South China Sea Intelligence Briefngs Weekly Briefing: February 21st

At The Open Source Briefing, we remain committed to providing the public with ongoing developments around the globe.

United States Author: Kevin O’Connell ​ ​

Courtesy of USNI News

This week the United States made a mix of operational and political moves related to force posture and strategy in the Indo-Pacific and the South China Sea. The first of these moves was the bilateral and trilateral naval exercises between the United States Navy, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), and the French Marine Nationale. The first occurred on February 15th when the JS Towada (AOE 442) and USS Charles Drew (T-AKE-10) conducted bilateral exercise in the vicinity of Okinawa. Additional ships in the area included USS America (LHA-6), USS New Orleans (LPD-18), USS Green Bay (LPD-20), USS Ashland (LSD-48), and USNS

The Open Source Briefing 1 ​ Victorious (T-AGOS-19).[1][2][3][4] It is unclear whether the LPDs and LSDs departed Okinawa with the USS America. Later in the week, on February 19th, the USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG-54), JMSDF Towada-class replenishment ship JS Hamana (AOE-424), and French Floréal-class light frigate FNS Prairial engaged in tri-lateral replenishment-at-sea operations.[5] These bilateral and multilateral naval operations emphasize the United State’s ongoing multilateral approach in the Indo-Pacific.

Continuing on the multilateral thread, the United States also participated in a virtual Foreign Ministers meeting of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (The Quad) with Secretary of State Antony Blinken engaging with the Foreign Ministers of Japan Australia, and India. This follows a phone call between President Joe Biden and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi last week on strengthening Indo-Pacific security through the Quad and an in-person meeting of the Quad foreign ministers in October of 2020 hosted by Japan.[6] Look for the Quad to take on increasing significance as a forum for multilateral political and military cooperation moving forward with a possible heads of state summit in the works.

Courtesy of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

The Open Source Briefing 2 ​ Finally, the movements of the United States Navy’s large deck aviation ships are noteworthy. With the USS Nimitz Carrier Strike Group rotating back to the United States after an extended deployment, the USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group has been operating in the South China Sea. This changed with the Theodore Roosevelt CSG’s transit through the Luzon Strait and out of the South China Sea on either February 18th or 19th.[7] Based on the Roosevelt, Carrier Air Wing 17 appears to have conducted live-fire exercises as part of an “air power show” while underway.[8] Ships in the CSG include the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71), USS Bunker Hill (CG-52), and USS John Finn (DDG-113). It is unclear whether the USS Russell (DDG-59) also exited the South China Sea as it appeared to be operating independently of the CSG when conducting a freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) in the vicinity of the Spratly Islands on February 16th.[9][10] What is clear is that the USS America (LHA-6) was observed near Sasebo, Japan, on satellite imagery on February 20th after departing Okinawa on February 17th.[11] This means that after approximately two weeks with three large deck aviation ships (USS Nimitz, USS Theodore Roosevelt, and USS America) operating near Taiwan and/or the South China Sea, there will be just one for the immediate future.

China and Taiwan Author: Tad Unruh ​ ​

Due to the interconnected nature of Cross-Strait Relations and the South China Sea related events this week, the China and Taiwan sections will be combined and written chronologically.

February 17th: Last week the U.S. Navy Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group (CSG-9) and Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG) conducted dual-carrier operations in the SCS, causing rebuke by China along with sovereignty arguments. No notable news occurred in the region on February 15-16; however, the United States Navy’s 7th Fleet guided destroyer USS Russell conducted a freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) within 12 nautical miles of the Spratly Islands.1 This is the second FONOP near the Paracel islands in 1 month, with the USS John McCain doing so on February 5th.2

On the same day as the FONOP, February 17th, it came to light that the Chinese government research ship Tan Suo 2 had been conducting a research FONOP of its

The Open Source Briefing 3 ​ own from February 2nd till the 9th in Vietnamese claimed Paracel Island waters.3 Its activity is reported as collecting biological samples, testing submersibles, and carrying out other research.

