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Republic of Iraq Ministry of Health \ Environment Directorate for Mine Action

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Republic of Iraq Ministry of Health \ Environment Directorate for Mine Action REPUBLIC OF IRAQ MINISTRY OF HEALTH \ ENVIRONMENT DIRECTORATE FOR MINE ACTION First update of the Extension Request Plan until (2028) in accordance with Article 5 of The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction Baghdad - 2019 1 State party: Republic of Iraq Ministry of Health \ Environment Directorate for Mine Action (DMA) Khaled Rashad Jabbar Director General of Directorate for Mine Action (DMA) Email: [email protected] Mobile: 009647816874525 Mr. Ahmed Abdulrazzaq Flayyih Al-Jasim - ( National Focal Point ) Director of Planning & Information Directorate for Mine Action (DMA) Email: [email protected] Mobile: 009647700044480 Nibras Fakhir Matrood - ( Alternative National Focal Point ) Director of RMAC-S Directorate for Mine Action (DMA) Email: [email protected] Mobile: 009647803507674 Iraq Kurdistan Mine Action Authority (IKMAA) Mr. Khatab Omer Ahmed Director of Planning and Follow up Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA) Email: [email protected] Mobile: 009647504557482 2 Table of content INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................................................ 7 IRAQ MINE ACTION PROGRAMS STRUCTURE ........................................................................................................................... 8 The Iraqi Mine Action Program includes: ............................................................................................................................... 8 Directorate for Mine Action (DMA) .......................................................................................................................................... 8 Regional Mine Action Center –Southrien (RMAC-S)................................................................................................................................. 8 Regional Mine Action Center –Northrien (RMAC-N) ................................................................................................................................ 8 Regional Mine Action Center –Middel of Eufrits (RMAC-M EU) .............................................................................................................. 9 B- Kurdistan of Iraq Mine Action Agency (IKMAA) .................................................................................................................. 9 MAIN GEOGRAPHIC FEATURES ........................................................................................................................................................... 10 Area........................................................................................................................................................................................ 10 Land borders .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 10 Surface sections ..................................................................................................................................................................... 11 Western plateau .................................................................................................................................................................................... 11 Mountain region .................................................................................................................................................................................... 11 Sedimentary plain .................................................................................................................................................................................. 11 Wavy area .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 12 CLIMATE........................................................................................................................................................................................ 12 Mediterranean climate .......................................................................................................................................................... 12 The steppe climate is ............................................................................................................................................................. 12 The desert climate is .............................................................................................................................................................. 12 ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS ............................................................................................................................................................. 13 Marshlands ............................................................................................................................................................................ 13 drinking water ........................................................................................................................................................................ 13 Global Warming ..................................................................................................................................................................... 14 The problem of desertification ............................................................................................................................................... 14 water shortage ...................................................................................................................................................................... 14 NATURAL PLANT ............................................................................................................................................................................. 15 Forests and mountain grasses : ............................................................................................................................................. 15 Plains : .................................................................................................................................................................................... 15 Riverside area : ...................................................................................................................................................................... 15 Marshlands and marshlands : ................................................................................................................................................ 15 Desert area : .......................................................................................................................................................................... 15 KEY ACHIEVEMENT .......................................................................................................................................................................... 16 GOALS FOR THE NEXT TWO YEAR. ....................................................................................................................................................... 17 BASELINE AS GIVEN IN EXTENSION REQUEST .......................................................................................................................................... 18 PROGRESS ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 19 CURRENT CONTAMINATION OF MINEFIELDS COMPARED WITH THE BASELINE ............................................................................................. 20 CHAPTER I: DIRECTORATE FOR MINE ACTION (DMA) ............................................................................................................. 22 IMPLEMENTED ACTIVITIES ACCORDING TO THE WORK PLAN THAT SUBMITTED IN THE EXTENSION REQUEST AS OF THE BASELINE. ............................ 22 Implementation of Non-Technical Surveys ............................................................................................................................ 22 Hazard Areas canceled by the non-technical survey of the four governorates where the survey was completed after the baseline: . 23 Hazardous areas confirmed and discovered by Non-technical survey (NTS) that completed after extension request for the four governorates (Babylon, Baghdad, Karbala, Mosul). ............................................................................................................................... 24 Confirmed and discovered hazardous areas for governorates where update Non-Technical survey .................................................... 25 Confirmed minefields that discovered by Non-technical survey after baseline..................................................................................... 26 Hazardous areas contaminated with IEDs discovered and confirmed by non-technical survey of all governorates. ............................ 27 Progress for Technical survey of minefields. .......................................................................................................................... 29 Reduce of minefield areas (mined Areas) through hazard reduction by technical survey of minefields that recorded in data base: ... 29 About
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