POLAC INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMANITIES AND SECURITY STUDIES (PIJHSS) Vol. 5 No 2 July- December 2020 Pages 1-14 ISSN: 2476-8057 Website: www.npaw-jhss.com.ng

Trend and Praxis in 's Electoral Violence and Democratic Culture, 1963 – 2019 Uzoma Samuel Osuala Department of History & Int'l Studies, Federal University Lokoja, Kogi State, Nigeria Abstract The unprecedented spate of electoral violence and political killings in Nigeria, especially since the First Republic is best described as the Hobbesian state of nature of man where life is said to be solitary, poor, brutish and short. Hobbes encapsulated this in the Latin words: bellum omnium contra omnes (war of all against all). In an attempt to avoid such scenarios, democratic institutions of governance evolved through electoral process. However, this seemed to be the converse given the nature and cycles of electoral violence in Nigeria since 1963. Thus, those Latin words could be best used to describe the trend and praxis of political violence in Nigeria's democratic culture. The paper examines these developments. The approach is historical, it employs content analysis of data and issues are thematically presented in chronological order. Primary and secondary sources constitute data collection. Keywords: Trend, Electoral Violence, Democracy, Nigeria Introduction In Hobbes' Leviathan (1651), man, in his natural state is selfish; he is moved to action not by his intellect or reason, but appetites, desires and passion (Appadorai 2000: 22). In other words, in the pursuit of daily needs, especially in political and economic goals, man is driven by selfish interest and personal aggrandisement. Hobbes, further described the self-centred and inherent nature of man's life to be solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short (Appadorai 2000: 22). According to him, the egocentric and auto-centric nature of man would always portend 'war' (Appadorai 2000: 22). This is vividly expressed thus: If two men desire the same thing, which they cannot both obtain, they become enemies and seek to destroy each other. In this state of nature, therefore, men are in a condition of war – bellum omnium contra omnes (every man against every man). Thus, the nature of man is a perpetual struggle of all against all (Alan 2002: 164). The above illustration without gainsaying vividly depicts the wanton killings among Nigerian political elites since independence, and especially

27 during the Fourth Republic (from 1999, the return to democratic governance) for the share appetite, desires and passion for political power. The development was prevalent across the geo-political zones of Nigeria with particular reference to the Southern region of the country. Nonetheless, in this state of man, Hobbes recognised the self-preservation of man to liberty; to seek peace and follow it; to relinquish the right to all things which being retained hinder the peace of mankind to perform their covenants made (Appadorai 2000: 22). In other words, the only way to attain peace is for men to give up so much of their natural rights as are inconsistent with living in peace through which a coercive power is instituted – government. This is expressed thus: 'I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man or assembly of men ( democratic government) on this condition that thou give up thy right to him and authorize all his actions in like manner' (Appadorai 2000: 22). Given the above submission, the sovereign institution of democratic government was instituted among men to encourage mutual co-existence, seeking peace, orderliness, security and the preservation of life. Put in another way, individuals giving up their innate self-aggrandisement and vainglory. In tandem with Hobbes' opinion, Locke averred that democratic governance is established through the medium of a contract in which each individual agrees with every other to give up to the community the natural right of enforcing the law of reason in order that life, liberty and property may be preserved ((Appadorai 2000: 25; Alan 2002: 191). Hence, the institution of governance became an integral constituent of man and society designed to enforce law and orderliness. This brings us to the clarification of another concept adopted in the study – government. Government as an institution or machinery of the state/ community/ society is primarily designed to administer and regulate human activities in the community. In other words, it is the political direction and control exercised over the actions of the members, citizens or inhabitants of communities, societies and states. This is clearly stated in the Law Dictionary of government thus: 'the regulation, restraint, supervision or control which is exercised upon the individual members of an organised general society by those invested with the supreme political authority, for the good and welfare of the body politics; by which individual members regulate their social actions'(Law Dictionary: 2013). Therefore, democratic governance is essentially instituted to control and restrain any act in the society that might lead to chaos. Hence, it is enshrined in the Nigerian constitution in section fourteen (14), sub-section two (2)b that, 'the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary

