World Transport Policy and Practice Volume 20.2/3 May 2014

Paul Mees 1961-2013

ECO-LOGICA LA1 LTD ISSN 1352-7614 © 2014 ECO-LOGICA LA1 LTD PAUL TRANTER PROFESSOR JOHN WHITELEGG SCHOOL OF PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENTAL & STOCKHOLM ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTE AT MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES, YORK, UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES, UNIVERSITY OF YORK, AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE ACADEMY YORK, CANBERRA ACT 2600, AUSTRALIA YO10 SYW, U.K

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CONTENTS Page Cover Photo - we are very grateful to Erica Cervini for permission to publish the cover photo 1

Contents 2

Editorial 3

Abstracts and Keywords 6

Death of an Urbanist, Paul Mees (1961-2013) 9

Paul Mees 1961-2013 by Jago Doson 11

Neat, Plausible and Wrong: Melbourne’s East West Link Anthony Morton 15

Heysham M6 Link Road David Gate 33

“Is this protester the most hated man in Scotland?”: A personal perspective on the legal fight against the Aberdeen Western Peripheral Route William Walton 43

The Curse of the Zombie Roads Patrick Kinnersly 63

The Death of the Habitats Directive Alan James 97

Public transport network planning in Auckland, New Zealand Muhammad Imran and John Stone 108

The Insanity of Normality: Reconceptualising the Road Safety Debate Gary Haq, John Whitelegg 114

World Transport Policy and Practice 2 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 EDITORIAL This is a special issue to celebrate the life (as in Lancaster) on the part of the courts and work of Paul Mees. Paul died at the to exercise one of their main historic and very early age of 52 in June 2013. His democratic functions which is to check the contribution to the world-wide debate excesses of the executive and make sure around sustainable transport was out- that due process has been followed and standing and his two books “A very public the law upheld. solution: transport in the dispersed city” (Mees, 2000) and “Transport for suburbia: James characterises the Lancaster bypass beyond the automobile age” (Mees, 2009) as “useless” and the use of the word “use- are full of insights and often quoted. His less” is based on careful analysis of what contribution ranged over traditional aca- it can achieve and the specious arguments demic activities including teaching, re- on which it is based. Paul Mees would searching and publishing but went much agree. wider and embraced campaigning, media activity and an ability to engage with sen- David Gate discusses the same road and ior public figures in a way that could not be presents a careful documentation of the ignored and in a way that exposed the ut- interaction between residents and those ter wrong-headedness of much Australian who make decisions. One of the many and State of Victoria transport policy and deeply worrying aspects of road building is spending. Paul was a constant critic of its dismissal of local opinion and its impo- road building in Melbourne, always empha- sition of an over-riding road building ideol- sising the illogicality, fiscal irresponsibility ogy regardless of cost and logic on those and missed opportunities represented by whose lives will be damaged. In the case billions of dollars of budget allocation for of the HM6L road the scheme was vigor- road building. His most recent campaign- ously pursued at the same time as the local ing work focussed on one of many useless MP opposed the road and the local author- highway schemes discussed in this special ity voted in full council to oppose the road. issue, the East-West link in Melbourne and As is often he case in the UK these events this is discussed in more detail in the arti- work to bring politics into disrepute. cle by Anthony Morton. Pat Kinnersly’s article on the Westbury Paul’s logical, analytical and incisive criti- Bypass draws attention to the “Zombie cisms of the East-West link are echoed in Road” phenomenon and the ability of seri- other articles in this special issue. Alan ously defective road schemes to be killed James discusses the Lancaster Northern off (or so it was thought at the time) and Bypass also known as the Heysham M6 to come back to life again. The death Link Road (HM6L) in the UK. He concen- of the Westbury bypass in 2009 was a re- trates on the convoluted way in which the markable achievement but it is once again road builders, aided by the judiciary and on the agenda and illustrates perfectly the public inquiry inspectors were able to di- ability of road schemes to remain intact lute the significance of European law (the no matter what the result of consultation Habitats Directive) in pursuit of the road and democratic decision making may de- building outcome. His forensic analysis of termine. This is a serious matter for the the steps taken to downgrade the signifi- environment, nature, heritage and habi- cance of the Habitats Directive highlights tat but also points to a huge democratic the multiple flaws in public policy- mak deficit and the ability of road schemes to ing, public inquiries and the willingness of survive changes of government changes courts to check the executive where road of policy and hand-wringing sustainability building is at stake. This theme is picked rhetoric only to be reborn in yet another up an again in William Walton’s analysis policy document until the road is actually of the Aberdeen Western Peripheral Route. built. Nothing is allowed to get in the way The Aberdeen road is characterised by of road building. seriously defective logic around the case for proceeding with the project, defective The juxtaposition of glaringly weak justifi- public consultation and a clear reluctance cations for a new road and the strong path

World Transport Policy and Practice 3 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 dependency of that road proposal is truly sums could be used to give us all a public staggering. It will be built. The glaringly transport system as good as Zurich, Vien- weak justification is aided and abetted by na or many German cities. truly defective methodologies. High up the list of defectives is cost-benefit analy- The article by Imran and Stone is partly sis which is used to create vastly inflated based on Paul’s work applied to the city of benefits (very big numbers) on the back of Auckland in New Zealand and shows that never to be achieved job creation and time Paul’s ability to condemn stupidity and ir- savings. The deeply significant insights of rational transport planning was support- Marchetti (2004) into the relationship be- ed by very clear ideas about how we can tween time and space and the consump- switch paradigms and get it right. One tion of distance are simply air-brushed out day we will get it right and a truly excel- of the picture. Marchetti showed that even lent public transport system in Melbourne if we do produce time savings through new serving all its communities and obviating transport infrastructure projects (and this the need to own a car will be the real mon- is often not the case thought it is prom- ument to his thoughtfulness and insights. ised) the result is that people consume the In much of Paul’s work and in all the arti- time savings as extra distance. They trav- cles on road schemes in this special issue el further to maintain the same 1.1 hour there is a common theme. How can we travel time per day so the whole crum- explain the utter stupidity of road build- bling edifice of time savings and - mon ing in and around cities when we know etised benefits is completely futile and they generate extra traffic, do not reduce serves to feed sprawl and longer distances congestion, add extra noise and air pollu- between origins and destinations. tion and increase road traffic danger. The final article in this collection (The insan- The futility of fuzzy numbers is much big- ity of normality) addresses this question ger than the time savings nonsense. Traf- and takes its title from a well-known Swiss fic forecasts are routinely inflated to pro- psychotherapist, Arno Gruen. Gruen has vide what passes for evidence in favour of written extensively on the “insanity of nor- road building and to assist the objective of mality” where he points out how societies producing a big number in the time sav- are able to develop a strong story line on ings box. If several hundred thousand any subject that is false, full of contradic- people can “save” 5 minutes on every trip tions and riddled with flaws and claim it is every day and we bolt that onto a spurious “normal”. Those that oppose it or merely methodology for valuing time we end up point out the inconsistencies are margin- with a big number for the monetary ben- alised and isolated and categorised as “in- efits of the road and that is the objective. sane” (to use Gruen’s terminology). The A decline in car use cannot be allowed to article here applies Gruen’s concepts to damage the case for a new road so this road traffic danger and points out that the is also air-brushed out of the picture as deaths of over 3000 people every day glo- it was in Lancaster. Thousands of jobs, bally in the road traffic environment is an in addition to any construction jobs, are example of what Gruen means by “insane”. proclaimed as a result of road building but It should not be happening, we should be road builders are very careful not to put aiming to reduce deaths and serious inju- these imaginary numbers to any kind of ries to zero, as is the case in Sweden, and test 5 years after the road has been built. yet the 3000 every day number does not Paul Mees was acutely aware of all these elicit a strong public policy response. It flaws but he also devoted a great deal of can be reduced but we do not reduce it. time and effort to point out how public We accept it. transport could be organised in a much better way to create high quality alterna- It is very clear in the articles in this special tives to the car. His robust condemnation issue on road building in Aberdeen, Lan- of useless road building was matched by caster, Westbury and Melbourne that the his careful construction of alternatives and road building option has achieved the sta- drawing the attention of decision takers to tus of “normal” and those opposing it are the massive sums of public money been either cranks or deviants who will not ac- thrown away on road schemes when these cept the huge increases in quality of life, World Transport Policy and Practice 4 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 freedom and movement brought about by the insertion of new roads into the urban environment. We know that road building does not solve the problems that it claims will be solved. We know that it is adding huge amounts of climate damaging carbon when we are repeatedly told we must reduce carbon and we know it bathes whole communities in noise and health damaging air pollution. Yet almost every local authority, regional authority, national government and entities like the European Union allocate billions of dollars, Euros or pounds to road building so who is sane and who is insane? This is exactly what Gruen was talking about when he coined the term “the insanity of normality”.

Paul was a truly splendid person and we all miss him terribly. We are at the same time enormously lucky. We have his books, his articles, and the video of his presentation on the East-West link a matter of days before his death (PTUA, 2014) and we have the example of inspired, robust, “tell it as it is” approach to a serious breakdown of human intelligence in a re- putedly sane world. It isn’t a sane world and all we need do is read Paul’s work to be reminded of this and once reminded we can get on with the serious business of ditching the road building paradigm and replacing it with something calm, human scale, ecological, non-threatening, intelli- gent, enriching, health promoting, child- friendly, deficit-reducing and life affirming. Our task, inspired by Paul, is to create the new “normal”.

John Whitelegg Editor

References: Marchetti, C (1994) Anthropological in- variants in travel behaviour, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 47, 75-88

Mees, P (2000) A very public solution: transport in the dispersed city, Melbourne University Press

Mees, P (2009) Transport for suburbia: beyond the automobile age, Routledge

PTUA (2014) http://www.ptua.org.au/2014/01/26/ paul-mees-oam/

World Transport Policy and Practice 5 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 ABSTRACTS AND KEYWORDS Neat, Plausible and Wrong: Mel- (Lancaster) where the scheme is located, bourne’s East West Link and ignored national issues such as the Anthony Morton need to reduce emissions. The justification for the scheme was con- Abstract: vincingly disproved during a nine year The state of Victoria, Australia, has long campaign: it will not relieve congestion, been a site of tension between an incum- or bring jobs, or regenerate the area; and bent and powerful road lobby and a com- better, cheaper alternatives exist. The case munity increasingly desirous of non-car was further undermined as traffic growth, transport alternatives. Today there is no journey time savings, BCR and new jobs greater signifier of this than the East West forecasts all reduced significantly. Link, a proposed 18km motorway in Mel- However, in spite of the convincing case bourne estimated to cost $16 billion. The against it, the scheme’s long life and the project is unprecedented both in the haste government’s obsession with infrastruc- with which it is being pushed through the ture spending carried it through. planning and pre-construction stages, and the apparent determination of the State Keywords: Government not to seek any kind of public Legacy scheme, congestion relief, new mandate for the project at a State elec- jobs, scheme costings, alternative meas- tion. Yet the project has no conventional ures. benefit-cost justification, does not serve a clearly defined demand in the context “Is this protester the most hated man of Melbourne’s travel patterns and trends, in Scotland?”: A personal perspective and is likely to displace better-justified and on the legal fight against the Aber- more popular public transport projects for deen Western Peripheral Route many years. Last year, it was the subject William Walton of Paul Mees’ final public addresses before his untimely death. This article examines Abstract: the historical background to the East West On 1st December 2005 the Scottish Trans- Link, the arguments put forward for it, and port Minister announced the preferred the alternatives that have featured in the route for a 46km long Aberdeen bypass ensuing public debate. in north-east Scotland. The route selected was significantly to the west of the previous Keywords: preferred semi-circular ‘C’ shaped route Motorways, Melbourne, Transport econom- and incorporated an 11.5km long spur to ics, Transport modelling, Agglomeration the south. A protest group called Road- benefits, Cost-benefit analysis, Downs- Sense , chaired by the author, was formed Thompson paradox, predict and provide. to oppose the scheme and campaign for more sustainable transport alternatives. Heysham M6 Link Road The group challenged the route in a public David Gate inquiry, through complaints to the Scottish Parliament, the compliance committee of Abstract: the UN Aarhus convention on access to The Heysham M6 Link Road is a legacy environmental justice and the European scheme with a long history, the present Commission and through the Scottish and version dating from 2004. After a long UK courts. This paper chronicles the cam- campaign against it by objectors, includ- paign, and explains why RoadSense chal- ing two public inquiries and two legal lenged the project and why the courts re- challenges, it was approved in December fused to quash the Scottish Parliament’s 2013. decision to approve it. It also examines This article discusses how the promoter, some of the practical difficulties which Lancashire County Council, decided on a the group and the author experienced in road solution before it had identified the gaining access to environmental justice problem it was intended to solve, refused and concludes that whilst some progress to listen to objectors, including the Council has been made in this direction it remains World Transport Policy and Practice 6 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 questionable whether Scotland (and hence The Death of the Habitats Directive the UK) is fully compliant with the spirit Alan James and the wording of the Aarhus convention. Abstract: Key words: The European Habitats Directive was pub- Aberdeen bypass (AWPR), RoadSense, lished in 1992, to provide a system of strategic environmental assessment strict protection for sites and species of (SEA), public consultation, environmental the highest conservation value at a Euro- justice. pean level. It was required to be transposed into law in every member state of the EU (EEC in 1992). It has been clari- The Curse of the Zombie Roads fied and if anything reinforced by case law Patrick Kinnersly and additional guidance since 1992, but remains unchanged in 22 years. However, Abstract: in Britain in recent years, following a few The paper sets out the history of road cases where the Habitats Directive pre- building along two transport corridors vented development from going ahead, it in South West England over the last two appears that scheme promoters increas- decades and seeks explanations for the ingly pay lip service to compliance with the revival of major highway schemes such Directive but by and large do not follow as the A350 Westbury Bypass and the due process in assessing projects against A36 Salisbury bypass. Thanks to mas- its requirements, in particular the criteria sive efforts by environmental groups both to be met for derogation from the prohibi- schemes have been decisively rejected by tions on damage or destruction of protect- the planning system and the government. ed species and their resting places. Local Why have such ‘Zombie roads’ survived planning authorities and inquiry inspec- into the 21st Century when the environ- tors seem reluctant to hold developers mental constraints on further increases in to the letter of the strict protection that road traffic should rule them out of con- is at the heart of the Directive. Case law sideration? These leftovers from the road- in Britain has delivered mixed outcomes, building boom of the 1990s rely on the but the landmark ‘Morge’ case in the Su- transport mythologies of the era of ‘Roads preme Court in 2010 acts as a precedent for Growth’ being revived by the present for cases involving protected species, es- government’s plan to spend £18bn on new tablishing in particular that the views of roads. The myths have survived - traffic statutory nature conservation authorities will never stop increasing; the govern- such as Natural England are paramount ment must predict the growth and provide in planning decisions and in judgements for it; an absurd cost-benefit appraisal where legal challenges are made. Yet Nat- system based on journey time savings can ural England is under-resourced to make still be relied on to show that even these proper assessments of all planning cases rejected schemes from the 1990s will be that trigger habitats Directive appraisals, good value for money today. Can such ap- and as a government-funded body is not parently suicidal irrationality be explained regarded as impartial by most campaign- by the fears of governments and global ers against development proposals: and corporations that congestion in local sur- ultimately is not infallible. face transport links might one day bring A further High Court challenge on the Hey- their entire global ‘Big transport’ network sham to M6 Link road, which threatened to a grinding halt? to destroy or damage the resting places of otters, failed in October 2013, and leave Keywords: to appeal was refused with the dismiss- Consultation, climate change, cost-benefit ive lines that the case for non-compliance analysis, globalisation, government policy, with the Habitats Directive was “technical multi-modal study, railways, roads, Wilt- and unmeritorious quibbling”. With these shire. words, in the author’s view the Habitats Directive lost its effectiveness as a part of the legal framework for development in Britain. This is not to deny that after 22 World Transport Policy and Practice 7 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 years the Directive may well be in need get. This view has met with citizen sup- of an overhaul: but its core principles and port and professional resistance and this values, as a ‘line in the sand’ against dete- paper describes the result of focus group rioration and destruction of the most im- discussions and a survey of profession- portant European sites and species, are as als to explore these differences. The pa- valid and necessary as ever. per seeks to explain different views and the persistence of death and injury rates Keywords: in the road traffic environment using the Habitats Directive, road scheme, otters, “insanity of normality” thesis produced by bats, Article 16 derogation, courts, Morge, the Swiss psycho-therapist, Gruen. AWPR, Heysham to M6 Link Keywords: Public transport network planning in System-design, Vision Zero, ethics, val- Auckland, New Zealand ues, psychotherapy, insanity Muhammad Imran and John Stone

Abstract: This paper explores the potential improvements to public transport patronage in Auckland, New Zealand that could be delivered by using the ‘network planning’ approach to public transport service design. Analysis of Auckland public transport services shows that a tailor-made approach has been adopted which is responsible for the low patronage levels. However, the city has an appropriate institutional structure and legislative framework which could support the redesign of public transport services to be simple, direct, higher frequency and make use of an integrated fare structure. Auckland land-use planning strategies provide a supportive context for network planning approach and should be used to develop a public engagement process for redesigning the public transport network. The paper concludes that Auckland has considerable potential to achieve higher public transport patronage by redesigning the network.

Keywords: public transport, network planning, Auck- land

The Insanity of Normality: Reconceptualising the Road Safety Debate Gary Haq, John Whitelegg

Abstract: Road safety debates have frequently identified the importance of having a system- wide approach to the urgent task of reducing death and injury. The system-wide approach is associated with the Swedish Vision Zero policy and its zero fatality tar- World Transport Policy and Practice 8 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 Death of an Urbanist

Paul Mees (1961-2013)

Brendan Gleeson

Paul Andrew Mees was a scholar of great Sustainability and the Public Works Com- accomplishment and distinction. His death mittee of the Parliament of Queensland. on 19 June 2013 at the early age of 52 Paul’s work on network planning is ex- deprives Australia of one of its most fear- pressly cited as the inspiration behind the less and perceptive academic voices. Paul European Union’s 2005 ‘HiTrans’ project. was well known as an activist intellectual whose formidable public voice called many Paul was indisputably one of the great- to account, especially the ensemble of est urbanists this country has produced public and private interests that have long and his achievements rank him amongst governed Australia’s lamentable transport the foremost of his peers anywhere in the policy arena. To deploy a well-known ax- world. In particular, his analysis of the iom, he ‘spoke truth to power’; unswerv- transport dilemmas facing the ‘dispersed’ ingly, bravely and through recourse to the low density cities of the western new world best available evidence and analysis of ur- is without parallel – both for the quality ban conditions. Paul was, to say the least, of the evidence and arguments assembled an insistently discomfiting presence in a and for the clarity of the solutions he pro- policy arena otherwise marked by a lazy posed. Paul’s active voice may have been indifference to the truth and, ultimately, silenced by his death, but the strength and to public interest. His caustic explana- integrity of his scholarship ensures that his tion of the urban transport sector is well influence will remain. In time his legacy summarized by Ulrich Beck’s memorable will continue to grow as his work becomes term, ‘organised irresponsibility’. A par- better understood and more widely known ticularly telling example that Paul brought and engaged – as it surely will. to light through scholarship and advocacy was Melbourne’s privatised ‘public’ trans- Paul’s scholarship was of the highest port system. He turned the language of standard – analytically, methodologically the right on itself to describe this system and conceptually. He was no high level as a rent-seeking muddle that denied the theorist. His contributions were in the public’s right to an effective, sustainable field of institutional and political analysis means of conveyance. of planning, and of urban conditions generally. Paul was not simply a transport Paul’s last advocacy, which he continued to planner, though through his advocacy and his final days, was to oppose Melbourne’s scholarly emphasis this casting is under- ecocidal East-West Link, a vast, cata- standable. The sweep of his curiosity and strophically expensive road scheme that ultimately his authority was much wider seemingly fails every conceivable planning than that. His legal qualifications and test. He led criticism with his usual in- experience expanded his understanding sight and courage. It is lamentable that of institutional process, whilst his math- the Australian planning community has re- ematical prowess enriched his analyses mained so collectively silent in the face of of urban dynamics. Many of we urbanists such malign schemes that continue to be deferred to his far reaching insights into inflicted on our cities. the wider urban process, with its manifold possibilities and failures. Paul’s public influence went far, however, beyond mere criticism. His urban advice Paul will be remembered rightly as a great was often sought not feared by more en- teacher. His pedagogy was marked by a lightened public bodies in Australia and potent mix of bravura, economy, and au- internationally. His expertise was sought thority. He was a demanding and uncom- from bodies as diverse as the Toronto promising supervisor of research students Transit Commission, New Zealand Trans- in an era that baulks at these traditional port, ACT Commissioner for Environmental teaching qualities, to its cost. Ultimately,

World Transport Policy and Practice 9 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 there is no greater a legacy that a scholar can leave than that of minds formed and improved through teaching, supervision, counselling and the many enriching acts of collegiality that good academics undertake quietly. This is of more import than the written testament even. The significance and scale of this part of Paul’s legacy is already witnessed to by the deluge of public tributes from former students that flowed in the days after his passing.

Paul remained steadfast in his scholarship through to the very last days of his life. The reward for this faithfulness was, as his beloved wife Erica has observed, a re- markable outpouring of what we will come to understand as some of his best work. His great lifeworks, the books A Very Pub- lic Solution (Mees 2000) and Transport for Suburbia (Mees 2010), were supple- mented by a series of powerful, perhaps peerless, studies of Australian urban conditions, including a magisterial account of Canberra’s planning and development published in this its centenary year (Mees, forthcoming). In these final works Paul was closely assisted by his colleague and co-author Lucy Groenhart. Other senior colleagues provided assistance that helped to ensure the last works were published in his lifetime, which pleased him immensely.

Vale ‘Comrade Mees’. We are unlikely to see your kind again, and perhaps we failed to cherish you properly when you were amongst us. Australia is harsh on its critics, and you were an especially potent and unsettling foe of conventional wisdom, and of venal power. As activist scholar you were without peer, but you were scorned by many lesser people. The good city you strove for remains elusive as ever, but you left us stronger for the struggle that seeks it. Still, our hearts are bruised by your parting and our talk is poorer for your si- lence. Dominus vobiscum.

Mees, P. (2000) A Very Public Solution, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne

Mees, P. (2010) Transport for suburbia: beyond the automobile age, Earthscan/ Routledge, London

Mees, P. (forthcoming) A Centenary Re- view of Transport Planning in Canberra, World Transport Policy and Practice 10 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 Paul Mees 1961-2013

Jago Dodson

Paul Mees was one of Australia’s most 2001, intersected with the Liberal (Con- creative and incisive transport and urban servative) Victorian government of 1992 planning thinkers and an unrelenting ad- to 1999. That administration, led by the vocate for more effective, sustainable and abrasive Jeff Kennett, applied a vigorous democratic transport policy and practice. deregulation and privatization program to His most significant intellectual contribu- the State’s public services, including public tion, among the many that he offered to transport. Kennett also undertook a mas- scholarship and practice, was in raising sive expansion of Melbourne’s motorway the importance of transport policy to the network primarily via the CityLink tollway achievement of sustainable urbanisation, project and later Western Ring Road and and the institutional methods to support Scoresby Freeway. Mees’ PTUA role saw this goal, in contrast to prevailing physical him regularly addressing Kennett’s pro- determinist assumptions about urban sus- gram via a mix of direct advocacy and tainability in which density drives transport campaigning accompanied by prominent behaviour. Mees’ contribution to scholar- private legal suits that tested the validity ship was also combined with an extraordi- of the CityLink taxation arrangements. At nary record of civic advocacy on transport one point he even ‘hid out’ in safe houses issues, especially in his home city of Mel- across Melbourne as private investigators bourne in which he was a prominent public pursued him for a subpoena. figure. In the early 1990s Mees began lectur- Mees began his professional career as a ing on transport at Melbourne University lawyer, specializing in employment rela- and started publishing papers that sys- tions, and drawing on his combination of tematically tested assumptions underpin- legal studies with mathematical training ning dominant views about Melbourne’s and a longstanding involvement in formal planning (Mees 1993; Mees 1994; Mees debating contests. However his interest in 1994). These works reflected his approach environmental and social issues, especially of detailed empiricism combined with in- around the car, and frustrated fascination stitutional narrative to understand how with Melbourne’s extensive yet underuti- transport systems succeed or failed. Much lised suburban public transport network of his early work, including his PhD under- drew him away from the legal profession, taken during 1994-1997 investigated the initially into public advocacy and subse- processes underpinning urban structure quently academia. including comparing Melbourne to Toron- to (Mees 1994). Mees’ doctoral findings Mees’ public advocacy developed through that Toronto achieved much higher pub- membership and subsequent presidency lic transport use rates than Melbourne, of Melbourne’s Public Transport Users As- despite largely similar urban form and sociation (PTUA), a community based body structure, demonstrated the independ- advocating for improved public transport ent influence of transport policy on urban in that city. Prior to Mees’ leadership the mode share, rather than a dependence on PTUA had been an important though mod- density. est pressure group modeled on the car- oriented Royal Automotive Club. But with During post-doctoral work at the Austral- his debater’s verve and capacity for stra- ian National University’s famed Urban Re- tegic campaigning Paul elevated the Asso- search Program in Canberra during 1997- ciation as one of the most systematically 1998 Mees adapted his PhD into his first critical interlocutors of urban transport book A Very Public Solution: Transport in policy in Melbourne. the Dispersed City (Mees 2000). In this

1 Although his election as PTUA President The youthful Mees’ direct style is well captured in a YouTube video of a 1992 TV debate with Victo- occurred under a Labor Victorian State rian Transport Minister Jim Kennan: http://youtu. Government1 , Mees’ term, from 1993 to be/0LPZy1lFIgE World Transport Policy and Practice 11 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 text Mees presented the core theoretical suburbs as part of a Federal by-election innovation on which his insights about ur- and then a general election. The cam- ban form and transport policy, and their paign achieved modest effect though, in implications, were founded. The key to what was highly car dependent suburbia meeting the dispersed travel demand and with a strengthening of conservative found in dispersed suburbia, he argued, sentiment nationally. The Public Transport was not densification via high-rise devel- First effort was one of Mees few direct en- opment but enabling transit to compete gagements in electoral politics. In 2002 he with the car by operating a grid of inter- was invited to stand as a Green candidate secting transit lines with seamless trans- for a Victorian seat in the Federal Senate, fers that served efficiently multiple origins but declined, citing the distraction from and destinations. A system designed on Melbourne urban transport issues and re- this basis could achieve a ‘network effect’ search that parliamentary responsibility of increasing returns to scale around im- might bring. proved service connectivity. This in turn relied on an array of network coordination Mees disdained frequent flying to interna- techniques such as stable regular time- tional conferences and eschewed the self- tables, high service frequencies, inter- promotion of global lecturing tours. But connected modes and fast, direct routes. during the early 2000s his work (Mees and Such arrangements, which lie at the core Dodson 2001) prompted invitations to as- of highly successful transit systems, such sist transit advocates and freeway oppo- as Zurich, in turn requires dedicated cen- nents in the New Zealand city of Auckland, tralised agencies whose task it is oversee one of the most car dependent outside of the entire network and apply these coor- the USA. His contributions helped to fos- dination techniques. Ultimately this re- ter a newly vibrant local transport advo- quires firm and consistent planning. The cacy scene in Auckland and over the past book captivated its readers. Sir Peter Hall’s decade the city has begun to transform (2001) review lauded its incisive contribu- its neglected public transport networks by tion and the challenge to planning ortho- applying in practice many of the network doxy around urban form and structure it planning principles Mees advocated . offered. The international recognition Mees found The recognition that persistent planning in New Zealand was mirrored much further was needed to solve urban transport ills abroad in the mid-2000s via the European found a glaring contradiction in the di- Union’s Hi-Trans project which produced rection of transport policy in Anglophone guidebooks on best practice for public polities, including Australia and the Unit- transport network planning (Nielsen et al. ed Kingdom. Melbourne’s public transport 2005). The network effect was canvassed networks were privatized by the Kennett in detail by the Hi-Trans authors as a fun- government in 1999. For Mees privatisa- damental principle – though unappreci- tion of public transport based on compe- ated prior to Mees - underpinning highly tition between operators and modes im- patronized European transit systems. Al- peded achievement of the network effect, though these insights are now well used which requires dedicated planning agen- in European transit planning practice, they cies. The Melbourne transit privatization have only recently begun to be recognized program posed both intellectual and prac- and tentatively applied in the Australian tical challenges and generated a stream setting. of new research papers during the early- 2000s (Mees 2002; 2005). Mees was among the most prominent public intellectuals in Melbourne. His effort From his newly tenured position at the Uni- was highlighted in University promotion- versity of Melbourne Paul’s advocacy took al material and one year he even gained a fresh turn in 2001 as he relinquished more media mentions than his Vice Chan- his PTUA presidency for a more direct cellor. But in 2007 Mees’ public advocacy model of public advocacy. This included brought him into uncomfortable contact leading a dedicated campaign against the with the harsher edge of institutional re- Scoresby Freeway in Melbourne’s eastern action. Comments about the performance World Transport Policy and Practice 12 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 of Victorian transport department officials capacity to stir public debate through the made at a public forum on Melbourne’s ur- media drew in part on Erica’s expertise as ban planning resulted in his University ini- a journalist while her editor’s eye added to tiating misconduct proceedings. This inci- the elegance of Mees’ persuasive and fluid dent prompted an extraordinary uproar of writing style. support among Melbourne’s civil society, including from some of Mees’ political op- In the Australia Day Honours announced ponents. The proceedings were withdrawn on 26 February 2014 the Commonwealth not before raising profound and troubling of Australia awarded Dr Paul Mees a rare questions about academic freedom and posthumous Medal (OAM) of the Order of advocacy (Farouque 2008). Soon after Australia in the General Division, for “serv- Mees was welcomed at RMIT University ice to public transport and urban planning and promoted to Associate Professor in as an academic and advocate for creating 2012. sustainable cities”.

In 2010 Mees published Transport for Sub- urbia: Beyond the Automobile Age (Mees References: 2010), an instant classic, which quickly Farouque, F. (2008). “Public provocateur”, found a global audience and entry to many The Age, 24 May, p.10; Melbourne. Avail- teaching text lists. This masterful text fur- able via: http://goo.gl/JoMwM9 ther expanded and refined Mees’ various insights into the network effect and institu- Hall, P. (2001). “An Old-fashioned So- tional design, along with a redoubled refu- lution.” Town and Country Planning tation of the new planning orthodoxy that 2001(May): 130-131. ‘density is destiny’ in transport outcomes. Its wry but persistent prose is essential Mees, P. (1993). “The Report of My Death reading to anyone who cares about cities, is an Exaggeration: Central City Retailing public transport and the future prospects in Melbourne Since 1900.” Urban Policy of dispersed suburbia in an age of climate and Research 11(1): 22-30. collapse and energy constraint. Mees, P. (1994). “Continuity and A lasting influence of Mees’ efforts on Change in Marvellous Melbourne.” Urban transport policy in Melbourne has been Futures(March): 1-11. to help foster what is now a robust and active civic conversation about transport Mees, P. (1994). “Too Good to be True: Are policy in the city. A generation of planning journeys to work really becoming short- students at Melbourne and RMIT universi- er?” Australian Planner 32(1): 4-6. ties have been educated under his tute- lage and many now hold influential roles Mees, P. (1994). “Toronto: paradigm reex- as practitioners in government and the amined.” private sector. Mees’ work has also been immensely esteemed in Australian plan- Mees, P. (2000). A Very Public Solution: ning scholarship and will surely resonate Transport in the Dispersed City. Melbourne, in debates here for many years as will the Melbourne University Press. echoes of his generous if sometimes exas- perating style of interlocution. His remon- Mees, P. (2002). Public transport privatisa- stration that density does not determine tion in Melbourne: ‘teething problems’ or transport outcomes will continue to irk en- something more serious? 25th Australa- trenched orthodoxies in policy, scholarship sian Transport Research Forum, Canberra, and practice alike. Moreover his distinc- ATRF. tive model of scholarly erudition and val- iant public action deserves much greater Mees, P. (2005). “Privatization of Rail and emulation. Tram Services in Melbourne: What Went Wrong?” Transport Reviews 24(4): 433- In all of his scholarship and public advo- 449. cacy Mees was supported by Erica Cervini, his wife of more than two decades. His World Transport Policy and Practice 13 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 Mees, P. (2010). Transport for Suburbia: Beyond the Automobile Age. London, Earthscan.

Mees, P. and Dodson, J. (2001). The American Heresy: Transport Planning in Auckland, New Zealand. Joint Conference of the New Zealand Geographical Society and Institute of Australian Geographers, University of Otago, Dunedin., New Zea- land Geographical Society.

Nielsen, G., Nelson, J., Mulley, C., Tegner, G., Lind, G. and Lange, T. (2005). Public Transport - Planning the Networks - Hi- Trans Best Practice Guide 2. Stavanger, Norway, European Union Interreg III and HiTrans.

World Transport Policy and Practice 14 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 Neat, Plausible and Wrong: Mel- While it has been the subject of numerous bourne’s East West Link studies over the years, it was only in 2012 Anthony Morton that the Victorian Liberal/National Coali- tion Government announced its intention Introduction to undertake the necessary planning and commence construction, initially for the Like much of the English-speaking world, most contentious eastern section. The the state of Victoria, Australia, has long project is unprecedented, both in the haste been a site of tension between an incum- with which it is being pushed through the bent and powerful road lobby and a com- planning and pre-construction stages, and munity increasingly desirous of non-car the apparent determination of the State transport alternatives (Mees, 2000 and Government not to seek any kind of public Stone, 2008). mandate for the project at a State election. Today there is no greater signifier of this than the East West Link: a proposed 18km At the previous election in 2010, the Co- motorway in Melbourne, running from east alition had replaced an incumbent Labor to west through the inner northern and Government on promises to build subur- western suburbs (www.linkingmelbourne. ban rail extensions and reform the man- vic.gov.au). Its eastern section would agement of public transport. Curiously, run for 5km through the inner north and it was Labor and not the Coalition who pass within 3km of Melbourne’s Central were making explicit promises on roads, Business District, and connect the exist- and then only for a more modest 5km ver- ing Eastern Freeway at the eastern end sion of the project’s western section, and with the CityLink tollway to the west. This a second motorway in the north-eastern eastern section alone has a current budget suburbs (VIctorian Government, 2008). cost of $8 billion. The project’s western Far from the Coalition Government hav- section would continue a further 13km ing an electoral mandate to build the East through the inner west and connect ulti- West Link, the 2010 election result would mately with the Western Ring Road in Mel- appear to imply the opposite. Perhaps bourne’s western industrial zone, raising with this in mind, the government has now the total project cost to an estimated $16 made clear that its haste in progressing the billion. planning for the road is aimed at obtain-

Figure 1: Proposed alignment for Melbourne’s East West Link, showing its relationship with other key Melbourne roads and the city centre. (Source: Victorian Government (Eddington, 2008), annotations by author.)