Also announced, Taiwan’s 200 coast guard ships will have the name Taiwan painted in gigantic letters to make them distinct from their Chinese counterparts.4 The reason for this clarifying move is China’s new law allowing the People’s Republic of China Coast Guard to use weapons upon those “foreign ships operating illegally in ‘China’s waters’ that refuse to stop while being intercepted.”5 One Taiwan news of note for the 17th is it marked the 11th straight day of Chinese flight incursion into Taiwan’s ADIZ, and it certainly wouldn't be the last day.6

February 18th:

Taiwan has arranged for military exercises to be executed in February and March.7 A locally developed Taiwanese Military drone (UAV) crashed during a test flight due to a control system malfunction from Taitung Chishang Air Base.8

February 19th:

The 19th was the most active day in cross-strait relations of the week by far. A U.S. Senator reintroduced the “Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act (TIPA) to congress, outlining the authorization of U.S. military force if China were to attack Taiwan.9 The bill has not been voted upon or passed into law and will continue to be a talking point throughout the next few months.

As the bill was being reintroduced, the Taiwanese Presidential office replaced the Ministry of National Defense, the National Security Bureau and the Mainland Affairs Council leaders.10 The pick for Defense Minister, Chiu Kuo-cheng, was controversial according to Beijing, as he had graduated from the U.S. Army War College in 1999 and has been an ally of the U.S. for an extended period.

Both the TIPA and cabinet reshuffling sparked strong responses from China. Nine planes made incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ on the 19th to protest one or both of

The Open Source Briefing 4 ​ these actions.11 Separate sources or articles have identified the TIPA or cabinet as the reason, but source the same tweets from the Taiwanese Ministry of Defense. Regardless of their reason, it was the largest group incursion on any day in February and is the 13th straight day of Chinese incursion into Taiwanese airspace. In addition to using its fighters to expel Chinese incursions, Taiwan activated missile defense systems on Friday, issuing radio warnings for defense purposes.12

February 20th:

Taiwan had to scramble jets for the second straight day as more than 12 Chinese aircraft and bombers carried out drills close to Taiwanese-held islands in the SCS.

Philippines Author: Bang Tongco ​ During the week, Philippine legislators proposed a new Bill to delineate the country’s maritime zones in a bid to strengthen its territorial claims and enhance maritime domain awareness. Meanwhile, the Philippine Navy (PN) announced that several vessels assigned to the Manila-claimed West Philippine Sea (WPS) are undergoing repairs and the Northern Luzon Command (NOLCOM) reported that it has completed the last two sovereign markers built on uninhabited islands in the Batanes Region.

House Deputy Speaker Rufus Rodriguez on 18 February urged legislators to pass House Bill 6156 or the Philippine Maritime Zones Act, which seeks to establish Manila’s different maritime areas, including its territorial waters [1]. Rodriguez opined that the Bill would enable Manila to delineate its maritime zones and could possibly help the Philippines push back against China’s controversial Coast Guard Law (CGL). The proposed Bill covers the Chinese-occupied Scarborough Shoal as well as the Philippines’ “Kalayaan Island Group” (KIG) in the Spratlys, whose baselines Rodriguez’ says are under the UNCLOS’ “Regime of Islands”. Rodriguez said that the Bill will help establish baselines at Scarborough and the KIG, over which the Philippines’ exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction. He added that the Bill would help the Philippines establish its maritime zones with respect to the sovereign rights and sovereignty Manila can exercise in said areas consistent with the UNCLOS. Rodriguez’ statement comes after Philippine officials continue to express concern over China’s CGL. Two days earlier,

The Open Source Briefing 5 ​ Philippine Ambassador to China Chito Sta. Romana reassured that the Philippine Embassy in Beijing monitored the development of the CGL and that the controversial law did not target Manila [2].

The PN Flag Officer in Command VAdm. Giovanni Bacordo on 16 February announced that the Del Pilar-class Frigate BRP Gregorio del Pilar will return to service by July after it ran aground in Half-Moon (Hasa-Hasa) Shoal in the Manila-claimed WPS in August 2018 [3]. Bacordo added that “several” PN vessels are currently under repair and will be deployed to the WPS [4]. Philippine state media reported that the one of the ship’s two variable-pitch propellers and propeller hub was damaged during the grounding. The PN said that it had difficulty in procuring parts for the ex-Hamilton-class High Endurance Cutter during the COVID-19 pandemic, moving the ship’s return-to-service date to July. Reports state that the propeller hub is expected to arrive in July and the completion of other repairs and upgrades was slated for December 2020. The vessel remains dry-docked in Subic Bay, Zambales [3].

