DMARC and Email Authentication
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DMARC and Email Authentication Steve Jones Executive Director DMARC.org Cloud & Messaging Day 2016 Tokyo, Japan November 28th, 2016 What is DMARC.org? • DMARC.org is an independent, non-profit advocate for the use of email authentication • Supported by global industry leaders: Sponsors: Supporters: Copyright © 2016 Trusted Domain Project 2 What Does DMARC Do, Briefly? • DMARC allows the domain owner to signal that fraudulent messages using that domain should be blocked • Mailbox providers use DMARC to detect and block fraudulent messages from reaching your customers • Organizations can use DMARC to perform this filtering on incoming messages – helps protect from some kinds of phishing and “wire transfer fraud” email, also known as Business Email Compromise (BEC) • Encourage your partners/vendors to deploy inbound DMARC filtering for protection when receiving messages • More information available at https://dmarc.org Copyright © 2016 Trusted Domain Project 3 Overview Of Presentation •DMARC Adoption •Case Study - Uber •Technical Challenges •Roadmap Copyright © 2016 Trusted Domain Project 4 DMARC Adoption This section will provide an overview of DMARC adoption since it was introduced, globally and within particular country-specific top-level domains. It will also show how the DMARC policies published by top websites has evolved over the past two years. Copyright © 2016 Trusted Domain Project 5 Deployment & Adoption Highlights 2013: • 60% of 3.3Bn global mailboxes, 80% consumers in US protected • Outlook.com users submitted 50% fewer phishing reports • PayPal: 70+% reduction in customers reporting fraudulent messages 2014: • Twitter able to measure and block 110MM attacks per day, 2.5Bn over a 45 day period • 600% increase in organizations using DMARC to filter incoming messages and sending reports to domain owners Copyright © 2016 Trusted Domain Project 6 Deployment & Adoption Highlights 2015: • 35% of email received by top global MSPs protected by DMARC • 70% of global mailboxes protected by DMARC • .BANK/.INSURANCE require strong DMARC policy for all domains • Blocket of Sweden adopts DMARC, blocks 99% of suspicious message, sees 70% reduction in customer phishing complaints 2016: • 12 commercial email gateways offer DMARC filtering • UK Cabinet Office requires DMARC for service.gov.uk domains • NCSC deploys DMARC on gov.uk domain Copyright © 2016 Trusted Domain Project 7 Adoption Data in Following Slides • Alexa data is based on DNS queries performed by DMARC.org • Other data about DMARC records supplied by Farsight Security • Farsight does not monitor the entire Internet – may miss records other organizations see and vice versa • But, Farsight’s data has been collected over the entire period DMARC has been deployed, providing a unique view of growth • Only DMARC records that were still active/published at the time the graphs were created are included. • The global total would more than double including records no longer published Copyright © 2016 by The Trusted Domain Project 8 High-Level Adoption of DMARC Valid DMARC Records and % Change by Month 70,000 120% Percentage Change (right axis) 62,066 60,000 100% Cumulative Still Published (left axis) 50,000 80% 40,000 60% 30,000 40% 20,000 20% 10,000 13% 0 0% 4/1/2014 2/1/2012 4/1/2012 6/1/2012 8/1/2012 2/1/2013 4/1/2013 6/1/2013 8/1/2013 2/1/2014 6/1/2014 8/1/2014 2/1/2015 4/1/2015 6/1/2015 8/1/2015 2/1/2016 4/1/2016 6/1/2016 8/1/2016 10/1/2015 12/1/2011 10/1/2012 12/1/2012 10/1/2013 12/1/2013 10/1/2014 12/1/2014 12/1/2015 Data supplied by Farsight Security Copyright © 2016 by The Trusted Domain Project 9 Data supplied Data supplied by 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000 New DMARC Records perMonth Records DMARC New 0 12/1/2011 Farsight 2/1/2012 axis) (right Records New axis) (left Published Still Cumulative 4/1/2012 Security 6/1/2012 8/1/2012 10/1/2012 12/1/2012 and Total New 2/1/2013 4/1/2013 Copyright © 2016 by The Trusted Project Domain Trusted by The 2016 Copyright © 6/1/2013 8/1/2013 10/1/2013 DMARC Valid 12/1/2013 2/1/2014 4/1/2014 6/1/2014 8/1/2014 Month by Records 10/1/2014 12/1/2014 2/1/2015 4/1/2015 6/1/2015 8/1/2015 10/1/2015 12/1/2015 2/1/2016 4/1/2016 6/1/2016 8/1/2016 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 8,000 10 Active DMARC Records in Euro ccTLDs 2,269 uk 660 nl 655 it 1,430 fr 606 eu 812 es 974 de 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 Data supplied by Farsight Security Copyright © 2016 by The Trusted Domain Project 11 Active DMARC Records in Euro ccTLDs 2,500 de 11% growth per month in 2016 for .uk, .fr 2,269 es 7% growth per month in 2016 for .de 2,000 eu fr 1,500 it 1,430 nl 1,000 uk 974 500 0 Data supplied by Farsight Security Copyright © 2016 by The Trusted Domain Project 12 Active