Torts – Supplemental Materials Part II Professor Gregory Dolin Section 608-339 Fall 2011 ROBERT RIGHT v. KIMBERLY BREEN SC 17439 SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT 277 Conn. 364; 890 A.2d 1287; 2006 Conn. LEXIS 55 November 28, 2005, Argued February 28, 2006, Officially Released defendant--a 1989 head-on collision, an incident in the KATZ, J. The issue in this certified appeal is early 1990s in which he backed a vehicle into a pole, and whether a plaintiff in a negligence action must be a 1995 high impact collision in which the plaintiff's awarded nominal damages, thereby making the vehicle was hit from behind on the highway--as well as defendant potentially liable for costs, when the defendant accidents that occurred after the May, 2000 collision--a admits liability but denies having caused the alleged 2001 rear impact collision, and a 2002 low impact injury, and the fact finder thereafter concludes that the collision. Using a verdict form provided by the plaintiff, plaintiff failed to prove that he suffered any injury as a the jury returned a verdict of zero economic damages and result of the defendant's conduct. This case affords us an zero noneconomic damages, and the trial court accepted opportunity to address this court's statement in Keller v. the verdict. Carone, 138 Conn. 405, 406-407, 85 A.2d 489 (1951), that a defendant's admission of liability establishes that the plaintiff has suffered a "legal injury" and therefore is The plaintiff then filed motions to set aside the entitled to "at least nominal damages." verdict and for additur, arguing that, under Connecticut case law, he was entitled to at least nominal damages *** because he had suffered a technical legal injury that The record discloses the following relevant facts and admittedly had been caused by the defendant. … The procedural history. In May, 2000, the plaintiff had trial court granted the plaintiff's motions, setting aside stopped his automobile at a red traffic light when it was the jury's verdict and awarding the plaintiff $1, "… struck from behind by a vehicle driven by the defendant. premised upon the defendant's admission of negligence." There was minor damage to the plaintiff's vehicle, but no The plaintiff filed a bill of costs … The trial court physical injuries were reported at the accident scene. awarded the plaintiff the $ 467.10 in nonmedical costs, in Thereafter, the plaintiff brought this action, alleging that, addition to the $ 1 nominal damage award…. 4 as a result of the defendant's negligence, he had suffered bodily injury leading to both economic and noneconomic 4 In light of the jury's verdict in her favor; see damages. In her answer, the defendant admitted that the footnote 3 of this opinion; the defendant also vehicle she was operating had struck the plaintiff's filed a bill of costs, pursuant to § 52-257, vehicle. She denied, however, the plaintiff's allegation requesting $ 681. The trial court implicitly denied that "the injuries and damages suffered by the plaintiff this request when it awarded costs to the plaintiff. were a result of the negligence and carelessness of the defendant . ." The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court …. At trial, the plaintiff presented evidence concerning his injuries that allegedly had resulted from the impact of *** the collision. Because the defendant contended that the [W]e are not inclined to obliterate the distinction plaintiff's injuries were the result of various other between intentional and unintentional conduct in terms automobile accidents, the plaintiff also presented of legal consequences which it serves to implement. evidence concerning accidents in which he had been Where the plaintiff's right has been intentionally invaded, involved prior to the May, 2000 collision with the its vindication in a court of law and the award of nominal 1 and even exemplary damages serves the policy of deterrence in a real sense. It is difficult to imagine what purpose would be furthered by permitting anyone who is jostled in a crowd or otherwise suffers some unintended contact with his person or injury to his dignity to set in motion the judicial machinery necessary for a recovery of nominal damages. That judges and juries have more important business to occupy them is as true today as it was in ancient times when the rule originated. There is nothing arcane about the wisdom of not cluttering the courts with trivia." Thus, this court clarified our common law to reflect the different treatment accorded to intentional and negligent acts--allowing recovery of nominal damages where a plaintiff's right intentionally has been invaded, but allowing recovery only upon proof of causation and of actual damages where a plaintiff's right negligently has been invaded. *** Such a result is consistent with