Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments

Power Shift in WP Electoral Success of Secular Parties Might Deepen Polarization

Anne Wolf S

Tunisia’s main secular party, , emerged as the largest force in the October 2014 parliamentary elections. The party’s leader has also a high chance of being elected president in a runoff ballot in late December. The results risk to increase polarization between Islamists and secularists, especially if Nidaa Tounes forms an all-secular gov- ernment coalition. It might also deepen frictions between the country’s marginalized regions and the richer and coastal belt. Already, the success of Tunisia’s main secular party has triggered protests in the poor south, as some people accuse Nidaa Tounes of rejecting more conservative sections of society and criticize its close asso- ciations with some former members of Ben Ali’s regime and the business sector. These ties and vested interests are likely to make it more difficult to launch structural eco- nomic reforms. They also risk to foster alienation, especially among , and might trigger radicalization. Europe should continue to support Tunisia’s young democracy with financial aid as well as specific economic and security expertise, and, most importantly, promote cooperation between various ideological forces.

Tunisia held its first post-revolution general Republic (CPR) with 8.7 percent and Etta- parliamentary and presidential elections katol with 7 percent. on October 26 and November 23, 2014. The The main secular party, Nidaa Tounes ballots were classified by international ob- (Call for Tunisia), emerged as the largest servers as being by and large free and fair, force in this year’s parliamentary elections, thereby reaffirming the democratic process winning 86 of the 217 seats in the legis- almost four years after the ouster of Zine lature, followed by Ennahda with 69 seats. el-Abidine Ben Ali. The outcome of the The parties next in line are the Free Patri- elections implies a major shift in political otic Union (UPL), which lacks any distinct power, which had been marked by a strong political orientation, with 16; the leftist Ennahda party and fragmented secularists coalition with 15; and the since the October 2011 elections, when the liberal with 8 seats. It is strik- Islamists had gained 37 percent of the vote, ing that all of the secular parties that did followed by the secular Congress for the well in the 2014 parliamentary elections

Anne Wolf is a non-resident fellow in the project “Elite change and new social mobilization in the Arab world” realized by the SWP Comments 54 Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). The project is funded by the German Foreign Office in the framework of the transformation December 2014 partnerships with the Arab World and the Robert Bosch Stiftung. It cooperates with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the PhD grant programs of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung and the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung.

1 did rather poorly in the 2011 Constituent In the elections, Nidaa Tounes was able Assembly elections or did not exist at the to capitalize on the economic downturn time, like Nidaa Tounes. Many Tunisians and the emergence of political violence are longing for a new start. They were dis- in 2012, which reinforced the perception appointed with the former govern- of many secularists that a major political ment – a coalition of Ennahda with the change was needed to keep the transition CPR and Ettakatol. The CPR gained only on track. Ennahda’s perceived dominance four seats while Ettakatol was left without following the 2011 elections had led to any parliamentary representation at all, increasing polarization between Islamists as many secular Tunisians reproached both and secularists over the past two years. This parties for having been co-opted by the came to a head after the assassination of Islamists. two secular politicians in February and July The first round of the presidential ballot 2013 by radical Islamists, which fuelled in November 2014 reaffirmed the success popular protests that summer. The simul- of Nidaa Tounes. Nidaa Tounes’ Beji Caid taneous coup against the Muslim Brother- Essebsi came first (39.5 percent), followed hood’s Muhammed Mursi, former president by the current interim president, CPR’s of Egypt, made many secularists believe (33.4 percent). A runoff that Ennahda could also be forced out of between both candidates will be held in office, but mainly through protests. It thus late December. Essebsi has a high chance ultimately strengthened Nidaa Tounes. In of winning, especially because he has the fact, the Islamist-led government was forced support of the business elite and major to resign in January 2014 and a techno- media outlets. cratic government took over. Nidaa Tounes, which was formed in Ennahda did not present or support mid-2012 by Essebsi – former interim prime any presidential candidate in the November minister who was also interior minister elections, because it initially assumed under and president of that it had a high chance of becoming the parliament under Ben Ali – has promised strongest force in parliament and did not to unite secular parties around a “modern want to be perceived as dominating politics democratic project” to counter Ennahda. once again. In Tunisia’s system of govern- During the first year of the Troika govern- ment, the president has power in the realm ment, internal fragmentation had weakened of foreign affairs and defense, whereas most secular parties in government and oppo- other executive tasks remain with the prime sition and reinforced the dominance of minister. The absence of an Islamist can- Ennahda. Therefore, many secular Tuni- didate in the presidential elections also sians were keen to join Nidaa Tounes, explains the relative success of Marzouki, including former members of the Ben Ali for whom many conservative Tunisians regime, important businessmen, as well as voted, especially in the south and interior leftists, trade unionists, independents, and regions. members of the Destourian (constitution) However, Ennahda’s success in gaining Movement. The Destourian Movement 69 parliamentary seats in the October 2014 had a central role in the fight for Tunisian elections – despite broad levels of frustra- independence. Under Bourguiba it took tion among the public with the former Troi- the form of the Neo- and later the ka government – still reaffirms the Islam- Socialist Destour Party, while Ben Ali sub- ists as a major force in politics. Ennahda’s sequently established the Constitutional relative success is partially due to the Democratic Rally (RCD), which became absence of other important conservative primarily an apparatus of patronage and parties as well as to the fact that the Islam- cronyism that had very little to do with ists tend to be better organized than any the original movement. other party, have a strong party platform,