The Del Pilar aground in Hasa-Hasa Shoal in the WPS in August 2018. Photo courtesy of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

Meanwhile, the NOLCOM--in charge of the Philippines’ northern land and maritime area facing Scarborough Shoal, Taiwan, and the Philippine Rise and similar to the US’ Combatant Commands--on 19 February announced the completion of sovereign markers on the uninhabited Mabbag and Barit Islands in the country’s northern maritime area [5]. The NOLCOM said that the two markers are the last of 11 sovereign markers placed on uninhabited islands and that the markers were placed and built in such a way

The Open Source Briefing 6 ​ that they would be visible to vessels transiting the area. The move to place markers in the NOLCOM’s AOR came after Chinese investors planned to invest up to $2B in a so-called “Smart City” on Fuga Island in the Batanes Region [5][6]. The first 11 markers were previously completed in August 2020 [7].

Sovereign marker on Barit Island, one of 13 such markers in the Batanes Region built by the NOLCOM. Photo courtesy of the Philippine Daily Inquirer.

Contributor’s Analysis

It is not yet known if the full text of House Bill 6156 will attempt to extend the Philippine sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal or recognize Manila-occupied features in the KIG as high-tide elevations. To recall, the 2016 Arbitral Award declared the Scarborough Shoal as a “Traditional Fishing Ground'' for use by coastal states and the Tribunal could not rule on the Shoal being under the sovereign jurisdiction of China or of the Philippines [8]. Regardless, the Bill will strengthen and better articulate Manila’s claims in the WPS and may help claimants and other stakeholders further understand the Philippines’ territorial interests in the SCS.

On military developments, the Del Pilar’s timely return to service would allow Manila to deploy the ship--and its two sister vessels--to the WPS and Batanes region amid increasing tensions and China’s CGL. However, the Del Pilar’s lack of modern armaments--as it remains an ex-US Coast Guard vessel--could hamper its activities in the shallow and rocky waters of the SCS. Meanwhile, the NOLCOM’s completion of sovereign markers on uninhabited islands underscore Manila’s increasing interest in

The Open Source Briefing 7 ​ securing its northern region as China continues to ramp-up air intrusions against Taiwan and PLA activities in the Taiwan Strait [9][10]. Increased military presence in the region could help provide Manila greater maritime domain awareness in the region and the critical Bashi Channel--between Taiwan’s Orchid Island and the Philippines’ Mavulis Island--leading to the Pacific Ocean and Philippine Rise [11

Vietnam Author: Giulia Croce Butler A recent report by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (ATMI) delineates how Vietnam is enhancing its facilities and overall defense capabilities in the Spratly Islands. The goal behind these Vietnamese endeavors is to not only strengthen its bases, but also reinforce deterrence by being able to reach and strike Chinese facilities. The AMTI report was created in collaboration with Simularity, and displays the last two years of upgrades via a series of satellite [1] images. ​ Currently, Vietnam claims between 49 to 51 outposts. The exact number is unclear ​ due to the undisclosed status of ongoing construction on Cornwallis South Reef. These outposts are stretched across 27 features in the South China Sea region. Only recently, Vietnam has reclaimed land at 8 islands it occupies, and developed its smaller outposts on banks and shoals.[2] ​

The report states that among the many outposts in the Spratlys, the two that have undergone [3] the most significant changes in the past two years are West Reef and Sin Cowe Island. ​ In ​ West Reef, the new construction includes several defense facilities, such as concrete pads and bunkers, as well as administrative buildings and a tower structure allegedly used for SIGINT or communication.

The Open Source Briefing 8 ​ New buildings on West Reef highlighted in these pictures. Photo Credit: CSIS/AMTI

Satellite images also pointed out the construction of a new tunnel network that stretches from the North to the South of the island.

On Sin Cowe Island, the most notable upgrades are a series of defensive installations along the coast, stretching for approximately 26 acres of reclaimed land. Additionally, the vegetated area on the North shore of the island was cleared for the construction of tunnels in 2018. Recent pictures display the same area the vegetation is starting to regenerate.

The Open Source Briefing 9 ​ New facilities on Sin Cowe highlighted in these pictures. Photo Credit: CSIS/AMTI

Hanoi has built similar facilities on other islands in the Spratly archipelago as well. ATMI quotes a 2016 Reuters article that mentioned that Vietnam deployed EXTRA artillery rocket systems over the Spratly Islands. These small systems are supposedly quick to deploy and easy to conceal as they require minimal infrastructure and could be launched on any surface that’s flat and firm. With a 150 km range (80 nautical miles), Hanoi’s EXTRA systems could strike all of the Chinese bases in the Spratlys. Photo Credit: CSIS/AMTI

Other upgrades include administrative buildings on Grierson Reef and Central Reef, a finished radome and several new buildings on Spratly Island, and new radomes with sensing or communications systems on Pearson Reef and Namyit Island, along with more administrative buildings. Finally, East Reef and Alison Reef both received a second building connected to the first facilities.