World Transport Policy and Practice 15 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 ing signed contracts for construction prior egory, the second of four steps required to the November 2014 State election, thus to fulfil its funding criteria (Infrastructure binding any subsequently elected govern- Australia, 2013). Meanwhile a competing ment (Tomazin, 2013). rail project—the Melbourne Metro Tunnel Stage 1—had been assessed in the fourth The road has been variously defended by category ‘Ready To Proceed’ in 2011, with its supporters, from the Victorian Premier a conventional benefit-cost ratio of 1.3 down, as a ‘congestion buster’, a ‘game (Infrastructure Australia, 2011). changer’ and a ‘city shaping’ project. The government agency responsible for the If this road project lacks a conventional project, the Linking Melbourne Authority benefit-cost justification and is unlikely (LMA), began its evidence to the East West to produce ‘agglomeration benefits’ of the Link panel hearings on 3 March by hand- sort claimed for it, then perhaps there are ing around copies of Edward Glaeser’s some other intangible benefits that might book Triumph of the City. This may seem justify why this project is being prioritised an odd choice given that Glaeser is no de- ahead of all other transport investment in fender of motorway building, particularly the state of Victoria. As this article will ex- in the central areas of established cities. plain, this is highly unlikely when one con- But we might understand this better if we siders in detail the claims made, the evi- recall that Glaeser’s book is intended as dence, and the measures that have been an apologia for the economic, social and put forward as alternatives in the politi- environmental benefits of concentrating cal debate around this project—measures human populations within large, high- that Victorians will be unable to afford in density urban areas—even, or perhaps es- future as a consequence of the govern- pecially, where this comes at the expense ment’s commitment to the road. As Paul of existing low-rise built forms (Glaeser, Mees might say, the East West Link could 2012). LMA’s business case for the East be the greatest political folly Victoria has West Link relies critically on ‘agglomera- yet seen. Or as H. L. Mencken put it dec- tion benefits’ of this kind. It is perhaps ades ago, “there is always a well-known hoped that Glaeser’s pro-development, solution to every human problem—neat, deregulationist stance, and his defence of plausible, and wrong” (Mencken, 1917). ‘urban megaprojects’ in particular, will obscure the fact that there is scant evidence Historical Background that big road projects actually promote urban concentration, and ample evidence Like almost every other major road pro- that they do the opposite, promoting the posed for Melbourne, the East West Link sprawl and hollowing-out of urban areas project has its roots in the Melbourne that Glaeser warns against. Transportation Study of 1969. This major planning study was postwar Melbourne’s It has always been clear that without bid at emulating the ambitious American these crucial ‘agglomeration benefits’ the highway plans of the era, and the authori- East West Link is on very shaky ground ties made a point of engaging for the task financially. All published assessments the firm of Wilbur Smith and Associates, of the East West Link to date have indi- who had taken the lead in developing such cated that on conventional cost-benefit plans ever since producing the first of its criteria, the project will fail to generate kind, the influential Chicago Area Trans- benefits sufficient to cover the sizeable portation Study of 1956. cost of construction. Paul Mees, prior to his untimely death in 2013, repeatedly In city after city where this computer-driv- made the point that the failure to pro- en ‘systems approach’ had been carried duce a positive benefit-cost ratio should out, the primary study outcome always have ruled the project out immediately. appeared much the same: a grid of free- Infrastructure Australia, the arms-length ways cutting across the urban area, typi- Federal Government agency that recom- cally with about a five-mile spacing (Mees, mends projects for Federal funding, has 2000). Melbourne’s own study likewise for its own part never rated the East West proposed a grid comprising well over a Link higher than the ‘Real Potential’ cat- dozen freeways with a total length around World Transport Policy and Practice 16 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 500km spread across the entire metropoli- his celebrated 1977 book Great Cities and tan area, with an overall scale and route Their Traffic: length similar to that of Los Angeles’ well known freeway system. This grid has, [The study is] an unconvincing work with minor modifications, served as the presented with all the glib political cli- template for major road proposals in Mel- chés that one has learned to distrust. It bourne ever since. is based on the earlier American transportation study techniques, by now As history tells, the release of the Trans- thoroughly discredited...quite clearly it portation Study in December 1969 predat- is a road plan, not—as it is called—a ed by only two months the first wave of comprehensive transport plan. political action against freeway-building, Victorian Premier Rupert Hamer respond-

Figure 2: The 1969 freeway plan, overlaid on a recent map of Melbourne. (Art- work by Public Transport Users Association. Base map © Melway Publishing 2002, repro- duced from Melway Street Directory Edition 29 with permission.) when in February 1970 the Governor of ed in due course to this criticism, excis- Massachusetts declared an embargo on ing large parts of the freeway plan the freeways in Boston (Mees, 2000). The re- day before announcing an election in 1973 volt soon spread to other cities, and be- (which the government subsequently won fore long Melbourne’s own Transportation comfortably). Plan was the subject of intense criticism. The general view was summed up by Brit- One of those roads removed in 1973 was ish urban geographer J. M. Thomson in the inner-city section of a freeway iden- World Transport Policy and Practice 17 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 tified as the F19. The remainder, known on the three radial motorways joined up as the Eastern Freeway, proceeded to be by CityLink has its origin or destination in built in stages and now extends through the city centre. Six years after the road much of Melbourne’s eastern suburbs. opened, Melbourne’s Age newspaper re- Since 2007 it has also connected to an- ported on traffic studies that showed only other motorway (originally labelled the 10% of traffic from the south-eastern sub- F35 in the 1969 plan, and now known as urbs used the CityLink route to bypass the EastLink) which proceeds due south and city, and only 12% of traffic from the West attracts traffic from a large part of Mel- Gate Bridge to the west used CityLink to bourne’s south-east. This has expanded cross over to the east (Colebatch, 2006). the Eastern Freeway’s role beyond that of a traffic feeder for the eastern suburbs, so Meanwhile, CityLink has had the predicted that it serves also as an alternative route effect on inner-city traffic. Melbourne’s in- from the south-east to the city, bypassing ner-city streets, still relatively free-flowing the heavily trafficked motorway that has in the 1990s, are now heavily congested served that purpose since the 1980s (the for most of the day. Although traffic vol- Monash Freeway). umes have now plateaued and are even in very slight decline (of which more be- These progressive extensions of the East- low), annual traffic statistics make clear ern Freeway to the east and south pro- that one effect of CityLink was to facilitate ceeded over decades despite planners’ a rapid increase in traffic in the five years knowledge that the freeway had a deliber- since opening, sufficient to induce stop- ately-created ‘dead end’ in the inner sub- start traffic conditions throughout the day urb of Clifton Hill, about 5km from the cen- on streets that were rarely congested out- tre of Melbourne. Until the beginning of side peak hours prior to CityLink opening. this century there were actually four such This is notwithstanding the fact that Cit- ‘dead ends’ where radial motorways met yLink, like the East West Link today, was the inner city, similar to those still found marketed to the public as a ‘congestion in London and other European cities. As buster’ and as the “Triple By-pass” promis- in those cities, Melbourne’s freeway dead- ing that “traffic will again flow freely in and ends came about in recognition of the fact around the Central Activities District, be- that these roads exist primarily to carry cause there will be far less through traffic commuters into the city centre, and the using our inner city streets.” (Melbourne central city area has a limited capacity to City Link Authority, 1995) absorb the resulting traffic. By ‘meter- ing’ the flow of traffic on approach routes, Even before CityLink opened in 2000, these dead-ends helped prevent inner-city political momentum was building to ‘do streets becoming completely overwhelmed something’ about the one remaining in- with traffic, kept demand for car commut- ner-city dead end, at the Eastern Free- ing at a level that city streets could ac- way in Clifton Hill. This was always go- commodate, and allowed public transport ing to be politically contentious, however, to demonstrate its ‘natural advantage’ in because (unlike with CityLink) there is no conveying large numbers of people to and convenient creek valley or industrial cor- from the city centre. ridor for a new road to follow: the route consists entirely of homes and highly val- This all changed when in the late 1990s ued parkland. So from the time the first the Victorian Government built the CityL- feasibility study was initiated in 1999, the ink motorway. This joined together three road extension was always referred to as of the four dead-ends, to the south and a ‘tunnel’—the subtext being that it would west of the city centre, resuscitating two be invisible and therefore impose no social other inner-city roads excised by Hamer or environmental costs to set against its two decades earlier. This was done on presumed benefits. the rationale that a ‘bypass’ route was required for traffic proceeding from one side The 1999 feasibility study was recast af- of the city to the other. Yet as traffic data ter a change of government, and became showed at the time, and as remains true to the Northern Central City Corridor Study the present day, the vast majority of traffic (NCCCS), which appeared in draft form in World Transport Policy and Practice 18 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 2003. This study was notable in that it ing the Case for Action report for the UK examined the evidence for travel time and Government (Eddington, 2006). A key other benefits from the road, and based theme in that earlier report was empha- its conclusions on the evidence rather than sising the wider economic benefits that any prior conviction on the project’s mer- are held to flow from public investment in its. Its key finding was that of all the daily roads, rail and airports, and a similar em- westbound traffic coming off the Eastern phasis underlay the recommendations of Freeway, only 15% continued due west to the 2008 Eddington Report for Melbourne. CityLink or beyond. The majority (about The LMA case for the East West Link draws two-thirds) turned south and headed to- heavily on the Eddington Report’s themes ward the city, matching the long-estab- of ‘transport connectivity’ and ‘agglomera- lished pattern observed on Melbourne’s tion benefits’—themes that now also find radial freeways. their echo in Glaeser’s work.

The draft NCCCS accordingly concluded The East West Link was one of three big- that no case could be made for extend- ticket projects recommended by Edding- ing the Eastern Freeway further west, be- ton. Another was the Regional Rail Link, cause all this would achieve would be to a new rail alignment from the west of Mel- take the existing ‘bottleneck’ in Clifton Hill bourne into the city that regional trains and redistribute it to other northern ap- could use to bypass the suburban rail net- proaches to the city, without significantly work. This ‘Tarneit link’ was not a major reducing the amount of traffic subject to focus of the report, but famously gained congestion. In its place, it recommended $3.2 billion of Commonwealth funding as a suite of local traffic management meas- a ‘shovel ready’ economic stimulus project ures to boost the efficiency of traffic flow in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis on the inner-city road network. in 2009, despite not being far developed beyond a line on a map at the time (Mur- As it happens, the NCCCS never proceeded phy, 2011). The third major project was to a final report: for reasons that remain the 9km Melbourne Metro rail tunnel, pro- unclear, the study was shut down after the viding an extra suburban train path under draft report appeared. The contract for the city centre between the inner western the EastLink motorway was awarded one and south-eastern suburbs. As previously year later in 2004, and this coincided with mentioned, planning for this project was the appearance in the media of stories sufficiently well advanced by 2011 that In- about the masses of traffic EastLink would frastructure Australia considered it ‘Ready add to the city end of the Eastern Free- to Proceed’. way. Then in 2005 came Melbourne City Council’s ‘East West Integrated Transport Both the Regional Rail Link and the Mel- Proposal’. This resuscitated the Eastern bourne Metro tunnel have been criticised Freeway extension in the form we know it by public transport advocates, most nota- today, including the additional 13km sec- bly by Mees, on the basis of high budget tion through the western suburbs. It was costs, inconsistent justifications, flawed now suggested this western section was design, ‘mission creep’, and a general fail- required as an ‘alternative’ to the congest- ure to weigh up the projects against po- ed West Gate Bridge, the principal free- tentially less costly alternatives (Mees, way route from the west. Notwithstanding 2008a/b). These objections notwith- the negative conclusion from the NCCCS standing, the Eddington Report and sub- study just two or three years previously, sequent assessments by bodies such as the State Government promptly took up Infrastructure Australia have consistently the cause, commissioning in 2006 the given these projects both a higher benefit- East West Link Needs Assessment, more cost ratio and a lower overall cost than the commonly known as the Eddington Report East West Link motorway. It was accord- (Eddington, 2008). ingly not these assessments the Victorian Coalition Government was relying on when it seized on the motorway as its highest Sir Rod Eddington came to the East West transport infrastructure priority. Link Needs Assessment fresh from prepar- World Transport Policy and Practice 19 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 Figure 3: Trin Warren Tam-Boore (Bellbird waterhole) urban wetland in Royal Park, set to disappear under an East West Link interchange. (Photo by author.) Examining the Claims systems is to promote mobility of the population by increasing the range of destina- The positive claims made for the East West tions accessible in a given time from one’s Link that call for scrutiny are numerous. starting point. This strict rationale is in- For the reader’s benefit, the various claims voked, for example, when planners gauge are investigated below in four broad cat- the productivity of the transport system egories: economic benefits and cost sav- by tallying the number of jobs accessi- ings; travel patterns and trends; the ad- ble within half an hour’s travel time from equacy of the road network and role of various points in the urban area (Victorian non-road alternatives; and job creation. Government, 2002, p.24).

The missing business case for the East The travel time metric is also vulnerable to West Link criticism, most palpably on the questions of how one assigns a dollar value to time Transport projects are conventionally sub- savings, and whether a one-minute sav- jected to a cost-benefit analysis where ing for each of 10 people should really be the costs of construction, land acquisition valued identically to a ten-minute saving and associated severance are weighed up for one person. It nonetheless remains against aggregate travel time savings and the best tool available for quantifying the other ‘cash’ benefits such as reduced road mobility benefit of a transport system im- trauma costs, vehicle operating cost sav- provement. It also provides a reasonably ings and additional public transport rev- reliable tool for comparing alternative pro- enue. Travel time is usually by far the posals from a mobility perspective. largest benefit assessed. Reliance of this It is nonetheless true that all conventional metric can be justified on the basis that benefit-cost ratios ever published for the on a strict view, the objective of transport East West Link as a standalone project World Transport Policy and Practice 20 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 have been less than unity; that is, the con- pared with Eddington’s $7 billion for the ventionally assessed benefits have failed entire project), but provided no other sup- to match the cost of construction, indicat- porting detail. Only when an Infrastruc- ing the project is wasteful of public funds. ture Australia official was called before a Conversely, when major public transport Federal Senate committee was it publicly projects such as the Melbourne Metro tun- confirmed that without including the wider nel have been assessed on the same ba- benefits, the BCR of the road was still only sis, the benefit-cost ratio (BCR) calculated 0.8—a return of 80 cents per dollar spent has been equal to 1 or greater. (Gordon, 2014).

The fiscal weakness of the East West Link The ‘wider benefits’ spoken of for the East was not directly apparent from the Edding- West Link are, for the most part, Glae- ton Report, because the costs and benefits ser’s ‘agglomeration benefits’. They rely were stated for the complete package of on the ability of improved transport sys- road and public transport improvements, tems to concentrate employment and ac- and not for the road project alone. How- tivities in urban centres. The problem is, ever, the consultants’ supporting analysis of course, that the building of urban mo- (Meyrick et al, 2008) also provided cost torways is not generally held to promote and benefit estimates for the public trans- urban concentration at all. The support- port improvements considered alone. As ers and opponents of road-building are Mees (2008b) pointed out, the figures im- generally agreed that the effect of build- ply by simple subtraction that the conven- ing more roads is to de-concentrate urban tional BCR for the road is 0.45, indicating a activities: to put more distance between return to the public of just 45 cents worth destinations and promote sprawl, as de- of benefit for every dollar spent (see Table velopment relocates to far-flung locations 1). dependent on private car transport. Even In order to provide a convincing justifi- where urban areas that have built motor- cation for the measures in the Eddington ways do achieve beneficial concentration Report, it was necessary to rely on ‘wider of activities, this concentration cannot be Cost ($bill) Benefit ($bill) BCR

A: Combined package of road and PT improvements 15.0 11.1 0.74 B: Public transport improvements alone 7.9 7.9 1.00 C: East West Link alone (difference A – B) 7.1 3.2 0.45

Table 1: Conventional cost-benefit analysis of measures in Eddington Report Source: Eddington (2008) and Mees (2008b) drawing on Meyrick et al (2008) economic benefits’ additional to the travel said to have been caused by motorway time and cost savings considered in a con- building; at best, the motorways have a ventional analysis. But even when these neutral influence on the concentrated ur- wider benefits were included, they failed ban form brought about by other means. to make a break-even case for the road: a calculation similar to the above found the As long as the full business case for the BCR for the road increased to just 0.74 East West Link remains shrouded in se- (Mees, 2008b). crecy, therefore, there are substantial grounds to doubt that the ‘wider benefits’ The current State Government has made claimed for the road have a basis in reality. much of having an updated ‘business And since the project is wholly reliant on case’ for the East West Link that computes these ‘wider benefits’ to have a chance of a more respectable BCR of 1.4 including returning a public benefit greater than the ‘wider economic benefits’. But this was cost of construction, this should call into only made public as a ‘short form’ 8-page question the entire economic justification summary document, which confirmed that for the road. the construction cost had been reassessed as $8 billion for the eastern section (com- World Transport Policy and Practice 21 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 The only way the case for the road might claimed for it. But in the real world, travel be salvaged is if the cost to the public of time savings from new urban motorways building the road were somehow reduced have been challenged on two grounds: to become less than the quantum of ben- first, that induced travel soon appears to efit. Accordingly supporters of the road cancel out any time savings gained (SAC- have emphasised the way it is being pro- TRA, 1994); and second, that the motor- posed as a ‘public-private partnership’ way ‘solution’ does not even fit the prob- (PPP) and that the State and Federal Gov- lem planners are trying to solve. ernments have so far only committed $1.5 billion apiece toward the $8 billion eastern In 2008, Melbourne University’s Professor section. Nick Low observed that “despite many billions of dollars being committed to road The implication is that the $5 billion bal- building on the basis of aggregate time ance will be funded by the private sector savings, there has not been a single study at zero cost to the public. But this, to put of whether time has actually been saved it mildly, is not how PPPs have worked in as a result of a particular road, or any the past. Private-sector partners, under- other form of transport infrastructure, or standably, are even more anxious than whether that time is actually spent produc- governments to obtain a commercial re- tively.” This inspired the economist John turn on investment; they have learned Odgers, from Melbourne’s RMIT Univer- from high-profile failures of similar toll sity, to make a study of actual travel time road operations such as Sydney’s Cross savings from the CityLink project. Odgers’ City Tunnel. But this financial return does conclusion was that there had in fact been not come out of nowhere: it comes either a travel time dis-saving from building the from the users of the road via tolls, or from road: motorists were spending more time the government via availability payments in traffic than before CityLink was built. As or ‘shadow tolls’. Either way, there is a he concluded (Odgers, 2009): transfer of money from the public as road users or taxpayers to support the private [T]hese results suggest that... an in- operator, representing once again costs to crease in average travel speeds has be offset against travel time savings and not eventuated in Melbourne’s urban other benefits. road network during the years under review. Indeed, based on the evidence Either way, the public still pays the full presented and analysed in this paper, cost of the road. The one advantage of one could be led to the conclusion PPPs—or indeed of direct public borrowing that investments in Melbourne’s urban to fund projects—is that the upfront cost road network have resulted in more of construction is restructured as a stream time being used by Melbourne’s mo- of future cash flows that can be discount- torists rather than less time. On the ed (as indeed the benefits must also be basis of the assumptions convention- discounted as they lie in the future). It ally used to justify road building, ma- appears unlikely, however, that a prima jor road infrastructure initiatives have facie public deficit could be parlayed into resulted in net economic disbenefits... a substantial public surplus purely through In closing, perhaps the German word accounting devices of this kind. It ap- schlimmbesserung—meaning an im- pears particularly unlikely given that long- provement that makes things worse— term observers of PPP projects in Victoria is an apt descriptor for the massive have concluded they can at least double program of new road construction that the ultimate cost to the public compared has marked Melbourne’s solution to its with ordinary deficit financing (Davidson, transport challenges over the last sev- 2013). eral decades.

Travel patterns and trends in Melbourne But quite apart from induced traffic is the question whether the East West Link is ac- Economic arguments for the East West tually fit-for-purpose. Like CityLink, it is Link all rely on assuming the road actu- claimed to be a ‘bypass’ of the inner city ally does generate the travel time savings to allow faster travel between the east- World Transport Policy and Practice 22 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 ern and western suburbs. Psychologically, What is not explicitly pointed out here is this argument appeals to the ‘availability that the travel pattern shown is not ob- cascade’ produced by the long queue that tained from real travel surveys, but is ac- regularly forms at the city end of the East- tually the output of a computer model— ern Freeway. The fact this queue points a more sophisticated version of the one due west, and not toward the city centre Wilbur Smith used in the 1960s. Though where most traffic is headed, actually un- the model is validated at a coarse level dermines our rational capacity to appre- against real traffic data, such an exercise hend the true traffic patterns in the area, can only validate the aggregate numbers: a task that demands ‘slow’ or ‘system 2’ it cannot validate the pattern of origins and thinking (Kahneman, 2011). The idea we destinations among individual journeys, are intuitively led to accept instead is that unless the real-world data includes origin- by joining up all the motorways we can destination or number plate surveys (like confine all the traffic there, and banish those undertaken for the NCCCS), and not all congestion from our arterial roads and just vehicle counts. This means the pat- residential streets. terns seen will be entirely a function of the assumptions programmed into the model. Of course, with our system 2 thinking engaged, we know that travellers’ final des- Brunswick Road is a local arterial road. It tinations are not on motorways, and we will therefore cater for a sizeable amount can recall the NCCCS conclusion that true of local travel as well as feeding traffic to east-west travel only accounts for 15% major routes such as CityLink or the East- of traffic coming off the Eastern Freeway ern Freeway. While some Brunswick Road and that the freeway’s primary role is as traffic will be seen to travel to CityLink and a radial commuter route to the city cen- some traffic will be seen to travel to the tre. It is unfortunate therefore that road Eastern Freeway, it is most likely that, in planners have attempted to obscure this nearly all cases, this is not the same traf- conclusion in order to justify the East West fic. For the most part it will be journeys Link project. that commence in the suburbs adjoining Brunswick Road itself and head to one of One way this has been done is using the these motorways, or vice versa. The East concept of ‘select link analysis’, many ex- West Link does not provide an alternative amples of which are given in Chapter 5 route for such journeys, as it is intended of the Eddington Report. The technique as a cross-city route with few intermediate is to choose a single point X on the road entry or exit points. network, and then map all the (actual or modelled) journeys that pass by X. The What this all means is that when model- result is a map with lines of varying thick- ling by East West Link proponents ap- ness, thicker lines indicating a larger share pears to find evidence of large-scale rat of the journeys through X. running through suburban streets, all they are seeing is their own model’s assump- Particular attention is drawn to an analy- tions reflected back in the results. The sis for Brunswick Road, which runs parallel model has in effect taken some limited to the route of the East West Link. The observations of local travel within these map extends two quite thick lines to the suburbs and hypothesised patterns of east and west, one onto CityLink and the long-distance travel that are consistent other toward the Eastern Freeway. Again with these observations. It repeats the the clear intention is to suggest a domi- key misapprehension in the case for the nant pattern of long-distance east-west EastLink motorway, when congestion on travel using Brunswick Road as a ‘rat run’ north-south roads in eastern Melbourne between these two motorways (Eddington was taken as evidence of large amounts 2008, chapter 5, pp.123–4). It is sug- of long-distance north-south travel, when gested the East West Link would absorb in fact it arises from the combined effect this travel, removing it from the local road of many short-distance local trips (PTUA, network. 1998).

World Transport Policy and Practice 23 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 Also overlooked in the traffic forecasts un- the daily traffic statistics for the very east- derlying the case for the East West Link is west roads in Melbourne that are said to the fact that the long 20th-century trend be grinding to a halt. As Table 2 shows, for car travel to grow faster than popu- many of these roads have seen daily traf- lation has actually ceased in much of the fic decline by as much as 15% over the western world. Indeed in some cities in- decade 2002–2012, and even those whose cluding Melbourne, car travel per capita traffic has increased have seen these in- has been on a very slight declining trend creases limited to at most 5% over that since about 2004 (Loader, 2013). One time. way this has been seen to play out is in 2002 2009 2012 Alexandra Pde near Smith St, eastbound 33,000 32,000 32,000 Alexandra Pde near Smith St, westbound 32,000 30,000 30,000 Alexandra Pde near Nicholson St, eastbound 40,000 37,000 34,000 Alexandra Pde near Nicholson St, westbound 38,000 35,000 34,000 Princes St near Rathdowne St, eastbound 29,000 28,000 28,000 Princes St near Rathdowne St, westbound 33,000 30,000 28,000 College Cres near Swanston St, eastbound 30,000 28,000 28,000 College Cres near Swanston St, westbound 30,000 28,000 28,000 Elliott Ave, eastbound 19,000 18,000 18,000 Elliott Ave, westbound 17,000 17,000 17,000 Victoria Pde near Brunswick St, eastbound 24,000 21,000 22,000 Victoria Pde near Brunswick St, westbound 24,000 21,000 22,000 Brunswick Rd near Lygon St, eastbound 11,000 11,000 11,000 Brunswick Rd near Lygon St, westbound 9,000 8,500 8,500 Bell St near Nicholson St (Coburg), eastbound 22,000 22,000 22,000 Bell St near Nicholson St (Coburg), westbound 25,000 24,000 24,000 Bell St near Albert St (Preston), eastbound 20,000 21,000 21,000 Bell St near Albert St (Preston), westbound 24,000 23,000 24,000 Table 2: Daily traffic volumes on key east-west roads north of Melbourne City, 2002–2012 Source: Vicroads (2013) On their face, these statistics do not indicate an urgent problem that is only capable of being solved by a new road. Rather they suggest road traffic in the region is being managed broadly in line with the recommendations of the 2003 draft NC- CCS report. It contrasts with the arterial roads parallel to CityLink, where motorists have seen the playing out of Odgers’ conclusion above, of rising local congestion and travel time dis-savings.

In its essence, the argument made for the East West Link in the Eddington Report and subsequent planning documents is the same one the UK Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (1995) described as predict and provide:

It has been assumed that there will be a continuing growth in road traffic, and that a continuous programme of build- The circular logic of freeways. (Car- ing new roads and improving existing toon by Ron Tandberg.) roads is required in order to accommodate that growth. World Transport Policy and Practice 24 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 When combined with the reality of in- pay a toll (whereas the West Gate Bridge duced traffic, ‘predict and provide’ is is toll-free). And that is just on the road self-evidently a policy with perverse con- network. The western section of the rail sequences. In such a world, new roads network comprises four suburban railway provide their own post hoc justification tracks, two freight tracks, and two tracks through increased traffic levels (as CityL- recently built as part of the Regional Rail ink did between 2000 and 2004), which Link project. On a conservative estimate in turn support new predictions mandating these tracks carry some 16,000 passen- the provision of further new roads. It has gers in the peak direction in the busiest been recognised that to break this vicious hour, which is twice as many as drive or cycle, planners must consciously resist the are driven over the West Gate Bridge in temptation to encourage traffic growth by the same hour. adding to road capacity in already-congested urban areas. It is especially critical that in those places where a declining trend has established itself—as appears to be the case in inner-northern Melbourne to date—they do not undermine this with contrary policies, based on recycled forecasts of rising traffic that do not reference the facts on the ground.

Road and rail network capacity, and the myth of ‘balance’

The above feeds into general arguments about the future capacity of Melbourne’s road network, its ability to cope with population growth and the demands of freight transport, and the role of public transport in relieving demands on the road system. Figure 4: Footscray railway station in Melbourne’s inner west carries twice The most popular argument for the west- as many on trains in the busiest hour ern section of the East West Link is the as drive over the West Gate Bridge in supposed need for an “alternative to the that time. (Photo: Daniel Bowen / PTUA.) West Gate Bridge” (Victorian Government, 2008). It is frequently suggested that the The completion of the Regional Rail Link East West Link would provide ‘backup’ in in 2015 is expected to add capacity to the event that an incident closes an ex- this part of the rail network equivalent to isting motorway route. If history is any a whole additional West Gate Bridge, with guide, however, the East West Link will 8,000 or more additional passengers able soon enough fill up with its own traffic that to be carried. Should the Melbourne Metro will all but prevent it from assuming the tunnel ever be built, one can expect yet additional load diverted from another mo- another capacity boost of the same mag- torway. It would only reliably function as nitude. ‘backup’ if it were kept closed to traffic until such time as an incident occurred. So in reality there are ample ‘alternatives’ to the West Gate Bridge for passenger Meanwhile, there are actually three ma- transport. The failure to recognise this in jor arterial roads to the immediate west the policy debate appears to be down to of central Melbourne that run parallel to the unwillingness of politicians and senior the West Gate Bridge and provide motor- planners to learn from the turnaround in ists with an alternative right now—a total public transport use in Melbourne over the of six lanes in each direction. The Western past decade. In a panel hearing on 5 March Ring Road performs a similar function, but 2014, LMA’s chief modeller Michael Veitch runs further north, requiring motorists to remarked that people in the East West approach the inner area on CityLink and Link catchment “are not users of public World Transport Policy and Practice 25 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 transport”. This commits what social psy- assertion known as the Downs–Thom- chologists call the ‘fundamental attribution son Paradox: that the level of service on error’—attributing people’s behaviour to the road system can depend more on the the kind of people they are rather than the quality of the alternatives to road travel circumstances in which they find them- than on the quality of the road system it- selves—which is an all too common fallacy self (Thomson, 1977). Improving public in transport planning (Druker, 2010). transport is actually of benefit to habitual motorists just as much as habitual public The fundamental attribution error is also transport users, because every new user at the root of the frequent calls for ‘bal- of public transport is one more traveller ance’ in transport planning. This is exem- not adding to traffic congestion. And if plified by the insistence in the Eddington motorists are persuaded to swap some of Report, frequently repeated in newspaper their car trips for public transport trips, so editorials, that the solution to Melbourne’s much the better. transport problems lies in building big road projects alongside big rail projects. In re- Of course, the ongoing provision of new ality, what this actually entails is build- road capacity on the predict-and-provide ing a rail project with a positive return on model drives the equilibrium in a mutu- investment, but then undermining that ally unsatisfactory direction: it attracts benefit by building a parallel road project more private car trips on its own account, whose own benefits fall short of its costs but also diverts funding from the mainte- but which will compete with the rail project nance and improvement of public trans- for passengers, starving both projects of port, making it more likely that people will revenue. abandon public transport for car travel. This in turn deprives the public transport

World’s most liveable city. (Cartoon by Ron Tandberg.)

In reality, people adjust their use of cars system of revenue, amplifying the vicious and public transport according to the qual- cycle. This is yet another reason why road ity of service available. This was first rec- plans on the predict-and-provide model, ognised by the economist Anthony Downs including all those produced in favour of and was developed by Thomson into the the East West Link to date, constitute an World Transport Policy and Practice 26 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 outdated and counterproductive approach with a continuous ‘pipeline’ of well-justi- to urban transport provision. fied projects in service of a strategic objective. In the Australian transport sec- The equilibrium between use of private tor for the past half-century, this meant cars and use of public transport for pas- a pipeline of road projects with steady senger travel is also of critical importance funding provided virtually as-of-right, with to road freight transport. Trucks and vans the strategic objective of facilitating more are an important component of the urban travel by private car at the expense of al- transport task, but freight vehicles gener- ternatives. This succeeded in employing a ally comprise just 10 per cent of the traf- substantial number of people in road engi- fic on any given road. This means that neering and construction. But having rec- the freight transport problem is really just ognised the perverse consequences of the the passenger transport problem in a new predict-and-provide model for road trans- guise. It has been established that build- port, the imperative now is to switch to the ing the East West Link will add to traffic alternative: a pipeline of public transport on suburban arterial roads: freight is thus improvements with a dedicated workforce likely to only be further impeded by pri- of planners, engineers, construction work- vate car traffic as a consequence. Freight ers, drivers, and service staff. transport is best aided by providing alternatives to private cars for passenger There are, indeed, currently hundreds of travel, so that additional congestion can workers gainfully employed in the con- be avoided. struction of the Regional Rail Link project due for completion in 2015. As things Jobs and investment stand, the only new jobs on offer for these workers after 2015 is on road projects Australia, and the state of Victoria more where their valuable rail-specific expe- specifically, has recently suffered a rience is likely to atrophy. Rail projects number of high-profile job losses. Austral- are at least as labour-intensive as road ian industry is experiencing a painful tran- projects and provide an alternative ave- sitional phase at present, and this gener- nue for future employment. ates much understandable anxiety about ongoing employment prospects for Aus- In short, there are alternatives to the East tralian workers, particularly those whose West Link that will employ more people skills are linked to declining manufactur- with a more diverse range of skills for ing industries. It is therefore understand- longer. It is appropriate that we turn now able that politicians and union leaders will to consider these alternatives. warm to the prospect of a road project that promises to create 3,200 jobs in con- Neglected Alternatives struction within 12 months. As has been argued, debates about trans- Overlooked here, of course, is that spend- port futures must always consider the ining an equivalent amount of money on any ter-relationship between demand for pri- other construction project—or better, a di- vate car travel and demand for travel by versified package of projects—would em- public or active transport, and between ploy the same number of people. Indeed, road freight and rail freight. The existence it is widely argued that public transport of the Downs equilibrium, attested by am- infrastructure projects create more jobs ple evidence, means that consideration per dollar spent, and those jobs include at of non-road alternatives to the East West least some that are long-lasting (such as Link cannot be dismissed out of hand, as the people who will operate the new serv- road proponents have suggested, by stat- ices). The East West Link’s eastern stage ing that people in the road catchment “are involves $2.5 million of spending for every not users of public transport”. single job created, in a country where the median household income is $64,000. One consequence of the East West Link being so costly at $16 billion is that it is The best way to provide secure employ- likely to crowd out any alternative investment through infrastructure provision is ment in transport infrastructure: as Mees World Transport Policy and Practice 27 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 said in his final public address, “there will But even on the most cursory analysis, be no money left for any substantial trans- the Metro tunnel only tackles half the East port projects for Melbourne for at least a West Link’s rationale: that for the west- generation.” The East West Link therefore ern section. It provides substantial new exists in direct competition with projects capacity for travel in the west, and to a to strengthen and extend the rail network, lesser extent in the south-east, but none but also with fixing rural roads and bridg- to the east or north-east. It may rightly es, with providing adequate arterial road be called a West Gate Bridge alternative. networks in the suburbs, and with grade- But for travellers stuck in chronic traffic separating the hundreds of extant road- queues on the Eastern Freeway it is of vir- rail level crossings in Victoria. All such tually no relevance. efforts are likely to face severe budget constraints as a consequence of the East The Doncaster rail extension is more West Link proceeding, just as similar ef- closely targeted at the Eastern Freeway forts did when large sums were diverted catchment in Melbourne’s north-eastern to freeway-building in the latter part of the suburbs: specifically the City of Manning- twentieth century. ham, which has long held the distinction of being the only municipality in metropolitan Melbourne to lack any form of rail service. On Census day in 2011, just 12 per cent of Manningham workers travelled to work by public transport, compared to a metropolitan average of 18 per cent, and 20 per cent in the neighbouring City of White- horse that is a similar distance from central Melbourne but does have a train line. Conversely, 84 per cent of Manningham workers drove to work compared with 75 per cent in Whitehorse and 78 per cent in Figure 5: Local volunteers collect sig- Melbourne as a whole. natures for the City of Yarra’s Trains Not Tollroads campaign in 2013. The Doncaster train line would run along the Eastern Freeway median for at least The most relevant alternatives to the part of its length before proceeding under- East West Link, however, must surely be ground to serve district centres in Man- those that tackle the same problems the ningham. Its potential to increase the East West Link purports to solve. In the mode share for public transport relative popular debate surrounding the project, to that for car travel is argued by analogy the two such alternatives most commonly with the Mandurah rail line in Perth, which mentioned are the Melbourne Metro tunnel also runs through low-density ‘freeway and the Doncaster rail extension. suburbs’. Prior to the train line opening in 2008, express bus services ran between The Melbourne Metro tunnel is put forward Perth and Mandurah carrying 16,000 pas- almost reflexively as the unique alterna- sengers a day. After 11 weeks of rail op- tive to the East West Link in some quar- eration, the train line on the same route ters, particularly among politicians and was carrying over 40,000 passengers a commentators. This is likely due less to day (MacTiernan, 2008). According to its specific benefits than to its rhetorical statistics published by planning authority position in the framing of the Melbourne TransPerth, the train line now carries up to transport debate. The Metro tunnel and 75,000 passengers a day. the East West Link shared top billing in the 2008 Eddington Report; both have budg- Critics of the Doncaster rail option point ets that are unprecedented in size for a to two major challenges, however. The single project; both have featured in Vic- first is that where the railway runs in the torian Government submissions to Infra- freeway median its stations would be re- structure Australia at various times; and mote from the passenger catchment. This both are at an advanced stage of planning. same issue occurs in Perth and in other World Transport Policy and Practice 28 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 Figure 6: PTUA and allied groups’ proposal for the Doncaster rail extension, originally put forward as an alternative to the Eastern Freeway eastward extension in 1990. (Diagram: Tony Morton / PTUA.) cities, and its solution involves high-qual- ling, which locates signal aspects (the rail- ity feeder bus networks, designed accord- way equivalent of traffic lights) in the driving to multimodal network planning prin- er’s cabin rather than on fixed trackside ciples of the sort described by Mees in his infrastructure. This is often combined with book Transport for Suburbia (Mees, 2010). a ‘moving block’ signalling philosophy that Case studies are cited in this and Mees’ allows trains to follow each other in a simi- earlier work A Very Public Solution (Mees, lar manner to cars on a freeway. These 2000) of cities where more than 70 per various ‘high capacity signalling’ solutions cent of suburban train passengers arrive have boosted track capacity to between at their station by connecting bus or tram. 30 and 33 trains per hour, compared with Melbourne’s 22 to 24 trains per hour (and The Doncaster line’s second point of con- less on suburban sections of the network). tention is that on the most affordable plan, Doncaster trains would share the same track as two existing train lines at the city end, as part of the so-called ‘Clifton Hill group’. Government planners have long argued that the infrastructure for this group lacks the capacity to carry trains on all three lines. At their busiest, the two existing lines account for a total of 18 trains per hour at present, and the practical capacity of the existing infrastructure (dependent primarily on signalling and station dwell times) is variously assessed as 22 to 24 trains per hour. So it is possible a Doncaster service with 6 trains per hour could be accommodated, but this would leave no room for future patronage Figure 7: In reality, unfortunately, growth at peak times. trains to East Doncaster are still just plans with no funding or political com- What this issue highlights is the funda- mitment. (Digitally altered photo: Daniel mental importance of bringing Melbourne’s Bowen / PTUA.) relatively outdated and neglected rail infrastructure up to the standard of comparable European cities. Since at least the Achieving these sizeable gains in rail sys- turn of the century, European cities led by tem capacity depends on a number of tech- London and Paris have been systematical- nical factors. It requires in particular that ly upgrading their rail signalling and train the network be close to fully ‘sectorised’ control systems to allow more trains to run (so that trains do not cross each other’s on the same tracks. The state of the art path) and ideally fully grade-separated currently is ‘radio based’ or ‘in-cab’ signal- from the road network. Achieving this in World Transport Policy and Practice 29 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 Melbourne’s rail network, with its baroque Melbourne Airport, a major source of such operating practices and abundance of lev- long-distance cross-city travel as does ex- el crossings, will come at substantial cost. ist) and operational fixes for the rail net- But the cost pales in comparison with that work, along with an overhaul of suburban of building entire new rail corridors parallel bus services, and minor works to improve to existing ones, or of providing the road train-tram and train-bus connections. It capacity to accommodate the equivalent is drawn from measures that have suc- amount of car travel. ceeded in other cities from Paris to Zu- rich, and would likely have lasting benefits Commentators have pointed to forecasts throughout the metropolitan area that the suggesting Melbourne is set to add anoth- East West Link would not deliver. Yet all er 1.3 million people in the next two dec- this could still be decades away if the East ades, a number equivalent to the popula- West Link proceeds. tion of Adelaide or Munich. This suggests there is an imperative to expand the pub-

Figure 8: Local community group protests against drill core sampling for East West Link in Royal Park in 2012. (Photo: Protectors of Public Lands.) lic transport network significantly within Conclusion two decades simply to cater for population growth, even without the popular mandate The East West Link is a massive backward to increase public transport’s mode share. step in Melbourne’s urban transport development, that belies a decade of strong Public transport advocates in Victoria led forward momentum in developing public by the Public Transport Users Association and active transport alternatives. Instead have proposed a package of measures to of responding to the evidence on the ac- revitalise Melbourne’s public transport. It tual transport problems that demand a involves a combination of high-capacity solution, and weighing the true benefits signalling, level crossing grade separa- and costs against respectable alternative tion, suburban extensions (including to projects, the East West Link is a return to World Transport Policy and Practice 30 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 the discredited approach known as ‘pre- Eddington, R. (2008) Investing in Trans- dict and provide’. port: East West Link Needs Assessment. Victorian Government, March 2008. We now know from worldwide evidence that cities will wind up with as much traffic Glaeser, E. Triumph of the City. Pan Mac- congestion as they are prepared to pay for millan, 2012. in road capacity. By predicting hypothetical increases in traffic and providing new Gordon, J. “East-west link would not re- roads to cater for it, cities help bring about turn state costs.” The Age, 13 February the very traffic congestion they forecast. 2014. Meanwhile, by monopolising transport budgets, the decisions to build roads deny Infrastructure Australia. (2011) Commu- funding to the public transport alterna- nicating the Imperative for Action: a re- tives, particularly rail, that actually have port to the Council of Australian Govern- a chance at creating the elusive ‘agglom- ments. June 2011. eration benefits’ and allowing people to be productive in large cities without adding to Infrastructure Australia. (2013) National traffic congestion. Infrastructure Plan. June 2013.

The last word should be that of the late Kahneman, D. Thinking, Fast and Slow. Paul Mees. “We have to stop this mad Penguin, 2011. scheme, this mad scheme that even on the government’s own analysis can’t pro- Loader, C. “Car and transit use per capita duce a proper positive return on invest- in Australian cities.” Charting Transport, ment.” published online, . Anthony Morton, Originally posted January 2010, updated Public Transport Users Association, October 2013. Melbourne MacTiernan, A. “Patronage figures soar on Email: Perth-to-Mandurah railway.” WA Govern- [email protected] ment media release, 11 March 2008.