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2 and are represented in all regions. Most im- dential elections – about one million less portantly, however, the Islamist base had than in the 2011 ballot. created strong bonds during the decades of Moreover, more than twice as many repression it suffered under Ben Ali, which Tunisians prefer Nidaa Tounes when has led to a level of unity that secular par- presented with a list of parties, compared ties lack. Following the Troika government, to when they are being asked in an open moreover, Ennahda was quite successful in question about their political preferences. convincing its constituency that the Islam- This signals that many Tunisians voted for ists were not able to perform better in gov- Nidaa Tounes for lack of a better alternative ernment because the opposition did not rather than because they strongly believe in assume a constructive democratic function the party. Many Tunisians, including secular but rather boycotted many policies. voices, have been especially critical of the age of Essebsi (88) as well as the integration of many former representatives of Ben Ali’s Changing Priorities regime. Many also resent the quick rise Tunisia’s new political landscape reflects of Essebsi’s son, Hafedh, who was initially how the priorities of many Tunisians have installed at the head of Nidaa Tounes’ list changed. Whereas in 2011 parties with for the electoral district Tunis 1, but later a track record on human rights, strong had to resign owing to internal protests, identity politics, and a history of anti-Ben given that he did not have any obvious cre- Ali militancy did well, in 2014 people dentials for this position. elected parties they perceived as being able to solve their economic malaise and security concerns. In early recognition of Nidaa Tounes’ Options that, even Ennahda, which had in the past Nidaa Tounes is the only party capable of harshly condemned Tunisia’s economic forming a government. Too many parties elite, integrated important businessmen on in parliament are categorically opposed to their electoral lists – including the head of Ennahda, which makes it impossible for the Syphax Airlines – to create the impression Islamists to assemble a coalition. No party that it would provide better governance other than Nidaa Tounes has this kind of than under the Troika government. leverage. However, Nidaa Tounes will need An increasing number of Tunisians pre- 23 more deputies to achieve an absolute fer stability and a strong leadership figure majority in parliament. This presents Nidaa over democracy. An October 2014 Pew sur- Tounes with two main political options: vey found that only 48 percent of Tunisians forming an all-secular coalition, or a broad think that democracy is preferable to other coalition that includes the Islamists. kinds of government, compared to 63 per- cent of Tunisians polled just months after the 2011 revolution. Moreover, 59 percent An all-Secular Coalition of the population today prefer a strong Nidaa Tounes has already contacted several leader over a democratic government, as secular parties and candidates to assess the opposed to 37 percent in 2012. General feasibility of establishing a coalition with disillusionment with parties and their rep- them. However, its relations with the second resentatives is also very high: 65 percent of biggest secular party in parliament, the UPL, those polled think that “political leaders have remained strained, given the rivalry are only interested in power and personal between the parties’ leaders. The UPL is gain.” Given that many Tunisians have been centered around the leadership figure of dissatisfied with the democratic process, wealthy Slim Riahi, whose comparatively only 3.18 million of the 8.4 million eligible young age (42 years) and economic success voters cast a vote in the first round of presi- through activities in oil production and

