Naval War College Review Volume 27 Article 20 Number 3 May-June

1974 May-June 1974 Review The .SU . Naval War College

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CHALLENGE!

For the past 6 months, much of our of the stockpiling solution in light of attention has been devoted to the changing circumstances versus the alter­ energy crisis. Some Americans have native uses of military forces? realized for the first time that seemingly Whatever the answers to these ques­ boundless energy resources really do tions, it is incumbent on those of us in have limits, both physical and political. uniform to understand what Blechman We have been reminded that even super­ and Kuzmack have to say. It is also powers live in a small, interdependent important that we understand what world. As evidenced during the recent part, if any, military force can play in oil embargo, small and distant countries solving this national problem. Presence in that world have the meansto disrupt forces can be a subtle, effective instru­ and change our way of life. ment of diplomacy when understood Messrs. Blechman and Kuzmack, in and used adroitly. However, it is my the thought-provoking article "Oil and belief that the use of presence forces is National Security," in this issue of the not fully appreciated by the military. In Review, explore the many sides to this addition, their potential effectiveness in problem. They conclude that stock­ low order contingency actions is largely piling is the best alternative to insure neglected. Hopefully, the immediacy against future interruptions of our and shock of the energy crisis and needed oil supplies and carefully detail articles like this one will stimulate us to how this could be accomplished. probe more deeply into these areas. But what of the military? Can the Discussion of this subject presages military contribute anything to the reso­ the annual Current Strategy Forum lution of this largely economic issue? we11 be hosting again in June. This year Can the availability and display of mili­ the whole problem of resource scarcities tary force prevent other nations from will be examined in support of the taking actions inimical to our interests, theme: "Resource Scarcity as a Possible or doesn't this work any more? Is Source of Future Conflict?" military action an acceptable means of Additionally, the need for deeper forcing the removal of nonbelligerent understanding of this type of politico­ embargoes or sanctions? Would stock­ military problem highlights the impor­ piling necessary raw materials beprefer­ tance of continuing research into naval able to an equivalent investment in theory. The War College has an Ad­ military forces? What of the inflexibility vanced Research Program. A few stu- Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1974 5 Naval War College Review, Vol. 27 [1974], No. 3, Art. 20

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4

Admiral Richard G. Colbert U.S. Navy 1915-1973

"Traditionally and historically, the War College, there is danger that it will Naval War College has been the foun­ not be done at all." tainhead of new concepts, doctrines, In implementing these goals as Presi­ and ideas within our Navy. In the face dent, Admiral Colbert built upon the of the challenge that confronts us, I foundations of having successfully met a would hope that 'on my watch' we will prior challenge at the college. In 1956 be able to generate new and meaningful he organized and served as the first thinking ..." With these words Admiral director of the college's allied officer Richard G. Colbert, in July 1968, school-the Naval Command College. assumed the mantle of leadership as Not only have the graduates of the President of the Naval War College. Naval Command College gained recog­ More than a simple generalization nition on their own merits, but the U.S. accompanying a change of the watch, Navy and the War College have bene­ this initial statement formally recog­ fited immeasurably through the estab­ nized that the requirements for profes­ lishment of personal and professional sional military education had undergone ties in the worldwide fraternity of naval radical change in the years since World leaders. War II. The Naval Command College was, Colbert's perceptive nature, condi­ however, but an obvious manifestation tioned by years of professional ex­ of the particular spirit Admiral Colbert perience, grasped the fact that the mili­ brought to diplomacy. For him, the tary officer was so conditioned to meet field of international relations took on a the day-to-day demands of putting out personal meaning. Long aware of the fires and meeting deadlines that he had impact that the presence of U.S. naval gotten out of the habit of sound re­ forces had in affecting national policy, search and orderly reflective thought. he tempered his grasp of military and Thus, it was the stimulation of these political problems with an ability to very qualities toward which he directed deal with people. Foreign policy was the Naval War College curriculum, not simply abstract statements and stating that "if the kind of research and docwnents; it was alive in the individ­ creative thinking necessary to sound uals with which it dealt. military knowledge is not done at the The fruits of this realization took a https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol27/iss3/20 8 War College: May-June 1974 Review