References: Mees, P. (2000) A Very Public Solution. Melbourne University Press, 2000. Colebatch, T. “CityLink deal might yet be an earner.” The Age, 13 June 2006. Mees, P. (2008a) “Does Melbourne need another central city rail tunnel?” Technical Davidson, K. “How to fund a better public report, RMIT University, July 2008. transport system.” The Age, 28 October 2013. Mees, P. (2008b) “Australia’s future infrastructure requirements: Avoiding wasteful Druker, M. “The fundamental attribution expenditure in urban transport.” Submis- error in transportation choice.” Psys- sion to Infrastructure Australia, October tenance, published online, . March 2010. Earthscan, 2010.

Eddington, R. (2006) The Eddington Melbourne City Link Authority. “Life will Transport Study—The case for action: Sir certainly improve once we have a triple Rod Eddington’s advice to Government. by-pass.” Advertisement, May 1995. HM Treasury, 2006. Mencken, H. L. “The Divine Afflatus.” New York Evening Mail, 16 November 1917.

World Transport Policy and Practice 31 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 Meyrick & Associates, Steer Davies Gleave & Econsearch. East West Needs Assess- ment: Economic Benefits and Costs Anal- ysis: Technical Report. Technical report, March 2008.

Murphy, J. “Vic project railroaded.” Aus- tralian Financial Review, 16 November 2011.

Odgers, J. Have all the travel time savings on Melbourne’s road network been achieved? Technical report, RMIT School of Management, September 2009.

PTUA (Public Transport Users Associa- tion). Scoresby Freeway Environment Ef- fects Statement: Submission in Response. September 1998.

Royal Commission on Environmental Pollu- tion. Transport and the Environment. Ox- ford University Press, 1995.

SACTRA (Standing Advisory Committee on Trunk Road Assessment). Trunk roads and the generation of traffic. Report for Department of Transport. HM Stationery Office, 1994.

Stone, J. Political factors in the rebuilding of mass transit: an investigation of failure in Melbourne since 1970 through comparisons with Perth and Vancouver. PhD thesis, Swinburne University of Technology, Victoria, 2008.

Thomson, J. M. Great Cities and Their Traffic. Gollancz, 1977.

Tomazin, F. “Bandt says Greens can stop east-west link with balance of power.” The Age, 15 September 2013.

Vicroads. Arterial Road Traffic Volumes. Online resource, Accessed February 2013.

Victorian Government. (2002) Melbourne 2030: Planning for sustainable growth. October 2002.

Victorian Government. (2008) The Victo- rian Transport Plan. December 2008.

World Transport Policy and Practice 32 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 Heysham M6 Link Road long before its bright engineers were born; David Gate long before the other Lancaster Bypass (now the M6 motorway) was built, and 1. Location long before government policy of “predict The Heysham M6 Link Road (HM6L), also and provide” was proved misguided, and known as the Lancaster Northern Bypass, jettisoned. This ancient origin is claimed is a proposed 3 miles (4.8km) of 4-lane as a justification, but to its many oppo- dual carriageway in North West England nents it is astonishing that a scheme so linking Junction 34 of the M6 motorway much past its sell-by date should still be to an existing “bypass” which runs to the pursued. small Lancashire Port of Heysham. A map of the route is at http://heyshamlink.lan- It was originally sold as bypass of Lancas- cashire.gov.uk/the-route.aspx ter urban area, but this description was abandoned when it became clear that it Heysham is not without links already: both would merely shift congestion from one a road and a rail link exist. But rather than part of the urban area to another. The new improve the existing road and rail links, name “Link” gave the flattering impression the promoter Lancashire County Coun- of strategic purpose. cil (LCC) has decided that another £129 million link is needed, and official figures 2. History claim that it will lead to journey time sav- The present incarnation of the scheme ings of 5 minutes, at peak times only. was proposed in 2004, after the County Council rejected a Western Route. The terrain through which it will run is challenging. It is an area of drumlins left Local residents got together in 2005 and by the last Ice Age. Rather inconvenient- formed Transport Solutions for Lancaster & ly, the Ice Age left the drumlins lying in a Morecambe (TSLM), to oppose the scheme North-South alignment, whereas the road and develop instead sustainable transport must run in an East-West direction. But solutions for the 21st century. this is no obstacle to the modern road engineer, whose genius will make the road The group, whose supporters numbered scythe through the drumlins in deep cut- around 1,600, mounted a vigorous cam- tings, soar over the Lancaster Canal, fly paign, with the result that the local MP over the West Coast Main Line at a height came out against it; a contentious issue in of 49 feet, and continue over the local B the 2007 local elections, immediately af- road at a height of 26 feet. terwards Lancaster City Council, the Dis- trict in which the scheme is located, voted This magnificent sight will be enjoyed by to withdraw its support. residents living close by, at the height of their bedroom windows; quite differ- When the County Council gave itself plan- ent from the existing green fields, with ning permission for the scheme, 2200 peo- their fresh air and birdsong, as the road ple wrote to the Secretary of State asking will run entirely through the North Lanca- for the scheme to be “called in” for a Public shire Green Belt. It is universally accepted Inquiry, which was granted in 2007. At the that it is inappropriate development in the Inquiry, TSLM presented a comprehensive Green Belt, and harmful to its purposes, case against the scheme, with colleagues but who should heed this minor planning from CPRE and FoE, and allied to the lo- quibble? cal College of Further Education, through whose grounds and next to whose class- The difficult terrain has led to something room windows the road would run. How- of a record: at £129 million for 3 miles of ever, they failed to convince Inspector road (£43 million per mile) it enjoys the Tipping, who in the opinion of objectors title of the most expensive local authority consistently approved the promoter’s case road per mile in the UK. It is also in the and not accepting the strength of the evi- running for another title: the oldest “lega- dence presented against the link. In Feb- cy” scheme. The road was first mooted in ruary 2008 the Secretary of State granted 1948 (some even say 1935), in any case, planning permission. A local resident, with World Transport Policy and Practice 33 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 help from TSLM, launched a legal chal- Most of the savings claimed were dubious: lenge to the decision, but this was rejected money would be saved by not removing in the High Court in August 2008. spoil from site, but closer examination re- Next came Programme Entry (PE), the vealed that it had never been intended to first stage of government funding; TSLM remove spoil from site anyway. The engi- argued against it, including at a meet- neers skilfully engineered contingencies, ing with officials from the Department for reserves and risk allowances to present a Transport (DfT) in London; however, PE more favourable financial picture. was granted in 2009. It is unusual, and significant, that it should take 12 months The changes meant that the existing plan- from planning permission (February 2008) ning permission was not valid, so a new to PE (February 2009). Correspondence application was required. In another in- released under FOI revealed that this time stance of extreme dubiety, the scheme was spent in disagreement between DfT was classed as a ‘Nationally Significant In- and LCC over such issues as (1) wheth- frastructure Project’, so an application for a er Park & Ride (P&R) was integral to the Development Consent Order (DCO) under scheme, as LCC had insisted at the In- the new Planning Act (2008) was submit- quiry: DfT said it was not, so they should ted to a new authority, the Infrastructure not fund it; (2) whether LCC could afford to Planning Commission (IPC) in March 2011. fund the building of P&R and the 24 major Accordingly, LCC held “Consultations” in structures: LCC said they could not; and June 2011, although they refused to con- (3) whether LCC’s methodology (including sult on road type or route. IPC accepted the traffic modelling), which had satisfied the application in December 2011, and held a Inspector but contravened DfT guidance Public Examination from April to Septem- (WebTAG), was satisfactory for DfT itself ber 2012. Again, TSLM and colleagues to grant funding: DfT said it was not. presented a comprehensive case against the scheme. The Examiner listened but did LCC then set about securing the “orders” not accept their arguments. The Transport (Compulsory Purchase and Side Road Or- Secretary approved the scheme in March ders [CPOs & SROs]), but, on their haste 2013; TSLM challenged the decision in the to push them through ahead of local elec- High Courts, and when this challenge was tions in May 2009, they made mistakes and rejected, applied to the Court of Appeal were forced to re-publish them in October for permission to appeal. But in November 2009. Again, TSLM organised hundreds of 2013 permission was refused. In Decem- objections and raised legal questions with ber 2013 the Development Consent Order the DfT. The Inquiry was eventually pencil- was granted, and in January 2014 work led in for October 2010, but still not con- began. firmed when the General Election of May 2010 intervened. 3. Issues of history From the long history of the scheme, sev- In June 2010 the new Coalition Govern- eral issues arise. ment suspended work on all schemes, pending a Comprehensive Spending Re- 3.1. LCC decided on the road solution be- view in which the government made clear fore it decided on the problem. that substantial cost savings were required for any scheme to proceed. The In- It was part of the justification of the quiry was shelved. Then in October 2010, scheme that it was allegedly first proposed DfT announced that the scheme would in 1948 or, by some accounts, 1935. Con- be in the “Supported Pool” of transport ditions have changed a great deal since schemes, and asked LCC to submit a “Best then, but it is clear that the proposer de- And Final Funding Bid” (BAFB), which it cided on a road solution before he decided did in February 2011, claiming to reduce what problem he was trying to solve. costs by £16 million to £123 million, and increasing LCC’s own contribution from £6 All DfT guidance is that the promoter million to £12 million. should analyse the problem, create a wide range of options as potential solutions to the problem, without prejudice as to World Transport Policy and Practice 34 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 mode, then analyse each of those options The promoter’s case was always that alter- and progressively refine them to reach a natives had been considered, but rejected. “preferred” solution, “second best option” The studies which considered alternatives and “low cost option”. The promoter failed were very old, and reading them gave the to do this. The “second best option” was impression that the only reason they had an alternative route that the promoter im- been considered was so that they could be mediately declared “unbuildable” (based rejected.. on a barrister’s judgement), and the “low cost option” was mostly an upgrade of the 3.3. Vote of local councillors ignored motorway junction, which should never have been a local authority responsibility, The campaign resulted in the local MP along with a hotchpotch of online meas- and Lancaster City Council opposing the ures, which was ill thought through and scheme. It might have been expected that very easy to reject. this would cause the promoter to recon- This failure to follow guidance was not sider. It did not. just procedural. It was obvious to the local community that its local authority was In 2007 Lancaster City Council at a meet- forcing through an unpopular scheme with ing of the full council voted to oppose the inadequate consideration of the alterna- bypass and this became the official policy tives or consultation with the people af- of the Council. For reasons that are still fected by it. This fuelled the growing op- not fully understood city council officers position to the controversial scheme. At then prepared a policy document (The Lo- the “consultation” events, the Council of- cal Development Framework Core Strat- ficers gave the impression of looking at egy or LDFCS) containing a paragraph their shoes in embarrassment, rather than supporting the bypass and embedding this discussing the scheme with disgruntled support in a key policy document. This pol- residents. TSLM’s alternative exhibitions, icy document went to full council approxi- which showed the damage to be wreaked mately one year later and was approved in by the scheme, and the possible alterna- a formal vote. Objectors to the bypass re- tive solutions to the transport problems, ferred the matter of an officer report that were better attended and well-received. was contrary to the Council policy to the Ombudsman alleging maladministration. 3.2. LCC assumed that everyone wanted The complaint was rejected. a road Further, the Inspector at the Public Inquiry The proposer’s starting point was that eve- gave no weight to the formal decision of ryone shared their desire for a road solu- councillors in 2007 when, in the view of tion. At the outset, they referred to objectors, a properly recorded democratic decision should carry a great deal of “Problems of a vocal minority who op- weight. pose the scheme against the (historical) majority who support the scheme, 3.4. Long Life Confers Benefits but remain silent because the County Council are proposing what they re- As the scheme wore on, it appeared that quire.” its very age became a recommendation in itself. They relied on old opinion polls, from 2001 before any detailed plans were published. In 2010, the scheme was changed dras- Residents were asked where they would tically to save money, and went through like the road to go: then they summed the new (IPC) planning process. LCC held those in favour of a Northern and a West- new “consultations”, which were quite ern Route to create a majority. Alternative inadequate. They refused to consult on solutions were not presented, much less whether a road was needed, or the route recommended. Yet the same poll showed it should take. This was in spite of IPC’s re- only 15% wanted to build roads, whereas quirement that they should consult on the 42% wanted to improve public transport whole scheme, and of LCC’s own fulsome and other alternatives to the car. but ultimately vacuous observation that World Transport Policy and Practice 35 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 new residents to the area needed to be 3.6 Damage to Environment Ignored properly consulted for the first time. Yet the IPC accepted the scheme for examina- Local residents found out about the scheme tion on the grounds that other local au- from their own inquiries: they were not told thorities, from Merseyside to the Scottish by the County Council, or County Council- border, had been ‘adequately’ consulted, lors, or City Councillors (who at that point even though the local community palpably supported it). 1074 homes lie within 200 had not. metres of the scheme.

The Examiner placed great weight on the They were appalled at the proposed dam- fact that scheme was long-running, as did age to the Green Belt, to the fields where judges in the subsequent legal challenge. children play and people walk their dogs, In the event, the Examiner listened to all to Lancaster Canal, whose waters are used sides but firmly sided with the promoter. It by people in boats and whose towpath is seemed that the long life of the scheme, enjoyed by walkers and cyclists. They were and the Coalition government’s obsession appalled by the proposed loss of many with spending on infrastructure, were de- veteran trees and protected hedgerows, cisive. inhabited by wildlife including bats and butterflies, and the damage to the banks 3.5 National Issues Ignored of the River Lune, recently repopulated by otters. They feared the loss of species The debate around the road was intensely which should be protected by European local, although funding was national, and law. They envisaged the pollution of noise, national issues were ignored. vibration and exhaust fumes of HGVs, and of the lights on the new road. Specifically, Climate Change. It was consistently part of TSLM’s case that Climate This indignation fed into the campaign Change was happening, it was accepted against the scheme and was the initial mo- that it was caused by human activity, spe- tivation of residents and campaigners. cifically the emission of greenhouse gases, and the Government had accepted a legal- This case was presented at the 2007 In- ly binding obligation to reduce these emis- quiry. The Inspector agreed that the road sions and set targets to reduce emissions would indeed have a major adverse im- across all sectors including transport. pact on the landscape and was inappropriate development in the Green Belt. But This road was assessed by its own promot- he simply ruled that this damage would be ers to be the worst carbon-busting local outweighed by the claimed benefits. So authority road scheme in the country: not the damage which appalled so many resi- only would emissions not be reduced, they dents was allowed because a single per- would actually be increased, contrary to son sat in judgement and needed to say Government policy. no more than that, on the balance of prob- abilities, the benefits would outweigh the The reply of the promoter was that in- harms, without giving reasons. creased emissions were only a small proportion of global emissions. He did not ac- 4. Justification cept his obligation to follow government policy in this. The Examiner agreed that 4.1 Congestion relief this was a negative aspect of the scheme, but not of sufficient importance to - out The relief of congestion was originally a weigh the scheme benefits. It even be- main aim of the scheme, and the main rea- came a reason not to pursue a legal chal- son for it enjoying some local support, but lenge on this aspect of the Examiner’s over the years it reduced in importance as decision: TSLM could not challenge him on it became clear that congestion would not his stance on climate change, because he be relieved. Council figures showed that on agreed with us! many roads traffic would rise on the day the Link Road opened. Near the scheme, the road itself would deliver increased World Transport Policy and Practice 36 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 traffic onto many local roads. Even roads ernment in 2010, they, along with all local at some distance from the scheme would businesses, refused to do so. see increases; embarrassingly, the road past Lancaster Town Hall was one such. One of the spurious reasons for claiming this local road as nationally significant was The proposer’s response was threefold. that the Port of Heysham was strategically To the road past Lancaster Town Hall, it significant for Irish ferry traffic. In fact, added three others to create an imaginary a national strategy document had named “screenline”, which would see a marginal Birkenhead (adjacent to Liverpool) as the reduction in traffic. One road past an an- strategic ferry port for Ireland, and Hey- cient church in the village of Halton would sham was not even mentioned as a con- see a 74% increase; here, the proposer tender. carried out a “sensitivity test” (in fact, a reanalysis using more convenient assump- The rhetoric of improving communications tions) to produce a more convenient re- was not matched by the proposer’s own vised figure of “only” 44%. And overall, forecasts. The time saved on the journey the official aim of reducing congestion was to be relieved by the new road was fore- downgraded to the more modest aim of cast to be five minutes, at peak times only. reducing congestion only on the two bridg- The significance of a 5 minute journey es over the River Lune. time saving on typical long distance HGV journeys to and from the port is trivial. The Council never engaged with the con- The idea that such traffic, planning a long cept that building more roads in an urban road and ferry journey to Ireland, would environment leads to increased traffic and be influenced to favour Heysham by a sav- increased car dependency; it never fully ing of five minutes, at peak times only, is accepted that a new road would create in- not credible. duced traffic; it never accepted its responsibility to encourage sustainable transport 4.3 New Jobs modes. An important aim was to bring new jobs to the area. 4.2 Heysham Port It was calculated in 2005 that the scheme Another aim was to improve communica- would create 6,014 new jobs in the area. tions between the M6 Motorway and More- This was achieved by taking the area of cambe and Heysham, including improving development land which was “inaccessi- the access to Heysham Port. ble” and would be “opened up” by the new road, and dividing it by a figure for aver- The port was represented as an expanding age jobs per square metre. The forecast concern. However, it is a small player in was widely publicised, to great approval. a highly competitive and volatile market It was only when TSLM pointed out that a for Irish Sea ferry traffic. It was respon- stage in the calculation had been missed, sible for only 8% of this market in 2010; that LCC’s consultants realised that they its freight declined by 7% from 2000 and had forgotten to divide the area of land by 2010, slightly more than the general de- the average area of buildings placed upon cline. By far the biggest player in this it. The calculation of new jobs should have market is Liverpool, which has massive been based on floorspace area, not total plans to be bigger still (Liverpool Super- land area. So 4,200 (70%) of the jobs port), leading to massive capacity (prob- forecast vanished at the click of a calcula- ably overcapacity) in the Irish Sea market. tor, down to only 1,800. This finding was Ferry companies are notorious for switch- not widely publicised by the red-faced pro- ing ports to gain competitive advantage, moter, and had to by wrung out of him by and it always seemed unwise to base long- a Freedom of Information request. term infrastructure investment decisions on such volatility. The ferry companies Further mistakes in the analysis reduced certainly think so: when asked to contrib- the number even further, down to 1,026, ute to this scheme by a cost-cutting gov- only 595 of which were in the target Re- World Transport Policy and Practice 37 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 generation Area. As the promoter’s hapless Without such a strategy, experience from expert witness at the Inquiry was forced to other towns indicates that it would prove admit, “not worth building a road for.” unattractive, be little used, and may prove unviable. By 2010, the forecast figure was 898. There were changes, because it turned out In its discussion of complementary meas- that much of the development land con- ures, LCC’s Preliminary Environmen- sidered “inaccessible” without a new road, tal Information (May 2011) listed recent had in the meantime been accessed and developments in improving sustainable developed, clearly without a new road. transport locally, and offered the hope The “inaccessible” development land had that, if the scheme produced some tem- been developed at much the same rate as porary traffic reductions, buses and- cy a business park situated right at Junction cling would be more attractive. The only 34 of the M6 motorway, which could not specific proposal was a footway/ cycleway possibly be more accessible. along the route, ideal only for pedestrians or cyclists eager to operate in thunder- Clearly, the promoter struggled with this ously close proximity to port-bound HGVs. justification. His struggle became more It was clear that LCC thought they had acute when he had to recognise the two- done just about everything they could do way road effect, that roads can take jobs about sustainable transport, and could out of an area as well as bring them in. not come up with specific ideas of further He admitted that this could lead to 1,095 measures that the link road would allow. residents losing their jobs. They mentioned adjusting timings at pedestrian crossings in Lancaster: the Exam- It appeared that the job forecasts, which iner wryly observed that this was a mea- had started out so optimistic and un- gre harvest of sustainability from such a checked, were entering negative territory. massive investment.

4.4 Complementary measures Under the new funding arrangements, LCC must take on all financial risks, includ- Another aim was to create opportunities ing cost overruns; LCC is unlikely to have for the enhancement of sustainable travel any funding available for the complemen- modes. tary measures that are essential to relieve congestion, and the subsequent Lo- It was recognised that the scheme itself cal Enterprise Partnership (LEP) proposed would not sufficiently relieve congestion, programme for transport investment in and would need “complementary meas- Lancashire contains no further investment ures” to do so. Indeed, one of the condi- proposals for Lancaster District – hardly tions attached to the planning permission surprising given that the Heysham M6 Link of February 2008 required LCC to draw up consumes such a disproportionate amount an action plan of complementary meas- of scarce LCC transport funds for the next ures, to be based on a report by Faber three or four years. Maunsell (“Lancaster District Transport Vi- sion and Strategy”), issued in July 2008. 5. Changes between the Inquiries of This action plan was never published, and 2007 and 2012 the proposals for complementary measures eventually published in the DCO were The long campaign against the road saw slight. The only concrete proposal was for the arguments in favour undergo interest- one Park & Ride site at the Junction with ing mutations. The justification changed in the motorway. Rather than a strategy, this important respects between the Inquires was more like a car park. There was no of 2007 and 2012. appraisal of its justification or usage, and no coherent strategy for its use: no traf- 5.1 Traffic growth reduced fic study, no dedicated lane for buses to access the city, no measures to discour- Studies for the 2007 Inquiry (done in 2005) age motorists from driving into the city forecast traffic growth in the area of 1.5% centre, or provision for ongoing subsidy. pa. By the time of the 2012 Examination, World Transport Policy and Practice 38 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 however, the studies (of 2010) showed 5.2 Journey time savings reduced that traffic growth had been only 0.5% pa. This is significant because the justifi- Related to reduced traffic growth, anoth- cation for the road was that traffic would er development between 2007 and 2012 increase indefinitely for 60 years, leading was that forecast journey time savings re- to gridlock and economic stagnation, and duced. On the journey to be relieved by the only solution was a new road. The eco- the new road (Junction 34 of the M6 to nomic “benefits” were quantified as mon- the end of the link road), the journey time ey saved because journey times were less saving reduced from the 2005 estimate than they would have been without a new of ten minutes at peak times (not all that road. If time saved were less, and future spectacular even then) to the 2010 fore- journeys were less, the “benefits” would cast of five minutes. plummet and the road would be much more difficult to justify. Furthermore, fore- But text of the justification (Economic Im- cast high growth produced “benefits” over pact Report) did not change: the journey 60 years. If that high growth failed to time savings were still labelled “signifi- materialise even in the first five years of cant”. Indeed, on one journey the min- the 60-year period, the future growth and utes saved reduced from 8.0 (2005) to 2.5 “benefits” would be reduced decisively. (2010), but were still judged to be “significant”. Readers of this publication will recognise here a national (indeed, international) “Insignificant” would be more appropriate. trend in reducing car usage (“Peak Car”), This is a strategic route: it is stretching the since about 2004. There are many reasons imagination to think that hauliers from the (Cities have a “time travel budget”, and it M62 area (Yorkshire and the Manchester- has been reached; public transport has Merseyside conurbations), planning a road grown; urban sprawl is being reversed; and ferry journey of over a hundred miles older people live in cities, and they trav- to Ireland, would be influenced to favour el less; a culture of urbanism has grown; Heysham by a saving of five minutes, at petrol prices have rocketed …) but the peak times only. trend is clear in the developed world. 5.3. Job numbers reduced LCC refused to recognise this trend. They explained the reduction as: less traffic As discussed above (4.3), forecast new than expected reassigning to the new road jobs reduced throughout the period. In (a tautology), economic recession, using a many cases, areas which were considered new modelling tool (Saturn) which is more to be “inaccessible” had filled up. Further, sensitive to competitive routes. Anything recognition of the two-way road effect car- rather than admit that their doom-laden ried the new jobs forecast into negative forecasts of gridlock were mistaken, and territory. their justification for the road unjustified. At the 2007 Inquiry, TSLM argued that if 5.4. BCR should have reduced lower growth estimates were used in the traffic models, the benefits would be con- In calculating the benefits of a scheme, siderably reduced, to such an extent that the estimate of total benefits (over a 60 it would become difficult to justify the year period) is divided by the total costs road scheme. In the event, by 2012 traffic to give a benefits to costs ratio (BCR). In growth had indeed turned out to be well the case of HM6L (in a typical calculation below the estimates on which the scheme from 2007) forecast benefits of £864,000 was justified, indeed two thirds of the were divided by costs of £145,000 to original forecasts. This should have car- give a BCR of 6.0. This was often given a ried through to the calculation of benefits, pseudo-scientific gloss by the promoter as and the justification for the scheme; but it “A recent study has shown that for every did not. pound spent on the road, there will be a benefit of £6 to the area”.

World Transport Policy and Practice 39 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 A BCR of 6.0 was a criterion of roads en- in the Major Scheme Business Case), but tering the “Supported Pool” in October made requests for updated detailed cost- 2010 and being fast-tracked by the Gov- ings, in particular in January 2011 follow- ernment, and HM6L was judged to meet ing publication of the BAFB. The crucial this criterion. June 2010 costings were only finally for- warded by LCC in April 2012, shortly be- “Benefits” are mostly time saved by fast- fore the IPC Examination. er journeys, over a 60 year period. Now if the amount of traffic using the scheme The costs became especially interest- reduced (by 20%), and the journey time ing at the time of the BAFB, when LCC saved reduced, it follows that the benefits claimed that changes had been made to should have reduced, in this case substan- meet the government requirement to re- tially; therefore the BCR should reduce, to duce scheme costs. These resulted in such an extent that it would become dif- the cost coming down by £16 million, to ficult to justify the road scheme. In a sane £123.25m, and LCC’s contribution went up world the BCR should have been recalcu- to £12.325m. It is not difficult to see that lated and the road plan rejected, but mo- LCC’s contribution became exactly 10% of mentum had built up for the scheme and the revised scheme cost, and the govern- sanity was bulldozed aside. ment contribution fell by just over 15%, so the required criteria for cost savings are In the event, LCC were vague in their cal- easily inferred. culations and used favourable assumptions. They introduced new elements to the On closer inspection, the cost savings calculation (“Wider Impacts”) to boost the were attributed mostly to reductions in as- “benefits” side of the equation. When spe- sumed inflation rates (down from 5% per cifically asked by the Examiner in 2012 to annum to 2.7%) which saved £7m; the run a “low growth” model of the BCR, they removal of £6m of contingency from the specifically failed to do so. The changes on scheme cost to an ‘additional risk layer’ the ground were not carried through into to be borne by LCC in the event of cost the theory of the road’s justification. overruns; reduction in excavation and disposal of material, brought about by raising Until, that is, the day that Final Approval a section of the road to reduce the depth of government funding for the scheme was of a significant cutting, said in the BAFB announced in December 2013, on which to save just over £7m; and alterations to day the LCC Cabinet Member for Transport the M6 sliproads, said to reduce costs by proudly announced that “for every pound about £1m. (These add up to more than spent on the road, there will be a benefit £16m in total, but other cost elements had of £4.40 to the area”. This smacks of du- increased meantime). plicity, given the reported criterion of a BCR of 6 for supported pool status, and The first thing this shows is that most of the ready identification in a report com- the ‘savings’ were not the result of actual missioned by TSLM in 2010 that the BCR scheme changes, but of technical adjust- should have been around 4.8, even based ments to the budget estimates for risk on use of LCC’s own figures without ques- and inflation. The main scheme change tioning any assumptions. came with the extraordinary claim that £7.3m had been saved on earthmoving 5.5 Costings: a case of smoke and mirrors costs, when the earthworks total for the whole scheme at PE in 2009 had only been Scheme costing has been a game of £8.5m! LCC stated in the BAFB that the smoke and mirrors from the outset, with reduced amount of excavation eliminated several peripheral cost elements, in par- the need for disposal of excess material ticular landscaping, preparation costs, su- off-site, but were left floundering when it pervision, contingencies, and inflation ef- was pointed out by TSLM that the original fects treated in different ways at different scheme had expressly excluded off-site times such that it became difficult to com- disposal. pare like with like. TSLM had the original scheme costings for 2005 (contained World Transport Policy and Practice 40 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 LCC eventually tried to argue that they had other £3.7m come from? Could it have never claimed that there would be sav- been the 9 months previously unaccount- ings from off-site disposal: and that cost ed for, 9 x £0.42m = £3.78m?? And when savings were due to reduced excavation, are we going to see the effect of the 18 avoiding excavation in rock, and reduced month gap in inflation allowances between transport along the site. The first is unten- November 2008 and June 2010? able since LCC undoubtedly claimed elimination of off-site disposal, which could not TSLM estimated as long ago as Janu- but have resulted in cost savings: and the ary 2011, when the shortcomings of the other two do not stack up in terms of ei- BAFB cost ‘savings’ were exposed, that ther the narrative at the time or the stated the eventual outturn cost of the scheme unit rates for excavation and respreading would be nearer £140m than £123m, plus on site for the amount of dirt involved. £8m preparation costs which by then were separate from scheme costs, plus site su- The Department for Transport was advised pervision costs which rather disappeared of this in the period between the BAFB be- from view at that time. The cost reached ing published and government approval of almost £129m three months before the the revised costings a month later. Their start on site. LCC may hope that their lush response was that they were satisfied with risk padding will see them through with- the reduced level of government funding, out further cost embarrassment, but hav- and if LCC had got it wrong on the costing started on site in the wettest winter ings, that was their problem, as the gov- on record it may not be long before the ernment contribution was now capped and contractor’s claims start rolling in. any cost overruns would be borne by the scheme promoter. LCC may seek to put the blame for cost escalation on the objectors (they already The treatment of inflation was equally un- have), but the fact remains that most of satisfactory. LCC stated in the BAFB that the delays in the 8 years since the scheme the inflation allowance was based on the was submitted, many think prematurely, revised 2.7% per annum from an updated in 2005 have been of the Council’s own cost estimate in June 2010, with an as- making. Above all, the time it took from sumed start date in October 2012. When planning permission in February 2008, the June 2010 costings were received, through Programme Entry to the publica- however, it became clear that the unit tion of Orders in October 2009, was the rates were identical to those in the No- direct reason for the scheme falling foul vember 2008 PE costings: in other words, of the CSR in 2010 and the fiasco of its there was zero inflation allowance for the inclusion as a NSIP in the ponderous IPC 19 months between the two dates! Fur- process. LCC has only itself to blame for thermore, within two months of approval costs to the Council that started at £6m of the BAFB, LCC revised the starting date at PE, rose to £12m in the BAFB, have al- forecast back 9 months to July 2013, mi- ready consumed most of the £6.5m ad- raculously with no effect on the forecast ditional risk layer, and look set to reach outturn cost. a total of £30m or more by the time the road is finished: but it is the people of Lan- It was only when TSLM launched their cashire who will ultimately pay the price legal challenge in April 2013 that LCC in the starvation of funds for significantly warned that the ensuing delay was going more useful transport projects across the to impact on scheme costs, at a rate of whole county. £420,000 per month (including an unsub- stantiated £230,000 for standing down the 6. Alternatives design team). It was announced by LCC in September 2013 that the scheme cost had There are many alternatives to the road risen to £128.9m, an increase of £5.7m. scheme. In 2010 TSLM joined with oth- The scheme was eventually delayed by at er sustainable transport groups in North most 5 months, so even on LCC’s dubi- Lancashire to produce a report and pro- ous monthly rate the delay due to the legal posal for transport improvements for the challenge was barely £2m. Where did the district. The proposals built on plans put World Transport Policy and Practice 41 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 forward by specialist transport consultants guage, but the decisions were being made Faber Maunsell, commissioned by LCC. on underlying political grounds, which Faber Maunsell were asked to make rec- were dressed in planning language, but ommendations based on the assumption not influenced by the planning arguments that the road would go ahead, but from that the objectors were making. their report it was obvious that the “complementary” measures themselves would It became apparent that, long ago, the achieve the main aims of the scheme of promoter had decided on a road solution congestion relief and economic regenera- and then sought to justify it. The justification. tions were weak, and began to unravel as soon as the figures were investigated. The The TSLM Report recommended a com- two Inquiries of 2007 and 2012 allowed plete package of non-road building meas- comparisons between earlier forecasts, on ures which would seriously reduce local which planning permission was granted, congestion, and so aid regeneration and and outturns in the intervening five years. tourism, and improve access to Heysham. In every respect the forecasts had proved What’s more, costed at £30-40 million, false. Forecast jobs had disappeared, these proposals would have saved £100 forecast traffic growth had not material- million on the cost of the Link road. ised, forecast costs were understated and purported cost savings were illusory, and The package proposed by this report would forecast journey time savings had been have five key elements: halved. The Cost Benefit Ratio should have • High quality spinal bus route be- reduced dramatically. tween Heysham and the University of Lancaster But these factors were ignored, and per- • Rail system upgrades mission granted anyway. • Cycle infrastructure • Revisions to Lancaster gyratory There was a political element: a govern- systems ment intent on spending on infrastructure • Park and Ride projects, influenced by businesses who wanted the road, although they refused to These effective measures, or the “comple- make the slightest contribution towards it. mentary” ones discussed rather vaguely It seemed that a momentum had built up, by Faber Maunsell, are unlikely to be im- wishful thinking displaced logical analysis, plemented: at this time of government and the longed-for wish for a bright, shiny austerity, the soaring costs of the road will new road was granted. use up the whole transport budget for Lan- caster for many years to come. Acknowledgements

7. Conclusion I am grateful to Alan James for his help with this article, and for supplying the text The objectors to the scheme who formed on costs (section 5.5). I would also like to TSLM were motivated by a horror of the thank Alan and John Whitelegg for their proposed damage to their community and help with the campaign. destruction of their environment, and a desire to prevent it. Even a cursory exami- Author details: nation of the justification for the scheme David Gate revealed that it would not bring the benefits claimed for it: it would not reduce Email: congestion, or bring jobs, or regenerate [email protected] the area.

