, Casey accepted the importance of Australian posts abroad, reflecting that ‘[o]ne thing (perhaps beyond others) that I've learned…is the value of our Australian Missions in the East and South East Asia…I had not quite realised before that we have something positive and useful to contribute.’652 Perhaps for the first time, an Australian foreign minister finally understood the importance of Australia’s diplomatic network in developing effective foreign policy and the important contribution Australia could make to regional and global issues.653 But despite the expansion that occurred during this period, DEA’s ‘place in the hierarchy of influence among the major government departments was still being established’ and as a consequence, its policy influence was heavily dependent upon a minister performing well.654 As already mentioned, Casey was ineffectual. Without a strong voice in Cabinet and a powerful advocate vis-à-vis other ministers and their departments, DEA struggled to gain influence over the development of the Treaty – particularly given the expanded mandate and administrative footprint of DoT.
Further diminishing DEA’s clout in the Menzies Cabinet was a disconnect between Casey’s view on the potential for Japanese rearmament and that of DEA. Around the time of the Treaty’s negotiation, Tange wrote to Watt that ‘I doubt whether the question of Japanese rearmament…will come to a head in Japan for some time yet’.655 Tange felt that anti-war sentiment was strong in Japan and that its political system made the constitutional amendment required for war too difficult to be of much immediate concern. The Treaty would therefore provide no material assistance to rapid Japanese rearmament in the view of Tange; a view not readily shared in the politics stream in the early deliberations over the Treaty. Yet is was a view shared by the Australian Embassy in Tokyo, which was pushing to develop a distinctive ‘Australian’ relationship with Japan, focused on shared geographic location and ‘on a different
651 Beaumont, 2003, op. cit., p. 89 652 Casey, 1951, op. cit., pp. 33-34. See for more extracts Casey, Richard. 1951. Extract from Casey’s Diary, 11 August 1951, [NLA: Casey Papers, MS6150/4/26, Volume 13]. 653 This transition is discussed in Fraser and Roberts, Dangerous Allies, op. cit. 654 Beaumont, 2003, op. cit., p. 150 655 Letter from Tange to Watt, 4 April 1956, [AA: A1838/278, 3103/10/10/1, iv]
117 qualitative basis than distant European countries whose vital interests are inevitably concentrated elsewhere’.656 For DEA, a robust relationship with Japan would not assist Tokyo’s rearmament, but would support Australia’s strategic interests in Asia.
Internally, Tange loomed large over the functioning of the DEA. He also played a role in changing Australian views towards Japan, and viewed Japan as a potential great power.657 During his time as Secretary, most bilateral relations with Japan were carried out at a very senior level, including during the Treaty development period. 658 With respect to DEA officials more broadly, Walton points out:
‘The contacts developed by these individuals were a crucial factor in the development of closer political relations with Japan and the construction of policy networks. Clearly policy networks were at an early stage of development. Australian diplomats fostered and supported the process of regular contact with Japanese counterparts during the 1950s and 1960s and ensured that the normalisation of relations was a relatively smooth process…The decision within External Affairs to enhance relations with Japan, given the lingering post-War animosity towards Japan within the general community, would have been a difficult decision.’659
Thus, whilst there was certainly competition between the DoT and DEA, both were positioning Australia for closer ties with Japan across multiple policy sub-systems. This facilitated and supported the political aims expressed in the politics stream by both Menzies and McEwen, but the latter in particular. Whilst one department focused on trade and the other on high-level diplomatic issues, officials from both worked towards enhancing the relationship through strong bilateral networks. This can be seen quite clearly during the trade negotiations, particularly when held in Canberra.660
The cooperation, whilst not always amicable, was a marked change from DEA’s earlier reluctance to support commencing negotiations. There had been suspicion within DEA about pursuing the Treaty at all, with officials concerned that affording greater market access to Japan, or indeed MFN status, would not be coupled with appropriate safeguards.661 DEA felt that there had never been an appropriate appraisal of the impact of the Treaty on Australian industry or British exports. Inter-departmental cooperation was the only way to ensure safeguards would be put in place. However, such cooperation had seldom been achieved between DEA and other central agencies involved in devising and implementing any safeguard measures.
656 Extract of Memorandum 816 from Watt to Tange, 27 September 1956, [AA: A1838/278, 3103/10/10/1, iv] 657 Walton, 2012, op. cit., p. 15 658 Ibid., p. 15 659 Ibid., pp. 16-7 660 See Memorandum from Stuart to Phillips, 18 October 1956, [AA: A1310/1, 810/1/39] and; Memorandum from Stuart to Phillips, 24 October 1956, [AA: A1310/1, 810/1/39]. Note however that at all times, negotiations were led by DoT. 661 Minute from Shaw to Loomes and Brennan, 29 December 1955, [AA: A1838/2,759/1/9, i]
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Nonetheless, there was a distinct role for DEA in formulating the early framework for trade negotiations. For example, informal discussions between Australia and Japan were held in the Australian Embassy in Tokyo, examining import licensing restrictions, customs duties and access to the Japanese wool market.662 It was also under a third person note from External Affairs that the Australian Government official requested the commencement of negotiations with Japan, signalling the official commencement of bureaucratic negotiating activity between Australian and Japan. 663 So whilst the DoT led in negotiating with Japan and domestic policy actors outside of government, the nature of the work of DEA was such that it maintained a formal role in policy making around the Treaty. Indeed, advice provided by DEA to Menzies prior to his 1957 visit to Japan outlined the Department’s views towards Japan:
‘Australia’s basic approach to Japan has been guided by a belief that Japan must be given an opportunity to develop peacefully in association with the countries of the free world, or else she will be forced to come to terms with Communist China and the Soviet Union…Australia recognises Japan’s economic needs in the trade agreement which is now being negotiated. Our approach is evidence of Australia’s desire to assist Japan to play her proper role in the family of nations and is an indication of how Australia can be of practical assistance to Japan.’664
DEA successfully pushed Menzies to follow this line in his public speeches in Japan and in Australia.665 Tange also played a role in dealing with Japanese Ambassador Suzuki. Tange was aware that Crawford and DoT played the lead role, observing to Ambassador Suzuki that formal discussions on the Treaty could not occur in the absence of both McEwen and Crawford.666 Tange knew DoT had the political imprimatur to negotiate with the Japanese and that DEA would play a secondary role.667 Indeed this became apparent in the Cabinet submission process, with McEwen and DoT taking the lead in drafting the submission for consideration by the Menzies Government. DEA did, however, advise Casey on the merits of these submissions and was generally supportive.668
As outlined above, the relationship between DEA and DoT with respect to the Treaty was fractious at best. Then Ambassador Watt notes that DoT was determined to control external trade policy and that they considered DEA as ‘striped-pants diplomats, obsessed with protocol, unable to recognise the basic, material facts of life’.669 This spilled over to the negotiation of the Treaty. DoT was adamant that trade commissioners have diplomatic privileges and with the help of a powerful minister ‘who knew how to get his way’, successfully lured DEA officials with economic capacity through higher wages to serve
662 Letter from Tange [1] to Watt, 10 April 1956, [AA: A1838/278, 3103/10/1, iv] 663 Note from Department of External Affairs to Japanese Embassy, 25 May 1956, [AA: A1838/283, 759/1/7,iv] 664 Extracts from Brief to Menzies, 8 April 1957, [AA: A1838/278, 3103/10/11/2/1, i] 665 See for example Statement by Menzies at Press Conference, Tokyo, 12 April 1957, [AA: A1838/283, 3013/10/11/2/1, ii]. 666 Record of Conversation by Brennan, 25 May 1956, [AA: A1838/283, 59/1/7, iv] 667 Acknowledge by Tange in Record of Conversation by Brennan, 28 May 1956, [AA: A2051/4, S0013, i]. 668 See for example Minute from Forsyth and Munro to Casey, 16 May 1957, [AA: A1838/283, 759, vi]. 669 Watt, 1972, op. cit., p. 264
119 under the newly formed department.670 Whilst Watt and the DEA more broadly accepted their expertise in matters of trade, the ‘selling of goods abroad involved many non-economic problems which should be taken into account’ with their officials ‘exuding self-confidence and substantially unaware of the peculiarities and susceptibilities of the countries [they were] visiting’.671
Ultimately, Watt notes that no credit for the signing of the Treaty could be given to him and indeed that his ‘own slight involvement in it, was a cause of frustration and annoyance’.672 Whilst Watt was aware of the exploratory talks between Australia and Japan that occurred in 1956 and the subsequent preparatory talks in November 1957, the embassy was given no direct information on the nature of the negotiations until instructed to prepare for the arrival of McEwen for the Treaty’s signing.673 DEA diplomats in Tokyo did not perform any substantive policy making role after the initial consultations with the Japanese described above – the in-county work once negotiations commenced was handled by DoT trade commissioners.
Throughout the negotiations, DEA would continue to manage the day-to-day bilateral relationship with Japan, both in Canberra and Tokyo. Yet when compared to DoT, its role in making the Treaty is secondary. This will be a useful point of comparison for later case studies situated in a period when DEA and DoT are in one departmental structure.
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet
At a general level, foreign policy making in the 1950s highlights the increasingly important and re- invigorated institutional role played by the then prime minister’s department, particularly as the prime minister travelled overseas more regularly than in years past.674 Until the mid-1935, DPM&C was the principal adviser on foreign affairs, changing only when an increasingly active role for the prime minister was required on the international stage.675 While DPM&C’s role in international affairs was diminished by the re-establishment of DEA in 1935 and the importance of the Department of Defence during WWII, the prime minister’s department still played a role in making the Treaty with Japan.
Menzies decided in 1955 that DPM&C should expand its largely administrative role, decreeing that the department should be “an independent source of advice to the Prime Minster on policy matters and as an agency of interdepartmental cooperation”.676 In response to Menzies’ wishes, a new departmental structure that incorporated dedicated areas for defence, international affairs and international economic
670 Ibid., p. 264 671 Ibid., p. 263 672 Ibid., p. 263 673 Ibid., pp. 263-264 674 Weller, Patrick, Scott, Joanne, and Stevens, Bronwyn. 2011. From Postbox to Powerhouse: A centenary history of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 1911-2010, Crows Nest (NSW), Allen & Unwin, p. 187 675 Ibid., p. 174 676 Quoted in ibid., p. 52.
120 advice was proposed.677 The re-structured department was designed to provide the prime minister with an assessment of policies across the entire government.678 This re-structure never happened, with the Public Service Board blocking any major structural changes to DPM&C. Nonetheless, it was the beginning of a process that currently sees the contemporary institution ubiquitous in Australian foreign policy making.
On the Treaty specifically, DPM&C outlined its view in a cabinet submission made by McEwen. DPM&C understood that whilst financial risks were involved in commencing negotiation with Japan, they were not severe enough to delay talks and risk retaliatory action by Japan and losing market access.679 It made two specific recommendations, both of which go towards establishing DPM&C’s view of the Treaty:
‘The recommendations of the submissions are supported. However, these negotiations go beyond the purely trade sphere, and because of the interest of other Ministers, we suggested that while the actual negotiations should be handled by the Minister for Trade and his officers, they should be subject to the oversight of a group of Ministers – the Prime Minister, Treasurer, Ministers for Trade and External Affairs. These departments should also be consulted. Common courtesy as well as its tactical benefit in the forthcoming trade discussion with the United Kingdom, warrant advice to the United Kingdom of our intention to negotiate in advance of any public announcement.’680
DPM&C was reluctant to leave the oversight of decisions made with respect to the Treaty solely to McEwen, preferring wider Cabinet and prime ministerial oversight. McEwen was absent during discussions on this submission and a Cabinet sub-committee was established to deal with Japanese trade matters.681 It would not prove to be a decisive body.682 DPM&C would also provide ad hoc input during the negotiations, providing Menzies with advice on whether to agree with submissions made by McEwen to the Cabinet on specific Treaty terms, by and large supporting McEwen’s position.683
DPM&C’s role in the making of the Treaty was linked to Menzies – when the prime minister participated, by default his department would provide advice. Whilst not as influential in terms of the content of the
677 Ibid., p. 53 678 Ibid., p. 54 679 Notes on Cabinet Submission No. 174 [1], 17 May 1956, [AA: A4926, Volume 8] 680 Ibid. 681 Extract from Casey’s Diary, 18 May 1956, [NLA: Casey Papers MS6150/4/28, Volume 18] and; Cabinet Decision 203, 21 May 1956, [AA: A 1838/283, 759/1/7, iv]. 682 Treasury commented on McEwen’s submission, concluding ‘it is not a primary responsibility of the Treasury to advise the Government on trade matters and there is no doubt that there could be substantial advantages in improving our trade relations with Japan at the present time’. See Minute from Randall to Fadden, 21 May 1956, [AA: A571/158, 57/2092, i]. 683 Notes by Prime Minister’s Department on Cabinet Submission 643, 16 May 1957, [AA:A4926, Volume 26]
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Treaty or in its networks with the Japanese, DPM&C nonetheless operated under prime ministerial direction and maintained an important link back to the politics stream.
Department of Customs and Tariffs
The final major bureaucratic actor, the Department of Customs and Tariffs (DCT), played a significant role both prior to the commencement of negotiations and after the signing of the Treaty. Following the reorganising of the DoT, the DCT was greatly reduced, with much of its functions allocated to other departments.684 Importantly, the DCT refused to accept that Australia needed to change its attitude towards trade with Japan.685 It felt that Australian manufacturers and importers from Britain could not compete with cheap Japanese imports in the event MFN was granted.686
Prior to the commencement of negotiations, a special committee was established within DCT to ‘report on the extent of the tariff and import licensing concessions which might be accorded to Japan’.687 This would provide Australian negotiators with a clearer position on what could be included and excluded in any final treaty text. The results of the committee’s review were to be discussed by the Comptroller- General of Customs and Crawford, with informal trade talks commencing with Japan thereafter involving officials from DCT and DoT.688 It would be in these initial discussions that the parameters around certain commodities, rates of tariff, MFN status and market access would begin to emerge. DCT would perform a lead role in establishing the various rates and percentages to be assigned to these measures. The DCT was never fond of re-establishing a trading relationship with Japan. As Capling notes, it was only through the founding of DoT that McEwen and Crawford were able to reduce ‘the ability of the nay- sayers in [DCT] to put a brake on Australia’s economic rapprochement with Japan’.689
After the negotiation and conclusion of the Treaty, the Chairman of the Tariff Board was appointed as a one-person advisory authority to investigate complaints and advise the trade minister on issues surrounding Japanese imports.690 This was warmly received by both the Associated Chamber of Manufacturers of Australia and Australian Chamber of Commerce (ACMA). Ultimately, only 14 complaints were referred and only five deemed necessary to enact any measures.691 Nonetheless, it was an initiative aimed at assisting in the smooth implementation of the Treaty, ensuring that both DoT
684 Capling, 2001, op. cit., p. 56 685 Golding, 1996, op. cit., p. 174. This point is also made by Drysdale, 1965, op. cit., and; Rix, 1984, op. cit. 686 Capling, 2001, op. cit., p. 62 687 Minute of Meeting at Department of Trade and Customs, 29 September, 1955, [AA: A1310/1, 810/1/39] 688 Letter from Crawford to Meere, 14 October, 1955, [NLA: Crawford Papers MS4514/9/33, Trade Policy: Relations with Japan]; Informal Trade Talks: Australia-Japan: Record of Discussion, 31 October, 1955 [AA: A1310/1, 805/118/24]; Informal Trade Talks: Australia-Japan: Record of Discussion, 4 November, 1955, [AA: A1838/283,759/1/7, iii] and; Informal Trade Talks: Australia-Japan: Record of Discussion, 7 November, 1955 [AA: A1310/1, 805/118/24]. 689 Capling, 2001, op. cit., p. 63 690 Menzies, 1970, op. cit., p. 64 691 Ibid., p. 64
122 and DCT maintained active linkages into the sections of the business community exposed to increased rates of Japanese imports.
Problems Stream
The problem stream is where many non-state actors contributed to the negotiation and implementation of the Treaty. It is the most accessible stream available to actors outside the state and one in which they can push their agendas, advocate for inclusion and exclusions of traded commodities, and lobby policy actors in the politics and policy stream. In this particular case study the industry panels set up by DoT provide the most useful mechanism for business engagement. Yet the political environment of the 1950s also allowed non-business actors to participate, particularly if their views were linked to Japanese atrocities during WWII. As explained above, animosity towards wartime Japan underpinned much of the public concern about formalising trade with Australia’s wartime enemy.
In this stream we can see a number of deep core beliefs and policy core beliefs that guide the actions of actors, and guide engagement with actors in the politics and policy stream. These are outlined in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3 – Deep Core Beliefs and Policy Core Beliefs
Belief Actor Deep Core Belief Preference for trade primary industries Preference for protection ACMA, manufacturers, ACTU, textile unions Preference for opening trade wool growers, primary with Japan industries Preference for Imperial trade certain textiles and Policy Core Belief manufacturers Support for embracing post- ACMA, ACTU War Japan Suspicious of post-War Japan Ex-Servicemen’s Association, RSL
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Business Groups and Trade Unions
The first major policy actors in this stream are the business groups and unions that represented Australian industry in the 1950s. The main function of these actors was to either advocate for or against the Treaty. Associations and unions most vocal in supporting or criticising the Treaty coalesced around two groups of industry sectors – manufacturing and agriculture. For both groups, interaction with policy actors that resided in the politics and policy stream provided the best opportunity to raise problems and concerns held by these organisations with respect to certain elements of the Treaty. Access to these political and bureaucratic actors was neither uniform nor consistent, with access to key actors in politics stream restricted to large and well-organised groups.
Firstly, McEwen described Australia’s manufacturers as the greatest opponents to the Treaty, in his own words they ‘were furious’ at the prospect of opening trade that allowed the import of Japanese goods.692 As Bell notes, ‘the war brought a large measure of industrial maturity to Australia best measured by industry’s achievements’ across a wide range of products, 693 and the companies manufacturing these items feared losses should competing products from Japan start being imported at a lower cost point.
Crawford notes, however, that the political imperative of signing a Treaty with Japan to help ensure it remained favourable to Western interest in the Cold War were not disputed by manufacturers. 694 Indeed a spokesperson for the ACMA accepted this as the core reason for pursuing the Treaty, stating: “we’re not quarrelling with the Government’s political decision to seek a trade agreement with Japan”.695 ACMA was much more concerned with the impact on its members of low-cost Japanese goods. This view would be consistent throughout the negotiations and upon the signing of the Treaty, ACMA requested a meeting with Menzies in an effort to dissuade ratification, arguing:
“…manufacturers do not take issue with the Australian Government making a bilateral trade agreement with Japan or, for that matter, any other nation. Our non- acceptance of the new Japanese Pact is because the agreement lacks the essential safeguards that Australian industry, on behalf of its shareholders and employees, considers to be its historical privilege.”696
692 McEwen, 1983, op. cit., p. 55. See also Stewart, 1995, op. cit., p. 93; Rattigan, Godfrey Alfred. 1986. Industry assistance: the inside story, Carlton (VIC), Melbourne University Press, p. 90; Tsokhas, Kosmas. 1984. A class apart? Businessmen and Australian politics, 1960-1980, Melbourne, Oxford University Press, p. 9 and; Walker and Jacobs, 1979, op. cit., p. 3. 693 Quoted in Bell, 1993, op. cit., p. 17. 694 Crawford, 1968, op. cit., p. 352 695 Sydney Morning Herald. 1957b. Manufacturers Protest About Japanese Trade Agreement, in Sydney Morning Herald, 27 June and; Crawford, 1968, op. cit., p. 369. 696 Letter from Associated Chambers of Manufactures to Menzies, August 1957, [NLA: Menzies papers MS4936/21/439, Folder 16]
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It was by lobbying Menzies directly that ACMA felt it had the best chance of having the Treaty voided, especially as they considered McEwen’s faith in Japanese ‘voluntary restraint’ to provide no real safeguard. Advice to Menzies also suggested that ACMA had little faith that McEwen would be “unwilling rather than unable” to enact emergency actions built into the Treaty should the need arise.697 But Menzies agreed with McEwen, noting the hostile organised manufacturers as well as important elements of the press ignored the potential economic opportunities.698
However, not all of Australia’s industry groups were against the proposed Treaty. For example, the Australian Woolgrowers’ Council recognised the opportunities presented to its members by an expanding Japanese economy and, whilst accepting of the potential impacts on manufacturers, supported the Menzies Government. Its chairperson observed:
“…the Australian Government should, as a matter of urgency, endeavour to find the necessary safeguards for Australian manufacturers which will enable the drawing up of a realistic bilateral trade agreement with Japan. The removal of unnecessary trade barriers will benefit not only the wool growing industry but every corner of our economy.”699
Advocacy for this position was made through the press and to DoT directly. Similarly, leading-up to the announcement of the Treaty’s negotiation, a number of primary industry groups gave Menzies their support including the Farmers and Settler’s Association.700
The differences between the manufacturers and primary industries was often pronounced, with the former reluctant to support the Treaty and the latter more supportive given the potential trade advantages. Indeed both groups tapped into differing non-economic elements of the political debate surrounding the Treaty, with a good example being the following statement from the chairman of the South Australian Wheat and Wool Growers, who viewed:
‘…with concern the racial arguments used by self-interested manufacturing interests whose principal purpose is to shut out mainly the Japanese, and other foreign countries' goods, and thus strangle our wool trade with Japan and other countries, who purchase Australian wool.'701
Whilst many of the business groups focused on the trading and economic impacts, the issue of race or recollections of war were also used to further their argument with decision makers in the politics and policy streams. This again reinforces the differing definitions and values present in the politics stream
697 Minute from Durie to Menzies, 29 August 1957, [NLA: Menzies Papers MS4936/21/439, Folder 16] 698 Menzies, 1970, op. cit., p. 63 699 Chairman of the Australian Woolgrowers’ Council, W.A. Gunn speaking to Queensland Country Life, 18 August 1955, quoted in Crawford, 1968, op. cit., p. 367. 700 See Letter to the Department of Commerce and Agriculture, 17 June, [AA: A609/1, 317/20/7]. 701 Letter from South Australian Wheat & Wool Growers’ Association to Menzies, 24 March 1954, [AA:A463/17, 56/984]
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– for the Treaty to be successful, straddling the lines between promoting economic opportunities, broader foreign policy considerations and less than favourable societal views of Japan were imperatives for actors in the politics stream.
A similar dichotomy in how the Treaty was defined and valued was displayed by the ACTU, who on the one hand agreed with the Menzies’ Government that trading with Japan was essential to peace:
‘…in the interest of world peace and raising of living standards throughout the world, there should be mutual trade between the nations of the world. To facilitate such trade, Governments should promote trade agreements and establish the necessary trade organisations on the basis of mutual assistance to all nations.’702
Yet, on the other hand, the ACTU pointed out that the Treaty simultaneously exhibited special concerns for primary producers, but threatened unemployment to workers in established Australian industries:
‘…the apparent lack of discrimination or effective control which would have assured the entry into Australia only of such products as have a high economic value to us.’703
The unions, in the majority, were against the proposed Treaty. A number, such as the Textile Workers Union, directly communicated with Menzies, pointing to the better quality of Australian goods and the unemployment that cheaper Japanese imports would result in as key reasons for limiting trade with Japan.704
The relationship between government and business was significantly different in the 1950s compared to contemporary times, as was the composition of the business groups themselves. Prior to consolidation in the late 1970s, many specific industry segments had dedicated national bodies representing their interests to government.705 This is opposed to larger, more all-encompassing groups that are dominant today (such as the Business Council of Australia or the Australian Industry Group). In the post-War era, manufacturers were politically organised through four major groups: the ACMA; the Australian Industries Development Association; the Metal Trades Employers’ Association (later the Metal Trades Industry Association) and; the Confederation of National Manufacturing Industry Advisory Council.706 Within ACMA, the vast majority of members were from Victoria and New South Wales and, consequently, the Victorian Chamber of Manufactures and the New South Wales Chamber of
702 Sydney Morning Herald, 1957b, op. cit. and; Crawford, 1968, op. cit., p. 380. 703 Sydney Morning Herald. 1957a. Australian Council of Trade Unions Condemns Japanese Trade Treaty, 27 September and; Crawford, 1968, op. cit., p. 379. A similar view is in Telegram from Australian Textiles Workers’ Union to Menzies, 31 March 1954, [AA: A463/17, 56/984]. 704 Telegram from Australian Textile Workers’ Union to Menzies, 31 March 1954, [AA: A463/17, 56/984] 705 Matthews, T.V. 1983. ‘Business associations and the State, 1850-1979’, in State and Economy in Australia, Head, B (ed.), Melbourne, Oxford University Press, p. 115 706 Tsokhas, 1984, op. cit., p. 1
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Manufactures were both powerful economic and political players within ACMA.707 The ACMA was also pivotal in the establishment of the Australia-Japan Business Co-operation Committee.708
Despite their clout, a large membership base did not automatically mean access to political policy actors, nor did it mean influence over their decisions. This was true also of DoT, as ‘having access to one’s “own” department or membership on a high-level standing advisory committee does not imply that the group will be listened to (or even consulted), even on issues of fundamental importance to its members.’709 Menzies was wary of developing too close an association with business as such a relationship had the potential to undermine the Government’s attempts at broadening its constituency.710 At the same time, there was a general feeling that McEwen had become too close to manufacturing interests, with a former head of the Tariff Board, coming to this conclusion and fearing potential political and policy implications.711
Despite this, there is enough evidence to suggest that many of the groups within the problem stream attempted to access the policy making process via communication directly with Menzies – a surprising conduit given McEwen’s key role within the Menzies Government. The perception may have been that Menzies had the ultimate say in government decision making or the records available have failed to capture the level of communication between McEwen and the various business groups. Indeed, whilst the records show a strong linkage between Menzies and DOT with the various business and union interests, the paper trail does not highlight the role of McEwen nearly as much as both the academic and biographical accounts of the period. This includes the account of Malcolm Fraser, who can remember vividly the role of McEwen in this particular case as outlined in the politics stream.
There are some exceptions to this. For example, McEwen, along with Westerman, met with the Rayon and Cotton Weavers’ Association in December 1957 to discuss concerns with the impending Treaty.712 McEwen disputed the Association’s assertions that tariffs alone would not protect the garment industry in Australia and that a restriction on Japanese imports was the most effective protection for local manufacturing. McEwen felt that to impose restrictions on one commodity would allow the Japanese to establish restrictions on Australian imports, notably wool:
“…to write quantitative restrictions on Japanese exports into any treaty would be to invite quantitative restrictions on wool at the Japanese end. There is not answer to this logic.”713
707 Ibid., p. 1 708 Ibid., p. 9 709 Matthews, 1983, op. cit., p. 141 710 Stewart, 1995, op. cit., p. 191 711 Ibid., p. 197 712 Notably then president of the ACMA was also present at the meeting highlight the role of ACMA in coordinating industry representation. 713 Record of Interview with Representatives of Rayon and Cotton Weaver’s Association, Melbourne, 5 March 1957, [NLA: Crawford Papers MS4514/9/33, Japan-Aust. Trade Negotiations 1956/57, Pt ii]
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The British Rayon Weaving Association also added its displeasure, claiming the Treaty would result in British textiles being ousted from Australia and a reduction of Australian exports to Britain.714 McEwen firmly believed Australian industry could be protected through tariffs and that imposing restrictions on Japanese imports would either imperil the likelihood Tokyo would sign a treaty or increase the chances of retaliatory quotas on Australian imports. DoT, who in follow-up conversations with the Rayon and Cotton Weavers’ Association, would repeat McEwen’s position.715
Organised Non- Business Interests
The other major group of non-government policy actors relevant to this stream is non-business organised interests. One such group was the Ex-Servicemen’s Association who maintained in the lead- up to the initial Peace Treaty and subsequent Trade Treaty that Japan needed to make reparations to ‘expiate their crimes’, with the Association recommending levying duties on Japanese imports as recompense to be paid to the families of ex-servicemen who fought in WWII.716 Trade concessions to Tokyo could only be countenanced once appropriate war reparations had been agreed. Documented records show that the Association made representation to Menzies through DPM&C believing it was through the prime minister that they would have the greatest input.717
Interest groups focused on returned soldiers were also a concern at the bureaucratic level. The DEA, for example, was concerned with the influence on public opinion of such groups, with Tange noting that the RSL ‘was a factor to be reckoned with in our efforts to promote closer relations with Japan’.718 In August of 1955, the NSW State Congress of the RSL voiced its opposition to Australia’s “soft” position towards Japan. Although through consultation, DEA understood the position of the Federal President to be more moderate.719 There was clearly a role for the bureaucracy in managing the public messages of the RSL.
Concluding Remarks
This case study is an example of the politics and policy streams working in unison. Indeed unlike the case studies that follow, this chapter has outlined a case where the politics and policy streams were equally as important in achieving a defined outcome. The successful negotiation of the Treaty, led by McEwen and Crawford, but also DOT, successfully nullified any opposition in the problems stream and swayed political concerns in the politics stream. Compared with the two cases that follow, the close
714 Cablegram from Menzies to McEwen, London, 24 June 1957, [AA: A1838/283, 759/1/7, vi] 715 Record of Discussion between Westerman and Burgess, Melbourne, 13 March 1957, [NLA: Crawford Papers MS 4514/9/33, Japan-Aust. Trade Talks, pt ii] 716 Letter from Ex-Servicemen’s Association to Prime Minister, 30 July 1951, AA: A463/17, 56/984 717 The RSL told the researcher original documents from this period have not been kept and no records of correspondence with the Menzies Government other than that referenced in this chapter have been uncovered. 718 Letter from Tange [1] to Watt, 10 April, 1956, [AA: A1838/278, 3103/10/1, iv] 719 Ibid.
128 working relationship between minister and department, and department and business groups, even where policy core beliefs did not align, is noticeable. Particularly so in the administrative arrangements between business and DoT – the establishment of dedicated committees to discuss business concerns provided industry with sustained and senior-level access the policy stream. The closeness of senior DoT executives and McEwen also meant concerns raised in the committees could be elevated to policy actors in the politics stream if required. In this regard, the DoT acted as a successful conduit between the politics and problem streams.
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Chapter 5: Negotiating a FTA with China
In October 2003, Australia and China signed the Australia-China Trade and Economic Framework, setting the agenda for the trade and economic relationship between the two countries for the coming years. A key element of this framework was the commitment to undertake a feasibility study into a possible FTA.720 This feasibility study was completed in March 2005 and in the subsequent month Australian and Chinese officials launched formal FTA negotiations.721 It was the beginning of a process that would take a decade.722
Just as the 1957 Australia-Japan Commerce Agreement was situated in the ongoing international debate surrounding post-WWII reconstruction and the GATT, the Australia-China FTA (ChAFTA) has been situated in a global economic context of multilateral trade liberalisation efforts bogged-down by the WTO Doha Round and an increasing preference for bilateral trade agreements. The Coalition Government under John Howard, along with the Labor Governments of Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard that followed, would point to the necessity of a preferential bilateral deal with China given the slow progress of multilateral trade liberalisation. But the ChAFTA was also situated in a broader political and strategic context not dissimilar to the 1957 Treaty – suspicions surrounding how the rise of China would affect the region along with a domestic manufacturing sector under enormous pressure, ensured that ChAFTA negotiations reflected many of the nuances characterising the relationship between Australia and China. The domestic economic implications of increasing trade with China and a public suspicious of Chinese ownership of agricultural land meant that ChAFTA was ensconced within Australian domestic politics. This was despite an electorate that was generally disinterested in the negotiations.723
As with the first case study, this investigation is structured on the hybrid framework outlined in Chapter 3. It will examine the actors, institutions and processes supporting negotiations to conclude ChAFTA, and will cover the negotiations that occurred during the Howard, first Rudd and Gillard Governments.