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8 NA VAL WAR COLLEGE REV mW

OIL AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Recent experience has shown that even a limited and poorly maintained Middle Eastern oil embargo can strongly affect the eoonomi.cand temperamental well-beillg of the United States. The potential for a future cutoff, due either to peacetime political and economic policy or wartime jnterdiation, remains a worrisorne contingency for American strategists. A viable counter to future threats on our foreign oil supply is oil stockpiling, an expensive and complicated procedure, but oue that cannot be ignored,

An article prepared by Barry M. Blechman and Arnold M. Kuzmack

The October 1973 war in the Middle • made it certain that those nations East finally witnessed the long threat· would not provide any support for ened use of the Arab uon weapon." The Israel; major Araboil producers-Saudi Arabia, • made it more difficult for the Kuwait, Iraq, the Sheikhdoms on the United States to receive Arab oil in­ Persian Gulf, Algeria, and Libya-all directly; and embargoed shipments of their oil to the • put pressure on the United States United States. The embargo was de• from these important sources to accede signed to curtail U.S. military, eco­ to the Arabs' demands. nomic, and diplomatic support for Israel The production cutback was a short­ and to cause this nation to force Israel lived policy. The December reduction to return to the pre-1967 cease-fire was canceled and output has since risen, lines. Additionally, the Arab oil pro­ although it seems unlikely to return to ducing states announced progressive cut­ prewar levels for some time. Also, the backs in total oil production. Beginning production cutback was never a unified in October, crude oil output was to be policy maneuver; Iraq, for one, flatly reduced 5 percent per month from the declined to go along. The embargo was level obtained in September 1973. This sustained longer and more uniformly step would mainly affect Europe and and continued in effect until March Japan-the major consumers of Arab 1974. However, neither of these actions oil-which, it was expected: have attained their stated ends. The https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol27/iss3/20 12 War College: May-June 1974 Review

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A predominant professional concern of midcareer naval officers at the Naval War College is personnel management under changing societal conditions. While it is generally agreed that the military has to change its way of doing business to cope with changes in society, there is far less agreement on methods and future military standards. However, both the diversity of opinion and spirit of inquiry expressed by these officers show a genuine interest in "why are we what we are?"-in contrast to the stereotype image of the rigid "military mind."

REFLECTIONS ON THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION

Au article prepared by Professor Francis J. Wesl, Jr. of the Dcparlmcnl of Management U.S. Naval War College

It is almost a truism to observe that Whether the public chooses to em­ the American public is ambivalent in its phasize the positive or negative aspects feelings toward the U.S. military as an of the military, such is affected by a organization. On the one hand, within host of interdependent factors, in­ the strong American tradition of politi­ cluding warfighting performance, media cal liberalism the military symbolizes coverage, international crises, and the state control and the loss of personal like. One thing is clear: the public's freedom, On the other hand, the mili­ image of the military does fluctuate tary exists to defend freedom, as in significantly and is given substantial World War II. It is clear that the public attention by the press. in general regards the military as more One might also speculate, however, than just a necessary evil. While the on how the military views itself, with military does exhibit instances of bun­ Vietnam in the past and the environ­ gling, waste, arrogance, and irrespon­ ment of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) sibility 1 it also sets national examples of in the present. What follows are perspec­ courage, asceticism, selflessness, and tives on the military as an institution devotion to duty. These latter traits, drawn from extensive conversations despite counterculture claims to the with and the written responses of contrary, are admired by the Nation as a numerous officers in the grades of lieu­ whole. We all need heroes as exemplars, tenant commander through captain both in terms of organizational efficien­ (equivalent for other services) at the cies and personal accomplishments. Naval War College. Sixty percent were https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol27/iss3/20 30 War College: May-June 1974 Review