28 purpose of government' (1999 Nigeria's Constitution 2011: 35). In a similar instance, Ayeni refers to government as a body of elected human beings, occupying formal positions and playing roles within established institutions or structures that claim or are vested with the authority to formulate and implement binding decisions that have the effect of creating and allocating values and resources in the interest of all members of a state (Ayeni-Akeke 2008: 28). He further identifies the paramountcy of democratic governance among the various forms of government (Ayeni-Akeke: 29 – 30). Nigeria returned to democratic dispensation in 29 May 1999 after sixteen years of military interregnum. In the midst of breath of fresh air from the Khaki Boys' exit, amid the euphoria and ecstasy, various contenders were desperate to step into the helm of affairs of the nation's polity. The available elective posts were few and the candidates were many (much more than available posts could accommodate), hence they become enemies and seek to destroy each other. Within the period, one wondered if there was any modicum regard for human life – the essence for which governance is sought and instituted. Since 1963, and especially the return to democracy in 1999, the history of the nation has been replete with brazen and unabashed political killings (Folorunsho 2015 int.). The Nigerian nation had never witnessed the unparalleled spate of killings and political brigandry that featured in the Fourth Republic. Paradoxically, the political brigandry that characterized the period was conceived, planned and executed by those at the helm of affairs – the so-called political elites. It cut-across the entire geo-political zones of the federation. For instance, in 2007, Nigeria Watch, a research group reported that between 1June 2006 and 31 May 2007, the nation had experienced 6,556 deaths out of the 1,721 public violence recorded (Usman 2009: 2). The record is inconclusive and outside the purview of 'top echelon politicians' assassinated without records. It is to this end that the discourse examines the historical cycles and trend in political violence and brigandry in Nigeria's democratic culture in the First Republic (1963), and particularly between 1999 and 2019. The periods (1967 – 1979 and 1983 – 1998) not covered by the paper was largely under the military. It argued that the road to elective posts and governance in Nigeria's electoral and democratic culture is exemplified in Hobbesian state of nature which contravened the essence of governance. Clarification of Theoretical Framework To develop our framework, we retrace our argument to Hobbesian state of nature where it was given that if two men desire the same thing, which they cannot both obtain, they become enemies and seek to destroy each other (Alan: 164). This usually results into conflict. According to Raven, conflict is, 'tension between two or more social entities (individuals, groups

29 or larger organisations) which arises from incompatibility of actual and desired responses' (1970: 70). This inevitably establishes our Conflict of Interest Theory. Another acceptable theory adopted to suit our framework is the Class Struggle Theory. Class struggle or class conflict explains tensions or antagonisms which exist in societies due to competing socio-economic as well as political interests and desires between people of different classes that may result to conflict in form of direct and indirect violence (Hassan 2013: 4). Given the above and the nature of man, there are three principal causes of quarrel. First is competition; second, diffidence; third, glory (Alan: 172). The first adopts violence and those involve make themselves masters of others. This invariably and consequently establishes class struggle or conflicts which in turn calls for war of all against all. The situation exemplifies the perception of politics as the winner wins all and the loser losses everything – 'the zerosum- game politics' – in Nigeria, (Ake, 1995) thereby catalyzing political brigandry and violence. This leads us to the political and electoral crises and violence that have been associated with Nigeria since independence and particularly the Fourth Republic. The use of violence – an intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against a person, a group or community that either result in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological trauma, underdevelopment and deprivation - (Violence, 2013) was prevalent during the period. In consonance, with the above, Jinadu classifies violence into three folds: physical, structural and psychological violence (1980: 40-7). Injury and death are associated with physical violence; structural violence involves social injustice and psychological violence is injury caused to the human psyche following indoctrination and threats (Jinadu: 40-7). All the violent phenomena have always been adopted in the cycles of electoral violence in Nigeria. It was adopted by groups seeking power, by groups holding power and by groups in the process of losing power (Anifowose 19521). Another clarification needed in this discourse is the line of our arguments. Since independence, the political terrain in Nigeria had been characterised by political violence with considerable root in ethnicity and religion. And as such, many within and outside the country had argued and concluded that Nigeria body polity would always be impeded by ethnoreligious violence. Some scholars (Nnoli 1980; Tijani 2012: 83 – 91; Aluko 2003: 253-9) had equally argued along this line. Nevertheless, one central argument the paper pursues is that political brigandry, assassination and violence that featured among Nigerian 'top echelon politicians' was not rooted in ethnoreligious politics rather on conflict of interest and class struggle. Hence, the