Along with these updates, the Congressional Research Service also presented an In Focus [4] report on U.S.-Vietnam relations to the U.S. Congress this week. ​ The document not only ​ highlights the diplomatic achievements since 1995, but is also focuses on Vietnam’s politics and its recent 13th Party Congress, then covers the country’s Covid-19 response, the rising tensions in the South China Sea, concerns over human rights, economics and trade, and U.S. foreign assistance in Vietnam.

The Open Source Briefing 10 ​ Photo Credit: CSIS/AMTI

Japan Starting this week off with a diplomatic notice, France has ordered one of its frigates to conduct surveillance activities in the East China Sea in an attempt to prevent North Korean smuggling operations.[1] This will be done in cooperation with the JMSDF who have been active in the area for obvious maritime responsibilities. It was also reiterated by Japanese officials that the nation stands by its allies in effectively “denuclearizing” the Korean peninsula. On 18 February, foreign ministers of the “QUAD” were in agreement that they would oppose the use of force by China in the Indo-Pacific to achieve its geo-strategic goals. Japanese Foreign Minister Motegi expressed his concern about China’s new law giving their Coast Guard more authority to use force in an attempt to scare competing nations away from their claims.[2] On Friday, U.S State Department spokesman Ned Price stated that there was concern over the language of China’s new law.[3] This is one of many affirmations that the QUAD remain united in addressing China’s aggressive actions in the region, however, there has been no mention of effective policy implementations if indeed things get tenser. On 16 February, the Japanese Coast Guard reported that two Chinese Coast Guard Vessels were spotted around the Senkaku Islands and that one of the ships had a “cannon-like” weapon.[4] Considering recency of these interactions around the

The Open Source Briefing 11 ​ Senkakus, it can be expected that we will see more over the next few months. China’s law affecting the applied use of force by their Coast Guard makes matters increasingly tense as a mistake in communication can potentially lead to a violent response. An agreement was made that will have Japan pay 200 Billion Yen for U.S troops stationed there. This one year deal was made with the COVID-19 Pandemic in mind and will allow both administrations to focus on domestic issues and address cost-sharing later down the road. Past deals traditionally ended after 5-years.[5]

Photo of V22-Ospreys at Yokota Airbase, Japan. Courtesy of TheJapanTimes

On 17 February, a video teleconference was held between Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark A. Milley, and Chief of Staff, Joint Staff General Yamazaki Koji. Similar to the other diplomatic encounters that occurred between the two allies within the past month, both sides reaffirmed their commitment to ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific and seek to strengthen ties between their respective nations.[6]

The Open Source Briefing 12 ​ Aircraft Monitoring

PLAAF Y-8 02/15 - Southwest Taiwan ADIZ [1] 02/16 - Southwest Taiwan ADIZ [3] 02/17 - Southwest Taiwan ADIZ [4] 02/18 - Southwest Taiwan ADIZ [5]

Shaanxi Y-8 Surveillance Aircraft: Has many variants that include anti- submarine warfare, ISR, cargo, troop transport.

C-5M Super Galaxy 02/20 - South China Sea [9]

The C-5M Super Galaxy is the USAF’s strategic transport aircraft used to transport large amounts of cargo and personnel.

P3-C Orion 02/15 - South Taiwan ADIZ [2] 02/18 - South Taiwan ADIZ [6]

P3-C Orion: Provides advanced threat detection for both surface surveillance on both land and sea.

02/19 - Southwest Taiwan ADIZ - Four J-16 Fighters, Four JH-7, and one Y-9.[7] Aircraft Cluster 02/20 - Southwest Taiwan ADIZ - Two J-10 Fighters, Two J-16 Fighters, Four JH-7 Aircraft, and one Y-8 ASW Aircraft. [8]

The Open Source Briefing 13 ​

United States

[1] https://twitter.com/jmsdf_pao_eng/status/1361216842941964293

[2] https://twitter.com/n_morse9927/status/1361430587974815752

[3] https://twitter.com/n_morse9927/status/1362196125365772289

[4] https://twitter.com/n_morse9927/status/1362196536948645891

[5] https://twitter.com/jmsdf_pao_eng/status/1362990363594563584

[6] Reuters Staff. “Blinken to Hold Virtual 'Quad' Meeting with Australia, India, Japan.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, February 18, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-blinken-quad/blinken-to-virtually-hold-quad-meeti ng-with-australia-india-japan-idUSKBN2AH2MH.