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Navies are more than the objective projection of a nation's maritime defense needs, they are also culturally determined expressions of how the nation sees itself. Pot example, the U.S. Navy persists in the image of our World War II victories with the two•ocean navy, the aircraft carrier1 and control of the seas concept. The ritualistic Norwegian Sea exercise is the very embodiment of this image1 an image Jong since countered by the reality of a powerful Soviet counterforce that looks not to the past but to the future. TllE LEMMING COMPLEX: RITUAL DEATH IN THE NORWEGIAN SEA

by Captain ltoherl B. Balhmsl, U.S. Navy of the Tactics Department, U.S. Naval War College

The recent series of articles on the the Sovlet being largely deductive, ideo• Soviet Navy by Admiral Gorshkov and logical1 and not narrowly jealous about the Four Missions Concept inspired by its self-interest; while the United States Admiral Zumwalt give us two different proceeds in a way that is inductive, ways of looking at a navy. Our conceit pragmatic, endlessly self-confident, and 1 that strategic concepts and perceptions driven by the demands of a 11 can-do ' of vulnerability are shaped by rational response. Irt each, Mahan and Clause· analysis is shocked into the recognition witz are only faint echoes. The colonial that navies are also an expression of trade essential to by Mahan i, absent in cultural intuitions. The arguments for the one and only a halfhearted targetof naval power by Admirals Gorshkov and the other. Clearly the game proceeds by Zumwalt provide a persuasive reminder other rules. that there is no longer a clear strategy of The old rhetoric persists, however. seapower. One is struck by the fact that Gorshkov Behind each of their arguments is the did not need Marx to bridge the gap assumption of a nearly inexhaustib)e between the navies of Czarist and Soviet wealth and inventiveness, time for de· Russia and that Zumwalt's navy cannot veJopment, and a distinct vagueness abandon Mahan's ucontrol of the seas" about the nature of future wars at sea. -·now nostalgically called '*sea control.'' Although based on a belief in cause­ While both navies intend to serve state effect analysis, their arguments spring interests, Gorshkov deduces those di­ from different philosophical systems: rectly from the dynamics of history Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1974 39 Naval War College Review, Vol. 27 [1974], No. 3, Art. 20

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WHAT'S LEFT OF SALT!

Any effective strategic arms control measures must reduce the likelihood of nuclear war as well as reduce one's own damage if war should occur. How well SALT is able to accomplish these objectives will largely determine its future.

An article prepared by Dr. Richard T. Ackley

The signing of the treaty on "Limita­ if war should occur. The point is, arms tion of Anti�Bailistic Missile Systems" control must contribute to national and the "[nterim Agreement of Certain security defense policy or it does not Measures with Respect to the Limita­ make sense at all. That is, it must tion of Strategic Offensive Arms" were enhance nuclear deterrence. provide proclaimed as historic events in every damage-limitation, and enhance crisis oonse of the word. A White House stability-preclude a ._first-strike statement referring to the 26 May 1972 bonus." More specifically, the U.S. stra­ Nixon-Brezhnev summit accords hailed tegic policy has been widely publicized the signing as uthe first time that two and clearly stated over recent years. major power.a have achieved this kind of President Nixon has said. "deterrence of understanding affecting their vital se­ war is the primary goal of our strategic curity." The real significance of the two policy and the principal function of our 2 agreements, however 1 is the claim that nuclear forces. " Thus. our strategic they "enhanced the security of both objectives continue to be: 1 side.s. 11 If, in fact, one is to deal • to deter all-out attack on the critically with the latter statement, the United States or its allies; strategic national security objectives of • to face any potential aggressor both the United States and the U.S.S.R. contemplating less than all·out attack should be tested against the terms of the with unacceptable risks; and agreements, then against the strategic • to maintain a stable political en­ balance as it has developed today. vironment within which tho threat of In the broadest of terms, any effec• aggression or coercion against the 3 tive strategic arms control measures United States or its allies is minimized. must reduce the likelihood of nuclear U.S. strategic objectives, then, en­ war, as wen as reduce one's own damage compass deterrence 1 assured destruc� Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1974 47 Naval War College Review, Vol. 27 [1974], No. 3, Art. 20