30 assassination prevalent among politicians domiciled in Nigerian geo-political zones – the political violence, (Ayokunle 2005: 85-103) the Anambra political kidnapping of a governor, (Human Right Watch 2007: 67-79) among other examples. The assassination of Chief Bola Ige, Nigeria's former Minister of Justice and Attorney-General of the federation, Funsho Williams, former Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) Governorship aspirant in , Marshal Harry, former South-south vice-chairman of PDP, before he defected to All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP), among others. The political crises in Ibadan and the politics of kidnapping in Anambra lacked ethnic and religious colorations but conflict of interest and class struggle. In fact, within the period, almost, if not all the entire geo-political regions especially the southern part of the country was overtaken by political brigandry that was unconnected to ethnic and religious undertones. All this combined have had its toll on Nigeria's body politics. A Synoptic Retrospection of Electoral Violence in Nigeria, 1960 – 2000 Political violence is a phenomenon prevalent in global politics (Bamgbose 2012: 2017). A trend that has internalised itself in polity and has been integrated into Nigeria emerging democratic dispensation. It is a phenomenon that defies explanation as it wears different shade of colour at every given instantaneous opportunity and time (John 2009: 463). For instance, it was exhibited in the United States' Congress in the 1850s when Senator Charles Sumner was brutally attacked and beaten with a cane by a fellow congressman, Preston Brooks over the controversial issue of slavery (Louise 2005: 314-320; Garry 2000: 373-4). This nature of polity is uncommon in the Western polity especially in the twenty-first century. In the developing nations, however, particularly in post-colonial Africa, scenes and frequencies of political violence abound and on the increasing tide. For example, in his quest for elective post, President Daniel ArapMoi of Kenya employed political violence where over 120 people lost their lives and thousands displaced (Bamgbose: 206). A similar incidence occurred in Togo during the April 4 presidential election which resulted in the mass movement of Togolese refugees to the neighbouring countries of Ghana and Benin (Bamgbose 2009: 109). Nigerian political history is replete with violence. There was hardly a period of electoral process or transition in the nation's history that had not witnessed political violence especially among the 'Political elites'. In the early years of independence, the nation experienced a turbulent political crisis that threatened the corporate entity of the nation. Within the period, the crisis and political brigandry that rocked the Western Regional House of Assembly on 25 May 1962 comes to mind. It all began on the platform of ideological

31 differences and tactics among the top 'political elites' – Chief Samuel Akintola, the then premier of the Western Region and deputy leader of the party who advocated that the Action Group should enter a Federal Coalition Government and Chief , a leader of the opposition in the Federal Parliament who strongly opposed this view and also supported a more radical policy in internal affairs. (James: 96). Again, the difference in the Action Group became a battle between the young radicals led by Awolowo who advocated that the party should depart from a Yoruba-based Western Regional Party into a National Party with a radical socialist outlook and the businessmen and traditional rulers led by Chief Akintola (James: 96) The rift in ideological divides within the Action Group centred on the alleged pact between Chief Akintola and the Northern Premier, Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello Sarduana of Sokoto, that Action Group supporter would support the latter in a bid for the Presidency if Nigeria became a republic (James: 97). A decision many party members were unaware of. Every effort made to patch up the rift deteriorated and eventually led to the dismissal of Chief Akintola as deputy leader of the party and Premier of Western Region for 'maladministration, anti-party activities and gross indiscipline' on 21 May 1962 (James: 99). Consequent upon Chief Akintola's removal as the Premier of the Western Region and deputy leader of Action Group on Friday, 25 May 1962, the House of Assembly met to debate a motion of confidence in the new government led by Chief Adegbenro, fighting broke out between members accordingly: First, Chief Odebiyi – Minister of Finance and leader of the House – was about to move the first business motion of the day when; Mr. E.O. Oke, a member for Ogbomosho South-West, jumped up, raised an alarm and flung a chair across the floor of the House; Mr. F. Ebubedike, a member for BadagryEast, seized the mace and smashed it on Mr. Speaker's (Prince A. Adedoyin) table; Mr. S.A. Adeniya, a member for Oyo East II, then seized a chair and hit Mr. K.S.Y. Momoh, Minister of Trade and Industry. He was rushed to the hospital for treatment. At this stage, chairs and tables were freely smashed. The pandemonium was quelled by about 200 policemen who cleared the house with batons and tear-gas (James: 99-101). What could be more violent than this? The situation is best described as political brigandry in governance as it laid a bad precedence for political violence of the country (It clearly manifested itself from 1999). Like the Bourbon in France who failed to learn from the lessons of the French Revolution of 1789, the Nigerian political class failed to learn from the Western Regional House of Assembly crisis because a similar situation repeated itself in October 2007 under the leadership of Patricia Etteh, ex-