720 DFAT. 2005b. Australia-China Free Trade Agreement: Joint Feasibility Study, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia and; Vaile, Mark. 2003. Australia-China Trade and Economic Framework, media release, 24 October 721 Zhang, Yanying, Zhang, Gaiyan and Fung, Hung-gay. 2007. ‘The Prospects for China’s Free Trade Agreements’, in The Chinese Economy, Vol. 40, No. 2, p. 26 722 It is noted this FTA was concluded by the Abbott Government. This thesis will not consider the Abbott Government’s role in the FTA due to employment restrictions of the researcher. This does not manifestly alter the findings of the case study. 723 Even after the Australia-China FTA was agreed under the Abbott Government in November 2014, 38 per cent of the electorate did not wish to offer an opinion on whether the FTA was good or bad when polled, highlighting the relative lack of understanding, and potentially, engagement with the issue by the Australian electorate. See Essential Media Communications. 2014. ‘Free trade agreement with China’, Essential Report, Melbourne, Essential Media Communications, November 18.
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The Policy Sub-System
The bilateral economic relationship underpinning ChAFTA has been described as ‘one of the defining features of [Australia’s] early twenty-first century engagement with the outside world’.724 Yet despite this, the three federal governments examined by this case study were unable to finalise a treaty during their respective terms – demonstrating the complexities of modern trade diplomacy.725 The implications of the deal, both economic and geo-political, required considerable reconciling against what both Canberra and Beijing were hoping to achieve. Underpinning this was the need to balance domestic political and economic concerns, particularly balancing industries and regions within Australia that would benefit from ChAFTA, and those that would be adversely impacted.
This case study is situated firmly in the Australia-China policy sub-system; a section of Australia’s broader foreign policy space that is focused on the bilateral relationship. This policy sub-system is complex, comprising diverse traditional foreign, trade and security policy concerns, and human rights, environmental, food security, immigration and cultural issues. This section of the case study will present a broad overview of the policy sub-system, examining both its recent history as well and issues present within the contemporary bilateral relationship.726 It is by no means an exhaustive analysis of the policy sub-system, but will highlighting the key elements influencing policy actors negotiating ChAFTA.
There is a second policy sub-system relevant to this case study; Australia’s broader trading and export regime during the period under investigation is an important consideration, particularly the policy sub- system relating to free or preferential trade agreements. It is important to examine this particular sub- system as some of the policy actors from this sub-system are relevant to the ChAFTA negotiations.
Australia-China Policy Sub-System
The Australia-China relationship pre-dates Federation, with Chinese migrants flocking to the Australian goldfields in the 1850s, often encountering hostility and discrimination. Their arrival was viewed through a lens of racial discrimination that also predated Federation, but was codified by the White Australia Policy.727 These cultural and racial fears would be exacerbated after WWII and the Communist victory in China, with the Menzies Government viewing China as a security threat.728 As Mackerras points out, the historical background to the Australia-China relationship is relevant to the contemporary debates.729
724 Manicom and O’Neil, 2010, op. cit., p. 29 725 The China FTA was concluded by the Abbott Government in 2015. This case study will only examine the negotiations up until the end of the Gillard Government. 726 This is not an exhaustive account of the contemporary relationship, but an introduction to the major elements within the broader policy sub-system. 727 McDougall, Derek. 1998. Australian foreign relations: contemporary perspectives, South Melbourne, Longman, p. 180 728 Ibid., p. 180 729 Mackerras, Colin. 2014. ‘China and the Australia-US Relationship: A Historical Perspective’, Asian Survey, Vol. 54, No. 2, p. 224. Mackerras’ overview of the Australia-China-US relationship provides the historical
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However, as in the previous chapter, providing a detailed account of the multifaceted relationship is outside the scope of this study. However, to understand the policy sub-system, several points need to be outlined.
Australian policy makers started to realise that China was not only a major power in the Asia Pacific, but may indeed ultimately be the dominant power in 1990s.730 McDougall notes that the Hawke Government sought to extend the accommodation with China achieved under the Whitlam and Fraser governments, committing himself to high-level engagement that would ultimately be interrupted by the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989. 731 During the 1990s, the Australia-China relationship steadily improved and diversified, with one scholar noting ‘the tyranny of distance [was] replaced by the advantage of proximity’ as the Chinese economy continued to grow.732
Regional stability has been a focus for both Australia and China through pan-regional institutions and increased trade and investment. Dupont argues that there are three dominant elements characterising the contemporary Australia-China relationship – a commitment to regional stability, a focus on the benefits of an effective partnership, and the potential for a strategic dilemma facing Australia through increased economic interdependence and growing Chinese power.733 Yu and Xiong go as far as to argue increasingly high levels of bilateral trade and investment have resulted in an economic interdependence, although they also point out this does not necessarily result in political trust and cooperation.734 Alexander Downer argued that ‘China’s activism is that it is helping to build regional cooperation and regional relationships’.735 This can be seen as a way for China to ensure its rise is perceived as peaceful by regional neighbours, particularly when done through active and constructive participation in regional economic institutions. Engagement in the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum, APEC and the Asia-Europe Meeting are all examples of Chinese and Australian regional-level engagement. As is the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a Chinese initiative
context of contemporary debates around the ANZUS Alliance and the rise of China. See also Curran, James. 2012. ‘The World Changes: Australia’s China Policy in the Wake of Empire’, in Reilly, James and Yuan, Jingdong (eds.). Australia and China at Forty, Sydney, Newsouth Publishing; Mackerras, Collin (ed.). 1996. Australia and China, Partners in Asia, Melbourne, Macmillan Education Australia; and Woodard, Gary. 1997. ‘Australia and China’, in McGillivray, Mark and Smith, Gary (eds.), Australia and Asia, Melbourne, Oxford University Press. 730 FitzGerald, Stephen. 1997. Is Australia an Asian Country?, St Leonards (NSW), Allen & Unwin, p. 152 and; McDougall, 1998, op. cit., p. 186. 731 McDougall, 1998, op. cit., p. 187 732 Kendall, Timothy. 2005. Ways of Seeing China from Yellow Peril to Shangrila, Fremantle (WA), Curtin University Books, p. 170 733 Dupont, Alan. 2004. ‘The Political and Strategic Implications of a Free Trade Agreement with China’, paper presented at Australian-China Free Trade Agreement Conference, Sydney, The Australian APEC Study Centre, 12 August 734 Yu, Chang Sen and Xiong, Jory. 2012. ‘The dilemma of interdependence: current features and trends in Sino-Australian relations’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 5, pp. 587-588 735 Downer, Alexander. 2004. ‘Australian and China’s Shared Interests – Security and Strategic Dimensions’, speech presented at Australian-China Free Trade Agreement Conference, Sydney, The Australian APEC Study Centre, 12 August
132 of which Australia is a partner despite pressure from the US and Japan to boycott. 736 However, continued instability in the East and South China Seas question China’s ability to grow within the region’s established frameworks that have provided stability for decades.
In terms of an effective partner, consecutive Australian Governments have focused on the growing trade relationship as the dominant positive element of the bilateral relationship. This is unsurprising given the trade statistics – two-way trade was valued at $160 billion in 2013-14.737 John Howard particularly pursued this approach, focusing on the positive trade relationship while keeping discussions on human rights and democracy to one side.738 Howard also kept Australia’s relationship with the US distant from its relationship with China.739 As will be discussed below, subsequent governments would be more willing to conflate trade, political, security and human rights issues, but only to an extent that would not significantly damage bilateral ties.
Rising Chinese power coupled, growing economic interdependence and the Australia-US relationship combined to form a particular conundrum for Australian foreign policy makers in the early 2000s. China overtaking Japan as Australia’s number one trading partner in 2007 marked the first time in Australia’s history that its most important trade partner was ‘a state that was neither its strategic guarantor nor an ally of that guarantor.’740 Julia Gillard alluded to this point when she spoke of ‘a positive sum game’, in which growing Chinese prosperity need not detract from the prosperity of any nation in the world, including the US.741 But Gillard also spoke of the need to understand that as the Australia-China relationship grew, so too did the level of interdependence. In order to maintain a smooth relationship therefore, both sides must clearly define challenges in the relationship and work towards resolution based on trust and mutual understanding.742
As Tow notes, Australia’s relations with China have historically been based on a non-adversarial Sino- American relationship and the ANZUS Treaty not being impacted by that relationship.743 While this dynamic came under increasing pressure in the early 2000s, Australia continued to successfully balance both relationships. As Howard notes:
‘one of the greatest successes of this country’s foreign relations is that we have simultaneously been able to strengthen our longstanding ties with the United
736 Rogge, Ashley. 2015. ‘Australia and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’, Australian Outlook, March 27; Bisely, Nick. 2015. ‘US puts Australia on the spot with zero-sum game on China’s Bank’, The Conversation, 19 March and; Keck, Zachary. 2014. ‘Under US Pressure, Major Countries Snub China’s New Regional Bank’, The Diplomat, October 23. 737 DFAT. 2015a. China country brief, Canberra, Australian Government 738 Bisley, 2014, op. cit., p. 304 and; Wesley, Michael. 2007. The Howard Paradox: Australian Diplomacy in Asia, 1996-2006, Sydney, ABC Books. 739 See Kelly, Paul. 2006a. ‘Howard’s Decade’, Lowy Institute Paper No. 15, Sydney, Low Institute for International Policy. 740 Bisley, 2014, op. cit., p. 297 741 Gillard, Julia. 2011c. Speech to the Australia China Economic and Co-operation Trade Forum, Beijing, 9 April 742 Ibid. 743 Tow, Shannon. 2012. ‘Diplomacy in an asymmetric alliance: reconciling Sino-Australia relations with ANZUS, 1971-2007’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 12, p. 78
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States of America, yet at the same time, continue to build a very close relationship with China’.744
This balancing act has become a hallmark of Australia’s Asian engagement, with consecutive Australian leaders arguing that Australia does not have to choose between the two powers.745 Howard went as far as to say it was absurd to suggest that “Australia is headed towards some sort of historic moment of truth of having to choose between the two”.746 Rather, leaders argued Australia could continue to press for US engagement in the region whilst simultaneously supporting China’s rise by providing its economy with the resources it needs to expand. Commentators are divided on Australia’s ability to achieve this, with some arguing Australia can manage a relationship with Washington and Beijing,747 while others are more pessimistic.748 There are those that also sit in the middle, such as Bisley who sees a “status quo plus” approach whereby Australia does not ‘split the difference between its economic and strategic interests’, but rather it engages in a hedging strategy to ensure America remains engaged in Asia.749 What is consistent between these camps is Australia’s ability to manage the relationship with its strategic partner and its largest trading partner is dependent upon a cooperative relationship between the US and China.750 Nonetheless, the success of Australia’s management of this tension thus far has involved development of a discrete China policy that is shaped by Canberra’s sense of its own national interest – and a willingness to communicate to US policy makers that these interests are not necessarily shaped by US preferences alone.751
International Trade Sub-System – a preference for FTAs
The second policy sub-system relevant to this case is Australia’s broader international trade sub- system. The failure of the WTO Doha Round to agree to further global liberalisation measures led many nations, including Australia, to reassess approaches to trade policy reform. Rightly or wrongly, bilateral preferential trade agreements (or FTAs) became a means through which nations, including Australia, sought ‘to seek to extend their sphere of economic and political influence.’752 Indeed the beginning of
744 Howard, John. 2004. Address to the Asialink-ANU National Forum: Australia’s Engagement with Asia, speech, Canberra, 13 August 745 Herscovitch, Benjamin. 2015. ‘Australia must choose between China and the US’, The Australian, 16 July. Then Defence Minister Stephen Smith made similar comments, see McGrath, Catherine. 2012. ‘Smith Says Australia Stands Firm with US’, Australia Network News, 16 August. 746 Quoted in Australian Associated Press. 2012. ‘No need to choose China or US: Howard’, The Australian, 2 October. 747 See McDougall, Derek. 2014. ‘Australian Strategies in Response to China’s Rise: The Relevance of the United States’, Asian Survey, Vol. 54, No. 2 and; Tow, 2012, op. cit. 748 See, White, Hugh. 2013. The China choice: why America should share power, Collingwood (VIC), Black Inc. and; Fraser and Roberts, 2014, op. cit. and; Kelly, Paul. 2016. ‘Australia must head the shift in the US-China power balance: Keating’, in The Australian, 24 December. 749 Bisley, 2014, op. cit., p. 309-310 750 See Friedberg, Aaron. 2011. A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, New York, W.W. Norton. 751 Tow, 2012, op. cit., pp. 72-73 752 He, Ling Ling. 2013. ‘On Re-invigorating the Australia-China Free Trade Agreement Negotiation Process’, The Journal of World Investment & Trade, Vol. 14, p. 673. See also Clarke, Andrew and Gao, Xiang. 2008.
134 the twenty-first century saw a proliferation of such agreements across the Asia Pacific region, including between Australia and its major Asian trading partners.753 FTAs became tools ‘to forge new geopolitical alliances and cement diplomatic ties’,754 moving beyond the aim of increasing trade between nations.
Much of this change of focus occurred during the Howard Government. Some accounts of the trade agenda under Howard contend that it was based on pragmatism, focusing on bilateral trade agreements whilst simultaneously attempting to consolidate global trading regimes through multilateral processes such as the WTO and APEC.755 Others have noted the economic regionalism championed by the Hawke and Keating Governments was not pursued as vigorously by Howard, who instead increased the bilateral focus on key trading partners and placed less emphasis on liberalisation through the WTO.756 Howard himself notes bilateral ‘FTAs had become the flavour of the month as a result of the totally failed multilateral trade talks in Seattle in 2002’.757 Leaver notes that while Howard steadily commenced bilateral FTA negotiations, ‘the real leg-work of export growth was being done by those black-and-white economic complementarities’.758 Criticism has been levelled at Howard for his pro- FTA trade policy, particularly with respect to the Australia-US FTA where he ignored advice from DFAT to walk away from an agreement that had no meaningful concessions for Australia.759
Both the Rudd and Gillard Governments continued to pursue FTAs, although as noted later in this chapter, both administrations also renewed efforts in multilateral fora. The corollary of a fragmented
‘Bilateral Free Trade Agreements: A Comparative Analysis of the Australia-United States FTA and the Forthcoming Australia-China FTA’, UNSW Law Journal, Vol. 30, No. 3, p. 854; and Thurbon, Elizabeth. 2015. ‘10 years after the Australia-US free trade agreement: where to for Australia’s trade policy?’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 5, p. 463. 753 Capling, Ann. 2008b. ‘Preferential trade agreements as instruments of foreign policy: an Australia-Japan free trade agreement and its implications for the Asia Pacific region’, The Pacific Review, Vol. 21, No. 1, p. 28. See also, Desker, Barry. 2004. ‘In defence of FTAs: from purity and pragmatism in East Asia’, The Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 1; Lee, Jong-Wha and Park, Innwon. 2005. ‘Free trade areas in East Asia: discriminatory or non-discriminatory?’, in World Economy, Vol. 28, No. 1 and; Ravenhill, John. 2003. ‘The new bilateralism in the Asia Pacific’, in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 2. 754 Crawford, Jo-Ann and Fiorentino, Roberto. 2005. The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements, World Trade Organization Discussion Paper No. 8, Geneva, WTO Publications, p. 144 and; Capling, 2008b, op. cit., p. 28. 755 See for example Kunkel, John. 2002. ‘Australian trade policy in an age of globalisation’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 2, p. 237 and Basu, Parikshit, Hicks, John and Sappey, Richard. 2005. ‘Chinese Attitudes to Trade Agreements in the Context of the Proposed Australia-China Free Trade Agreement’, in Economic Papers, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 295. 756 See for example Calvert, Ashton. 2002. ‘Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy Agenda’, in The Sydney Papers, Vol. 14, No. 4, p. 14 and McDougal, Derek. 1998. Australian Foreign Relations – Contemporary Perspectives, op. cit., p. 152. 757 Howard, John. 2010. Lazarus Rising, op. cit., p. 509 758 Leaver, Richard. 2011. ‘Australia, Trade Policy and the Global South: An Odyssey over Five Decades?’, in The Round Table, Vol. 100, No. 415, p. 382 759 Capling, Ann and Ravenhill John. 2015. ‘Australia’s flawed approach to negotiations: and where do we sign?’, in Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 5, p. 499
135 global and regional trading infrastructure is the complex trading environment that Australia now finds itself in, as captured in figure 5.1.760
Figure 5.1 – Australia’s Participation in Regional Economic Architecture761
As Figure 5.1 indicates, the complex trade arrangements that Australia now finds itself in, including its growing stable of bilateral agreements, will ensure consistency across Australia’s trade regime becomes an increasingly difficult thing to achieve.
Variables
This section outlines the most important exogenous variables relevant to this case study. A major biophysical and material condition is the amount of trade liberalisation that Australia can offer China. Whilst the two economies are very complementary, Australia’s unilateral liberalisation that started in the 1980s meant certain facets of the Australian economy were already open to Chinese investment.762 That said, the overwhelming Chinese appetite for Australian mineral resources, agricultural products
760 DFAT. 2013. Australia’s participation in regional economic architecture, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia 761 DFAT, 2013, op. cit. 762 See Banks, Gary. 2003. ‘Gaining from trade liberalisation: some reflections on Australia’s experience’, presentation at New Horizons in Trade: the WTO Round and Australia’s Free Trade Negotiations, Adelaide, 5 June. See also Varghese, Peter. 2014. ‘Trade and Domestic Reforms: The Australian Experience’, presentation at CUTS International 30th Anniversary Lecture, Canberra, 3 February.
136 and services (particularly education and tourism), and Australia’s desire for cost effective manufactured goods, meant the external conditions for a FTA framework were positive.763 The comparatively warm relationship between Canberra and Beijing - especially compared to Beijing’s relationships with Washington and Tokyo – also added to these suitable conditions.
Ongoing community anxiety about Chinese trade and investment is a relevant attributes of the community variable, with the Lowy Institute’s 2012 poll of public opinion and foreign policy finding 56 per cent of Australians felt the government allowed too much investment from China. 764 Then- Opposition Leader Tony Abbott’s 2012 speech in China on foreign investment and subsequent policy paper, also received much attention for its populist roots and lack of appreciation for the bilateral economic relationship and Australia’s historic reliance on foreign investment.765 The public perception of China’s investment in Australia was a political and policy problem for governments of both persuasion given China’s appetite for investment in key and often sensitive areas of the Australian economy.766 The Gillard Government’s ban on Chinese technology giant Huawei from tendering for the National Broadband Network on national security grounds represents a response to some of this disquiet.767 Whilst not a determining factor in ChAFTA negotiations, public perceptions towards China’s do limit policy makers’ policy choices, particularly in the politics stream. Added to this was a level of community scepticism in FTAs, encouraged by the limited economic return from the US FTA.768
The rules-in-use variable is also particularly relevant to this case study. The power to enter into treaties with other countries rests exclusively with the Commonwealth Government. 769 This means the Commonwealth is the responsible authority for ratifying all treaty obligations accepted by it on Australia’s behalf.770 While state and territory governments may conduct trade missions and appoint local trade commissioners, the ability to negotiate, sign and enter into force a treaty with another
763 For statistics on the trade relationship see
137 sovereign government rests solely, and unambiguously, with the Commonwealth. This in turn provides unique policy making abilities to agents of the Commonwealth – both political and bureaucratic – that other policy actors cannot have.
On top of national laws, there are also a number of global rules that govern Australia’s trade and investment commitments. For example, FTAs that the Australian Government enters into, regardless of the partner country, need to be consistent with WTO rules. The steps and rules required for FTAs with respect to trade in goods are outlined under Article XXIV of the GATT, but can be summarised as follows:771
• creation of a free-trade area consisting of two or more customs territories; • creation of a mechanism for deciding rules of origin; • eliminate duties and other restrictive regulations on commerce; • ensure barriers against third parties are not increased; and • notify the WTO any decision to enter into a FTA.
The WTO aims to ensure FTAs between two or more member states do not adversely impact other member states not party to the new agreement. As both China and Australia are WTO members, ChAFTA is subject to the restrictions and provisions dictated by the GAT. Bilateral FTA obligations cannot discriminate against other WTO members. Whilst lower rates of tariffs can be assigned, anti- competitive mechanisms designed to exclude third parties from trade cannot be included. Previous trade agreements also provide a de facto rule-in-use as they establish benchmarks against which contemporary negotiations are measured.772
The global financial crisis (GFC) was a major external shock during the period under investigation. The GFC affected many trade-exposed industries and encouraged protectionist tendencies in some sectors.773 China’s ongoing behaviour in the East and South China Seas also had the potential to impact the negotiations. Whilst neither shock ultimately impacted the finalisation of ChAFTA by the Abbott Government, it is worth noting that a significant deterioration in the bilateral relationship had the potential to have a negative impact on the trade relationship.774
Action Arena
As outlined in Chapter 3, the action arena brings together a number of conceptual elements required to make policy. It also focuses attention on discrete action situations. In this particular case, the action
771 Adapted from DFAT. 2005h. Negotiating free trade agreements: a guide, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, p. 25. 772 Free trade agreements with Singapore, the US and Thailand are three examples. 773 See Emerson, Craig. 2012. ‘Protectionism a flawed tactic’, The Australian, 5 May; Garrett, Geoffrey. 2009. After the GFC – Australia and the Chimerica Challenge, Canberra, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September and; Bussiere, Matthieu, Perez-Barreiro, Straub, Roland and Taglioni, Daria. 2010. Protectionist Responses to the Crisis – Global Trends and Implications, Frankfurt am Main, European Central Bank. 774 See Brown, James. 2016. ‘South China Sea row: what’s at stake for Australia’, The Australian, 16 July.
138 arena allows investigation of a set of participants, the positions they fill, the actions they are permitted to undertake, and the information to which they have access in a given action situation. The action situation under investigation in this case study is the policy making activity that stems from the initial decision to launch negotiation made by the Howard Government to the negotiations that followed during the Rudd and Gillard Governments.
Politics Stream
The politics stream is relatively important in this case study. In this stream there are a number of political actors – prime ministers, foreign ministers and trade ministers – contributing to a strong political narrative advocating for the FTA, but with subtle differences between the three governments investigated. The strong links into the bureaucracy evident in case study one are not evident in this case.
In this stream we can see a number of deep core beliefs and policy core beliefs that guide actors and impact their ability in the policy and problem streams to engage. These are outlined in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2 – Deep Core Beliefs and Policy Core Beliefs
Belief Actor Preference for extensive trade Howard, Downer, Vaile Deep Core Belief liberalisation Preference for some trade Rudd, Gillard, Smith, Crean, liberalisation Emerson Preference for an FTA with Howard, Downer China Preference for multilateral trade Rudd, Smith, Emerson, Vaile Policy Core Belief liberalisation Preference for a combination of Gillard, Crean bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation Support for compartmentalising Howard, Downer, Vaile Australia’s relationship with China
The Prime Minister
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John Howard, Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard were very different policy actors across many spectrums of government activity.775 With respect to ChAFTA, however, they acted similarly even where their views on the merits of the FTA diverged.
Many of the FTA’s parameters are defined by how each prime minister conceptualised it in terms of their belief system and views on China and international trade. This manifests in the political narrative that surrounds the FTA, linking it to their government’s economic agenda and interpretation of Australia’s position in the region. It is the most important role the prime minister plays in the negotiations – giving the FTA political legitimacy, authority and adding political incentive to conclude difficult items when talks stall. The prime minister also instils their individual political beliefs into the deal, reflecting the politics of their government and their policy preferences as leader. In ChAFTA, the specific policy parameters underpinning negotiations – that is what would and would not be negotiated, and why negotiations should occur at all – were originally defined under Howard, with the initial feasibility study launched under his imprimatur.
With this in mind, the prime minister performs four major roles:
• setting and prosecuting the political narrative defining political parameters of the FTA; • linking the FTA to broader foreign and strategic policy considerations; • linking the FTA back to their government’s domestic economic and broader trade agenda; and • providing leadership authority to push through negotiation deadlock.
What follows is an account as to how each of the three prime ministers under investigation executed these roles.
Howard believed the negotiation of ChAFTA was the logical – albeit possibly futile – next step in an economic relationship that had grown exponentially during his first three terms of government. 776 Understanding agricultural concessions from the Chinese and convincing Australia’s manufacturing industries to accept greater market access for Chinese products would be difficult to negotiate, Howard recognised the negotiations would be complex – announcing the prospective negotiations by stating Australians ‘should not underestimate the complexity of the negotiating process to come’.777 Further, Howard believed that bilateral trade with or without a FTA would continue to grow and that FTAs were ‘often more important with countries where there was no natural trade relationship’.778 A FTA with China was “not the be-all-and-end-all” of whether Australia maintained a good relationship with China; Australia had products that China required and would demand irrespective of the treaty arrangements
775 As noted previously, neither the second Rudd Government nor Abbott Government’s role in finalising the China FTA are within the scope of this investigation. 776 Howard, 2010, op. cit, p. 509 777 Howard, John. 2005a. Announcement of Free Trade Agreement Negotiations between Australia and China, press release, 18 April 778 Ibid., p. 529
140 in place.779 While Howard believed a link existed between the trade relationship and the diplomatic relationship, he did not feel one need necessarily dictate the other. Howard, therefore, set the parameters of the FTA squarely around trade, removing the political and strategic dimensions of the relationship from the negotiations. He developed and led a trade-focused public political narrative on ChAFTA.780 In some respects, the FTA was to be negotiated in a strategic vacuum, isolated from the other issues in the Australia-China policy sub-system.
Howard had not always prosecuted this distinction. In the earlier 2003 Foreign Policy White Paper Advancing the National Interest, the Howard Government clearly linked a deepening economic relationship with China as a mechanism for greater political and security connectedness.781 That said, for the most part under Howard maintained a pragmatic trade focus on China, keeping other issues including ANZUS, human rights and regional tensions in a separate ‘sealed box’.782 Whilst these issues required attention, Howard fought hard to keep trade and the opportunities it presented separate from everything else. ChAFTA became part of Howard’s broader Chinese economic miracle narrative, as well as a key part of his government’s broader FTA agenda.783
Under Kevin Rudd, the distinction between trade with China and high-diplomacy was more blurred.784 During the first Rudd Government, negotiations continued but were not as heavily emphasised by the prime minister in his public statements on China. For example, on announcing his first visit to China in March 2008, Rudd did not mention ChAFTA with the Chinese leadership. Rather, he said he would be ‘exploring areas for greater bilateral cooperation, including in climate change and trade in services’ and that he would be ‘working closely in that visit with representatives of the Australian business community in seeking to expand their trade and investment opportunities’.785 This was a step away from Howard’s announcements, where ChAFTA was routinely mentioned during official bilateral meetings.786 Trade was to become integrated with the other key areas of the Australia-China policy sub-system under the Rudd Government. The narrative around ChAFTA under Rudd was subordinate to other elements of the Australia-China relationship.
779 Dunn, James. 2014. ‘John Howard on free trade, Australia and the world’, The Australian Financial Review, 18 March 780 Howard, 2005a, op. cit.; Howard, John. 2005b. Doorstop Interview Great Hall of the People, Beijing, China, interview, 19 April and; Howard, John. 2006. Doorstop Interview Shenzen, China, interview, 27 June. 781 DFAT. 2003. Advancing the national interest: Australia’s foreign and trade policy white paper, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia 782 Dobell, Graeme. 2010. ‘China: Lessons from the Rudd era’, The Lowy Interpreter, 3 September 783 This agenda included completed FTAs with the US, Thailand and Singapore, along with FTAs under negotiation with Chile, Malaysia, Japan and ASEAN. 784 It is acknowledged the second Rudd Government did push for a more speedy conclusion to the FTA. See for example Li, Jiabo. 2013. ‘China welcomes faster FTA talks with Australia’, China Daily, 17 July; Sainsbury, Michael. 2013. ‘Moves to fast-track China trade deal’, The West Australian, 16 July and; Murray, Lisa. 2013. ‘Rudd, Xi push for China trade deal’, Australian Financial Review, 9 July. 785 Rudd, Kevin. 2008b. Visit to the United States of America, Europe and People’s Republic of China, media release, 4 March 786 See, Howard, John. 2005c. Visit to China, Japan, Turkey and Greece, media release, 15 April
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Rudd also differed from Howard in how he defined the importance of the FTA in the context of Australia’s broader trading regime. Rudd would refer to the trading relationship with China through multilateral terms multiple times. For example, in a major speech on China, Rudd noted that Australia and China were working together to ‘secure the conclusion of an ambitious WTO Doha Round’.787 Indeed, much of the speech focused on engagement with China through multilateral fora and the participation of Beijing in creating robust regional architecture including ASEAN, APEC and the East-Asia forum. The speech also spoke of values, accepting that there would always be differences between Australian and Chinese values, but that:
‘I do not think that every time we express ourselves on the basis of our values and beliefs that our core friendship towards China should be called into question.’788
Trade was not to be excluded from Rudd’s foreign policy values. Indeed, Rudd understood that FTAs – including that with China – performed an important function, but noted adding further bilateral FTAs to the set of regional trade rules risked ending up with “a bowl of spaghetti rather than an integrated set of free trade agreements”.789 Multilateralism and multilateral trade would remain important for Rudd during his prime ministership, reflecting his broader world view. The FTA therefore fitted into Rudd’s broader China political narrative, one that involved all the elements of the Australia-China policy sub- system, departing from the compartmentalised approach pursued under Howard. This was a narrative that was firmly controlled by the Prime Minister’s Office, purposefully separate from the foreign and trade ministers, DFAT and other bureaucratic foreign policy actors.790
The start of Julia Gillard’s prime ministership was similar to Rudd’s; in announcing her first trip to China she failed to highlight ChAFTA as a key area for discussion with Chinese counterparts.791 Indeed in a number of high profile speeches on the relationship with China, ChAFTA was not mentioned.792 Gillard was sceptical of endorsing FTAs when the benefits to Australia were circumspect, claiming what ‘counts is not the signatures on the bottom line but what the bottom line represents’.793 Gillard notes that much of her government’s trade agenda was left to her Trade Minister, Craig Emerson, who set about breaking down the Doha Round negotiations into smaller parts, and similarly approaching discussions at APEC and the G20.794 Trade was to be bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral under Gillard and
787 Rudd, Kevin. 2010a. Australia and China in the World – 2010 Morrison Lecture, speech delivered in Canberra, Australian National University, 23 April 788 Ibid. 789 Parliament of Australia. 2008. Hansard – House of Representatives – Questions without Notice – Asia- Pacific Region, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, Thursday 5 June, p. 4702 790 Stuart, Nicholas. 2010. Rudd’s Way, Carlton North (VIC), Scribe Public Pty Ltd, pp. 130-131 791 Gillard, Julia. 2011b. Prime Minister to visit Japan, The Republic of Korea and China, media release, 13 April. The same occurred for her second trip in 2013, see Gillard, Julia. 2013b. Prime Minister and Senior Ministers to Visit China, media release, 31 March. 792 See for example Gillard, Julia. 2012c. Speech to the Gala Dinner – Fortieth Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations Between Australia the People’s Republic of China, speech delivered in Canberra, 12 December. 793 Gillard, Julia. 2014. My Story, North Sydney, Random House Australia Pty Ltd, p. 212. 794 Ibid., pp. 212-214. Also confirmed by a former staffer, who noted Gillard had little interest in heavy intervention in the trade portfolio. Former Gillard Staffer, interview with researcher, 20 January 2016.
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Emerson, but it was to be the latter who prosecuted the government’s agenda.795 Like Rudd, there was little grand political narrative dedicated to ChAFTA under Gillard. Nonetheless, at a broad level, Gillard acknowledged embracing free trade had assisted in developing an open, prosperous and competitive economy that withstood the global finance crisis and created jobs.796
Under Gillard, the Australia-China relationship was upgraded in status to that of a Strategic Partnership, involving annual meetings and fora between the Australian prime minister and the Chinese premier as well as between respective foreign ministers and treasurers. 797 Prime Minister Gillard’s linking of ChAFTA to the broader strategic relationship with China was a tactic also pursued by Howard whilst negotiating the Australia-US FTA (something he would not do in the case of China).798 By linking the FTA two important relationships in Australia’s foreign policy calculations, it is afforded a greater sense of legitimacy, even if the overall advantages are not as strong as originally proposed.