our case law holding that the "essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are well established: duty; breach of that duty; causation; and actual injury." Without proof of each of these elements, a plaintiff's cause fails entirely, and he is not entitled to have the question of damages considered. This is because conduct that is merely negligent, without proof of an actual injury, is not considered to be a significant interference with the public interest such that there is any right to complain of it, or to be free from it. The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with direction to reverse the judgment of the trial court and to remand the case to the trial court with direction to render judgment for the defendant and to modify the order of costs accordingly. In this opinion the other justices concurred. 2 SHIRLEY HALE v. ERWIN OSTROW, ET AL. No. W2003-01256-SC-R11-CV SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE, AT JACKSON 166 S.W.3d 713; 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 612 April 6, 2005, Argued July 1, 2005, Filed street to check for traffic. As she looked up, she tripped OPINION BY: E. RILEY ANDERSON over a chunk of concrete and fell into the street. Ms. Hale's left hip was crushed in the fall, and she required extensive medical care. We granted review to determine whether the property owners owed a duty to a person injured off the The bushes that had overgrown the sidewalk were owners' property as a result of a hazard existing on the located in front of 1073 Mississippi Boulevard. That owners' property and if so, to determine whether the property, a vacant lot, was owned by the defendants Max hazard was the cause of the injury. The trial court Ostrow, Erwin Ostrow, and Rose Ostrow (collectively, granted summary judgment to the defendant property "the Ostrows" or "defendants"). The crumbled sidewalk, owners, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. After and the spot where Ms. Hale actually fell, were located carefully reviewing the record and applicable authority, in front of 1063 Mississippi Boulevard. That property we conclude that the defendants owed a duty of care to was not owned by the defendants. the plaintiff to ensure that the sidewalk was not Ms. Hale filed suit against the Ostrows in the Circuit obstructed by overgrown bushes and was passable. Court for Shelby County, Tennessee, on theories of Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the premises liability and public nuisance. The Ostrows plaintiff, there are genuine issues of material fact as to moved for summary judgment on the negligence claim, whether the defendants' breach caused her injury. We arguing that a property owner owes no duty of care to a therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings. person injured on another's property. Because Ms. Hale's injury occurred when she tripped on the sidewalk located Background in front of 1063 Mississippi Boulevard, rather than in The record on summary judgment contains the front of the Ostrows' property at 1073 Mississippi following facts, which we consider in the light most Boulevard, the Ostrows argued that they owed no duty to favorable to the plaintiff, the nonmoving party. On May Ms. Hale because she never entered their property. 27, 1998, plaintiff Shirley Hale ("Ms. Hale") was Moreover, they argued that her injury was caused by the walking home from a bus stop in Memphis, Tennessee. defective sidewalk, not by the overgrown bushes. She had taken a different bus than usual and so was The trial court granted summary judgment to the walking a route along a sidewalk that she did not Ostrows without stating any grounds, and the Court of normally travel. As she proceeded south on Mississippi Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals held that Ms. Boulevard, a busy street, she noticed that the sidewalk Hale could not succeed on either a theory of premises ahead was blocked. Bushes protruding from 1073 liability or of public nuisance because she could not Mississippi Boulevard had overgrown the sidewalk and establish that the overgrowth was a proximate cause of had grown around a telephone pole located on the her injury. The intermediate appellate court relied on the sidewalk, blocking Ms. Hale's way. Ms. Hale determined fact that Ms. Hale never actually reached the bushes that she had to leave the sidewalk and enter the street in before she fell. Judge Kirby dissented from the Court of order to bypass the obstruction. She noticed that the Appeals' opinion, arguing that there existed a genuine sidewalk was "crumbled." As she left the sidewalk, but issue of material fact as to whether Ms. Hale had left the before she reached the bushes, Ms. Hale looked into the 3 sidewalk and tripped because of her need to avoid the Conclusion bushes.