[7] https://twitter.com/n_morse9927/status/1363293083719335936

[8] https://twitter.com/INDOPACOM/status/1362069300123602944

[9] https://twitter.com/n_morse9927/status/1363293083719335936

[10] 7th Fleet Public Affairs. “7th Fleet Destroyer Conducts Freedom of Navigation Operation in South China Sea.” Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet. United States Navy, February 16, 2021. https://www.c7f.navy.mil/Media/News/Display/Article/2505035/7th-fleet-destroyer-condu cts-freedom-of-navigation-operation-in-south-china-sea/#.YCyp9JkyTMU.twitter.

[11] https://twitter.com/lobsterlarryliu/status/1363424358937415692

China and Taiwan 1. Lendon, B. (2021, February 17). US steps up challenges TO Chinese-claimed islands in South China Sea. Retrieved February 21, 2021, from

The Open Source Briefing 14 ​ https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/17/asia/us-navy-south-china-sea-freedom-of-navigation-i ntl-hnk/index.html

2. Shelbourne, M. (2021, February 17). Destroyer USS RUSSELL Performs South China SEA FONOP. Retrieved February 21, 2021, from https://news.usni.org/2021/02/17/destroyer-uss-russell-performs-south-china-sea-fonop

3. Haver, Z. (2021, February 17). Chinese research Ship Collects Samples, TESTS submersibles in Vietnam-Claimed Waters. Retrieved February 22, 2021, from https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/usa-southchinasea-02172021154744.html

4. Chen-Pang, L., Ku-Hsiang, W., & Lim, E. (2021, February 17). Taiwan coast guard ships add new livery to distinguish them from China's. Retrieved February 22, 2021, from https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202102170014

5. Ibid.

6. Yun-yu, C., & Lim, E. (2021, February 17). Chinese spy planes enter Taiwan's ADIZ for 11th day in February. Retrieved February 22, 2021, from https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202102170022

7. Shumei, L., & Lin, W. (2021, February 18). Taiwan island's Intensive military exercises a political show to cover its WEAKNESS: ANALYSTS. Retrieved February 22, 2021, from https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202102/1215898.shtml

8. Lu, T., & Lim, E. (2021, February 18). Taiwan's locally-developed military DRONE Crashes; no one hurt. Retrieved February 22, 2021, from https://focustaiwan.tw/society/202102180023

9. Everington, K. (2021, February 19). US Senator reintroduces Taiwan Invasion Prevention ACT: TAIWAN News: 2021/02/19. Retrieved February 22, 2021, from https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4130946

10. Kuan-Ting, L., Kuei-Hsiang, W., & Mazzetta, M. (2021, February 19). Taiwan names New defense, intelligence, china Affairs heads (update). Retrieved February 22, 2021, from https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202102190025 11. Lim, E., Chin-yeh, C., & Yu-chen, C. (2021, February 19). Nine Chinese Pla planes enter Taiwan's ADIZ after U.S. bill submitted. Retrieved February 22, 2021, from https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202102190024

12. Al Jazeera. (2021, February 19). Taiwan deploys missiles after Chinese jets 'enter its air zone'. Retrieved February 22, 2021, from

The Open Source Briefing 15 ​ https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/19/taiwan-says-chinese-jets-entered-its-air-zon e ______Vietnam [1] “Vietnam Shores Up Its Spratly Defenses.” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. Feb 19, 2021. https://amti.csis.org/vietnam-shores-up-its-spratly-defenses/ [2] Vietnam Island Tracker, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/vietnam/ [3] https://amti.csis.org/vietnam-shores-up-its-spratly-defenses/ [4] “U.S.-Vietnam Relations.” Congressional Research Service, Feb 16, 2021. https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/20485319/us-vietnam-relations-feb-16-20 21.pdf

Japan [1] https://twitter.com/japantimes/status/1363001697350598656?s=20

[2] “Quad Nations Oppose China’s Attempts to Alter Status Quo by Force.” The Japan Times, 19 Feb. 2021, www.japantimes.co.jp. Accessed 22 Feb. 2021.