Gillard’s memoirs make no significant mention of the FTA when discussing China. Indeed, she admits her attention on the China bilateral relationship was focused on creating a diplomatic infrastructure that ensured annual high-level meetings became a fixture – a successful endeavour culminating in an annual leaders’ meeting, foreign and strategic dialogue, and economic dialogue. 799 For Gillard, the FTA was an important part of the bilateral relationship – but just one part among many. Her foreign policy statement, the Australia in the Asian Century white paper, makes only one small mention of ChAFTA,800 preferring to speak of economic engagement with the region as a whole.801 Like Rudd, Gillard did not lead a strong independent narrative on the FTA.
In terms of linking ChAFTA to domestic economic policy, Gillard was the most proactive of the three prime ministers. In a major speech to the Australia China Economic and Co-operation Trade Forum, Gillard declared that free trade means more jobs and growth and that a high-quality FTA would ‘complement our work for regional trade liberalisation in the multilateral system’.802 She also linked the
795 A former Gillard staffer noted ‘it was all left to Craig – the Prime Minister was not overly interested in steering the FTA debate’. Ibid. 796 Parliament of Australia. 2011b. Hansard – House of Representatives – Questions without Notice – Nation Building, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, Thursday 24 February, p. 1432 and; Parliament of Australia. 2010b. Hansard – House of Representatives – Questions without Notice – Trade, Thursday 30 September, p. 335 797 Gillard, Julia. 2013a. Australia and China Embark on New Bilateral Architecture, media release, 9 April. For discussion on the implications of the Strategic Partnership, see Grigg, Angus. 2013. ‘PM wins new partnership with Beijing’, The Australian Financial Review, 8 April and; Jakobson, Linda. 2013. ‘Australia-China strategic partnership: Two years of fits and starts’, The Lowy Interpreter, 10 April. 798 Allard, Tom and Garnaut, John. 2002. ‘All the way with USA on trade’, The Age, November 15 and; Capling, Ann. ‘Submission from Professor Ann Capling’, submission to the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee Inquiry into the Propose Australia-US Free Trade Agreement, Melbourne, pp. 5-6. 799 Gillard, 2014, op. cit., pp. 172-177. See also Mayer, Sid. 2013. ‘China deal the cornerstone of Gillard’s Asian Century’, The Australian, 10 April. This effort culminated in securing the Australia-China Comprehensive Partnership and the Strategic Economic Dialogue. 800 Commonwealth of Australia. 2012. Australian in the Asian Century White Paper, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, p. 232 801 FTAs get scant attention at all in the white paper, only suggesting they provide ‘concrete benefits and help agriculture and food exporters to compete on equal terms.’ See ibid., p. 218 802 Gillard, 2011c, op. cit.
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ChAFTA to Australia’s broader trade goals. From 2011, negotiations were conducted under the auspices of the government’s Trading Our Way to More Jobs and Prosperity trade policy statement. Whilst declaring that multilateral trade arrangements accrue the largest benefits to Australia, the policy statement reaffirmed the Gillard Government’s commitment to bilateral trade agreements provided that ‘the final deal is in Australia’s national interest…the assessment of national interest should not include how much Australia has to give up, or “pay”, by way of domestic economic reform’.803 The policy statement also committed the government to resolving the impasse in ChAFTA negotiations by committing the nations’ respective trade ministers to a series of high-level dialogues aimed at overcoming major differences.
In 2013, Gillard and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang announced new negotiations rounds after months of inactivity to attempt to get the deal over the line.804 Similar commitments had been made by Howard and then Premier Wen Jiabao in 2006, 805 and Rudd and President Hu agreed to ‘unfreeze’ negotiations in 2007.806 Gillard made the commitment when announcing Australia and China would form a strategic partnership, a major coup for her government and an example of linking strategic and trade policy imperatives.807 But as one scholar notes, one of the reasons ChAFTA took a decade to conclude was that ‘leadership engagement has been far from sufficient’, particularly when compared with other similar agreements.808
The Foreign Minister
The second major policy actor in the politics stream is the Minister for Foreign Affairs (or foreign minister). Four foreign ministers cover the period examined by this case study – Alexander Downer, Stephen Smith, Kevin Rudd and Bob Carr.809 While the prime minister plays a significant role in setting the high-level narrative around the FTA as described above, individual ministers are able to carve out unique perspectives on the policy portfolios under their control. Whilst these four foreign ministers reflected the values and definitions of the China FTA established by the prime minister, each added
803 DFAT. 2011. Gillard Government Trade Policy Statement: Trading our way to more jobs and prosperity, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, July, p. 7 804 Sky News Australia. 2013. ‘PM hails historic deal with China’, Sky News Australia 10 April and; China Daily. 2013. ‘Australia eyes conclusion of FTA talks with China’, China Daily, 8 April. 805 DFAT. 2006. ‘China Free Trade Agreement’, Annual Report 2005-2006, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia 806 DFAT. 2008. ‘China Free Trade Agreement’, Annual Report 2007-2008, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia 807 Although outside the scope of this case study, this was also important in finalising the deal under the Abbott Government, with the prime minister providing the imprimatur for negotiators to conclude within 12 months of the 2013 election and leading political attacks on the ALP over Chinese workers. See for example Australian Broadcasting Corporation. 2013. ‘Abbott confident of getting free-trade deal with China in 12 months’, ABC News, 7 October and; Coorey, Phillip. 2015. ‘Tony Abbott’s Free Trade Agreement message to China – “A deal is a deal”, The Australian Financial Review, July 29. 808 He, 2013, op. cit., p. 678. He compares the level of leadership engagement with the Australia-US FTA and from the Chinese side, the China-New Zealand FTA, finding there was engagement at the prime ministerial and presidential levels in the Australia-China case. 809 This section will not focus on Kevin Rudd, given the discussion of his time as prime minister establishes much of the role he played in the China FTA negotiations.
144 individual emphasises. What is also apparent is that the foreign minister plays less of a hands-on role in terms of steering the negotiations than the trade minister (outlined in the subsequent section). Much like the prime minister, the foreign minister played a high-level and strategic role in this particular case study. At a broad level, all four foreign ministers relevant to this case study performed three major roles:
• contributing to the political narrative established by the prime minister both in terms of defining the political parameters of ChAFTA and linking it to domestic economic policy; • linking of ChAFTA back to Australia’s overall relationship with China and broader strategic; considerations; and • relationship building with key business policy actors.
Firstly, the foreign minister supports the prime minister in establishing the FTA as part of the government’s broader foreign and domestic economic policies. The foreign minister has the contextual authority and expertise to include and exclude elements of the Australia-China relationship in to the FTA debate. For example, Downer was reluctant to link the FTA to discussion on human rights, arguing to do so would be symbolic but “utterly fruitless”.”810Downer believed the basis of the Australia-China relationship was the complementary nature of the two economies.811 Downer was of the view that ‘a free trade agreement with China would see the relationship develop even further’.812 While he shared Howard’s view that trade should be separated from the broader relationship, Downer also believed that as trade underpinned the relationship, ChAFTA would result in broader bilateral advantages. Indeed, speaking at the Australia-China Free Trade Agreement Conference, he clearly linked negotiations to the wider relationship stating it ‘would lend important strategic support to our efforts to build and strengthen the broader bilateral relationship in the future’.813
Whilst Kevin Rudd was an active prime minister with respect to foreign policy, statements by his Foreign Minister, Stephen Smith, were indicative of how the first Rudd Government defined and valued ChAFTA. For example, Smith emphasised that whilst individual FTAs would be negotiated between nations in the Asia Pacific region – Australia and China included – the Rudd Government saw the WTO Doha Round as the way forward on ensuring ‘international structural reform which see openness and access to trading arrangements much more effective in the future’.814 Similarly to Rudd, on a number of occasions Smith’s addresses regarding trade with China failed to mention ChAFTA. 815 Smith
810 The Age. 2005. ‘China human rights not FTA issue: Downer’, The Age, March 14 811 Downer, Alexander. 2005. Speech to the Australia China Business Council, Victoria Branch, speech, Melbourne, 3 October 812 Ibid. 813 Downer, 2004, op. cit. 814 Smith, Stephen. 2008b. Q&A with the media, Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo, question and answer session, Tokyo, 18 December 815 See for example, Smith, Stephen. 2008a. Joint Press Conference with Chinese Foreign Minister, Canberra, 5 February and; Smith, Stephen. 2009e. Visit to China, press release, 20 March. Rudd followed this pattern during his time as Foreign Minister as well, see Rudd, Kevin. 2010b. Foreign Minister to visit China and Republic of Korea, media release, Canberra, 29 October
145 favoured linking broader trade and economic ties with China to the broader relationship and regional integration, rather than highlighting the specifics of the FTA negotiations.
Smith also saw the development of an FTA as a mechanism for moving the relationship beyond day- to-day management and confronting long-term challenges, by providing a structure to the economic partnership between Australia and China and being in both nations’ national and strategic interests.816 He believed that greater strategic cooperation would facilitate greater economic engagement.817 Smith also engaged directly with his Chinese counterparts in pushing forward progress on the negotiations, particularly the area of bilateral investment, advocating for the inclusion of an investment chapter in the FTA to facilitate Chinese capital investment.818
Finally, the foreign minister plays an important bridging role between business and government policy makers. Both the ACCI and ACTU see using the foreign minister as an important conduit to engage the processes of decision making in the politics stream and so this portfolio is very influential in any trade negotiation.819 The ACTU in particular used discussion with the foreign minister, particularly under Rudd and Gillard, to link the FTA to broader international labour rights.820
The Trade Minister
As with the foreign minister, four trade ministers are directly relevant to this case study – Mark Vaile, Warren Truss, Simon Crean and Craig Emerson.821 The trade minister is ultimately responsible for progress of the FTA, and on instruction of the cabinet, approves the individual items up for negotiation and the concessions and demands Australia is willing to discuss with respect to individual goods and services. The decision as to how involved in the negotiations the trade minister gets is ultimately a decision made by the individual minister, the prime minister and the Cabinet Whilst the trade minister participates in high-level activities such as establishing narratives and defining the FTA, they are also responsible for the management of the negotiations. Of all the actors in the political stream, the trade minister was the most involved in ChAFTA. The trade minister is also the Australian representative on the Australia-China Joint Ministerial Economic Commission which aims to advance the bilateral
816 Smith, Stephen. 2009a. Australia-China Relations: A Long-Term View, speech given to the Australia National University’s China Institute, Canberra, 26 October; Smith, Stephen. 2009b. Interview – Phoenix Television, Beijing, interview, 26 March; and Smith, Stephen. 2009d. Press Conference, Beijing, 27 March 817 Smith, 2008a, op. cit 818 Smith, 2009d, op. cit. and; Smith, Stephen. 2009c. Media conference at Sichuan University, China, 24 March 819 ACCI, interview with researcher, 28 May 2012. ACTU, interview with research, 17 July 2012. 820 ACTU, interview with research, 17 July 2012. 821 The title of Minister for Trade had varying names during the period of investigation (including additional responsibility for other minor portfolios). This chapter will use ‘trade minister’ to represent responsibility for the trade portfolio. Stephen Smith also briefly fulfilled the role of trade minister. His views towards the FTA, however, are captured in the section above.
146 economic and trade relationship, including through bilateral treaty architecture, 822 and co-chairs the annual High-Level Economic Cooperation Dialogue.
With this in mind, the trade minister performs five major roles:
• highlights the role of the FTA in the government trade and export policy narrative; • responsibility for the administration of the negotiations and trade policy areas; • authority over ‘red lines’ and what can and cannot be negotiated; • responsibility for carrying negotiation decisions from cabinet to lead negotiators; and • relationship building with key business policy actors.
The trade minister supports the prime minister in linking the specifics of the FTA back to the government’s overall trade policy narrative. For example, Vaile was pivotal in the initial stages of ChAFTA’s development, signing with his Chinese counterpart the initial economic framework in 2003. At a broad level, Vaile argued that free trade opened up markets and provided opportunities for Australia’s exporters.823 He believed that trade was essential for delivering prosperity to Australia and that it was “central to our way of life”, with free trade and bilateral arrangements often “delivering deeper and faster gains” compared to multilateral negotiations.824 Bilateral trade agreements were seen to foster closer economic integration within the Asia-Pacific region. 825 Nonetheless, Vaile saw the conclusion of complex multilateral agreements as the Australian Government’s “greatest trade priority”, particularly the WTO.826
Vaile was responsible for meetings with the Chinese for the initial six months of discussion, and once a mutual understanding of Australia and China’s respective trade and investment regime was reached, he deferred to negotiators who would meet every three months.827 He would have DFAT pursue a simple principle throughout the negotiations:
822 DFAT. 2007a. ‘North Asia: China: High-level visits’, in Annual Report 2006-2007, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia 823 Parliament of Australia. 2006. House of Representatives – Official Hansard, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, Thursday 9 February, p. 72 824 Vaile, Mark. 2005a. Australia’s active trade policy, speech to the Economist Group Roundtable, Canberra, 22 June; Vaile, Mark. 2005c. Speech at the Engaging China 2005 Conference, speech, Sydney, 8 June and; Vaile, Mark. 2005e. Trade – Securing Our Future, speech to the National Press Club, 13 April. 825 Vaile, Mark. 2004. Australia’s Trade Prospects: Opportunities and Challenges, speech to the Federation of Automotive Products Manufacturers, Coolum (QLD), 22 July 826 Vaile, 2005c, op. cit. and; Vaile, 2005e, op. cit. This sentiment is also captured in the Trade 2005 Statement launched by Vaile and drafted by DFAT. See DFAT. 2005a. ‘1.1.6 Trade development/policy coordination and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation’, Annual Report 2004-2005, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia. See also Vaile, Mark. 2006. Trade Negotiations and the Public Service, speech to the Australian Public Service Commission Lunchtime Seminar Series, Canberra, 14 September 827 Vaile, Mark. 2005d. Towards and Australia-China Free Trade Agreement, speech to the Australia-China Business Council, Canberra, 22 November
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“Trade negotiations can never be approached from a zero sum mentality. To conclude a trade deal, both sides must feel that they have got something worthwhile.”828
Alternatively, Crean, trade minister in the Rudd Government, believed the various strands of multilateral, regional and bilateral trade agreements run in tandem as a ‘self-reinforcing cascade effect’.829 Crean argued that it was both politically and practically possible to support multiple processes aimed at free trade and economic integration, yet he also echoed the Rudd Government’s general position that the biggest outcomes occur through multilateral liberalisation. It was also under Crean that the negotiations become bogged down, and he acknowledged that political will and stimulus were required to reach agreement. 830 Crean clearly articulated that Australia’s “engagement with China isn’t just about concluding an FTA”, but rather ChAFTA was important as it would provide a framework leading to an improved overall trading relationship831
Emerson would go even further, suggesting that a comprehensive FTA with China was “just beyond both countries” and was looking to conclude a limited agriculture deal with China instead.832 Emerson believed that the potential of the FTA was overrated, stating there was no interest in ‘collecting trophies for the national mantelpiece…if they are nothing of the sort and of token value to our country’.833 His concerns about the inability of Canberra and Beijing to reach an agreement were a result of the Chinese Government’s demands that Australia lift its foreign investment restrictions, a politically sensitive topic for the electorate.834 Emerson felt a pragmatic solution would be to siphon-off issues both nations could agree to and create smaller sector-specific deals to liberalise trade in limited areas. This position is significant given Emerson’s training as an economist and core belief in the benefit of trade liberalisation, and led to him focusing on the specific areas of the trading relationship rather than the FTA in the later stages of his tenure as trade minister.835 He was also responsible for developing a trade approach based on five guiding principles set out in the Gillard Government’s paper Trading Our Way to More
828 Vaile, 2006, op. cit. 829 Crean, Simon. 2010. ‘Regional economic integration as a foundation for prosperity – an Australian perspective’, speech to the ANU conference on Asian Economic Integration, Canberra 830 Sainsbury, Michael and Callick, Rowan. 2009. ‘Crean looks for new way as China trade negotiator quits’, The Australian, 11 May 831 Ibid. 832 He, 2013, op. cit., p. 677. See also Callick, Rowan and Kitney Damon. 2013. ‘China Trade Deal Scaled Back as Beijing Seeks $1bn Investment Approval Threshold’, The Australian, 19 April; Packham, Ben. 2013. ‘China FTA Abandoned’, The Australian, 19 April and; White, Andrew. 2013. ‘Free trade talks deadlocked over foreign investment restrictions’, The Australian, 18 April. 833 Emerson, Craig. 2010. The Future of Trade Policy in an Uncertain World – Address to the Lowy Institute, speech, Sydney, December 10 and; Janda, Michael. 2012. ‘Emerson says China free trade deal overrated’, ABC Australia, 3 April. 834 Kitney, Geoff. 2012. ‘FTA “can’t be relaxed” for China’, Australian Financial Review, 26 July. 835 See for example Emerson, Craig. 2013. Address to Australia China Business Council, speech, Melbourne, 15 February
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Jobs and Prosperity. These five principles established a basic set of rules against which Emerson used to guide the day-to-day administration of the ChAFTA negotiations.836
The trade minister is responsible for siging-off – sometimes in conjunction with the cabinet – on major line items for discussion with Chinese counterparts. Whilst the lead negotiator has some flexibility during the negotiations owing to the vast amount of complex detail being negotiated, the major parameters and the most sensitive items are decided upon in the politics stream by the trade minister.837 This is the fourth, and arguably most important, role of the trade minister. However, it can be hard for external observers – including large corporations – to know exactly what these red lines are.838 Amplifying this difficulty is the Australian practice of not to releasing draft trade agreement text prior to introducing agreements to parliament. This is not the case in other countries, including in Europe.
The trade minister also plays an important role in liaising with business interests. Both business association interviewed for this study noted that individual meetings with the trade minister were key to making sure their views were known in Cabinet.839 Furthermore, it has become customary for trade ministers to travel with business delegations when visiting major trading partners. For example, in 2008 Simon Crean hosted a Business Club Australia event in Beijing bringing together 3000 business people and was accompanied by a clean energy business delegation. 840 A similar trip accompanied by business occurred in 2009,841 and Craig Emerson was accompanied by one of the largest ever trade delegations on a visit in 2011.842 Visits such as these provide highly sought after access to the minister and ensures that the views of accompanying delegate on trade barriers facing Australian companies in China are heard.843
Other Ministers
Given the wide-ranging nature of any FTA, particularly with Australia’s largest trading partner, other ministers were involved in the negotiations on an ad hoc basis. A number of business groups indicated the Treasurer was exceptionally important at the political level when it comes to investment and exports policy.844 One such group indicated that the foreign investment oversight responsibility of the Treasurer meant his or her input into the ChAFTA debate was crucial, along with the work of the China Economic Group within the Treasury.845 This occurred at various times when the subject matter fell under the
836 DFAT, 2011, op. cit. 837 This has been confirmed by off the record discussions with Australian officials familiar with Australia’s approach to the China FTA. 838 ACCI, interview with researcher, 28 May 2012 839Ibid. Also Business Group A, interview between policy director and researcher, 19 March 2011. 840 Crean, Simon. 2008b. Trade Minister Visit to China, press release, Canberra, 6 August 841 Crean, Simon. 2009. Trade Minister Visit to Shanghai and Inland China, press release, Canberra, 3 May 842 Emerson, Craig. 2011d. Minister leads Australia-China 2.0 Trade Mission, press release, 2 August 843 ACCI, interview with researcher, 28 May 2012 844 Ibid. and; Business Group A, interview between policy director and researcher, 19 March 2011. 845 Business Group A, interview between policy director and researcher, 19 March 2011
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Treasurer’s portfolio, such as Wayne Swan’s comments on state-owned enterprises and their rights to invest under ChAFTA.846
The Treasury’s subject matter expertise over issues such as foreign direct investment make it a key conduit for business associations and corporations to influence FTA negotiations – particularly given their existing relationship in the domestic economic context.847 This also accords with how the business groups interviewed situate the FTA within Australia’s broader relationship with – by making the Treasurer their key point of contact, the discussion will always be on the trade and finance elements of the FTA, avoiding the more sticky political and geo-political issues associated with the two broader policy sub-systems related to this case.848
Policy Stream
The activities of policy actors in the policy stream is very much guided by the Australian Government approach to treaty negotiation. In the early years of ChAFTA negotiations under the Howard Government, the FTA negotiating process was spelled out in Negotiating free-trade agreements: a guide.849 Under Rudd and Gillard, this matured into a five-stage process, with DFAT being the lead bureaucratic policy stream actor, responsible for coordinating the overall process. Whilst some elements are performed by parliament, the cabinet and relevant ministers, the process is run by DFAT, which provides the required expertise and policy advice. However, despite centralised control by DFAT, there are a number of other stages orchestrated by other government agencies as indicated below:850
Table 5.3: Stages of FTA negotiation
Stage Action and Responsible Organisation 1. Assessment of feasibility • Feasibility study conducted (DFAT) (overall DFAT managed ) • Consultation with stakeholder conducted (including state governments) and calls for public submissions made (DFAT) 2. Decision to launch • Consideration by the Prime Minister who seek agreement negotiations (overall to launch negotiations (DPM&C) DPM&C managed) • FTA negotiations jointly announced with partner nation (Ministerial)
846 Swan was very reluctant to change existing laws on investment by state-owned enterprises in the China FTA. See Kitney, 2012, op. cit. 847 Business Group A, interview between policy director and researcher, 19 March 2011 848 The agriculture minister also played a role in the negotiations at various points, see Skuthorp, Lucy. 2009. ‘Agriculture must be part of China free trade deal: Burke’, Farmonline, 15 April and; Australian Associated Press. 2009. ‘FTA a focus of Burke’s trip to China’, The Age, April 15. 849 DFAT, 2005h, op. cit. 850 See Mugliston, 2009, op. cit., pp. 17-18. The role of the individual organisations has been confirmed by the researcher by informal discussions with officials. Michael Mugliston is DFAT’s special negotiator for a variety of trade agreements, including AANZFTA and RCEP.
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• Minister for Trade makes statement to Parliament (Ministerial) • Second call for public submissions (DFAT) • Negotiating team created (DFAT) 3. Substantive negotiations • Cabinet approves overall objectives, strategy and (overall DFAT managed) commitments Australia is prepared to offer – known as negotiating mandate (DPM&C) • Negotiations commence and continue until agreement reached (DFAT) • Ongoing consultation and text checked for legalities (DFAT and line agencies) • Cabinet amendments made as necessary (DFAT/DPM&C) 4. Conclusion of negotiations • Announcement that negotiations have concluded (DFAT) and legal verification • Cabinet approves final package (DPM&C) (overall DFAT) • FTA legally verified (DFAT)
5. Ministerial signing and • First submission to Executive Council parliamentary scrutiny • Preparation of documents and signing (overall DPM&C and • Details of FTA made public Parliamentary Services) • Tabling of the ‘National Interest Analysis’ in Parliament
• JSCOT examine NIA and reports to Parliament • Amending legislation to enable FTA prepared • Government responds to JSCOT recommendations if necessary • Entry in force • Registration with UN and WTO (DFAT)
This process outlines the rules to which the federal bureaucracy must adhere. As discussed in Part A of this thesis, routines and processes are important parts of policy making work within government institutions and so adherence to this process ultimately structured much of the behaviour of the public servants involved in ChAFTA negotiations. As in case study one, bureaucratic actors from the federal government perform most of the policy making roles in this stream.
In this stream we can see a number of deep core beliefs and policy core beliefs that guide the actions of actors, and guide engagement with actors in the politics and problems stream. While difficult to assign these beliefs to the bureaucratic actors examined in this section, beliefs clearly articulated by these institutions are outlined in Table 5.4.
Table 5.5 – Deep Core Beliefs and Policy Core Beliefs
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Belief Actor Deep Core Belief Preference for extensive trade N/A liberalisation Preference for some trade DFAT liberalisation Preference for an FTA with N/A China Preference for multilateral trade DAFF Policy Core Belief liberalisation Preference for a combination of DFAT bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation Support for compartmentalising DFAT to an extent Australia’s relationship with China
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DFAT is the central agency tasked with Australia’s foreign and trade policy making, including managing and negotiating FTAs. ChAFTA fits squarely within DFAT’s policy remit. This allows DFAT to restrict access to the action arena and access to information, particularly for non-government policy actors or periphery policy actors from within government. It must be remembered, however, that any department’s scope to influence policy is dependent on the government of the day. In this context, it is worth noting that some in DFAT felt the department had been ‘reduced to little more than a visa- processing offshoot of the prime minister’s office’ under Kevin Rudd.851 Given this, prior to examining DFAT’s main tasks drawing-up ChAFTA, it is important to establish how DFAT conceptualises FTAs in the context of Australia’s broader trade agenda. This will assist in discussing why some non-government actors access DFAT’s policy making infrastructure and others do not in the final chapter of this thesis.
At a broad level, DFAT defines FTAs as elements of Australia’s broader foreign policy designed to:
‘…create a “cascade effect” of trade liberalisation where the reductions to barriers to Australia’s exports are sought through all approaches available, whether through multilateral trade liberalisation or bilateral or regional approaches.’852
851 Stuart, 2010, op. cit., p. 130 852 DFAT. 2010. Review of Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements – Submission to the Australian Productivity Commission, Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, p. 3. A similar position was put by former Secretary Dennis Richardson - Richardson, interview with researcher, 13 June 2011.
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FTAs are therefore part of the foreign policy makers’ toolkit to be used with other mechanisms, including multilateral and unilateral trade liberalisation, when pursuing a more liberal international trading environment. This aligns with much of the narrative outlined in the politics stream above. It is unsurprising that DFAT’s outlook and definition of Australia’s trading regime aligns with that articulated by all three governments under investigation, after all, DFAT must develop and implement the policies of its political masters. However, DFAT’s penchant for multilateral approaches is more aligned with the overall trading positions of the Rudd and Gillard Governments. As DFAT notes,
‘…the multilateral approach to trade liberalisation offers the most potential trade gains for Australia, and is therefore the favoured approach for policy makers.853
This position remained relatively constant under all three governments, with DFAT continuing to provide resources for extensive multilateral trade liberalisation efforts despite the Howard Government’s shift in policy focus. On FTAs, DFAT sees the agreements as delivering economic benefits to the countries involved more quickly than through the WTO. Bilateral trade arrangements are also able to tackle issues in more depth and address trade issues not fully negotiated during WTO rounds, such as investment.854 This is complemented by plurilateral or regional negotiations such as RCEP, which includes China. The same can be construed for DFAT’s position regarding ChAFTA – an important mechanism for increasing trade, but one that should complement multilateral and regional efforts.855 Consequently, non-government policy actors sharing a similar issue definition to DFAT stand a better chance of achieving meaningful engagement.856
Nonetheless, any FTA negotiated by DFAT with China has to result in a high quality and comprehensive agreement in order to make the effort worthwhile.857 As former DFAT Secretary Ashton Calvert notes, above all else, a FTA has to have a clear trade and economic rationale.858 Calvert believed the trade and economic rationale should be the ‘primary focus of the Australian government’s consultations with the private sector’.859 The geo-political and security elements of ChAFTA were not areas of discussion for outside government despite Calvert believing the FTA was a means of ‘strategically positioning’ for
853 DFAT, 2010, op. cit., p. 4. It has been difficult to prove without doubt that this position was the same under the Howard Government given its preference for bilateral trade negotiations and DFATs obligations to deliver on the policy objectives of the government of the day. However, given institutional culture and policy preferences evolve over decades, not years, it is likely that the favouring of the multilateral approach has been consistent since the combining of foreign affairs and trade departments in 1987. 854 Ibid., p. 4. 855 The major regional negotiation relevant to the China context is RCEP. Commitment to the multilateral liberalisation efforts has been a long-standing DFAT policy, see for example Calvert, Ashton. 1999. ‘Secretary’s Speech: Multilateral Trade Negotiation – The Challenges and Potential Rewards’, speech to the Fourth Annual Trade Lecture to the Melbourne Business School, Melbourne, 28 April. 856 The ACTU pointed out the differences between the approach to the FTAs with respect to labour rights under the Coalition and Labor. ACTU, interview with researcher, 17 July 2012. 857 Murray, Lisa. 2013. ‘Farmers push for FTA with China’, Australian Financial Review, 3 June. This also aligned with the political policy actors’ view in the policy stream. 858 Calvert, Ashton. 2004. Closing Speech at the Australia-China FTA Conference – Future Directions, Sydney, August 859 Ibid.
153 the long term.860 Calvert was attempting to restrict policy actors engaging in the FTA process, limiting engagement to the economic dimensions. It is a view shared by former Secretary Dennis Richardson, who had a more nuanced position, suggesting that whilst non-government actors, particularly business, had little interest in the strategic dimensions of the FTA, they had to be consulted on the economic dimensions.861
With this contextualisation of FTAs in mind, DFAT can be seen to be undertaking five main tasks in making ChAFTA:
• early feasibility study and initial consultation process; • day-to-day management of the FTA; • conduct of negotiations; • manage external consultation processes; and • coordinate the government’s position on FTA.
Firstly, DFAT was charged with undertaking the analysis, consultation and scope for whether an FTA with China was feasible. Stemming the 2003 Australia-China Trade and Economic Framework, this first task manifested in a 2005 joint feasibility study, which highlighted a number of priority areas for future work:
• understanding barriers to trade and investment flows in goods, services and investment between Australia and China that could be remedied by an FTA; • an assessment of the impact if existing barriers were removed; and • an examination of how an FTA between Australia and China would fit into the international trading system.862
Despite the complex relationship between Australia and China, the study situated the proposed FTA almost solely in an economic context, ignoring other key areas of the relationship – notably geostrategic issues, human rights and environmental protection.863 This aligned well with the views of John Howard outlined above – the need to position trade as a separate part of the relationship was reflected in the study.864
Following the study, Calvert convened an Australia-China FTA conference involving government and business representatives.865 An interdepartmental committee (IDC) flowed from this conference that
860 Ibid. 861 Richardson, interview with researcher, 13 June 2011 862 DFAT, 2005b, op. cit., p. 7 863 This is important as it limits the avenue for engagement with the FTA discussion by non-government organisation that do not have an economic focus, particularly human rights and environmental groups. 864 This too is not surprising as such feasibility studies tend to have terms of reference that focus on the economic costs and benefits of FTAs, ignoring other issues such as strategic relations. See DFAT, 2005b, op. cit., p. 7. 865 See DFAT. 2005f. ‘Feasibility study points to benefits of Australia-China FTA’, Annual Report 2004-2005, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia and; Ashton, 2004, op. cit.
154 established the framework for how the negotiations would commence, both in terms of the subject matter that the negotiations should engage with and the outcomes desired by both countries. This aligned with the parameters for what could and could not be discussed established in the politics stream by the cabinet and ministers, and the expectations set out by business at the conference.866 The IDC provided DFAT policy makers with the subject matter they could negotiate and the structure through which to commence negotiations.
