U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacic Region: An Independent Assessment Co-Directors David J. Berteau Michael J. Green Principals Gregory T. Kiley Nicholas F. Szechenyi Contributors Ernest Z. Bower Victor Cha Karl F. Inderfurth Christopher K. Johnson Gary A. Powell Stephanie Sanok August 2012 U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region: An Independent Assessment Center for Strategic and International Studies Co-Directors David J. Berteau Michael J. Green Principals Gregory T. Kiley Nicholas F. Szechenyi Contributors Ernest Z. Bower Victor Cha Karl F. Inderfurth Christopher K. Johnson Gary A. Powell Stephanie Sanok About CSIS—50th Anniversary Year For 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has developed practical solutions to the world’s greatest challenges. As we celebrate this milestone, CSIS scholars continue to provide strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s more than 200 full-time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look to the future and anticipate change. Since 1962, CSIS has been dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. After 50 years, CSIS has become one of the world’s preeminent international policy institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global development and economic integration. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn has chaired the CSIS Board of Trustees since 1999. John J. Hamre became the Center’s president and chief executive officer in 2000. CSIS was founded by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2012 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, with the exception of Appendix A and Appendix B. All rights reserved. Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006 Tel: (202) 887-0200 Fax: (202) 775-3199 Web: www.csis.org U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region: An Independent Assessment Center for Strategic and International Studies June 27, 2012 Cover Letter from Dr. John Hamre 3 Executive Summary 5 Introduction 8 Methodology and Organization of the Report Section One: Current and Emerging U.S. National Security Interests 13 Enduring Interests and New Challenges Role of Forward Presence in U.S. Strategy Emerging Force Posture Requirements Advantages, Constraints, Risks, and Areas for Further Investment Section Two: The Strategic Setting 23 Japan Korean Peninsula Australia New Zealand Southeast Asia India and South Asia China Russia Section Three: Options for Force Posture in the Asia Pacific Region 43 Description of Evaluation Criteria Summary Description of Options Option 1: As Is, Where Is Overall PACOM Force Posture Japan South Korea Guam Hawaii Alaska/CONUS Support/Other Option 2: Planned Posture United States-Government of Japan SCC Agreements United States-Republic of Korea Strategic Alliance 2015 Other United States Bilateral Efforts 1 Summary of Option 2 Actions Option 2 Evaluation Additional Excursions Option 3: Increased Posture Increased Seapower Posture Increased Airpower Posture Increased Ground Forces Posture Align PACOM Force Posture for Expanded Regional Engagement Increased Force Protection Posture Increased Posture of Mission Support Assets Summary of Option 3 Actions Option 3 Evaluation Evaluating Option 3 under Different Budgetary and Geostrategic Scenarios Option 4: Decreased Posture Decreased Army Posture Decreased Marine Corps Posture Decreased Air Force Posture Decreased Engagement Activities and Resources Summary of Option 4 Actions Option 4 Evaluation Evaluating Option 4 under Different Budgetary and Geostrategic Scenarios Section Four: Findings and Recommendations 89 Overarching Findings Recommendations Concluding Observations Acknowledgements 96 List of Acronyms 97 Endnotes 100 Appendix A: Secretary of Defense Transmittal Letters to Congress 109 (UNCLASSIFIED Upon Removal of Classified Annex) Appendix B: Comments from the Secretary of Defense 116 2 June 27, 2012 The Honorable Leon Panetta Secretary of Defense 1000 Defense Pentagon Washington DC 20301-1000 Dear Mr. Secretary: I am pleased to transmit to you the study that CSIS was asked to undertake to comply with Section 346 of the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act. That Section directed the Defense Department to commission an independent assessment of U.S. force posture in Asia. CSIS is honored to have been given this task. The very capable team—led by co-directors David Berteau and Michael Green—stands ready to follow up with the Department in any way concerning the issues we discuss in this report, but I also want to share some specific views with you. America’s national security depends on a stable and peaceful international order, especially in Asia. President Obama recognized this fundamental reality when he spoke of the need to rebalance U.S. forces globally to reflect the importance of a rising Asia. We found a strong consensus on this overall objective within the Department, in the policy community generally, and especially with allies and partner countries. But we also found no durable operational framework guiding the specific efforts toward that goal, and without that framework, we found many discontinuities. Understandably we begin with a history that has placed our forces in specific locations in Asia. But the future will entail new challenges that now need to be addressed. The ongoing deliberations are shaped more by the legacy of the past (for example, arguing about where to relocate particular facilities) than by the security imperatives of the next thirty years. The repositioning of forces in the region has strategic consequences that will shape the trajectory of the next three decades. We need but currently lack an operational framework to match that strategic imperative. This report outlines the broad dimensions of a durable operational framework, but not every detail. That should be the work of the Department in coming months and years. The work, however, cannot wait until all details are worked through before we act. There are too many challenges of an immediate nature 3 The Honorable Leon Panetta, Secretary of Defense June 27, 2012 Page 2. that must be addressed. We found that there were important near-term steps that could be taken that fit well into a future operational framework. Many of those steps are not controversial and could be implemented relatively quickly. All of them need to be judged in the context of a thirty-year vision. America sustained a remarkably consistent defense policy for fifty years of the Cold War because our national leaders at the outset established a durable consensus on national challenges and strategic objectives. We now need a comparable framework for the next thirty years in Asia. Our goal, of course, is never to have to fight a war. By shaping the security environment through the active engagement of our forces in the region working with allies and partners, we can contribute to a stable, peaceful and prosperous Asia that is good for all nations in the region and good for the world. Again, let me thank you for giving us an opportunity to undertake this important work. We received active and constructive cooperation from all quarters in the Department these past three months, and on behalf of our study team, we thank you and all the involved staff for supporting this work. The report and its conclusions and recommendations, of course, are ours alone. Sincerely, John J. Hamre President and CEO 4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The president signed the Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, or Public Law 112-81) in December 2011, setting in motion the requirement under Section 346 of the NDAA to commission a report on force posture and deployment plans of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). One week later, on January 5, 2012, the president released, at the Department of Defense (DoD), a new Strategic Guidance document that directed a rebalancing toward the Asia Pacific region of military forces and national security efforts across the government. This guidance, and the Fiscal Year 2013 defense budget, marks only the beginning of force posture rebalancing. In March, DoD tasked the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) to undertake that study, with a report due 180 days after enactment, or by the end of June 2012. At one level, PACOM force posture is tied to current deployments and activities in the region and to announced plans to modify such deployments. Chief among these are plans for replacing Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma and funding for additional military construction needed to transfer Marines from Okinawa to Guam. These plans are at the center of a logjam between DoD, which would like to implement them, and the Congress, which is reluctant to authorize funding absent better details about cost and long-term master plans. This report tackles those issues and proposes a way to break that logjam. However, the stakes for the United States in the Asia Pacific region go well beyond the scope of military construction projects. This report focuses on the larger question of how to align U.S. force posture to overall U.S. national interests in the Asia Pacific region. Current U.S. force posture is heavily tilted toward Northeast Asia, to Korea and Japan, where it focuses properly on deterring the threats of major conflicts on the Korean peninsula, off Japan, and in the Taiwan Strait. However, as evidenced by recent Chinese activities in the South China Sea and throughout the Pacific islands, the stakes are growing fastest in South and Southeast Asia. To be successful, U.S.