They then delved deeper into the planning aspects of the scheme, and learned to deal with the planning arguments. Yet throughout the process, there was a sense that they were speaking the planning lan- World Transport Policy and Practice 42 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 “Is this protester the most hated man A green belt prohibiting development en- in Scotland?”: A personal perspective circles the city’s northern, western and on the legal fight against the Aber- southern suburbs. This has encouraged deen Western Peripheral Route much high density brownfield apartment William Walton development within the city but the development of new family housing has tended Introduction to leap frog the green belt to the small market towns mentioned above. Since The announcement made by Tavish Scott, the main centres of employment have re- the Scottish Transport Minister, on 1st De- mained within the city there are high vol- cember 2005 revealing that the route for umes of car traffic heading into and out the proposed Aberdeen bypass in north of Aberdeen along five principal trunk- east Scotland would cross the River Dee roads of varying levels of design capacity. about 2km to the west of the ‘preferred The only distributor road within the city is route’ and would incorporate an 11.5km known as Anderson Drive and was built as long spur running south to Stonehaven a de facto bypass during a phase of ur- came as a complete shock to virtually eve- ban expansion back in the 1930s. Most rybody in the area and made inevitable the long distance road traffic heading from likelihood of a protracted and often bitter the south is bound for the city but some, dispute between a sizable group of objec- including some heavy vehicular traffic, is tors and the Scottish Government (Scot- headed towards the more remote fishing tish Executive 2005a). The campaign en- ports of Fraserburgh and Peterhead and gaged a coalition of various interests but use a series of cross country roads west of was led by a group of largely local residents Aberdeen to avoid congestion black spots called RoadSense1. This group, chaired by on the edge of the city. the author, fought the proposed Aberdeen Western Peripheral Route (AWPR) at every The concept of a bypass to the west of Ab- opportunity and eventually took the case erdeen had been formulated as far back to the Supreme Court in London. This pa- as 1933 although it had only been since per chronicles the most important events around the mid-1980s that the proposal in that campaign, explains the case put started to receive serious consideration forward against the scheme in the public from local councillors (Walton and Far- inquiry and subsequent legal appeals and rington, 2000). The dominant dynamic tries to place the lessons learned from the of Aberdeen and its economy since the campaign into some wider context. 1970s, notwithstanding the brief down- turn in the mid-1980s, has been one of Geographical and historical context to growth due to sustained output of North the AWPR project Sea oil. This not surprisingly translated into increased pressures on housing and Aberdeen is a city of around 210,000 rising levels of car usage and congestion. people located on the north-east coast of In response to the traffic congestion issue, Scotland and dominates a predominantly instead of resurrecting the longstanding rural hinterland containing a small number proposal for a western bypass the regional of former market towns, such as Bancho- and district councils explored the possibil- ry, Inverurie, Ellon and Stonehaven, each ity of a dual carriageway scheme running located 15-25km or so away (see Map 1 from the River Dee in the south through p58)2. It has rail links south to Dundee, the city centre, crossing the River Don over Edinburgh and Glasgow, and north-west to a new crossing (the Third Don Crossing) Inverness but, with relatively few interme- and terminating in the suburb of Bridge 1 diate suburban stations, short distance rail There are many individuals that made huge con- travel is unattractive to most commuters. tributions to our campaign but in particular I would As with most cities in the UK the private like to acknowledge the inputs of Sheona Warnock, Kath Keay, Dave Robb, Henry Irvine-Fortescue, Tony car provides the primary mode of trans- Hawkins, Roger Murray, Paddy Imhof, Keith Good, port for most, other than very short, jour- Robin Winmill and John McIntosh. neys. 2 I am indebted to Derek Johnson, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Geography at Northumbria Univer- sity, for preparing the maps for this paper. World Transport Policy and Practice 43 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 of Don on the northern side of the city. The influence of the AWPR on Aber- This strategy, which was only ever imple- deen’s urban development mented in part through the construction of a short (but highly expensive) section As a result of this decision the Murtle route of dual carriageway through Union Terrace was incorporated into various land use de- Gardens in the city centre, was eventual- velopment plans prepared for the north ly abandoned following the public inquiry east Scotland region and inevitably fea- into a road widening scheme in Bucksburn tured as an important factor in a number where the planning reporter (the Scottish of developer led large scale planning pro- term for a planning inspector) concluded posals that emerged during the mid and that only a bypass would alleviate the traf- late 1990s. Of particular note was the pro- fic congestion problems of Aberdeen. posal for a new settlement of 4,500 houses and associated industrial development An important step forward in the promo- on a site 5km south west of the fringe tion of the AWPR occurred in the early of the city at Banchory Devenick. Faced 1990s when the former Grampian Region- with what it viewed as a severe shortage al Council identified for investigation 33 of housing land Grampian Regional Coun- route options contained within 4 to 5 corri- cil and its consultants identified 27 pos- dors, including one from Stonehaven in the sible locations for a new settlement and south, running in a broadly semi-circular selected Banchory Devenick, inter alia, pattern around the west of the city linking for the opportunity which a large develop- the A90 in the south with the (then) A92 in ment presented at that location to secure the north. Following cost benefit and desk significant developer funding contributions top environmental appraisals these 33 op- for the WPR. tions were reduced to just two – Route 12 (the so-called Pitfodels Route) close to the Much of the political initiative for a new western edge of the city and Route 14 (the settlement in the Aberdeen area was lost so-called Murtle Route) slightly further to in 1994 when the Labour led administra- the west. Selection of either of the routes tion of Grampian Regional Council was re- would create significant environmental im- placed by the SNP and Liberal Democrats pacts in the highly sensitive locations close who favoured spreading housing alloca- to the River Dee – the Victorian suburb of tions more evenly around the rural areas. Pitfodels was designated as a conserva- As a result, notwithstanding a recommen- tion area and Murtle was the location for dation in favour of approval from the of- the world renowned Rudolph Steiner Cam- ficers for the Banchory Devenick applica- phill and Newton Dee communities (oper- tion lodged prior to the political changes, ated by Camphill Village Trust) for young the scheme was rejected. The applicant, adults and children with learning difficul- the Aberdeen based Stewart Milne private ties. Routes further out to the west and house builder, appealed and at the public going further south to Stonehaven were inquiry undertook to contribute £20m to dismissed primarily because their greater help fund the WPR which was aligned co- length and their distance from the city terminous with the northern extent of the made them both more costly and less eco- scheme. The Reporter issued a ‘Finding of nomically beneficial. As the scheme was Facts’ report which gave strong support to a ‘local road’ and not part of the national the project but following the intervention motorway or trunk road network it would of the Minister the scheme was eventually have to be funded entirely by the Council rejected after a second inquiry was con- rather than by the government. In Novem- vened to re-examine the specific issue of ber 1994 Grampian Regional Council opted housing land supply in the light of newly is- in favour of the Murtle route and commit- sued guidance on brownfield development ted itself to delivering the AWPR (then (Walton, 2000). Two other large proposals known as the Western Peripheral Route or on the edge of the city for a new 25,000 WPR) and costed at around £80m. seat football stadium at Kingswells and a new settlement of 2,200 houses / new university campus at Blairs, both incorporat- ing significant developer contributions for the bypass, were also unsuccessful. World Transport Policy and Practice 44 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 In the absence of being able to secure sig- In 2004 Aberdeen City Council issued its nificant funding from private developers local plan ‘Green Spaces; New Places’ in the prospects of Grampian Regional Coun- final form and this sought boldly todi- cil (and its unitary authority successors, lute the previous policy commitment to Aberdeen City Council and Aberdeenshire brownfield development and focus the tra- Council) delivering the increasingly costly jectory of development outward through WPR were remote. This situation changed former green belt along the principal ar- dramatically, however, when on 27th Jan- terial routes toward the proposed AWPR uary 2003 the then First Minister, Labour’s alignment (Aberdeen City Council, 2004). Jack McConnell, announced to a business A series of so-called Future New Commu- breakfast audience at the Marcliffe at Pit- nities located within the green belt and fodels Hotel that the Scottish Executive, comprising land capable of accommodat- recognising the national significance of the ing around 3,000 houses for development project, would fund the bulk of it, with the beyond the life span of the plan were two local councils expected to make good identified at Countesswells, Kingswells the balance (Scottish Executive, 2003a). A and Dubford. In each case, echoing the few weeks later the Scottish Executive an- previous sagas of the developer led new nounced that £3bn would be made avail- town proposals at Banchory Devenick and able to fund integrated transport projects Blairs, and the proposed new football sta- such as the WPR (Scottish Executive, dium at Kingswells, the planners argued 2003b). A further fortnight later it was that the schemes would link to, and capi- announced that ‘detailed design and con- talise upon, the proposed AWPR. struction work would begin’ (Scottish Ex- ecutive, 2003c). As part of the process of working up the detailed design for the scheme the Scot- The strategic policy support for what be- tish Executive commenced preparation of came known as the AWPR was published an environmental assessment of the Mur- in the form of Delivering a Modern Trans- tle route including detailed groundwork port System for North East Scotland (MTS) analysis. Inevitably this led to an anxi- prepared by the local transport partnership ety amongst property owners in the Ab- body (NESTRANS, 2003). This document, erdeen greenbelt. However, probably the which was not subject to public consulta- most deep-seated fear was felt by the tion, sought to take forward some policy management of the Camphill and New- proposals set out in an earlier multi-modal ton Dee communities which occupied an study produced for the city by Oscar Fab- extensive greenbelt campus north of the er (1998) (which had concluded that the River Dee that would be bisected by the level of congestion relief brought about alignment of the bypass. The direct threat through a bypass would be minimal) by to the tranquillity – and hence the sustain- addressing the ‘transport deficit’ through a ability and viability - of the community led series of proposed transport interventions to the promotion of a well-orchestrated including, as well as the AWPR, a high vol- national campaign against the proposed ume cross-city rail shuttle linking Stone- scheme with a clear message being sent haven through a series of new stations to the Scottish Executive that any attempt to Inverurie north of the city (known as to pursue the project would be met with ‘crossrail’), a system of park and ride sites very strong opposition and inevitable legal and enhanced bus services. The strategy, challenges right up to the European Court which was assessed under the Scottish of Human Rights. Transport Assessment Guidance (STAG), emphasised that “...not every scheme will It was no doubt because of this threat that deliver benefits towards every objective, the Scottish Executive decided to hold but collectively, it is believed that the pro- a consultation exercise in March / April posed strategy best delivers on a balance 2005 to elicit opinion on the route, not- of these objectives...” (NESTRANS, 2003, withstanding that the Roads (Scotland) p.8). In terms of overall cost the AWPR ac- Act 1984 under which the scheme was counted for around 65% of the proposed promoted did not contain any provision local transport capital budget (Walton and for public consultation or a public inquiry Shaw, 2003). (Scottish Executive, 2005b), and four oth- World Transport Policy and Practice 45 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 er possible alternatives (Map 2, p59). Most cally was on the ‘line’ of the now preferred of the space within the exhibition – com- so-called ‘route’, was febrile. plete with a simulated fly-over to give a bird’s eye view - was devoted to the Mur- Many speaking from the floor felt they had tle Route with information on the alterna- been completely misled at the public ex- tives being restricted to A4 sized sheets hibitions by Transport Scotland’s agents containing summary data pinned to the when they had probed them about the walls in a corner of the room. Members of precision of the alternative ‘routes’. One staff from Jacobs Babtie, the consultants said that the Jacobs Babtie agent was una- acting for the Scottish Executive, were on ware that the ‘Peterculter / Stonehaven’ hand to answer queries from the public route crossed a field that had planning although they seemed to be much more permission for a state of the art school. comfortable talking about the preferred Several said that they had been told that route than the alternatives. the alternative routes were simply identified to demonstrate the superior cost-ben- The formation of RoadSense and the efit return of the Murtle route and should campaign to the public inquiry not be regarded as likely contenders. An- other told the audience that he had bought The Minister’s decision to opt against the a run-down farm building for conversion Murtle route and in favour of what was 750 metres from the Peterculter / Stone- presented as a combination of two of the haven ‘route’ on the strength of repeated four alternatives came as an enormous assurances given by Jacobs Babtie over shock to the affected communities. The fi- the precision and accuracy of the lines on nal route, the Milltimber Brae /Stonehaven the display plans. Three months after our route, was estimated to cost £295-395m public meeting, and with no opportunity at 2005 prices. Individuals from various afforded to him for comment, the finalised communities met in December 2005 and preferred alignment of the FastLink run- agreed upon holding a public meeting in ning from Maryculter to Stonehaven was February 2006 under the banner of the published leaving it within 60 metres of his newly formed RoadSense to gauge the dream home (Scottish Executive, 2006) strength and depth of opposition and as- (Map 4, p61). sess whether there would be the stomach for what was likely to be a lengthy and Once RoadSense was established we set costly opposition campaign. I was asked about formulating a constitution, electing to chair the meeting; by that stage I was office bearers and organising ourselves into reasonably well known to many residents a series of sub-committees tasked with se- living on the Aberdeen urban-rural fringe curing and preparing for a planning inquiry, as I had advised and acted for several ac- lobbying politicians, liaising with other ob- tion groups and community councils that jector groups such as the Woodland Trust, had opposed many of the schemes already raising awareness through the distribution discussed – the proposed new settlements of a newsletter and the production of plac- and the new football stadium – as well as ards, and critically, raising funds (Evening some other large scale housing schemes Express, 2006; Herald, 2006). Our overall on greenfield sites. aim was to fight the proposed route of the bypass and campaign for more sustainable One event above all guaranteed that solutions to Aberdeen’s transport prob- the meeting would be well attended. On lems which we did through making repre- 30th January 2006 the local broadsheet sentations on emerging transport and land newspaper, the Press & Journal (2006), use planning strategies. At a private meet- published a map leaked to it showing in ing in July 2006 we were given an assur- dark red a ‘corridor of search’ for the new ance by an often ill-tempered Minister that route measuring 4-5km wide in places the scheme would not be included in the (Map 3, p60). Not surprisingly, the mood emerging draft National Planning Frame- of the 1,500 or so people that attended work’s list of nationally significant infra- the meeting in the newly built auditorium structure projects exempt from the need at the International School of Aberdeen in for any public inquiry (Scottish Govern- Milltimber, which ironically but symboli- ment, 2007; Scottish Government, 2008). World Transport Policy and Practice 46 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 We also collected around 5,000 signatures organisation called the Pitfodels Conser- to have the route selection process de- vation Society and the Transport Minister. bated by the Scottish Parliament’s Public Inspection of the Electoral Commission’s Petitions Committee (Scottish Parliament, records revealed that the Scottish Liberal 2006). Tellingly, Mike Rumbles, the lo- Democrat party had received very sub- cal MSP, told the committee that he had stantial financial donations from mid-2005 not been consulted on the FastLink by the onward from a property magnate living Transport Minister. in close proximity to the Pitfodels route who wanted to develop adjoining land for Much of the lengthy preparatory work lead- luxury housing (Daily Mail, 2008). To the ing to the public inquiry was undertaken onlooker it appeared to be an expression by our membership which, reflecting the of gratitude, or possibly remuneration, for income characteristics and nature of the dropping the Pitfodels option. communities likely to be affected, included many highly qualified professionals with Our first opportunity to register formal op- expertise in highway and civil engineering, position to the scheme came in Novem- finance, ecology, law and planning. Nev- ber 2006 with the publication of the en- ertheless we still had the need to bring in vironmental statement and the draft road a good deal of outside assistance3. Usu- orders (the process had to be repeated ally this was straightforward but we failed due to a procedural error in publishing the to find a firm of project managers that statement) (Jacobs, 2007). On the advice would be willing to present evidence chal- of the local Friends of the Earth group we lenging the cost of the scheme for fear, we decided to distribute several thousand post were told, of blotting their copybook and cards, setting out grounds for objection, to prejudicing opportunities for future work members of the public visiting the several with the Scottish Executive (as it turned beauty spots threatened by the scheme, out evidence on this issue would proba- such as Countesswells Woods and the bly have been inadmissible). A number of former Deeside Railway Line, to sign and major donors were identified to help fund return. We also set up a web site through our mounting costs arising from employ- which members of the public could lodge ing environmental and transport consult- their objection but when we approached ants, lawyers and public relations advisors Transport Scotland asking permission to but ultimately most of the £330,000 plus link it to their email account we were told which we spent was provided in the form that its pledge to e-democracy did not of a large number of relatively modest do- extend to helping facilitate submission of nations. We also received charitable do- objections to its own projects (The Times, nations from the Esmee Fairbairn Founda- 2007). By the deadline over 10,000 objection and from the cosmetic firm, Lush. tions had been submitted, more than for any other road proposal in Scottish history. Within the group we spent a considerable By this stage the reader will have no doubt amount of time trying to elicit the basis gathered that RoadSense considered the upon which the route had been selected. process of route selection to have been Following a successful appeal against re- inadequate, but this was only one of sev- fusal of Freedom of Information requests eral grounds of objection. In summary, we eventually received a welter of civil we contended that the promoters had not servants’ and Ministers’ emails and mem- demonstrated that a bypass was required, os relating to route selection (Scottish that the scheme would cause irreparable Information Commissioner, 2007). These damage to the River Dee Special Area of confirmed our understanding that the Mill- Conservation (SAC), that it would destroy timber Brae / Stonehaven route had been bat roosts in the International School of far less attractive in economic and envi- Aberdeen, that it would destroy ancient ronmental terms than either the Murtle woodland on the historically important or the Pitfodels routes. However, by this Kingcausie estate, that it would lead to stage the Pitfodels route had disappeared 3 We called upon the expertise of Alan James, Eco- from the Minister’s radar screen. In 2005 Logica, who presented evidence on landscaping and there had been an unminuted meeting be- transport policy and upon Colin Buchanan & Part- tween members of a previously unknown ners who presented evidence on transport appraisal. World Transport Policy and Practice 47 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 large scale development in the green belt, stating that the Minister had ‘accepted the that it would be financially more costly need in principle for the road’ and that he than other (road and non-road) alterna- only wished to hear evidence with respect tives, that it would induce additional traffic to the technical and environmental as- usage and greenhouse gas emission lev- pects of the route choice. Objectors could els and that its impact on congestion relief identify and promote alternative routes within the city would be minimal (Stand- but only if they had undertaken sufficient ing Advisory Committee on Trunk Road As- background work to show that they were sessment, 1994). capable of being implemented. In practice this seemed to be a requirement that A fundamental problem which we faced objectors undertake what amounted to a throughout the campaign was a lack of desktop engineering and environmental support from any of the main political par- study. Moreover, Transport Scotland con- ties. The AWPR had been promoted under tended at the inquiry that the effect of the the Labour / Liberal Democrat Holyrood Ministerial announcement December 1st administration whose voters in the centre 2005 was to require any alternative Fast and north of Aberdeen respectively saw it Link route to be anchored at Stonehaven, as a panacea for congestion relief, and it and that alternative Fast Link routes link- was also strongly supported by the SNP ing to the A90 at Portlethen (approxi- who considered it as vital to the economic mately half way between Stonehaven and prosperity of their heartlands in north Ab- Aberdeen) as advanced by some objectors erdeenshire and Moray. At a private meet- were inadmissible. It was obvious that the ing in his constituency in December 2006 undertaking given to us by Alex Salmond, the SNP’s Alex Salmond MP told us that who by this stage was First Minister in the he passionately supported the underly- newly named ‘Scottish Government’, to ing principle of the scheme but considered give effect to the Reporter’s recommenda- the route selection process to have been tions was a double edged sword. The in- – somewhat predictably - a typical piece quiry remit had been so unduly restricted of “...Liberal Democrat ineptitude...”. He that a recommendation to approve the also stated that if the SNP were elected to scheme seemed increasingly inevitable. power in the forthcoming May 2007 elections then he or his Ministerial colleague One party that became noticeably reticent would abide by the Planning Reporter’s during proceedings leading up to the plan- recommendations (an undertaking which ning inquiry was the International School breaches the public law principle that a of Aberdeen, a private school jointly owned Minister must not fetter his discretion on by a number of giant oil companies to pro- quasi-judicial matters such as this). What vide an international baccalaureate type none of the many MSPs whom we met dur- education to the scions of overseas oil ex- ing our campaign, including the Transport ecutives posted to the city for relatively Minister, were prepared to discuss was just short periods. As already stated part of how much the scheme would cost or how the school’s wooded campus in Milltimber it would be funded. Later on the Transport was on the proposed alignment. Although Minister was to admit that he did not know there were areas of open land immediately how the scheme could be funded, possi- to the east of the campus where the road bly because, as revealed some years later could be accommodated without any need through Freedom of Information requests, for property demolition the project engi- he knew that the official cost estimates neers opted instead to put it through some were hugely inaccurate (Press & Journal, of the school buildings notwithstanding 2009; The Herald, 2011). the acknowledged presence of European protected bats. Shortly before the inquiry In May 2008 a pre-inquiry meeting was opened we learned that the trustees of the held at the Aberdeen Exhibition Centre to school had come to an agreement with determine the ground rules for the con- the Scottish Government that the cam- duct of the forthcoming public inquiry and, pus would be closed and demolished with most significantly, to inform parties of the the school being relocated 5km east to a scope of the inquiry. A few days later all ob- £51m publicly funded state of the art pur- jectors received a letter from the Reporter pose built campus on a large wooded site World Transport Policy and Practice 48 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 in Cults. That news made it inevitable that ‘tweak’ that inevitably shifted the impact the road would be approved. It also meant onto other property occupants). that the Government would not face any opposition from an oil company backed What it did not reveal was exactly why the objector. Minister opted for the hybrid Milltimber Brae / Stonehaven route since no minute The Public Inquiry into the AWPR of the critical meeting had been taken. The hybrid route returned lower economic At the commencement of the public inquiry benefits and greater environmental costs in August 2008 held at the Treetops Hotel than the Murtle and the Pitfodels routes. in Aberdeen our barrister, Stuart Gale QC, On cross examination it was conceded submitted that the restricted remit was in by Transport Scotland that the route was breach of article 6(4) of the EU Habitats & changed at the last minute due to the Species directive (92/43/EC). The prelimi- need to avoid confrontation with the Cam- nary appropriate assessment prepared by phill and Newton Dee communities. With Transport Scotland acknowledged that the an underhand assurance having been giv- scheme would cause material damage to en to the Pitfodels Conservation Society it the River Dee SAC, but nevertheless stat- seemed that the Milltimber Brae / Stone- ed that there was no article 6(4) require- haven route had been selected by a simple ment to investigate alternative transport process of elimination. policies and alternative route alignments since the impacts on the highly sensitive The Reporters’ unconditional recommen- river would be fully mitigated. Invoking dation to approve the finalised preferred the precautionary principle and the need Milltimber Brae / Stonehaven route in De- for absolute protection to the known pop- cember 2009 came as no surprise. David ulation of EU listed pearl mussels in the Gordon, the chair of the three reporters vicinity of the proposed crossing we con- adjudicating the inquiry, had earlier ig- tended that there was a good deal of un- nored protestations about the true scale of certainty attaching to the effectiveness of brownfield land availability when produc- the somewhat ill-defined mitigation meas- ing his ‘Findings of Fact’ on the inquiry into ures, which pointed to the need for a wider the new settlement at Banchory Devenick exploration of transport solutions. In ef- in 1996. With respect to the AWPR the Re- fect, given that the entire River Dee was porters accepted in their Findings of Fact, designated as a SAC, this meant exploring for example, that 31 local landscape char- either tunnel or non-road based solutions. acter areas would be irreversibly damaged The decision of the Reporter to reject our but nevertheless concluded that the envi- submission was to be the first of several ronmental impacts were not so severe as defeats on the issue of the inquiry remit. to render the proposal unacceptable and that no alternatives offered a clear overall What the public inquiry did reveal was that advantage to the proposed scheme. Under the decision to identify alternative ‘routes’ the procedures, which were changed fol- had been made only a matter of weeks in lowing the debacle over the Glasgow M74 advance of the public consultation exer- extension when the Minister had overrid- cise and that the decision to opt for the den the Reporter’s recommendation to so-called hybrid Milltimber Brae / Stone- reject the scheme, final approval for the haven ‘route’ was revealed to the Project AWPR and the accompanying CPOs had to Manager only 30 minutes before it was be given by the Scottish Parliament, under announced to the press. The inquiry also its affirmative order procedure. Parliament laid bare some of the machinations be- approved the project in January 2010. hind the scenes in finalising the alignment of the FastLink. A letter written by Mike The legal challenges to the Minister’s Rumbles MSP to the Church of Scotland decision Minister for Maryculter revealed that following a private meeting between himself From the outset of our campaign we were and the Transport Minister, the route had aware that it was unlikely that we would been ‘tweaked’ and shifted to the east to get the result we desired through the pub- lessen its impact upon the parishioners (a lic inquiry and that we would probably World Transport Policy and Practice 49 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 have to resort to challenging the scheme the event that our challenge was defeated. in the courts. Any challenge could only be Such orders have been introduced in the made on a point of law and, more specifi- UK (they are known as Protected Cost Or- cally, under the terms of the Roads (Scot- ders in England and Wales) to give effect land) Act 1984, we had to show that we to the Aarhus and EU stipulation that ac- had been ‘aggrieved’. We soon received cess to environmental justice ought not to advice from our own counsel that there be prohibitively expensive. At that stage were issues that should be ventilated in we had funds of around £78,000 and the the court but we decided nonetheless to Court awarded us a PEO of £40,000 (on the gain a second opinion from another bar- grounds that our legal costs were estimat- rister specialising in planning law. When ed to be around £30,000 and those of the that advice supported a challenge we went Scottish Ministers were between £50,000 back to our members who overwhelmingly and £60,000) (RoadSense and William backed our proposal for legal action. Walton v Scottish Ministers [2011]).

As well as pursuing a legal challenge we This PEO was, however, transferred to my decided to lodge complaints with the Com- name when, on the opening day of the pliance Committee of the United Nations hearing, the judge in the Outer House of Aarhus Convention on Access to Infor- the Court of Session expressed doubt as to mation, Public Participation in Decision- whether RoadSense, as an unincorporat- Making and Access to Justice in Environ- ed body, had legal personality to sue the mental Matters (the ‘Aarhus Convention’) Scottish Government. What became my and with the Commission of the European case was conjoined with that of two other Union (United Nations Economic and So- objectors, John and Maggie Fraser, who cial Council, 2011). In the Aarhus Conven- ran an organic farm adjacent to the Fast tion complaint we alleged: that there had Link and contended that they should have been a failure to undertake proper public been granted legal aid to fund professional consultation, in particular with those peo- representation at the planning inquiry. ple living close to the Fast Link; that the challenge was unaffordable; and that we The principal submissions made on my had been denied access to important eco- behalf were: first, that the decision to logical information relevant to the River add the FastLink was a modification to Dee. In regard to the Commission we con- the MTS and so breached article 3(3) of tended that Transport Scotland had failed the EU Strategic Environmental Assess- to consider alternative alignments around ment directive (2001/42/EC); second, the International School notwithstanding that there had been a failure to consult on that the environmental assessment (EA) route options when all options were avail- acknowledged that it housed bats, pro- able, in breach of the requirement under tected under the Habitats directive (Sun- article 2(2)(b) of the EU Public Participa- day Herald, 2009). In response to our sub- tion directive (2003/35/EC); third, that mission the Aarhus compliance committee the public inquiry remit had been unfairly found that the alignment of the Fast Link restricted in breach of the common law; had changed but that members of the fourth, that the failure to consider alter- public had had the opportunity to attend native routes breached article 6(4) of the the public inquiry to challenge the plan. EU Habitats directive; and fifth, that the It seemed that the Compliance Commit- planned demolition of the International tee, whose function it was to uphold the School of Aberdeen breached article 16(1) convention, had failed to understand the (c) of the Habitats directive. convention’s requirement for early consultation when all options were up for con- In support of the 2001/42/EC issue we not- sideration. The Commission did not pursue ed that the Minister had sought to justify our complaint. the ‘policy decision’ (his own words) to add the FastLink by stating that it would help Faced with diminishing funds we applied alleviate growing traffic congestion on the to the Court of Session for a Protected A90 between Aberdeen and Stonehaven, Expenses Order (PEO) to limit our liabil- a policy objective that had not previously ity for the Scottish Ministers’ legal costs in been articulated in the MTS or evaluated World Transport Policy and Practice 50 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 through a strategic environmental assess- tive submissions, holding on the first that ment (SEA). The failure to conduct such there was no credible evidence to cast an SEA, in which other policy interven- doubt on the effectiveness of the proposed tions such as enhanced rail or bus services SAC mitigation measures and on the sec- could have been evaluated, rendered the ond, somewhat spuriously, that we had approval of the AWPR unlawful. In the ab- not shown that alternative routes would sence of an SEA we argued that the inquiry not also impact upon bat roosts. should have allowed evidence questioning both the need for a FastLink and the re- To an individual that had far more confi- quirement that it be geographically an- dence in the integrity and objectivity of chored at Stonehaven. On the 2003/35/EC the courts than in the flawed public inquiry issue we contended, first, that the Scottish process (during the campaign I had found Government had not transposed the direc- time to complete the bar exams and had tive properly and, second, that the first been Called to the Bar at Lincoln’s Inn in formal opportunity the public had to object October 2010) I found the reasoning of the to the scheme was when the EA and draft judgment difficult to accept. Stuart Gale road orders were published in November QC, who had acted for RoadSense during 2006, by which time other options (in- the inquiry and then, on a conditional fee cluding non-road based alternatives) had arrangement (a CFA is a form of ‘no win, been discarded. On the inquiry remit issue no fee’), for me in the Court of Session, we submitted that we should have been was of the view that I should appeal. His able to challenge the policy supporting the junior, Jane Munro, concurred and also of- FastLink. Finally, on the 92/43/EC issues fered to act on a CFA in any appeal to the we contended that the Scottish Govern- Inner House. ment had failed to demonstrate that there would be no damage to the River Dee SAC, Armed with the informal opinion of jun- thus requiring consideration of alternative ior and senior counsel I asked for support routes and measures, and that there was from the RoadSense committee and mem- not a satisfactory alternative alignment for bership. By this stage our annual general the AWPR around the school which would meetings were down to a core of around 60- have avoided the destruction of bat roosts. 100 people and our committee to around a dozen. Shortly after we announced our In his decision handed down 11th August decision to appeal I was invited on to a 2011 Lord Tyre was not persuaded by local radio talk show to field questions the arguments of either John and Mag- from callers on why we were opposed to gie Fraser or myself and refused both ap- the AWPR. At the start of the programme I peals (William Walton & Others v Scottish set out the basis of our decision to appeal Ministers [2011] CSOH 13). On the criti- and explained to listeners that one of our cal FastLink issue he held that it was not committee members alleged she had been an ‘addition’ to, or ‘modification’ of, the told some years before by the then Alex scheme but was merely a component of Salmond MP that we ought to pursue the the project which was part of the broader matter through the courts. Two days later, strategy set out in the MTS. Since the MTS reporting a response from Alex Salmond had not been modified he accepted Trans- to my radio comments, I found an over- port Scotland’s submission that its ante- blown picture of myself on the front page cedence meant that it not fall within the of the Press & Journal with the headline requirements for an SEA. Further, he held ‘Is this protester the most hated man in that there had been no procedural error in Scotland?’ with the First Minister claiming restricting the inquiry to an examination that I was holding Scotland to ransom and of the environmental and technical mat- pleading with me to listen to the people ters of the scheme and noted that it had and withdraw my appeal (Press & Journal, still been open to the Reporters to have 2011a) (Picture 1, p62). A few days later recommended against the entire scheme the Press & Journal (2011b) sought to pile or the FastLink component. His judgment further pressure on me when it splashed for some reason failed to address the the results of its own opinion poll across 2003/35/EC transposition issue. Finally, the front page claiming that 91% of local he rejected both of the Habitats direc- people wanted me to withdraw the appeal. World Transport Policy and Practice 51 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 Alex Salmond again reiterated his plea for dered that in the event that I won the me to see sense. Scottish Ministers would only be eligible to cover the costs of my senior counsel. Arguably such comments and journalism Unsurprisingly, given the highly restrictive amounts to contempt of court and when terms of the costs order both my counsel they were raised by my counsel at an in- withdrew (a senior would not normally act terim cost hearing Lord Osborne sternly in such a case without a junior) (Press & observed that whilst it was one thing for Journal, 2012a). Initially, notwithstanding Government ministers to express their that my experience was limited to making support for policy objectives it was quite a bail application in my bar examinations, another to seek to offer public advice to I decided that I would act as a litigant- a litigant to withdraw from litigation. The in-person (Press & Journal, 2012b). Fortu- bench made it clear that they wished to nately, within 24 hours my solicitor, Franc- hear no similar repetitions of such threats es McCartney, informed me that one of and, at least for once during the campaign, Scotland’s most eminent barristers, Aidan I felt that some sense of justice had been O’Neill QC, was prepared to act for me on achieved (Press & Journal, 2011c; The Tel- a CFA with a junior, Chris Pirie, prepared to egraph, 2011). act pro bono (Press & Journal, 2012c). Of course experienced barristers are used to Any thought that I might win on appeal, drafting complex pleadings at short notice however, was soon expunged at the start but nevertheless the timescale, with the of the hearing when Clarke LJ expressed case scheduled to be heard in July so as to the opinion in forthright terms that my meet Transport Scotland’s concerns about appeal was procedurally incompetent as the 3 year time limited CPOs expiring, was I had not been served with a compulso- extremely tight. ry purchase order and so could not be an ‘aggrieved person’ under the terms of the In the run up to the Supreme Court hear- Roads (Scotland) Act 1984. Putting to one ing I was subject to direct pressure to side that I was appearing in the capacity withdraw the appeal and was on the cusp of the chairman of a group that contained of doing so until 3 days before the hearing many members that had been served with when I was offered a new lecturing post compulsory purchase orders, such a per- at Northumbria University whose man- spective was completely at odds with the agement made it explicitly clear that they judgment handed down by the Supreme did not regard my involvement in a cam- Court just a few months earlier in Axa paign against a road scheme in Aberdeen General Insurance Ltd and others v Lord as being incompatible with my contract of Advocate [2011] which seemed to sweep employment. The University of Aberdeen, away the unduly restrictive title and inter- my previous employer, had been a strong est requirements imposed by Scots Law. supporter of the AWPR through its mem- Although they agreed to hear the substan- bership of ACSEF (Aberdeen City & Shire tive issues the decision of the three judges Economic Forum) (Times Higher Educa- was that none of the submissions had any tion, 2013). merit and that my appeal should be dismissed. Central to Lord Clarke’s opinion The appeal to the Supreme Court focused was that EU law provided for a system of on whether the proposed FastLink should tiered decision making and that once the have been subject to a strategic environ- Scottish Government had taken the policy mental assessment and whether there decision to build the AWPR the scope for had been a breach of common law fair- questioning the FastLink was limited to an ness. To sustain the SEA argument we had examination of the detail of the alignment. to demonstrate, first, that the MTS was a He rejected any suggestion that the addi- plan that served a regulatory purpose for tion of the FastLink was a separate ‘poli- determining transport investment in the cy decision’ (Walton v Scottish Ministers Aberdeen area and, second, that the ad- [2012] CSIH 19). dition of the FastLink was a modification to that plan and not, as Lord Tyre had held In March 2012 I decided to appeal to the at first instance, just an expression of its Supreme Court. However, the court or- detail. We were inviting the Court to grant World Transport Policy and Practice 52 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 either an interdict (an injunction) prohibit- Conclusions and reflections ing construction of the FastLink or a de- claratory judgment confirming the need At the start of the campaign, whilst recog- for an SEA. nising the reality of what it meant to challenge a Government sponsored project, I In the lead opinion Reed LJ departed from was nevertheless optimistic that our case the reasoning of Tyre LJ and held that even would prevail. Like many in RoadSense though he was prepared hypothetically I believed that the process by which the to accept that the MTS was a ‘plan’ un- scheme had been promoted would be ex- der the directive, the issue was redundant posed as flawed either in the public in- since the project had been taken over by quiry or, more likely, in the courts. Other the Scottish Government (Walton v Scot- campaign groups had defeated trunk-road tish Ministers [2012] UKSC 44). The con- projects – such as at Oxleas Wood and the sequence of this decision meant that the M65 extension in the Pennines - and I be- scheme was only subject to the require- lieved we could do the same. ments of an EA and not an SEA. The other judges concurred with the decision al- The outcome is still difficult to accept. The though, importantly, asking the rhetorical decision to build a bypass was, according question who would protect the ospreys, to Transport Scotland, based on the MTS Hope LJ made it clear that I did have the published in 2003 which had not been right to bring the action since it was evi- subject to public consultation. The deci- dent that I was not a ‘mere busybody’ but sion to opt against both the Murtle and somebody that had a genuine and long- the Pitfodels routes and in favour of the standing environmental interest. Thus, Milltimber Brae / Stonehaven route was the Supreme Court judgment, following its essentially the product of politics and se- earlier holding in Axa General Insurance cretive negotiations rather than one based Ltd, has significantly advanced the right of upon an objective and transparent assess- those in Scotland without a direct prop- ment of acknowledged environmental and erty interest to challenge a decision and so economic criteria. Prior to the Ministerial brought the law of standing into line with route announcement in December 2005 that in England and Wales. behind the scenes deals appear to have been concluded with the Camphill Village Notwithstanding the welcome expressed Trust and with the hitherto unheard of by the Scottish Government to the defeat (and no longer existent) Pitfodels Conser- of the final legal challenge there has, at the vation Society, effectively ruling out se- time of writing, still been no contract put lection of either of the two long favoured in place for construction. This is no doubt ‘inner’ Murtle and Pitfodels routes. Once because the Scottish Government now es- the more westerly Milltimber Brae / Stone- timates that the final cost will be around haven route had been selected then fur- £745m, more or less double the original ther deals appear to have been concluded official figure of £295-395m which under- with the International School of Aberdeen pinned the benefit-cost estimates cited at and the Church of Scotland so as to ac- the inquiry which the objectors were not commodate their interests. It is quite pos- permitted to challenge. More recently Au- sible that other parties also concluded dit Scotland has concluded that the final confidential agreements with the Scottish cost of five key infrastructure projects cal- Government. culated over 30 years of operation will be around £7.5bn, double their current cost The decision to incorporate a hitherto un- of £3.8bn, implying a 30 year cost for the canvassed 11.5km long spur into the pre- AWPR of around £1.5bn (Audit Scotland, ferred route was based upon a policy ob- 2013). There is a distinct possibility that jective which had never previously been this grand scheme will be started but nev- articulated or evaluated and which could er completed. In the meantime, the more not be scrutinised or challenged at the in- sustainable and far less costly proposal quiry. The first opportunity anybody had for the enhanced cross-rail shuttle serv- to object to the FastLink was in response ice included in the MTS has been quietly to consultation on the EA and draft road shelved. orders in November 2006 by which time World Transport Policy and Practice 53 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 consideration of non-AWPR alternatives, I came under the media spotlight which including the widening of the A90, had was often quite unpleasant and intrusive. been discarded. At no stage in the pro- I was subject to a personal attack in the ceedings was there any evaluation of the press by the First Minister and other MSPs, comparative merits of the FastLink against threatening and uninvited comments from other possible transport policy interven- passers-by, intervention by civil servants, tions, a position which the Supreme Court hate mail in the blogosphere and undue held was not in breach of the law but which and improper pressure to withdraw my ap- nonetheless defies the principles of sound peal from senior staff in a long established transport and land use planning. and ancient institution in Aberdeen.

In retrospect, however, by the time we had There is also an enormous financial -ex realised what had happened and formed pense incurred in fighting schemes of ourselves into a campaign group in Decem- this size and complexity. In our case we ber 2005 it was, in reality, already too late. had many members with relevant skills For reasons stated above nobody antici- and qualifications and we were also able pated the selection of a route so far to the to raise considerable sums of money to west of Aberdeen so we cannot blame our- fund our representation at the public in- selves for being caught flatfooted. By the quiry (although we still found it difficult to time residents were formally consulted in persuade some consultants to act for us). 2006 all of the alternative possible options Less privileged communities are at a far had been disbanded, notwithstanding the greater disadvantage in fighting projects seemingly straightforward requirement of that might threaten the amenity and in- Article 2(2)(b) of the public participation tegrity of their area. Tillydrone, a com- directive. So once the preferred route had munity in north Aberdeen suffering from been selected, subjected to preliminary multiple deprivation, was affected by a engineering works, had an environmental proposal for a road widening scheme and assessment prepared and had very large new river crossing during the same period sums of public money spent acquiring ob- covered in this paper. In sharp contrast jectors’ properties then the prospects of to RoadSense that community found the persuading a planning reporter to recom- task of raising funds for professional wit- mend refusal to the Minister in the context nesses and legal representation for two of a highly restricted public inquiry were all short inquiries extremely demanding and but impossible. Our belief that the courts eventually abandoned an intended court would remedy the shortcomings caused by action on the grounds that legal aid was the absence of an SEA, the risk of damage not available to an aggrieved property to the River Dee SAC, the destruction of owner subject to a compulsory purchase bats, the skewed and limited public con- order. This episode raises profound ques- sultation exercise and the restricted public tions about access to environmental jus- inquiry proved to be ill founded, illusory tice in Scotland for low income individuals and possibly naive. and communities.