Secondly, It is DFAT’s responsibility to appoint a lead negotiator for each trade negotiation. The lead negotiator does not necessary mirror government views on the prospects of achieving a deal. Indeed one ChAFTA lead negotiator was on record as believing that the “Chinese Government does not want the FTA; they have no interest in doing that”,867 which was contrary to much government rhetoric. This can be problematic, as the minister and chief negotiator work closely in determining the bargaining position Australia takes to negotiations
DFAT’s FTA branches were responsible for liaising with other parts of the Department to ensure all information pertinent to the negotiations or advice to ministers was collated and presented in a coherent manner. The nature of the departmental branches responsible for FTAs can change depending on the relationship with the trade minister and DFAT’s resource priorities. For example, upon commencing ChAFTA negotiations, a China FTA Taskforce responsible for the overall day-to-day management of ChAFTA’s development was established. 868 Under the Rudd Government, perhaps reflecting the preferences outlined in the politics stream, dedicated staff numbers in the China FTA Taskforce were cut.869 On staffing more broadly Capling and Ravenhill identified that DFAT’s negotiating capacity has been diminished as a result of consistent cutbacks, narrowing the Department’s world view and interpretation of how an FTA will enhance the national interest.870
Thirdly, DFAT was responsible for leading the Australian delegation when negotiating with the Chinese and provides the majority of the negotiators. 871 DFAT is also developed the structure of the negotiations. ChAFTA’s structure started with a memorandum signed between DFAT and its Chinese counterpart, the Ministry of Commerce (MoC),872 noting that the joint feasibility study recommended
866 See for example Morgan, Hugh. 2004. Key issues for an FTA, Business Council of Australia, Sydney, 12 August 867 Ibid. 868 This was established under Minister Vaile, see Parliament of Australia. 2005. Hansard – House of Representatives – Questions in Writing – Free Trade Agreements, Monday 31 October, p. 163 869 Parliament of Australia. 2010b. Hansard - Main Committee – Committees – Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Join Committee, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, Monday 12 September, p. 9768 870 Capling and Ravenhill, 2015, op. cit., p. 509. See also George, Anna. 2014. ‘AUSFTA: Unintended Consequences, Political Blindness or Governance Failures?’, paper at Academy of Social Sciences in Australia workshop on Ten Years Since the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement, University of New South Wales, September 25-26. 871 Outcomes from each round of the negotiations is available online – see
155 that an FTA would not only be feasible, but would be beneficial for both countries.873 It decreed that ‘all sectors would be negotiable, involving liberalisation and facilitation of goods and services, and the issue of investment flows would also be addressed.’874 Indeed this mandate was confirmed by Vaile, stating:
‘…senior trade officials will map the way forward for the negotiations, operating on the principle that they will be comprehensive, covering agriculture, goods, services and investment, and be completed as single undertaking.’875
This meant the entire gamut of the Australia-China trading relationship was effectively up for negotiation between DFAT and the MoC – the procedures for which were decided in the first round of talks.876 The MOU also noted both nations’ commitment to the WTO, meaning that both parties were restricted in their actions by the rules ascribed by the WTO for bilateral trade negotiations, including non- discrimination against all other WTO non-party members.877 Therefore, negotiators had the political imprimatur to negotiate a wide-ranging and high quality deal, as well as a structured agreement influenced by the WTO system.878 DFAT and the MoC ultimately agreed that the negotiations would be structured through four parallel working groups: agriculture, quarantine and technical regulations and standards; trade in goods, and government procurement; trade in services, investment and electronic commerce; intellectual property, competition policy, transparency, and legal and institutional issues.879
The relationship between the minister and negotiators is pivotal during treaty negotiations, and consequently, the negotiator as an individual becomes an important policy actor. Indeed, the style, tactics and manner of the negotiator dictates the flow of the Australian negotiating team and is reinforced by the authority given to senior executive service employees in DFAT.880 The lead negotiator is a conduit between the actors in the policy stream and the actors in the politics stream – particularly the trade minister.
Economic impact assessments are another important mechanism used by DFAT to establish negotiating positions and opens up the process to experts in the relevant impact discipline. Monash University, for example, conducted independent modelling of the proposed FTA prior to the
873 DFAT. 2005g. Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia and the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Public of China on the Recognition of China’s Full Market Economy Status and the Commencement of Negotiations of a Free Trade Agreement Between Australia and the People’s Republic of China, signed in Beijing on 18 April 874 Ibid. 875 DFAT. 2005c. Australia-China FTA Negotiations: First Round of Negotiations, 26 May 876 Ibid. 877 See DFAT. WTO and free trade agreements, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia 878 For an overview of the earlier negotiation rounds see Clare and Gao, 2008, op. cit. 879 DFAT. 2005e. Australia-China FTA Negotiations: Third Round of Negotiations, 11 November 880 This observation was made in personal communication with a former DFAT officer.
156 commencement of the negotiations.881 Monash and DFAT both claimed as a result of this study that between 2006-15, ChAFTA would increase Australia’s economy by $24 billion.882
Fourthly, operating in tandem to both roles two and three, DFAT runs an external consultation process for policy actors outside government, allowing them to engage in the FTA process. As Richardson notes, ‘you can’t go and negotiate a FTA with any country without active consultation with your major domestic elements affected by a FTA’. 883 The mechanism for this engagement has largely been through the call for submissions from interested parties and via industry briefings. On the latter, in 2007 alone DFAT conducted 380 consultations. 884 DFAT coordinated submissions for both the initial feasibility study as well as the actual FTA negotiations, with the process remaining open through all three governments under investigation.885 The China FTA Taskforce managed the submission process, analysed the submission and liaised with the policy experts in the two policy branches to ensure key domestic concerns are understood.
DFAT, both in Canberra, in state offices and at overseas posts, also liaised with business through ‘regular and varied calls from industry associations and individual businesses to expedite current FTA negotiations and for an expansion of the FTA agenda.’886 Whilst these briefings and contacts are useful, the ACCI makes the point that briefings over a protracted period make it difficult for industry to remain actively involved, let alone actively contribute to negotiations. The longevity of the negotiations, according to the ACCI, has made business less likely to engage with the process of establishing the FTA as business interests are more immediate than a ten year FTA negotiation.887
In summarising the importance of external consultation, one DFAT trade officer noted:
‘In order to provide domestic decision-makers, including the Minister for Trade and Cabinet, with a balanced assessment of Australia’s defensive and offensive interests, it is necessary to have clear and regular consultation with domestic stakeholders, business and other interested groups such as unions and other non- government organisations, and effective processes to consult across Commonwealth agencies and with state and territory governments. Effective communication and solid working relationships with FTA negotiating partners is of equal importance, given the various levels at which negotiations take place – expert working groups, senior officials concerned with broader policy issues, and
881 Mai, Yinhua. 2005. Modelling the Potential Benefits of an Australia-China Free Trade Agreement, Clayton (Vic), The Centre of Policy Studies 882 Ibid. 883 Richardson, interview with researcher, 13 June 2011 884 DFAT, 2007a, op. cit. 885 A full list of these submissions see
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Ministerial level contacts. Good working relationships are particularly important in the case of Ministers who are required to act decisively.’888
Finally, DFAT coordinated a whole-of-government approach to ChAFTA through the IDC mechanism, and by including members from other agencies on the negotiating teams. DFAT also coordinated state government consultation through the Ministerial Council on International Trade (MCIT) chaired by the trade minister through COAG.889 Sitting underneath this structure is the MCIT Standing Committee of Officials, which is jointly chaired by DFAT and Austrade. Whilst not a focus for this study, the role of state governments in this particular case is interesting, with none of the non-government interviewees contacted nominating their state representatives as playing a major part in their engagement with the FTA negotiations. This seems to be counter to what DFAT thinks, seeing state agencies as a useful conduit into the business community within their jurisdictions, and working closely with DFAT’s state offices to promote trade and investment opportunities.890
Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet
DPM&C is becoming an increasingly powerful bureaucratic policy actor across all areas of government activity – foreign policy is no exception. 891 DPM&C’s role has been limited during the period of investigation. The negotiations did not progress far enough along the process outlined at the beginning of this section to activate its main treaty making responsibilities. Further, in the trade negotiations sphere, DPM&C does not have the resources, expertise or authority to contribute in any substantive manner to the way ChAFTA was negotiated. Nonetheless, there are three major roles played by DPM&C:
• coordinate with DFAT the passage of the treaty through cabinet processes; • advise and guide prime ministerial interventions in the negotiations; and • link the FTAs to the broader economic reform agenda.
As indicated in the treaty making process outlined at the beginning of this section, DPM&C’s role in ChAFTA during the period of this case study, was predominantly in the initial decisions to instigate negotiations and through its coordination role with the cabinet. DPM&C also advised on prime ministerial intervention into the ChAFTA debate and the linking of the FTA back to the broader domestic economic agenda. DPM&C also chairs the Commonwealth-States Standing Committee on Treaties, which receives regular briefings by DFAT negotiators.892
888 See Mugliston, 2009, op. cit. p. 16 889 Ibid., p. 6 890 Two state agencies were contacted for interview, but none were willing to participate in this study. 891 This trend is discussed extensively throughout Weller et al., 2011, op. cit. 892 See Mugliston, 2009, op. cit., p. 6. This mechanism facilitates ratification of treaties through the Parliament.
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It is difficult to ascertain the exact relationship between DPM&C’s International Division and the Prime Minister’s Office, let alone the information provided on ChAFTA. Nonetheless, as DPM&C has the sole responsibility of advising the prime minister on trade matters, this relationship is important in positioning the ChAFTA as a part of the government’s broader economic agenda. For example, the Australia in the Asian Century White Paper was managed by DPM&C, drawing together contributions from various government portfolios. 893 The prime minister’s department is unique in this respect as while DFAT and other agencies attempt to link ChAFTA to other domestic policy goals, it is only DPM&C that has a broad policy remit that covers all areas of government activity. This gives DPM&C the role of ensuring ChAFTA is embedded in the broader economic growth and reform agendas of all three governments under investigation.
Other Federal Departments
As pointed out by Richardson, other federal departments are involved in inputting expertise and leveraging their domestic networks to contribute to the negotiations. Whilst DFAT plays the lead role, FTA negotiations are a whole-of-government undertaking, with multiple federal bureaucracies assisting with the process of trade negotiation. Expertise and liaison are the two main tasks of other federal departments.
Firstly, subject matter expertise for many areas of policy that ChAFTA covers is housed in departments other than DFAT or DPM&C. For example, the Treasury advises on the development and implementation of foreign investment regimes within Australia’s broader trade policy initiatives. 894 Similarly, the Department of Industry provides DFAT with advice on tariffs, rules of origin, services, investment, trade remedies and standards, all key and sometimes controversial elements of the negotiations with China.895
Importantly, federal line departments such as the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF), play key consultative roles for DFAT. DAFF has extensive relationships with the agricultural industry and supports a significant research effort through its Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences and Biosecurity Australia agency. It is also important in the context of providing expertise to the China FTA team in relation to sanitary and phytosanitary requirements, export subsidies and technical barriers to trade. 896 DAFF has noted that its preference on trade liberalisation is through a comprehensive outcome to the WTO Doha Round, and commitment of resources to Doha is prioritised over bilateral FTAs, including China.897 DAFF liaises with DFAT through
893 Commonwealth of Australia, 2012, op. cit. 894 The Treasury. 2012. Strategic Framework 2012-13, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, p. 3 895 Department of Industry. 2012. Free Trade Agreements, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia. The Department of Industry was contacted for interview, but was unable to participate in this study. 896 DAFF. 2010. Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry submission to Productivity Review of Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, p. 1. DAFF was contacted for interview, but was unable to participate in this study. 897 Ibid., p. 1
159 an IDC that includes Biosecurity Australia and where market access issues are discussed and biosecurity concerns are noted.898 The IDC model provides line agencies an opportunity to input policy concerns directly into the negotiation process. The Department of Industry provides similar portfolio- specific advice through the same mechanism, as does the Department of Immigration on labour and people movement.899
The non-state domestic policy actor linkages maintained by the line departments are important in this arrangement, with Richardson claiming that you simply would not engage agricultural industries like beef, for example, without involving DAFF and using their networks.900 This also allows stakeholders such as agricultural groups through DAFF or financial groups through the Treasury, to engage DFAT via their more common domestic departmental linkages. Indeed in the case of some of sectors of the economy, the connections maintained by DFAT are substantially less robust than those of the federal and indeed, state, line agencies. DFAT has no natural constituency in the business community through which to maintain strong linkages to receive advice and recommendations.
Further, agencies such as the Productivity Commission provide regular reports into areas of government activity that guide future government action in a given policy space – FTAs included. In 2010, the Commission conducted a review into the value of FTAs finding little evidence from business that bilateral FTAs had provided substantial economic benefits, and that inadequate assessment of other policy options to encourage trade and inadequate consultation once negotiations had been undertaken. 901 While not specifically impacting on ChAFTA, the review does provide agencies responsible for trade negotiations with recommendations on improving their processes.
Problem Stream
The problem stream is where many non-state policy actors can contribute to the development of ChAFTA and the surrounding political narrative. Typically, non-state policy actors do this by advocating for or against the proposed trade deal, highlighting the benefits and impacts of the FTA based upon their core missions and constituencies. Their role is to influence actors in the politics and policy stream, convincing them through direct or public advocacy that a particular course of action is in the national interest. To be successful, it is useful if actors in this stream can link their views to that of the prevailing ChAFTA narrative established by the prime minister and other political actors in the politics stream. For larger and well-resourced non-state policy actors, relationships with the key policy actors within the politics stream are possible, particularly for large businesses or business groups. However, for many smaller business or non-business policy actors, participation in FTA development is limited to
898 Condon, Jon. 2013. ‘Trade access issues greatly limit China beef export opportunity’, Beef Central 899 Department of Immigration and Border Protection. 2015. Inquiry into the proposed Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the People’s Republic of China (Canberra, 17 June 2015), Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, pp. 4-10 900 Richardson, interview with researcher, 13 June 2011 901 Productivity Commission. 2010. Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, pp. xx, xxiv and xxix
160 consultation with actors in the policy stream, particularly through formal consultation mechanism and outreach programmes.
One of the main mechanisms through which actors in this stream can participate in the policy making process is through the consultation and submission processes outlined above in the policy stream section. ChAFTA had both formal and informal processes for consultation – both through the submissions process and through existing networks between non-state policy actors and government policy actors in the politics and policy streams. A 2005 DFAT publication lists the key organisations requiring consultation when negotiating an FTA:902
• agricultural produces and farming associations • chambers of commerce • consumers bodies • education and training providers • importer and exporter associations • industry associations • intellectual property associations • interest groups • professional associations • standard-setting bodies
The business focus of this list is clear, yet nonetheless, it represents policy actors in the problem stream that are most likely to gain traction with policy actors in the policy stream, and perhaps, the politics stream. Aligning business interests with the policy interests being sought by the Commonwealth Government is pivotal to access the politics stream.
In this stream we can see a number of deep core beliefs and policy core beliefs that guide the actions of actors, and guide engagement with actors in the politics and policy stream. These are outlined in Table 5.5.
902 From DFAT. 2005h, op. cit, p. 9
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Table 5.3– Deep Core Beliefs and Policy Core Beliefs
Belief Actor Deep Core Belief Preference for extensive trade National Farmers’ Federation, liberalisation certain agriculture producers Preference for some trade N/A liberalisation Preference for an FTA with Majority agriculture producers, China financial industry, pharmaceutical industry Policy Core Belief Preference for multilateral trade ACTU liberalisation Preference for a combination of Minerals Council of Australia, bilateral, plurilateral and Australian Industry Group, multilateral trade liberalisation National Famers’ Federation, Support for compartmentalising N/A Australia’s relationship with China Cautious of FTA with China Horticulture industry, dairy industry, elements of the union movement (particularly CFMEU), Australian Conservation Foundation, AFTINET
Businesses and Business Associations
Businesses and business associations displayed two major roles in this case study:
• highlight the pros and cons of a potential FTA; and • provide evidence and research for government consideration.
Businesses and business lobby groups performed these roles from two vantage points – those for the FTA and those against. In so doing, these policy actors advocated for their position via official channels as well as more private political channels. The former is captured by various consultation mechanisms run by DFAT along with other reviews and enquiries.903 What follows is a summary of the key business sectors and how they advocated for and presented evidence on their particular stand points.
903 See DFAT, 2005d, op. cit.
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Firstly, agricultural exporters were, in the majority, supportive of ChAFTA as outlined in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4 – Agricultural Industries Supportive of ChAFTA904
Wool 'We want to see the tariffs and quotas removed, but the key with China is the post-border issues.'[781] '...a comprehensive FTA will clear obstacles along the wool supply chain that restrain export growth to this $1 billion annual wool export market. The FTA should increase capacity for real export growth through the liberalisation of not only tariffs and quotas, but also by addressing beyond the border issues such as quota administration and the mandatory re-testing of Australian wool.'
Pork 'Australian Pork Limited supports efforts by the Australian government aimed at establishing a free trade agreement between Australia and China...To lay the platform for the Australian pork industry's long term expansion into the high value end of the Chinese pork market, there should be an emphasis on reducing tariffs, reducing red tape in China, ensuring China adopts international standards for food production and residue levels such as defined by CODEX.'
Wine 'There are considerable benefits to the wine industry from commencing negotiations with China on a Free Trade Agreement...Clearly it will be difficult for China to accept a rapid reduction in tariff barriers...[T]herefore, while we should seek elimination of tariffs over the longer term, the major benefits to the Australian wine industry will come from liberalising technical regulations. In particular, these include labelling, certification procedures...and food standards inconsistencies.'
Cotton 'An open market and no tariffs and quotas will give us much greater access to an extremely significant customer and this is great news for our industry that exports over 95% of its crop. However, we are concerned about some of China's spinning mills honouring contracts, due to their ability to selectively choose between domestic supplies and imports, depending on the better price. We consider it vitally important that sanctity of contract be addressed in these negotiations.'
Dairy • 'Immediate removal of all tariffs on dairy product lines' or 'a maximum of three years to phase the tariffs to zero'.An undertaking that Australia will have no worse treatment for dairy imports than is negotiated between China and any other country (particularly New Zealand). Specific and detailed harmonisation provisions on dairy SPS, animal welfare and residue levels for food imports.’
904 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade. 2005. Opportunities and challenges: Australia’s relationships with China, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, Chapter 12
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Clearly, quotas and tariffs were the biggest concerns for the industries in the table above. The detail policy actors in the problem stream can delve into is far more substantial than in the politics stream, and much more congruent with the lines of negotiation in the policy stream. The National Farmer’s Federation (NFF) was also unequivocal in its support of ChAFTA, arguing that while tariffs and quotas were important items to address, a transparent and predictable Chinese import regime were equally important.905 Further, the NFF acknowledged that agricultural exports to China would grow with or without ChAFTA, therefore putting its support behind a high-quality agreement.906 This aligned with the views of ministers – such as Emerson – in the politics stream and importantly, DAFF in the policy stream.907 Underpinning much of the NFF’s support was also a fear that Australia would ‘fall behind our competitors’ in the absence of ChAFTA.908
However, there was dissent amongst the agricultural industry with some sectors concerned that the sheer size of Chinese industry would swamp local producers.909
Table 5.5 - Australian exporters' attitudes to the FTAs910
Attitude: Very Positive Somewhat No Impact Somewhat Very Positive negative Negative Number: 15 26 51 6 2
There were some elements of the agricultural industry that were against, or at least cautious, of the FTA. For example, the horticulture industry through its peak body AusVeg, was concerned that imported Chinese vegetables would decimate local production and cause job losses.911 AusVeg felt the NFF had traded horticultural interests for larger agricultural sectors such as grain and wool.912 Yet this view was not supported by either the NFF or then Minister Vaile, both of which noted that horticultural production in Australia and China was largely counter-seasonal meaning complementary trade would benefit both
905 NFF. 2005. Submission to the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee’s Inquiry into Australia’s Relations with China, Canberra, NFF, June, p. 3 906 Ibid., p. 3 907 The linkages between the NFF and DAFF are substantial. See DAFF. 2005. Inquiry by the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee into: Australia’s relations with China – Submission by the Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, April 908 NFF. 2015. Submission to the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee inquiry into the proposed China-Australia Free Trade Agreement, Canberra, NFF, p. 6 909 For example the Australian Dairy Council was adamant that any agreement reached with China had to provide as good access to the Chinese market as the China-New Zealand FTA. See Farmonline. 2009. ‘Dairy Industry knocks China FTA’, SL Farmonline, 23 April 910 DHL Export Barometer. 2005. Australian Export Trends, May, Issue 4, p. 4 911 McKenzie, D. 2005. 'NFF dismisses China threat', The Weekly Times, 22 June, p. 25 and; Senate Standing Committee Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 2005, op. cit, Chapter 12. 912 The potential fissures within the NFF on a given policy position is substantial given the variety of agricultural sectors the federation represents. See for list of sectors and members
164 producers.913 Another is the dairy industry which, whilst supportive of the FTA, framed the truncated negotiations as harming export opportunities, particularly vis-à-vis market access granted in the China- New Zealand FTA. 914 Convergence of views within industries should not be assumed in trade negotiations.
Other industries such as the financial and pharmaceutical industries, all broadly supported ChAFTA, and threw their weight behind government efforts to clinch a deal, particularly through formal parliamentary inquiries.915 Indeed, the then Chief Executive Officer of ANZ Bank, Mike Smith, publically supported the agreement saying it was ‘one of the most important economic events in Australia’s recent history’.916
For many others in the business community, ChAFTA was approached in purely economic and trade terms, with no reference to any other issues discussed in both the politics and policy streams. For example, the Minerals Council of Australia (MCA) approached the negotiations as follows:
The MCA also considers an FTA should focus on other features of regulation in the Chinese economy, which inhibit trade, investment and business. In particular, the minerals industry would wish to see greater freedom to invest in China, liberalisation of domestic trading rights including import licence restrictions and an enhanced capacity for the movement of business personnel.917
Throughout their submission to the original feasibility study, the MCA made specific recommendations around tariffs, rights of appeal, dispute resolution and government oversight.918 The MCA did, however, agree with both DFAT and certain political actors in that ChAFTA needed to fit within the broader efforts at the WTO, going so far as to say that the Australian Government should ensure the FTA went further than the minimum WTO requirements and that ChAFTA should facilitate China’s continual transition to a market economy and participation in the WTO.919 The MCA appreciated that the FTA would need to be compatible with the global rules-based trade regime. Similarly, the Australian Industry Group (AIG) argued that any comprehensive FTA, be it with China or another partner, should be WTO-plus – that is, ‘deliver liberalisation more rapidly and fully than could otherwise be achieved through the WTO’.920 The
913 Vaile, Mark. 2005b. 'FTA fears misguided', in The Land, 26 May, p. 12 and; Senate Standing Committee Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 2005, op. cit., Chapter 12. 914 See for example Murray, 2013, op. cit. 915 See for example Australian Bankers’ Association. 2015. ABA response to the Inquiry into the China- Australia Free Trade Agreement, Sydney; Financial Services Council. 2015. Inquiry into the Proposed China Australia Free Trade Agreement, Sydney and; Blackmores Ltd. 2015. Submission to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade on a China Australia Free Trade Agreement, Warriewood (NSW) 916 Smith, Mike. ‘Why ChAFTA is more than just another FTA’, Blue Notes, Melbourne, ANZ Bank 917 MCA. 2004. Submission to Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade – Issues for Consideration in a Australia/China FTA Feasibility Study, Melbourne, Minerals Council of Australia, p. 4 918 Later MCA submissions are not publically available and multiple requests for interview were declined. 919 MCA, 2004, op. cit. pp. 2-5 920 AIG. 2010. Productivity Commission Study into the Effectiveness of Free Trade Agreements – Australian Industry Group Submission, Canberra, Australian Industry Group, p. 4
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NFF goes even further, indicating its resources would be working towards concluding the WTO Doha Round over bilateral FTAs.921
Two key formal structures exist for the leadership of large corporations to access the public decision makers in the politics stream. Firstly and as discussed above, all major trips to China conducted by the three prime ministers under investigation and also some of the trips taken by foreign and trade ministers, involved a delegation of key business leaders.
Secondly, larger businesses and business associations can directly liaise with a relevant minister. For example, the ACCI routinely met with the treasurer and trade minister under all three governments to discuss ChAFTA. 922 One business group interviewed for this study focused its attention on the treasurer as it was highlighting the importance of foreign direct investment from China as a key area requiring liberalisation under the FTA. 923 By aligning their interests with the political narrative the government was making with respect to the FTA – albeit purely in the economic sense, avoiding the geopolitical issues924 – big business in the problems stream can pursue its interest via the existing linkages it has with politicians and the federal bureaucracy.
Business can also use its expertise to influence government decision makers. For example, the ACCI provided modelling to the government, arguing that if ChAFTA could be concluded, it would put Australia in a unique and enviable position having secured FTAs with the world’s two economic superpowers.925 Similarly, the AIG surveyed its member companies and provided the Rudd Government with a series of recommendations on ensuring future FTAs – with China included – included a number of post- ratification engagement mechanisms to ensure business made the most of new market opportunities.926
Non-business organised interests
Unlike large business and peak business bodies which can directly access political actors in the politics stream, many non-business organised interests can only engage ChAFTA negotiations through formal consultation, review and inquiry processes.927 Nonetheless, there is evidence of two major roles for these policy actors:
• highlight the pros and cons of a potential FTA; and
921 NFF. 2010. Review of Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements – NFF Submission, Canberra, NFF, pp. 5-9 922 ACCI, interview with researcher, 28 May 2012 923 Business Group A, interview with researcher, 19 March 2011. 924 Ibid. Business Group A noted that did not engage with the government on geopolitical issues, although it acknowledged they formed part of the government’s decision making process. 925 ACCI. 2005. Riding the Chinese Dragon: Opportunities and Challenges for Australia and the World: Position Paper, Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Canberra 926 AIG, 2010, op. cit., pp. 7-13 927 As referenced above, the Senate Standing Committee Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade’s investigations into Australia’s relationship with China and the China FTA, along with DFAT’s consultative mechanisms and the Productivity Commission’s review of trade agreements are all examples of these processes.
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• provide evidence and research for government consideration.
Outside government institutions, certain civil society groups maintained good links with decision makers. For example, the ACTU’s advocacy of labour rights and the removal of investor state provisions were salient under Rudd and Gillard.928 Further, the ACTU has a clear preference for trade liberalisation occurring through the WTO rather than through bilateral FTAs as it gave greater negotiating power to smaller nations and upheld global trade rules, including on labour.929 Similarly, concerns surrounding the environment, human rights and labour rights were also raised by the Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union.930 However, organisations in this group do not have access to draft treaty text, do not know precisely what is being negotiated and are not privy to the political considerations as to why some items may or may not be included in the final text.
More publically, the Australian Workers Union also engaged the ChAFTA debate through its Don’t Dump on Australia Campaign, singling out Chinese as the number one culprit in dumping cheap manufactured goods into the Australian market931 The CFMEU was the most active union against ChAFTA, calling it ‘the worst trade agreement that an Australian Government has…ever attempted to impose on the Australian public’.932 While much of their public campaign against ChAFTA was directed at the Abbott Government who signed and tabled the agreement in Parliament in 2015 (and outside the scope of this case study), the CFMEU’s view is important to capture because although it was not anti- free trade per se, it was particularly vociferous in its objection to ChAFTA.933 Indeed, it outlined the major problem as follows:
‘a major area of concern with ChAFTA is that it dramatically changes the labour and industrial relations landscape in Australia by including unprecedented elements compared to all of Australia’s previous Free Trade Agreements regarding labour mobility provisions.934
Other non-government actors lamented the narrow scope of the negotiations. For example, the Australian Conservation Foundation noted the proposed FTA ignored environmental and social issues, a particular concern given ‘China’s well documented failing in the area of environment protection, record
928 ACTU, interview with researcher, 17 July 2012 929 ACTU. 2010. Submission on behalf of the ACTU to the Productivity Commission’s Review of Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements, Melbourne, ACTU, p. 3 930 See Australian Manufacturers Working Union. 2005. Submission to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Concerning a Possible China-Australia Free Trade Agreement, Sydney, Australian Manufacturers Working Union 931 See material on
167 on human rights abuses and poor labour standards’.935 The Foundation argued that ignoring these issues reflected the Howard Government’s failure to recognise the link between greater economic integration and liberalisation with increased environmental and social issues, and position aligned with their broader position on trade.936
On the second role for non-business organised interests, the Australia-China Business council produced numerous reports on trade between the two countries that examined the flow of goods between two countries with the Council ultimately pushing for a more ‘balanced’ trade relationship.937 Similarly, the Australian Fair Trade and Investment Network (AFTINET) – a network of 60 community organisations – produced a significant amount of research aimed at advocating ‘fair trade based on human rights, labour rights and environmental sustainability.’938
Concluding Remarks
Unlike the first case study, the ChAFTA action arena saw significantly more policy making activity in the policy stream than in the politics stream. Whilst political actors, notably the prime ministers and trade ministers listed above, linked the FTA to their government’s broader foreign, trade and domestic economic policy agendas, the policy actors in the policy stream were left to carry the negotiations forward.
A disconnect between the politics and policy stream was also found. With the negotiations continuing at the bureaucratic level during the period under examination, the political level was unable to make necessary political decisions to conclude a deal. Political concerns around damaging trade exposed industries – particularly manufacturing, which had already been impacted by structural changes in the Australian economy and the GFC – limited the willingness to make compromises with the Chinese, particularly for policy actors in the politics stream. Unlike in case study one, the connection between DFAT and the trade ministers was not particularly strong, and none of the trade ministers had the cache of John McEwen in their respective cabinets. Further, the connections back into industry maintained by DFAT were not as strong as its DoT predecessor. This case study highlights the need for the political stream to provide the imprimatur for policy actors in the policy stream to conclude a trade deal – this will be further discussed in Chapter 7 where the roles of public decision makers and policy insiders are explored.
935 Australian Conservation Foundation. 2005. Submission to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Concerning Negotiating Priorities for the Proposed Australia-China FTA, Melbourne, Australian Conservation Foundation, p. 1 936 Ibid. p. 1 and; Australian Conservation Foundation. 1999. Policy Statement No. 65 – Trade & The Environment, 1 August. 937 Janda, 2012, op. cit. See also Australia China Business Council. 2013. The Benefits to Australia Households of Trade with China, Sydney, Australia China Business Council National Secretariat and; Australia China Business Council. 2009. Estimating the impact of an Australia-China trade and investment agreement: 2008 economic modelling update, Sydney, Australia China Business Council. 938 AFTINET. 2015. Submission to the Senate Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Committee Inquiry into the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement, Sydney, AFTINET, p. 4
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Chapter 6: Selling Australian Uranium to India
The sale of uranium to foreign nations has long been a vexed policy question for both the Australian government and the Australian community more broadly.939 For many years Australian uranium export policy was guided by the ‘grand bargain’ and the ‘grand compromise’ – the former an agreement with the international community on a safe export regime for Australian uranium and the latter bipartisan agreement for this approach between Australia’s major political parties. The grand bargain was instigated by the Fraser Government after the Ranger Inquiry recommended that provided sufficient regulation and controls were put in place, the hazards associated with mining uranium were not sufficient to prohibit the development of the mines and subsequent export of yellowcake.940 A key restriction, however, was that export destinations were to be signatories to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Following the Fraser Government’s decision, bipartisan agreement on the grand bargain was displayed during the Hawke and Keating years, where both leaders were keen to link Australia’s uranium policy to notions of good international citizenship and middle power diplomacy.
The grand bargain and compromise continued to be upheld for most of the Howard Government. Yet, in 2006, a decision to negotiate the export of Australian uranium to India, a non-signatory to the NPT, disrupted 30 years of policy consistency. It became a political issue for both the subsequent Rudd and Gillard governments. Further, it became a major consideration in how Australia engaged with the sub- continent, with the sale of uranium arguably becoming the most important issue in the Australia-India bilateral relationship during both those governments.941
What occurs in this case study is foreign policy making predominantly in the politics stream. All three prime ministers had a vested political interest in ensuring their views on the sale of uranium became Australian policy and as a consequence, all three had a decisive role in the policy making process. The public service had a role to play, but it was not as prominent as in the Japan and China trade agreement cases. Further, access to the decision making core by non-state actors in the problem stream was more difficult given the prime minister and senior cabinet members debated the policy at the highest political level. This case is thus an example of a policy dominated by political stream.
