id: 40280 date: 9/9/2005 18:16 refid: 05BOGOTA8495 origin: Embassy Bogota classification: CONFIDENTIAL destination: header: This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 008495

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2005 TAGS: KJUS, PGOV, PREL, PTER, CO, AUC SUBJECT: SUPREME COURT APPROVES DON BERNA'S EXTRADITION; URIBE HAS FINAL SAY

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) On September 7, 's Supreme Court approved the U.S. extradition request for paramilitary commander Diego Murillo, AKA "Don Berna," and transmitted the case to the President for his decision. The approval occurred in much less than normal time for such a decision (less than a third of the time the Simon Trinidad extradition took for example). The USG seeks his extradition for narcotrafficking crimes committed after 1998. Berna has been a key negotiator for the United Self-Defenses of Colombia (AUC), and is currently involved in the U.S.-supported paramilitary demobilization process. In private, President Uribe has expressed his reluctance to extradite leaders who are actively advancing the peace process.

2. (U) Following a highly-publicized GOC hunt for Don Berna in May, the GOC placed him under house arrest on a farm in the municipality of Piedras de Valencia, Cordoba Department. In July 2004, the GOC suspended arrest warrants for negotiating paramilitaries to encourage their full participation in the peace process. The suspended arrest warrant for other AUC leaders effectively postponed extradition proceedings for them, but Don Berna's house arrest status allowed his extradition process to proceed.

3. (C) President Uribe suspended a decision on AUC leader Salvatore Mancuso's extradition, saying that his cooperation in the peace and demobilization processes made immediate extradition inappropriate.

------COMMENT ------

4. (C) The Supreme Court may have set a political trap for Uribe whether by design or not. Don Berna is a key player in the paramilitaries now and maintains much influence over others in the paramilitary groups. If Uribe extradites him, the GOC risks a severe backlash. The slow pace of reintegration of paramilitaries due to resource constraints could mean the peace process is at least partially reversible. If Uribe does not extradite Don Berna, he may be seen as cooperating with paramilitaries and he may risk charges from NGOs and the Colombian left (normally not/not friends of extradition) that his government is not prosecuting the paramilitaries. End Comment. WOOD

======CABLE ENDS======id: 22359 date: 11/2/2004 18:31 refid: 04BOGOTA11752 origin: Embassy Bogota classification: CONFIDENTIAL destination: header: This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BOGOTA 011752

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2014 TAGS: PREL, CO SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR PRESIDENT BUSH'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT URIBE IN COLOMBIA

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

------Introduction ------

1. (C) President Uribe welcomes the visit of President and Mrs. Bush with enthusiasm. Current hot topics include:

--Floods in Northern Colombia, more than 150,000 persons affected

--Demobilization and reinsertion of up to 3,000 paramilitary terrorists in the next two months

--U.S. support in out years

--Free Trade Agreement negotiations; next round in Tuscon at the end of November could be crucial

--Record-breaking drug eradication and seizures

--Major judicial reform starting in January

--Extradition

--U.S. travel advisory and security in Cartagena

--Continued shortage of helicopters for counter-drug and counter-terror missions

--Status of U.S. hostages

--Human rights

--Alternative development and humanitarian assistance

------Floods in Northern Colombia ------

2. (C) Heavy rainfall has caused flooding in the north coast region, including the Cartagena area. Some 200,000 persons have been affected and more than 300 homes destroyed. Through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, we are providing $150,000 in assistance to the Red Cross to help some 10,000 persons in the hardest-hit areas south of Cartagena.

------Demobilization and Reinsertion ------

3. (C) Colombia plans to demobilize 3,000 or so members of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), the country's largest paramilitary terrorist organization, in the next six weeks, adding to the over 1,000 paramilitaries who demobilized in 2003. The program is underfunded and the OAS verification chief has issued an international call for help; several European nations have responded with low levels of aid. Uncertainty regarding Patriot Act restrictions has prevented direct U.S. assistance or involvement in design of the program. President Uribe may seek U.S. assistance to help reinsert voluntarily demobilized ex-terrorists who are cooperating against their former organizations and otherwise adhering to the government's program. This demobilization/reinsertion is expected to be the template for eventual demobilization of up to 15,000 paramilitaries by the end of 2005, and the leftist terrorists of the ELN, with whom preliminary talks are underway but going slowly.

------U.S. Support ------

4. (C) As in past meetings, Uribe will be looking for private and public reaffirmations of U.S. support and continued financial resources for the next few years. Requested U.S. assistance tops $660 million in FY05, plus a number of DOD operating accounts. Special DOD assistance to Plan Patriota operations runs out after 2005.

------Free Trade Agreement/Economy ------

5. (C) Negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement, with Peru and Ecuador, begin their fifth round on November 29 in Tuscon. President Uribe remains a strong proponent, but agricultural and other concerns, principally regarding pharmaceuticals, have prevented Colombia from moving as rapidly as it should. As a result, our goal of conclusion by early 2005 is uncertain. Colombia hopes for special consideration for its close cooperation on counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism efforts. Overall growth continues to be strong (about 4 percent), and investment is returning. But the country faces fiscal pressure, and President Uribe political pressure, from the competition for resources between defense and social needs, especially unemployment (currently 12.5 percent).

------Drug Eradication/Interdiction ------

6. (C) FY04 drug eradication and interdiction are at record levels. We should meet our 130,000-hectare goal for coca spraying and exceed last year's level for opium poppy. President Uribe is working to expand manual eradication efforts. We continue to press for spraying in national parks in the face of Colombian and U.S. congressional resistance. Drug seizures are also at record levels. In 2004 the Colombian National Police has seized approximately 56 metric tons; the Colombian military, primarily the navy and coast guard, approximately 68 metric tons; and a multi-national force approximately 192 metric tons. Between eradication and seizures, more than 475 metric tons of drugs have been blocked in 2004, in comparison to about 300 tons in 2003.

------Judicial Reform ------

7. (C) Colombia will switch to an oral adversarial trial system, like that of the U.S., in January. We have provided extensive training and advice to this major reform; it is also a high priority among many in the U.S. Congress. President Uribe may request additional resources. The Minister of Justice has requested that the justice sector rapidly/rapidly receive 50 percent of all Colombia-related drug assets that we seize; in the past, Colombia has received a smaller share, sometimes after years of delay.