[3] “U.S. Concerned China’s New Coast Guard Law Could Escalate Maritime Disputes.” The Japan Times, 20 Feb. 2021, www.japantimes.co.jp. Accessed 22 Feb. 2021.

[4] Johnson, Jesse, and Satoshi Sugiyama. “China Sends Ship with Cannon-like Weapon near Senkakus for First Time under New Law.” The Japan Times, 16 Feb. 2021, www.japantimes.co.jp. Accessed 22 Feb. 2021.

[5] ---. “Japan and U.S. Reach Agreement on Cost of Hosting American Troops.” The Japan Times, 17 Feb. 2021, www.japantimes.co.jp. Accessed 22 Feb. 2021. [6] https://www.mod.go.jp/js/Press/press2021/press_pdf/p20210217_02.pdf

Philippines [1] CNN Staff. “House leader seeks to delineate PH maritime areas, strengthen territorial claims”. CNN Philippines. 18 February 2021. https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2021/2/18/House-bill-West-Philippine-Sea-maritime-are as-counter-China-Coast-Guard-Law.html Accessed 21 Feb 2021.

The Open Source Briefing 16 ​ [2] Mabasa, Roy. “PH not a target of the Chinese Coast Guard Law -Sta Romana”. Manila Bulletin. 16 February 2021. https://mb.com.ph/2021/02/16/ph-not-a-target-of-the-chinese-coast-guard-law-sta-roma na/ Accessed 21 Feb 2021.

[3] Nepomuceno, Priam. “BRP Gregorio Del Pilar to be operational in July: Navy”. Philippine News Agency. 17 February 2021. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-23/china-adopts-law-letting-coast-gu ard-fire-on-foreign-vessels Accessed 21 Feb 2021.

[4] Zambrano, Chiara. “Several vessels under repair to be deployed to West PH Sea: Philippine Navy Chief”. ABS-CBN News. 16 February 2021. https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/02/16/21/several-vessels-under-repair-to-be-deployed-t o-west-ph-sea-philippine-navy-chief Accessed 21 Feb 2021.

[5] Mangosing, Frances. “PH military installs more ‘sovereign markers’ in northern frontier”. Inquirer.net. 18 February 2021. https://globalnation.inquirer.net/193918/ph-military-installs-more-sovereign-markers-in-n orthern-frontier Accessed 21 Feb 2021.

[6] Gotinga, JC. “PH Navy to build Fuga Island outpost ahead of Chinese ‘smart city’ plan”. Rappler. 14 November 2019. https://www.rappler.com/nation/philippine-navy-build-fuga-island-outpost-ahead-chinese -smart-city-plan Accessed 21 Feb 2021.

[7] Lazaro, Freddie & Mabasa, Roy. “PH asserts sovereignty over 11 islands in Northern Luzon”. Manila Bulletin. 26 August 2020. https://mb.com.ph/2020/08/26/ph-asserts-sovereignty-over-11-islands-in-northern-luzon/ Accessed 21 Feb 2021.

[8] Fonbuena, Carmela. “Hague ruling: Filipinos, Chinese may fish in Scarborough”. Rappler. 13 July 2016. https://www.rappler.com/nation/philippines-china-arbitration-scarborough-fishing-ground Accessed 21 Feb 2021.

[9] Reuters. “Taiwan Scrambels Jets Again After Chinese Exercises Over South China Sea”. VOA. 13 July 2016.

The Open Source Briefing 17 ​ https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/taiwan-scrambles-jets-again-after-chinese-e xercises-over-south-china-sea Accessed 21 Feb 2021.

[10] Reuters. “Taiwan Sends Ships, Aircraft as Chinese Carrier Passes Island”. VOA. 20 December 2020. https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/taiwan-sends-ships-aircraft-chinese-carrier- passes-island Accessed 21 Feb 2021.

[11] Liu Xuanzun and Guo Yuandan. “PLA bomber swarm near Taiwan ‘likely routine operations’”. Rappler. 13 July 2016. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202101/1213770.shtml Accessed 21 Feb 2021.

Aircraft Monitoring [1] https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1361254570278547458 [2] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1361531302923677696 [3] https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1361617079963582466 [4] https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1361981909241241600 [5] https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1362342867272798209?s=20 [6] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1362598254693806099 [7] https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1362711933569224705 [8] https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1363128843830091780?s=20 [9] https://twitter.com/SCS_PI/status/1363033634471514114?s=20

The Open Source Briefing 18 ​