This case study will examine the decision to abandon the long-term commitment to the grand bargain. It will examine the issue of uranium exports to India under three governments – Howard, the first Rudd
939 Rovere, Crispin and Robertson, Kalman A. 2013. ‘Australia’s Uranium and India: Linking Exports to CTBT Ratification’, Security Challenges, Vol. 9, p. 51 and; Falk, J. 1987. ‘Preventing Proliferation: The Role of Australian Uranium’, in Ball, Desmond and Mack, Andrew. (eds.), The Future of Arms Control, Sydney, Australian National University Press, p. 253. 940 It is noted that the Ranger Inquiry (also known as the Fox Report) was instigated by the Whitlam Government in July 1975. See Commonwealth of Australia. 1977. Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry, Second Report, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, May and; Parliament of Australia. 1977. Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, Vol. 6, Paper 117. 941 Roy, Edmond. 2011. ‘Australian Uranium and India: Ideology versus Pragmatism’, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1, p. 113
169 and the Gillard governments. Specifically, it focuses on three key policy changes and associated decisions:
1. Howard’s initial decision to break with the historic grand bargain and grand compromise and agree to sell uranium to India in 2006; 2. Rudd’s decision to revert back to the historic policy position upon defeating Howard at the 2007 federal election; and 3. Gillard’s decision to negotiate the sale of uranium to India after the 2011 Labor Party National Conference provided her with a party mandate to do so.
As with the previous two chapters, this case study will focus on the role of domestic policy actors operating in the politics, policy and problems streams.942 The restrictions placed on these streams will be examined, as will the policy sub-systems relevant to this particular case. Despite covering the same governments as case study two, which saw bipartisan and sustained commitment to a policy objective, this case exhibits significant change.
The Policy Sub-System
This case study is situated predominantly in the Australia-India policy sub-system. The Australia-India relationship, at the heart of this policy sub-system, is complex and comprises policy areas covering traditional foreign, trade and security policy concerns, but also immigration, education, the environment, sport and culture. This section of the case study will provide a broad overview of the policy sub-system, examining its recent history as well as the key issues present within the contemporary sub-system.
There is also a second policy sub-system relevant to this particular case study. The broader uranium export regime coordinated by the Commonwealth Government directly influences the ability of Australia to export yellowcake to India. Indeed this particular case study is an example of linked sub-systems within the institutional context under investigation – both the broader uranium export regime and specifics of uranium exports to India are intertwined, with both important components of any analysis.
Australia-India Policy Sub-System
The Australia-India relationship can be traced back to Federation, with Australia’s second prime minister, Alfred Deakin, suggesting that “intimacy between the two countries will doubtless be established in the course of time”.943 Yet despite a shared British colonial heritage, the relationship
942 It is noted that an Australia-India nuclear cooperation agreement will likely be signed prior to this thesis being reviewed. However, as the author is employed by the Commonwealth Government, current government positions have not been analysed in this chapter as the scope of the study ends at the Gillard Government. That said, where non-government actors have engaged in this debate post-Gillard, their views have been considered relevant as they often point to long-standing views. 943 Quoted in McCarthy, John, Baru, Sanjaya, Parthasarathy, Gopalaswami, McKew, Maxine, Malik, Ashok and Kremmer, Christopher. 2012. Report of the Australia India Institute Perceptions Taskforce: Beyond the Lost Decade, Melbourne, Australia India Institute, p. 33
170 between Canberra and New Delhi has never been as strong or as deep as relationships with other Asian powers such as Japan, or increasingly, China and Indonesia. There are four key elements to the contemporary policy sub-system – a history of mutual neglect, differing strategic priorities, a relatively shallow relationship given shared histories and a growing economic relationship.
Firstly, much academic work on Australia-India relations has focused on the mutual neglect. In the post-British Empire period, neither country has sought to strengthen the relationship.944 The entire Indian Ocean region fits into this foreign policy focus malaise, for as Bill Hayden, foreign minister in the Hawke Labor Government, said in 1984:
‘When times have demanded a bit of a show (like an election campaign) the Indian Ocean has been plucked out and dusted off. At other times, it has been left packed away like Aunt Tilly’s expensive bone china tea set – an object of occasional curiosity but not much practical use.’945
Howard supports this, recalling Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh personally telling him “[w]e have a lot in common, but we haven’t had much to do with each other”.946 The lack of substance in the relationship between Australia and India has been an issue confronting Australian foreign policy for some time.947 Indeed coverage of India by the Australian media rarely moves beyond poverty, religious animosities and cricket, with Australia’s once strong scholarly record on India substantially diminished and expertise lost due to a ‘lack of political leadership’ in steering and deepening the relationship.948 Put simply, there has not been the political will on either side of the Indian Ocean to progress the bilateral relationship to anything other than cordial and transactional, playing off the links between the two nations as a result of shared language and history.
That being said, from the 1970s on, there have been a number of significant policy issues with which the relationship has had to contend. 949 For example, the successful testing of Indian nuclear weapons,
944 See for example, Mayer, Peter and Jain, Purnendra. 2010. ‘Beyond Cricket: Australia-India Evolving Relations’, Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 5, No. 1; Smith, Gary. 2010. ‘Australia and the rise of India’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 64. No. 5 and; Weigold, Auriol. 2011. ‘Conflict within the Commonwealth: Australia’s Troubled Relationship with India’, Stoddart, Brian and Weigold, Auriol, Australia & India: Bridging Different Worlds, New Delhi, Readworthy. 945 Quoted in Mayer and Jain, 2010, op. cit., p. 134. 946 Howard, 2010, op. cit., p. 529 947 Evans and Grant, 1995, op. cit., p. 263 948 McCarthy et al., 2012, op. cit., p. 33. For an overview of the decline of the study of India and South Asia more broadly see Reeves, Peter. 2011. ‘Missed Opportunities’, in Stoddart, Brian and Weigold, Auriol, Australia & India: Bridging Different Worlds, New Delhi, Readworthy. 949 The scope of this section is limited to the contemporary period of the Australia-India relationship as it aligns with the era in which Australia first establishes its uranium export policy. For pre-1975 material see Mayer and Jain, 2010, op. cit. Also, McCarthy et al., 2012, op. cit., pp. 34-37, provides a useful overview of the impact of co-membership of the British Empire and Australian Government policies, such as the White Australia Policy, on early Australia-India relations. Finally, Weigold, 2011, op. cit., looks at the impact of the Australia-India relationship as a result of the relationship between Menzies and Nehru.
171 first in 1974 and again in 1998, caused a negative political and public reaction in Australia.950 Indeed the 1998 test elicited a sharp response from Australia, with the Howard Government downgrading relations at the political level (including visits), suspension of defence relations and the suspension of non-humanitarian aid.951 On the other side, Australia’s decision to support a US base on Diego Garcia and British weapons to apartheid South Africa struck New Delhi as hypocritical for a self-designated middle power.952 Nonetheless, the relationship has not been a dominant one in the foreign policy narratives of either nation, with one Indian diplomat going so far as to say that Australia rates below Finland in order of importance to officials in New Delhi.953
Secondly, the strategic outlooks of both nations have often clashed. For example, Australia’s commitment to the West during the Cold War was in stark contrast to India’s non-alignment – a divide evident in the fractious relationship between Menzies and Nehru.954 In the decades after WWII as both nations’ allegiance to and reliance on Britain waned, Australia shifted towards the US whereas India became a key nation within the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).955 Guiding India’s position during this period was Nehru’s belief that India “should not align [itself] with other power blocks. We can be of far more service without doing so…” 956 Furthermore, the Menzies Government’s willingness to allow British nuclear tests in Australia from 1952 ran contrary to the NAM’s – and in particular Nehru’s – opposition to nuclear weapons.957 Indeed, Nehru reportedly asked Menzies to join the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, an autonomous body examining issues of disarmament, which the Australian prime minister refused.958 The positions of both countries would be almost directly opposite decades later when India undertook nuclear weapons tests of its own.
The different strategic environments – South Asia versus the Pacific – has also meant different foci for Australian and Indian Governments; events in one region having little to no bearing on events in the
950 See Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Reference Committee. 1999. The 1998 Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Tests, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, June. 951 Downer, Alexander. 1998. Australian Response to Indian Nuclear Tests, media release, 14 May 952 Wesley, Michael. 2012. ‘The Elephant in the Room – Australia-India Relations’, The Monthly, February. See also Brewster, David. 2014. ‘Australia-India Strategic Relations: The Odd Couple of the Indian Ocean?’, Future Directions International, 20 May. 953 Roy, 2011, op. cit. p. 128 954 Gurry, Meg. 1992. ‘Leadership and bilateral relations: Menzies and Nehru, Australia and India 1949-1964’, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 65. No. 4, pp. 510-526; Mansingh, Lalit. 2008. The Promise and the Limits of the Indo-US Relationship: What it means for Asia and the World, Australia-India Strategic Lecture, Sydney, March 25; Smith, 2010, op. cit., p. 567 and; Roy, 2011, op. cit., p. 116. 955 For coverage of Australia’s shift in strategic dependence from Britain to the US, see Fraser, and Roberts, 2014, op. cit. 956 Quoted in Weigold, 2011, op. cit., p. 60. For full transcript of speech from which this quote is derived, see Government of India. India’s foreign policy: selected speeches, September 1946-April 1961, Bombay, The Public Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, p. 47 957 Roy, 2011, op. cit., p. 116 958 Broinowski, Richard. 2004. Fact or Fission: The Truth about Australia’s Nuclear Ambitions, Melbourne, Scribe Publications, p. 92 and; Roy, 2011, op. cit., p. 116. Beyond the nuclear and Cold War dimensions, there was a deeper ambivalence displayed by Menzies towards India and other newly formed post-colonial nations, see Weigold, 2011, op. cit., p. 57 and; Martin, 1993, op. cit. p. 405.
172 other had limited the strategic need for closer relations.959 This preoccupation with events within both Australia’s and India’s respective geographic regions meant early thoughts towards creating regional military dialogues never materialised, even after a brief focus on the potential threat of growing Indian naval power by the Australian media during the late 1980s.960 Australia’s relatively benign regional security and strategic concerns are in stark contrast to India’s, which faces a hostile security environment with bordering competitors Pakistan and China and significant domestic security and terrorism concerns.961 .
The relationship between Australia and India is relatively shallow, particularly compared to Australia’s other relationships with Asian powers. This is exemplified by how small events can be over emphasised by both nations, despite being significant for the individuals and communities involved. For example, the serious assaults on Indian students in Australia in 2009 dented the relationship, with the Indian media quick to cast the events as part of Australia’s history of racism and violence.962 The Australian Government was accused of failing to act and dispatched a number of high level ministers to India, including the then education minister Julia Gillard and a number of state premiers.963 Alternatively, the problems faced by Australian companies involved in providing services for the Delhi Commonwealth Games were portrayed as typical problems with doing business in India.964 The rapid descent into racial and cultural stereotypes on both sides of these debates highlights the lack of depth in the relationship, as a deeper relationship would see such incidents ‘framed within a larger perspective of productive partnerships and overriding positive sentiment’.965 According to Peter Varghese, former secretary of DFAT and former High Commissioner to New Delhi, these kinds of events build upon existing significant differences in trade, and importantly, proliferation that had already “soured a generation of Australian and Indian diplomats towards each other”.966 As Pearson notes, the nub of the problem appears to be cultural, with both nations ignoring the other’s contributions to trade, science and education.967 The relationship therefore remains beholden to the impacts of single issue shocks and is at risk of becoming
959 See Gordon, Sandy. 2007. Widening horizons: Australia’s new relationship with India, Barton (ACT), Australian Strategic Policy Institute and; Gurry, Meg. 1996. India: Australia’s neglected neighbour? 1947-1996, Nathan (QLD), Centre for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations, Griffith University. 960 See Smith, Gary, Cox, Dave and Burchill, Scott. 1996. Australia and the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy, Melbourne, Oxford University Press, pp. 158-159 961 Gordon, Sandy. 2011. ‘Australia’s Relations with India: In the Light of Asia’s Emerging Strategic Environment’, in Stoddart, Brian and Weigold, Auriol, Australia & India: Bridging Different Worlds, New Delhi, Readworthy, pp. 102-113 and; Snedden, Christopher. 2011. ‘Australia-India Relations: Strategic Dissonance’, Stoddart, Brian and Weigold, Auriol, Australia & India: Bridging Different Worlds, New Delhi, Readworthy, pp. 78-80 962 Smith, 2010, op. cit., p. 567 963 South Asia Times. 2009. ‘Julia Gillard’s India visit raises questions’, South Asia Times, 2 September 964 See for example Hodge, Amanda. 2001. ‘Delhi Games legacy is one of debt and crime’, The Australian, October 3 965 Smith, 2010, op. cit., p. 567 and; Stoddart, Brian. 2011. ‘Trading Places’, in Stoddart, Brian and Weigold, Auriol, Australia & India: Bridging Different Worlds, New Delhi, Readworthy, pp. 126-127. 966 Varghese, Peter. 2011. ‘Foreward’, in Stoddard, Brian and Weigold, Auriol (eds.), India and Australia: Bridging Different Worlds, New Delhi, Readworthy Publications, p. vi 967 Pearson, Gail. 2011. ‘CHOGM: our complex relationship with India’, The Conversation, 26 October
173 almost personality driven by the respective prime ministers – both Menzies and Nehru’s well documented animosity, and Hawke and Rajiv Gandhi’s status as ‘mates’ being two examples.968
Whilst there have been overtures from both sides regarding deepening the relationship, such an undertaking is no easy task. As Smith highlights:
‘Australia and India cannot just start with the low politics dance steps. The global complexity and interconnectedness of the issues of economy, politics and environment is no more clearly illustrated than in the prospect of uranium trade between Australia and India.’969
That being said, in 2009 Rudd and Singh announced a commitment to build “a strategic level partnership”. A key element of this announcement was the India-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, covering areas such as counter-terrorism, defence and non-proliferation.970 Yet efforts in such areas have failed to materialise into concrete outcomes, with the action plan promised under the joint declaration yet to be implemented.971 Further, the relationship is still beset with impediments inhibiting the greater cooperation espoused by the commitment to building a partnership. For example, Prime Minister Singh’s absence at the CHOGM meeting in Perth was seen as a snub to Canberra in return for its resumption of uranium export bans.972 Indeed, the uranium issue has become a major component of the contemporary relationship, particularly as India has felt that Australia was more insistent that New Delhi sign-up to international treaties regarding nuclear weapons and demanded more stringent adherence to existing commitments than Canberra did with other powers. 973 This was particularly so with regard to China, with New Delhi perceiving Australia as employing a double standard in its relations with India’s most powerful strategic rival, turning a blind eye to Beijing’s poor proliferation record.974 Indian displeasure at Australia’s position vis-à-vis China was also exacerbated by the Rudd Government’s decision to distance itself from the quadrilateral defence dialogue (Australia-India-Japan- US), particularly so given the announcement was made at a press conference with the Chinese Foreign Minister.975
The relationship therefore remains less developed than it might be, and certainly less when compared with Australia’s relationship with other countries of India’s size and status. In a recent report by the Australia-India Institute, the authors agree with this sentiment:
968 Snedden, 2011, op. cit, p. 71 969 Smith, 2010, op. cit., p. 568 970 DFAT. 2009a. India-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, announced New Delhi, 9 November 971 There has been some strategic cooperation between Australia and India, including the joint naval exercise AUSINDEX in September 2015. 972 McCarthy et al., op. cit., p. 39 973 Rovere and Robertson, 2013, op. cit., p. 55 and; Mansingh, 2008, op. cit 974 Rovere and Robertson, 2013, op. cit., p. 55; Mansingh, 2008, op. cit., and; Medcalf, Rory. 2011. ‘Australia’s Uranium Puzzle: Why China and Russia but not India?’, Fearless Nadia, No. 1, Spring, p. 13. 975 Metcalf, Rory. 2009. Problems to Partnership: A Plan for Australia-India Strategic Ties, Policy Brief, Sydney, Lowy Institute for International Policy, p. 4.
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‘A patchwork fabric of commonalities – the English language, parliamentary democracy, and sport – has created an impression of shared values that masks far more important differences in word views and values between Australia and India. We are not, as some analysts claim, natural allies. The result has been a generally cordial, but distant relationship, described by most observers as one of benign neglect.’976
The final element to the relationship that has bearing on this policy sub-system is trade, particularly so with the Australia-India Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (AICECA) currently under negotiation. An increasingly important trade partner for Australia, two-way trade increased from $3.3 billion in 2000 to more than $17.4 billion on 2012.977 India now ranks as Australia’s fourth largest export market, with gold and coal being the principal exports, although it still lags well behind China, Japan, South Korea, the US and the EU in trade and investment importance.978 The ninth round of negotiations for the AICECA were completed in September 2015 and focused on three groups; goods, services and investment. 979 The trade dimension is therefore an increasingly important element in the bilateral relationship.
Australia’s Uranium Export Regime
Consecutive Australian governments have acknowledged that all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle carry significant risks. 980 This acknowledgement added further controversy to the Australia-India deal. Consequently, a discussion on uranium exports to a nuclear armed nation needs to consider the policy sub-system built around Australia’s uranium industry and in particular, its export regime. Further, the significant changes that occurred to this regime during the Howard, Rudd and Gillard years go hand-in- hand with the Australia-India policy sub-system – the abandoning of both the grand compromise and bargain cannot be seen in isolation from the relationship between Canberra and New Delhi. As such, it is worth examining this history of Australia’s uranium export regime and an overview of how this regime has changed as a result of the events since Howard’s announcement in 2006.
As Australia has the world’s largest resources of low-cost uranium, the pressure to export the commodity is strong. 981 Global energy demand, economic benefits and low-carbon emissions are common rationales given by export proponents as to why the industry should not only exist, but be
976 McCarthy et al., 2012, op. cit., p. 37 977 India is Australia’s third largest merchandise export market and Australia is India’s eight largest trade partner. See Emerson, Craig. 2011a. Australia-India Joint Ministerial Statement 13th session, Canberra, 12 May and; DFATa. 2012. About the Australia-India Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement negotiations 978 Stoddart, 2011, op. cit., p. 120. DFAT also produces bi-annually trade and economic summaries covering Australia’s economic relationship with most nations – see http://dfat.gov.au/geo/pages/countries-and- regions.aspx 979 DFAT. 2015b. Ninth Round of Negotiations 980 Smith, 2010, op. cit., pp. 268-269 981 For an overview of Australia’s uranium resources, see Baker, Greg. 2009. Australia’s Uranium, Parliamentary Library Research Paper, Canberra, Parliament of Australia
175 expanded.982 Yet, in a nation where the mining industry is a significant part of the export economy and underscored national economic growth even during the darkest periods of the global financial crisis, uranium exports are an insignificant contributor to the nation’s overall mineral wealth - around $1 billion per annum, easily dwarfed by iron ore and black coal at $34 billion and $61 billion respectively.983
Despite being a relatively minor contributor to Australian export earnings, the political and environmental sensitivities of uranium have meant the policy framework around its export has been more stringent than those for other commodities. The policy framework includes international arrangements such as inspection of civilian nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and signing- up to the NPT. These measures assumed that ‘strategic and diplomatic benefits [will] accrue to Australia through a “principled” uranium export policy’.984
As mentioned, the grand bargain was instigated by the Fraser Government following recommendations by the Ranger Inquiry. The bargain rested on three pillars (i) Australia would use its uranium reserves to give itself a significant role in the nuclear fuel cycle; (ii) exports would strengthen the non-proliferation regime through bilateral and later multilateral export controls; and (iii) the comprehensiveness of the non-proliferation regime would be extended through activism to expand the NPT and other treaties.985 As Fraser recalls on the decision:
‘When my government began the sale of uranium in 1977, we made a commitment that sales would be made only to countries that were signatories to the non- proliferation treaty. We also argued that if we were involved in the trade we could make sure that safeguards were applied in the strictest and most technically advanced manner.’986
Following the Fraser Government’s decision, bipartisan agreement and the grand compromise were upheld during the Hawke and Keating Labor governments through the 1980s and early 1990s, where both leaders were keen to link Australia’s uranium policy to notions of strong multilateralism, good international citizenship and middle power diplomacy.987 Indeed Hawke lifted the ALP moratorium on uranium mining instigated under the Whitlam Government, with the 1984 ALP National Conference
982 Clarke, Michael. 2011. ‘The Third Wave of Uranium the Uranium Export Debate: Toward the Fracturing of Australia’s Nuclear “Grand Bargain”’, in Clarke, Michael, Fruhling, Stephen and O’Neil, Andrew (eds.), Australia’s Uranium Trade: The Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges of a Contentious Export, Farhnam, Surrey, Ashgate Publishing and; Leaver, Richard. 2011. ‘The Economic Potential of Uranium Mining for Australia’, in Clarke, Michael, Fruhling, Stephen and O’Neil, Andrew (eds.), Australia’s Uranium Trade: The Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges of a Contentious Export, Farhnam, Surrey, Ashgate Publishing 983 Clarke, Michael, Fruhling, Stephen and O’Neil, Andrew. 2011. ‘Introduction: Australia’s Uranium Trade in Domestic and International Context’ in Clarke, Michael, Fruhling, Stephen and O’Neil, Andrew (eds.), Australia’s Uranium Trade: The Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges of a Contentious Export, Farhnam, Surrey, Ashgate Publishing Limited, p. 1 and; Australian Bureau of Statistics. 2010. Mining Commodities, 2001- 02 to 2008-09, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia 984 Clarke, 2011’, op. cit., p. 118 and; Medcalf, 2011, op. cit. 985 Clarke, 2011, op. cit., p. 112 986 Fraser, Malcolm. 2011. ‘Canberra’s abject submission to US pressure is shameful’, in The Age, 12 December. Confirmed by Fraser – Fraser, interview with researcher, 15 November 2013. 987 Clarke, 2011, op. cit.
176 adopting what was to become known as the ‘Three Mines Policy’. This allowed exploration and extraction at the Nabarlek, Ranger and Olympic Dam mines.988 The initial policy of the Howard Government was also in the spirit of the grand bargain. However, in a 2006 visit to New Delhi, Howard opened up the possibility of an export regime for selling Australian uranium to India. This was despite its non-signatory status on the NPT, and abandoned almost 30 years of principled bipartisanship.
The Howard Government argued that the sale of yellowcake in 2007 was justified given India’s exemplary behaviour in non-proliferation and that it would help underpin India’s clean energy development. 989 Facing particular pressure from the US, which had just signed a civil nuclear cooperation deal with India, Howard insisted that exports would only occur under strict conditions and a robust agreement that allowed ‘Australian nuclear inspectors to ensure the uranium was used only for power generation’ and not weapons of mass destruction would be agreed.990 It was also seen as equalising Howard’s decision to sell uranium to China, a nation that had signed the NPT but had been known to proliferate nuclear technology to both North Korea and Pakistan over the previous decades.991 The argument was made that the embargo on uranium sales to India had become a hindrance to the broader relationship, restricting any possibility of deepening the connection between Canberra and New Delhi; a situation Howard wanted to amend.992
However, Kevin Rudd, opposition leader at the time, argued that uranium should not be made available until India signed the NPT, despite New Delhi’s record on proliferation. Upon winning government in 2007, he reversed the Howard Government’s decision.993 Between the actions of both leaders, the grand compromise was certainly dead. Rudd’s decision represented a reaffirmation of Australia’s commitment to the NPT but also continued to provide Australia’s iron ore and coal producers’ significant advantages in providing resources to fuel India’s energy sector. It represented a return to the grand bargain established under Fraser, but particularly mirrored the approach adopted by Hawke and Keating.994 It was also in agreement with Rudd’s ambitions to emphasise multilateralism as a potent diplomatic tool and was also one of the three pillars Rudd was to base his foreign policy upon. 995 However, somewhat paradoxically, despite Rudd’s stated opposition, the Government did not oppose the Indo-American agreement at either the IAEA or the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group.996
To add further confusion to Australia’s position and further complexity to the policy sub-system, upon becoming leader, Julia Gillard overturned Rudd’s position and the long-held Labor position of exporting
988 Roy, 2011, op. cit., p. 115 989 Mayer and Jain, 2010, op. cit., pp. 140-141 and; Frost, Frank. 2007. ‘Perspectives on Australian foreign policy 2006’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 3, pp. 416-419 990 Mayer and Jain, 2010, op. cit., p. 141 991 Ibid., p. 140. See also Gordon, 2007, op. cit. 992 See Clarke, 2011’, op. cit.; Mayer and Jain, 2010, op. cit. and; Gordon, 2007, op. cit. See also Murphy, Katharine. 2007. ‘Howard’s U-Turn on India’, in The Age, 30 March 993 Mayer and Jain, 2010, op. cit., p. 141 994 Clarke, 2011, op. cit., p. 119 995 See Rudd, 2007, op. cit. 996 Gordon, Sandy. 2008. Implications of the Sale of Australian Uranium to India, Working Paper No. 410, Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, p. 1
177 to NPT signatories only, accepting that sales of uranium to India should be negotiated as it was “an idea whose time had come”.997 The issue of uranium sales to India became a heated political one within the federal ALP, not helped by the continued animosity between Rudd, Gillard and their supporters. The internal party struggle was fought out at the Labor Party National Conference in 2011, where party delegates voted to change the party platform – a procedural requirement enabling the federal ALP to pursue Gillard’s desired export policy. Although outside the scope of this case study, the Australia India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement covering uranium exports was eventually signed during former Prime Minister Abbott’s visit to India in 2014, with the Turnbull Government actively pursuing uranium exports to India.998 Prior to it coming into force in November 2015, JSCOT held public enquiries and has made its report public.999
Variables
As with the previous two case studies, an exhaustive list of variables is not possible to cover in one chapter. However, what follows captures the most important contributors to each of the four variables used by the framework structuring this case study.
Firstly, two obvious material conditions impacting this debate are the amount of uranium available for export within Australia’s reserves and the international market demand for this uranium. Australia has the largest share of global uranium resources, accounting for approximately 33 per cent of the world’s reasonably assured resources.1000 The finite supply of Australia’s uranium reserves, coupled with the mining industry’s capacity to exploit the reserve – restricted mainly by accessibility, return on investment and environmental safeguards – limits the amount of uranium available to export to India.1001 The demand and supply of the resource on international markets also impacts as the higher the demand and lower supply, the more lucrative Australian uranium export deals are for both miners and royalty revenues, increasing the desirability of exporting to new markets within business and government. The greater the market demand for uranium, the greater the pressure on the Australian government to facilitate its export and seek new markets.
997 Gillard, Julia. 2012a. ‘Australia and India: Old Friends, New Partners’, speech to the Indian Business Chambers Lunch, New Delhi, 17 October 998 See March, Stephanie. ‘Prime Minister Tony Abbott seals deal to allow Australian companies to export uranium to India’, ABC News, Australian Broadcasting Corporation; Crowe, David. 2015. ‘China free trade deal wrapped, next stop India: Malcolm Turnbull’, The Australian November 17 and; Blackwell, Eoin. 2015. ‘No Barriers Left For Uranium Sales to India’, Huffington Post, December 19. For the text of the agreement, see
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A less obvious example of the biophysical world attributes variable in this case, based at least on Ostrom’s definition of the variable, is the decision of the US to commence negotiations on a nuclear cooperation deal with India in 2005. This deal made Australia’s position somewhat anachronistic, particularly given two major world powers were bypassing the international agreements Australia had always supported. The policy space in which Australia could acceptably export uranium to India was opened-up by Washington’s arrangements with New Delhi.1002 Indeed the decision by the Americans to overturn their long held opposition to nuclear trade with India forced Australia to consider its own position. Coupled with India’s demand for resources and claims of unfair treatment by Australia’s export policy, there was a strong incentive for the Howard Government to break with tradition.
The attributes of the community variable is somewhat more complex as the issue of uranium export to any country with a civil nuclear industry, has long been a controversial issue in the Australian community. Indeed, despite often bipartisan agreement over uranium exports, the debate has been polarising. 1003 Furthermore, public expectations around uranium mining and exports cannot be disassociated with concerns surrounding nuclear weapons and the dangers of nuclear generated energy, particularly in a post-Fukushima environment. These concerns ultimately limit the options available to Australia’s foreign policy makers with regard to uranium exports. There are policy options that the electorate simply would not accept as legitimate uses of Australian export uranium, be it regarding India or any other state.
How the public conceptualise Australia’s nuclear exports as a part of more normative discussions around nuclear weapons is also important. Leah and Lyon posit three differing phases of Australia’s view on ‘the bomb’ and take into consideration four key questions when constructing these visions:
• “What role do nuclear weapons play in the international order? • Does deterrence work? • What part does arms control play in managing nuclear weapons? • What contribution do nuclear weapons have in relation to Australia’s specific strategic and defence needs?”1004
The first vision can be loosely considered as the ‘internationalist vision’, believing Australian strategic interests are best served – even if indirectly – by the deterrence provided by nuclear weapons and the global order they help keep in place.1005 The authors label this as ‘Menzian’ given the central tenets of the vision were outlined by Prime Minister Menzies in 1957. The second vision is more direct in its
1002 As then Minister for Defence, Stephen Smith put it, ‘the ground rules changed “when India entered into the India-Unite States civil nuclear agreement”’. See Thompson, Jeremy. 2011. ‘Pakistan wants equal access to Australian uranium’, ABC News, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 5 December 1003 Covered extensively in Graetz, Geordan and Manning, Haydon. 2011. ‘The Politics of Uranium Mining in Australia’, in Clarke, Michael, Fruhling, Stephan, O’Neil, Andrew (eds.), Australia’s Uranium Trade: The Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges of a Contentious Export, Farnham (Surrey), Ashgate. 1004 Leah, Christine, and Lyon, Rod. 2010. ‘Three visions of the bomb: Australian thinking about nuclear weapons and strategy’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 64, No.4, p. 451 1005 Ibid, p. 451
179 conceptualisation of the order provided by nuclear weapons. Unlike the abstract and global order conceived in the first vision, this vision believes nuclear weapons can only serve Australian strategic interests if they are directly tied to our national needs. In other words, an Australian nuclear arsenal is important to this vision – an approach best described as ‘Gortonian’ after Prime Minister Gorton worked hard to preserve the nuclear option for Australia.1006 The final vision is in stark contrast to the first two, believing that ‘nuclear weapons are order-destroyers rather than order-builders’ and that deterrence is fallible and a threat to humanity. 1007 Under this vision, nuclear weapons cannot serve Australia’s strategic needs regardless of whether Australia or a friendly great power possesses them. They call this the ‘disarmer’ vision, or to follow the prime ministerial nomenclature, the ‘Keating’ vision. Smith also labels this last vision as a globalist perspective, which in some parts, rejects outright the sale of uranium on the basis that safeguards preventing nuclear weapons were fictitious thus condemning the industry as altogether too dangerous.1008
In any respect, the prevailing vision of Australian nuclear capability has oscillated between viewing weapons as a strategic option and the more contemporary perspective of pushing for global nuclear disarmament. It is this last vision that has the most salience for this case study; Australia has rejected both nuclear weapons and, so far, nuclear energy, for its own defence and energy needs. This feeds into public perceptions about the appropriate use of Australia’s export uranium as it is a commodity that has thus far only been permitted to be used modestly for research in a domestic context.
At the broader level, the general lack of public interest in foreign policy also results in an inability or unwillingness of the public to separate the domestic mining industry and the specifics of the exporting to India issue. This becomes a particular restriction on policy makers given that the public find uranium mining far from a worthy industry, with 66 per cent of people believing in either ending the industry or prohibiting its expansion.1009 This limits Australia’s ability to expand its uranium mining capacity given the potential political sensitivities involved in approving new mines.
Further, the debate around the sale of uranium to India is situated in a much broader discussion around Australia uranium export policy settings – historically restricted to major allies and like-minded nations. It is important to situate the India question within this discussion as it is not an isolated uranium policy decision. Earlier decisions to sell uranium to China and Russia, two nations with poor proliferation records, also attracted controversy given Australia’s long-standing commitment to the international non- proliferation regime.1010 Even earlier, the original decision to mine and export uranium was based primarily around the need to support ‘great and powerful friends’ – namely, British and American nuclear
1006 Ibid, p. 452 1007 Ibid. p. 452 1008 Smith, 2010, op. cit., p. 575 1009 Graetz and Manning, 2011, op. cit., p. 141 1010 For commentary on China’s proliferation record see Davies, Alan. 2006. ‘Australian Uranium Exports and Security: Preventing Proliferation’, Strategic Insights Paper No. 28, Canberra, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, p. 18 and for the agreement with Russia, see DFAT. Australia-Russia Nuclear Cooperation Agreement – Frequently Asked Questions.