32

Speaker, Federal House of Representative. During the Second Republic, similar violent political activities were exhibited in the Federal elections. The road to the Second Republic in 1979 was relatively politically violent free. This was attributed to the umpire role of the military in the transition programme. However, in 1983, the democratic transition was marred by vandalism and thuggery. Those who could not demonstrate their act of political brigandry during the 1979 election had the ample time to do so in the 1983 elections. One of the most violent mayhem took place in where the carnage reached the level of public chaos akin to what occurred in 1964 – '65. In the violent demonstration, the entire families of politicians were wiped out and hundreds of houses were set ablaze including the state headquarters of the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) (Bamgbose: 210). Three months after the 1983 elections, the Second Republic was swept into oblivion by 31 December 1983 military coup d'état under the control of General MuhammadBuhari. Hence, the military ruled the nation for another sixteen years (1983 to 1999) before the return to democratic governance. Shades of Electoral Violence in Nigeria's Democratic Culture, 1999 – 2019 In May 1999, after sixteen years of military regime, the Khaki Boys returned the nation to democratic governance for a broad representative government. The road to the transition programme was non-violent given the umpire role of the military, though not without shortcomings. Nonetheless, since the return to democratic dispensation and with the gradual winding up of the first-four years ushering in the 2003 election, political office holders intent on keeping their jobs and new aspirants employed all means necessary, including political brigandry to achieve their objectives. Agbaegbu described the political scenario among candidates in 2003 election as 'blood and fire; no longer sacrifice or healthy competition for public services' (2001: 44). Since the return to democratic rule, all attributes of the ugly past when politicians used the police, thugs, as well as hired assassins to intimidate, harass and even kill opponents resurfaced. For example, within the period considered, more than fifteen states of Nigeria had witnessed the kill-the-opponent syndrome. It had been most prevalent and bloody in most states in the southern region of the country – Ebonyi, Anambra, Rivers, Enugu, Lagos, Oyo, Osun, Bayelsa, Taraba, and Nasarawa. Across the nation, more than hundred high profile ranking politicians had suffered brutalities, harassment, threats and even death over political post occasioned by differences in political ideologies and quest for power. For clarity of purpose, we examine all these under the following sub-topics: intra/inter party violence, legislative brigandry, godfatherism, police, politics and political

33 brigandry. It should be noted that attempts are not made to cover all the dimensions of political violence given the inexhaustible nature of the issue, nevertheless, reasonable cases shall be visited. (a) Intra/Inter Party and Electoral Violence Most political violence was necessitated by complex number of factors such as the quest for power, control of resources, lack of trust, avarice as well as betrayal. The political brigandry existed within (intra) and across (inter) party politics. Party members threatened another party member considered to be a political hindrance to their ambition. At other times, it would be against another party member of a rival political party. And as a result, dirty means deemed necessary were deployed to stop an opponent even if it required the breakdown of government institutions. The situation was most precarious at the federal and state levels. One of the states where this existed was Ebonyi, a state in south-east Nigeria. The political gladiators were Sam Egwu, the then governor of the State and , the former Senate President. The duos were stakeholders of Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in the state. Both had disagreed over how best to govern the State and modalities of administering PDP therein. The tempo thus created camps in the State and party – the Abakiliki group for Sam Egwu and the Abuja group for Anyim Pius Anyim (Tobs: 44-5). The tension created by this culminated in the death of four PDP members: Onyebuchi Ede, PDP chairman of Ishielu Local Government Area, ChibuezeIdah, Ogbonna Odimbaiwe and Ifeanyi Nnaji. Their death was consequent upon an open confrontation between the forces loyal to Sam Egwu and Anyim Pius at Nkalagu, a border town between Enugu and Ebonyi States (Tobs: 44-5). The death of the four was the outcome of political machinations of power tussle between Sam Egwu and Pius Anyim. was yet another political hot-zone in south-east Nigeria where political brigandry was well-played out. Here, politicians employed the services of Vigilante Security Services otherwise known as 'Bakassi Boys' to intimidate, torture and at other times kill political contenders and oppositions. In Anambra, the villain of the piece had been the governor, Chiwoke Mbadinuju who had attacked his opponents and critics. For example, IfeanyiIbegbu, a minority leader in the State House of Assembly was tortured and humiliated in the hands of members of the so-called Anambra Vigilante Security Services (Bakassi Boys). In an interview with Newswatch, Ibegbu lamented that he was tortured, because he opposed the administration of Mbadinuju (Tobs:48). Some others who suffered similar political brigandry in the hands of the governor were Chinedu, the then Deputy Governor who narrowly escaped death from gunshot and Chudi Offodile, a member of the Federal House of Representative who led a faction