Mounting a challenge against any Gov- Whilst these constraints have to a cer- ernment backed infrastructure scheme is tain extent been addressed following the likely to be a truly daunting experience recent judgment in R (on the applica- for objectors. For about 20 of us in Road- tion of Edwards & Pallikaropoulos v Envi- Sense it more or less took over our lives ronment Agency et al) [2013], which in for around six years or so, and whilst it certain circumstances limits for liability was often extremely draining it was ulti- of the respondents’ costs to £5,000, the mately a very rewarding life experience in claimants remain liable for their own legal terms of making new friendships and giv- costs which, without solicitors and barris- ing us a unique insight into the workings ters being prepared to act on a CFA or pro of the state. At all times we conducted our bono basis, could still be several tens or campaign in a transparent and dignified hundreds of thousands of pounds. Had I manner, something which cannot be said been fully invoiced by my legal team for of all of the other parties involved. When the three hearings the total costs would the case moved to the courts in my name have been at least £200,000-£250,000. World Transport Policy and Practice 54 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 For all but the very wealthiest of people References: this will mean that engaging in protracted court action is out of the question and thus Aberdeen City Council (2004) Green Spac- one must ask whether the UK is compliant es; New Places: A local plan for Aberdeen. with the Aarhus convention’s requirement Aberdeen. that litigation must not be prohibitively expensive (Uprichard v Scottish Ministers & Audit Scotland (2013) Scotland’s key in- another) [2013]. Fears over costs had also frastructure projects. Edinburgh. prevented John and Maggie Fraser from appealing Lord Tyer’s decision. Arguably Axa General Insurance Ltd and others v UK law on protected cost orders still falls Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46 a long way short of what is required under international law. Daily Mail (2008) “Liberal Democrat chief accused after bypass is switched”, 23rd In making their decisions on major January 2008, p.10. projects, and in line with long established public law principles, Ministers possess a Evening Express (2006) “’Stump up your considerable degree of discretion which money to fight the bypass plan’”, 10th May the courts will only interfere with in cir- 2006. Aberdeen Journals Ltd, Aberdeen. cumstances where there have been clear and incontrovertible breaches of the law. Jacobs (2007) Aberdeen Western Periph- Such an accommodating approach to the eral Route: Environmental Statement. policies and decisions of Governments ar- Transport Scotland, Edinburgh. guably places individuals and the environment at great risk since these interests, NESTRANS (2003) Delivering a modern notwithstanding legislation protecting hu- transport system for north-east Scotland. man rights and the environment, will usu- Aberdeen. ally be accorded far less weight than those of the wider population whom the state Oscar Faber (1998) A Sustainable Trans- claims to represent. There were numerous port Study for Aberdeen, Scottish Execu- occasions when the judges deferentially tive, Edinburgh. remarked that a rejection of the AWPR project after so much work had been done Press & Journal (2006) “Shock over 3 mile and so much money spent (it was submit- wide route for bypass”, 30th January 2006, ted in the Supreme Court on behalf of the p1. Aberdeen Journals Ltd, Aberdeen. Scottish Ministers that around £130m had already been spent on property acquisi- Press & Journal (2009) “I do not know how tion, engineering studies and professional we will pay for the bypass, says minister”, fees) would be ‘detrimental to Aberdeen’ 1st May, p.3. Aberdeen Journals Ltd, Ab- with the implication that any procedural erdeen. errors were now water under the bridge. Some readers might find such expressed Press & Journal (2011a) “Is this protester sentiments to be rather unsettling given the most hated man in Scotland?”, 13th what they reveal about the pliability of the September, p.1. Aberdeen Journals Ltd, so-called rule of law in the context of de- Aberdeen. termining challenges to major infrastructure schemes. Press & Journal (2011b) “91% of you think that RoadSense should drop bypass court Author details: action now”, 21st September, p.1. Aber- William Walton deen Journals Ltd, Aberdeen.

Email: Press & Journal (2011c) “Judge rebukes [email protected] Salmond for attack on Walton”, 29th Octo- ber p.3. Aberdeen Journals Ltd, Aberdeen.

World Transport Policy and Practice 55 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 Press & Journal (2012a) “Bypass appeal Scottish Information Commissioner (2007) ‘all but over’ after court order”, 18th May, Decision 218/2007 Dr A D Hawkins and p.1. Aberdeen Journals Ltd, Aberdeen. Transport Scotland. Request for information regarding the Aberdeen Western Pe- Press & Journal (2012b) “Walton set to ripheral Route. Scottish Information Com- lead own bypass case”, 19th May, p.1. Ab- missioner, St Andrews. erdeen Journals Ltd, Aberdeen. Scottish Parliament (2006) Public Petitions Press & Journal (2012c) “Walton hires top Committee. Session 2. 6th September. Ed- QC in ‘last throw of the dice’”, 25th May, inburgh. p.1. Aberdeen Journals Ltd, Aberdeen. Standing Advisory Committee on Trunk R (on the application of Edwards & Pal- Road Assessment (1994) Trunk roads and likarapoulos) (Appellant) v Environment the generation of traffic. Department of Agency and others (Respondents) (No. 2) Transport, London. [2013] UKSC 78 Sunday Herald (2009) “How a colony of RoadSense and William Walton v Scottish bats is set to scupper Scotland’s most Ministers [2011] CSOH 10 controversial road and £51m of taxpayer cash”, 6th December 2009. Scottish Media Scottish Executive (2003a) “Aberdeen ring Group, Glasgow. road initiative”, 27th January 2003, Edin- burgh. The Herald (2006) “Hundreds in by-pass route protest”, 10th May 2006, Scottish Scottish Executive (2003b) “£3bn to ‘build Media Group, Glasgow. better transport’”, 5th March 2003, Edin- burgh. The Herald (2011) “Warning over cost of bypass”, 27th September, p3. Scottish Me- Scottish Executive (2003c) “Next stage for dia Group. Aberdeen bypass”, 19th March 2003, Ed- inburgh. The Telegraph (2011) “Judge criticises Salmond for attack on road campaigner”, Scottish Executive (2005a) “Aberdeen p.7. London. bypass route”, 1st December 2005, Edin- burgh. The Times (2007) “Let us know your views, just don’t send an email”, 9th Octo- Scottish Executive (2005b) “Aberdeen ber 2007. London. Western Peripheral Route”, 4th March 2005, Edinburgh. Times Higher Education (2013) “University pressured me to quit anti-bypass fight”, Scottish Executive (2006) “Aberdeen by- 25th July, p16. London. pass preferred line confirmed”, 2nd May 2006, Edinburgh. United Nations Economic and Social Council (2011) Findings and recommen- Scottish Government (2007) “Public local dations with regard to communication inquiry on Aberdeen Western Peripheral ACCC/C/2009/38 concerning compliance Route”, 12th October 2007 Scottish Gov- by the United Kingdom of Great Britain ernment, Edinburgh. and Northern Ireland. Geneva, UN.

Scottish Government (2008) National Uprichard v Scottish Ministers & another Planning Framework for Scotland 2: Dis- [2013] UKSC 21 cussion Draft. Edinburgh. Walton, W and Farrington, J (2000) “The Sustainable Transport Study for Aberdeen: A Pioneering Attempt at a ‘Multimodal Study’”. Environment & Planning C: Gov- ernment and Policy 18 (5) 609-627. World Transport Policy and Practice 56 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 Walton, W and Shaw, J (2003) “Applying the new approach to transport policy at the local level in the UK”, Journal of Trans- port Geography 11(1) 1-12

Walton, W (2000) “Windfall sites for housing: An underestimated resource”, Urban Studies 37 (2) 391-408

William Walton & Others v Scottish Minis- ters [2011] CSOH 13.

Walton v Scottish Ministers [2012] CSIH 19

Walton v Scottish Ministers [2012] UKSC 44

World Transport Policy and Practice 57 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 World Transport Policy and Practice 58 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 World Transport Policy and Practice 59 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 World Transport Policy and Practice 60 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 World Transport Policy and Practice 61 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 Picture 1: Front page of Aberdeen Press & Journal 13th September 2011

World Transport Policy and Practice 62 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 The Curse of the Zombie Roads Patrick Kinnersly

Just the place for a fast highway? This is the Wellhead Valley, between the town of Westbury and the western escarpment of Salisbury Plain. Wiltshire County Council wanted to build an eastern bypass of the town through here. After a long planning inquiry in 2008 the scheme was axed by the government because the transport case was too weak to justify the damage it would have done to this tranquil landscape. After appearing to accept that the scheme had been killed off, the county’s new unitary council hopes to revive it by claiming that the safeguarded route survived refusal of planning permission and so can live on as a proposal in its new local plan for the period to 2025. The Westbury bypass is one of hundreds of ‘Zombie roads’ being brought back to life as Britain embarks on a new age of road construction. (Photo credit: Jenny Raggett, June 2009)

THE CURSE OF THE ZOMBIE ROADS A map of the proposed scheme is on the web site of the White Horse Alliance - Old road schemes do not die. Like the leg- http://www.corridor-alliance.co.uk/Maps. endary zombies they lie buried but undead, html More about the history of the road waiting for the call to rise again. The road and its revival can be found via this link at the centre of this article is the West- and in Appendix 3 to this article. bury bypass in Wiltshire, supposedly killed off for ever after an almost unprecedented But bypasses cannot exist in isolation. rejection by the planning system in 2009. They may be marketed to a town or vil- That should have been its last chance to lage as though the whole enterprise is force a way through the tranquil Wellhead conceived for no other purpose than to rid Valley between the town and the western their community of danger, pollution and escarpment of Salisbury Plain, right under noise, but road builders are never that the nose of the White Horse, the chalk hill philanthropic. ‘Your’ bypass is just one figure that is the emblem of the town it- part of their corridor to somewhere else. self. That was the strategy behind the formation of the A36 Corridor Alliance more than World Transport Policy and Practice 63 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 20 years ago; we had to mirror what was gonna call? All the stock defenders of jus- then the government’s plan to build a fast tice and liberty are shown shrinking away dual-carriageway across Hampshire, Wilt- from a fight: a procession of green gurus, shire, North Somerset and South Glouces- useless lawyers, timorous planning in- tershire linking the M27 to the M4. When spectors, flaccid MPs and compliant judges Wiltshire’s highway boosters started to de- slinks across the screen. As rivers of tar velop their own ‘growth corridor’ along the engulf the land it seems no-one can stop A350 linking the M4 to the A36 in West ‘the biggest road-building programme Wiltshire we added this road to our terri- since the Romans’. tory and our title. So, it’s down to a raggle-taggle resistance movement led by fearless young ideal- Zombie roads wait for the call to rise again. ists to challenge the might of Maggi’s ar- The government has found the ancient in- moured divisions. They fight the Zombie cantation bequeathed to it by the great roads in the chalk hills, through ancient leader of the road-building cult, Margaret woods and across the rooftops where ur- Thatcher – ‘Roads for Prosperity’and ‘The ban motorways gnaw at the suburbs of the great car economy’. The Westbury bypass capital city. Armed only with D-locks, fierce is now rising from its grave. So, unbeliev- courage and limitless powers of invention, ably, is the A36 Salisbury bypass. the young guerrillas slow the advance of the zombie roads; it takes longer to cut The manifest foolishness of the govern- through the rolling downs, hack tree-by- ment’s programme for massive road- tree through the woods, drop-ball house- building at this stage of our history is al- by-house towards the city centre. Maggi’s most beyond satire. I know I must treat it henchmen grow nervous as the gold in the as a lethal threat – and I will do so later in great ironbound war chest runs low - just this article - but all the same ... when they need sacks of the stuff if they are to hold onto power. ZOMBIE ROADS – RETURN OF THE In the final scene the imprisoned resist- UNDEAD ance leaders are set free and carried shoulder high through the streets. Maggi Unless you are over 40 you probably won’t is sent into exile with a cutlery drawer remember that cult classic of the 1990s, of daggers in her back. The land is quiet The Zombie Roads. For those too young again save for the sound of tar and con- to have seen it and those obliged to forget crete slurping out of the valleys like dark it as they head towards the upper levels of glaciers retreating. transport planning, a brief recap may help. As the credits roll we see, far off on a moonlit hill, young people dancing in a cir- In a small country off the coasts of north- cle of beech trees. ern Europe the government has been taken over by a covert alliance of oil compa- It should have been impossible to make nies, car makers, construction firms and a sequel to The Zombie Roads. It was so property developers. This is of course a Nineties, so 20th Century. Those were the totally implausible premise (think - Who days of rampant monetarist economics Killed Roger Rabbit, in which the good and unshakeable confidence in an endless- name of General Motors is besmirched by ly rising market, before ‘we’ knew about suggesting that it actually bought up the global warming, peak oil and the longest trams of Los Angeles in order to destroy recession in history. Ranged on the other the city’s rapid transit system. As if!) side was a youth culture of dissidence and do-it-yourself social invention rebelling The genuinely scary noir style of The Zom- against attempts to suppress its raves and bie Roads was lightened by the blatant- other manifestations of new-age indiffer- ly satirical characterisation of the villain, ence to global commodities, the ‘Great Car the evil Maggi, stalking the land chanting Economy’ and other supposed attractions ‘Roads for Prosperity, Roads for Growth.’ of ‘the property-owning democracy’. But even in a genre I shall call blacktop noir, the villain must somehow come to By the middle of the Nineties, senior a sticky end. But how - and who are you Conservative cabinet ministers including World Transport Policy and Practice 64 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 Environment Secretary John Gummer1 entire route from the M27 near Southamp- had renounced their faith in tarmac as a ton to the M4 north of Bath and Bristol. growth medium and torn up their sacred They too would have been forced to scrap text, Roads for Prosperity2. The reports the Salisbury scheme for environmental of the Standing Advisory Committee on reasons. But after years of anti-road cam- Trunk Road Assessment had confirmed paigning we allowed ourselves to believe that building roads just encouraged traf- that this cancellation and others around fic growth and further congestion3 and did the country might just herald a new age not necessarily bring economic growth or of rationality. regenerate regions with poor connections to the strategic road network4. A swathe We looked forward to transferring our of road projects was cancelled. But the energy from the soul-destroying work of ‘Nasty Party’, with more to live down than stopping bad things to the creative chal- environmental destruction, suffered a lenge of promoting good things. In Salis- crushing defeat at the general election of bury, anti-bypass campaigners formed 1997. a local group of Transport 2000 and set about promoting ‘home zones’, cycle- The incoming New Labour government of ways and better buses. In 1998 we even Tony Blair had of course promised nothing launched a ‘Green Commuter of the Year’ truly radical on the transport front. Cru- competition. (The ‘Brown Wheel Trophy’ cially there would be no re-nationalisation was awarded to the schools of Salisbury of the railways system so disastrously pri- for ‘services to congestion’. The County vatised by the Tories. But the good news Council declined to receive an award that was that Deputy Prime Minister and life- recognised its failure to develop school long transport union member John Pres- travel plans). cott wanted integrated transport and in- tegration of environmental and transport John Prescott’s policies for integrated planning. The result was a new super- transport appeared to be deflecting the ministry, the Department for Environment, road-builders’ juggernaut, if not exactly Transport and the Regions (DETR) and the turning it round. Wiltshire County Coun- Commission for Integrated Transport. The cil’s first Local Transport Plan (LTP1), pub- intention was to join up planning of devel- lished in July 20005, embodied some of opment with planning of transport across the new as well as too much of the old. the regions of the UK. He wanted to shift On the one hand it offered the poisonous motorists from cars to more sustainable fruits of the Salisbury Transport Strategy, forms of transport - including trams - and a tarmac-laden study commissioned from freight from road to rail. But his commit- consultants WS Atkins after the cancella- ment to eat his hat if he did not defeat tion of the Salisbury bypass6. On the other traffic congestion went unfulfilled. Traffic hand the LTP contained progressive am- continued to increase; the hat remained bitions for reopening railway stations and uneaten. It wasn’t really his fault. While even toyed with the notion that the council he may have already bitten off more than itself might hire rolling stock and run local he could chew by joining up so many min- rail services. isterial functions his real mistake was to underestimate the power of the roads lob- With hindsight it is easy to see that the by and the belief embedded in all govern- game was already up. The railway im- ment departments that better transport provements were just green garnish on must mean more and better roads; oth- the old high-calorie junk-transport menu. er modes, including rail, bus, cycling and The days of modal shift were over; New walking, were alternative transport. Labour had done a handbrake turn and was already motoring off in the other di- But for us in the SW there was a phoney rection as fast as Tony Blair could drive it. peace, a brief lull after the Labour government scrapped the A36 Salisbury bypass in In July 1999 he had appointed the former 1997. The Tories had already begun to dis- trade union militant turned media mogul mantle the Department of Transport (DoT) Gus (by then Lord) Macdonald as Minister plan for a fast dual-carriageway along the for Transport, an appointment he held for World Transport Policy and Practice 65 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 just under two years. By the time the first had purchased at knock-down prices from LTPs appeared it was clear to campaign- the government. The government would ers that the word had gone out to regional not inject the extra cash required to un- government offices that local authorities lock this vicious circle. When the possible could dust off their old road schemes with- outcomes of multi-modal studies were so out undue embarrassment. limited there seemed little point in ‘environmental transport stakeholders’ wasting Wiltshire County Council was quick to re- time proposing strategies that had little vive sections of the DoT’s old A36/46 su- chance of being realised. I resigned from perhighway plan and present them as local further involvement with consultations on relief and link roads around Salisbury and the London to South West & South Wales ‘improvements’ along the A36 itself. Multi-Modal Study (SWARMMS)7.

In September 2000, independent hauli- The railway stations that LTP1 earmarked ers and farmers, supported by Conserva- for reopening remained closed. When Wilt- tive Party leaflets and petitions, protested shire County Council’s plans for road im- against the rising cost of motor fuel by provements along the A36 corridor were blockading oil refineries and staging go- abandoned or rejected it switched its at- slow convoys on motorways, demanding tention to its first love, the A350 ‘growth a cut in fuel duty. Neither the police nor corridor’ between the M4 at Chippenham the oil companies tried to break up the and the A36 at Warminster. After building thin lines of protesters at the refineries, one complicated and expensive new sec- in marked contrast to the treatment of tion, the Semington-Melksham Diversion, obstruction by trade union pickets or by in 2004 it came unstuck at Westbury. The activists trying to halt road projects such government declined to fund its 2005 bid as Twyford Down.. Panic buying and pet- for an A350 eastern bypass of the town. rol shortages damaged the economy and After powerful lobbying of the South West the popularity of the Labour party. The Regional Assembly, in alliance with the fuel duty escalator was switched off. A other shire counties of the South West, more populist approach to transport was WCC secured funding for a revised scheme switched on. and applied to itself for planning permission in 2007. ZOMBIE ROADS 2 – NOT DEAD BUT SLEEPING Fortunately the Planning Inspectorate agreed with us that the application was By 2001 it was obvious that Labour’s brief a ‘departure’ from the Local Plan. It was flirtation with integrated transport was called in for determination by the Secre- over. In the new consensual spirit of ‘New’ tary of State and a planning inquiry or- Labour, transport and environment cam- dered. We then had to embark on a legal paigners were being consulted to death on challenge to get the council’s proposed local transport plans and on the ‘multi-mo- starting date for the inquiry postponed to dal studies’ designed to reassure the road- give us time to assemble all the expert builders that cancelled roads did not mean evidence needed to expose the flaws in the end of hope. It was soon clear that the council’s case. The Treasury Solicitor ‘multi-modal’ did not mean what it said agreed that this was a reasonable request on the label. If the study favoured certain from a body representing thousands of road schemes they would be built; if it fa- people through its 12 member organisa- voured massive investment in rail corridors tions. This meant that we did not have to along the same routes the shareholders take the argument to the High Court and of the privatised infrastructure company, gamble our hard-won fighting fund before Railtrack, would not cough up the cash. the inquiry had even started. The separate private train operating companies would not hire more rolling stock to After a long public inquiry in 2008 the support better services; the private com- inspector’s report was a damning indict- panies set up to provide them with rolling ment of the scheme. The government ac- stock would not in any case purchase new cepted his recommendations and in July trains to expand the ageing fleets they 2009 rejected the planning application World Transport Policy and Practice 66 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 http://www.corridor-alliance.co.uk/news- ZOMBIE ROADS 3 – july-2009.html. The council had wasted THE REAWAKENING the best part of £5m on a demonstrably dud transport scheme that would have Five years on we are back where we start- wrecked one of Wiltshire’s finest land- ed. Another Conservative government (in scapes. The £40m budget allocated to the coalition with the Liberal Democrats - a road was transferred to the dualling of the party notorious among environmentalists railway line between Swindon and Kemble. for ‘talking green’ while it supported the A34 Newbury bypass and, more recently, It had cost us tens of thousands of pounds the A380 South Devon Link Road) is back to achieve this almost unprecedented vic- on the black stuff. In an uncanny echo tory. By campaigning at every level of the of the last Tory splurge on road-building, political system and investing in legal rep- Chancellor of the Exchequer George Os- resentation and expert evidence on eve- borne has announced spending of £18bn rything from transport economics to dor- on what spin doctors call ‘the biggest roads mouse ecology we had defeated a road programme since the Romans’. He seems which, like most major highway projects, to have built a history bypass around the was expected to be rubber-stamped by the £23bn programme launched in 1989 - 470 planning system. The council was so confi- schemes including 150 bypasses - which dent of success that it had already predict- ministers described at the time as ‘the big- ed a start date and begun to get estimates gest since the Romans.’1 from suppliers of stone and gravel. This time round, the programme is priced We had also effected a rare modal shift at £18bn (with another £10bn for road re- of the kind foreseen but not achieved by pairs and maintenance). See ‘Investing in John Prescott in the heady days of 1997: Britain’s Future. The shopping list includes money for a destructive road scheme had 221 extra lane-miles on the busiest mo- been switched to a rail improvement that torways, and a long-term ambition to dual had been awaiting financing for years but and grade-separate most of the non-mo- had not received the necessary prioritisa- torway network managed by the Highways tion in a regional funding process domi- Agency. nated by shire counties. The programme in 1989 was based on the We had learned from the Corridor Alliance government prediction that traffic would that old roads never die. They just lurk in rise by 142 per cent over the next 30 the plan chests in Whitehall and county years. The current one is based on the De- halls across the land, waiting for the next partment for Transport’s predicted rise of business-friendly government to flash a 40 per cent over the next 40 years. These war chest of blacktop gold with which to forecasts of everlasting traffic growth win - the Daily Mail will assure them of prompted Professor Phil Goodwin to pro- this - the hearts and votes of long-suffer- duce his famous ‘porcupine graphs’ [re- ing and overtaxed motorists. produced by Dr Chris Gillham in his submission to the Department for Transport’s So we decided not to disband the White consultation on the Draft National Net- Horse Alliance. Every year in July we hold works National Policy Statement (NN NPS) a garden party overlooking the exqui- See Appendix 4]8. site sweep of the Wellhead Valley. We are there not just to celebrate the anniversary So here we go again – another massive of the road’s cancellation but also to raise national programme of road construction, funds for the ongoing struggle against the another round of consultation over the indelible plans of the new unitary author- same old road schemes. This time we are ity, Wiltshire Council (WC), to ream out well into the 21st Century and old enough the A350 ‘growth corridor’. Any increase in to know better. The economy has melted capacity upstream of Westbury would in- down, the icecaps are going the same way duce more traffic, reverse the steady de- – but even if, implausibly, we could totally cline in congestion through the town and decarbonise transport, or at least limit car- strengthen the feeble case for a bypass. bon emissions from our individual trans- World Transport Policy and Practice 67 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 port activity so that they were contained removed and compliance with European within our personal carbon ration (two biodiversity law is to be fudged by a will- tonnes a year per global citizen if we are to ful misinterpretation of the Habitats Direc- keep planetary warming below 2 degrees tive. C), we would not address the larger problem of unsustainable use of the planet’s The government’s draft National Networks resources. Indeed, as I argued in a pre- National Policy Statement (NN NPS) pro- vious article for WTPP10 just decarbonis- poses that the whole £18bn package of ing transport could make things worse by highway improvements should effectively enabling us to carry on doing more of the bypass the European legislation by claim- same. Bigger, faster and cheaper trans- ing to be justified by ‘Imperative reasons port – whatever it is powered by – enables of overriding public interest’ (IROPI). I the larger unsustainability of which cli- challenged this simple- minded interpreta- mate change is the most obviously threat- tion in my response to the consultation on ening symptom. Advocates of the trickle- the National Policy Statement – see Ap- down theory of world development (rather pendix 111. than the trickle-up theory in my analysis) will resent the analogy but I offer it all the By arguing here that Big Transport is same to convey the destructive power of an essential enabler of global economic ‘business as usual’: converting a battle- growth it might look as if I am accepting field tank to electric power would deal with the Department for Transport’s assump- only one of the things wrong with it. tion that new roads almost inevitably foster economic growth. After more than two By refusing to acknowledge the role of Big decades of challenging this assumption Transport as the enabler of global unsus- and witnessing at first hand the manifest tainability, governments and corporations failure of sustained road-building to deliv- can continue to work on the assumption er reliable economic growth (was our cur- that eternal growth in world trade will al- rent financial crisis triggered by a shortage ways be feasible. Cheap labour and cheap of road capacity?), I would hate anyone resources - everything from food to miner- to think I had swallowed the doctrine of als – can be exploited in distant locations Roads for Prosperity. My colleague Chris and goods shipped at marginal cost back Gillham has dissected with forensic preci- to the markets where they will be con- sion all the reasons for not believing in a sumed and surplus value and profits real- causal link between road investment and ised and concentrated. economic growth. As he pointed out in his submissions to the NPS consultation and Even the most stupid government should the House of Commons select commit- be able to see that this model is destruc- tee on transport – see Appendix 212 the tive and unsustainable. Infinite growth is national economy and road capacity have self-evidently impossible on a planet with both grown in recent decades, but no offi- finite supplies of land, water, food, miner- cial body has ever produced any evidence als, fossil energy and the other resources of a causal link between the two. Did road needed to create and maintain a habitable investment boost economic growth or were world. Our coalition government in the UK more roads built to accommodate the traf- (‘the greenest ever’) does not just ignore fic generated by industrial expansion? this constraint at the end of the game, it is going out of its way in a time of supposed If we accept the second proposition, that austerity to lavish money on making the economic activity of certain kinds gener- mechanism of destruction go faster. ates more road traffic, then we can begin to get into the minds of those who insist It also seems bent on removing any ob- that building roads boosts industrial in- stacles that might obstruct new highways vestment. They may know very well that and other transport infrastructure: the as- the relationship is the other way round but sessment of risks to biodiversity is to be it doesn’t matter; they have other rea- fast tracked; the freedom of planners and sons for wanting more roads built. As long objectors to argue that a road scheme as the weighted spools of the cost-bene- would increase carbon emissions is to be fit analysis (COBA) fruit machine can be World Transport Policy and Practice 68 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 trusted to come up with a row of cherries, ment will provide the required slip roads they can ‘demonstrate’ that road-building and roundabouts; the developer may or benefits ordinary people by giving them may not have to contribute to the cost by faster and more reliable journeys. Neo- sharing some of the gains that flow from liberal prejudices against subsidising any opening up new land for these new ‘ap- part of the public realm can be satisfied pliances’ that will be connected into the by arguing that roads ‘pay for themselves’ national ring main. Any subsequent ex- and even if they didn’t (which they don’t pansion of the road network required to - see Gillham again8) motorists have al- accommodate the traffic generated by the ready paid for them through taxes on ve- new developments will be funded by the hicles and fuel (of course they have not state. The COBA assessment will show begun to cover the external costs of mo- that the investment will pay for itself by toring (see Pearce, quoted in Gillham12). reducing delays on the link that has just been gummed up by the developments. Just in case they are ever forced to admit that the COBA formula might be less than This is the model of spatial and trans- scientifically ‘robust’, the DfT and HA have port planning we have been confronting recently added a new ‘benefit’ to the case in Wiltshire since 2009 when the council for road expansion – green-field housing published its first draft of the local plan for estates, business parks and other econom- the county until 2025. Large out-of-town ic assets will be enabled by new highways developments are to be located within the or new junctions on the strategic road net- A350 ‘growth corridor’, creating a ‘need’ work. Along the South coast we were told for better road links to and within the cor- that improvements to the M27/A27 would ridor, thereby expanding its ‘strategic’ ca- help to develop the economic potential of pacity. It now looks as if the government’s two redundant military airfields. The sup- new bodies for funding local transport – posed economic gains from this wheeze Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) and were not set against the economic dam- Local Transport Bodies (LTBs) - will pick age that expansion of rival airfields might up most of the bills for everything but the have done to the existing airport at South- local distributor roads. ampton, or the damage caused to environment and health by spreading aircraft The Sustainability Appraisal of Wiltshire’s noise to even more people. ‘core strategy’ warned that the scale of residential and business development pro- We were assured that the developments posed in West Wiltshire would generate made possible by such road projects so much traffic that the A350 route would would unlock billions of pounds of invest- eventually have to be dualled. This did not ment. This is the equivalent of the electri- cause the council to modify its plan; in- cian and the maker of kitchen appliances deed the prediction must have sounded getting together to assure you that you like sweet music to councillors and trans- will be better off if you put in a new ring port officers fixated for years on thevi- main with lots of new sockets. The pri- sion of a fast highway between the M4 and mary purpose of the expanded road sys- the A36 route via Salisbury to the port tem is not so much about moving vehicles of Southampton, labelled as a ‘European along a ribbon of asphalt as opening up gateway’ in the LEP report Transport vi- land for development, just as the prima- sion 2025. The Highways Agency quoted ry function of the ring main is to support as ‘evidence’ for its SW Peninsula Route an ever-expanding array of electrical de- Based Strategy (RBS) an unnamed ‘stake- vices. Shifting more and more electrons holder’ who suggested that for the A350 through copper wires is the consequence to ‘work’, it needed to be a dual route and not the cause. In both cases the network had the potential to ‘take on the role of the will overheat unless its capacity increas- A36/A46’ – see Appendix 313. es. The new housing estates will generate thousands of vehicle movements a day; the business parks thousands of car and The A36/A46 trunk road goes from the HGV trips in a daily ebb and flow of goods M27 near Southampton to the M4 north and workers. National and local govern- of Bristol and Bath. The A46 section of World Transport Policy and Practice 69 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 the route is indeed unsuited to the role of It is almost inevitable that this approach trunk road. Severe environmental obsta- to development produces large car-de- cles prevent a direct link between the A36 pendent estates remote from town cen- and 46 across the flood plain of the Avon tres. Small clusters of houses close to east of Bath. Plans for a fast highway from town centres take more design work and it Bath to the M4 were withdrawn for envi- is difficult to accumulate the housing num- ronmental reasons in the 1990s. Substi- bers required, especially when sites are on tuting the A350 for this part of the A36/46 former industrial land. The same applies corridor would not help Wiltshire Council to small enclaves in villages where a coun- achieve a fast route to Southampton. The cil might want to meet a desperate need whole route is stacked with environmen- for affordable homes for rural workers. tal obstacles. Those at Salisbury were declared insuperable when the government Supposing the council wants to do the right scrapped the Salisbury bypass in 1997. thing by locating new housing and employ- East of Salisbury the route passes through ment allocations around new or improved Hampshire where the county council has public transport services? This classic for- so far shown more interest in taming the mula for sustainable development is al- traffic through its villages than in reinstat- most impossible for a local authority to ing the government-planned bypasses of achieve. Serving new development with the 1990s. new roads is a doddle by comparison. Councils cannot just put in a new railway However Investing in Britain’s Future ex- station. It takes years of negotiation with presses a long-term ambition to dual and Network Rail and train operators. Passen- grade-separate most of the Highways ger numbers have to be assessed in com- Agency’s non-motorway network. The mercial terms. Rail franchises have to be Swindon and Wiltshire LEP has naturally revised, extra rolling stock hired (none is seized the opportunity to add a Salisbury likely to be available). There is no national bypass to its ‘reference list’ of long-term plan for increasing the capacity of the lo- ambitions. The A350 Westbury bypass is cal rail network. Indeed the government of course on the same list. has ruled out major investment in improving local rail services because it would only So, local as well as central government is add to delays on the system – a constraint locked into the business of expanding road curiously absent from plans for upgrading capacity for the foreseeable future. and repairing the road network.

A local authority that wants to plan some- Buses might seem like an easier option, thing more suited to the needs of the 21st but neither the council not the develop- century will find it difficult to achieve. For ers will want to underwrite revenue costs a start councils no longer have enough stretching far into the future. There is no skilled staff to do all of the detailed plan- formula to demonstrate that such invest- ning. The alternative is to reach for the ments would ‘pay for themselves’ by cut- ‘plug-and-play’ solution: in effect you just ting carbon emissions, removing traffic subcontract most planning of housing, from congested roads or increasing social employment and transport to large devel- cohesion. opers, on condition that the local development plan will permit them to open up When doing the right thing is so difficult the large tracts of virgin farmland they put we have to conclude that it is meant to be into their land banks years earlier. Sell- like this. Why do the mandarins at the DfT ing the resulting ‘spatial strategy’ to the insist on adding more sharply rising spikes Planning Inspectorate should be easy as to the downward curve of the porcupine’s long as you can show that you and the back? How can they justify their latest builders can deliver enough homes to sat- spike, a prediction of 40 per cent traffic isfy the government’s requirements for an growth by 2040, when it relies among oth- adequate ‘five-year supply’. This centrally er absurdities on the assumption that oil imposed quota will trump any requirement prices will fall every year until 2030? Why by local communities that their country- manufacture fictional graphs of ever-rising side not be paved over. demand for road transport while ignoring World Transport Policy and Practice 70 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 the actual evidence of steadily rising de- to claim for a new container port the same mand for rail travel? privilege it claims for its bloated new roads programme: ‘imperative reasons of over- The only conclusion to be reached is that riding public interest’ would prevail over government policy requires them to do damage to protected habitats and species. these things. There must be a political mo- As well as the container port, the Dibden tive arising from actual economic benefits Bay development was designed to pro- accruing in very influential places. I would vide a Ro-Ro ferry berth and a terminal be the last person to believe that these for dredged sand and gravel. More heavy benefits are the value of accrued time trucks and cars would have flowed along savings totted up by the COBA formula or ‘our’ road corridor, east and west along the the 6 to 1 return on each pound of road M27, and north on the M3 (through the investment claimed by transport minister notorious cutting at Twyford Down, east of Philip Hammond. Winchester.

Governments and big businesses do things This ever-expanding global infrastruc- we regard as stupid but it would be naïve ture of bigger ports and airports and big- to think that they are actually stupid when ger ships and planes cannot work without it comes to looking after the short-term more and bigger heavy goods vehicles. economic interests of the large corpora- The UK has so far resisted proposals to tions whose support determines their po- double the maximum weight of HGVs from litical fortunes. This search for motivation 40 tonnes to around 80 but we have been goes far beyond the obvious vested inter- warned. Now we begin to see ‘transport ests of the car-makers, road-builders and economics’ from the point of view of glo- oil companies that make money from road balising governments and corporations. construction. The search takes me back to What would happen if the big new trucks the central role of Big Transport in ensur- carrying the big boxes from the big new ing that the destructive globalisation of container port couldn’t get to the hangar- extraction, production and distribution can sized distribution warehouses located at expand and grow for as long as we, or the strategic points along the motorway and planet, will permit it. trunk road network (but not in peripheral regions of the country because these can Sitting under an oak tree on the western be supplied from megasheds closer to big- shore of Southampton Water you can see ger markets)? The whole model would col- one of the biggest parts of this normally lapse. Ships would stand idle as the sys- invisible infrastructure in action. Day and tem backed up all the way to Cherbourg, night the cranes unload the vast contain- Rotterdam and Shanghai. ‘Just in time’ er ships that bring us the boxes of shoes, would become ‘just too late’. Production clothes, electronic goods and all the sup- lines would stop for want of components. posed necessities of modern life that are Wages would be paid for waiting time, more profitably made in China, Vietnam, markets missed, perishable goods sent to South Korea, Malaysia or Indonesia than landfill. in Europe. The place where we sit was destined to be an even bigger contain- The prospect is unthinkable and no gov- er port, able to accommodate the next ernment must ever be allowed to forget even bigger generation of ships. The Dib- the price it will pay if it fails to provide a den Bay deep-water port was not built. A strategic road system ‘fit for the 21st Cen- planning inquiry found that the resulting tury’. Predicting a 40 per cent increase in damage to the Southampton Water Spe- traffic between now and 2040 should pro- cial Protection Area for birds would have vide enough spare road capacity to ensure breached the European Habitats Directive. that the global transport system never If – or more likely when – the zombie port reaches gridlock. Preventing the planet returns, it’s possible that a planning in- overheating is not our concern. Well, not spector would again recommend rejection. until it begins to hit the bottom line. But this government has little time for the ‘gold-plated’ environmental safeguards This conflict between the demands of glo- laid down by the EU. We would expect it bal economic growth and our more press- World Transport Policy and Practice 71 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 ing needs for the simple necessities of hu- politicians in Cornwall and Devon said the man existence was illustrated when the disruption would cost the economy hun- Highways Agency staged a stakeholder dreds of millions of pounds. Businesses in ‘engagement event’ in Taunton, Somerset, Plymouth estimated the cost at £1m a day. on 24 January this year. Most of those present were from local authorities and Exeter MP Ben Bradshaw repeated a ques- LEPs around the South West region. The tion he had asked the government before few environmental activists who made it the disaster - what had happened to £31m to the event were there because national promised in 2013 for ‘resilience work’ to NGOs had informed their local contacts and protect the line from damage by the sea? the word had gone round. The Wiltshire The threat of storm damage at Dawlish Wildlife Trust and the Natural England of- has been know since Brunel’s original line ficer most involved in wildlife protection in was first severed in the 1880s. Creating a the county were not informed. The envi- diversionary route by reinstating services ronmentalists who did make it were able via Okehampton axed in the 1960s would to point out that the ‘route based strategy’ help to ensure that the SW stayed con- (RBS) under consideration was entirely nected during periods of extreme weath- mono-modal, concerned only with exam- er. It would also offer rail connections to ining ways to improve the A303/A358/ many poorly served rural communities. A30 road corridor into the SW. They were Unfortunately the cost-benefit rules gov- also able to highlight the constraints that erning rail investment would tend to rule have hindered previous attempts to turn out an investment meeting so many re- the route into a dual carriageway between quirements of a sustainable future. In the M3 and the far west of the peninsu- his submission to the DfT’s consultation la. These include among others the World on its policy statement for national net- Heritage Site at Stonehenge, the European works [see paras 1.10 - 1.11 in Appendix protected habitats of Salisbury Plain and 48] and his submission to the Highway’s the Hampshire Avon, and the Blackdown Agency strategy for the SW9 my colleague Hills Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty. Chris Gillham contrasts this failure to pay for storm-proofing the railway route into It seems that the Department for Transport the region with the £130m being so enthu- and the Highways Agency would rather not siastically spent a few miles away on the be burdened by such considerations. Of- South Devon Relief Road between Newton ficials have been instructed to find ‘shovel Abbott and Torbay. ready’ or ‘no-regrets’ schemes, along the corridor in time to garnish the Chancellor’s By the following Saturday, Exeter was to- autumn statement. The local authorities tally inaccessible by train due to flooding and electors of the SW need to hear that on the Somerset Levels and a landslip at something will be done to speed up the Crewkerne. The route from Bridgewater ‘second strategic route into the region’. was blocked by the flooded River Parrett to the south of the town and floods at The 24th of January was also the day when Athelney blocked the main line from Castle Somerset County Council declared a Ma- Cary[at Athelney]. jor Incident after weeks of flooding in the Somerset Levels. The village of Muchelney At the time of writing, well into March, had been cut off and supplied only by boat the Somerset Levels are still flooded. The for three weeks; further heavy rain was severed railway line at Dawlish is not yet forecast for that weekend. repaired. There are few serious delays on the A303 trunk road into the region, ex- After the ‘engagement event’ at Taunton cept during the morning and evening rush transport campaigners returning to Wilt- hours. At the peak of the summer holiday shire by train stared out in disbelief as the season motorists heading for the SW may track became a causeway between floods have to crawl slowly past Stonehenge. This stretching as far as the eye could see. is one of the bottlenecks being studied by a ‘Route based strategy’ designed to find On 4 February heavy seas took out the road projects that can be announced in rail line at Dawlish. Business leaders and the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s Autumn World Transport Policy and Practice 72 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 Statement. Earlier plans for a long tun- 4. SACTRA (1999) Transport Investment, nel under the monument were abandoned Transport Intensity and Economic Growth because they were simply unaffordable. HMSO, London. Widening the road at this point would put the UK in breach of its duties to protect the 5. Wiltshire County Council (2000) Wilt- World Heritage Site. shire Local Transport Plan 2001/02 – 2005/06, Environmental Services Depart- The people of the region may well want a ment, Wiltshire CC., Trowbridge. faster road into the South West. But, given a choice, they might rather see their share 6. W S Atkins for WCC A Transport Strat- of the Chancellor’s £18bn roads budget egy for Salisbury http://www.brlsi.org/ spent instead on flood defences, the rail- events-proceedings/proceedings/17811 way and its decrepit rolling stock and all the other things they will really need for 7. WTPP Vol 7 No 1 (2001) I Quit. Patrick their survival and wellbeing in the 21st Kinnersly Century. No one has asked us which we would prefer. Instead we have been asked 8. Gillham Submission to National Net- which Zombie roads we would like to see works National Policy Statement (NN NPS) brought back to life. It is a very dumb question. 9. Gillham February 2014 Response to Route-based Strategy: Evidence Report - Author details: South West Peninsula Patrick Kinnersly 10. WTPP Vol 15 No 4 (2010) Climate Patrick Kinnersly is a founder member of change on a planet near you. Kinnersly the A36/A350 Corridor Alliance (ACA), http://www.eco-logica.co.uk/pdf/ formed in Salisbury, Wiltshire, in October wtpp15.4.pdf 1993. He is Secretary of the White Horse Alliance which was established in the sum- 11. Kinnersly Submission to National Net- mer of 2007 to fight the proposed West- works National Policy Statement (NN NPS) bury eastern bypass. WHA is a coalition of 13 organisations ranging from nation- 12. Gillham 2013 Submission to Transport al NGOs, including Campaign for Better Select Committee - Strategic Road Net- Transport, to regional and local bodies in- work cluding ACA, CBT and four parish councils. 13. Kinnersly Submission to consultation Email: on SW Peninsula Route Based Strategy [email protected] (RBS)

References:

1. Independent on Sunday (20 March 1994) Stephen Castle and Geoffrey Lean, report on interview with John Gummer.

2. Department of Transport (1989) Roads for Prosperity, White Paper, HMSO, Lon- don.

3. SACTRA (1994) Trunk Roads and the Generation of Traffic Standing Advisory Committee on Trunk Road Assessment, HMSO, London.