180 weapons programs.1011 The country of destination is therefore important in considering public opinion towards uranium exports. From the point of view of the Australian Indian community at least, ‘seven out of 10 Indians surveyed think selling uranium is important to Australia's relations with India; only five per cent think it is not’.1012
The rules-in-use variables is also somewhat complicated in this case study given the way the issue of uranium sales to India has been handled by the three governments under investigation. Across all three administrations, the decision was political in nature and one that was seemingly made outside the usual foreign policy institutions, meaning some rules that structure participation and access to information differ in this particular policy making example.
For example, in terms of decision making in the Gillard years, access to the system depends upon membership of the triennial ALP National Conference. The Conference decides on changes to the ALP National Platform as recommended by the National Policy Forum. 1013 For Gillard to change the Platform, she needed to convince both the National Policy Forum and Conference for it to be codified as ALP policy. This was not an issue for either Howard or Rudd, as the former did not have a conference structure to manage and the latter’s policy position was in line with his party’s longstanding position on uranium.
More broadly, there are concrete and codified rules affecting the policy options available to policy makers within this case. For example, one key rule restricting the action arena is the legality of Australian uranium sales to India – this particularly relates to the relevant international treaties Australia has ratified relating to uranium and nuclear energy. For example, legal advice provided to the Gillard Government by Rothwell suggests supplying India with uranium would violate Article 4 of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.1014 This view was supported by Malcolm Fraser, a key political actor in the original decision to sell uranium abroad and advocate for continuing the ban on uranium sales to India.1015 The legal obligations of Australia with respect to uranium exports need to be central in any decision to sell uranium to India. This is particularly so with respect to Australia’s obligations under the NPT itself.
Robertson sets out the various interpretations of Australia’s obligations under the NPT with the most relevant clause regarding exportation to India being Article III.2:
1011 Clarke et al., 2011, op. cit., p. 1 1012 Medcalf, Rory, Mattoo, Amitabh and Kremmer, Christopher. 2013. ‘Most Indians agree there’s more to our relationship than cricket’, The Australian, 17 April. This piece summaries a poll conducted by the Lowy Institute into how Indian citizens view their nation in the world and is available at:
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“Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non- nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.”1016
This is a particularly grey area for Australian policy makers as whilst India is considered a non-weapons state pursuant to the terms of the NPT, it is not a signatory and therefore not beholden to the NPT’s restrictions. 1017 The NPT does not provide for India’s specific position as India is neither a non-weapons state nor a weapons state by the terms of the treaty – this is despite India declaring itself a nuclear weapons state following tests in 1998. Whilst Robertson and Rothwell differ in their interpretation of Australia’s obligation under the NPT regarding India, the point remains that the international agreements Australia enters into restrict the policy options available to policy actors.1018 Any policy decision the Commonwealth Government makes, regardless of the politics of the time, is restricted by these rules, limiting policy options and outcomes. There are further treaties that Australia has ratified and must adhere to in terms of its uranium export regime.1019 The Safeguards Act 1987 and the Arms Trade Treaty being two examples. Australia’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) also binds Australia’s actions in terms of uranium sales to India. In this case, New Delhi agreed to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities, open the former to international inspection, uphold its voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing and refuse to share certain nuclear technologies if the NSG granted India a waiver on nuclear trade. This waiver exempted India from existing rules forbidding nuclear trade with a non-NPT signatory, and opened-up India as a uranium market (after intensive US diplomatic efforts).
Finally, there are two major external shocks relevant to this case study. As described above, the Australia-India relationship is exceptionally vulnerable to the impact of external shocks, often focused on one issue, such as the attacks on Indian students in Melbourne and Sydney. Of particular note for this case study is a much broader external shock of such breadth that impacted global thinking towards nuclear energy – the Fukushima nuclear disaster as a result of the 2011 Japanese tsunami. One major impact of the disaster was the impact on public acceptance of nuclear energy as a power source – three in five global citizens opposed the use of nuclear energy according to one poll taken after the
1016 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, accessible at < http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPTtext.shtml> (last accessed 10 September 2013). Also see Robertson, 2012, op. cit. 1017 A nuclear weapons state is defined as a nation that manufactured and exploded a nuclear device before 1 January 1967 – India exploded its first nuclear weapon on 18 May 1974. 1018 Robertson, 2012, op. cit., lists a number of key treaties that would bind Australian and Indian policy makers with respect to uranium sales including Agreement between the Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities and Protocol Additional to the Agreement for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities 1019 For an examination of some of these issues see Carlson, John. 2014. ‘Is the Abbott Government abandoning Australia’s nuclear safeguards standards for India?’, The Lowy Interpreter, 1 October
182 disaster.1020 This had a flow on effect on national governments, with Germany, Italy and Switzerland all planning on either phasing-out or not replacing nuclear power plants.1021 The other was its impact on uranium prices, with a 2011 spot price peaking at $US73 a pound in January before declining by 30 per cent to $US49 following the tsunami and subsequent reactor shutdowns, particularly in Japan and Germany. 1022 While Fukushima caused global reflection on the validity and safety of an industry powered by Australia’s uranium exports, the disaster did not heavily sway any of the three governments under investigation in this case study – each maintained its stated political position.
Action Arena
As outlined in Chapter 3, the action arena brings together a number of conceptual elements required to make policy. It also focuses attention on discrete action situations. The action arena allows investigation of a set of participants, the positions they fill, the actions they are permitted to undertake, and the information to which they have access in a given action situation.
In this particular case, the action arena refers to a policy space in which three separate government decisions that impacted Australia’s uranium export regime to India were made:
1. the Howard Government’s decision to sell uranium to India; 2. the Rudd Government’s decision to reverse the Howard Government’s decision and continue to restrict sales to India based on the previous bipartisan ‘grand bargain’; and 3. the Gillard Government’s decision to revert back to the position of the Howard Government and commence negotiations with India over uranium sales.
Each of these decisions represents an action situation as described by Ostrom, although it should be noted that policy making does not simply start or conclude with a decision by a given government – it is an ongoing process. Nonetheless, in order to examine the different roles of domestic policy actors, this case study will examine the three decisions listed above and the policy making activity that followed, looking at the participants involved and the roles they played.
Politics Stream
The politics stream is the most important stream in this case study. The highly politicised nature of this policy and willingness of consecutive prime ministers to personally lead the political narrative on their respective government’s view situates much of the policy work within this first stream. The following
1020 Ipsos Global. 2011. Strong Global Opposition Towards Nuclear Power, 23 June 2011. See also Elliott, David. 2013. ‘Fukushima’s positive legacy’, The Conversation, 12 July and; Gerster, Robin. 2011. ‘A short history of Australia’s love/hate relationship with uranium’, The Conversation, March 30. 1021 Detailed demand statistics, including the decreased demand within the Western world for uranium as a result of Fukushima can be found in Nuclear Energy Agency. 2012. Uranium 2011: Resources, Production and Demand, Paris, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, p. 75 1022 DRET. 2012, op. cit.
183 section will focus particularly on Howard, Rudd and Gillard but will also include key ministers and parliamentarians engaging with issue around the 2011 ALP National Conference.
In this stream we can see a number of deep core beliefs and policy core beliefs that guide the actions of actors, and impact the ability of actors in the policy and problem streams to engage. These are outlined in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1 – Deep Core Beliefs and Policy Core Beliefs
Belief Actor Australia has a role in the global Howard, Rudd, Gillard Deep Core Belief nuclear industry Australia has no role in the N/A global nuclear industry Sale of uranium only to NPT Rudd, Downer (initially), Smith, signatories (support for the Crean, elements of the ALP grand bargain/compromise) Caucus Policy Core Belief Sale of uranium if suitable Howard, Gillard, Downer, Carr, domestic safeguards are in Ferguson, Gray, Robb place Sale of uranium under no N/A circumstances
The Prime Minister
The three prime ministers relevant to this case study undertaking three main policy making roles:
• setting the political narrative around why uranium should, or should not, be exported to India; • linking uranium exports to economic growth, proliferation concerns and the strategic relationship with India; and • managing the internal party political requirements necessary to export to India.
The three roles weave in and out of one another, with all three leaders bringing different perspective and values to the uranium export debate, highlighting differences in their global outlooks and political requirements. The main mechanism for executing these roles was through public announcements, and in the case of Gillard, incorporating India into broader strategic policy documents. This section will examine these differences in the context of each prime minister and how they fulfilled each role.
Firstly, Howard recalls that given the relatively lacklustre relationship between India and Australia, uranium ‘was a commodity which had the potential to give momentum to the commercial and political
184 relationship’.1023 The sale of uranium to India was thus both a strategic and commercial opportunity for Australia. For Howard, the visit of US President Bush to India and the opening-up of nuclear cooperation between Washington and New Delhi changed the playing field with respect to selling uranium to India. In an official visit to India in 2006, Howard noted that in talks with Singh, both leaders were keen on establishing a uranium export relationship between the two countries.1024
Recognising that India’s non-signatory status to the NPT was an impediment to this process, Howard set in motion ‘a process which would have resulted in a change in policy’ despite reservations from both DFAT and Foreign Minister Downer.1025 The result of the 2007 election would mean such a policy change would not occur under the Coalition, with Howard’s memoirs framing this as ‘a roadblock to better relations between the two nations’.1026 Under Howard, the Australian Government framed the issue as one of both commercial opportunity but also a mechanism for deepening the bilateral relationship between the two countries. To not sell uranium to India, Howard would argue, would undermine efforts in building the relationship in other areas. Howard understood his role to include bringing members of the Coalition party room sceptical about changing the government’s export regime around to his point of view.
Yet this position was not consistent with the Howard Government’s policy through much of that government’s existence. As late as 2006, Downer was highlighting the Coalition’s commitment to the grand bargain, stating:
‘….our policy has been that we would only export uranium to countries that are signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. If we were to export uranium to India, that would constitute a significant shift in our policy…It’s probably better for us to give all the support we can to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’.1027
Recognising the need to assure his policy was not seen to undermine the NPT, Howard personally imposed a series of rules relating to the successful negotiation of treaties without which the policy of selling uranium could not proceed. This helped calm concern within the Coalition about the sale of uranium to a non-NPT signatory. Howard stated:
‘This change of policy is subject to conclusion of a suitable safeguards agreement between India and the [IAEA] covering all designated civil nuclear facilities; conclusion by India of an additional protocol on strengthened safeguards; consensus decision by the Nuclear Suppliers Group to make an exception to its guidelines enabling international civil supply to India; conclusion of a bilateral civil nuclear co-operation agreement between India and the US; and satisfactory
1023 Howard2010, op. cit., p. 530 1024 Ibid., p. 530 1025 Ibid., pp. 530-531 1026 Ibid., p. 531 1027 Downer, Alexander. 2006a. ‘Interview on ‘AM Program’, on ABC Radio, 3 March; also quoted in Roy, 2011, op. cit., p. 123
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progress in implementing India’s commitment to place designated civil nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards in perpetuity”.1028
Under Howard, these agreements were pre-requisites for the policy going ahead. Whilst the policy decision had been made, in order for it to be implemented, the rules needed to be adhered to and it was in the policy stream that these agreements would be fleshed out between Australian and Indian negotiators. Howard believed that the international system of rules and safeguards governing uranium needed to be upheld in order for him to change Australia’s export regime – an example of Howard’s use of the multilateral arrangements to suit what was in many respects a domestic political agenda.
During Rudd’s prime ministership, Australia took a different view to the relationship between exporting uranium to India and its impact on the multilateral non-proliferation effort. In the lead-up to the 2007 election, Rudd linked the sale of yellowcake to India as a threat to the NPT, arguing:
‘…we’ve got to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation in our region, our neighbourhood, our own backyard. No one in Australia wants a nuclear arms industry aided by the US, in the Indian sub-continent or between India and China, because we have failed to ensure the upholding of the NPT.’1029
Under Rudd, if India wanted Australian uranium, it would need to sign the NPT.1030 One reason for this disparity is the difference in judgement between Howard and Rudd as to the benefits to Australia’s strategic and diplomatic goals the sale of uranium to India would achieve.1031 On the one hand was Howard’s position that it would strengthen the bilateral relationship with India, and, on the other was Rudd’s, arguing it would weaken Australia’s commitment to the global non-proliferation effort. Rudd concluded that Australia’s commitment to global rules regarding nuclear weapons outweighed the potential strategic advances in Canberra’s relations with New Delhi. This position was reached despite the Rudd Government’s desire for a strategic partnership with India.1032
Rudd therefore led his government’s political narrative on why Australia would not export to India, continually linking his refusal to India’s NPT status. 1033 This remained Rudd’s position despite discussions within the NSG to allow nuclear trade with India. Indeed, Rudd acknowledged Australia’s active support of the NSG lifting its nuclear moratorium on India, and outwardly acknowledged India’s
1028 Quoted in Roy, 2011, op. cit., pp. 123-124 1029 Australian Broadcasting Corporation. 2007. ‘Labor Pledge to Overturn Australia Uranium Deal’, ABC News, 17 August 1030 Franklin, Matthew. 2009. ‘Kevin Rudd refuses to buckle on refusal to seel uranium to India’, The Australian, 12 November. Rudd’s position was always going to be untenable for India for a variety of strategic concerns, see Sing, Jaswant. 1998. ‘Against Nuclear Apartheid’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 5. 1031 Clarke, Michael. 2011. ‘Australia, India and the Uranium Question’, The Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 46, No. 3, p. 490 1032 Smith, Stephen. 2010. Ministerial Statement on the Australia-India Relationship 1033 See for example Franklin, 2009, op. cit.
186 good non-proliferation record.1034 Nonetheless, bilaterally Rudd continued to stress that his policy was not directed at India per se, but was simply a continuation of a global Australian policy that had been applied since 1978.1035 The grand bargain must stand if Australia was to continue its good record in support of global non-proliferation efforts – Rudd saw his role as chief prosecutor of this argument.
The viewpoint of Gillard was very different to Rudd, with Gillard elucidating three clear reasons for why she believed changing ALP policy to support uranium sales was important:
“First and foremost selling uranium to India will be good for the Australian economy and good for Australian jobs…Second I believe that this will be one way we can take another step forward in our relationship with India…[referring to the US-India nuclear deal and bringing India into the non-proliferation fold ] third I believe this change should make sense and should take place because circumstances have developed in the international community…for us to refuse to budge is all pain with no gain.’ 1036
Jobs, the bilateral relationship and the change in the international situation regarding India and non- proliferation - in that order - became the narrative Gillard used to define this issue under her prime ministership. Yet Gillard required a change in the Labor Party Platform in order to mandate her desired policy changes. 1037 It had been a difficult undertaking for Gillard to even get the issue on her Government’s agenda, and the internal process through which this occurred remains unclear:
“Firstly, internal government processes are just that - they're confidential and I don't intend to go to them, but I've certainly been aware for a long period of time that a number of my ministers had concerns about the party platform and I've determined that we will take this step.”1038
Nonetheless, Gillard was attempting to control a disorderly caucus and required the party imprimatur to change government policy on uranium exports – the mechanism for this was the Labor National Conference. Unlike the two prime ministers that went before her, Gillard’s initial major role in this case study was to convince her party a change in policy was worthwhile; persuading the Australian population of the merits of such a change would come later. The 46th National Conference of the Australian Labor Party highlighted the divisions within the party regarding the issue of uranium exports to India. Many
1034 Rudd, Kevin. 2009a. Address to the Indian Council of World Affairs – “From Fitful Engagement to Strategic Partnership’, New Delhi, 12 November 1035 Ibid. See also Rudd, Kevin. 2009b. Prime Minister Transcript of doorstop interview New Delhi 12 November 2009, interview, New Delhi, 12 November 1036 Gillard, Julia. 2011d. Transcript of Press Conference, press conference, Canberra, 15 November 1037 The purpose of the platform, how it is created and the roles played by different ALP members is captured in Parts A – F of the most up-to-date ALP platform, accessible at:
187 from the left factions were critical of reversing the long-standing ALP policy, with factional leader Doug Cameron bluntly telling Gillard she was wrong.1039 Nonetheless, Gillard made the decision to raise the issue at the national conference noting “I made that decision; I viewed it as a leader’s call and I took it”.1040
The political risk of changing Labor’s position for Gillard was made clear by the open division displayed at the conference, yet the prime minister ultimately prevailed, successfully carrying the floor by a slim margin of 208 in favour and 185 against.1041 Consequently, the ALP National Platform of 2011 states two specific export policies regarding uranium, with the first focused on export restrictions on nations other than India:
‘In relation to exports other than to India, Labor will allow the export of uranium only to those countries that observe the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), are committed to non-proliferation policies, have ratified international and bilateral nuclear safeguards agreements and maintain strict safeguards and security controls over their nuclear power industries.’1042
This is exactly the same as the previous policy position under Rudd, excluding the reference to India. Unlike in 2009, India received its own specific policy position in the 2011 platform, as a result of Gillard’s victory:
‘In relation to India, an important strategic partner for Australia, commitments and responsible actions in support of nuclear non-proliferation, consistent with international guidelines on nuclear supply, will provide an acceptable basis for peaceful nuclear cooperation, including the export of uranium, subject to the application of strong safeguards.’1043
The ALP policy under Gillard clearly frames the decision to overturn longstanding party policy through Australia’s strategic partnership – or desire for a deeper partnership – with India. In order to overcome proliferation concerns, the establishment of NPT-like safeguards will satisfy government concerns about India’s record. India also makes another specific entry into the ALP’s statement of uranium in that Labor will walk towards:
‘… supporting the maintenance and enhancement of international and Australian safeguards to ensure that uranium mined in Australia, and nuclear products derived from it, are used only
1039 Murphy, Katharine. 2011. ‘Labor votes in favour of selling uranium to India’, The Age, 4 December 1040 Parliament of Australia. 2011a. Hansard – House of Representatives, Commonwealth of Australia, 21 November, p. 12945 1041 Rovere and Robertson, 2013, op. cit., p. 52 and; Murphy, 2011, op. cit. 1042 Australian Labor Party, 2011, op. cit., p. 69 1043 Ibid., p. 69
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for civil purposes by approved instrumentalities in approved countries that are signatories to the NPT (with the exception of India) and with whom Australia has safeguard arrangements.’1044
Again, this is exactly the same as previous statements excluding the reference to India. Indeed the policy under Gillard is verbatim the policy – including mining and waste in addition to exports – as it was under Rudd. The reference to India is the only change. Gillard was the chief policy actor responsible for instituting this change, and indeed changing one of the major variables restricting policy outcomes in the India and uranium policy sub-systems.
Having successfully changed the internal ALP policy to facilitate uranium exports, Gillard then became responsible for arguing the need for the change to the Australian community, particularly by addressing the non-proliferation issue. This was done by avoiding direct links to India and non-proliferation. For example, and as mentioned in case study two, the major foreign policy document released by the Gillard Government was the 2012 white paper Australia in the Asian Century. Whilst not specifically referring to the India debate, the white paper does address Australia’s commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons:
‘…efforts to control the proliferation of technologies and materials needed for nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their delivery will be important to Asia’s security, especially as technology advances and trade links become more complex. Issues of particular importance for Australia will be enhancing the effectiveness of relevant export controls, including securing closer regional engagement with export control regimes such as the Australia Group, and supporting practical forms of cooperation such as the Proliferation Security Initiative.’1045
Adherence to the NPT was not mentioned, but other export control and proliferation arrangements that would ultimately be in place with India were discussed. These controls were highlighted in a section outlining Australia’s objectives regarding sustainable security, and in particular, collective security arrangements in the Asian region. While this indicates that on at least one level, Gillard conceptualised the issue of non-proliferation as a security issue, it may also indicate a desire not to link the India uranium export deal to the broader non-proliferation debate. Adding to this position is that uranium exports, and India more broadly, were not foci of the other major foreign affairs policy statement released by the Gillard Government Trading Our Way to More Jobs and Prosperity.1046
1044 Ibid., p. 69 1045 Commonwealth of Australia, 2012, op. cit., p. 237. The white paper does mention - in an appended table summarising Australia’s bilateral architecture in the region - that a nuclear safeguard and cooperation agreement is undergoing negotiation Commonwealth of Australia. See p. 238. 1046 DFAT. 2011, op. cit.
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As part of the public messaging effort, Gillard also undertook a state visit to India in 2012, releasing a joint statement with her Indian counterpart. Specific reference to uranium sales was included in the statement:
“Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh welcomed the decision of the Australian Government on uranium sales to India, noting that nuclear energy will play an important role in India’s future energy needs. The Prime Ministers announced that India and Australia would commence negotiations on a bilateral Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement which, for Australia, is a prerequisite for uranium sales to other countries.”1047
Under Gillard, the sale of uranium to India became a more important part of her broader political narrative than it did under Howard or Rudd – it became linked to her authority as prime minister. However, all three prime ministers needed to set (and control) the political narrative around exports that suited their overall policy goals – deepening the relationship and economic growth, or alternatively, upholding Australia’s longstanding grand bargain and commitment to global non-proliferation infrastructure.
The Foreign Minister
The role of the foreign minister in this case is subordinate to the prime minister, particularly under the two Labor governments given the internal politics explained above. Four foreign ministers cover the period examined by this case study – Alexander Downer, Stephen Smith, Kevin Rudd and Bob Carr.1048 The foreign minister can be seen to perform one major policy making role, again typically executed through public statements:
• supporting the prime minister’s political narrative by providing policy authority on the Australia- India relationship and the global non-proliferation effort.
Under the Howard Government, Downer led much of the policy narrative around uranium exports prior to the escalation of the India issue in 2006.1049 As noted above, as late as March 2006, Downer was highlighting the Coalition’s commitment to the grand bargain. 1050 For Downer, prior to Howard’s announcements in the lead-up to the 2007 election, upholding Australia’s commitment to the NPT was an important consideration.
1047 Joint Statement, Prime Minister of Australia and Prime Minister of India, New Delhi, Wednesday 17 October 2012 1048 This section will not focus on Kevin Rudd, given the discussion of his time as prime minister establishes his role in this issue. 1049 See for example, Kirk, Alexandra. 2005. ‘Australia must boost uranium exports: Downer’, ABC AM, 2 September; Australian Associated Press. 2007. ‘Downer approves uranium exports to China’, iThe Age, 5 January and; Downer, Alexander. 2001. Safeguards Arrangements for Uranium Exports to Taiwan, media release, 13 August. 1050 Downer, 2006a, op. cit.. Also quoted in Roy, 2011, op. cit., p. 123
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But Downer also dismissed the threat of Australian uranium being used to fuel nuclear weapons arguing that as the quantities required to produce nuclear weapons was small compared to producing power – around five tonnes for one weapon versus 200 per annum for a 1,000 megawatt reactor – indigenous supply of uranium within nuclear weapons states were more than adequate.1051 Whilst ignoring vertical proliferation in this rationale, Downer clearly did not see any proliferation issues with exporting Australian uranium to existing nuclear weapons states, even if at that point, the Howard Government’s policy was consistent with Australia’s historic setting. This position would ultimately change.
Stephen Smith, the foreign minister under Rudd, also sought to separate Australia’s position from that Washington’s nuclear deal:
“…our consideration of the US-India nuclear civil arrangement certainly won’t lead to a change of policy, so far as Australia’s exports of uranium are concerned…our longstanding policy position as a political party and as a government in office is we only export uranium to those nation-states who are parties to the [NPT]”.1052
Smith’s comments fitted in with the narrative led by Rudd that Australia’s commitment to the NPT was best served by adhering to both the grand bargain and compromise. Yet running in tandem with Smith’s reluctance to sell uranium to India, was a desire to build a strategic partnership, as he noted:
‘In keeping with [a] strategic partnership, Australia will pursue deeper bilateral, regional and international cooperation with India in a wide range of fields, including on strategic and security matters…The underlying strength of the Australia and India relationship is our common interests, including shared values and democratic traditions.’1053
Smith, nor Rudd for that matter, never defined what the strategic partnership would entail or gave it a definitive timeline for implementation.1054 Nonetheless, Smith assisted in refocusing Australia’s export policy back to the grand bargain that had previously enjoyed bipartisan support – he played a supporting role to Rudd’s narrative.
Bob Carr would also talk to the strategic dimension of the Australia-India relationship, although he viewed the potential sale to India more positively. Writing before he became foreign minister, Carr noted in 2011 that Gillard’s desire to change the ALP’s platform showed leadership and was a policy that could provide clear environmental benefits by reducing Indian carbon emissions.1055 During his tenure as foreign minister, officials from Australia and India would commence negotiations, launching
1051 Downer, Alexander. 2006b. Submission No. 33.1 to House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry and Resources, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, p. 11 and; Rovere and Robertson, 2013, op. cit., p. 56 1052 Quoted in Roy, 2011, op. cit., p. 132 1053 Smith, 2010, op. cit. 1054 See Snedden, 2011, op. cit., pp. 71-72. 1055 Carr, Bob. 2011. ‘Uranium to India: Leadership from Gillard’, on Thoughtlines with Bob Carr, November 15
191 discussions with his Indian counterpart and linking the sale of uranium to Australia’s strategic future.1056 Indeed he believed that without agreeing to uranium exports, ‘Australia was not going to be able to build a fully-fledged relationship with the world’s largest democracy’.1057
The Coalition Opposition also contributed to the narrative around the export deal through the foreign affairs portfolio lens. The Liberal Party platform during the Rudd and Gillard Governments remained consistent with the 2002 Howard-era platform and makes no specific reference to uranium or India nor does it challenge the arguments put forward by Howard and Downer.1058 However, at the time of Rudd’s overturning of the Howard Government decision, then Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrew Robb, condemned the decision, arguing it undermined the strategic imperative to make a major political investment in India.1059 Robb echoed much of Howard’s original policy, defining the debate in terms of the need to deepen Australia’s strategic relationship with a growing power, the need to maximise Australia’s commercial and trade opportunities with an energy intensive and growing economy and pointing to the imprimatur that the US-India nuclear deal provided Australia to come to a similar arrangement.1060 Further, Robb added an environmental element to the debate, arguing that India would not sacrifice economic development for the sake of reducing greenhouse emissions and that Australia was perfectly positioned to provide the raw materials that would enable India to pursue nuclear energy as a mechanism to ensure growth as well as embrace cleaner energy.1061 Indeed Robb stated that on ‘green house considerations alone this agreement is a “must do”’.1062 With the addition of the climate change element, perhaps a function of the role of that debate in Australia’s domestic politics during the early Rudd years, Robb’s position and that of the Coalition remained consistent throughout Rudd’s prime ministership.1063
The coalition defined the issue around strategy, economics and energy security. This remained consistent from the time Howard’s original decision to overturn the ban through to the end of the Gillard Government.1064 Indeed Julie Bishop, the then Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs repeated the line that the Labor ban on uranium was an impediment to a deeper relationship.1065
1056 See Hodge, Amanda. 2013. ‘Talks to start on sale of uranium to India’, The Australia, January 22 and; Australia India Institute. 2013. Senator Carr Engages with India, Melbourne, Australia India Institute, January 22 1057 Carr, 2011, op. cit. 1058 Liberal Party of Australia. 2002. Federal Platform: Liberal Party of Australia, Barton (ACT), Liberal Party of Australia 1059 Robb, Andrew. 2008. ‘Uranium Sales to India: A Strategic Imperative’, The Sydney Papers, Autumn 2008, p. 55 and; Khoury, Andre. 2008. ‘Australia drops uranium sales to India’, in Business Asia, April, Vol. 16, No. 1, p. 22 1060 Khoury, 2008, p. 22 1061 Robb, 2008, op. cit., p. 58 and; Khoury, 2008, p. 22. 1062 Robb, 2008, op. cit., p. 60 1063 Ibid., p. 60 1064 At the time of writing, neither the ALP nor the Coalition had changed their positions. The issue of uranium sales to India was a not a salient one during the 2013 or 2016 federal elections. 1065 Bishop, Julie. 2011. ‘Charting the future of Australia-India relations’, Australian Polity, Vol. 2, No. 3
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The role of the foreign minister in this case study was to take the broad strokes of the narrative led by the prime minister, and add nuance and detail on the impact on the bilateral relationship with India and the global non-proliferation effort. Downer and Smith performed this role in particular, both publically outlining the specifics of nuclear weapon manufacturing, international legal arrangements and Australia’s non-proliferation efforts to reinforce the narrative of their leader. Given the centrality of the prime minister in this case, particularly Rudd and Gillard, the role of the foreign minister was more subordinate than might otherwise be expected in a key issue with a significant bilateral partner.
Trade Minister
Like the foreign minister, the trade minister’s role in this case is diminished somewhat given that much of the debate around uranium exists outside the trade portfolio. Nonetheless, it was the role of the trade minister to ensure the sale or non-sale of uranium to India was linked to Australia’s broader trade policy or more specially, the trade relationship with India.
For example, under Simon Crean, much of his relationship with India was focused on a potential FTA, although he did note that on the uranium issue, Australian and India disagreed:
“…but it’s not the stumbling block to concluding an FTA. In many senses, having an energy chapter in the FTA might facilitate something of a dialogue in that direction.”1066
Gillard’s Trade Minister, Craig Emerson, spoke of the proliferation and safeguards issues underpinning the deal, 1067 but also of the need to provide energy stability to India’s population and link the agreement back to the Gillard Government’s Australian in the Asian Century white paper.1068
Other Ministers and the Parliament
Given the cross-over into the domestic policy sphere, the Minister for Energy and Resources is also involved in this particular case. Particularly under the Rudd and Gillard Governments, the ministers performed two major tasks:
• making refinement to how the export deal was defined; and • linking the deal back to key government initiatives and industry at the domestic level.
In addition to definitions provided by Rudd and Gillard, consecutive ministers responsible for the energy portfolio contributed to the political narrative defining the uranium deal. For example, then Minister for
1066 See Wade, Matt. 2010. ‘Uranium no bar to India deal: Crean’, The Age, May 5 1067 Emerson, Craig. 2011b. Interview on ABC News Radio, interview 5 December; Grattan, Michelle. 2012. ‘Caution over India uranium sales’, The Sydney Morning Herald and; Emerson, Craig. 2011c. Interview on Insiders, 30 October. 1068 Hudson, Phillip. 2012. ‘Prime Minister Julia Gillard will start negotiations to sell uranium to India’, Herald Sun, October 16
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Resources Martin Ferguson supported the sale of uranium to India. He spoke of non-proliferation as an issue specific to exports to India, and although acknowledging India’s unwillingness to sign onto the NPT, accepted that uranium needed to be a part of India’s energy future:
“While India is not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Australia acknowledges the need to meet India’s growing energy needs as a major emerging economy. And we welcome India’s willingness to work with the international community through the International Atomic Energy Agency.”1069
Ferguson also spoke of the need to influence non-proliferation, but noted that Australia must be part of the nuclear fuel cycle if it was to effect change:
‘the truth is that, without Australia’s active involvement in the nuclear fuel cycle— as a strategic uranium supplier—we cannot expect to influence the future course of events when it comes to nuclear non-proliferation’1070
In 2013, Minister for Resources and Energy under Gillard, Gary Gray, framed the issue through a domestic economic policy lens:
“The Government's Energy White Paper…acknowledges our potential to be the world's leading uranium supplier, with our extensive uranium resources, mining expertise and leadership role in global weapons non-proliferation and safeguards regimes. There is also a significant role for uranium to play in helping the world address the issue of climate change.”1071
Gray would link the economic and proliferation issue together, noting:
“In India, in 2007 around 412 million people were living without adequate access to electricity. India will require more electrical energy for its households and, for business if it is to lift its population out of poverty. For India to develop and prosper, it will need Australian uranium producers to step up. Australia supplies around 22% of China's uranium demand, and negotiations have commenced with India on a bilateral safeguards agreement, which will pave the way for significant exports in the future.”1072
1069 Ferguson, Martin. 2011. Speech delivered to the Australia India Business Council Dinner, speech, Brisbane, 4 August. Similar sentiments expressed in Ferguson, Martin. 2012. Speech delivered to the AusIMM International Uranium Conference, speech, Adelaide, 13 June 1070 Ferguson, Martin. 2007. Speech at Labor Party National Conference, Sydney, 28 April. Also quoted in Roy, 2011, op. cit. p. 135 1071 Gray, Gary. 2013. Speech to the Australian Uranium Association, speech, Canberra, 6 June 2013. 1072 Ibid.