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Besides generating considerable politiaal and emotional impact, the recent Arab oil embargo also highlighted the critical need for new energy sources. The ocean floor, particularly the area of the Continental Shelf, is one potentia11y vast source of oil energy that has been largely ignored because of limiting technology and profitability. The high price of oil has to some degree removed the economic constraints from offshore oil production, but political and technical problems must still be solved if this valuable potential is to be realized. OIL AND GAS IN THE OCEANS

A research paper prepared by Dr. Herman T. Franssen

Introduction. Petroleum consump· position than the United States. Neither tionin the world has doubled during the has large reserves or even substantial 1 %O's and is likely to double again in potential petroleum resources on land the period from 1970-1980. To meet and consequently are largely dependent these projected demands, nations will on the Middle East. These Persian Gulf increasingly tum toward the last largely States contain more than one-half of the untapped reservoirs of oil and gas, the world's proved oil reserves, but because oceans. In the United States-the major of monopolistic practices and political oil producer among the large non­ instability have been unable to guaran­ Communist industrial countries-new tee supplies at a relatively stable price. additions to proved onshore reserves are Japan and Europe may succeed in par­ no longer the result of newly discovered tially diversifying their sources of oil fields but are instead caused by im· and gas supplies through offshore de• proved recovery techniques for already velopment because liquid hydrocarbons producing wells. Aside from continuing improvements in recovery techniques, Dr, Franssen is an Advanced Research new fields with vast petroleum potential Project Associate with the Department of are likely to be found in Alaska and Advanced l{esearch at the Nava,lWar College, 'beneath the continental margins around This article has heen. drawn from the research the United States. project titled "Actual and Potential Conflict over Ocean Resouwm, Within Areas of Na­ The two other major industrial giants tional and Limited National Jurisdiction as in the Western World, Western Europe Proposed for the Third Law of the Sea and Japan, are in a far less enviable Conference, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol27/iss3/20 54 War College: May-June 1974 Review

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Racism, male chauvanism, and the generation gap are three facets of a broad problem facing naval management under the general heading of minority-majority group relations. With the advent of the all-volunteer force, the military has found it increasingly important to identify wJth the humanistic aspirations of its people. How well the Navy can deal with these questions will have a grave impact on the service and will ultimately determine the future of the zero draft.

UNDERSTANDING RACE RELATIONS AS AN ASPECT OF THE MANAGEMENT OF MILITARY PERSONNEL l

A leclnre delivered in the Defense l•:conomics and Decisionmaking t:urriculum al the Naval War t:ollege by Ur. Lawrnnce Podell

No other major segment of American Racial equality became an issue for society has dealt with institutional racial the United States, and particularly for segregation with the swiftness and the military, with the Emancipation thoroughness of the military. Dis• Proclamation. Much has happened since criminatory practices in industry, com­ that time, and a broad review of service merce, schools, colleges1 and housing racial policies should be of some benefit continue today on a far larger scale and in understanding present-day problems. with much greater persistence than in During the Civil War, the Union Army the armed services. Some knowledge of included 180,000 blacks serving in these facts is essential if one is to white·officered segregated regiments. properly describe and assess today's After the war, four Regular Army Negro military race problem. However, tradi­ regiments policed the Western frontier tional aspects of race relations in and battled Indian tribes; some of these America, those most often corrected by fought in Cuba during the war with "official" action as with the Navy, have Spain. In World War I the combat in some measure been superseded by the performance of all·Negro units was new attitudinal problems of black con· mixed, with the 92d Infantry Division sciousness and white backlash. Com· coming under particular criticism. After manders, the field managers of military World War I the racially segregated personnel, must understand these phe­ Army imposed a Negro quota. Designed nomena if they are to accomplish their to equal the 9.8 percent proportion of mission. blacks in the U.S. population, at the Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1974 71 Naval War College Review, Vol. 27 [1974], No. 3, Art. 20