World Transport Policy and Practice 73 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 Appendices: haustive examination at planning inquir- These appendices contain some of our re- ies. sponses to consultations on the government’s road-building plans. Now we are told that planners may not consider objections to such absurd projects on grounds of their adverse impacts on cli- Appendix 1 mate change. Planning will be streamlined to eliminate challenges that hold up the Submission to National Networks National process of ‘delivery’. Environmental as- Policy Statement (NN NPS) sessment can be simplified by new on-line Patrick Kinnersly guidance from NE.

Department for Transport public consul- After more than two decades of oppos- tation on the government’s draft national ing this obsession with ‘roads for prosper- policy statement for national networks in ity’ and the wilful insistence of successive England, 4 December 2013 to 26 February governments on ignoring reports from 2014 SACTRA and other expert bodies, I know that nothing I say will make the least bit Submitted 26 February 2014 of difference. Experience suggests that the promise of umpteen billion to be spent on a new age of road building will turn to I note that the NPS is supposed to cover nothing as it did last time round. I hope rail as well as road networks but it is clear that history will repeat itself. that you have returned to the dream time of 1989 and ‘Roads for Prosperity’ when Meanwhile I would suggest that your read- roads investment was to be doubled over ing of the Habitats Directive is so seriously the next 10 years. Then as now this was misguided that it would lay the UK open called ‘the biggest road programme since to legal challenge at the European Court the Romans.’ of Justice.

Experience of the Corridor Feasibility The Habitats Assessment summarises Study ‘engagement events’ and study of DfT’s interpretation of European Law as the RBS documents makes it clear that we follows - are embarking on a programme of mono- 3.4.4 As the NPS does not identify specif- modal studies with a view to producing a ic locations for interventions, and neither list of quick-fix road schemes with which do any of the alternatives, it is not possi- to garnish the autumn statement. ble to reach a definitive conclusion about whether or not any of these alternatives As DfT has already told us that investment would have adverse impacts on European in local rail is not desirable I doubt if the protected sites, nor what comparative im- autumn statement will contain much by pacts they would have on those sites. way of new rail investment apart from a 3.4.5 The Government believes that there few millions for replacement of the miss- are sufficient grounds to establish Impera- ing link at Dawlish. tive Reasons of Overriding Public Interest (IROPI) for the NN NPS because of the As a campaigner for sustainable transport very strong economic and social need for who has wasted time on numerous con- the measures supported by the NPS. This sultations over the last couple of decades need is detailed in I vowed after my exit from SWARMMS not the NPS and summarised below. to engage in this nonsense again. Trans- port planning needs to be integrated. You I believe you have deliberately misunder- have fragmented it into a mess of acro- stood the test of IROPI. The Habitats Di- nyms – LEPS, LTBs, SEPs, RBS etc – out of rective does not allow a developer to skip which we see emerging all the old zombie straight to Imperative Reasons. The first road schemes, including unbelievably the duty is to assess impacts and consider al- Salisbury and Westbury bypasses, both ternatives. Para 3.4.4 reveals a total lack rejected by Secretaries of State after ex- of the evidence on which impact could be World Transport Policy and Practice 74 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 assessed and absence of harm confirmed 1.3. The DfT takes the third assumption as beyond scientific doubt [See ‘Wadden- the basis for its entire economic appraisal zee’]. process (COBA) – if the user is willing to pay then, if the increase in road capac- I don’t think any road has been permit- ity allows him1 to pay less for the same, ted on grounds of public interest. Even the there must be a benefit that accrues to the Via Baltica Euroroute was stopped by the economy as a whole. Habitats Directive. 1.4. The first assumption depends upon I would be grateful for a considered re- the other two, but of itself it ignores the sponse to any of the points above. possibility that there may be costs to society that the road user does not perceive or Patrick Kinnersly associate with his activity. Summing the [personal capacity] advantages to the users does not guarantee that the economy as a whole benefits. Appendix 2 If burning fossil fuel is fatal to the stability of the planet, the Invisible Hand assump- Evidence to House of Commons Transport tion still reckons society benefits. Select Committee Inquiry into the strategic road network 1.5. It is possible to test the first assump- Christopher Gillham tion by seeing how measures of changes in economic welfare correlate with changes http://www.parliament.uk/business/com- in road capacity. I carry out some sim- mittees/committees-a-z/commons-select/ ple calculations to show that the assump- transport-committee/news/strategic- tion is unreliable. I have presented these road-network---tor/ to various DfT officials over decades and they have never critically or analytically Submitted 17 October 2013 responded.

Strategic Road Network 2013 1.6. The second assumption is rooted in Individual Submission – Christopher Gill- the proposition that you can never have ham enough of anything. Building a road in a country empty of such infrastructure de- 1. Summary monstrably allows economic activity that would not occur without it. This does not 1.1. This submission explores the assump- mean, however, that there is no point at tions on which the DfT (with Treasury ap- which extra such infrastructure impedes proval) bases all its road planning. The activity. Simple thought experiment shows problem is that the assumptions are so there must be an optimum such level of deeply entrenched that they have taken infrastructure; the question is to know on an ex cathedra aspect – no civil servant, which side of the optimum Britain lies. politician or media correspondent ques- DfT has never considered this elementary tions them. When questions have been question even though its assumption that raised by a few individuals, the DfT has we can always benefit from new road ca- never answered them; it has never done pacity does not appear to be borne out by any research to evaluate its assumptions. my correlative tests.

1.2. The DfT makes three fundamental 1.7. The third assumption begs the ques- assumptions that it has never evidenced. tion “who is willing and who pays?” be- First that road building must be an un- cause the user does not pay the full cost of qualified good for the economy; second- what he is using. There have been many ly that there is always an insufficiency of studies of cost externalisation and the big- road space; and thirdly that Adam Smith’s gest and most thorough study reckons the invisible hand acting through millions of road user externalises costs to around 3 road users’ willingness to pay, guarantees 1 I use the male pronoun to represent a person of that the macro-economy benefits by a either gender, to avoid the infelicity of using the kind of economic annealing. gender-free 3rd person plural.

World Transport Policy and Practice 75 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 times the total taxes he pays. The DfT has trial research. I have spent more than half never contested these studies or produced my life fighting road schemes, beginning in one of its own. 1975 in the build-up to the second of the four M3 Inquiries at Winchester, and going 1.8. Eddington believed users should pay on to take part in campaigns and inquiries the true cost of what they do and it is in Hampshire, Dorset, Sussex, Kent, Sur- hard to avoid this belief since the subsidy rey, Berkshire, Wiltshire, Somerset and to motorists is highly regressive. What London.I have not done this for fun - it Eddington did not do was work out what is not a hobby, because I find the whole would happen if the externalised costs business of road inquiries to be amongst were recovered. I show some calcula- the most depressing, frustrating and fun- tions, based on the apparent elasticity of damentally unfair and unfeeling activities response to fuel price. These indicate that to be involved with. today’s traffic levels would reduce to those pertaining in the 1960s. 2.5. Two major barriers to reasonmanifest themselves at road inquiries: 1.9. As an economic argument there is no • An inquiry cannot question ‘gov- need for more road capacity, indeed ar- ernment policy’. guably there is a need to reduce it. This • The Inquiry must confine itself to ought long ago have been considered to be the locality. the case as an environmental argument. 3. Questioning Government Policy 2. Introduction 3.1. There are obvious problems of con- 2.1. In my submission I will try to get sistency in government policy, sometimes at the core assumptions underlying eve- simply because governments change and ry government policy on roads since the emphasis changes, but very often within war. I do not believe that any office of the policies of a single administration. government, including the Treasury, has The clash between policies on greenhouse ever demonstrated that the assumptions gas emissions, air pollution, biodiversity, are valid; nor have they carried out any landscape and heritage protection and research to inform or justify their assump- most other transport policy or practice is tions. Vast elaborate structures of policy most obvious. On these matters one can and appraisal have been erected on these only hope to stress the importance of the unjustified assumptions and huge sums of former and hope that an Inquiry Inspector money spent in consequence. is civilised enough to see it. It happens occasionally, but it is a lottery. 2.2. The Command Paper ‘Action for Roads’ is no different in this from any previous 3.2. But there are also cases, cited fre- policy or strategy; it is informed by these quently in public inquiries, where govern- assumptions and bound to this structure. ment policy is arguably counter to reality. It is mumpsimus’ - consistency in error There is a famous story of the US State does not do away with error. that tried to legislate to make mathematical πexactly equal to 32. The point I make 2.3. Before making my case on the false in relation to road inquiries is that certain assumptions of road economics I give things, such as traffic forecasts and the some background on how ordinary mem- methodology of cost-benefit analysis, are bers of the public are confronted with gov- regarded as policy, even though they are ernment policy (usually through the public highly questionable in logic and arithme- inquiry process) in this area and how bar- tic. riers to fundamental questions are put in the way. 2 This is not exactly apocryphal - in 1897 Repre- sentative T.I. Record of Posen County introduced 2.4. My name is Christopher Gillham of 16 House Bill #246 in the Indiana House of Repre- Upper High Street in Winchester. I am a sentatives. He proposed that π take one of three retired scientist with a PhD in physics and rational numbers. Whether this was silly season politics or a serious attempt to deny reality is not have worked in both academic and indus- recorded. World Transport Policy and Practice 76 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 3.3. I will address below why I believe that a process by which all official attempts to the basis of appraisal of road schemes in examine transport policy very quickly go this country is deeply flawed. What I would native and swallow the received wisdom of like to get over here is how unfair the the DfT and the Treasury. What does one process is. If the Department for Trans- do in this Kafkaesque world? port says the world is flat, ordinary mor- tals are required to accept that it is flat, 4. The Local Question whatever evidence they have for believing this to be untrue. Inspectors at Inquiries 4.1. The appraisal of a road at a road in- will sometimes listen to such evidence, but quiry supposes that one is simply compar- they always stress that they cannot take ing the expected effects of a scheme with cognizance of it. ‘Do-Nothing’ in the vicinity of the scheme itself. A bypass scheme, for example, is 3.4. I have given evidence at more than supposedly appraised environmentally for a dozen major highway inquiries and the its local effects on a town being relieved promoters have never chosen to answer and on the countryside that is to bear the the fundamental points I have made on the burden of the bypass construction.It is ap- appraisal methods, nor have Inspectors praised economically by considering the ever required them to do so.Inspectors supposed reduced costs of journeys within will usually say, quite reasonably, that the region of the scheme against the costs such fundamental matters should be taken of construction and increased maintenance up directly with the DfT. of a new road.

3.5. Unfortunately this avenue does not 4.2. It does not appraise the effects be- appear to be open either. Three years ago yond the area of a scheme. Thus the traf- I made an attempt to get a definitive re- fic induced by a new bypass affects the sponse from the DfT. I wrote to Norman network and communities well beyond the Baker, making a number of points that I scheme and this disbenefit, both environ- make in this submission. I received no an- mental and economic, is simply ignored. swer to them. A year later I put questions More importantly it fails the test of the fal- on the basis of road appraisal in a suc- lacy of composition3 - a set of benefits are cinct form (which I reproduce in Appendix presumed to add up to an overall benefit. A, but which are implicit in what I say be- Just because a case is made (and I seri- low). Despite other letters and emails to ously doubt that any such case has ever the Minister since, requesting a response, been properly made) that there is an eco- I have not yet received any answer. nomic benefit to be had for a given road scheme, does not mean that the benefits 3.6. The DfT has spent many billions of of lots of individual road schemes add up pounds building roads over the last 60 to a benefit for the nation. years. It appears never to have justified the processes it uses to appraise what it 5. Of Atoms and Diamonds-Infrastruc- does. It appears to be unwilling or unable ture ‘Investment’ to respond to questions on its processes. 5.1. Assumption 1:It is taken for granted, 3.7. Select Committees appear not to ex- almost uniformly it seems amongst parlia- amine the fundamentals. Nor do commit- mentarians, that spending money building tees of experts challenge these. SACTRA roads must be beneficial to the nation eco- did some good work on issues such as nomically. Action for Roads certainly takes traffic induction and worked on details of this as read 4. And we even see it quan- 3 the COBA mathematics, but never really ‘“The fallacy of composition” is a logical error - a questioned the assumptions behind the mistaken belief that what seems good for an individ- appraisal process. Eddington did slightly ual will still be good when others do the same thing. For example, someone who stands at a crowded better, in that he hinted that there were concert may get a better view of the stage. But if unproven assumptions (e.g. of economic everyone at the concert stands up, nobody’s view is benefit) and economic distortions such as improved.’Fast Food Nation; Eric Schlosser p119 cost externalisation, but he shied away 4 It seems more concerned that Britain is falling be- from examining these. There is seemingly hind other nations in its provision of roads than it is World Transport Policy and Practice 77 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 tified. Three years ago Philip -Hammon or a heap of soot in front of him and prob- dasserted that ‘for every pound we spend ably knows the relative values much better on Highways Agency schemes, on average than the atomist who has computed what we will get back £6 of benefits’. Where he will get. The answer to the value of the does this calculation come from? We need modelling can probably only be seen at the to examine the other assumptions. macro level. That is where we should test the assumptions. 5.2. Assumption 2: It is supposed that we have an insufficiency of road infrastruc- 6. Testing the Assumptions ture. It follows, therefore, that if we can add more such infrastructure or make the 6.1. Assumption 1 – Road investment is existing infrastructure more efficient at an automatic good. Firstly making as- doing what it does, there must be a ben- sumptions 2 and 3, it is still not axiomatic efit. But this in turn supposes another as- that building more roads must be good. sumption. People may make decisions based on individual economic benefit; there may be 5.3. Assumption 3: That what we do with an insufficiency of infrastructure to allow the infrastructure is, of itself, economi- them to make those decisions; by provid- cally beneficial. This assumption essen- ing the infrastructure it may be that a na- tially falls back on Adam Smith’s invisible tional first approximation economic ben- hand - his ‘claim that individuals’ efforts to efit results from summing those individual maximize their own gains in a free market benefits. But what if those choices have benefit society, even if the ambitious have consequences not felt or not noticed by no benevolent intentions’5. This action of those individuals, but which sum to some individuals is deemed (e.g. by SACTRA) to consequence to society, environmental, be mediated by ‘willingness to pay’. economic or both?

5.4. What the DfT (with Treasury approval) 6.2. Obvious examples can include cli- does with these assumptions is atomistic. mate change, pollution and health conse- It takes a section of the road network and quences, which can easily be argued as argues that the users of that network have significant economic consequences. In a made an economic decision guided by the resource-diminishing world (energy, cli- Invisible Hand and that, if they benefit mate stability, water, food etc.) the Invis- from an improvement at that section by ible Hand can create habits that are more more than it costs to make that improve- and more difficult to break. We would not ment, then the overall economy must ben- normally think in terms of buying bongs or efit from the difference. needles and planting opium poppies as an ‘investment’. Why would we think about 5.5. The granularity of this atomism bor- ‘investment’ in oil dependency? ders on the fantastic – COBA aggregates billions of tiny supposed time-savings and 6.3. There is, therefore, no justification fuel-savings over a period of 60 years, for assuming road building is beneficial as augmented in turn by equally fantastic an axiom. How, at a macro, phenomeno- forecasts of traffic growth. It is so fantas- logical level, do we demonstrate that road tic that it is very difficult, however fairly building represents an overall good for the one tries to put it, to get over to a normal economy? Obviously the sort of state- thinking member of the public that this is ment that Philip Hammond made (§5.1) what the DfT does. does not do this because it is atomistic and starts from all three assumptions – if 5.6. The COBA atomistic approach is akin any one of them is even partly wrong, his to the physicist who reckons to model a statement is meaningless. substance by bringing together billions of atoms, without really knowing the true properties either of the atoms or of the with attempting to show what the economic benefit crystal structure that will keep those at- might be. oms together. The man on the street 5 probably knows whether he has a diamond E.g. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invisible_hand World Transport Policy and Practice 78 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 6.4. The only kind of answer to this that negative – GDP tends to go down after I have got from the DfT was in an email road construction. Similarly other meas- exchange a few years ago, in which I was ures of economy appear not to have the referred to the EddingtonReport as dem- positive effect reckoned for them. A cor- onstrating that road building was good for relation test indicates that a rise in unem- the economy. In fact it does no such thing. ployment, for example, follows an increase Eddington refers to a correlation between in road building (see Appendix B). GDP growth and road traffic, but is at pains to stress that he did not know which 6.9. Even correlation of accidents with way the correlation ran – does GDP growth road building does not follow the direction result from road building or the other way of causality the DfT would have us believe. round? It is a pity that he did not com- Considering that COBA always reckons an mission a study of this (from my failure accident benefit from building roads this to extract any response from the DfT on may come as a surprise, but it shouldn’t this I think we can safely assume that they do so. We know that the accident rate have never studied it either). on motorways, for example, is low compared with that on other roads, but that 6.5. This ought to take our breath away. says nothing about how motorway driving For 60 years the Department for Transport may influence driving off the motorway has been carving this country up on the (peripheral effects) or how road building assumption of an economic benefit and induces traffic on other parts of the- net it doesn’t know (and more importantly work and effectively contributes accidents has never bothered to find out) whether there. economic growth comes from increasing traffic by building roads or whether roads 6.10. Assumption 2 – There is an insuf- are built to accommodate traffic brought ficiency of road infrastructure. This is about by economic growth. really a flawed belief that you can never have enough of a good thing. Nobody 6.6. Yet it is not that difficult to take a stab doubts that the ability to transport goods at it. There is historical series data on is a necessary factor in generating wealth. road building and on economic measures If there were no roads in Britain economic such as GDP and unemployment levels. In activity would be very local and very lim- Appendix B I explain the process of deter- ited – the GDP of such an economy would mining correlation integrals. I would hesi- be relatively low. On the other hand, if tate to assert that such integrals demon- Britain were entirely laid down to road and strate the direction of causality, but they the road was used, then we would have are a reasonable test of an assertion that no space to grow or make anything, and there is a particular causality. since we would be travelling all the time, no time to be involved in any economic ac- 6.7. If we cross-correlate changes in GDP tivity at all. Somewhere between no roads with increases in major road capacity we and country saturated with roads must be get curves of this nature: the optimum for economic activity.

6.8. This would suggest that the direction of correlation is opposite to that we would expect from the presumption that roads increase GDP. The correlation is markedly World Transport Policy and Practice 79 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 6.11. Just consider what this means. We could find out by observing the elastic There has to exist a curve representing response to forcing motorists and freight economic activity of the country as a func- operators to pay an increasing proportion tion of the amount of road space in it; that of the true costs. And we could work out curve must increase from zero to some what might happen to traffic if the users level and decline to zero again. Some- paid the full costs. thing like this: 6.15. The last Pearce estimatefor UK externalisation was that it totalled more than three times the total vehicle and fuel duty taxation.7,8 It is extraordinary that this is simply not known by most commentators and politicians (especially the Chancellor and the Secretaries of State for DEFRA, DfT and DCLG), who talk the absurd language of ‘war on the motorist’ – the motorist is in fact highly subsidised and the subsidy is extraordinarily regressive9. Ed- dington also recognised the problem of externalisation and indicated that he thought 6.12. The peak of this curve clearly occurs road users should pay the true cost. at the optimum level of road space. How do we know on which side of this peak we 6.16. What if they were required to do so? sit? Politicians, the Treasury and the DfT We know that road traffic peaked in 2007 seem to be uniformly of the view that we and has fallen steadily since10. We can must sit on the left hand side. What evi- guess that this is in part due to a fall in dence is there for such a view? The cor- disposable income and economic activity relation data I have shown above actually from the recession, though the curve was favours the supposition that we are on the plateauing before the 2008 economic col- right-hand side – that new road building lapse. It seems more likely that the re- makes us poorer (and the arithmetic of sponse relates to the perceived immediate COBA becomes simply nonsensical). You price of making journeys (i.e. the price of would think the DfT or at least the Treas- petrol). ury would want to know. I see no evidence that they have ever asked the elementary 6.17. We can do a simple test of the elas- question. ticity of this response (detailed in Appen-

6.13. Assumption 3 – The Invisible Hand 6 E.g. Blueprint 5: The True Costs of Road Transport tells us there is a benefit through ‘willing- ; Maddison D, Pearce D, Johansson O, Calthrop E, Lit- man T &Verhoef E; Earthscan, London 1996 ness to pay’. The question, however, is ‘Who is willing and who pays?’ If we pay 7 And we should remember that these estimates made in the mid-nineties were before the extent of for all the economic choices we make, the air pollution costs were understood and certainly market theory is that this somehow equili- massively underestimated the climate change conse- brates or anneals to a stable optimum or quences of transport emissions quasi-optimum state. But that pre-sup- 8 There are a number of studies of externalisation, poses that we do pay for the choices we none of which come to a contrary verdict to Pearce. make. The Blueprint studies of the late The DfT have never released any statement refuting 6 these studies or reported on any research of their Professor Pearce , however, showed that own. motorised road transport users externalise a very great part of their costs, so market 9 Arguably those least likely to own a car are the poorest, who suffer from lack of such mobility in very choice is skewed. many other ways (facilities, shops etc. move further away from them)brought about by the mobility of 6.14. If externalisation is large the skewed those they subsidise. response would be expected to be large. 10 It seems extraordinary that the government is How can we say there is a legitimate de- putting money into increasing capacity in a system mand for road space when we don’t know with falling demand – why not put it all into a system with increasing demand – rail (which is probably less whether the users would pay the real cost? subsidised and subsidies are declining)? World Transport Policy and Practice 80 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 dix C). Data from 1990 to 2012 shows a tances to do the same thing. I’m sure we surprisingly linear response to price sug- all know of the stories that milk from cows gesting a fall of 37km per year per vehicle in Dorset travels to Glasgow for processing for a fuel price rise of 1p. Pearce-type es- to be shipped back to Dorset for retail. And timates of the cost externalisation at three I expect we all have personal anecdotes, times total taxation suggests that recovery but I can certainly testify to the fact that of this externalisation via fuel price would the last 40 years has taken away many require a price increment of 426p per litre. facilities that I had within walking distance This suggests that the average km per ve- of my house in Winchester, firstly to edge- hicle would drop from the present 14000 of-town industrial estates and then down to around 3000. the motorway to Southampton or beyond. Obviously we should not rely on anecdote, 6.18. Consider what this means. Edding- but what do you do when the DfT does no ton said that road users should pay the research whatever on the consequences of true costs of what they do. Yet if they did, its actions? the data would suggest that traffic levels would be way down on present levels (in- 7.4. Peripherality. It is common practice deed at a level last observed in 1959). On with authorities promoting roads, to assert the current network it would be hard to that economic benefit will accrue to de- see how there could be any congestion pressed regions and it is common practice anywhere if this really happened, so why, for DfT and politicians to swallow this ar- if Eddington thought it should, did he still gument, even though it is never really evi- suggest that there was a need to relieve denced. One has only to look at schemes congestion hotspots? The position is non- such as Kingskerswell or Combe Haven12 sensical. to see how these unevidenced assertions prevail.13 7. Other Assumptions 7.5. Roads are two-way things and in logic 7.1. Value of time. We have heard much can as equally drag activity out of a region of the criticism of the DfT in relation to as bring it in. Eddington, who is hardly its cost-benefit analysis in respect of HS2, anti-road, fights very shy of asserting that particularly focusing on its calculations of an individual scheme can be assumed to value of time. Clearly with roads there is bring a benefit to a particular area and no equivalent assertion that the time spent certainly doesn’t include this as one of his travelling can be used for other things. reasons for building roads. This is some- Nevertheless there are severe objections thing else the DfT ought to have done to how time is valued in COBA. I do not some research on. intend to dwell on this because it all sits in the classic paper by David Metz.11 8. Conclusion ‘Telle est la faiblesse de notre raison: elle 7.2. Essentially the behaviour of motor- ne sert le plus souvent qu’à justifier nos ists does not fit the DfT supposition that croyances’ Marcel Pagnol – La Gloire de they seek to minimise the time they take Mon Père driving, but rather, with the provision of extra road capacity, they tend simply to 8.1. Road Inquiries are atomistic or reduc- drive further. Indeed the net result of all tionist - all about minute examination of the road building of the last 40 years has lots of detail of variable provenance and actually been slightly to increase the time credibility, which somehow an inspector is motorists spend driving. supposed to aggregate into an informative 11 ‘The Myth of Travel Time Saving’; D Metz; Trans- 7.3. Undoubtedly the DfT would argue that port Reviews, Vol. 28, No. 3, 321–336, May 2008 people are merely taking advantage of the 12 To be fair to the DfT they did not see an economic opportunities afforded to them by making case for this hugely damaging scheme – the Chancel- longer distances easier to travel. But can lor overruled them. this really plausibly be the case? Are we 13 Though the Inspector at the Westbury Bypass In- really doing new things with this opportu- quiry in Wiltshire did look critically at the claims of nity or are we simply travelling greater dis- economic benefit and reduction of out-commuting. World Transport Policy and Practice 81 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 and decisive result. The problem is that change, anybody will see any sense in all the processes of appraisal are based on the silly decisions from the Treasury and entirely unevidenced assumptions. the DfT to carry on pouring fuel on to the planetary fire? 8.2. The DfT have had more than half a century in which to do the elementary re- Appendix A – Correspondence with search to justify their assumptions. They Norman Baker have not done it and they have not engaged in argument when elementary criti- After writing to the Minister in November cism of their assumptions is drawn to their 2010 and receiving no substantive reply to attention. The DfT have always adopted a the points I made, I sent a second letter strategy of simply ignoring criticism. in November 2011 in which I spelled out the questions I was seeking answers to. I 8.3. COBA appraisal is a huge, elaborate sent a further letter asking for a response edifice built on quicksand. It is junk sci- to my previous letters in July 2012. I have ence and no less junk because politicians not received a reply from either the Minis- and a whole transport planning industry is ter or the DfT. The questions I put were: prepared to swallow it. So it seems reasonable to me to return to 8.4. I am reminded of my first University the unanswered questions of my original exposure to experimental physics, when letter and ask that you obtain responses it was apparent that the supervisor was from the DfT to each of my points. Put not particularly interested in the detail of simply my letter was about the false eco- the experiment or its outcome, but sim- nomics of DfT road scheme appraisal as ply asked us ‘Do you believe that this is a represented by Philip Hammond’s asser- credible result?’. He was not asking us to tion that ‘for every pound we spend on surrender the experimental evidence to an Highways Agency schemes, on average we irrational (or rather non-rationalised) be- will get back £6 of benefits’ and the wider lief, but to stand back from the experiment economic assumptions famously encapsu- and see whether what we had observed lated in Mrs Thatcher’s ‘Great Car Econo- accorded with our wider knowledge and my’. experience. Economic Appraisal 8.5. Does Britain’s transport policy accord with what we believe and fear about the 1) The economic appraisal process for future of our planet?This is the big ele- road schemes is based on an assumption phant-in-the room question – do we mor- that road transport at the level it occurs in ally cop out from this question by paying the UK represents a net economic ‘good’ all our attention to the atomistic detail of for the country. Without this assumption the Webtag process? there is no justification for further assuming that reducing the costs of road trans- 8.6. For me the answer to the holistic port (especially through road building) question is obvious. I can only say that represents an economic ‘better’. I have everything we do know of the science and asked at many public inquiries what re- almost everything that we see of the poli- search the DfT has carried out to justify ticians willingness to do anything about that assumption, without receiving any de- it,progressively and rapidly darkensour fu- finitive answer. Question: has there been ture. The dangers are imminent and the any research into this basic assumption? prospect is catastrophic, much more horrible than the very worst part of the cosy 2) The Eddington Report has been ad- picture that Stern and Eddington have duced as demonstrating a basis for such painted. an assumption, but while Eddington makes a link between GDP and road building he 8.7. Yet Government is in defiance even is careful to stress that he does not know of these mildest of warnings. Who seri- which way round it goes – do we have ously believes that in 10 years time, pos- growth because of road building (or road sibly beyond the tipping point of climate transport) or road building (or road trans- World Transport Policy and Practice 82 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 port) because of growth? Question: does of car sales might reasonably be presumed the DfT have any evidence on the direction to increase a balance of trade deficit in this of causality in the correlation between GDP area. Question: does the DfT have any and either road building or road transport evidence that there is a net economic ben- use? efit to the UK of encouraging the sale of cars? 3) While SACTRA did some useful things in the past and showed a degree of inde- 6) Surely the best environment (and hence pendence, notably when it insisted on the the more natural home market) for devel- induced traffic effect, which the Highways oping any green technology is likely to Agency had denied for decades, unfor- be in those countries that most naturally tunately it got side-tracked by the laby- think in terms of alternatives to wholesale rinthine processes of benefits calculation conventional individual-vehicle-centred without ever questioning its fundamen- transport. The UK does not compare well tal principle of ‘willingness to pay’. The with major European and Japanese com- problem with the principle is that it does petitors in this regard. Germans, for ex- not ask the question who is paying what? ample, naturally seem to look for alterna- Question: how is ‘willingness to pay’ a tives when it comes to transport, in a way proper basis for determining the benefit of that the British people mostly no longer reducing the costs of a user, if the user do. Question: has the DfT done any re- is not paying the true costs of his activity search on the relative economic benefits and other people or other things are doing to the UK of investment in public transport so? compared with the support for private motoring? 4) The Blueprint studies of the late Prof. Pearce at Leeds University suggest that the 7) Car access for prosperity: The as- true costs of road transport are something sumptions about economic benefit of road like three times the total taxation burden transport exist at many levels. Town coun- on the road user. If we take the known cils throughout Britain have forever shied elasticity of demand with respect to fuel away from restricting car access to their price as an indicator, tripling the taxation town centres in the belief that it is bad for on the road user would bring about a mas- the economy. While Park and Ride often sive decline in the use of the roads. Ques- figures as an alternative to building more tion: has the DfT carried out any research car parks in the centre of towns, very of its own seeking to establish the degree rarely do councils take the obvious logical of externalisation of road user costs, and step of significantly removing city centre does it have any evidence to suggest that car parks. Yet if you imagine planning the the Pearce calculations are fundamentally access for a town from scratch you would wrong? not decide that the most efficient access through a restricted street network was Cars for Prosperity: for individual shoppers or tourists to each enter in a separate box with 20 times the 5) The motor trade for prosperity: Gov- footprint of a human being. ernments are fond of subsidising car pur- chases, a subsidy which is clearly regres- Conventional public transport with good sive in nature, from the scrappage scheme reliability, frequency and coverage (spatial of the last government to the support for and temporal) would so clearly be the ef- electric car selling under a spurious ‘green’ ficient way of doing things that you’d think agenda. Car manufacture is an economic every town council in the country would be activity and it certainly brings wealth to making it happen. But ask them and they some countries. But what is the evidence all say that local businesses fear a loss that support for the sale (or even the of trade if you restrict car access. While manufacture) of cars in the UK is benefi- there are towns and cities on the Continent cial to the economy of the UK? We import with clearly more radical transport policies in terms both of vehicle numbers and of and apparently at least as prosperous as money much more than we export. Any car-choked towns, there appears to be no encouragement of indiscriminate growth definitive research on this. Question: has World Transport Policy and Practice 83 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 the DfT done, or had access to, any re- ited – the GDP of such an economy would search on the economic consequences of be relatively low. If the British Isles were more radical transport polices for urban entirely laid down to road and the road centres, and if not would it consider ur- was used, then we would have no space gently commissioning the definitive study to grow or make anything, and since we that is needed? would be travelling all the time, no time to be involved in any economic activity at all. 8) Road building for local prosperity (pe- Somewhere between no roads and infinite ripherality): two years ago the South- roads must be the optimum for economic West saw the end of the Westbury Bypass activity. in Wiltshire. After many years of planning and a wasted £7M of ratepayers money Wiltshire Council came to an Inquiry with a positive COBA (naturally! – it is quite difficult to make COBA negative) and a claim for local economic benefit. An - ar gument used was that economic welfare was draining out of Westbury by out-commuting and that a bypass would somehow give better access to its industrial estate and thereby create more employment in Westbury. The notion that a new bypass to Westbury might actually increase the If (as a result of our mistaken way of as- propensity for out-commuting (by reduc- sessing road schemes) we have built so ing the transport costs of it) had simply many roads and created so much traffic not occurred to the planners. But it did that we are on the wrong side of this op- occur to the Inspector. timum, then the more we build the worse the economy gets. Question: does the DfT The obvious truth that a road is a two- recognise that there must be an optimum way thing and can just as easily suck eco- level of road space for the economic good nomic activity out of an area as draw it of the country, and if so what research has in, is simply ignored all over the country. it done to discover where that optimum At this moment the DfT is actively consid- lies? ering an appraisal for the Kingskerswell scheme (where the local authority is ap- Appendix B – Correlation Techniques parently prepared to risk several tens of millions of pounds of ratepayers money) Time series of data can be depicted as which makes assertions of economic ben- simple curves. If there were an under- efit to the region without any considera- lying causal link between one time series tion of peripherality evidence at all. Ques- and another, say between series A (the tion: Has the DfT ever done any research cause) and series B (the result), we would on the economic peripherality effects of expect there to be a correlation of some road schemes? Supplementary Question: sort between data in A at some point in when the DfT analyses road bids made to time and data in B at some later time. If a it, does it ever look at or attempt to quan- quantity y in series A ‘causes’ quantity z at tify its likely peripherality effects? some time T later in series B, we say y is a function of time t, y(t), and z is a function 9) Road building is an economic good in z(t), and that itself?: The biggest assumption is that building roads, allowing greater growth in z(t+T) = g(y(t)) transport, must be good for the economy per se. But because something at some where g is the correlative function. Let us level may be a good does not mean that take a simple example. Suppose a value more of it is better. y at any time gives rise to (i.e. causes) a value z=y3 4 years later, we can plot for If there were no roads in Britain economic any series A of y, a series B of z. (Figs. 1a activity would be very local and very lim- and 1b) World Transport Policy and Practice 84 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 Fig 1a

Fig 1b

The chosen function is a positive correla- process of the correlation integral is to test tion, that is an increase in y results in an the coincidence (by summing the prod- increase in z in 4 years. Although the ucts) of the two curves as one slides over two curves are not identical, it is easy to the other in time. We plot the integral see the correlation, because if we slid the as a function of how much we have slid y curve 4 years to the right, the peaks the curves in time. Thus for the example and troughs would match up with those above we get the curve in Fig 2. in the z curve. With real data, however, especially where complex phenomena are Here we can see that there is a strong cor- involved, a causal relationship between y relation peak centred on 4 years into the and z will be blurred by other factors, i.e. future, which is precisely the causative z may be only partially a result of y and correlation we defined. One might expect other systematic and random influences intuitively that since we defined a precise may be present. An underlying correlation relationship between a cause and an effect trend is then no longer obvious to the hu- only and exactly after 4 years delay, and man eye and we have to use a mathemati- we have not added any other influences or cal process to find it. The mathematical corrupting effects, the correlation integral World Transport Policy and Practice 85 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 Fig 2 should have a very sharp spike at 4 years We have, of course, to be careful not to and no value elsewhere. The reason it is confuse correlation with cause and effect. not as perfect as that, is because the first A particular danger arises with false cor- time series I have used is not a random relations that arise from two independent set of numbers but possesses its own in- quantities each correlating similarly with a ternal correlations (auto-correlation). third. The commonest mediating quantity is time, with untold numbers of ex- If we had defined an anti-correlation, that amples of quantities monotonically (that is is a functional relationship such that an in- only ever going one way) declining or increase in y causes a decrease in z, the cor- creasing as time passes. Over the last 50 relation integral will show a negative peak. years there has probably been a monot- If, as a trivial example, I just change the onic growth in the number of young peo- sign of the relationship, so that z=-y3 4 ple who wear T-shirts, and over the same years later, we get the inverse curve as period a monotonic growth in civilian air shown in Fig 3. traffic. Those two quantities will positive-

Fig 3

World Transport Policy and Practice 86 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 ly correlate, but you would be hard put to wards an exponential-like function on a make a causal connection between them. steepening curve, and motorway length increases historically with a tendency for However, the DfT claims effects from a a declining rate), so that straight line fits particular cause, road building, which has are probably not appropriate. The first properties which do allow the possibility of curved polynomial is quadratic in form and testing for sensible correlation, by which I I have chosen to do all the fittings to this mean a correlation which indicates a phe- same polynomial level for consistency. In nomenological relationship, which may or fact the results are not very sensitive to may not be causal. A time series of the to- the level chosen anyway. tal length of motorway is not of itself very useful, being (unfortunately!) a monotoni- To summarise the process I will use, I will cally increasing function, so that it would, take a time series that represents road for example, correlate positively with the length and a time series that represents growth of population or the consumption some other interesting quantity such of hamburgers. But road building itself, as GDP. I will turn each of these series that is the time series of the number of into incremental patterns by removing a roads being built in each year, is not mo- smooth underlying trend. I will then de- notonic - it rises and falls. If road building termine the correlation integral for these has a causative effect on other measura- two patterns. ble quantities, those rises and falls should statistically correlate, and since those ris- Here I must make a disclaimer. While this es and falls are likely to have a pattern is bona fide numerical analysis, I am not all of their own (determined by budgets seeking to demonstrate that there are and policy changes), the likelihood of sig- causal correlations, merely testing wheth- nificant coincidental correlation is much er the statistical evidence supports the smaller. DfT’s presumption that a particular causal relationship exists. So it is the minor variations in quantities, which have patterns which are statistically To explore this I take the significant period traceable, rather than underlying trends, of motorway building. The most obvious which will give sensible correlations, if indication of road building activity would they exist. In the following testing of DfT be the growth in road space available. By hypotheses, the quantities I use will be road space I mean the area of drivable derived from published time series data. road, or the length of road times the mean I am looking for the patterns of changes in number of lanes. I show the time series quantities, so I need to remove the under- of motorway km and the residual (magni- lying trends, the monotonicity, and leave fied in scale here) after removing the un- the differential or incremental data. That derlying trend (Figs. 4.1 and 4.2, p67): after all makes sense - we are interested in whether an incremental increase in roads causes or at least correlates with an incremental increase or decrease in some other quantity, like GDP. I find the incremental pattern by removing a smooth underlying trend, using a standard process of polynomial curve fitting by least squares minimisation.