------Extradition ------

8. (C) President Uribe has approved since taking office more than 150 extraditions to the U.S. He will likely ask for more political sensitivity in our extradition requests, as he and his ministers have done several times in the last year. Although Uribe is solid in his support, extradition faces political pressure from well-connected drug traffickers awaiting extradition and from paramilitary leaders involved in peace negotiations. We are taking steps to avoid killing the golden goose. Uribe may raise paramilitary leaders' efforts to negotiate extradition at the peace table. We have said that extradition should not be a topic in the negotiations, and not be addressed in any way before all/all demobilization steps are fulfilled by the paramilitary leaders, including peaceful demobilization of their troops. Uribe has agreed.

------Cartagena/Consular ------

9. (C) The U.S. travel advisory warns against all travel to Colombia. President Uribe may ask for a cut-out for Cartagena, so cruise ships, a potential major source of tourist revenue, can enter. Cartagena has not seen a terrorist incident for two years, has special safeguards for cruise ship tourists (no incidents have been reported for European cruise ship tourists), and has a better security record than many Latin American capitals. Although we resist a cut-out for Cartagena, we are working to revise the travel advisory for Colombia as a whole, and the State Department head of security will visit Cartagena at the end of November.

------Plan Patriota/Military ------

10. (C) The Colombian Armed Forces has made steady progress against illegal armed groups since the late 1990s, thanks in large part to U.S. assistance. Plan Patriota is currently focused in FARC-dominated, heavily forested southeastern Colombia; it is going well, but slowly. The logistical strain of keeping 17,000 troops in the dense, hostile jungle, hundreds of miles from their supply bases, has been a huge challenge. Poor inter-service cooperation, corruption, and tolerance of paramilitarism continue, but they are improving, most recently with good changes in senior military leadership. There continues to be competition for scarce helicopters between counter-drug and counter-terrorism missions. President Uribe may ask for additional Blackhawk helicopters.

------Reelection ------

11. (C) Constitutional reform to permit Presidential re-election is near completion; we believe it is probable. The reform will face review by the Constitutional Court early next year, a wild card. The press may seek a U.S. view on re-election. Although we can praise President Uribe, we should avoid comment on re-election, which could be played as "interference in domestic affairs." Uribe is above 65 percent approval in polls.

------Human Rights ------

12. (C) The Uribe Administration continues to make progress in human rights, but has not been completely successful in ensuring accountability, strengthening the military justice system, in breaking military ties to paramilitary groups, or in ending corruption. The government has an active dialogue with NGOs, the United Nations, and foreign governments. Human rights training is mandatory for all members of the military and police. The Embassy vets all units that receive U.S. assistance, in accordance with the Leahy Amendment. Homicides fell by 20 percent, kidnappings by 30 percent, and forced displacements by 49 percent in 2003; that trend has continued in 2004. Less than 2 percent of human rights violations are attributable to government security forces. But recent violations by members of the armed forces, such as the suspicious murders in August of three trade unionists in the highly conflictive department of Arauca, demonstrate the need for further improvement.

------U.S. Hostages ------

13. (C) The three U.S.-contractor hostages captured by the FARC in February 2003 are now the longest U.S. terror captives in the world. (Another U.S. contractor and a Colombian were killed by the FARC in the same incident, when their helicopter safely crash-landed due to mechanical failure near a FARC camp.) Plan Patriota operations have increased the likelihood that we will receive more information about the hostages, but also that an unintended encounter between Colombian forces and the hostage holders will result in their execution. The are providing full assistance, both to keep us informed and to avoid unplanned encounters that might endanger the hostages. The U.S. publicly has counseled against negotiations with the FARC for any of its dozens of hostages, to avoid providing an incentive for further hostage-taking. We have supported Uribe's proposals for an exchange of hostages for FARC prisoners not accused of violent crimes provided that the FARC prisoners are prevented from returning to terrorist activities; so far the FARC has refused. Uribe has assured us that the U.S. hostages will be included in any possible exchange.

------Development, Humanitarian, Judicial Reform ------14. (C) Alternative development, humanitarian aid, and democracy programs are going well. We have leveraged substantial private sector assistance to establish 270 square miles of legal agriculture benefiting 40,000 families. U.S. aid has helped nearly 2 million internally displaced persons. Colombia has the largest displaced population outside Africa. WOOD

======CABLE ENDS======

id: 13060 date: 1/6/2004 18:34 refid: 04BOGOTA85 origin: Embassy Bogota classification: CONFIDENTIAL destination: header: This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 000085

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2014 TAGS: PTER, PREL, PHUM, PINR, PINS, MOPS, CO, FARC SUBJECT: SENIOR FARC LEADER SIMON TRINIDAD IN CUSTODY: GOC INTEREST IN EXTRADITION TO THE U.S.

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)

------Summary ------

1. (C) On January 2, Ecuadorian authorities arrested Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) commander Ricardo Ovidio Palmera Pineda alias "Simon Trinidad." He is now in Colombia, where he faces over 50 counts of terrorism and other serious crimes. Palmera, who played a ke role in managing FARC finances and is implicated in several high-profil terrorist incidents, is the highest-ranking FARC commander ever to be captured. His capture is a major political victory for President Uribe and demonstrates the importance of effective security cooperation between Colombia and its neighbors. The GOC would like to extradite Palmera to the U.S. End Summary.

------Ecuador-Colombian Cooperation ------

2. (C) On January 2, Ecuadorian authorities arrested Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) commander Ricardo Ovidio Palmera Pineda alias "Simon Trinidad," in a popular tourist district of Quito. Palmer was allegedly in Quito to receive treatment for prostate cancer. The Ecuadorian National Police (ENP) had been tracking his movements for several weeks. After appearing before an Ecuadorian judge, Palmera was turned over to Colombian authorities and transported to Bogota, where he faces a total of 59 charges of terrorism, kidnapping, and drug trafficking. The GOC was fully aware of the Ecuadorian operation and, prior to the arrest, provided Ecuadorian officials with a positive identification of Palmera. Contrary to press reports, an informant did not provide Colombian military authorities with information on Palmera's whereabouts; the ENP planned most of the operation independently of Colombian authorities.

------Who is "Simon Trinidad"? ------

3. (C) Palmera, more commonly known as "Simon Trinidad," is the most senior FARC commander ever captured. Although not a member of the seven-member FARC Secretariat, Palmera was an influential member of the FARC's General Staff ("Estado Mayor"), a decision-making body ranking directly below the Secretariat that administers most of the FARC's political, strategic, and operational activities. Palmera -- who holds a university degree in economics and hails from a wealthy cattle-ranching family in the department of Cesar -- helped manage FARC finances and drug trafficking operations.