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"Pencil pushing1' was once an ac• tivity thought to occupy the time of shore duty officers only, but over the REPORTS years the operating manager afloat has found his time increasingly preempted by reporting requirements1 often at the OR expense of essential combat readiness functions. If the proliferation of these READINESS: time consuming and expensive reports is to be arrssted, a sound admim'strative reports control system should be em­ A DILEMMA ployed that emphasizes the costs of information, the principles of exception reporting, .and sample theory. A paper prepared for the course in Defense Economics and Decisionmaking at the Naval War College hy Lieutenant Commander Thomas S. Tollefsen, U.S. Navy

lnlroduclion officers. Indeed, the cancerous growth of a cumbersome, often redundant re­ Life at sea is a high adventure. The porting system has led many of the 90 few young Americans who still godown percent of the surface junior officers to the sea in ships are usually rugged who leave the fleet at their first oppor­ and outspoken in their own element. tunity to list the onerous administrative Seamen have traditionally enjoyed a burden as a principalcomplaint, Neither high degree of tolerance coupled with a is it inexplicable that career surface keen sense of justice. As a kinetic group, warfare officers in the full vigor of their they respect authority and willingly professional careers seek opportunities follow the precepts of their shorebound ashore to avoid the administrative superiors. This authority1 however, liability of senior shipboard positions, when it is abused or unreasonable, To command a surface combatant inculcates a spirit of disregard by the was once a challenge and an adventure; men who man the fleet ships. 1 In­ but the administrative burden of com• dividualism remains a keystone and an mand has so mushroomed that even a essential ingredient of most effective return to homeport is frequently navies, and the constraining ship admin� dreaded as the prelude to yet another istrative reports system presently in recurring reporting requirement. In the effect in our own Navy has proven to be 2-year period from I 971 through 1973, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol27/iss3/20a catalyst for resentment by fleet the fleet ships experienced a 38 percent78 War College: May-June 1974 Review

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B3

PACIFISTS AND PEACEMAKERS

An arlicl" prnparnd by Captain Wayne P. Huglu,s, Jr., U.S. Navy

Some of my good Christian friends Most of mankind demonstrates an are pacifists. I have struggled to per­ ambiguity toward war. Subscribing to suade them that the heart of the Chris• platitudes for peace, we are profoundly tian message is not that war brings evil skeptical that pacifism is practical. We but that evil brings war. Treating the argue vigorously for the "right of self­ symptom will not keep the disease from defense1 JJ with deliberate vagueness flourishing. about what that means. We have a deep They have not boon receptive to any uneasiness that the idea of pacifism -of view other than that war is intolerable. a refusal to fight back no matter what Being reluctant observers of our na· the provocation-is somehow unnatural. tional participation in a decade of nasty, The more simple and childlike the man, frustrating, killing war, they see the the more he works with his hands, with obvious: that war does generate pain the earth, and with the beasts of the and suffering. They set aside the possi• earth, the more quickly he accepts bility that a world withoutarmies could violence as part oflife. TheThoreau, of also be intolerably chaotic, avaricious, the world seem to most of us to be the and cruel. exception that proves the rule. Some of my pacifist friends deplore Anthropologists rage in a debate over only aggressive war. Others hold that whether man descended from an aggres• any fighting, even in self,defense, is sive ancestor who cheerfully fought to wrong. The Christ taught us we must survive in an uncharitable world or, a la turn the other cheek. "Blessed are the Rousseau, derived from a gentle, peace­ peacemakers," He said. They promote fut ancestor whom society corrupted. unilateral disarmament and national re• The answer determines how one views nunciation of war. They are quite pre� the primary purpose of government: it pared to endure privation, like Mahatma can be to constrain an essentially com­ Gandhi, in a noble cause. Paradoxically, bative mankind or it can be to promote 1 their methods, unlike Gandhi s1 can be the betterment of our fellow man. The downright militant. As we saw in the former would organize police and late l %O's, pacifists seem to attract, armies but eschew social programs as an and accept, those who draw the line at avoidable concentration of power in the hands of the corruptible; the latter Publishedno excess by U.S. exceptNaval War killing. College Digital Commons, 1974 87 Naval War College Review, Vol. 27 [1974], No. 3, Art. 20