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3 property development in Libya led some leadership figures deeply resent Nidaa Tunisians to believe that he could put Tuni- Tounes’ integration of former members of sia’s economy on the right track. Riahi also Ben Ali’s regime. Indeed, many leftists had has strong financial links to the media and been harshly persecuted by Ben Ali and sub- owns a football club, which certainly helped jected to torture. The Popular Front itself him while campaigning. He describes the was created in October 2012 to overcome UPL as a “modernist, non-ideological” party the increasingly bipolar political landscape of the center. The idea of “non-ideological” between Nidaa Tounes and Ennahda, which parties has gained prominence in Tunisia they perceived as a threat to democratic as a strategy to denounce opponents such transition. Working with Nidaa Tounes will as the Islamists – and to a lesser degree the therefore be difficult for the Popular Front, far left – as “ideologues,” i.e., dangerous but is probably still preferable to being left radicals with impractical ideas. It is essen- out of an all-secular coalition. Already in the tially used by secular parties – including past, the Popular Front has opted to work not only the UPL but also Nidaa Tounes – with Nidaa Tounes, which it still prefers to to appear pragmatic and rational. Ennahda, in order to “contain Islamism.” The UPL has promised to rebuild Tuni- Significantly, the Popular Front and Nidaa sia’s interior regions, generate 422,000 jobs, Tounes together led the National Salvation and eradicate terrorism within six months. Front – although the alliance broke apart Yet it will be unlikely to live up to these quickly after the Troika government re- promises, not least because of the lack of signed. Being part of the government and resources to induce large-scale develop- formulating concrete policies might also ment and job-creation and the absence of a prove difficult for the Popular Front, which detailed party program. Riahi, just as Nidaa has relied more than most parties on criti- Tounes’ Essebsi, also ran in presidential cizing rather than trying to find solutions elections, which increased the political to Tunisia’s post-revolution challenges. rivalry between both candidates. Since the On the other side, Nidaa Tounes’ former parliamentary elections, leaders of the UPL RCD members, who have become very influ- have met several times with Ennahda, in- ential within the party, have reservations dicating that Riahi is much more flexible over an alliance with the Popular Front, with regard to collaboration with the Islam- because the latter voted on May 1, 2014, ists than the Popular Front. However, on in favor of a political exclusion law, which December 5, Riahi officially endorsed the would have prevented former members presidential candidacy of Essebsi for the of Ben Ali’s regime from running for office. runoff ballot after an agreement between This wing also propagates a liberal eco- both parties. nomic program, which is opposed by Nidaa The Popular Front has expressed its Tounes’ leftists as well as Popular Front openness toward being part of a secular members. coalition. The alliance of leftists and Arab By contrast, Afek Tounes is open to join- nationalist parties rose in prominence fol- ing both a secular government as well as a lowing the two political assassinations in broad-based government. Its success in the 2013 – in both cases of Popular Front poli- election is owed to a combination of strong ticians – and in subsequent prominence business links, its niche ideology in Tunisia, while staging anti-regime protests as part as well as a clearly defined political program. of the National Salvation Front, a coalition Indeed, most secular parties have positioned of secular parties and associations that themselves on the center or the center-left eventually forced the Troika government and failed to deliver a clear party platform. to resign. Afek Tounes proposes solutions to terror- It is open to a secular coalition despite ism and crime; policies to increase the the fact that many of its members and key quality of health services and education;