4. (C) Palmera is believed to have been directly involved in several high profile terrorist incidents, including the kidnapping and murder o former Minister of Culture Consuelo Araujo in September 2001 and the deaths in May 2002 of over 100 civilians who took refuge in a church during a clash between the FARC and paramilitary forces in the town of Boyaja, Choco department. The 53-year-old Palmera has been an active member of the FARC for nearly 20 years and gained public prominence fro his role as a hard-nosed FARC negotiator during peace negotiations with the government of President Andres Pastrana from 1998-2002. Palmera di not play a major role in planning FARC combat operations; his absence i unlikely to hurt the group's military capacity.

------Public Relations Coup ------

5. (C) Palmera's capture is a political victory for Uribe, who has publicly pledged to kill or capture leaders of Colombia's illegal armed groups before the end of his term. Colombian media have touted the arrest as the most important blow to the FARC in recent memory, and it should temporarily satisfy the public's growing impatience to see the GOC achieve a major victory against the insurgent group. Palmera's arrest also demonstrates the importance of close security cooperation between the GOC and officials in neighboring countries, where FARC leaders often go for relaxation.

------Extradition ------6. (C) Senior GOC officials, including President Uribe, have asked that the U.S. consider requesting the extradition of Palmera. They obviously would prefer to see him secure in a U.S. jail than processed in the sometimes unreliable Colombian judicial system. Their requests have had a note of urgency to them. At this time, however, Palmera doe not face criminal charges in the U.S. The Embassy is unaware of any pending investigations against this well-known narco-terrorist by U.S. law enforcement agencies. WOOD

======CABLE ENDS======

id: 13754 date: 2/5/2004 17:15 refid: 04BOGOTA1198 origin: Embassy Bogota classification: CONFIDENTIAL destination: 04BOGOTA993 header: This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 001198

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2014 TAGS: PREL, KJUS, PTER, SNAR, PHUM, CO, Demobilization SUBJECT: URIBE ON PARAMILITARY DEMOBILIZATION

REF: BOGOTA 993

Classified By: DCM Milton Drucker, Reasons: 1.5 B & D.

1. (C) In a February 4 meeting with Ambassador Wood and visiting U.S. inter-agency delegation, President Uribe stated that he was instructing his Administration to offer paramilitary leaders two options: relocation to so-called "concentration zones" for those who agree to demobilize or prosecution (e.g., jail or death on the battlefield). Ambassador and DAS Peter DeShazo urged Uribe to neither lift the arrest orders on top paramilitary leaders, including Carlos Castano and Salvatore Mancuso of the AUC, nor attempt to change extradition laws (see para 3 reftel). Uribe stressed he would not modify extradition. Uribe added that if demobilized paramilitaries were to be given a temporary safe conduct in concentration zones they would need to be engaged in social service type activities. Uribe noted that since he took office (August 2002), 3908 paramilitaries had been captured and an additional 435 had been killed.

2. (C) In a January 27 meeting with Ambassador and members of the Core Group (reftel), Peace Commissioner Restrepo had indicated that the GOC would not formally lift arrest warrants for paramilitary leaders, but intended to allow them freedom of movement in designated zones in order to facilitate demobilization (and OAS observation efforts).

3. (C) Comment: Uribe is firm on his commitment not to touch extradition in the event of a collective paramilitary demobilization. We will continue to work with the Uribe Administration to find a satisfactory way to deal with the issue of AUC members who already have arrest warrants. Additional items discussed in the February 4 meeting with Uribe will be reported septel. WOOD

======CABLE ENDS======

id: 37166 date: 7/22/2005 20:33 refid: 05BOGOTA6889 origin: Embassy Bogota classification: UNCLASSIFIED destination: header: This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 006889

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E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KMDR, KPAO, OPRC, PREL, SNAR, PGOV, CO SUBJECT: COLOMBIA: JULY 2005 GALLUP POLL RESULTS

Security Policies ------

1. (U) The survey found that 71% of respondents feel safer today than they did a year ago, up seven percent (64%) from April 2005. Those disagreeing with the statement decreased from 31% in April to 26% in July. As such, a little over a third of Colombians (36%) feel that public order/security is the country's top problem. As security conditions improve, the public's willingness to forego some liberties to improve security decreased, from 63% in December 2004 to 55% in July. The large majority (73%) believes that the Government is respectful of human rights; 19%

Peace Process ------

2. (U) Public support for the Government's negotiations with paramilitary groups remains strong - 73% in favor, and 23% against. Support for reinsertion programs for former members of guerrilla/ paramilitary groups has declined from 65% in April to 56% in July. Public support for humanitarian exchanges between guerrillas and hostages also continues to decline, from 47% in favor in December 2004, to 36% in July 2005.

Economic Management ------

3. (U) With security conditions improving in the cities where the poll was taken, respondents identified the economy as the main problem facing Colombia (46%). Sixty-percent disapproved of the president's handling of cost of living issues (36% approved), and 59% disapproved of his unemployment policies (36% approved). On an FTA with the United States, support decreased from 60% in June 2004 to 52% in July 2005.

Extradition ------

4. (U) Support for extradition, at 44% in July, is down three points from March.

Aerial Spraying ------

5. (U) For the first time, opposition to aerial spraying surpassed approval, 50% to 47%. Support for aerial spraying has lost 6% points since December 2004.

Elections/Candidates ------

6. (U) Support for President Uribe's reelection remained strong at 66%. Favorable ratings for other potential presidential candidates were as follows:

- Colombia's ambassador to Spain, Noemi Sanin: 54% - Bogota Mayor Luis E. Garzon: 54% - Former Bogota Mayor Antanas Mockus 51% - Former Bogota Mayor Enrique Penalosa: 46% - Polo Democratico candidate Senator Antonio Navarro Wolf: 37% - Vice-President Santos: 38% - Former President Cesar Gaviria: 35% - Minister of Interior Sabas Pretelt: 32%. - Liberal Party hopeful Horacio Serpa: 30%

Seventy percent of respondents considered themselves political independents, 19% Liberals, and 6% Conservatives.

Institutions ------

7. (U) Among institutions, the Armed Forces enjoyed the highest favorable image, at 80%. Plan Colombia and the Police, at 70% and 69% respectively, were in the top five. The United Nations has a 67% favorable rating, and Human Rights NGOs come in next at 66%. With regards to Venezuela, 37% have a favorable opinion, while 50% have a negative opinion. When asked if the relationship with Venezuela could be described as respectful and prosperous, those agreeing with that statement have been decreasing steadily from 65% in March, 61% in April, to a low of 47% in July. Hugo Chavez received 16% favorable ratings and 49% unfavorable.