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HERE'S TO GROG!

An article 11rnpared by Commander J.R. Tappan, U.S. Navy

1 'What do you do wfth a drunken sailor early-y�y-y in the mornin'?" Grog. traditional wetting-down parties, drink­ The seafarer 1s drink of song and ing the dolphins, beer busts, wine­ chantey. Our traditional beverage. tasting nights, vodka blizzards, initia­ But grog is more than sea-spray 1 sails, tions, mess nights, Friday noon liquid and swords, Grog is also alcohol. lunches:1 champagne brunches, "muster­ And what do we do with the ing'' at the O'Club or the Chief's Club, drunken sailor-the pilot, FBM fire­ hard-to-refuse prices at the package control technician, chief ordnanceman, store, and our happy, happy (happy?) doctor, snipe, admiral, messcook 1 para· hours . , . ? That must be it. chute rigger ... ? Because, of course, you don't have a You may begin to sense that there is problem, and besides ... no intention of hoisting any tankards here. Even s:01 maybe you have a Per• sonal reason for reading this. Is it because you have an uneasy In this article the author makes a gut plea feeling that the Navy i, dependent on for Navy management to deal with a problem that is causing extravagant waste in term& of alcohol�is an alcohol pusher? people and dollars, The article is a popu­ Is it because your skipperi your exec, larized version of an e><:haustive research your department head, your division project by Commander Tappan conducted chief, petty officer, leading seaman, or under the auspices of the college's advanced research pl'ogram. The project is titled "Pre­ the new recruit has caused you trouble vention of Alcoholism and Other Drinking at one time or another when he or she Problems in the U,S, Navy"; copies of this could not ' 1handle0 the booze? Or, study are available from the Chief of Naval closer to home, is it because booze is Personnel (ATT: Pers 6cl5), Navy Depart­ moving in on your mother, sister, ment, Washington, D.C. 20350 (autovon 222-1210), The author wishes to acknowledge brother, wife, daughter 1 or your son? the valuah1e advioo and assistance given by Or are you reading this because the Mr. Bernard Donohue in the prepar�tion of title made you feel good about our this article. Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1974 91 Naval War College Review, Vol. 27 [1974], No. 3, Art. 20

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NEWPORT: THOSE WERE THE DAYS

"It is a great misfortune that our Historic Newport, one of the key military schools should be established in cities in the upcoming bicentennial connection with the watering places celebration, also boasts over 300 pre­ characterized ... in scenes of social dis­ Revolutionary War buildings, more than play and dissipation. Surely the students any city in the United States. The old will be wasted ... on the giddy maidens homes and public buildings, combined who disport themselves on the rocks in with the narrow streets (designed for sunbonnets!" These were the words of horse traffic and often a challenge for Congressman William McAdoo as he horseless carriages) create an 18th cen­ described the relationship between New­ tury seaport atmosphere. Where else, for port and the Naval War College in 1892. example, could a visitor dine in an 18th In 1974, though giddy maidens no century tavern on fine local cuisine, step longer wear sunbonnets and the social outside and see a waterfront filled with display is less conspicuous, Newport square-riggers and the finest sailing ships still offers a wide variety of entertain­ on the east coast? Numerous buildings ment and cultural activities for the have been restored to their colonial family and enterprising bachelor. state by private owners or local organi-

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