DMARC Records in Asia ccTLDs vn 69 Most DMARC records nz 86 captured for .jp appear to be for servers at jp 215 network operators, rather than sending in 210 domains. id 141 hk 74 cn 258 au 616 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 Data supplied by Farsight Security Copyright © 2016 Trusted Domain Project 13 Active DMARC Records in Asia ccTLDs 700 au 12.5% growth per month in 2016 for .in ~8.5% growth per month in 2016 for .au, .cn 616 600 cn hk 500 id in 400 jp nz 300 vn 258 200 100 0 Data supplied by Farsight Security Copyright © 2016 Trusted Domain Project 14 Who Publishes DMARC in Japan? • Mostly network operators (ne.jp = 147) • 60 odn.ne.jp • 47 att.ne.jp • Most are 4-level (_dmarc.xxx.yyy.ne.jp) • Domestic companies • 三井住友銀行 (SMBC Trust Bank) • 株式会社ローソン (Lawson) • 三菱UFJフィナンシャル・グループ (Mitsubishi UFJ Financial) • 楽天市場 (Rakuten) • 東芝 (Toshiba) • Foreign companies (Amazon, AmEx, Apple, Citi, Google, PayPal) Copyright © 2016 Trusted Domain Project 15 Alexa Top Sites and Email Auth Alexa Top 100 Alexa Top 100 Email Authentication Use DMARC Policies 100 40 37 89 89 91 90 85 35 80 30 28 27 70 64 26 60 56 57 25 50 20 19 50 20 SPF 16 40 15 DMARC 15 30 No records Sender-ID 10 11 20 14 10 10 10 9 9 8 5 10 10 7 7 7 p=none p=reject p=quarantine - 0 Jan-15 Jul-15 Jan-16 Jul-16 Jan-15 Jul-15 Jan-16 Jul-16 Copyright © 2016 by The Trusted Domain Project 16 Alexa Top Sites and Email Auth Alexa Top 1,000 Alexa Top 1,000 Email Authentication Use DMARC Policies 900 160 152 150 148 763 762 776 800 742 140 135 700 117 120 600 SPF DMARC No records Sender-ID 100 89 500 82 80 73 400 321 275 60 300 254 259 36 40 34 200 230 232 27 214 214 24 100 57 20 59 49 54 p=none p=reject p=quarantine - 0 Jan-15 Jul-15 Jan-16 Jul-16 Jan-15 Jul-15 Jan-16 Jul-16 Copyright © 2016 by The Trusted Domain Project 17 Case Study Uber’s Road to Email Authentication Copyright © 2016 Trusted Domain Project 19 Uber’s Road to Email Authentication • We regret that we do not have permission to redistribute the slides from this section of the presentation. • We thank Uber and ValiMail for making them available to our audience on November 28th Copyright © 2016 Trusted Domain Project 20 Technical Challenges This section describes some technical challenges currently facing the email community. Copyright © 2016 Trusted Domain Project 21 Technical Challenges •Indirect Mail Flows And ARC •DKIM Replay Copyright © 2016 Trusted Domain Project 22 Indirect Mailflows And ARC This section describes the problems indirect mailflows pose to email authentication, and how the Authenticated Received Chain (ARC) is designed to address these problem. Copyright © 2016 Trusted Domain Project 23 DMARC and Indirect Mailflows • DMARC operates on DKIM and SPF results • Both DKIM and SPF have issues with “indirect mailflows” • Messages that transit multiple organizations • Forwarding, aliasing, mailing lists, etc • Indirect mailflows are very important to their users • Applying DMARC in many cases requires the ability to accommodate indirect mailflows • This gave rise to the ARC protocol DMARC Alignment DKIM SPF DNS SMTP Copyright © 2016 Trusted Domain Project 24 Example: Indirect Mailflows and SPF example.com IN TXT “v=spf1 ip4:192.168.1.100” Subject: … Subject: … Sender Intermediary Recipient 192.168.1.100 10.23.45.99 • Intermediary verifies valid message from Sender • Intermediary forwards the message from a different IP address • SPF will fail to verify for Sender’s domain when checked at Recipient Copyright © 2016 Trusted Domain Project 25 Example: Indirect Mailflows and DKIM DKIM-Signature: b=hiS8JvPwwGJpZR… Subject: … Subject: [List] … Sender Intermediary Recipient • Intermediary verifies valid message from Sender • Intermediary changes the message contents, for example Subject: • Sender’s DKIM signature will fail to verify when checked at Recipient Copyright © 2016 Trusted Domain Project 26 Why Was ARC Created? • Indirect mailflows always a challenge – not a new problem • DMARC initially used for commercial domains – banking, marketing – where messages sent directly to consumer • In Spring 2014 attackers start impersonating AOL and Yahoo addresses to attack their customers in great numbers • AOL and Yahoo published a p=reject DMARC policy for their customer-use domains, [email protected] • Resolved the attack against their customers, but had very negative impact on ~1% of mail using indirect mailflows • ARC working group formed Copyright © 2016 by The Trusted Domain Project 27 Design Decisions for ARC • Originator of message makes no changes • Convey the Authentication-Results: content intact from the first ARC intermediary forward • Allow for multiple “hops” or systems/organizations handling messages • ARC headers can be verified at each hop • Work at Internet scale • Define ARC independently of DMARC if possible Copyright © 2016 by The Trusted