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4 reforms to Tunisia’s top-heavy administra- partner than the Popular Front, which tion; as well as liberal economic policies. voted against it. On December 5, Nidaa An alliance with Afek Tounes could be the Tounes voted in favor of Ennahda’s Abdel- basis for a broad coalition dominated by fattah Mourou as vice-president of parlia- Nidaa Tounes, whose liberal wing is strong- ment, sidelining the Popular Front’s can- ly represented in parliament, as well as the didate. Islamists, who also tend to advocate eco- A broad coalition would still be prefer- nomic . able in both parties to a narrow Nidaa Tounes-Ennahda coalition, which would theoretically also be feasible but certainly A Broad Coalition alienate even more party members. Before A broad coalition would include all major the elections, leaders of Ennahda and Nidaa political forces. The option was already Tounes engaged in a sort of preemptive presented in the form of a national unity coalition negotiation, which was strongly government prior to the 2011 elections criticized by members of both parties. The by Ennahda, the CPR, and Ettakatol, but latter suspected that a “secret pact” was it failed to resonate widely among other formed between their leaders: with Nidaa secular parties. The latter did not believe Tounes promising to not prosecute Islam- that secularists and Islamists could work ists for crimes they may have committed in together and maintained that Ennahda the past, while in turn Ennahda would not would anyway try to dominate politics. As pursue former Ben Ali affiliates. To the a result, a smaller coalition between secu- frustration of many party members, in larists and Islamists was realized in the practice this deal has already been realized Troika government. to a certain extent: the vast majority of In contrast, a close working relationship senior members of the Ben Ali regime were between Islamists and Nidaa Tounes would set free from prison and a decreasing num- indeed prove difficult. Many members of ber of Nidaa Tounes’ members have called Ennahda regard Nidaa Tounes as counter- for the Egyptian scenario – especially once revolutionary and part of the old regime, the new leadership in Cairo had not only which committed torture and other human cracked down on the , rights violations against the Islamists and but on all opposition. other political opponents. Nidaa Tounes, on Although a broad coalition would be the other hand, was essentially created to the lesser evil to a narrow coalition for counter the Islamists. Many of its members many members of Ennahda and Nidaa also accuse Ennahda of complicity with Tounes, forming it might prove difficult violent Salafists. Working side by side in a because some smaller secular parties would unity government would also risk alienat- most likely be opposed to joining it. The ing members of both parties, especially at Popular Front in particular, which is argu- the base. This is likely to be more severe in ably even more critical of Ennahda than the case of Nidaa Tounes, whose members Nidaa Tounes, would probably not be wil- have often little more in common than ling to join a government in which the their anti-Islamist stance. By contrast, over Islamists participate, not least because many the past years Ennahda has been able to of its members hold Ennahda responsible retain a certain degree of unity and support for the 2013 assassinations. even after taking positions that were fierce- Even though there is a risk that a broad ly criticized by its base, such as when it coalition would be inefficient, in the case voted against the political exclusion law. of Tunisia it could help to decrease polari- In the eyes of some Nidaa Tounes mem- zation between Islamists and secularists, bers, Ennahda’s vote against political exclu- which would be a milestone for Tunisia’s sion makes them a potentially more reliable young democracy. Indeed, polarization is a