34 of PDP opposed to Mbadinuju's policies (Tobs: 48-9). Many other instances abound in Anambra State and had been traced to the Mbadinuju-Emeka Offor tussle for power and control of the Government House in Awka in 2003 (Tobs: 48-9). The South-west of the country was not short of political brigandry, as the saga remained the same. The political machinations, intrigues and violence were both intra and inter party attacks. The example of Osun and Lagos States will be illustrated to substantiate this argument. In , the atmosphere of desperation and political violence for the control of the 'Government House' eventually led to the death of Olagbaju Odunayo, a member of Osun State House of Assembly on 19 December 200l and Bola Ige, an Alliance for Democracy stakeholder in and ex-minister of Justice and Attorney-General of the federation on 23 December 2001 (Murtala 2011: 48-9). The underlying thrust of events which led to the death of Chief Bola Ige was the differences between Chief Bisi Akande, the then governor of Osun State, Chief Bola Ige who was then the deputy leader of Afenifere (a pan- Yoruba socio-political body) and Iyiola Omisore, former deputy governor of Osun State. The lingering differences among them assumed a violent turn at the palace of Oba Akande Sijuwade, the ? ? ni of Ife on the occasion of the installation of late Stella Obasanjo, wife of the former President, as the Yeye ? ranmiyan of Ile-Ife. Omisore had hoped to be the governor of Osun State in 2003 and had expected the support of Chief Bola Ige. However, given his (Omisore) antecedents during the military regime of late , Bola Ige had admonished him to await the completion of BisiAkande's second tenure in 2007. This, Omisore would not take for an answer, hence the ugly incidence that occurred at the palace of Oba Sijuwade where Chief Bola Ige was violently accosted by Omisore's political supporters. Babarinwa gives vivid narration of what happened: … it was at this stage that Omisore's supporters led by a member of the Osun State House of Assembly and a former commissioner, decided to attack him (Ige). His security detail was identified and dealt a blow from the back. In a jiffy, they surrounded Ige and one of them attempted to tear away the gold chain on his neck, a present from th Funso, his daughter, on his 70 birthday anniversary. His spectacles were removed and his cap was seized … (Dare 2002: 27-9). Following the ugly incidence described above, there was celebration at the Omisore's camp. Omisore had been quoted to have boasted in Tempo Magazine that, 'the people of Ife beat him (Ige) up and he was crying like a baby, as they removed his cap and glasses. Had it been a political gathering, he would be dead by now' (Yemi 2002: 29-33). Four days after Omisore's

35 interview, Chief Bola Ige was assassinated in his Solemilia Court, his palatial home in Bodija Estate, Ibadan, Oyo State. In Lagos State, the nation's commercial centre, the story was the same in 2006, as the country prepared for another democratic transition in 2007, incumbent political office holders fought to retain their posts against new aspirants, the nation again began to witness increasing spate of political brigandry and assassinations. Between 1999 and 2006, many people were killed and as the 2007 election drew closer, the premonition that many got killed or fell to the bullets of political assassins could be best explained in the assassination of Anthony Olufunsho Williams, ex-governorship aspirant of PDP in Lagos State and an apostle of 'politics without bitterness' on 30 July 2006. The late politician had on 26 July 2006, admonished co-aspirants to eschew from politics of bitterness and violence as the nation approached the 2007 election (Chris 2006: 14-23). Prior to that, on 23 July 2006, Funsho Williams had narrowly escaped death during a rally organised by the Lagos PDP in Gbagada and Ikorodu, Lagos. The rally turned out violent between the supporters of Adeseye Ogunlewe, former Minister of Works who was also in the race for Lagos State governorship and Williams' supporters (Chris: 19). However, the turbulent political atmosphere reached its crescendo on 30 July 2006 when Funsho Williams was assassinated by yet to be identified assailants in his 18B Corporation Drive, Dolphin Estate, Ikoyi residence in Lagos (Chris: 18). The death of Funsho Williams was not unconnected with the 'kill-theopponent' syndrome that was synonymous with the Fourth Republic. Williams was said to have been murdered by one of his closest rivals who considered him a threat because the deceased was highly favoured by the PDP stakeholders to clinch the ticket of Lagos State gubernatorial candidate (Chris: 18). The assassination of Funsho Williams, Chief Bola Ige, among others was in the waves of the unresolved political killings ubiquitous in Nigeria's democratic experience up to 2007. Some others were Marshal Harry, top politician of the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) who was killed on 5 March 2003 and AminasoariDikibo, PDP South-South National Vice- Chairman, murdered on 6 January 2004 (Murtala 2011: 48-9). The list is endless and it cuts across the States of the Nigerian federation. Across the nation's political landscape – Enugu, Bayelsa, Imo, Nasarawa et cetera – there were instances of political brigandry (Joseph 2006: 20-2). In Edo State for example, a scenario of political violence erupted on 15 July, at Saidi Centre, Benin where Aikhomu, the then coordinator of Fourth Dimensions Nigeria (FDN), a political association which had fused with others to form UNDP, was holding a meeting. Properties were destroyed and