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This position seemed to overturn much of the Rudd Government’s stance towards uranium exports towards India by acknowledging that by avoiding becoming involved with India through uranium exports, Canberra could not possibly influence India on non-proliferation issues. Yet it follows the pattern of minister with portfolio responsibilities supporting the prime minister’s narrative. Like the foreign minister provides foreign policy context for the uranium deal that feeds back into the government’s overall narrative, the resources minister takes on a similar role but in the context of energy and resources.
Policy Stream
The policy stream is much less structured in this case as compared to the other two case studies for two main reasons. Firstly, the majority of the policy making in this case occurs in the politics stream. Secondly, in the period under investigation, much of the detailed work on safeguard arrangements, domestic consultation and negotiations was preliminary and subject to changes in government and leadership. Nonetheless, we see a number of bureaucratic policy actors in this stream playing a significant role in the development of Australia’s uranium export regime to India.
In this stream we can see a number of deep core beliefs and policy core beliefs that guide the actions of actors, and guide engagement with actors in the politics and problems stream. These are outlined in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2 – Deep Core Beliefs and Policy Core Beliefs
Belief Actor Deep Core Belief Australia has a role in the global DFAT, ASNO, DRET nuclear industry Australia has no role in the N/A global nuclear industry Sale of uranium only to NPT DFAT (initially), ASNO signatories (support for the grand bargain/compromise) Policy Core Belief Sale of uranium if suitable DFAT, DRET, DPM&C domestic safeguards are in place Sale of uranium under no N/A circumstances
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
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DFAT’s role in this case study is limited by virtue of the fact that much of the policy making activity exists in the policy stream and most of the relevant policy expertise was outside of the department. Nonetheless, DFAT performs three key roles in this case study:
• negotiates the agreement with Indian counterparts • is responsible for Australia’s non-proliferation and nuclear safeguards efforts • contextualises the agreement with India in terms of the global uranium and nuclear non- proliferation framework.
As an institution, it is more difficult to ascertain a concrete issue definition than with the individual policy actors in the politics stream. Nonetheless, when it was put to former DFAT Secretary Dennis Richardson that the uranium sales to India was a trade issue, it became apparent that DFAT (or at least its head) did not view it in terms that aligned exactly with its political masters:
“It’s not really a trade issue… really takes you into the world of nuclear safe guards and the like, is there a potential trade benefit for Australia? Yes, but before that benefit can be realised…we don’t export uranium to any country without safeguard agreements and they’re fairly stringent, we have them with China, Russia, the US, we have them with France, in other words, simply because you’re dealing with a friendly Western country you don’t send off uranium whether you’re sending them to a friendly Western country or another country until you’ve still got to safe guard. That is the key part of the negotiations there and you don’t really involve your uranium industry…we’re not representing, when we negotiate a safeguards agreement which allows the export of uranium to a particular country, we don’t have one eye on the uranium producers.”1073
It was only once safeguards had been put in place, that the issue became one of trade. Richardson further suggested that only once the safeguards were established was it appropriate that the uranium industry would become involved through various approval processes. This position is clearly different to that at the political level, where Howard and Gillard in particular clearly link the decision to sell to trade and export opportunities as well as the deepening of the Australia-India bilateral relationship – well before any safeguards arrangement are in place. If we take Richardson’s view as a prevailing definition for DFAT, the issue of uranium exports was not one of trade or strengthening the bilateral relationship per se, but one of safeguards and non-proliferation. This issue definition ensures the DFAT maintains a role in any export negotiations with India given DFAT’s role in leading Australia’s international negotiations. Richardson’s comment also clearly outlines its role in this stream as negotiating a safeguard agreement with potential export partners rather than an advocacy role for the nation’s uranium miners.
1073 Richardson, interview with researcher, 13 June 2011
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Within DFAT, ASNO also contributes to Australia’s anti-proliferation efforts. ASNO is responsible for Australia’s uranium export policy that restricts policy options available to policy makers developing the export agreement with India. Some key points of the policy are as follows:
• ‘Australian uranium may only be exported for peaceful non-explosive purposes under Australia's network of bilateral safeguards Agreements, which provide for. • Australia retains the right to be selective as to the countries with which it is prepared to conclude safeguards arrangements. • Non-nuclear weapon state customer countries must at a minimum be a party to the NPT and have concluded a full scope safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. • Nuclear weapon state customer countries must provide an assurance that Australian Obligated Nuclear Material (AONM) will not be diverted to non-peaceful or explosive uses and accept coverage of AONM by IAEA safeguards • Commercial contracts for the export of Australian uranium should include a clause noting that the contract is subject to the relevant bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement.’1074
These are strict rules to which ASNO must adhere to ensure Australia’s regulatory framework allows Australian companies to safely export uranium and support the global non-proliferation regime. ASNO also must advocate the objectives of Australia’s safeguards regime ensuring that uranium is used exclusively for peaceful purposes, does not contribute to military aims, and Australian Obligated Nuclear Material is appropriately accounted for as it moves through the nuclear fuel cycle. 1075 Any agreements that stem from these objectives must contain binding peaceful use commitments, consent rights for certain activities, and identification mechanisms for identifying Australian material and items captured by the agreement.1076 The Gillard Government would insist on a further Additional Protocol with the IAEA as a pre-condition on sales to India.1077
The long-held commitment to the core roles of ASNO has meant that non-proliferation concerns are a salient voice within DFAT on any nuclear export regime, regardless of the destination country. This commitment to Australia’s uranium export policy restricts the department’s behaviour on this issue,1078 and is reinforced by powerful internal voices. The uranium export policy restricts DFAT to facilitating export opportunities to countries and governments that meet the particulars of the policy.
DFAT is also restricted by a variety of government legislation, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987; Customs Act 1901 (Prohibited Exports) and; Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention and Proliferation) Act 1995. The first example provides particularly stringent requirements on DFAT, including monitoring compliance with any treaty Australia negotiates with another country and
1074 DFAT. 2012b. Australia’s Uranium Export Policy, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia 1075 Carlson, John. 2005. ‘The role of bilateral nuclear safeguards agreements’, Trust and Verify, October 2005- February 2006, No. 122, pp 1-4. John Carlson was the Director General of ASNO. 1076 Ibid. 1077 DFAT. 2012c. India-Uranium: Exports, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, documents released under freedom of information. 1078 DFAT, 2012b., op. cit.; and DFAT, 2012c, op. cit.
197 second, a detailed reporting schedule on where Australian-origin nuclear materials sit in each stage of the fuel cycle and its end use.1079 This means it would not be possible for DFAT to sign a bilateral agreement with India that did not meet the requirements of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987. Only a decision by a political actor in the politics stream can overcome these restrictions by removing the relevant legal and treaty obligations.
Other Federal Departments
In this particular case, DFAT shares the policy stream with the Department of Research, Energy and Tourism (DRET) as it is responsible for the nation’s domestic uranium policy. DRET’s major role in this case study is to link the export deal to Australia’s domestic policy settings. DRET also convenes the Australia-India Joint Working Group on Energy and Minerals, a group that is the ‘primary forum to discuss bilateral engagement on resources and energy related matters’.1080 Importantly, DRET is also responsible for the Uranium Council, a group that aims ‘to contribute to national wellbeing through the progressive and sustainable development of the Australian uranium exploration, mining, milling and exporting industry in line with world's best practice standards’.1081 Despite having a primarily domestic focus, the Council is a significant method for engaging the uranium industry as many of the key industry actors, including state and federal government authorities, are members of the council.
The role of DRET means business and business associations can access this stream more so than if negotiations were left solely to DFAT. Of particular use to these groups are the submissions processes run by DRET such as for the Australian Energy White Paper and the Australian Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Treaties review into nuclear proliferation.1082 Whilst they are not solely focused on the uranium exports to India issue, they do provide a mechanism for industry to put their point of view to the public service and highlight industry concerns. Yet business faces a problem in the policy stream for this particular issue as both DFAT and DRET do not fulfil the typical role of the public service in Australian foreign policy making exhibited in most other foreign policy issues – that is, an interlocutory role between domestic policy actors and elected officials. In this case, this role has been diminished owing to the politicisation of the issue and the dominance of the interactions within the politics stream. This requires business to access actors in the politics stream if it wants to encourage sympathetic policy decisions.
Under the Howard Government, DPM&C also played a role in this case study, having convened the Uranium Mining, Processing and Nuclear Energy Review Taskforce to review Australia’s current uranium mining and processing activities and investigate the potential for nuclear power to contribute
1079 Floyd, Robert. 2014. Official Committee Hansard – Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Canberra, evidence provided, Monday 15 June, p. 3 1080 DRET. 2012a. Bilateral minerals and energy cooperation with India, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia 1081 DRET. 2012b. Uranium Council, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia 1082 Department of Industry and Science. 2015. Energy White Paper, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia and Joint Standing Committee on Treaties. 2009. Report 106: Nuclear Proliferation and Disarmament, Canberra, September, Commonwealth of Australia.
198 to the Australia’s future energy needs.1083 The report contributed to the narrative around the economic benefit put forward by the Howard Government in finding that:
‘Consultations revealed support for the expansion of Australian mining and export of uranium. Skill shortages, government policies and legal prohibitions restricting the growth of the industry would need to be urgently addressed.’1084
This supported Howard’s narrative in the politics stream. The report also linked Australian exports to the broader global proliferation debate, finding:
‘While proliferation of nuclear weapons remains a critical global issue, increased Australian involvement in the nuclear fuel cycle would not change the risks; nor would Australia’s energy grid become more vulnerable to terrorist attack.’1085
This encapsulates the major role of DPM&C in this case study – supporting the position of the prime minister of the day, and validating their policy position. The coordination role central to DPM&C means that it attempts to corral policy and line agencies into line – a line usually emanating from the Prime Minister’s office.
Problem Stream
The problem stream is where many non-state policy actors can contribute to the debate around uranium exports and the surrounding political narrative. The problem stream is the most accessible to domestic policy actors residing outside the government structures. It is the stream in which they can push their cause through research, advocacy, campaigning and lobbying, but also by engaging official consultation mechanisms controlled by the policy stream – such as the open submissions process managed by DRET, DFAT or by engaging political representatives at the Labor National Conference. In this particular policy, because the political stream is so dominant in controlling the narrative, the problem stream is somewhat muted in terms of impact. This is particularly so compared to other foreign policy initiatives, such as trade negotiations, where sectoral issues are catered for by both the policy and politics stream more thoroughly. Nonetheless, there are a number of non-government actors differing in their definition of the problems represented by selling uranium to India as defined by their values. As discussed in Part A of this study, the values a policy actor brings to an issue ultimately position it with or against the government view, potentially impacting its ability to engage in policy making.
1083 See DPMC. 2006. Uranium Mining, Processing and Nuclear Energy – Opportunities for Australia?, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia; and Wesley, Michael. 2008. ‘Refashioning Australia’s Nuclear Bargain?’, The Non-proliferation Review, Vol. 15, No. 2 1084 DPMA, 2006, op. cit. p. 2 1085 Ibid., p. 2
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In this stream we can see a number of deep core beliefs and policy core beliefs that guide the actions of actors, and guide engagement with actors in the politics and policy stream. These are outlined in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3 – Deep Core Beliefs and Policy Core Beliefs
Belief Actor Deep Core Belief Australia has a role in the global BCA, ACCI, AUA, MCA, Rio nuclear industry Tinto Australia has no role in the FOE, ACF, Wilderness Society, global nuclear industry Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons Sale of uranium only to NPT N/A signatories (support for the grand bargain/compromise) Policy Core Belief Sale of uranium if suitable BCA, ACCI, AUA, MCA, Rio domestic safeguards are in Tinto place Sale of uranium under no FOE, ACF, Wilderness Society, circumstances Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
Businesses and Organised Business
In this case, individual business and organised business associations can be seen to perform one major role:
• advocacy for the sale of uranium to India.
Unlike the second case study where a wide range of business and business groups engaged in advocating for or campaigning against ChAFTA, in the main, those involved in this case study had a stake in ensuring a deal was reached between Australia and India. No major business or business association was found to publically advocate against the deal. Similar to the political stream, business policy actors linked their advocacy to a problem definition of economic growth, energy security, clean energy and non-proliferation. This advocacy was conducted primarily through engaging government consultation mechanisms such as energy white papers and JSCOT reviews.1086
1086 For example Department of Industry and Science, 2015, , op. cit.; Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, 2009, op. cit.; and although outside the scope of this study, the following Senate report provides the clearest articulation of business reviews, Joint Standing Committee on Treaties. 2014. Report 151: Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of India on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, Canberra, September, Commonwealth of Australia.
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At the association level, the BCA, the ACCI and the Australian Uranium Association (AUA) all engaged the public debate using the potential for increased economic activity as leverage, while simultaneously focusing on India’s energy security and the need for clean energy.1087 The BCA, for example, supports the export initiative arguing it would assist “India to meet its future clean energy needs through the sale of uranium will contribute to that country’s continued growth, which will have benefits for Australia and the rest of the world”.1088 More broadly, all three organisations also produce numerous publications and research reports, focusing on the benefits of increased trade, including exploitation of Australia’s mineral resources.1089 The AUA also added its support, particularly given increased competition from Canada and Kazakhstan, and regulator and political opposition to uranium mining in a number of Australian states.1090
The Minerals Council of Australia (MCA) also supported the deal, stating that it would ‘provide new commercial opportunities for Australia’s uranium exploration, mining and export industries, which in turn provide broader economic advantages for Australia’. 1091 Providing its views through submissions processes run in the policy stream, the MCA also argues that supplying uranium to India would help meet a growing demand for base load energy through a low emissions commodity. BHP Billiton shared the MCA’s view, noting that Australian uranium exports contribute to providing 400 million people energy security but with lower environmental impacts than other commodities.1092
On the non-proliferation front, the AUA argues that in the absence of being able to convince India to join the NPT, Australia could ‘support efforts to have [India] accept obligations similar to those required of NPT signatories’.1093 Non-proliferation should thus be seen as a separate issue to selling uranium to India, although any framework of cooperation established under an export agreement would direct India’s behaviour to that expected under the NPT.
1087 Smaller business association make similar claims, see The Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia. 2015. Australia-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement – Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Perth, The Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia; and The South Australian Chamber of Mines and Energy. 2015. Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of India in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, Adelaide, The South Australian Chamber of Mines and Energy 1088 Business Group A, interview with researcher, 19 March 2011 1089 See also Australian Uranium Association. 2009. Submission to the Energy White Paper Secretariat, Melbourne, Australian Uranium Association. 1090 Ibid. 1091 MCA. 2014. Australia-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Canberra, MCA, p. 1 1092 BHP Billiton. 2015. Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties – Australia-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, Melbourne, BHP Billiton, pp. 1-2. Paladin Resources and the former Compass Resources (both uranium mining companies) have also made similar points in submissions to various energy enquiries. See for example, Paladin Resources. 2005. Submission to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry and Resources – The Strategic Importance of Australia’s Uranium Resources’, Subiaco (WA), Paladin Resources; and Compass Resources. 2005. Submission to the Standing Committee on Industry and Resources – Inquiry into the development of the non-fossil fuel energy industry in Australia’, Sydney, Compass Resources 1093 AUA. 2008. JSCOT Inquiry into Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Melbourne, AUA, p. 10
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Similarly, the MCA emphasise that ‘India’s non-proliferation record is strong’ and that commitments made regarding the NSG, the IAEA, and its adherence to both of these agreements ensures Australian ‘exported uranium derivatives cannot benefit the development of nuclear weapons or be used in other military programs’.1094 Rio Tinto agreed, noting ‘robust measures that safe guard the sale and use of uranium exclusively for peaceful civilian purposes are an essential component of the sustainable production and sale of uranium.’ The company maintained that Australia had put in place robust arrangements with other nations, and that an export regime with India would be not different and should proceed.1095
Non-business organised interests
The main non-business organised interest groups active in this case study are environmental and civil society. In the main, they perform one major role:
• advocacy against the sale of uranium to India.
During the Gillard Government, eleven major groups formed an advocacy coalition to lobby Labor members of parliament to resist changing their party’s platform. Organisations such as Friends of the Earth (FOE), Greenpeace Australia, the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACFo) and the Wilderness Society all conceptualised the issue as one of environmental impact and non-proliferation, arguing that exporting uranium to India was detrimental to both endeavours.1096 Such behaviour is consistent with groups with a similar policy belief coming together to advocate a shared policy position.
Individually, the larger non-government organisations (NGOs) all participated via formal consultation mechanisms ran in the policy stream. For example, in submissions made by the ACFo, it argued that safety concerns and non-proliferation safeguards were the two major reasons not to export to India.1097 On the first point, the ACFo points out that the Indian Auditor General warned of a ‘Fukushima or Chernobyl-like disaster’ if the nation’s nuclear safety issue is not addressed, highlighting poor regulation, lax governance and an underdeveloped safety culture.1098 Australian exports would simply exacerbate these issues if exports were allowed without guarantees that Indian authorities adequately addressed safety concerns. The ACFo also argued that ‘business as usual’ cannot proceed post- Fukushima and in the absence of Australia responding to a UN call for Australia to review the impacts
1094 MCA, 2014, op. cit., pp. 5-6. Similar sentiments were made by BHP Billiton, see BHP Billiton, 2015, op. cit. p. 1. 1095 Rio Tinto Services. 2015. Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties on the Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of India on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, Brisbane, Rio Tinto Services, p. 1 1096 An open letter to the ALP National Conference signed by 11 organisations dated November 2011 is available at both
202 of its uranium export regime – selling yellowcake to India should not occur in the absence of this review. Secondly, the ACFo points to India’s NPT status, failure to allow IAEA inspections at all nuclear plants, refusal to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and tensions with Pakistan as evidence that any safeguards put in place by an export treaty would ‘provide only an illusion of protection’.1099
The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons also highlighted India’s nuclear weapons program, poor safety records and potential for a bilateral agreement to undermine the global nuclear non-proliferation regime as reasons to oppose exports. 1100 Similarly, according to FOE, India’s expansion of its nuclear weapons arsenal and broader weapons proliferation concerns should prohibit Australian exports of uranium to India.1101 In an interview with FOE, it was noted that while FOE would always make its position on contentious issues such as uranium known, it did have the trust in relevant ministers to engage them directly – ‘why tell them something they don’t want to hear and will just ignore?’.1102 The position of FOE and other NGOs against the general Australian Government uranium policy made access to the politics stream very difficult. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the position of these groups makes them policy outsiders in this case study.
Concluding Remarks
In this case study we see policy making that is occurring predominantly in the politics stream. The pivotal role of the prime minister, particularly Gillard, in controlling the narrative ensured that this particular foreign policy was made at the highest levels of government. The subsidiary role of the public service, sidelined until the political game in the politics stream played out, goes to this point. Further, the polarised positions actors in the problem stream found themselves in – either for or against the deal, with few in between – further restricts access to the decision making core. This is more so than in case studies one and two, where consultative mechanisms established in the policy stream at least facilitate some engagement with non-state policy actors.
1099 Ibid., p. 3 1100 International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. 2014. ICAN Australia submission- Inquiry into the Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of India on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, Carlton (Victoria), International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, p. 1 1101 FOE. 2014. Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties regarding the Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of India on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy’, Carlton (Victoria), FOE, p. 3 1102 FOE, interview with researcher, 1 February 2013
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Chapter 7: The Role of Domestic Policy Actors in Australian Foreign Policy Making
This final chapter will analyse the data presented in the three case studies and answer the first of two central research questions this study sought to answer: what is the role played by domestic policy actors in the making of Australian foreign policy? It categorises the actors identified in the case studies according to the typology outlined in Chapter 3 – public decision makers, policy insiders and policy outsiders. The second question, on the access of non-state policy actors, will be addressed in the conclusion to this thesis.
Public Decision Makers
The position of a public decision maker confers structural advantages over other actors, particularly in terms of legitimacy, authority and control over process and information.1103 Execution of policy making activities utilising these advantages are key indicators of public decision maker status. Analysis of the three case studies concurs with the proposition put forward by Real-Dato that public decisions makers are typically agents of the state.1104 This section will examine the role played by public decision makers, linking the activities observed in the case studies to the above three characteristics.
For the most part, public decision makers exist within the politics stream. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the politics stream is where decisions are made and policy narratives are constructed. In Kingdon’s original work, the politics stream is where policy making by government actors primarily occurs – a position confirmed by the case studies, even if somewhat nuanced given the pivotal role of the public service in the policy stream in the Australian foreign policy making context. Nonetheless, the case studies highlight that the key public decision makers of Australian foreign policy – the prime minister, the foreign minister and the trade minister (and to a lesser extent the cabinet and other senior ministers) – all play out their roles primarily in the politics stream.
In addition to this, the policy stream also sees the DFAT, and its predecessor agencies, act as public decision makers. In this context, DFAT’s role as a public decision maker occurs at the institutional level, or in some cases, at the level of powerful individuals within the institution (such as John Crawford in Japanese trade treaty process). Interestingly, DFAT can also be seen as acting as a policy insider in some cases, a phenomenon supported by the literature that suggests a policy actor can change roles depending on the policy being made.1105
1103 Real-Dato, 2009, op cit., p. 135 and; Cobb and Ross, 1997, op. cit., p. 26 1104 Real-Dato, 2009, op. cit., p. 122 1105 See Page, 1999, op. cit. and; Maloney et al., op. cit. 1994.
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There is clear evidence of the prime minister being a significant – if not the most significant – public decision maker in at least the second and third case studies.1106 This is due to the prime minister exhibiting the three structural advantages of a public decision maker:
• legitimacy – afforded to the prime minister as the elected head of the government and as Australia’s highest-ranked elected representative abroad; • authority – head of the federal cabinet and executive with the power to sign-off on all decisions; and • control – has as much access to information as personally desired, controls access to a centralised action arena and whilst does not directly control the bureaucratic arm of foreign policy making, does control the passage of decisions through the cabinet, the party and the parliament.
The prime minister’s chief policy role is setting the political narrative around anygiven foreign policy issue, determining whether some should or should not be done. This is an example of the prime minister exercising both legitimacy and authority. This supports Althaus et al’s classification of policy making through advocacy – the prime minister using a political narrative to ‘argue a case rather than force a result’.1107 By controlling the narrative, the prime minister deploys moral and political capital to create or exploit opportunities that other would not exist.1108
The case study on the Australia-India uranium deal provides the best example of the prime minister controlling the narrative, as the three prime ministers involved all set separate narratives; narratives that would be led by the prime ministers themselves. As the case study demonstrated, each prime minister – Howard, Rudd and Gillard – took differing approaches to the deal, paralleling their government’s broad ideologies. This meant the deal endure policy motivations that oscillated between often-opposing political narratives: bilateralism, multilateralism, commercial interests and employment gains. Howard, for example, built a narrative that argued in favour of exporting uranium to India, focusing on the need to deepen the bilateral relationship with India but also highlighting the commercial opportunities a deal would present to Australia’s mining industries. Alternatively, Rudd provided a stark contrast by opposing Howard and then overturning his decision when elected to office, on the grounds that the sale to a non-NPT signatory state would undermine the global multilateral non-proliferation effort.
It is through these narratives that the prime minister – reflecting their individual belief system – engages the Australian public on matters of foreign policy and creates restrictions on the policy options available to bureaucratic policy actors attempting to implement foreign policy and non-state actors trying to shape
1106 The exception to this would be the role of Menzies vis-à-vis McEwen in case study one. 1107 Althaus et al., 2007, op. cit. p. 89 1108 Kane, John. 2001. The Politics of Moral Capital, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 11 and; Althaus et. al., 2012, p. 9
205 policy to suit their interests. Controlling the narrative makes the prime minister a significant public decision maker in the making of Australian foreign policy.
Secondly, the prime minister is responsible for linking the specific foreign policy proposal back to their government’s broader foreign policy and domestic policy aims – this happened in all three case studies. This again is an example of being a public decision maker by exercising legitimacy and authority, and represents policy making by advocacy. As demonstrated in case study one, Menzies was vocal in linking the trade treaty with Japan to maintain the post-War peace, keeping Japan out of the communist orbit and providing a source of growth for Australia’s domestic industries by transitioning them from their war time footing.
Similarly, Howard canvassed the need for ChAFTA within his broader scepticism for the multilateral trade effort that had failed to reach consensus at Doha, and the subsequent array of FTAs his government would launch to promote Australia’s trade interests – describing it as a mechanism that would also provide greater bilateral political and security connectedness. Gillard also linked ChAFTA to her broader trade goals espoused in the Trading Our Way to More Jobs and Prosperity policy statement and Australia in the Asian Century white paper.
This second role of the prime minister situates their foreign policy preferences within the broader objectives of their government, and provides a rationale for why the government is pursuing one tactic over another. Linking a foreign policy issue to a codified domestic policy, such as a white or green paper, is a clear example of Sabatier’s nested policy sub-systems outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, but is also an example of policy making through government action, particularly if the domestic policy has a dedicated budget involved.1109
Finally, and in particular for contentious foreign policy decisions such as the sale of uranium, the prime minister is responsible for getting their party to support the policy. This is an example of the prime minister exercising control, and is consistent with what Althaus et al. labelled policy through government action. In the three cases studies investigated, Gillard performed this role most obviously, successfully getting the ALP to change its long-standing platform of only selling uranium to NPT signatories. Menzies also played this role to some degree once McEwen had done the hard yards in convincing the cabinet to support the Japan trade agreement – the prime minister was responsible for getting the Coalition to fall in behind his trade minister. This procedural role of the prime minister is important in cases where ministerial unity is not guaranteed.
The foreign minister also acts as a public decision maker in the politics stream. As with the prime minister, the foreign minister can be seen to exhibit the advantages afforded to public decision makers:
• legitimacy – afforded to the foreign minister to authoritatively speak on foreign policy as head of the ministerial portfolio and as Australia’s second highest-ranked elected representative abroad;
1109 Althaus et al., 2012, pp. 92-94
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• authority – responsible for foreign policy within the federal cabinet and executive and is traditionally a senior member of both bodies; and • control – has as much access to information as personally desired, can restrict access to a centralised action arena, and has responsibility for the public service responsible for foreign policy.
The most significant role played by the foreign minister is to support the narrative established by the prime minister, but to add policy expertise and nuance to the overarching policy story. For example, Downer would support Howard’s narrative on uranium sales by making public statements on proliferation, focusing on the specific technical details and Australia’s role in the nuclear supply chain. Similarly Smith’s public statements on the uranium deal would go into detail on the US-India civil nuclear arrangement and outline why the deal would not alter Labor’s long standing commitment to the grand bargain and compromise. While Howard and Rudd were left to focus on the broader bilateral relationship, proliferation and economic elements of the deal, their foreign ministers underpinned the narrative with facts and expertise. The supporting role played by the foreign minister is also an example of policy by advocacy – by adding expertise and factual detail to the prime minister’s narrative, the foreign minister legitimises their government’s position by investing their own political capital.
The second role of the foreign minister is to link the issue to Australia’s broader foreign policy setting. The foreign minister can be useful for a government in this role as they can provide deeper analysis of issues that might be too sensitive or particularly complex for the prime minister to address in detail. Take, for example, the uranium debate in case study three, the impact of selling uranium to India on the global non-proliferation effort was a major point of difference between those supporting and opposing the deal. In both cases, the foreign minister highlighted the specifics of the international non- proliferation infrastructure and how their government’s position would not only avoid any negative impacts of the deal, but would likely improve the infrastructure by brining India in from the cold. Similarly in ChAFTA, the foreign minister was charged with highlighting the benefits of greater trade would have to other areas of the bilateral relationship with China. Stephen Smith went even further into details about how the FTA fitted into the global multilateral trade architecture that the Rudd Government was keen to support.
Nevertheless, the foreign minister’s role in linking an issue to broader foreign policy considerations is not always influential. In the Japan Commerce Treaty, for example, where despite his strategic calculations being broadly aligned with Menzies, Casey was relegated to a side role in that treaty’s development because of his position within the Menzies Cabinet. This shows that whilst the foreign minister should be a public decision maker in the course of any given foreign policy, the individual occupying the portfolio can have a significant impact on the authority aspect of being a public decision maker. A similar view could be constructed of Rudd during his term as foreign minister under Gillard – the political dynamics between those two individuals overpowered the automatic assigning of legitimacy, authority and control to the foreign affairs ministerial portfolio. Some commentators also concluded Smith had limited scope for ministerial discretion under Rudd. As Weller notes, the prime
207 minister is the ‘first amongst equals’ in Australia’s parliamentary system – even a powerful and skilled foreign minister, ultimately, remains beholden to prime ministerial discretion, beliefs and political imperatives.1110
Finally, the foreign minister has direct control over the public service responsible for the bureaucratic elements of Australian foreign policy. In the Japan trade agreement case, while the role of Casey and the Department of External Affairs was not a dominant one, the cabinet submissions, ministerial submissions, minutes and cable produced during the course of negotiating the treaty highlight the significant wealth of information, resources and intelligence the foreign minister has access to by virtue of being the head of the foreign affairs portfolio. Whilst a lack of access made ascertaining the exact nature of the minister’s working relationship with DFAT difficult, the researcher’s own experiences suggest that a similar process exists today – DFAT makes specific recommendations to the minister via a ministerial submission outlining the pros and cons of a given issue, and recommending a course of action. The minister then decides whether they agree or disagree with the recommendations and DFAT implements the decision accordingly. The foreign minister also holds regular meetings with DFAT’s executive officers, ensuring that strong views on given foreign policy are filtered up and down the line.
The trade minister is the final political policy actor that routinely displayed the characteristics of a public decision. With legitimacy, authority and control s virtually identical to the foreign minister (but with a trade focus), the trade minister can be as influential a public decision maker as the foreign minister depending on the make-up of the cabinet – take for example McEwen’s level of influence vis-à-vis Casey’s in case study one.
McEwen exercised substantially more legitimacy, authority and control over the negotiation of the Japan Commerce Treaty than his external affairs counterpart. On the first count, the then separate portfolios of trade and external affairs meant that the narrative around the Treaty focused significantly on it as an economic issue. McEwen’s portfolio responsibilities thus afforded him a more legitimate policy voice on much of the debate. On authority, McEwen drove the Treaty’s passage through the Menzies Cabinet, responsible for key cabinet submissions explaining the economic imperatives underpinning his view that Australia was well poised to ‘supply the products Japan needed’.1111 He was also pivotal in getting the back-bench to support the cabinet, threatening them with having to personally explain to their electorates why they had squandered such a significant economic opportunity. This was much more compelling than Casey’s efforts in the cabinet and publically, which were at best, not influential and at worst, not credible. Finally, on control, McEwen was able to wield significant control over the available information and bureaucratic processes underpinning the Treaty because of his position as trade minister and his close relationship with John Crawford.
1110 Weller, 1985, op. cit. 1111 McEwen, 1983, op. cit., p. 53
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Like the foreign minister, the trade minister must also link the given foreign policy issue back to their government’s broader foreign policy agenda. In ChAFTA, Vaile led the discussion around the relative speed at which a bilateral FTA would deliver economic gains as compared to global liberalisation through the WTO. Conversely Crean situated ChAFTA within Australia’s multilateral efforts through which the Rudd Government believed greater economic benefit would be achieved. Emerson too limited progress on ChAFTA in favour of the broader policy of engagement with the WTO, refusing to budge on redlines in the agricultural sector.