8. (U) The opinion poll was conducted by telephone in the four largest metropolitan areas July 5-6. It overweighted poorer respondents and represents a good profile of the more politically relevant or influential populat

======CABLE ENDS======id: 16082 date: 4/16/2004 23:24 refid: 04BOGOTA3894 origin: Embassy Bogota classification: SECRET destination: header: This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

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S E C R E T BOGOTA 003894

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2014 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KJUS, SNAR, CO SUBJECT: UPDATE ON COLOMBIAN DRAFT LEGISLATION TOUCHING ON EXTRADITION

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, Reasons: 1.4 B & D.

1. (S) Summary: The Colombian House of Representatives is close to a final vote on criminal procedure code reforms. The GOC, supported strongly by the Embassy, is pushing for status quo on the article that addresses extradition. A sizable number of congressmen, however, continues to advocate new language that would add an oral evidentiary hearing to the extradition process. Senior House players have assured us that the GOC will prevail in the House. In addition, ranking senators have assured us the GOC would ultimately prevail in the Senate, which would be the final step in passage of legislation. Nevertheless, we continue to monitor the situation as drug traffickers and paramilitaries are trying to influence both houses. In a related development, 38 members of Congress co-signed a legislative proposal to modify the Constitution to prohibit extradition of any individual who participates in an eventual peace process with the government. As a Constitutional reform, this measure would face a higher vote hurdle for passage. End Summary.

2. (C) The week of April 12 saw two sessions of debate in the House regarding reforms to the Criminal Procedure Code (Codigo de Procedimiento Penal). Debate is set to resume on April 20. A crucial item in the legislation is Article 518, which established procedures for the Supreme Court's role in the extradition process (Spanish texts faxed to WHA/AND). The House Constitutional Affairs Committee passed a reform proposal that would modify Article 518 to mandate an oral evidentiary hearing between the Court and the defense attorney of the potential extraditee. The GOC, supported strongly by the Embassy, has pushed for maintaining Article 518 intact. Article 518 at present calls for Supreme Court written administrative review of the extradition request. The oral hearing element, according to Embassy and Colombian legal experts, would potentially subject the extradition process to questions, delays, and legal challenges. Sabas Pretelt and Mario Iguaran, GOC Interior and Justice Minister and Vice Minister, respectively, maintained a near constant presence in the House during debate the week of April 13, in an effort to keep out damaging extradition language. The Embassy also expressed U.S. opposition to legislators.

3. (C) In a related development, on April 14, Representative Maria del Rocio Arias Hoyos, along with 38 House and Senate co-sponsors (Senate membership is 102, House 166), introduced into the House a proposal to prohibit extradition of any individual who "reincorporates into society by way of a peace process with the government." (Text faxed to WHA/AND). The proposal is not currently on the formal congressional calendar. As a Constitutional reform, the Arias proposal would require four rounds of approval, two in each house, and in back-to-back congressional periods (periods are March-June and July-December). The second round in both houses would require qualified majority, i.e., majority vote of total members (vice quorum). President Uribe appears to have enough members in both houses to prevent its passage.

4. (C) Comment: The criminal procedure code legislation, once passed by the House, would need to be passed by the Senate prior to becoming law. Speaker Alonso Acosta and Vice President Edgar Torres have assured us privately that the GOC will carry the day in the House. Senate Constitutional Affairs Committee Chair Luis Gomez Gallo and member Andres Gonzalez (former GOC Justice Minister) tell us that any attempt to modify extradition will not make it out of their committee. Nevertheless, the congressional scene is a complicated one, and ongoing tensions between the Executive and Legislative branches may complicate the GOC's ability to hold the line on extradition. Fortunately, the Arias proposal (para 3), as a Constitutional reform, faces a higher vote threshold in the second round.

5. (S) Comment (continued): Embassy has information indicating that both drug traffickers and paramilitaries may be attempting to influence senators and congressman. Embassy will continue to monitor the situation and lobby against any and all modifications to extradition rules and procedures. WOOD

======CABLE ENDS======id: 16448 date: 4/28/2004 15:53 refid: 04BOGOTA4297 origin: Embassy Bogota classification: CONFIDENTIAL destination: 04BOGOTA4278 header: This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 004297

SIPDIS

GENEVA FOR POLITICAL COUNSELOR JEFF DELAURENTIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (SUBJECT LINE CHANGED)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2014 TAGS: PTER, PHUM, PGOV, PINR, PINS, SNAR, ASEC, CO, ELN Peace Process SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH MOD AND PEACE COMMISSIONER

REF: BOGOTA 04278

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) On April 27, Ambassador spoke to Minister of Defense Uribe and Peace Commissioner Restrepo about that day's presidential declaration on the peace process (reftel).

2. (C) Minister Uribe said that the declaration had been composed the day before and had been reviewed before issuance by himself, Minister of Interior and Justice Pretelt, Restrepo, and the military High Command. Although the President wrote most of the declaration himself, the message was a product of many hands. Ambassador told Restrepo that the Embassy strongly supported the declaration.

3. (C) Regarding the opening line on paramilitary threats against the President, Minister Uribe said they had good information that drug trafficker/paramilitary "Don Berna" and others were trying to organize an attempt on the President's life. Paramilitary attacks on the President are a new phenomenon and run counter to their rhetoric of "patriotism."

4. (C) Regarding the line that "those who wished to avoid extradition must demonstrate to the international community good faith and a purpose of amending their ways," Minister Uribe said it was not meant to open the door to evasion of extradition. Rather, the declaration was clear that extradition was not on the negotiating table and equally clear that it was the "international community" who must be convinced in any case where extradition was not granted. Extradition would remain an open possibility in all cases and, at least for the time being, the subject was closed.

5. (C) Minster Uribe commented that the declaration should serve to separate any paramilitaries interested in a genuine peace process from those, increasingly dominant, who are merely narco-terrorists trying to masquerade as political actors to get in on the benefits. He shared the view that Carlos Castano was dead and that the paramilitary movement was falling increasingly into purely narco-terrorist hands.

6. (C) Restrepo said that the declaration was not an ultimatum, in spite of the language saying "(if the paramilitaries) do not comply, the government will continue fighting them until they are done with." Restrepo said it was a "clarification," which would help him at the negotiating table, remove any doubts that his tough line was not also that of the President, and present the paramilitaries with a clear choice. He stressed the criteria of a real cease-fire, concentration of forces, and movement toward demobilization were key to progress.

7. (C) The declaration coincided, by chance, with a rally in Cali in favor of a "humanitarian exchange" of prisoners of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) for kidnap victims. The evening news in Colombia focused on the declaration's statement that the FARC would not be permitted to impose a humanitarian exchange by threat that would weaken the Government's policy of democratic security. A parade of family members of kidnap victims criticized the declaration.