36 many members of the FDN sustained severe injuries and beaten by thugs. In a Newswatch interview, Aikhomu asserted that PDP stakeholders, Tony Anenih, then Minister of Works and Housing, Lucky Igbinedion, ex-governor of Edo State and were responsible (Tobs: 51). According to him, 'we live in a very politically hostile environment in which PDP has boasted that they want to turn Edo State into a one-party state and that no other association or party will be allowed to operate' (Tobs: 51). The situation encapsulated both structural and psychological forms of political violence (Bamgbose: 207-9). At the root of the violence was the struggle for the control of the state. While Aikhomu was strengthening the FDN and by extension UNDP foothold in Edo State, Igbinedion, the PDP party leader in the state poised not to let the FDN have a say of any sort. This obviously contravened the principles of democracy where the minority (the opposition) group is sacrosanct. The example given so far described the nature of politicking in Nigeria, 1999 – 2019. It was a process hinged on self-aggrandizement and founded on intrigues, lack of governmental institutional trust, avarice, covetousness, betrayal and intolerance for opposition party as well as criticisms – even when they were constructive. This invariably bred an atmosphere of tension evolved into threats, kidnapping and attaining its climax in wanton assassinations. This needless violence and killings to argue, contradicts the ethics and principles on which government was established. (b) Political Violence and Legislative Chamber The Nigerian Legislative Houses (Federal or States) had at one time or the other exhibited act of political brigandry. Instances abound where members of legislators engaged in a free-for-all even when the House was on session. In most cases, the basis of violence had always centred on matters of impeachment, embezzlement of public funds and corruption. Within the periods, factions were created for auto-centric benefits. In the early years of independence, legislative brigandry erupted in the Western Regional House of Assembly (James: 99-101). The fracas threatened the corporate entity and existence of the nation's newly won independence. Like the Bourbon of France who failed to learn from the lessons of history, the Nigerian legislators during the Fourth Republic exhibited the same unethical and unabashed freefor- all where members threw chairs and other forms of injurious objects at each other. For example, in Enugu State, a scenario was created when a faction of members of the State House of Assembly resolved that the Speaker, Abel Chukwu had been impeached as at 25 January 2001 (Tobs: 50). However, the group loyal to the Speaker refuted that and in the midst of a blazing row, members engaged in open fracas to the detriment of lawmaking,

37 orderliness and good governance. As a result, many legislators were injured. Four years after, the scenario manifested itself in Oyo State House of Assembly where one member of the faction faithful to Chief LamidiAdedibu stabbed another House member supportive to RashidiLadoja, the ex- governor, with a knife leading to a free-for-all. In the ensuing pandemonium, some lawmakers drew firearms and fired into the air to ward off attackers from the opposing camp (Human Right Watch: 54-5). The failure to learn from the lessons of history caused a greater havoc and national embarrassment as members of Nigerian Federal House of Representative similarly embroiled in a free-for-all on 17 October 2007. The incidence began following the accusation and charges of corruption (? 628 million equivalents to about $4.3 million) levelled against the Speaker, Patricia Etteh (Anza: 2007: 26-9). As a result, the Idoko-David panel (a committee set up to investigate the allegation) concluded that the Speaker had violated the due process of law-making and recommended that the Speaker should resign. However, the faction adherent to the Speaker and the anti-Speaker (the Integrity Group) created a scene that led to a rowdy, lawless and free-forall scenario. In the midst of this, a member, late Aminu Safawa lost his life (Anza: 26-9). The scenario described above opposed the essence of law-making. According to the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended section four (4), sub-section one (1), 'the National Assembly shall have power to make laws for the peace, order and good governance of the Federation …'(Nigeria Constitution: 21). Nonetheless, the actions of the legislators betrayed the oath they swore to their fatherland and negate essence of law-making. The aim of government and law-making is for an orderly society. But when law-makers turned out to be political brigands, then, the fundamental principles of government is lost. Thus, the political brigandry exhibited by legislators (Federal or States) within the period under review was another gully Nigerian democratic experience found itself. (c) Godfatherism, Electoral Process and Political Violence Not all political aspirants in Nigeria polity could afford to raise reasonable resources for electioneering and other panoplies of politics, hence many candidates had to depend on some sort of political bigwigs or moneybags known in Nigerian parlance as 'Godfathers'. Godfatherism, a phenomenon which describes a group of powerful individuals who sponsor political aspirants financially or other means necessary to political offices in expectation of financial returns or otherwise. Human Rights Watch elaborately clarified the concept of'Godfatherism' thusly: …individuals whose power stems not just from wealth but from their