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5 key threat to instability in Tunisia, and nomic reforms and rather reinforce the decreasing it is a precondition for promot- crony capitalist structures established ing economic growth and undermining under Ben Ali, thereby further marginaliz- security challenges. ing the country’s interior regions. As many people struggle to make ends meet, they have become alienated by what Key Disputes and Challenges they see as ideological battles taking place Tensions might be aggravated if Essebsi in politics. An increasing number of Tuni- wins the presidential elections, which sians have thus been withdrawing from could foster the perception of an all- politics, while some have become drawn to dominant Nidaa Tounes. This might pro- more destructive forms of opposition, such mote polarization between secularists and as Salafi jihadism. Fearing that if Essebsi Islamists, many of whom are afraid that were to become president, he might further Nidaa Tounes might limit their freedoms. alienate conservative sections of society, Supporters of Moncef Marzouki, a human Ennahda released a statement on November rights activist and former head of the CPR, 27 calling upon Essebsi to remain neutral maintain that Essebsi entertains a polariz- and avoid dividing Tunisians along religious ing discourse. They particularly reject and regional lines. At the same time, Ennah- Essebsi’s accusation that Marzouki voters da itself might contribute to the alienation are Islamists and radical Salafis. This has of conservative Muslims if it appears to be already led to some protests in the margin- too compromising toward former Ben Ali alized south of the country, where people figures and corrupt businessmen. tend to be more conservative – foreshadow- Essebsi’s presidency would arguably not ing the extent of instability that a Nidaa be in the interest of Nidaa Tounes. Indeed, Tounes-led government might trigger if it to date, Essebsi has been Nidaa Tounes’ uni- is perceived as being exclusive and opposed fying figurehead, capable of keeping the to more traditional sections of society. party’s diverse ideological currents relative- Indeed, in socioeconomic terms, most ly united. However, as a president, Essebsi people in Tunisia are worse off than before would have to abandon all his party respon- the revolution, especially in the marginal- sibilities. This would risk creating disunity ized interior regions and the south. Almost among the diverse ideological currents with- 60 percent of Tunisians now describe the in Nidaa Tounes and could, in the worst economic situation as very bad, compared case, even lead to the implosion of the party. to 20 percent polled in September 2011. Most politicians attribute the economic downturn to a decrease in foreign invest- Tunisia Needs an ment and the number of tourists coming Evenhanded Europe to Tunisia. However, an important factor is Europe, and especially Germany, should that corruption in Tunisia has most prob- reaffirm their explicit support for Tunisia ably increased since the revolution and that while remaining realistic about the various many of the patronage structures that were challenges the young democracy is facing. established under Ben Ali have been re- In that respect, the EU should be careful inforced rather than dismantled. In 2014, when presenting Tunisia as a “model” of a the Corruption Perception Index ranked successful democratic transition. It is true Tunisia 79 out of 177 countries – a drop that Tunisia represents a lot of hope for from place 59 just before the revolution. many people in the region. But the narra- In the scenario of a broad coalition that tive of the model should not lead Euro- includes the Islamists, a key risk is that peans to gloss over difficulties and to down- the suspected “pact” between Ennahda and play the extent of support the EU should Nidaa Tounes would prevent structural eco- still provide.

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6 On the economic side, the EU should Comments 53/2014 by Christian Mölling continue to encourage investment in the and Isabelle Werenfels). marginalized regions in the interior of the Lastly, the EU should reaffirm its willing- country and reinforce its financial support. ness to remain a strong and evenhanded It should also reiterate the need for struc- partner. In that respect, it should be careful tural economic reforms. Many of the patron- to refrain from being more lenient toward age networks established under Ben Ali are transgressions of human rights that might still in place and reinforce the marginaliza- be committed in the future by secular tion of broad segments of the population. parties in government. A priority should be Dismantling these structures of cronyism to foster dialogue and cooperation between are key to fostering inclusive economic various ideological forces. These actions growth. That might prove difficult, given should go beyond focusing on the main par- that all major parties have strengthened ties, but should also include smaller political their ties to the business elite. It would forces and civil society, with the objective therefore be reasonable to tie financial of improving coexistence and cooperation © Stiftung Wissenschaft und aid from Europe to structural economic between all Tunisians. Europeans should Politik, 2014 reforms and concrete measures to curb offer to support dialogue fora of various All rights reserved corruption. In this vein, Europeans should sorts, choose inclusive approaches in proj- These Comments reflect pursue their projects that Germany, for ects they fund, and back local mediators solely the author’s views. example, had planned to carry out together in cases of political crisis and ideological SWP with the Ministry to Fight Corruption and or regional polarization, which will most Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Promote Good Governance before the latter certainly reoccur. German Institute for was abolished earlier this year. The projects, International and Security Affairs including the establishment of a joint good governance academy, should still be pur- Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 sued, preferably within an independent 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 framework. Fax +49 30 880 07-100 Europe should also help Tunisia to www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] reform and strengthen its security sector. This is especially important because up to ISSN 1861-1761 3,000 Tunisians are said to have joined the so-called Islamic State in the war in Syria and Iraq, which may create a security prob- lem upon their return to Tunisia. In addi- tion, the security crisis in Libya is a major challenge for Tunisia, especially because the vast border between both countries is impossible to control, despite recent efforts to increase army patrols and surveillance. Tunisian and Libyan jihadis have prepared joint attacks in Tunisia. The security forces in Tunisia are ill-equipped and -trained to deal with these people and would welcome more external expertise from Europe. At the same time, the EU should try to ensure that any responses to violent Islamists are in conformity with human rights and not used to justify a wider crackdown on con- servative Muslims (for details see SWP

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