WOOD

======CABLE ENDS======

id: 41267 date: 9/23/2005 22:03 refid: 05BOGOTA9089 origin: Embassy Bogota classification: CONFIDENTIAL destination: header: This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 009089

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2015 TAGS: KJUS, PTER, PREL, PGOV, CO, ELN Peace Process, Demobilization SUBJECT: PEACE COMMISSIONER OPPOSES DON BERNA'S EXTRADITION AND IS SURPRISED BY SUPPORT FOR ELN TALKS

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

------SUMMARY ------

1. (C) Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo on September 22 told the Ambassador that the GOC is inclined not to extradite Diego Murillo AKA "Don Berna" at the moment because it would endanger future demobilizations and Don Berna remains an important player in ensuring these demobilizations happen. The Ambassador responded that not extraditing Don Berna would feed domestic and international critics of the peace process. Restrepo agreed to delay any public announcement on Don Berna until the Ambassador has had the opportunity to consult with Washington and speak again to President Uribe. Restrepo also updated the Ambassador on the public and private support the GOC has received for its preliminary peace talks with the National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN). He contrasted this with the unenthusiastic response to the GOC's decision to allow 38 jailed Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) members to benefit from Justice and Peace (J&P) law sentence reductions. End summary.

------GOC LEANING IN FAVOR OF KEEPING DON BERNA IN COLOMBIA ------

2. (C) Restrepo expressed ambivalence about Don Berna's extradition. On the one hand, he is aware of the political implications, in particular with the USG and NGOs, of refusing to extradite him given ongoing criticism the GOC's negotiations with the AUC. Nevertheless, his primary goal is to demobilize the remaining paramilitary structures during the next three months and Don Berna remains an important player in ensuring this happens.

3. (C) Restrepo explained that if the GOC were to announce Don Berna's extradition now it could generate "panic," freeze future demobilizations, and lead those leaders imprisoned in Santa Fe de Ralito to try to escape. There is already fear and resistance after meetings last week with AUC leaders when he made clear that demobilized paramilitary leaders would serve time in prison. He was told that his announcement had angered many AUC members, especially those in the middle ranks, and that his statement threatened the current peace talks with the remaining paramilitary blocks.

4. (C) Restrepo insisted that his hesitation to extradite Don Berna did not extend to the other 10 to 12 key AUC leaders. If Don Berna is extradited, however, Restrepo foresees a significant change in the atmosphere, which could affect ongoing peace talks and spark paramilitary violence. He emphasized that the GOC would need significant USG security assistance if this occurred. He drew on his experience as a psychologist to express particular concern for the state of mind of the paramilitaries, whom he described as "bandits willing and able to do harm." His preference was not to scare them, but instead to encourage them to continue to "enter the corral" and participate in the process. Meanwhile, he said that AUC leader Salvatore Mancuso wanted to speak to the USG because he is willing to consider serving some time in the United States and could convince others to do the same. Other AUC leaders have suggested that after being convicted in Colombia, they would like to serve their time in another country. The rational for this is that they have no opportunities here and their lives would be in danger from fellow AUC and FARC members.

------AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED USG POSITION ON EXTRADITION ------

5. (C) The Ambassador said the USG wants Don Berna's extradition for judicial and political reasons. Judicially, the USG has been able to support the Justice and Peace (J&P) law because the GOC promised it would not negotiate extradition. The J&P law denies benefits for illegal activities conducted for personal gain before membership. The law permits the serving of sentences abroad. Therefore, there should be no obstacle for Don Berna or others to be extradited to the United States. Don Berna personally benefited from illicit activities before and during his membership in the AUC. Don Berna has also been accused of complicity in the killing of a government official while negotiating, thus violating the ceasefire, and his subsequent denial of responsibility for this crime makes him eligible for trial in the regular criminal justice system.

6. (C) From the political perspective, the Ambassador said he understood Uribe's concern about the political cost of extradition while trying to demobilize paramilitaries. Nevertheless, showing a firm hand with respect to the rule of law would help to further legitimize the process. The Ambassador said that in his meetings on September 23 with Governor Gaviria of Antioquia, Mayor of Medellin Fajardo and General Carillo, both Gaviria and Carillo favored Don Berna's extradition, and the Mayor did not oppose the idea. (Berna had an extensive network in Medellin.)

7. (C) The Ambassador stressed the intense focus in the U.S. and elsewhere on Colombia's demobilization and reinsertion efforts. An announcement like that for Salvatore Mancuso, that the GOC was suspending Don Berna's extradition "while he assisted the peace process" would undercut support for the demobilization process and the J&P law. It would also undermine Uribe's credibility shortly after his conversations with members of the U.S. Congress. The Ambassador asked that there be no public statement until he again discussed it with President Uribe.

------POTENTIAL TALKS WITH ELN RECEIVE SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT... ------

8. (C) Restrepo said that in the past days he has received more local and international support on potential peace talks with the ELN than he has had during his three years trying to promote peace with the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). Politicians, former Presidents, the Catholic Church, and the Swedish and Norwegian governments have expressed their willingness to help in the process. With the AUC, he struggled to "fill a van of supporters," while with the ELN he has already had to "hire three large buses and turn people back." He was appreciative of the reiteration of USG support for the process and emphasized his hope that the ELN would take advantage of it.

9. (C) Restrepo speculated that the talks might succeed because of tensions between the ELN and the FARC. In recent weeks, the FARC has intensified its threats against the ELN leadership and warned them to withdraw from negotiations or expect a war. Restrepo said the FARC's tactic of discouraging the ELN from negotiating may benefit the government. Specifically, he thought the threats could backfire by convincing the ELN to negotiate now before fighting with the FARC weakens them further.

------...BUT SUPPORT FOR FARC'S 38 J&P PETITION IS WEAK ------

10. (C) Restrepo understood the political cost of allowing the petition of the 38 jailed FARC members to participate under the Justice and Peace (J&P) law, but underscored the overall value of this and similar future requests. He explained that accepting these requests weakens FARC morale and helps the GOC collect intelligence against the guerrillas. He hoped to put the FARC members interested in participating in the J&P law through a rigorous interrogation process, which could confirm their identification and extract relevant intelligence. He added that he has a list of an additional 150 FARC members waiting for a response from the GOC regarding their petitions to participate under the J&P law.