38 ability to deploy violence and corruption to manipulate national, state or local political systems in support of the politicians they sponsor. In return, they demanded a substantial degree of control over the government resources stolen by their protégés or lucrative government contracts awarded to them as further opportunities for graft (Human Right Watch: 33). In its nature, godfatherism deployed all means necessary to promote political brigandry – threats, kidnapping, corruption, violence and assassination. Godfathers' relevance in polity lies in their ability to employ violence and corruption with impunity to compete for office in contest that often effectively and sometimes actually exclude Nigeria's voters (Human Right Watch: 34; Chinua 2012: 245). Instances of godfatherism and political violence abound and across the landscape of Nigeria democracy, 1999 – 2019. In Oyo State for example, it was a titanic struggle between Chief Lamidi Adedibu, the Ibadan political godfather and the former governor, Rashidi Ladoja (Ayokunle 2007: 85-103). In the late 2006 and towards the 2007 election, the state was turned into pandemonium as Chief Lamidi Adedibu clashed with Rashidi Ladoja. Across the streets of Ibadan, the capital city, there was lawlessness, violence and chaos as Lamidi made the state ungovernable for Rashidi – the zenith of political banditry in the State. A similar incidence took place in Anambra State, south-east Nigeria. In this case, the political saga of the former governor's (Chris Ngige) kidnapping comes to mind. The political crisis revolved round Anambra political godfather, Chris Uba and Chris Ngige (Human Right Watch: 67- 79; Korikye: 2011: 120). Godfatherism had caused malfeasance in governmental institutions, especially within the Nigerian framework of democratic practice. Over time, the system was prevalent in virtually all governmental parastatals as well as established hooliganism in governance. Besides, it encouraged youth restiveness, arms proliferations, breeds corruption and impeded the developmental strides of infrastructural facilities expected in democracy. The legacy of godfatherism haunts the nation's democracy as it impacted negatively on the psyche of the political class. In replacement of acceptable politics, it left a disorientation and seemingly acceptable culture of political brigandry among politicians as well as the electorates. This has led to political apathy among the people as many regarded politics as a 'dirty game' and politicians as charlatans, cheats, dishonest and unworthy of the electorates' trusts. Effects of Electoral Violence on Nigeria's Wobbling Democracy and Some Caveats Nigeria's democratic pace, especially since the return to electoral