I do not want to go into too much detail on this. At its simplest we fit in a statistically ‘best’ manner, a parametrised curve to the overall data, with as few parameters as possible. All of the time series data to which I shall refer have some marked curvature in their overall form (e.g. GDP historically until very recently tends to- World Transport Policy and Practice 87 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 Fig 4.1

Fig 4.2

As a first measure of economic well-being I choose GDP at constant factor cost (Figs. 5.1 and 5.2 p68):

World Transport Policy and Practice 88 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 Fig 5.1

Fig 5.2

The motorway building correlates with changes in GDP as shown in Fig. 6 (p69).

World Transport Policy and Practice 89 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 Fig 6

This shows a very marked anti-correlative form. The historical statistics show that road building is followed by a decline in GDP troughing after about 3 years. Em- ployment is another supposed benefit of road building. Taking unemployment measures for the same period (Figs. 7.1 and 7.2).

Fig 7.1

World Transport Policy and Practice 90 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 Fig 7.2

A trend line is a bit more difficult to assert here, but it is probably still more valid to use the ‘changes’ curve than the overall historic curve. The correlation integral becomes as shown in Fig. 8.

Fig 8

Suggesting the historical statistics show a strong correlative effect and telling us that unemployment tends to rise following road building with peak effect after about 4-5 years.

World Transport Policy and Practice 91 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 Appendix C Elasticity of traffic to fuel price

For the years 1990 to 2012 the average number of km/vehicle travelled can be plotted against fuel price (unleaded) at pump:

We can determine the price of petrol that would recover the externalised costs for an average vehicle1 :

Assuming the user should pay tax (VAT) as above graph) suggests that veh-km would on any normal economic activity, this sug- drop from around 14000 now to around gests that recovery of externalised costs 3000. per vehicle, via fuel price, would result in a price of £4.26 per litre. The appar- 1 Figures from Transport Statistics and AA:http:// ent elasticity relating distance travelled to www.theaa.com/motoring_advice/running_costs/ pump price (the trend line fitted in the index.html World Transport Policy and Practice 92 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 Appendix 3 The council’s draft core strategy published that year gave no hope that such an ob- Submission to consultation on SW Pe- jective might be achievable. It was the ninsula Route Based Strategy (RBS) epitome of unsustainable planning – large Patrick Kinnersly extra-urban extensions sprawling across farmland remote from town centres and http://www.highways.gov.uk/route- linked by new roads to the A350. The fi- based-strategies/ nancial linkage was as obvious as the link roads: strategic housing and employment Submitted to Highways Agency South sites would help to fund the old dream of West Route Based Strategy Team creating a ‘strategic route’ between the M4 5 March 2014 at Chippenham and the A36 at Warmin- ster.

SW Peninsula Route Based Strategy This ‘economic growth corridor’ has domi- (RBS) nated and distorted the planning and transport strategies of Wiltshire councils I am secretary of the White Horse Alli- for several decades now. In the 1990s ance, a coalition of 13 organisations rang- the dream was shared with Dorset County ing from national NGOs, including CPRE Council. The two shires had a shared inter- and the Woodland Trust, to parish coun- est in making the A350 a strategic route cils in West Wiltshire. The WHA was set up between the M4 and the expanding port of in 2007 to mount a professional case at Poole. Dorset’s county and district councils the planning inquiry into Wiltshire Coun- appear to have abandoned that ambition, ty Council’s application to build the A350 leaving WC to switch its focus to its other Westbury eastern bypass and to campaign old dream road to the Channel ports, the for sustainable transport and planning in A36(T). Wiltshire and the wider SW region. Whichever ‘gateway to Europe’ dominates We spent tens of thousands of pounds on the council’s strategic ‘thinking’, Westbury legal representation and expert witnesses stands in the way. For the member groups at the planning inquiry in 2008. The In- of our alliance the only comfort to be tak- spector recommended against the scheme en from the WC’s core strategy was that on the grounds that the small transport it did not propose a bypass for Westbury. benefits of the road could not justify the Millions of pounds’ worth of improvements damage it would have done to the land- were proposed for the A350 but they were scape through which it would have passed all to the north of Westbury. The policies – a tranquil valley below the western es- for the community area proposed nothing carpment of Salisbury Plain and Westbury more than measures to reduce the impact Hill, where the emblematic white horse of the road on the town centre. The public would have looked down on a three-lane exhibition introducing the Core Strategy highway climbing out of the clay vale. to the people of Westbury showed no bypass. The emerging Local Transport Plan In July 2009 the Secretary of State ac- was similarly silent on the matter. cepted the Inspector’s report and rejected the planning application for the road. Wilt- Then in the summer of 2012 a map of the shire Council, created that year as unitary original eastern bypass route was included successor to WCC, did not challenge the in the ‘proposals map’ in Appendix H of the decision. The first of our objectives had Core Strategy, justified by the claim that been achieved: it looked as if the West- this was a mere technicality resulting from bury eastern bypass had been definitively the need to ‘save’ Policy T1a from the still buried by the planning process. We decid- current West Wilts Local Plan. ed to continue as an active organisation in pursuit of our second objective, achiev- Our lawyer and member groups of the ing more sustainable spatial and transport WHA challenged this move at the Exami- strategies in West Wiltshire and its region. nation in Public of the CS last summer. The council declined the Inspector’s requests World Transport Policy and Practice 93 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 to remove the safeguarded route from its When is ‘insuperable’ not insuperable? draft development plan. When you have the memory of a goldfish, dreams of everlasting economic growth So, unless the Inspector insists and the and the environmental and cultural sensi- council relents, we will be back where we tivities of a cockroach? started in the summer of 2007. You will by now have recognised some el- This sense of futility and déjà vu is all per- ements of the route strategies embodied vasive today. The zombie roads are slith- in your work on the SW Peninsula. The ering out of old plan chests all around the A36/A46 Trunk road (detrunked and then country and taking up position along the retrunked again after the five local author- pegged lines that showed where they ex- ities responsible for it could not agree a pected to triumph over landscape, wildlife, joint management policy for it) is on your water resources and common sense in the map, hanging around in an un-strategic great Blacktop Age of Roads for Prosperity diagonal sort of way between the RBS cor- and the great car economy. ridors.

One of the founder groups of the White The A350, not being a trunk road, is there, Horse Alliance, the A36 Corridor Alliance but without prominence. Your ‘evidence’ was formed in 1993 by a coalition of envi- shows that the two roads have much ronmental and transport groups along the greater significance in some LPAs mental route of the A36/A46 corridor between the maps of the area. M27 near Southampton and the M4 at Tor- marton. Seeing the emerging ambitions of For example a report for the Swindon and Wiltshire County Council we subsequently Wiltshire LEP in January ‘Transport Vi- added the A350 to our name and our brief. sion 2025’, envisaged not only an A350 Among the founder members at that first Westbury bypass but also eventually an meeting in Salisbury were those fighting A36 Salisbury bypass, along with several the A36 Salisbury bypass. This was the A303 schemes (the latter marked on the centrepiece of the Government’s proposed consultant’s map before your A303 route strategic dual-carriageway linking the M27 study had even got under way!). The re- and M4. None of the environmental or port puts the Westbury and Salisbury by- heritage QUANGOs appeared at the plan- passes in a 10-year plan ‘reference list’. ning inquiry in 2004. The road would have been built if grassland ecologists work- The report does not list the A36 as a ‘corri- ing pro-bono for opponents of the road dor’ in its own right; the ‘Vision’ subsumes had not found what the DoT’s ecologists it into the ‘A303 corridor’ yet the map and had somehow overlooked. The proposed text show the A36 trunk road pointing at route on embankment across the water ‘South coast gateways to Europe’! We can meadows of the River Avon would have only assume that this coupling with the destroyed a rare flowery meadow (MG8 A303 is intended to scoop up gravy from grassland type). English Nature woke up. the Chancellor’s £18bn roads programme The Avon was after all a candidate Euro- budget. pean SAC. The EA was suddenly worried about flooding and impacts on groundwa- From your own work on the SW Peninsula ter flows. The precursor of English Herit- strategy you will recognise another cou- age suddenly noticed that the river valley pling of corridors: and meadows below Salisbury provided Table 4.1 ‘Schedule of challenges and one of the finest views of the Cathedral – opportunities’ is a mish-mash of largely ‘A quintessentially English landscape’. anecdotal information from local council and LEP wish-lists. For example: The government scrapped the scheme in 1997 because of these insuperable envi- ‘A350 North of Warminster, Swin- ronmental obstacles. The DoT’s A36 su- don and Wiltshire: perhighway detumesced. Wiltshire CC ‘This is a key route serving north-south. tried to revive the Salisbury bypass in the It is significant also due to the number guise of local relief roads but failed. of towns along the route. It is a local World Transport Policy and Practice 94 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 corridor, but should be seen in relation member groups of the White Horse and to the A46. Is the A46 fulfilling its role Corridor Alliances. CPRE and CBT nation- as a strategic road? For the A350 to ally have submitted evidence and you will work, it needs to be a dual route. Has have received the protests those cam- the potential to take on the role of the paigns generated from individual mem- A36/A46.’ bers, including myself, over the national strategy behind your strategy. I know that I wonder who could have told them that! my colleagues in Salisbury and CBT Bristol and Bath Travel to Work Area group will be The scoring boxes for this A36/46/350 hy- dealing with matters of particular concern brid corridor dream show a tick for ‘Short to them. I know that the Stonehenge Al- term priority’ and confirm that it was liance has submitted a powerful objection ‘identified through local stakeholder en- pointing to the inadequate evidence base gagement.’ of environmental and heritage constraints that should be tempering the ancient re- So, here we go again! All the old roads, gional instinct to dual the A303. The World rebundled, rebranded and bunged togeth- Heritage Site around Stonehenge and two er into various unconnected consultation AONBs are not listed as constraints. I will processes, LEP and DfT and HA trying not list all the other AONBs, the National to come up with shortlists of quick wins, Parks or the European sites and SSSIs that low hanging fruit and shovel-ready fossils could be endangered by this recrudes- while the funding window remains open. cence of tarmac, runoff, and air pollution. Responses from ‘stakeholders’ committed You should be able to locate them if you to sustainable planning and transport for have the time or motive. a survivable future cannot have any bear- ing on a process unashamedly committed I also have an obligation to link our con- to mono-modal expansion of the road net- cerns in the SW with the concerns of col- work. leagues in the South East: our regions and route studies appear to be separated from The older ones among us have been here each other. We have seen no evidence that before. Some of us attempted to play a modelling is being done - or can be done in constructive role in the consultation proc- the time available - of cross-border induc- esses of the SWARMMS multi-modal study tion of extra traffic as road schemes such at the turn of the century. I resigned from as the almost inevitable Arundel Bypass the consultation and wrote to the consult- and road-based strategic developments ants to tell them why. My open letter of increase both demand and capacity along resignation was published in World Trans- the South Coast. Are we in danger of report Policy and Practice in 2001. I attach it viving that old dream of a South Coast Mo- here in the hope that you will see the ex- torway’? traordinary similarities between that time and the present day. I would like to remind you that SWARMMS ran concurrently with a South Coast multi- Given my renunciation of consultation with modal strategy and a strictly mono-modal government over its transport planning Highways Agency ‘route management (or lack of it) you may be wondering why strategy study’ of the route between the I have responded at such length to this M5 near Exeter and the M27 near South- one. The answer is that I have responded ampton. Since then we have also had the to the dishonesty implicit in the process Bristol and Bath to South Coast study that that is now being rushed towards a list of recommended signage to redirect HGV roads projects for the Autumn Statement. traffic away from the A36 and the A350 This is a travesty of what transport plan- and route it via the A303, A34 and M3 to ning should look like in the 21st Century. Southampton and Poole. I write to protest at something I know I cannot influence by engaged comment on You might like to add those studies to your what passes for strategy and evidence. evidence base – if there is any time to read actual evidence showing that you and your I also bear some responsibility to the ‘stakeholders’ are engaged in a political World Transport Policy and Practice 95 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 process that has nothing to do with transport planning and everything to do with fulfilling your absurd prediction that traffic will grow by 40 per cent by 2040.

Yours sincerely

Patrick Kinnersly Secretary, White Horse Alliance Joint convenor, A36/A350 Corridor Alliance

World Transport Policy and Practice 96 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 The Death of the Habitats Directive Britain and still less an issue in develop- Alan James ment decisions. It was – and arguably still is – primarily a protocol to protect wild- The European Habitats Directive1 was en- life, rather than a development planning acted in 1992 to introduce to all EU (at tool. However, the interests of the two the time EEC) member states a system often coincide: if a development destroys of strict protection for vulnerable natural the resting place of an Annex IV protected habitats and species. It required states species, that is a reason why the develop- to draw up lists of areas to be afforded ment may not legally proceed, in order to special protection (Special Area of Con- enforce the “strict protection” (the actual servation or SAC) because of the presence words of the Habitats Directive Article 12) of habitats or species of particular impor- of the species, unless very precise condi- tance in a European context, in order to tions for derogation from this requirement create a coherent network of sites (Natura are met. In the past few years, more 2000); and to afford legal protection to a cases have arisen, in transport and other specific list of species (Annex IV) which areas of planning, in which objectors to a while not always rare in a national con- scheme have invoked the Habitats Direc- text, were susceptible to deterioration in tive as a reason why development cannot population or range. lawfully proceed.

The Habitats Directive was required to be This article argues, with case studies, that enshrined in law in each of the member the planning system increasingly margin- states, including drawing up a list of can- alises the Habitats Directive whilst paying didate SACs to be confirmed by a given lip service to it: and the law (albeit with date. In the United Kingdom, the Directive exceptions) generally appears reluctant to was first incorporated into British (includ- impose the strict protection required by ing Scottish) law in 19942, and the current the Directive on decisions which come to version dates from 20103, often called the judicial review. The article concentrates Habitats Regs. There have been problems on protected species, mostly in relation with the adequacy of transposition of the to transport projects, but as much again Directive into national law, but in any case could be written about protected sites. The the Directive has supremacy in cases of case studies include the two most impor- ambiguity. tant recent High Court cases on protected species, known as ‘Woolley’ and ‘Morge’ The Habitats Directive was and remains a after the individuals who brought the cas- remarkably powerful statement of what is es: and two road schemes, the Aberdeen and is not acceptable in terms of develop- Western Peripheral Route (AWPR) and the ment impacts on habitats and species that Heysham to M6 Link, both of which were fall within its orbit. If an area is designated subject to legal challenge on grounds of a SAC (or a Special Protected Area – SPA impact on protected species amongst oth- - for birds, subsequently incorporated into er issues. the Directive), or if an individual species is included in Annex IV, there are narrowly With the High Court decision in 2013 to prescribed criteria and procedures to de- allow the Heysham to M6 Link Road to go termine whether development is permissi- ahead in the face of evidence that it would ble. It is in effect a line in the sand, drawn result in the deterioration of resting plac- to ensure ultimate protection to the sites es of otters which are Annex IV protected and species that were deemed to matter species, in my view the Habitats Directive most. The strictness of protection has can no longer be relied on as an effec- been clarified and if anything reinforced tive conservation tool in Britain, in spite by case law in the years since 1992, and of being the law of the land. In transport in particular by European guidance based projects, my experience suggests that on case law issued in 2000 and 2007 for whilst blatantly damaging options may be sites4,5 and in 2007 for species6. discarded, compliance with the Habitats Directive will be claimed for the preferred Through most of the 1990s the Habitats option irrespective of its possible short- Directive was relatively little known in comings. World Transport Policy and Practice 97 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 Requirements of the Habitats Direc- derogations must satisfy” (para 34) tive • Alternatives should be chosen to solve the identified problem in a way that en- Under Article 12(1)a) and c), the deliber- sures the best protection of the species, ate7 capture, killing or taking of eggs from which “could involve alternative loca- protected species is prohibited. Article tions (or routes), different development 12(1)b) prohibits the deliberate distur- scales or designs, or alternative activi- bance of protected species: and 12(1)d) ties, processes, or methods” (para 37). prohibits the deterioration or destruction • “recourse to derogations must be a of breeding sites or resting places of pro- last resort” (para 38, bold in original) tected animals. The last of these is some- • “a derogation may only be allowed what different from the other three, in where no other solution which does not that the transgression is against the habi- involve setting aside these (Article 12) tat rather than the species themselves: it prohibitions can be adopted” (para 39) is not a defence to argue that individuals • Whether or not an alternative is satis- were not present at the time of destruc- factory must be assessed on objectively tion so could move somewhere else. verifiable factors of a scientific or technical nature (para 40), but in any case Article 16 sets out criteria which could per- “another solution cannot be deemed mit derogation from the requirements of unsatisfactory merely because it would Article 12. In the absence of satisfactory cause greater inconvenience to or com- alternatives, and provided that the favour- pel a change of behaviour by the benefi- able conservation status (FCS) of the spe- ciaries of the derogation” (para 41) cies is maintained, the main derogation applicable to transport schemes arises if Taken together, this is a formidable list of there are of Imperative Reasons of Over- requirements, as befits a system of strict riding Public Interest (IROPI), including protection for the most vulnerable species, public health, safety, wider environmental to be met before all alternatives have been benefits, or reasons of a social or econom- exhausted and derogation can be granted. ic nature. This is usually summarised as In effect, it puts the safeguarding of pro- three derogation tests – IROPI, alterna- tected species ahead of all other consider- tives, maintenance of FCS - all of which ations, with derogation being a last resort have to be met. if no other course of action would remove or reduce impacts on protected species. The 2007 Guidance on protected species has exhaustive discussion on the mean- Two further points are important in any ings of IROPI, FCS, and alternatives. FCS discussion of Habitats Directive/ Regula- is not often a contested issue in British tions assessments: transport projects8, not least because of the resources that would be needed for • A constant theme of the Habitats objectors to prove it. IROPI is notoriously Directive and the Guidance documents difficult to prove or disprove, but the 2007 is that decisions must be based on the Guidance emphasises that ‘imperative’ and best available scientific evidence. As will ‘over-riding’ set a high bar in the context be seen in the case of the Heysham-M6 of strict protection of vulnerable species Link, the quality of evidence may have (see ref 6, III.2.1 para 24). Road scheme been the best ‘available’, but was far promoters invariably make airy claims of from the best that was possible. public interest to justify their projects, • In Britain there is a system of li- with little rigorous argument to underpin censing for derogation, managed by the the assertion9. nature conservation bodies of the individual countries - Natural England (NE) In contrast, the guidance on alternatives is for England, Scottish Natural Heritage very specific and fairly clear-cut. In sum- (SNH) for Scotland, etc. mary (all quotes 2007 Guidance [ref 6] III.2.2, paragraph numbers as given): Almost invariably, inquiry inspectors and judges rely on the opinions of the nature • It “is an overarching condition that all conservation bodies in determining con- World Transport Policy and Practice 98 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 tentious cases relating to the Habitats an acceptable impact on European Directive. This attitude is now reinforced protected species. But that is not the by case law since the Supreme Court rul- question posed by the Directive and ing on the Morge case. However, NE often Regulation 3 (4) which concerns the fail to engage with assessments (as in the requirements to be met before any Woolley case) due to a chronic and wors- derogation can take place at all. ening lack of resources, and argue with some justice that if they contested every It is a common argument that an impact case however minor, their resources would on a European protected species is ac- become even more stretched and their ceptable, often on the grounds that with effectiveness in challenging government mitigation and compensation measures on the most important cases would be the habitat for the species will be main- diluted. Most campaigners against road tained or even enhanced. However, as J schemes regard NE and SNH as hopelessly Waksman states, “that is not the question compromised, since they are government posed by the Directive”: the question is bodies and seem reluctant to act against whether the three tests for derogation are the government’s bidding except in the met. most extreme cases10. He then goes on to say (in response to Woolley and Morge the argument that the outcome of planning approval would have been the same These are the two most significant High had the local authority complied with the Court cases in Britain in recent years relat- relevant guidance): ing to species protected under the Habi- tats Directive. The very different outcome 34. In any event, given the strict re- between the former in 2009, and the fi- quirements for any derogation I would nal decision in the latter, by the Supreme be very reluctant to hold that the out- Court in January 2011 marked a signifi- come would have been the same in any cant shift in case law. event. And the fact that a licence was ultimately obtained ... does not alter In the first of these11, Simon Woolley that conclusion. Indeed at the Inquiry was the claimant and Cheshire East Bor- Millennium’s (the developer) planning ough Council the defendant. The case witness agreed that imperative rea- concerned the demolition of a bungalow sons of overriding public importance containing a bat roost. The particular is- did not arise and that there was a suit- sue was whether a local planning author- able alternative to demolition which ity was required to satisfy itself that the was to retain Bryancliffe. scheme was compliant with the Habitats Directive/1994 Regs in reaching a deci- The derogation licence was issued by NE sion to grant the planning permission (for four months after the planning permission a small housing development) for which had been granted. Although not stated the demolition was required: or whether in so many words, the inference may be it was sufficient to note the applicability drawn that NE should not have licensed of the Directive and Regulations because the destruction of the roost because the of the presence of bats, and state the re- tests for derogation had not been met. quirement for a derogation to be licensed. Even the developer agreed that there were Judge Waksman QC concluded in favour of no imperative reasons of over-riding pub- the claimant, basically on the grounds that lic interest in building a small housing de- it was necessary for the local authority to velopment, and there was an alternative engage with the requirements. to demolishing the bungalow.

In the context of the present discussion, The initial Morge High Court hearing was two paragraphs of J Waksman’s decision also in 200912, but the case rumbled on are particularly important: through an Appeal in June 201013 to the Supreme Court hearing in November 2010 31. The Planning Permission itself stat- and judgement in January 201114. It was ed in reason 6 that the proposal had brought by Vivienne Morge against Hamp- World Transport Policy and Practice 99 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 shire County Council, and concerned a pro- press themselves satisfied that a proposed busway through an area containing posed development will be compliant bat roosts. Although the busway avoided with article 12, the planning authority destruction of roosts, the argument was are to my mind entitled to presume that it constituted disturbance under Arti- that that is so” cle 12(1)b) because of the loss of foraging areas and severance of commuting routes The dissenting opinion argued that in fact to other foraging areas. The case was NE, who initially objected to the scheme clearly a difficult one, as the first judge because of lack of information on bats, had found in favour of Hampshire CC, the ap- not expressed themselves satisfied that peal judge overturned that ruling, and the there would be no breach of Article 12. Supreme Court overturned the Appeal de- It was also argued that the officer report cision but with one dissenting opinion. misrepresented NE’s statement and gave more assurance to council members than Without going into too much detail, the was in the specialist reports, that distur- decision revolved around how to define bance would not be significant. He there- ‘disturbance’, and how to resolve conflict- fore concludes (para nos from ref 14): ing opinions on what extent of disturbance was critical to the future of the bats in the 82. ... It was simply not possible for area. Like Woolley, the decision also per- the committee to properly conclude tained to the obligations placed on a local that Natural England had said that planning authority to determine the effect the proposal would not be in breach of the Habitats Directive on approval or re- of the Habitats Directive in relation to fusal of permission. The Appeal judge ar- bats. Absent such a statement, they gued that a planning authority could grant were bound to make that judgment for permission only if it concluded that there themselves ... . would be no breach of Article 12, or that in the event of a breach NE was likely to 83. As I have said, Natural England ... grant a licence for derogation under Ar- had not explicitly addressed the ques- ticle 16: but the authority should refuse tion whether the disturbance of bats permission if it was uncertain whether a that the proposal would unquestion- breach would occur, or whether a licence ably entail would give rise to a viola- would be granted if needed. The Supreme tion of the directive. The main focus of Court judges argued (ref 14 para 29) that the letter of 19 July (when the objec- this went too far, and that a planning au- tion was withdrawn) was on an entirely thority should only refuse permission if different question ... the unalterable it concluded that the development would fact is that(NE) did not say that it had both offend Article 12 and be unlikely to concluded that no violation would be be licensed. involved, much less that the planning committee did not need to consider the The Supreme Court ruling supersedes question. J Waksman’s judgement in the Woolley case, and moves towards a presumption This judgement appears closer to J Waks- in favour of granting planning permission man’s view that a planning authority has to unless there are specific reasons not to do satisfy itself that no breach of the Habitats so, as opposed to the precautionary prin- Directive is likely to occur in the event of ciple adopted in the Appeal Court ruling, planning approval, notwithstanding advice of refusing permission in cases of doubt. it may have received even from the statu- However, its greater effect is on the sub- tory body for nature conservation. How- stantive case of assessing disturbance. ever, this was a dissenting opinion15, and The key judgement was the majority opin- the effect of the Supreme Court decision is ion (ref 14 para 30) that Natural England’s that whatever NE says – or is thought to views should take precedence over others, have said – goes. This may be an over- because NE is the statutory body charged simplification of a complex decision, but with nature conservation: the effect is real and recognisable in subsequent inquiries and appeals16. “Where, as here, Natural England ex- World Transport Policy and Practice 100 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 Aberdeen Western Peripheral Route The Inquiry Reporters somewhat ducked (AWPR) the issue, saying they were not aware of any decisive advantages of one route over This scheme involves a 41km route around another and that it was for Ministers to the West side of Aberdeen, which was op- decide whether there were no satisfactory posed by a large number of people on a alternatives. The High Court judges ac- large number of grounds over a long pe- cepted an argument put forward by Trans- riod of time. The salient facts (from 2005 port Scotland, that all five routes had po- onwards, when the scheme was reas- tential impacts on bats, so the destruction sessed) are that: of bat roosts at the International School could not be said to be a determining • Five routes were presented for con- factor against the Milltimber route. This sultation, at ever-increasing distances judgement was in my view fundamentally westwards from the edge of Aberdeen flawed on two counts: – named in order Pitfodels, Murtle, Mill- timber, Peterculter, and Peterculter with 1. The case was that, within the Milltim- a southern leg ber route, there was a variant that did • The Murtle route was consistently as- not involve the destruction of the bat sessed as the preferred route, both be- roosts: therefore, the Milltimber route fore and after the 2005 reassessment, as proposed was illegal as there was a even though it had a severe impact on satisfactory alternative within the terms the Camphill community for people with of the Habitats Directive. Furthermore, disabilities this aspect of the assessment had not • In spite of this overall assessment, the been addressed in the reason given for ministerial decision in 2005 was to pro- preferring the destructive variant, which mote the Milltimber route, but in a hy- was essentially that it was better to re- brid version also with a southern leg locate the International School than to • The Milltimber route passed in the have it sat alongside a busy major road. vicinity of the Aberdeen International 2. There was no evidence on the actual School, which was acknowledged in the or potential destruction of bat roosts on Environmental Statement to house bat the other four route options, only asser- roosts tions that there would be disturbance • All British species of bat are protected of bats, without even an assessment of under Annex IV of the Habitats Directive, which option offered the least distur- so fall under the orbit of Article 12 and of bance, as required in the 2007 Guidance the Article 16 tests for derogation from (ref 6 III.2.2 para 37). Destruction of Article 12 resting places is a distinct element in • There were two variants of the Milltim- Article 12 of the Habitats Directive, and ber route at the International School. much more tangible than ‘disturbance’. One was to demolish the school buildings, put the road through the site, and The judges accepted the argument that rebuild the School elsewhere: the other there was no reasonable alternative that was to run the road alongside the Inter- would have eliminated impact on bats, national School site and not relocate it, since all routes had a potential to im- accepting that there would be an impact pact on bats. This failed to address ei- on the school. ther the point that a Milltimber route could • The decision was made to relocate the have avoided the destruction of the rest- school and demolish the existing building place; or that there was no evidence ings: this decision, whatever other logic whether other routes would have had any was involved, did not mention or consid- impact on resting places, or whether they er the presence of the bat roosts and the disturbed bats to a greater or lesser extent potential contravention of the Habitats than Milltimber. Directive. • This decision was challenged both at the Inquiry into the scheme in 2008, and in subsequent legal challenges

World Transport Policy and Practice 101 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 otters on this stretch of the River Lune but Heysham-M6 Link Road (HM6L) acknowledged that other sources indicated that they were present. Their presence HM6L is a 4.8km length of road, promoted was accepted as likely but the degree of by Lancashire CC (LCC) to link the M6 with disturbance was deemed unlikely to cause the Port of Heysham and other parts of a breach of Article 12(1)b), and there was the peninsula between the estuary of the no evidence of resting places in the vicin- River Lune and Morecambe Bay, bypassing ity of the bridge. the existing urban road through the eastern side of Lancaster and the suburban The second application in 2011 admitted areas between Lancaster and Morecambe. that the 2004 survey had not been for- The background to the scheme is covered mally updated, but this was not felt to in an accompanying article by David Gate be necessary since it was not disputed of the action group TSLM which vigorously that otters were present. The objectors opposed the scheme for 8 years. commissioned a survey from nationally respected otter experts, who presented It is difficult to understand the point of strong evidence of at least one otter holt this road, which lops only a few minutes in the immediate vicinity of the proposed off the journey time between the M6 and bridge, and possibly several more in the the port and, as LCC acknowledged, does area of typical otter habitat on the north- little to reduce congestion on the existing ern bank of the river. urban road network. Extravagant claims about creating 6,000 jobs on the peninsula This evidence was presented to the Exami- proved over-egged by a factor of 10 even nation, causing discomfort to LCC and its using the dubious standard methodology nature conservation consultants because for estimating job creation. The road was of the potential breach of Article 12(1)d) admitted to be inappropriate development in causing the destruction or deterioration in the Green Belt, but a typical unfounded of a resting place. There was no ques- claim of over-riding public interest was in- tion of the tests for derogation being ap- voked. plied, because the scheme promoter had no knowledge of the existence of the rest- The scheme gained planning permission in ing place because it had done no in-depth 2008, but this became redundant in 2010 survey work for nearly 10 years! because of scheme changes. The scheme went through a second inquiry, an Exami- Natural England were also represented at nation under the2008 Planning Act for a the Examination, and explained new ar- Development Consent Order (DCO) un- rangements for ‘shadow licensing’ of dero- der the dubious pretext of being classed gations, introduced to fit DCO/ NSIP pro- as a Nationally Significant Infrastructure cedures. NE can give an opinion on the Project or NSIP (17) in spite of being a lo- likelihood of a licence being granted on cal authority road. It emerged that there the basis of evidence presented to them was a significant and previously undis- at earlier stages in scheme development, closed increase in forecast traffic through subject to there being no significant chang- the village of Halton, just east of the M6 es by the time of application for a licence. and on the bank of the River Lune. Halton However, in a case where no evidence was residents had already been objectors to presented by the scheme promoter due to the scheme because of concerns about a lack of up to date survey information, NE flooding, but more joined the campaign would be unable to give any opinion. some of whom knew a lot about otters on the Lune and questioned whether they LCC hurriedly arranged a single site inspec- were affected, as an Annex IV species, at tion, falling well short of the 12 months of the new HM6L river bridge immediately data advocated in NE guidance on accept- West of the M6. able survey methodology. This took place at a time of very high river levels with the The Environmental Statement for the 2005 main holt entrance under water. The out- version of the scheme included a survey of come was that LCC stated that they could otters in 2004, which found no evidence of not find any evidence of a holt so in their World Transport Policy and Practice 102 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 view it did not exist so no further evidence that NE had no position one way or the would be presented. other.

The objectors commissioned a second re- The ExA attempted to justify his position port from an otter expert, independent on the reasonableness of LCC’s proposed from the first, and he confirmed the likely course of action by stating that: presence of a holt at the location previously identified, and that it would be unviable “From what I have seen and read, as a resting place if the bridge were built. should such an application ultimately prove to be required it would seem The Examining Authority (ExA) concluded likely to be able to be granted on the in his report18 that “the situation with re- basis of mitigation...” (ref 18 para 187) gard to otters is less clear cut” (ref 18 para 180) than with bats, which was more As J Waksman said, that is not the ques- clear cut because the destruction of roosts tion posed by the Directive. Should an ap- had been sanctioned by NE in the shadow plication to licence prove to be required, it licensing process, albeit without reference would have to satisfy the three tests for to the tests for derogation19. However, he derogation, using the best scientific evi- concluded that the approach adopted by dence available (and it is hard to envis- LCC was “not unreasonable in seeking to age even a minimum acceptable standard establish at the appropriate time prior to of scientific evidence without any proper construction whether a licence would in surveys), in the context of derogation as fact be required to cover potentially ma- a last resort. terial disturbance to otters.” (ref 18 para 187). The alternatives test required looking well beyond whether the bridge could be in The logic of this statement is questionable. an alternative location (ref 18 para 188): The DCO could be approved, compulsory there had to be assessment, as quoted purchase set in motion, contracts entered earlier in this article, of “different devel- into with cancellation penalties, and works opment scales or designs, or alternative committed elsewhere along the route, for activities, processes, or methods”. To a scheme which would be unlawful if the my knowledge no such assessments were tests for derogation were not met should ever undertaken with the bar set at ‘last a licence to derogate prove to be required resort’ in the context of strict protection once the promoter got round to doing the of Annex IV species, for which “another survey. solution cannot be deemed unsatisfactory merely because it would cause greater in- This line of argument only really works if convenience to or compel a change of be- it had already been concluded that a li- haviour by the beneficiaries of the deroga- cence would without doubt be granted if tion”. The view of objectors remains that needed, because the tests for derogation the only test that was probably satisfied would be satisfied come what may. It is was the maintenance of favourable con- difficult to comprehend how such anap- servation status. proach satisfies the core principles,- pur poses, and procedures of the Habitats Di- The failure to follow due process in assess- rective. It is also in direct contradiction to ing the impact on otters as a European the stated position of Natural England at protected species was one of the grounds the Examination, that it could not adopt a for legal challenge. The case20 was heard position on licensing a derogation without in July 2013, and the decision was pub- having seen evidence on the position and lished in early October. The usual para- nature of any resting places. At the same graphs 29 and 30 of the Morge Supreme time, NE’s position contradicts its own ini- Court decision were quoted at length, but tial position in the Morge case, which was the reasons why this was relevant to HM6L that it objected to the scheme because of are not explicitly stated. Morge was about the lack of adequate survey information disturbance of species, HM6L was about on protected species: with HM6L the re- destruction or deterioration of resting sponse to exactly the same complaint was places. World Transport Policy and Practice 103 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 There are further reasons to challenge the promoter. It is in any case hard to un- handling of this section of the judgement: derstand how NE could express a view, then or at any time, that resting places • The judge asserts that the challenge of unknown whereabouts (as far as LCC facing the ExA was that otters are a mo- were concerned) would not be damaged bile species, so it was not possible to or destroyed by the bridge. tell in advance where they would be at • The final part of para 71 is arguably a the time of the bridge’s construction. In non-sequitur: “In this case, it was open fact, the issue was about resting plac- to the defendant to conclude that it was es, which are not mobile, and the 2007 not likely that the proposed development guidance expressly states that a resting would harm otters in those ways prohib- place need not be occupied at the time of ited by the Regulations or that, even if its destruction for due process under the it, did (sic) Natural England would be Habitats Directive to be required likely to issue a licence”. This appears • It is stated that NE would “not consider to adopt the Morge approach, that if NE granting a pre-emptive shadow licensing were satisfied that breaches of Article 12 application” (ref 20 para 69), by implica- were unlikely and were in any case likely tion because of the mobility of the spe- to be licensed, then LCC, the ExA, the cies. This is not what NE said at the Ex- Secretary of State, and judges hearing amination, as reported by the ExA. NE legal challenges were entitled to reach could not consider a shadow licence ap- the same conclusion. However, NE at plication without evidence which would no point said they were satisfied: they have been available had LCC done up to needed evidence before they could begin date surveys. NE was perfectly happy to to address the issue. In any case, even issue a shadow licence for the destruc- if as para 71 claims, NE had said that a tion of bat roosts, which involved equally licence application was probably unnec- mobile species; and all shadow licens- essary, this says nothing about whether ing is subject to there being no material NE would have been likely to issue a li- changes in circumstances at the time of cence had they changed their mind on application for the actual licence. the need for licensing. • He quotes from para 30 of the Morge Supreme Court decision, that “Where, The legal challenge failed, and both written as here, Natural England express them- and oral leave to appeal were sought but selves satisfied that a proposed develop- refused. The written application21, which ment will be compliant with article 12, amplified the above case against the first the planning authority are to my mind decision, was dismissed in three lines: entitled to presume that that is so.” This is not relevant to HM6L, as NE explicitly “The judge’s reasoning concerning the said that they did not have an opinion 2010 Regulations and the others (sic) one way or the other, because they had makes complete sense to me. The arno evidence on which to base an assess- guments now advanced against it seem ment. to be unrealistic and to represent tech- • Para 71 of the decision is open to ques- nical and unmeritorious quibbling” (ref tion and comes across as internally con- 21 para 8) tradictory. It is stated that “Natural Eng- land indicated that if a survey were to find that there were resting places in the Concluding discussion vicinity of the bridge at the time work is shortly to commence then a licence ap- For me, the dismissal by a senior judge plication would probably not be required of issues of compliance with the Habitats (presumably on the basis that such rest- Directive as “technical and unmeritorious ing places would not be damaged or de- quibbling”, without even engaging with stroyed)”. It is unclear when and where the issues raised, marked the death of the NE indicated this position, but it is in con- Habitats Directive as a procedure ensuring flict with their consistently stated posi- the strict protection of species of European tion that they could give no opinion until significance. I have discussed the cases presented with evidence by the scheme of HM6L and AWPR with nature conserva- World Transport Policy and Practice 104 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 tion professionals, and the general view ment by people whose primary interests is that whilst compliance with the Direc- are not the conservation of nature. tive may or may not have resulted in the schemes being quashed as unlawful - in And yet ... the interests of sites and spe- other words, a scheme could legitimately cies of European conservation value are pass properly applied derogation tests - not served by marginalisation of the it was questionable whether due process system of strict protection by scheme had been followed in either case. promoters, for whom the scheme is also ultimately more important than the con- The decisions are based on unfounded servation of nature: nor by decision mak- assumptions that derogation from Ar- ers whether planning authorities, planning ticle 12, if needed, would be sanctioned inspectors, nature conservation bodies, or through the licensing process, which in judges, who often appear to me to adopt turn often appears remarkably lax about too wide an interpretation of strict proc- applying the actual tests for derogation. esses for strict protection. J Waksman argued perceptively that the characterisation of impacts on protect- In my experience, the Habitats Directive ed species as ‘acceptable’, or capable of is widely regarded as both idealistic and mitigation or compensation, were not ad- unrealistic in our ‘modern’ world where dressing the question asked by the dero- growth and development are everything, gation tests. Unfortunately, his judge- and quality of life is an assumed by-prod- ment was consigned to history within two uct of the economic prosperity that growth years by the Morge Supreme Court ruling, and development bring. Perhaps the Hab- and in the process the baby of proper ap- itats Directive does need an overhaul 22 plication of the tests for derogation was years after it first saw the light of day. But thrown out with the bathwater of planning equally, its core values should not be dis- authority obligations towards the Direc- regarded or eroded, and perhaps its ‘line tive. The proper application of the tests in the sand’ approach to protection of the for derogation has, albeit possibly as an most vulnerable sites and species is as unintended consequence of the Supreme necessary now as it was in 1992. Court decision, been reduced to a crude rule of thumb that if Natural England or Author details: SNH are happy with a scheme in relation Alan James is a landscape architect and to the Habitats Directive there is no cause sustainable transport consultant. Since for anyone else to be unhappy. 1996 he has appeared as an expert witness at over 20 public inquiries, mostly It is possible that the Habitats Directive on behalf of local action groups opposing has become its own worst enemy because road schemes and other developments it is so tightly defined and prescriptive. with significant transport issues. His first There is an attitude, especially among contact with the Habitats Directive was at those who espouse major infrastructure the Barnstaple western bypass inquiry in schemes as the route to economic salva- 2001, when the question of the status of tion, that schemes costing hundreds of a candidate SAC was a major issue that millions of pounds should not be thwarted went all the way to the House of Lords. by a bat roost or an otter holt, when the He acted as an expert witness for both bats and otters can easily relocate else- TSLM on the Heysham to M6 Link first in- where without harming the purposes of quiryin 2007, and for Roadsense at the species protection. There is also a view AWPR inquiry in 2008: and subsequently among conservation professionals that the appeared as an individual objector at the Annex IV lists should be reviewed 20 years second Heysham to M6 Link examination. on, as some species, including otters and On both schemes he led the evidence on the commoner bat species, are not as vul- compliance with the Habitats Directive, nerable or endangered as they once were. which fed into the High Court challenges. Finally, there is a perception that the purpose of the Habitats Directive was prima- Email: rily to protect nature, and this purpose has [email protected] been hijacked as a tool to oppose develop- World Transport Policy and Practice 105 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 References and Footnotes: 10. At the Westbury bypass inquiry, NE raised no objections on landscape impact, 1. Council Directive 92/43/EEC 21 May which is also one of their areas of statutory 1992 on the conservation of natural habi- responsibility: yet this was the main rea- tats and of wild fauna and flora son for refusal of the scheme, expressed in such crystal clear terms by the Inspec- 2. Statutory Instrument 1994 No 2716: tor that it is hard to understand how NE The Conservation (Natural Habitats, &c.) could have espoused the opposite conclu- Regulations 1994 sion other than for reasons of expediency.