The trade minister can also be seen to exercise authority in their clear role in convincing the federal cabinet of the need to adopt a given policy position. McEwen provides the best example of this, signing key cabinet submissions in support of the trade treaty, convincing the back-bench, and overcoming Menzies (and Casey’s) hesitance to support liberalising trade with Japan. Again an example of policy making by advocacy, except in the case of McEwen, he did so both with the public and, in the best traditions of the Westminster system, within his own party. In a more contemporary example, Gillard’s personal reflections on the role of Emerson suggest that he was responsible for much of her government’s broader trade policy and, as a consequence, where ChAFTA sat within it. As one former staffer confirmed, ‘she left most of the running to Craig’.
The trade minister also has control over areas of DFAT (its trade divisions) and so enjoys the same authority and control the foreign minister does in this regard. Importantly, ChAFTA, the trade minister was also a conduit for other policy actors wishing to advocate for or against the agreement. Crean and Emerson both travelled to China with large business delegations, and the BCA, ACCI and ACTU all noted the trade minister as key point of contact for pressing their views on the FTA. Equally, although it occurred over 60 years earlier, case study one highlighted the connections between business and the trade minister, particularly when using DoT as a conduit.
In the policy stream, DFAT (and its previous incarnations) is the most significant public decision maker. Like the political policy actors above, DFAT exhibits the key advantages afforded to public decision makers:
• legitimacy – afforded to the department through legislation and ministerial direction; • authority – responsible for foreign policy within the federal bureaucracy and manages Australia diplomatic network; and • control – has access to complete non-political information and control non-government policy actor access to policy making through its consultation and engagement mechanisms.
The major role of the department is to do the leg work associated with a given foreign policy. For example, in case of ChAFTA, DFAT undertook FTA negotiations with Chinese counterparts to develop a suitable text to be agreed at the political level. While the various ministers involved ultimately decide the major issues to be included or excluded in the text, they do so under advisement from DFAT’s negotiating team. For less significant issues, the department can decide itself, affording it significant influence in terms of the wording and contents of the final agreement. DFAT also coordinates foreign
209 policy across the public service, giving it an authoritative say on the management of Australia’s bureaucratic processes that underpin foreign policy making.
DoT in case study one also provides an example of being a public decision maker through authority and control. DoT chaired the Australian side of negotiations and acted as conduit between negotiators and McEwen. DoT controlled the flow of information within the Australian public service, and its Secretary managed a close relationship with his minister so as to ensure the department’s view was front and centre of McEwen’s mind. In all three case studies, DFAT had access to all non-political information (and in case study one, much of this too) and controlled the majority of the external consultation processes giving it control over the non-state actors accessing decision makers.
The second role is for ensuring the making of foreign policy is done in accordance with Australia’s existing international obligations. For example, in case study three, the decision to sell uranium to India should be consistent with the international agreements Australia has signed, such as the Non- Proliferation Treaty. Domestic legislation such as the Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention and Proliferation) Act 1995 are also example of DFAT legitimately utilising the acts that guides its behaviour but also authority as implementing these acts prohibits certain policy options. The GATT and WTO rules and procedures restricting DFAT’s policy options are two further examples.
Across the three case studies investigated, the role of public decision makers was relatively consistent. Whilst the importance of the foreign minister vis-à-vis the trade minister varied in case study one, the prime minister and DFAT (or its earlier manifestations) were the dominant domestic policy actors in the politics and policy streams and the key to developing the trade agreement with Japan, negotiating the FTA with China, and selling uranium to India.
Policy Insiders
As outlined in Chapter 3, the typology adopted by this study includes three specific sub-groups of policy insiders – core insiders, specialist insiders and peripheral insiders.1112 As mentioned in Page and Real- Dato’s original works, the policy insider was typically not an agent of the state. However, given the highly centralised nature of Australia’s foreign policy making structure, certain agents of the state displayed characteristics associated with being a policy insider rather than a public decision maker – although as noted above, some portrayed behaviours of both. We see policy insiders primarily acting in the policy and problems stream – with the core insiders more likely to exercise their influence in the former. Again recalling the work of Kingdon, the policy stream is dominated by policy specialists working to provide solutions to problems within an often closed policy community dominated by policy insiders.1113 Policy options are discussed, traded and negotiated and policy feasibility, acceptability and
1112 See Chapter 3 for discussion on these terms. 1113 Robinson and Eller, 2010, op. cit.
210 constraints are all considered. It is unsurprising that major government actors such as DFAT, DPM&C and Cabinet would act within the policy stream as core insiders.
Further, Binderkrantz’s work on insider and outsider strategies provides some indicators as to the type of behaviour policy actors with insider status can be expected to display. 1114 As outlined in Chapter 3, policy insiders utilise both direct and indirect strategies to influence and engage public decision makers. The three case studies examined all provided examples of insiders using these strategies, and validate Binderkrantz’s findings that insiders utilise indirect strategies as much or as little as policy outsiders (discussed in the subsequent section).
Core Policy Insiders
Core policy insiders in foreign policy making should exhibit sustained engagement in relevant policy sub-systems, have access to a significant amount of information on the policy sub-system and have a direct link to the public decision makers in the politics stream. Further, and as identified by Page, they should have frequent contact within the ministry, be consulted on virtually all foreign policy matters and should be able to influence public decision makers.1115 In the case of the three case studies examined in this thesis, both DFAT (and its predecessor agencies) and DPM&C can be considered the major core policy insiders.
In terms of participation, both DFAT and DPM&C had sustained roles in each of the policy sub-systems investigated, with the former having a significant role in all three. In case studies one and two, DFAT developed early concepts, consulted and negotiated the terms of the two trade agreements analysed, and in the first case study, implemented the agreement which, as outlined above, confirm Althaus et. al’s classification of policy making through advocacy, money and laws. The role of DFAT across all three case studies was ubiquitous, from providing ministerial advice, to managing consultation processes, to ensuring the legality of proposed agreements and coordinating across government. No foreign minister or trade minister could perform their jobs without DFAT.
For DPM&C, its level of involvement in all three case studies was dependent on the interest of the prime minister, but even when prime ministerial involvement was less than other ministers (such as with ChAFTA), its role as the central conduit of advice to the prime minister ensured it consistently performed the role of core policy insider. This was particularly so for case study three, but also in the two other cases where the department was responsible for linking the trade agreement back to the government’s broader domestic economic agenda.
In terms of policy information, both DFAT and DPM&C have a significant level of access to information that helps inform their decision making and their positions on given policy issues. DFAT in particular has substantial control over foreign policy information as it is responsible for the overseas network of embassies and consulates, and the Commonwealth cable system used for overseas reporting. In case
1114 Binderkrantz, 2005, op. cit., p. 696 1115 Page, 1999, op. cit., p. 208
211 studies one and two, for example, DFAT also had detailed knowledge of the trade concessions the Australian Government was willing to make to get a deal over the line. For PM&C, it too has access to much of the information generated by the diplomatic network, but also the information it garners from its role in coordinating policy across government. Its role in case study three as chair of the Uranium Mining, Processing and Nuclear Energy Review Taskforce ensured it had access to an excellent cross- section of government and industry information on uranium mining. Similarly with ChAFTA, PM&C was responsible for situating the FTA in the broader economic reform agenda but also progressing the matter through various cabinet processes, again giving it good access to information from the highest level of government and from across the bureaucracy.
Finally, the ongoing relationships between DFAT and two key public decision makers – the foreign minister and trade minister – gives the department sustained access to the decision making core. DPM&C’s access is similarly guaranteed. Responsible for managing the Cabinet, DPM&C’s structure and responsibilities ensure it has access to a variety of public decision makers across numerous policy sub-systems. Both of these examples are also evidence of Binderkrantz’s direct strategies – contacting the relevant minister and members of parliament.
Specialist Insiders
Recalling Maloney et al. from Chapter 3, specialist insiders have specific policy interests within a given policy sub-system, but are seen by public decision makers and other policy insiders as ‘a reliable and authoritative source of information in these niches’.1116 In the three case studies examined, we see a number of specialist insiders, mainly interacting within the policy stream, but also in the problems stream. The case studies indicated that specialist insiders can be a category mostly limited to state policy actors.
The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) is a good example of a state actor that is a policy insider. This is particularly evident in case study two, where its expertise on agricultural trade, sanitary and phytosanitary requirements, and the impact on rural Australia of a FTA, were authoritative influences on the views of DFAT negotiators and the Minister for Trade. Then-DFAT Secretary Richardson described DAFF as a crucial part of the FTA negotiations as its expertise and networks into the primary industries were valuable sources of information. By virtue of its responsibility for domestic agricultural policy, the department carved itself a niche position as a policy insider on international agricultural issues – pivotal points of negotiation between Australia and China in terms of market access and biosecurity concerns.
Similarly in case study three, the Department of Research, Energy and Tourism (DRET) is a key specialist insider given it is responsible for Australia’s domestic uranium policy settings. DRET’s
1116 Maloney et al., 1994, op. cit., p. 30
212 domestic role gives it an interest in this particular foreign policy case as its expertise and connections to the mining industry are specifically relevant to deciding whether the deal should proceed and if it does, what restrictions need to be put in place to ensure compliance with Australia’s domestic regulations. However, DRET had no substantial role in either case study one or two making it a specialist insider that only engages with foreign policy when it intersects with the department’s domestic policy responsibilities.
Peripheral Insiders
The final group of policy insiders are peripheral insiders, which can find a voice in both the policy and problem streams. When acting in the problems stream, periphery insiders can bring attention to public problems usually via a combination of engaging with public servants and political appointees and in some cases, public advocacy.1117 When in the policy stream, it will likely have greater access to a core insider or public decision maker.
Certain business groups can be classified as peripheral insiders and can exist in both the policy and problems stream. As Page argues, non-state insiders should have frequent contacts with a public decision maker, consulted wildly on their field of expertise, and should be able to influence policy.1118 In the case of Australian foreign policy, non-state actors exhibiting all of these characteristics are limited to peak business bodies and some large businesses. For example, in ChAFTA, the BCA, the ACCI and the NFF were all perceived as key sources of expertise by public decision makers. Large business associations have particularly good access to the decision making core of many policy sub-systems, and because of their expertise and considerable resources, in foreign policy sub-systems with a trade element, they too enjoy a heightened level of access and authority.
Inside the problems stream, these groups also have significant strengths with their resource and specialist insider status giving them a significant public advocacy voice, as outlined in both case studies one and two. In case study one, despite being dated, the ACMA and various other peak business bodies fulfilled similar roles to their more contemporary counterparts. Indeed the industry panels established by DoT upon signing the trade treaty with Japan gave these groups direct access to senior policy insiders and public decision makers within that department. Given the direct relationship between bureaucrats such as Crawford and Westerman with McEwen, these panels provided an opportunity to raise an issue that would likely reach the minister himself. Case studies one and two provided sound examples of business pursuing both administrative and parliamentary strategies to engage politicians, public servants and the parliament.
An interesting example of a peripheral insider that also acted as a policy outsider is the ACTU in case study two. The ACTU noted that it enjoyed substantially greater access to public decision makers (particularly ministers) during the Rudd and Gillard years than it did under Howard. Whilst this is not
1117 Robison and Eller, 2010, op. cit. 1118 Page, 1999, op. cit., p. 208
213 surprising given the political links between the ACTU and the ALP, it goes towards supporting the literature that suggests policy actors can change between insider and outsider status despite being a permanent fixture in a policy sub-system.1119 Legitimacy is important for the ACTU’s access to public decision makers, and while the Rudd and Gillard Governments afforded it influence and access on trade issues, the Howard Government was much less forthcoming. Indeed this is a more nuanced finding than a similar result in Page’s work, which led him to conclude that ‘insider or outsider status is not a binary variable; a group is not simply an insider or an outsider.’1120
The literature would suggest that a key variable ‘to securing core rather than peripheral status is…resources’.1121 The case studies examined suggest this was only one element when dealing with foreign policy. Whilst well-resourced groups such as the BCA and ACTU had access to government policy makers, there was nothing discovered to suggest their resources alone could transition them from periphery to core insiders. In foreign policy, the literature and the data collected both point to core insiders only being agents of the state. What resources can contribute to, however, is preventing an actor from slipping into the category of policy outsider – resources allow an actor to maintain policy relevance by continuing to engage core insiders and, to a much lesser extent, public decision makers. This of course is also dependent upon the insider having ‘characteristics which will assist in policy making’.1122 In the case of the peripheral insiders above, these characteristic include expertise and importantly for controversial policies, legitimacy for the government’s position. In ChAFTA for example, if the governments pursuing the agreement could line-up public support from both business and the trade union movement, it would create a compelling addition to the political narrative around economic growth pursued by all three governments.
Binderkrantz et al. observed businesses as insiders that can influence government, particularly through consultation.1123 Concluding that the influence on public policy by business is disputed, their analysis shows that business groups are more influential on matters of the economy, but not across all areas of public policy equally.1124 In the three case studies examined, case studies one and two lend support to this theory – business were much more likely to be policy insiders (even if only peripheral) in the Japan trade agreement and ChAFTA cases than in the uranium case. As discussed, case study three was substantially conducted in the politics stream by political public decision makers, limiting the access to the decisional core to even the most resourced businesses and associations.
1119 Page, 1999, op. cit., Maloney et al., 1994, op. cit., and; Binderktranz, 2005, op. cit. 1120 Page, 1999, op. cit., p. 210 1121 Maloney et al., 1994, op. cit., p. 36 1122 Ibid. p. 37 1123 Binderkrantz, Anne Skorkjaer, Christiansen, Peter Munk and Pederson, Helen Helboe. 2014. ‘A Privileged Position? The Influence of Business Interests in Government Consultations’, in Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 24, No. 4 1124 Ibid., p. 893. Authors point to similar findings made by Bouwen, Pieter. 2004. ‘Exchanging goods for access: A comparative study of business lobbying in the European Union institutions’, in European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 43, No. 3 and; Dur, Andreas and Mateo, Gemma. 2013. ‘The Europeanization of interest groups: National associations in multilevel Europe’, paper prepared for the EPSA Annual Conference, Barcelona, June.
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The policy insider in Australian foreign policy making is, more often than not, an agent of the state. The resources, information and access state-based policy insider have to the public decision makers far exceeds that of those outside state structures. Consequently, the influence state-based policy actors have over public decision makers, particularly those in the politics stream, is significant. That said, large businesses and certain peak bodies can act as policy insiders – particularly if they align themselves with the objectives of public decision makers or are seen by other actors as offering certain expertise to a policy sub-system.
Policy Outsiders
As outlined in Chapter 3, there are two types of policy outsiders – outsider by ideology or goal, and outsider by choice. The first group are outsiders as their ideology or goal usually by virtue of their raison d’être is not compatible with the aims of policy makers or the consultative process.1125 If such groups are incapable of incrementally changing their ideology or goals, then insider status is unlikely to ever be possible. The second group, outsider by choice, makes a direct decision to not develop or be perceived as having a ‘cosy relationship’ with policy makers.1126 Both groups fail to meet the threshold of being a public decision maker very clearly – they have little legitimacy, authority or control over foreign policy making. Further, their failure to meet three of Page’s criteria for policy insider classification – frequent contact with the ministry, consulted on virtually every foreign policy relating to their interests, and an ability to influence foreign policy – makes these groups unlikely to be elevated to insider status within Australia’s broader foreign policy context.
Both groups of outsiders are more likely to find a voice in the problems stream. This is due to the problems stream providing a forum for policy actors to highlight problems requiring attention – including problems with existing or proposed government policy, such as the labour elements of a free trade agreement. These problems can be made public regardless of whether or not they are on the government’s policy agenda. Irrespective of an outsider’s view vis-à-vis that of key public decision makers on an issue, the problems stream allows policy actors to raise important issues and advocate for solutions to problem they believe are important. However, a divergence in the core or policy core beliefs with public decision makers is likely to result in the group being given outsider status over insider status. Binderkrantz argues that outsider groups also engage in direct and indirect strategies – this is evident in both case study two and three where non-state actors engaged in a combination of public consultations, seeking out public servants, media releases and publishing expert analysis.
Outsiders by Ideology
The third case study provides the best examples of outsiders by ideology, with environmental groups opposed to the sale of uranium filling this category during the Howard and Gillard years. Engaging in
1125 Maloney et al., 1994, op. cit., p. 32 1126 Ibid., p. 32
215 both direct and indirect strategies (particularly press statements and research), these groups also provide a good example of advocacy coalition building by combining their resources to lobby Rudd and Gillard governments against opening up the uranium export trade. However, their underpinning argument that sales to India were both detrimental to the environment but also undermined the NPT and global non-proliferation put them at odds with both Rudd and Gillard. Both prime minister’s core belief that uranium sales were acceptable provided protective mechanisms were in place, was so at odds with certain environmental policy outsiders that their policy positions were diametrically opposed, making it difficult for any voice to gain political traction.
Another example of outsider by ideology is the union movement. For example, the ACTU’s views on labour laws made it an outsider by ideology in case study two during the Howard years, but a peripheral insider during the Rudd and Gillard years given a closer alignment of values. The latter two governments’ views that labour laws should be a part of any FTA negotiations meant that the core belief of the ACTU (and other unions) became relevant to public decision makers. In the absence of public decision makers sharing these views, however, the ACTU had no access to the decision making core. When an organisation has a raison d’être that is particularly ideological or activist, and when that ideology runs foul of the incumbent government’s core and deep core beliefs, it is difficult for it to be any other category than a policy outsider.
Outsiders by Choice
Outsider by choice was more difficult to decipher than outsider by ideology. Again, using the example of case study three, the Friends of the Earth (FOE) told the researcher that they did not trust public decision makers to listen to their position, acknowledging that their underlying views on uranium sales to India would never align. Yet FOE, along with likeminded non-government groups, simultaneously engaged in a public campaign to highlight their objection to the deal. So whilst they had no contact with policy insiders or public decision makers, they were still actors within the uranium to India action arena by virtue of engaging in policy making behaviour. That said, it is difficult for bureaucratic actors to assign legitimacy to outsiders by choice if the government of the day fundamentally opposes the ideology in play – frank and fearless advice to political masters is one thing, context is everything.
It is difficult to influence policy direction if you have no access to the forum in which the policy is being developed – particularly if the public decision makers have no intention to provide access. Whilst it was outside the scope of this study to measure the influence of individual policy actors, it is reasonable to conclude that a lack of access makes it very hard to be influential. For example, AFTINET’s position against ChAFTA, particularly on labour rights, made it very difficult for even the Labor governments of Rudd and Gillard to include it in regular and consistent consultative mechanisms. This is despite the membership and executive of AFTINET having strong links to the union movement, with a number of staff also being prominent academics in labour law and trade negotiations.
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Examining how policy values can impact, or at least be perceived to impact access, is important in understanding why some groups are political outsiders. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the beliefs of policy actors can be difficult to ascertain. However, assigning beliefs allows this study to untangle the relationship between policy participants – particularly between public decision makers and policy insiders where beliefs are aligned. It also helps to explain why some well-resourced and connected policy outsiders are not particularly engaged in Australian foreign policy making – a divergence in deep core and policy core beliefs, despite resources, can mean a public decision maker is able to exclude a policy actor from the action arena based on divergent beliefs.
Yet, pragmatism – or the imperative to secure a deal – can sometimes overcome beliefs, with policy actors that do not share core or policy beliefs coming together to achieve a mutually acceptable outcome. John McEwen and the union movement in case study one provide a good example of this, where the renowned anti-union McEwen actively involved the unions in discussion on the Japan Commerce Treaty in an attempt to neutralise their opposition. The unions should ordinarily have been policy outsiders with Menzies Government, but were in this case study afforded a much greater role as peripheral policy insiders.
To echo Binderkranzt, policy outsiders are able to engage in direct and indirect strategies to participate in policy making, and Australian foreign policy making is no exception. However, the case studies investigated here suggest that policy outsiders struggle to sustain ongoing contact with public decision makers and policy insiders. Public campaigns or participating in ad hoc consultation mechanisms may appeal to the ideological underpinnings or membership base of many policy outsiders, but they do not equate to meaningful engagement with Australia’s foreign policy making structures.
Concluding Remarks
The case studies examined in this study corroborate the premise that the typology of public decision maker, policy insider and policy outsider is a useful one for describing the roles of domestic policy actors in the making of Australian foreign policy. Public decision makers are senior agents of the state and can be found in the politics stream. Policy insiders are usually agents of the state – particularly bureaucratic actors – but can sometimes be well-resourced businesses or interest groups, and occupy the policy stream. Finally, policy outsiders are non-state policy actors and, whilst some can occasionally be policy insiders, their ideological underpinnings and membership tend to ensure they are limited to participating in Australian foreign policy making in the problems stream.
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Conclusion
In opening the 2016 DFAT Non-Governmental Organisations Forum, the twentieth such event, Foreign Minister Julie Bishop said:
“It is an invaluable opportunity for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to bring together representatives of Australian and international NGOs. It is an opportunity to share our agendas. It is an opportunity to discuss common interests in promoting and protecting human rights at an international level.”1127
In many ways, this quote captures the three streams of policy making this thesis has examined – a public decision maker in the politics stream, using a policy insider in the policy stream to interact with policy outsiders in the problems stream. Yet the three case studies examined suggest interaction between the three streams and the actors within them is not as clear-cut as suggested above.
This study sought to answer two questions – firstly, what role is played by domestic policy actors in the making of Australian foreign policy. And, secondly, does the structure of Australian foreign policy accommodate engagement with domestic non-state policy actors. Chapter 7 answered the first question, exploring the roles of public decision makers, policy insiders and policy outsiders in Australian foreign policy. Before directly answering question two, it would be useful to summarise the secondary objectives this study sought to achieve, which were to:
• develop a public policy framework suitable for analysing Australian foreign policy making; and • elucidate the domestic policy actors present, both state and non-state, in the making of Australian foreign policy.
The first secondary objective was achieved by undertaking a historical analysis of Australian foreign policy making that found four key factors that must be considered in the framework adopted:
1. Elite world views – the importance of the prime minister, foreign minister, trade minister and senior public servants cannot be underestimated. Their world views, policy beliefs and prioritisation of foreign policy issues are key influencers of Australia’s foreign policy. 2. Institutions are important – DFAT is a critical nexus of foreign policy expertise, information and resources. The rules and processes within DFAT structure the behaviour of the major foreign policy making institution in Australia. Similarly, other government departments and the institutions of the parliament all have similar processes that influence Australian foreign policy making.
1127 Bishop, Julie. 2016. Address to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Non-Government Organisations Forum 2016, Canberra, 8 February
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3. The international system is important – Australian foreign policy making does not occur in a domestic vacuum; the impact of the international system on Australia’s priorities, elite world views and policy options is significant. 4. Multiple levels of activity occur in Australian foreign policy making – as this thesis has shown, foreign policy making in Australia is highly centralised. In order to understand and classify the role of policy actors, analysing actors at the centre of the process as well as on the periphery is important, particularly if non-state actors are to be included.
In capturing these four elements, the study examined the contemporary public policy literature and the few examples where a public policy approach was used to analyse a foreign policy decision. Following this review, the research posited a hybrid framework consisting of elements from the IADF, ACF and MSF. Drawing from Real-Dato’s work on creating a synthetic framework for public policy analysis, this thesis adopted a framework that consisted of four key components: a policy sub-system, an action arena, a set of exogenous variables, and three streams of focus.
Firstly, a policy sub-system is the main unit of analysis and is composed of participants with a speciality or interest in the given foreign policy area. This allows the capturing of elites, institutions and periphery policy actors. It positions a given foreign policy within the broader Australian foreign policy space, but also links it to sub-systems within an institutional context.
Secondly, the action arena relates to the specific elements of a problem or policy requiring action, and sits within a policy sub-system. The action arena allows for a description of a set of participants, the positions they fill, their allowable actions and functions, and the information they can access. Policy actors operate within the action arena, with their actions are determined by the structure of the arena and a three-tiered belief system – deep core beliefs, policy core beliefs and secondary beliefs.
Thirdly, a set of exogenous variables that structure the action arena was adopted. The variables – rules, biophysical world attributes, community attributes and external shocks – limit the patterns of participation between policy actors, behaviour of policy actors, their access to information, policy options available to policy makers and acceptable participants within the action arena.
Finally, three streams of focus – politics, policy and problems – allow for the examination of all foreign policy actors at both the decision making core and periphery. These streams provide a lens through which multiple levels of activity can be observed.
In responding to secondary objective two, the research undertook a literature review to elucidate the key domestic-based foreign policy actors, both from within and outside government. Drawing from the work of McDougall, and Gyngell and Wesley in particular, the literature review identified the prime minister, foreign minister, trade minister and senior cabinet ministers as the major relevant political actors. Within the public service, DFAT and DPM&C were identified as significant. Outside of government, business, business groups and non-business organised interest groups were highlighted by scholars. These policy actors were also evident across all three case studies.
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To test the framework and examine the policy actors identified, this thesis utilised three case studies – the 1957 Trade and Commerce Agreement with Japan; the Australia-China Free Trade Agreement and; the Australia India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.
In the 1957 Trade and Commerce Agreement with Japan case study, policy making that occurred in the politics and policy stream in equal parts was observed. In a policy sub-system dominated by hostilities towards Japan stemming from WWII, a Western desire to keep Japan out of the communist orbit, and a changing Australian economic and global trade system, the Treaty was led politically by a dominant trade minister and negotiated by an effective DoT. The political narrative established by McEwen and reinforced by Menzies established both the strategic and economic imperatives for the Treaty. DoT’s negotiations involved established processes linking negotiators to the political and problem streams, allowing them to consult with business and reassure them that the Treaty would not adversely impact their interests. Generally, major policy actors were members of the political and bureaucratic elite, although some larger business association and the RSL did have some access to the action arena. Still, in this case study, most non-state policy actors were relegated to the periphery of the action arena, restricted to highlighting the pros and cons of the Treaty.
The second case study examining ChAFTA, depicted an action arena dominated by the policy stream. Despite the economic rationale for the FTA, links to Australia’s bilateral relationship with China and benefits to Australia’s regional economic integration were both key parts of the political narrative in the politics stream. The policy making heavy lifting in this case study, however, was done in the policy stream. This was particularly so as the negotiations became deadlocked at the political level, where a change in government shifted Australia’s trading preference for bilateral to multilateral. The heavily prescriptive treaty making process ensured that for the majority of the 10 year period this case study examined, DFAT was left to negotiate with Chinese counterparts, run public submission processes and coordinate with the trade minister on negotiating lines. Policy actors in the problem stream had some access to the open submission processes and could engage in multiple stakeholder outreach programs. However, both the length of the negotiations and the secrecy surrounding the treaty text meant that only those within government knew exactly what was being negotiated.
Case study three, which analysed Australian uranium sales to India, was an example of a foreign policy making process played out predominantly in the politics stream. Howard, Rudd and particularly Gillard all played very active roles in either pressing the case to commence sales or, in Rudd’s case, continuing Australia’s historic practice of only exporting to signatories of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Indeed Gillard’s linking of this issue to her authority as prime minister during the 2011 Labor National Conference meant that for that period, policy making was conducted solely in the politics stream. This made it very difficult for policy actors on the periphery to engage with the debate, particularly those that opposed to the sale on environmental and non-proliferation grounds.
The three case studies all provided evidence of the policy actor typology put forward in Part A of this thesis. As discussed in Chapter 7, the role played by domestic policy actors in the making of Australian foreign policy is that of public decision maker, policy insider and policy outsider. Public decision makers
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– always state actors – exist in the politics stream. Policy insiders – usually state actors, but sometimes well-resource business and business associations – exist mainly in the policy stream. Policy outsiders – usually non-state actors – typically exist in the problems stream, and are often relegated to the periphery of Australian foreign policy making.
In addressing the second question - does the structure of Australian foreign policy accommodate engagement with domestic non-state policy actors - the relegation of many non-state actors to the periphery of Australian foreign making is critical to understanding their level of engagement in Australian foreign policy making. Despite Julie Bishop’s quote at the start of this chapter, the research has found that in most cases, non-state domestic policy actors are incapable of meaningfully engaging with the processes of Australian foreign policy making. The structure of Australian foreign policy making as a closed, elite-dominated system is not conducive to facilitating large scale, ongoing and substantive engagement with actors outside the state apparatus. For example case study three, which was dominated by three prime ministers as key public decision makers, made access to the decision making core difficult for even well-resourced policy insiders. Equally, large and influential bureaucratic policy actors in the policy stream (such as DFAT) had difficulty engaging in this particularly policy making process given the centralisation in the politics stream.
As such, this study has found that domestic non-government policy actors do not typically play a pivotal part in the process of making foreign policy in Australia. Even large and well-resourced non-state actors that have access to public decision makers do not necessarily translate this into a significant policy making role. This lack of access and influence is exacerbated for smaller or poorly resourced policy actors. In most cases, non-state actors are incapable of meaningfully engaging with the processes that underpin Australia’s international agenda let alone affect lasting change – particularly over a sustained period of time, such as a decade-long trade negotiation.
The insignificant role of non-state policy actors in Australian foreign policy making is not typically due to active discouragement by state actors. Rather it is the closed nature of the formal processes, routines and institutions managed by state actors that make it difficult to include outsiders. It is a system of exclusivity by design, not necessarily by policy actor choice, and one that has evolved over time. Australia’s foreign policy making history still has significant influence on contemporary foreign policy making practices, particularly the secretive nature of decision making and the restricted access to information on national security grounds.
This secretive nature was one of the major difficulties encountered in this study as it made access to government information on contemporary issues extremely difficult. Indeed, the case studies were chosen as a number of public submission processes or archival materials were accessible and ensured a solid foundation of data was available for analysis. However, the reluctance of major state policy actors, particularly public decision makers, to speak on the record limited the first-hand account of policy making. This is instructive for future research in that any public policy analysis of a contemporary foreign policy issue will need to ensure there are public consultation processes or significant amounts of
221 publically available resources to analyse – reliance on access to bureaucratic or political policy actors should be avoided.
That said, information constraints are not in and of themselves impediments to future analysis of Australian foreign policy making through a public policy lens. Given the lack of literature and academic inquiry in this regard, the options for future research using the policy sciences are many. One such option would be the application of network theory to an Australian foreign policy making case study.1128 This would allow for detailed mapping of the relationship between public decision makers, policy insiders and policy outsiders, and would facilitate a better understanding of information flow between state and non-state actors. Another approach would be to take one element of foreign policy making, such as implementation, evaluation or consultation, to examine how Australia undertakes this element and suggest improvements for policy makers to facilitate greater non-state input.1129 A comparison of non- state actors in other countries foreign policy making processes would also provide useful insights into Australia’s system.1130
The need for greater non-state input into Australian foreign policy making is increasing in a foreign policy environment in which policy decisions are becoming more complex – particularly given the intertwining of domestic and foreign policy issues. Significant fiscal pressures on the Commonwealth Government’s budget has compounded decades of underinvestment in Australia’s foreign policy making capability – particularly in DFAT and its overseas network of embassies and diplomats. Whilst this study has highlighted a significant lack of engagement in foreign policy making by non-state actors, opening up the centralised system of Australian foreign policy and providing greater access to information to non- state actors may help future governments better solve difficult policy problems in a fiscally constrained environment.
1128 See for guidance Rhodes, 2006, op. cit.; Rhodes 1993, op. cit. and; Adam, Silke and Kriesi, Hanspeter. 2007. ‘The Network Approach’ in Sabatier, Paul (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process, Boulder (CO), Westview Press. 1129 As an introduction, Althaus et al., 2012, op. cit. examines a number of policy elements in an Australian context. 1130 The discussed the British context in interviews with Chatham House, the Oxford Research Group, and the Royal United Services Institute in London in July 2013.
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Author/s: Roberts, Cain Norman
Title: Domestic policy actors and Australian foreign policy: A public policy approach to analysing the making of Australian foreign policy
Date: 2017
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