39 process in the Fourth Republic had been greatly impeded by political violence. This had haunted and has continued to haunt the nation's democratic experience and development. The impacts cut-across all aspects of governmental parastatals. Arms proliferations and increasing crime rates are among the consequences of political violence. Politicians in virtually all parts of the country became suspicious of their opponents and as a result armed their supporters in readiness for political battles. Given the waves of political killings and tensions, most political aspirants had raised their own private security cover. For example, in in southern Nigeria, the State Security Service arrested Kenneth Kobani, the State Commissioner for Finance and Gabriel Podomson, a member of the State House of Assembly for stockpiling arms prior to 2007 election (Tobs 2006: 18). Both were said to have separately sponsored rival cult groups in the State which had led to clashes in August 2006 and the eventual death of about twelve persons (Tobs: 24). The situation was prevalent in almost all the States of the federation. Arms proliferation had contributed to increasing crime rate. Most of the thugs or assassins used by politicians were usually dumped by their masters (politicians) after their aims were achieved. Consequently, these thugs used their guns not only against their political lords but also innocent citizens around the cities. M.T. Atabo, an economist and former Minister of Petroleum, in an interview with Newswatch Magazine, stated that 'these youths who carry guns were trained and armed by the politicians to help them win election in 2003. After the election, they dumped them to become serious nuisance to the society' (Tobs: 24). At times, these gangs take life for as low as ? 100,000 ($700) while the fees are higher if a high profile personality is the target (Tobs: 24). The situation exhibited the increase spate and culture of political killings within the period and the created the premonition that more might still be assassinated in the years ahead. The negative effects of arms proliferation and increasing crime rate had resulted in the loss of credible leaders, paralysis of State affairs as well as breakdown in government institutions. For example, following the assassination of Funsho Williams, JadesolaAkande, a professor and former vice-chancellor, Lagos State University (LASU) explained that 'hired-assassins were gradually eliminating credible leaders who would have made positive and remarkable changes in the nation's political landscape (Chris: 16). The result of the increasing spate of political assassinations in the country was the ripple effect of killings that engulfed Nigeria body politics. Besides, the activities of godfathers undermined the institutions of government, paralyzed State affairs in some States and established a protracted rancour between governors and deputies and unending party factions. The examples

40 of Ebonyi, Osun, Oyo, and Anambra are convincing points. Economic, industrial and technological growth would only triumph in an atmosphere of political harmonyand stability. Every investor would be willing to channel their capital where they are safe and guaranteed. Hence, as the nation returned and continued to struggle in the democratic dispensation, it offered hope for foreign investment – industries as well as technology. Nonetheless, aspirations and expectations of Nigerians became hopeless as the political terrain was unsuitable for investment. The politics of thuggery, kidnapping, assassination and violence were considered to be dragging the nation to another Hobbesian state of nature where chaos and lawlessness reign. As a result, the nation's pace for accelerated economic growth was undermined. Increasing unemployment and crime rates, falling standard of living and education as well as failure in many governmental institutions became some of the ripple effects of political violence. Conclusion The attempts in this exercise have been to re-examine the nature of politics practised since the return to democratic rule in 1999. To achieve this, the paper begins with an introduction which provided the background for the emergence of government in the society. Thereafter, it explains the framework on which the paper's arguments were established. This is immediately followed by a synoptic retrospection of Nigeria's electoral violence since independence. At this stage, the various dimensions of electoral brigandry practiced in Nigeria since 1999 were considered. And to this end, it established that the political intimidations, killings and assassinations that flourished during the period exhibited Hobbesian state of nature where life was meaningless, brutish, nasty, short and chaotic. The paper submitted that Nigeria's electoral process and road to political office should not and must not necessarily be violent as exemplified by the political elites since independence and particularly in Fourth Republic. Public offices are avenues designed to solve and resolve contentious matters confronting man in the society and not to create any. And to achieve this, the institutions of government were created to ensure this through appointment or electoral processes. However, for all intents and purposes, Nigeria's democratic experience, 1963–2019have been a paradox of those ideologies for good governance and legislations as the various and essential parastatals of government – police, judiciary, and legislature, among others exhibited interconnectedness of shamelessness and lawlessness. Thus, godfathers who undermined the institutions of government could go unpunished, corrupt officials and politicians keep floating at the corridors of powers with reckless impunity. Illicit arms proliferations became the stock in trade of the

41 political elites with its attendant societal consequences – armed insurgents which invariably turned to hired-assassins thereby created an atmosphere of insecurity that has been the lots of the citizenry. Within the period, the nation could be tagged a 'failed state' given the resources at its disposal to re-direct the economic, industrial, technological, educational as well as the political structure of the nation. Rather, the country was confronted with economic backwardness, incompetent legislature as well as judicial inefficiency with increasing falling in the standard of education. Other menace emanating from Nigeria's undemocratic process include high rate of income inequality, leading to high prevalence of poverty as a result of dearth of infrastructures which widened unemployment with the emanated problems of youth restiveness, insurgencies as well as prevalence of criminality. In addition, the electorates and the entire citizenry should serve as the societal watchdog for democratic re-engineering, culture and credible electoral process. Attempt should be strenuously made to weed out every cog in the wheel for good governance and above all, the institutions of government should be strengthened to ensure effectiveness, accountability and responsiveness. The political elites should not make Nigeria's return to democracy be likened to Thomas Hobbes' State of Nature as enunciated in the Leviathan.

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