------COMMENT ------

11. (C) We believe that we can persuade the Uribe Administration not to suspend Don Berna's extradition on an open-ended basis like they did for Mancuso. But we doubt we can get a decision for immediate extradition by the September 29 deadline. WOOD

======CABLE ENDS======id: 44203 date: 11/1/2005 13:28 refid: 05BOGOTA10230 origin: Embassy Bogota classification: CONFIDENTIAL destination: header: This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

------header ends ------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 010230

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2015 TAGS: PGOV, PTER, VE, CO, 2006 Elections, Venezuela, ELN, FARC SUBJECT: FORMER PRESIDENT GAVIRIA HIGHLIGHTS PARAMILITARY INFLUENCE; SUGGESTS U.S. ESTABLISH CHANNEL TO CHAVEZ

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood. Reason: 1.4 (b,d)

------Summary ------

1. (C) Former President Cesar Gaviria told Polcouns October 28 that paramilitaries are threatening and intimidating Liberal Party candidates and office holders, and claimed President Uribe's efforts to combat such activities are conspicuous by their absence. The Liberal Party would continue to campaign throughout the country despite paramilitary threats. (Almost as if on cue, Uribe said the same day that paramilitaries who interfered in the electoral process would lose benefits under the Justice and Peace law.) Gaviria said extradition is at the core of the current GOC-paramilitary impasse and expressed surprise at the manner in which Uribe was handling the issue. Gaviria predicted the Liberals would increase their legislative representation in March 2006 elections. He discounted the importance of an upcoming Constitutional Court ruling on the Electoral Guarantees law, and predicted that Uribe could win the presidency in May on the first ballot. Gaviria suggested the U.S. establish a private, confidential channel to Venezuelan President Chavez, preferably a U.S. citizen close to President Bush. In the alternative, Gaviria said OAS Secretary General Insulza "would not be a bad choice," nor

SIPDIS would a non-U.S. citizen who had the confidence of President Bush. End summary.

------Paramilitaries Exerting Dangerous Influence in Campaigns ------

2. (C) Gaviria said paramilitaries are threatening and intimidating Liberal Party candidates and office holders, especially in the Departments of Antioquia, Risaralda, and Bolivar, as well as on the coast. In one case, Gaviria said narcotics trafficker "Macaco" (who heads up the Central Bolivar Bloc of paramilitaries, the most powerful yet to demobilize) visited a town in Risaralda to ensure that Macaco's brother became the next mayor. In similar ways, he said, paramilitaries are telling Liberal Party candidates that they are not welcome in certain areas and that the paramilitaries have already selected the winning candidates. The party has received information from confidential informants about paramilitary intentions against party candidates and from security detail observation of vehicles following party officials. The party has filed complaints with the police. Gaviria said Liberals would continue to campaign throughout the country despite the risks because there was no other option. (One of Gaviria's DAS security detail said after the meeting that an AUC informant had told of a specific AUC plan to attack Gaviria. Gaviria's security detail has one armored vehicle for Gaviria's use.)

3. (C) Gaviria is worried about a violent election campaign (though not as violent as the 1990s) in the wake of the recent attack on Senator German Vargas Lleras, which Gaviria believes is more likely to be the work of a paramilitary/narcotics trafficker nexus than the work of the FARC. The possibility of a violent campaign is increased when the influence of regional mafias is taken into account, he said. They also have interests to protect.

------Uribe Silent on Paras, Gaviria Says ------

4. (C) Gaviria said he did not understand why Uribe stayed silent in the face of clear evidence of paramilitary intimidation. "We don't know where he stands," he said. In Gaviria's view, Uribe should at least state that paramilitaries are not welcome in any political grouping that purports to support the president, and make clear that he rejects paramilitary support. His silence is troubling, in Gaviria's view. Uribe's efforts with the paramilitaries have focused too much on reconciliation and not enough on justice and truth, he said. More generally, the Uribe administration's effort to permit sentenced prisoners (from the AUC and FARC) to benefit from the Justice and Peace law was "absurd," Gaviria said.

------Extradition is Point of Contention ------

5. (C) Gaviria believes that extradition is the crux of the current difficulty that Uribe is facing with the paramilitaries and expressed surprise that Uribe has failed to manage the matter more effectively. Gaviria asserted the GOC, through Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo, had made private commitments on extradition to certain paramilitary leaders and is now facing their fear and distrust. The paramilitaries worry about extradition above all else. In Gaviria's view, Uribe's lack of transparency on extradition has caused the current tensions. He said if Uribe was going to promise not to extradite certain leaders, he should have obtained a much better deal from the paramilitaries than that embodied in the Justice and Peace law.

------Uribe Could Win on First Ballot; Law No Impediment ------

6. (C) Gaviria predicted Uribe could win the presidency on the first ballot in May 2006 but noted that his likely voter poll numbers are falling. The Liberals would not win but would make it a contest. Horacio Serpa was the most likely Liberal standard bearer against Uribe, but Rafael Pardo and Rodrigo Rivera should not be discounted. The Constitutional Court's ruling on the Electoral Guarantees law (expected November 11) would be no impediment to Uribe running again, in Gaviria's opinion. The Court has made its basic constitutional ruling and the Court's view of the guarantees law cannot change that. It would be helpful to have a clearer sense of the limitations on public officials getting involved in political campaigns, and of the allocation of media time, but such issues pale when considered next to the dangers of campaigning in the face of paramilitary threats, he said.

------Liberals Expect to Increase Legislative Seats ------

7. (C) The Liberal Party should be able to increase its Senate representation from 20 to between 25 and 30 seats in March elections (out of 102), according to Gaviria. (Note: Liberal Party identification is somewhat murky, as allegiances are prone to shift. Gaviria's figure of 20 Liberal Senators seems high. End note.) Liberal Party workers are motivated and energetic, more so than the backbone of other parties. A combined Liberal/Polo Democratico legislative bloc would have a good chance of exceeding a combined Uribista/Conservative party grouping, he suggested.

------U.S. Should Establish Channel to Chavez ------

8. (C) In response to a question about Venezuela, Gaviria suggested that the U.S. open a private, confidential channel to Chavez. The best candidate to serve in this position would be a U.S. citizen close to President Bush. Other possibilities included OAS Secretary General Insulza ("he would not be bad") or other non-U.S. citizens, as long as such a person had reasonably strong access to the White House. From Gaviria's perspective, Chavez is more measured in his actions than many give him credit for and has a strong sense of how far he can go; he will not cross certain lines. His rhetoric is more important to him than concrete achievements. Chavez has to know that he is essentially talking directly to the White House when he deals with a U.S. emissary.

9. (C) Gaviria said Chavez might try to influence Colombian politics but he would not be successful. "No-one would dare take his money," he suggested. He said it was more likely that Chavez was already trying to influence elections in countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador.

------FARC and ELN ------

10. (C) Gaviria said the FARC was likely to commit terrorist attacks during the electoral campaign "because that is what they do." However, the FARC has never been a factor in Colombian electoral campaigns and this time would be no different. The ELN peace process is worth the effort, Gaviria said, but it appears to lack the necessary political will to be successful, especially on the part of Uribe, who (like Samper and Pastrana) started the process late in his term.

Comment ------

11. (C) Gaviria remains one of the most adroit partisan political leaders in Colombia. Uribe and Gaviria exchanged views on paramilitary influence in recent days. Uribe said October 28 that paramilitaries should respect democracy, and warned that those who interfered in the political process would lose benefits under the Justice and Peace law. Gaviria, in an interview published October 29, repeated his criticisms of Uribe on this subject and called for action, not words, to ensure a fair campaign environment.

WOOD

======CABLE ENDS======id: 123557 date: 9/25/2007 17:02 refid: 07BOGOTA6967 origin: Embassy Bogota classification: CONFIDENTIAL destination: header: VZCZCXYZ0010 OO RUEHWEB

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C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 006967

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2017 TAGS: PTER, PREL, PGOV, VZ, CO SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BROWNFIELD'S SEPTEMBER 21 MEETING WITH GOC PEACE COMMISSIONER LUIS CARLOS RESTREPO

Classified By: Ambassador William R. Brownfield Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d)

------SUMMARY ------

1. (C) GOC Peace Commissioner Restrepo said that the GOC finds it hard to control Senator Cordoba's and President Chavez' efforts to facilitate a humanitarian exchange. The FARC has little interested in an exchange, but wants to use Chavez' role to gain international recognition, create tensions between the GOC and USG, and gain space to help it outlast Uribe's presidency. The GOC and USG must work closely together to prevent the FARC from blaming them should the initiative eventually collapse. Restrepo described the ELN peace process as "exhausted," but said Chavez' role brings new energy to the talks. He also commented that he would consult with President Uribe on the usefulness of USG funding of civil society in the process. Restrepo said Uribe needs "judicial" proof of Don Berna's ongoing involvement in crime to extradite him. End Summary

------THE FARC AND A HUMANITARIAN EXCHANGE ------

2. (C) In a meeting with Ambassador and PolCouns on September 21, Restrepo said the GOC accepted Senator Cordoba's initial proposal of direct GOC-FARC talks outside of Colombia with no demilitarized zone (despeje), because it coincides with President Uribe's position. The GOC hoped that by setting the rules of the game--no despeje and no return of FARC prisoners to FARC ranks--it could keep Cordoba and President Chavez under control. This has proved difficult. Cordoba has respected the GOC position of no despeje, but has ignored GOC instructions not to involve other countries or international actors in the process. She did not consult with the GOC before launching her trip to the United States to meet with "Simon Trinidad" and "Sonia," U.S. legislators, and family members of the U.S. hostages. Similarly, Chavez has supported the FARC's call for a despeje and continues to push for a meeting with FARC leader Marulanda despite the GOC position.

3. (C) Restrepo said the GOC needs to react each time Cordoba or Chavez exceeds the limits set by the GOC. After Cordoba met with Congressman McGovern, he called Ambassador Barco and asked that President Uribe publicly support a meeting of U.S. Congressmen with President Chavez. At the same time, Cordoba called Uribe and urged him to publicly endorse a meeting of the family members of the U.S. hostages with Chavez. Uribe reacted sharply, telling Barco to inform McGovern he would not insert himself into "U.S. domestic politics." Restrepo said he told Cordoba and Venezuelan Foreign Minister Nicolas Maduro they should not involve other international actors without prior GOC approval. Maduro said Chavez understood, but unilateral Chavez statements remain a problem.

4. (C) Restrepo judged that the FARC has no interested in a humanitarian accord or broader peace process. It wants to exploit Chavez' involvement to gain international recognition, create tensions between the GOC and the USG, and gain political space that will help it outlast Uribe's presidency. The GOC and USG must manage the process in a way that does not permit this or for the FARC to escape blame for the process' eventual collapse. The USG statements supporting the humanitarian initiative were positive, and caught Chavez, Cordoba, and the FARC by surprise. Restrepo continued that the USG should explain to Congressman McGovern and other U.S. legislators that the FARC will try to manipulate them and the hostages' families for political advantage.

5. (C) He said the GOC plans to demand an immediate meeting with the FARC if a FARC emissary meets with Chavez in Caracas. Such a request would highlight that the GOC and FARC do not need a despeje to hold talks on a humanitarian accord, and would be resisted by the group. If the FARC refuses to meet, the GOC will consider ending the process. Restrepo said he had explained the GOC's stance to Cordoba and Chavez. Cordoba assured him that the FARC will meet with him in Caracas, but Restrepo remains skeptical.

--- ELN ---

6. (C) In response to the Ambassador's query. Restrepo said the ELN has no political agenda and manipulates the peace process, particularly civil society groups' participation, to play for time. The GOC tries to pressure by cutting off its funding from the Swedes, Norwegians, and Swiss, and by limiting its contacts with civil society. Chavez' involvement injects some new energy into an "exhausted" process, but it does not compensate for the ELN's lack of political vision. Restrepo agreed that U.S. funding of a civil society group--if focused on a specific purpose and for a limited time period--might help move the process forward. He would consult with President Uribe and get back to the Ambassador on this issue.

------DON BERNA AND EXTRADITION ------

7. (C) Restrepo said various officials inside and outside the GOC believe that the DEA letter outlining the evidence of Diego Fernando Murillo AKA Don Berna's on-going criminal activity does not justify his extradition. Medellin Mayor Sergio Fajardo told President Uribe that Don Berna continues to meet his obligations under the paramilitary peace process, Colombian National Police Director Oscar Naranjo said he has no proof of his involvement in criminal activity after his demobilization. Restrepo told the Ambassador that he, himself, had recommended extradition based on current evidence. Nevertheless, Uribe believes he needs "judicial" proof, such as an identified witness, to extradite Berna. Brownfield

======CABLE ENDS======id: 120131 date: 8/27/2007 19:23 refid: 07BOGOTA6278 origin: Embassy Bogota classification: CONFIDENTIAL destination: header: VZCZCXYZ0000 PP RUEHWEB

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C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 006278

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2010 TAGS: MARR, PRGOV, PREL, PTER, CO SUBJECT: EXTRADITION PROCESS ON TRACK FOR FORMER PARAS

Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer. Reason: 1.4(b,d)

1. (C) Minister of Interior and Justice Carlos Holguin announced August 24 the transfer of Carlos Mario Jimenez (alias "Macaco") from Itagui prison in Medellin to the maximum security Combita prison near Bogota for conducting drug trafficking activities from prison. The Fiscalia has approved his provisional arrest warrant for extradition, which will be served August 27. He would be the first paramilitary to lose eligibility under the Justice and Peace Law (JPL).

2. (C) Holguin also announced the transfer of Diego Fernando Murillo Bejarano (aka "Don Berna") to Combita as a "security precaution." Outgoing Department of Administrative Security (GOC intelligence agency) director Andres Penate told us August 24 Don Berna will likely be extradited to the U.S. within the next two weeks due to his continuing involvement in criminal activity. President Uribe subordinated our July 2004 extradition request for Berna on drug and money laundering charges in September 2005 because of Berna's key role in the paramilitary peace process. The U.S. has extradited 87 individuals from Colombia this year, bringing the total to 583.

3. (C) Penate said the GOC needed to satisfy specific Colombian legal requirements before extraditing Berna. Complying with these steps would strengthen Uribe's political and legal position. Penate said the GOC must provide five days notice to citizens subject to an extradition order before it can extradite them. It will take the GOC several days to prepare the paperwork; notification to Berna is unlikely to occur before August 31. He said the GOC also would open a criminal case against Berna at the Fiscalia to bolster its claim Berna had continued to engage in criminal activity. Berna would be the first paramilitary leader whose extradition request was subordinated by Uribe to be extradited.

4. (C) Penate said Uribe is committed to extraditing Don Berna as soon as these legal steps are completed. The only risk is that Berna's lawyers will exploit the five days to find a friendly judge who would issue an order blocking extradition. Penate said the DAS had passed intelligence reports implicating Don Berna in several murders in Medellin and Cartagena, but lacked legal proof. Uribe's decision to move against Berna was provoked by an anonymous letter that was passed to him by a trusted source. The letter was addressed to Castano's wife and claimed Berna and Macaco were involved in Vicente Castano's murder earlier this year. It also warned Castano's wife to leave the country. DAS records showed she left Colombia three weeks ago. Nichols

======CABLE ENDS======id: 153741 date: 5/13/2008 22:37 refid: 08BOGOTA1764 origin: Embassy Bogota classification: CONFIDENTIAL destination: header: VZCZCXYZ0003 PP RUEHWEB

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2018 TAGS: KJUS, PREL, PREF, PTER, PHUM, CO SUBJECT: COLOMBIA EXTRADITES 14 EX-PARA LEADERS TO THE U.S.

Classified By: Political Counselor John Creamer Reasons 1.4 (b and d)

SUMMARY ------1. (U) The GOC extradited 14 ex-paramilitary leaders, including Salvatore Mancuso, Diego Murillo, and , on May 13 to the United States to face narcotrafficking and money laundering charges. President Uribe said he extradited the fourteen due to due to their continued involvement in crime or their failure to meet their Justice & Peace Law (J&P) obligations. He added that victims could have access to the extradited paras through judicial cooperation agreements and that any seized assets would benefit victims. The Ambassador held a news conference to reiterate the USG's commitment to truth and reparations. Opposition Senator Petro called the extraditions "the death of the Justice and Peace process." End summary.

EX-PARA LEADERS EXTRADITED ------2. (U) On May 13, the GOC extradited fourteen former United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) leaders to the United States to face narcotrafficking and money laundering charges. The ex-paras had all begun testimony under the J&P Law. Some had provided limited information on mass graves, but none had provided comprehensive information on past crimes or turned over significant assets in accordance with their J&P law obligations.

3. (U) President Uribe said he extradited the fourteen because of their continuing involvement in crime or their failure to meet their J&P obligations. He said he had reached agreement with the USG that Colombians would have access to the trials of the ex-paras, and that any assets seized from the paras would benefit victims. Uribe added that the extraditions were necessary to show the GOC's determination to enforce the J&P Law, and called on guerrillas who demobilized under previous peace processes to confess their crimes and make moral reparations. Post worked closely with the GOC in the days leading up to the extraditions to ensure that all procedures and paperwork in the cases were completed in line with normal extradition protocols. Those extradited were: --Salvatore Mancuso-Gmez --Diego Fernando Murillo-Bejarano, aka "Don Berna" --Rodrigo Tovar-Pupo, aka "Jorge 40" --Eduardo Enrique Vengoechea-Mola --Juan Carlos Sierra-Ramirez --Francisco Javier Zuluaga-Lindo, aka "Gordo Lindo" --Ramiro Vanoy-Murillo, aka "Cuco Vanoy" --Guillermo Prez-Alzate --Nodier Giraldo-Giraldo --Hernan Giraldo-Serna --Diego Alberto Ruiz-Arroyave --Edwin Mauricio Gomez-Luna --Martin Penaranda-Osorio --Manuel Enrique Torregrosa-Castro

GOC WORRIED ABOUT FREEZE OF PARA EXTRADITIONS ------4. (C) Presidential legal Advisor Edmundo del Castillo told us President Uribe decided to extradite the fourteen because he feared additional tutelas (injunctions) or court rulings would limit his extradition authority. Such restrictions would undercut presidential power and undermine the J&P process. Judicial Council Magistrate Angelino Lizcano told us the Council's May 5 ruling reversing a lower court injunction prohibiting Macaco's extradition was written as broadly as possible to allow the GOC to extradite other paras. Still, Constitutional Court Magistrate Maurico Gonzalez told us on May 9 that a victims' group was appealing the Council's ruling to the Constitutional Court. Given the current political support for victims' rights, he predicted that the Constitutional Court would rule in the victims' favor.

PUBLIC REACTION: MIXED ------5. (U) The extraditions generated immediate, mixed public reaction. Opposition Polo Party Senator Gustavo Petro called the move "the death of the Justice and Peace process." He said the extraditions signaled the GOC's lack of confidence in the judicial system's ability to manage the ex-para leaders. Popular radio commentator Vicky Davila said many suspected the extraditions represented an effort to prevent para leaders from implicating more politicians, military, and businessmen. Castillo said it would be important that the USG show its commitment to address victims' rights after the extradition to preserve popular support in Colombia for the extradition process.

6. (U) The Ambassador held a press conference May 13 to reiterate U.S. support for the extraditions and to thank those involved in the successful operation. He also assured the public that the USG wanted to see the paras confess the full truth about their crimes and provide reparations to victims. He said there were legal instruments available to facilitate Colombian access to U.S. evidence/testimony provided by the ex-paras.

7. (U) Former Vice Minister of Justice and radio commentator Rafael Nieto said the extraditions would benefit both Colombia and the United States. He said the ex-paras had not cooperated previously in the J&P process, and had continued criminal activities from jail. Those activities needed to be stopped. He added, "The United States has every reason to cooperate fully with Colombia to find the truth and achieve reparations for para victims, and there are many mechanisms available to do so." BROWNFIELD

======CABLE ENDS======