3. SI 2010 No 490, The Conservation of 11. High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Habitats and Species Regulations 2010 Division, Case No CO/2820/2008

4. Managing Natura 2000 Sites: the provi- 12. High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench sions of Article 6 of the ‘Habitats Directive’ Division, Case No CO/10056/2009 92/43/EEC: European Commission 2000 13. Court of Appeal, Civil Division, Case 5. Guidance document on Article 6(4)of No C1/2009/2589 the ‘Habitats Directive’ EEC 92/43/1992: European Commission January 2007 14. Supreme Court, 2011 UKSC 2

6. Guidance document on the strict pro- 15. The majority view was that NE’s posi- tection of animal species of Community in- tion was clear, notwithstanding what was terest under the Habitats Directive 92/43/ or was not in the July letter: NE had ob- EEC: European Commission February 2007 jected because of lack of information on bats, and withdrew that objection, from 7. The 2007 guidance defines ‘deliberate’ which it was reasonable to infer that the in an interesting way (II.3.1 para 33), as grounds for objection had been resolved. proceeding in the knowledge that an action is likely to result in death/ capture/ 16. For an interesting discussion on the disturbance of a species, even if that is not effects of the Morge Supreme Court deci- the intention. sion (which does not necessarily coincide with my views), see “After Morge, where 8. It was an issue in the Westbury bypass are we now? The meaning of ‘disturbance’ inquiry (2008), which involved several of in the Habitats Directive”: Charles George the rarer species of bat and a colony of QC (who represented Mrs Morge in the dormice: but it remained untested, as the hearings) and David Graham March 2011. inquiry Inspector recommended refusal on See also note 19 below other grounds. 17. This anomaly was corrected in 2013 9. The Heysham-M6 Link Road was bi- amendments to the Planning Act, which zarrely defined as a Nationally Significant clarified that a NSIP would apply only to Infrastructure Project in 2011, which ef- highways for which the Secretary of State fectively closed off discussion on IROPI: was responsible, and not local authority in reality it is a three mile stretch of local roads unless certain exceptions were ap- authority road which was eventually con- plied. ceded to save an average of only 5 minutes journey time at peak hours, hardly 18. Heysham to M6 Junction 34 Link road, the stuff of imperative and over-riding North of Lancaster Order: Examining Au- public interest! thority’s Report of Findings and Conclu- sions and Recommendation to the Sec- retary of State for Transport: Planning Inspectorate December 2012

World Transport Policy and Practice 106 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 19. This was not pursued in the subsequent High Court challenges, on legal advice that since NE had indicated they would licence a derogation the chances of success were almost nil in the aftermath of the Morge Supreme Court decision – a clear case of the malign effect of that decision, in contrast to the position in J Waksman’s decision, that the issue of a licence by NE did not necessarily mean that the tests for derogation had been met, so a licence did not necessarily guarantee compliance with the law.

20. High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Case No CO/5073/2013

21. Court of Appeal Civil Division, Case No C1/2013/2923

World Transport Policy and Practice 107 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 Public transport network planning in as commuters. These services do receive Auckland, New Zealand modest public subsidies, but at the same Muhammad Imran and John Stone time offer significant environmental -ben efits and high level cost-recovery ratios. Introduction - elements of public The network planning approach ena- transport network planning bles ‘anywhere-to-anywhere’ travel while keeping occupancy rates high, by carrying This paper explores how efficiency and pa- different kinds of travellers on the same tronage levels can be improved in public services. Transfers are integral to a public transport provision in Auckland, New Zea- transport system that offers access to a land by employing a ‘network planning’ ap- large number of potential destinations at proach to public transport service design. an affordable cost to the operator (Nielsen Historically, in New Zealand cities, public 2005). Traditional public transport plan- transport has provided mobility for people ning has treated transfers as an inconven- without access to cars (Imran and Mat- ience to be avoided at all costs, but the thews 2011). However, public transport network planning approach makes them is increasingly called upon to contribute the building blocks of a multidestinational to environmental sustainability by reduc- system. While transfers present many new ing carbon emissions (AC 2012), and to travel opportunities, they also impose in- influence economic growth by alleviating convenience. Creating effective transfer- Auckland’s traffic congestion (MoT 2012). based public transport systems requires These objectives for public transport seem careful planning to ensure that the incon- daunting. While increasing peak hour venience is reduced to an absolute mini- services may seem an obvious technique mum (Mees et al 2010). The HiTrans best to reduce both environmentally damaging practice guide to network planning (Niel- emissions and congestion, this strategy son 2005) lists four key elements that un- may have unforeseen repercussions. For derpin the creation of high-quality, trans- instance, a focus on peak hour services fer-based networks: may detract from the quality of off peak provision, disadvantaging those reliant on 1. A simple line structure: simplicity such services including part-time workers, makes the network easier for passen- and people seeking to access educational, gers to understand, and it reduces the recreational, social, community and utili- resources that an operator must provide. tarian facilities (Mees et al. 2010). 2. Stable line and operating patterns: a network must also be stable. The idea One approach to providing for diverse is to provide a consistent, high-quality travel patterns is to provide separate serv- service across the network all day, rather ices for different markets: express buses than operating different service types in and trains for peak commuters; regular peak, off-peak, night and weekend time buses for local trips along busy corridors; periods. and para-transit for low-demand corri- 3. Convenient transfers: easy transfer- dors and times (Nielson 2005). The prob- ring requires attention to timetables and lem with this approach is that the more physical facilities. ‘Random’ transfers are public transport services become tailor- possible when all lines serving an inter- made, the more they surrender their en- change point operate frequently, gener- vironmental and economic advantages. A ally every 10 minutes or better. ‘Timed’ public transport system offering a direct transfers are needed when services are service between every origin and destina- less frequent, and the timetables for tion would have low frequencies, low occu- connecting lines must be coordinated pancies, high costs and high greenhouse (Nielsen 2005; Mees 2010). emissions per passenger. 4. Appropriate institutions and fare systems: fare systems must allow free The alternative is the ‘network planning’ transfers. The pooling of fare revenues is approach adopted by many cities in Eu- essential for this; and to allow cross sub- rope and Canada (Mees 2010). These cit- sidies. Planning on a whole-of-system ies focus on the provision of public trans- basis seems to require a single responsi- port services to local passengers as well ble regional agency. World Transport Policy and Practice 108 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 These four elements for public transport a multi- system, rather than as an avoid- services planning create ‘the network ef- able inconvenience. Thompson and Matoff fect’ (Mees 2000). Mees (2000) argues (2003, p.298) argue that ‘the multidesti- that doubling service levels in a tradi- national approach uses transfers to open tional network will lead to only a 50 per travel paths to and from non-CBD destina- cent increase in patronage levels, but if tions that are reachable in radial systems the traditional north-south network can be only by lengthy and circuitous travel. The complemented by east-west services, this intent is to induce new ridership through provides the potential for a 1000 per cent the provision of new travel opportunities increase in patronage. created by transfers in the belief that the induced non-CBD patronage will exceed A hypothetical example – ‘Squareville’ - any CBD patronage that may be lost due can be used to illustrate the efficiencies to an added transfer.’ that can be generated by the ‘network effect’ in a low-density, dispersed city (Mees Historically, the Paris Metro and the Zurich 2000). ‘Squareville’ (see Figure 1) has public transport are successful illustrations a grid-iron pattern and public transport of the network planning approach. Howev- services are designed to operate in east- er, Vancouver is an example of a city where west and north-south directions. However, the bus network has been successfully re- each passenger has to transfer to reach structured by employing the network plan- their destination. This pattern increases ning approach in last two decades (Stone elasticity of demand, patronage and rev- et al. 2012). The reduced costs of operat- enue from fares, and exemplifies the core ing the B-Line services which provide high- concept underlying network planning: er standard services – less frequent stops, maximising possible journeys whilst mini- and upgraded boarding and interchange mising operational resources by transfer- facilities, are reallocated to local routes to ring people. improve service levels. For example, the #98 B-Line commenced operation in 2001 to the district of Richmond in Vancouver’s southern suburbs. Prior to 2001, many low- frequency routes, often only operating during peak hours, and with express sections in the inner city, came to the CBD. The #98 provides a single, high frequency, full-time express service, with other bus lines forming feeders or cross suburban links that connect with it at specially designed interchange ‘sta- Figure 1: The network effect of the ‘Squareville’ (Mees 2000; tions’. With this de- Nielson 2005) sign, the trade-off for transferring is a The network approach reverses traditional dramatically increased service level on the public transport planning approaches by local line sections (Mees et al. 2010). treating transfers as the cornerstones of World Transport Policy and Practice 109 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 While no two cities, even those in the same Public transport service planning in country, are directly comparable due to Auckland different histories, topography, economic and institutional structures, Vancouver This section covers the institutions which shows notable successes can result from influence public transport service stand- the use of the network planning approach ards, CBD circulation and ticketing in to public transport. It is therefore, reason- Auckland. able to assume that this approach could offer the potential for improvements to Institutions public transport in Auckland (Stone et al. 2012). There are some basic similarities The New Zealand government’s 1989 de- between Vancouver and Auckland, such as regulation of public transport had its great- low population densities (17.1 and 18.9 est impact in the Auckland region, allowing persons per hectare respectively), rela- several private bus companies to operate tively weak CBDs (12.6 and 13.6 percent services that directly compete with each of total jobs), the necessity of making wa- other, and with the rail services. ter crossings to access other parts of the city, and high car ownership and mode Rail services and some bus services are share for work trips (74.4 and 87.4 per- planned and subsidised by AT and are de- cent) (Mees et al. 2010). However, Van- livered by private contractors. Outside this couver outperforms Auckland in terms of framework, many bus routes are delivered work trips made by public transport (16.5 as ‘commercial’ services, for which op- to 7 percent), and by an even greater erators receive fare revenues and a pay- margin when considering per capita for ment from AT to offset concession fares. all trips (135 to 40 boardings per capita) The MAXX brand is used as a coordinat- are analysed. Accordingly, Auckland is re- ing mechanism but many services operate nowned for its congestion and the worst outside of this, using the liveries of the pri- levels of public transport provision in the vate operators (Mees et al 2010). developed world (Bachels et al. 1999). Service standards A number of agencies at various levels of government are responsible for transport Whilst the Northern Busway (the first BRT planning in Auckland (Imran and Matthews in Auckland) represents an improvement 2011). At the local or metropolitan level, in service standards, public transport in Auckland Council was created in 2010 and Auckland does not have a clearly defined its subsidiary Auckland Transport (AT) is network structure. The train system pro- responsible for planning and formulating vides the skeleton trunk service in the transport strategies. The data collected for southern and western corridors that, even this study comes from both desk-top re- with current diesel operations (electrifi- search, and a consultative workshop. The cation is underway), offers competitive desk-top data analysis included timetables travel times when compared with buses and fare structures available on websites. which offer direct competition. Services It was not possible to access commercially are chiefly oriented towards city-bound sensitive information such as patronage commuter markets, with low frequencies data for individual public transport lines, during off-peak periods and in counter- which would have enabled a more in-depth peak travel directions. Bus services are analysis. A consultative workshop was generally designed to avoid transfers: a conducted on 11 February 2009 as a part multiplicity of indirect lines are used to link of NZTA funded project which was attend- likely origins and destinations. At some lo- ed by central, regional and local transport cations, timetables refer to transfers and planners. The workshop helped in gaining interchanges but connections with trains an in-depth understanding of public trans- are seldom well designed or encouraged port issues in Auckland. The next section (Mees et al 2010). The Northern Busway summarises the public transport operating offers a trunk service to the northern sub- practices found in Auckland. urbs with relatively high daytime frequencies. The design of interchanges at busway stops is conducive to easy transfers and the World Transport Policy and Practice 110 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 routes of some local bus lines have been Discussion and Conclusions altered to take advantage of the improved travel times. However, other bus lines still It is clear from the analysis in the last sec- run in competition, taking passengers all tion that considerable potential exists to the way to the CBD, but at slower speeds improve public transport in Auckland. This (Matthews and Imran 2013). section discusses how the embracing of a public transport network-planning ap- The concentration of many bus lines in the proach can present opportunities for im- Auckland CBD is a major source of delays, provements in public transport provision as buses compete for street space with in Auckland. private cars and have little effective signal priority. The problems caused by this Institutions congestion for efficient operations, and for public understanding of the system, are Auckland Transport – a metropolitan trans- well-understood by local planners. How- port agency - coordinates public transport ever, current institutional arrangements services in the region. AT, like its prede- limit the potential for the introduction of cessor ARTA, is structured in such a way, measures, such as the use of ‘pendulum’ and has staff with the requisite skills, to lines (routes that start at one suburban facilitate the implementation of a network- terminus and ran through the CBD to an- planning approach. Such an approach other suburban terminus) and suburban would require the development of a new transfers that could alleviate these prob- relationship between AT and private op-

Figure 2: Confusing for users and inefficient for operators: buses queuing in the Auckland CBD (Photo taken by Muhammad Imran) lems (Mees et al. 2010). erators, in which fare-box revenues would be retained by the tendering authority, to In Auckland, a zonal-based fare system is fund the delivery of the planned network used for travel on public transport. Under (Mees et al. 2010). This relationship would this system, passengers pay higher fares be possible under existing or reformulated for longer travel distances. One set of tick- procurement legislation (Gibson 2010). ets is issued for train travel, and there are nine separate sets of bus fare ‘products’ Recent upgrades to Auckland’s rail system associated with the various private opera- provide a platform off which community tors. Free transfers between services are consultation processes could be built to generally limited to those run by a single generate support for reorganisation of ex- operator. However, the Northern Busway isting public transport services into a func- fares are designed with transfer in mind. tional network. Public consultation could Despite this transferrable fare being in be based upon the passenger transport place, the suburban bus network is not advisory committee model. designed as a feeder service and is rarely used for transfer. Recently the Auckland For the network planning approach, it Council simplified the system by introduc- would be essential to create a fully inte- ing a smart card (the HOP card), although grated fare system. The Auckland HOP it is still not useable on all bus services; as Card is a good initiative, but its value is a result the fare system remains complex diminished by the financial penalty - im (Matthews and Imran 2013). posed on passengers who make transfers between lines and modes; this penalty World Transport Policy and Practice 111 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 needs to be removed (Matthews and Im- The focus of the Auckland Plan and Unitary ran 2013). Plan on medium density compact development, mixed land-use, urban design for Service standards pedestrians, and restraints on car access Previous sections show that Auckland has to the CBD provide a supportive frame- adopted a ‘tailor-made’ approach to public work against which to implement the net- transport service planning. This approach work planning approach to public trans- includes service variations depending on port service planning (AC 2012; AC 2013). the time of day and user, including an ex- In conclusion, Auckland public transport press bus services for commuters in peak service planning lacks a network plan- directions and separate services for com- ning approach to improve patronage in munity and late night trips. Moreover, bus the short term. However, AT has the skills services often run in competition with the and structures in place necessary to de- train services. velop networked public transport services in the Auckland metropolitan area. The This approach could be replaced with the planning and implementation of a network network planning approach which would planning approach would require: a new increase both the efficiency of vehicle de- relationship between AT and the private ployment and rates of boarding per serv- operators; a new public processes to build ice-km (Mees et al. 2010). Land-use plan- political and community support; an inte- ning decisions suggested by the Auckland grated HOP card to provide a mechanism Plan and the Unitary Plan (AC 2012; AC for cross-subsidies for lower-patronage 2013) would largely dictate the location of but important network services; and new key suburban public transport interchang- transfer points or interchanges to be iden- es. Once decisions are made about the tified during the land-use planning- proc network structure, the operational details ess suggested by the Auckland Plan and should be designed on the network prin- Unitary Plan. ciples of simplicity and directness, speed and reliability, and frequency. Author details: Muhammad Imran In Auckland bus lines serving the major Resource and Environmental Planning pro- travel corridors show considerable dupli- gramme, cation, including those serving the CBD; School of People, these services are often also competing Environment and Planning, with rail services. Both the 2003 opening Massey University, of the Britomart terminal, and the City Rail Palmerston North, Link (CRL) project, advanced rapid rail so- New Zealand lutions, thereby, providing a suitable platform from which to build public support for Email: the development of the network planning [email protected] approach. This approach would overcome rail-bus competition and assist in develop- John Stone ing on-road priority for public transport. Faculty of Architecture, Building and Plan- Moreover, adjusting city wide timetables ning, would help to transfer passengers from the University of Melbourne, one mode or line to other modes or lines, Australia ultimately increasing patronage (Mees et al. 2010). Email: [email protected] Vancouver’s experience shows that political and community support is necessary to develop the network planning approach (Stone et al. 2012). It is therefore necessary for AT to actively engage with communities and local politicians on public transport service alterations.

World Transport Policy and Practice 112 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 References: Stone, J., Mees, P., & Imran, M. (2012). Benchmarking the efficiency and effective- Auckland Council (2012). Auckland Plan, ness of public transport in New Zealand available at www.aucklandcouncil.govt.nz cities. Urban Policy and Research, 30(2), accessed on 20 September 2013. pp. 207-224.

Auckland Council (2013). Auckland Uni- Thompson, G., & Matoff, T. (2003). Keep- tary Plan, available at www.aucklandcoun- ing up with the Joneses: Radial vs. multi- cil.govt.nz accessed on 22 January 2014. destinational transit in decentralising regions. Journal of the American Planning Bachels, M., Newman, P., & Kenworthy, J. Association, 69(3), 296-312. (1999). Indicators of urban transport efficiency in New Zealand’s main cities. Perth: Murdoch University.

Gibson, R. (2010). New Zealand public transport procurement strategies in a new legislative environment. Research in Transportation Economics, 29, 159-163.

Imran, M., and Matthews, L. (2011). Dis- cursive path dependence: keeping the supremacy of road-based urban transport planning in Auckland. Road & Transport Research. 20(1), 41-57

Matthews, L and Imran. M. (2013). Im- proving public transport in Auckland, New Zealand. Paper published in the selected proceedings of 13th World Conference on Transportation Research, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

Mees, P (2000) A very public solution: transport in the dispersed city. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Mees, P. (2010). Transport for suburbia: Beyond the automobile age. London, Ster- ling: Earthscan.

Mees, P, J Stone, M Imran and G Nielsen (2010) Public transport network planning: a guide to best practice in NZ cities. NZ Transport Agency research report 396. 72pp.

Ministry of Transport (MoT) (2012) Gov- ernment Policy Statement (GPS) on land transport funding 2012-2021. Wellington.

Nielson, G. (2005). HiTrans best practice guide 2: Public transport - planning the networks. Stavanger: European Union, In- terreg.

World Transport Policy and Practice 113 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 The Insanity of Normality: massive global effort to export the same Reconceptualising the Road Safety flawed system design to China and India Debate and other parts of the world where mil- Gary Haq, John Whitelegg lions of avoidable deaths, serious injuries and life-time disabilities are accepted as 1 Introduction an undesirable but inevitable part of modern life. In its recent review of pedestrian safety the World Health Organisation (WHO, The perpetuation of a system of mobility 2013) estimated that globally “more than and its detailed design elements alongside 270,000” pedestrians lose their lives on the enormity of the death and injury con- the world’s roads each year. This is 22% sequences of this system can be explained of all road deaths and in some countries by the phenomenon described as “The in- the proportion is as high as two thirds. sanity of normality” by the Swiss-based Millions more are injured but accurate psychoanalyst Arno Gruen (Gruen, 1992). statistics on this total are not available. This paper explores the insights provided The WHO report emphasises that this toll by Arno Gruen and attempts to put into should not be accepted as inevitable “be- practice his insights through a reconceptu- cause they are, in fact, predictable and alisation of the road safety discourse. This preventable. This combination of very sig- discourse has traditionally been dominat- nificant impacts (death, injury, grief, dis- ed by mechanistic and economistic views ability, loss of income, poverty) combined of the road, the driver and the “accident” with the stark reality that it is well within victim with a clear avoidance of the impor- our grasp to eliminate death and seri- tance of ethics, morality, humanity and the ous injury in the road traffic environment need to re-design systems that punish the points to a serious level of irrationality and poor, the weak and those without power. disfunctionality in the discourse and policy This reconceptualisation has already com- environment within which road safety sits. menced in the Swedish Vision Zero road The disfunctionality is so serious that it ex- safety policy (Whitelegg and Haq, 2006) actly matches what the Swiss psychother- but this does not carry a sufficiently strong apist, Arno Gruen, has called “The insan- determination to confront the insanity of ity of normality” (Gruen, 1992). It is the normality and address all those societal objective of this paper to explore the road forces that ensure the perpetuation of car- safety discourse, interrogate the “insanity” dominated mobility, large scale public sub- perspective to see if it can help us to radi- sidy of this domination and the prioritisa- cally re-engineer the total road safety dis- tion given to speed and saving time. course and use the Swedish “Vision Zero” road safety policy as an example of what In what follows we will seek to define the can be done to shift global society towards dimensions of the global road safety prob- a zero death and zero serious injury future lem and its impact on those who become in the road traffic environment. the unwilling victims of system design. We will test this reality against Arno Gruen’s Thirty years ago Whitelegg (1983) argued “insanity of normality” thesis and then that there is a significant policy deficit in define a new reality informed by these approaches to road safety. This deficit is insights where road safety problems are still evident. The persistence of death eliminated by fundamental re-design of and injury in the road traffic environment the mobility landscape. Our redefinition is a major global problem with 1.2 mil- of the mobility landscape will be based on lion deaths and 50 million injuries each original empirical research conducted in year on a global scale (WHO, 2004). Road a UK Department for Transport research safety policy is still very reluctant indeed project reported in Whitelegg and Haq to address fundamental structural solu- (2006). In this project over 300 citizens tions to the problem of “road traffic -ac took part in detailed focus group work cidents” and the basic changes to system and produced a citizen led “Vision Zero” design that these solutions would involve. of road safety that is at odds with expert The last three decades have seen no such opinion. We conclude with remarks about change in system design and have seen a the barriers to progress represented by World Transport Policy and Practice 114 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 the conflicting world views of citizens and “Every day thousands of people are experts and assess the likelihood of an killed and injured on our roads. Men, ethical, human-centred approach replac- women or children walking, biking or ing a model based on speed, saving time riding to school or work, playing in and the instant gratification of wants. the streets or setting out on long trips will never return home, leaving behind 2 Murder most foul shattered families and communities. Millions of people each year will spend Dean (1947) wrote a powerful treatise on long weeks in hospital after severe the unacceptability of 181,438 deaths and crashes and many will never be able 4.7 million injuries on Britain’s roads in the to live, work or play as they used to. period 1909-1945. In commenting on this Current efforts to address road safety huge death toll and revealing his feelings are minimal in comparison to growing about its moral unacceptability in his title human suffering.” “Murder most foul” he expresses hope for the future: In a strong echo of John Dean the WHO concludes: “The reconstruction of Britain will indeed be a dismal failure if it includes “The time to act is now. Road safety as a permanent feature of the national is no accident. It requires strong po- life the killing and maiming of a quar- litical will and concerted, sustained ef- ter of a million, or more, persons every forts across a range of sectors. Acting year on the roads, with the wholesale now will save lives. We urge govern- lying and hypocrisy by means of which ments as well as other sectors of soci- the slaughter is concealed or justified. ety to embrace and implement the key But there is no reason for failure. As in recommendations of this report” WHO every other direction, the opportunity (2004). is ready at hand. All that is needed is the will to act.” (page 111) Clearly a body count cannot convey the enormity of the impact of death, injury and Dean’s hopes for the future were not ful- distress on parents, families and friends. filled. The very high annual death toll in A more discursive, ethnographic and nar- Britain at the time he wrote his treatise rative assessment is needed to capture e.g. 7343 in 1934 has reduced to 1754 in the full extent of impacts on people and 2012 (DfT, 2013) but this apparent im- relationships. We need to find a way to provement in level of safety is rarely eval- give a much stronger voice to the victims uated against the observable background in shaping road safety policy if we are to of wholesale reductions in those exposed build a way out of the accepted param- to risk. Nor is it adequately evaluated eters of the road safety debate and chart within a context that can embrace human a course towards a “Vision Zero”. We turn impact, distress and the overwhelming to this in our discussion of focus group re- feeling (see discussion below) that it is sults below. unnecessary and can be avoided. The degree to which children are eliminated from Notwithstanding this strong caveat on the the road traffic environment because of poverty of numbers WHO (2004) uses the fear of traffic and awareness of danger them to good effect: reduces the population at risk and points • Worldwide an estimated 1.2 million to a different conclusion about the efficacy people are killed in road crashes every of road safety improvements (Hillman, Ad- year and approximately 50 million are ams and Whitelegg, 1990). injured. • This annual total approximates to Attention has now shifted to the global di- 3000 deaths every day. mension in a way that could not have been • These figures will increase by 65% foreseen by John Dean in 1947. The World over the next 20 years unless there is “a Health Organization (WHO, 2004) has cor- new commitment to prevention”. rectly identified the scale and human na- • Road traffic deaths will increase in ture of the problem in its “World Report”: the period 1990-2020 form 0.99 million World Transport Policy and Practice 115 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 to 2.34 million. It is, moreover, reasonable to conclude • Low income and middle income that if several thousand people were going countries account for 85% of the deaths to work everyday in a large office complex and 90% of the annual disability-adjust- and during a normal, routine working day ed life years (DALYs) lost because of road a percentage of them would be killed and traffic injury. we avoided fundamental interventions to • Without appropriate action by eliminate this daily reduction in the work- 2020, road traffic injuries are predicted force then this would be “madness” and to be the third leading contributor to the could be described as “insanity”. Interest- global burden of disease and injury. ingly normality in the office domain is in • A large proportion of the road crash tune with zero deaths. We do not expect or victims in low and middle income coun- accept deaths as in any way the norm or tries are vulnerable road users such as in any way unavoidable. We have “Vision pedestrians and cyclists. Zero” in our offices. In the main people are • In the period 1975-1998 road traf- not killed at work because we make sure fic fatality rates rose by 44% in Malaysia we do not have defective elevators, live and by 243% in China. electrical connections on computers and buildings that give way under the weight The WHO (2004) report concludes by say- of files. Clearly the road traffic environ- ing that “Road traffic crashes are predict- ment is different. We do not adopt the able and therefore preventable.” approach we use in offices to road safety and this meet Gruen’s definition of “insan- 3 The insanity of normality ity”. Holzapfel (1995) has drawn attention to the same theme in his analysis of “Vio- Gruen (1992) describes a number of per- lence and the car”: sonal and societal circumstances where events and socially accepted norms which “The term violence should be used are clearly very suspect, highly undesira- carefully. Many people drive their cars ble and in other ways abhorrent are widely intending no harm. But automobile accepted and taken as the norm. Individu- driving, in its existing form, is anything als cannot see the contradictions and at but a rational phenomenon from A to the societal level conformity with gener- B: cars designed for speeds at which ally accepted views is the norm and op- they hardly ever travel, European cit- position or dissent is the exception. Gruen ies ripe for good pedestrian develop- advances the thesis that in many places ment relinquishing their urban charms and times what passes for “normality” is to chunks of mental – the hallmarks clearly a manifestation of what could be of the car-centred society are all too taken as “insanity”. He does not address conspicuous, and it uses by no means road safety issues specifically but the compensate for them. The negative in- widespread acceptance of death and influences of the car-centred society are jury in all countries currently running at enormous. Indeed car technology re- 3000 per day fits his thesis perfectly. The sembles no other, not even the tech- acceptance of death and injury on a large nology of war, in the destructive influ- scale when it can be avoided and when so- ences it has so far inflicted.” cial-technology systems are making things worse (high powered cars, legal devices And he concludes: that permit motorists to avoid detection when speeding) clearly matches the use “Everything points to an increase in of the term “insanity”. Greater force can violence brought about by the car. be given to Gruen’s examination of this Indeed there are clear signs of a self subject by the clear statement from the perpetuating process operating, which World Health Organization that “Road traf- fuels itself. Even quite against their fic crashes are predictable and prevent- will, people are affected by this proc- able”. Why should we not move quickly to ess and drawn into it. The only way out prevent the slaughter of 3000 people each of this situation is first, a simple ad- day if the manner of death is “predictable mission of the situation and the mis- and preventable”? ery it is spreading. Admittedly it goes World Transport Policy and Practice 116 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 against the grain: a gleaming car in an 4. Expert and citizen views of Vision advertisement is a far more attractive Zero proposition than facing the hospitals where brain-damaged children from Whitelegg and Haq (2006) carried out a traffic accidents try to make sense of research project for the UK Department the world. By recognizing misery such for Transport which had five main objec- as this, a process must emerge where- tives: by people can be empowered to make 1. To explore and explain the Swedish the ultimate sacrifice and to live with Vision Zero road safety policy fewer cars.” 2. To carry out focus groups in Eng- land on the concept of Vision Zero and Self-injury and self-destructiveness have the degree of support for it voiced by always been regarded as a malfunction of citizens individual, group or societal pathology but 3. To carry out an on-line question- both Gruen (1992) and Holzapfel (1995) naire survey of professional working in identify destructiveness within a general transport and road safety to ascertain paradigm of rationality as requiring special expert opinion on Vision Zero effort to understand and overcome. 4. To summarise the advantages and disadvantages of a Vision Zero approach Gruen identifies the absence of human translated to the UK values and the exercise of power by those 5. To specify the policy changes that who have severed themselves from hu- would have to be made in the UK to man roots as key issues to be resolved: adopt the full force of Vision Zero.

“Whereas people who can no longer 4.1 The Swedish approach to road bear the absence of human values in safety the real world are considered “crazy”, those who have severed themselves The responsibility for road safety has tra- from their human roots are certified ditionally been placed on the individual “normal”. And it is members of the lat- road user rather than on the designers ter group to whom we entrust power of the system. Road safety has tended and whom we allow to determine our to focus on encouraging good behaviour lives and our future. We believe that by road users via licensing, testing, edu- they have the correct key to reality and cation, training and publicity. Sweden is know how best to deal with it. But a among those countries with the lowest person’s relatedness to reality is not number of traffic fatalities in relation to its the only criterion for establishing men- population. However, in spite of this ex- tal illness or health; we also have to cellent record, in 1997 the Swedish Par- ask to what degree feelings such as liament introduced a new approach to despair, perceptions such as empathy road safety called “Vision Zero”. Vision and experiences such as enthusiasm Zero is based on a refusal to accept hu- are still possible” Gruen (1992). man deaths or lifelong suffering as a result of road traffic accidents (Elvik, 1999 and In the next section of this paper we will Elvik and Amundsen, 2000). It requires explore the entirely different worlds of moving the emphasis away from reducing those who exercise power (the experts) the number of accidents to eliminating the and those who simply live in a community, risk of chronic health impairment caused observe daily reality and relate this reality by road accidents. Vision Zero in Sweden to human values (the citizen). This pro- requires fatalities and serious injuries to vides considerable amplification of Gruen’s be reduced to zero by 2020. explanation. Vision Zero has had a mixed reception in the academic and professional literature and is by no means immune from criticism (Elvik, 1999 and Elvik, 2008, Elvebakk and Steiro, 2009). The policy has stimulated fundamental thinking around the nature World Transport Policy and Practice 117 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 of policy itself including whether or not it against mobility. At the core of the Vision is” rational” (Rosencrantz, Edvardsson, Zero is the biomechanical tolerance of hu- K and Hansson, S O, 2007) and including man beings. Vision Zero promotes a road explicit discussions of the role of ethics in system where crash energy cannot exceed road safety policy (Hokstad, P and Vatn, J, human tolerance. While it is accepted that 2008) and including a useful discussion of crashes in the transport system occur due “backward and forward responsibility” in to human error, Vision Zero requires no Fahlquist (2006) crash should be more severe than the tolerance of humans. The blame for fatali- The 1990 Swedish National Traffic Safety ties in the road system is assigned to the Programme set a target of less than 600 failure of the road system rather that the fatalities for traffic safety by 2000. In road user (Wadhwa, 2001). 1993, the Road Safety Office merged and became the Swedish National Road Ad- Vision Zero is based on the ethical impera- ministration (SNRA). In 1994 the SNRA, tive that (Tingvall and Haworth, 1999): now responsible for national traffic safety work, presented a National Traffic Safety “It can never be ethically acceptable Programme for the period 1995–2000. A that people are killed or seriously in- new target of 400 fatalities for the year jured when moving within the road 2000 was adopted. This original target system.” was achieved in 1994. The intentions of the National Traffic Safety Programme, Accidents have to be prevented from lead- with ten sub-targets for traffic behaviour, ing to fatalities and serious injuries by de- were not reached but abandoned with the signing roads, vehicles and transport serv- discussion of the Vision Zero concept. An ices in a way that someone can tolerate interim target of reducing the number of the violence of an accident without being road accident fatalities from 600 in 2000 killed or seriously injured. Common long- to 270 in 2007 was adopted as a move term disabling injuries and non-injury ac- towards the Vision Zero target. The annu- cidents are outside the scope of the Vision. al number of fatalities has been constant Vision Zero is estimated to achieve a pos- during the period 1994 to 2001. In 2000, sible reduction in the number of fatalities there were 591 deaths and 4,103 serious by a quarter to one third over a ten-year injuries in traffic in Sweden (Koornstra et period (SNRA, 2003). al., 2002). In the period 2001-2010 the number of fatalities in the road traffic en- Vision Zero strategic principles are: vironment in Sweden was reduced from • The traffic system has to adapt to 591 to 266, a decline of 54.4% (Europa take better account of the needs, mis- Commission, 2012). Sweden was the top- takes and vulnerabilities of road users. ranked country in the EU on three meas- • The level of violence that the hu- ures (fatalities per million inhabitants, fa- man body can tolerate without being talities per 10 billion passenger kms and killed or seriously injured forms the ba- fatalities per million passenger cars). sic parameter in the design of the road transport system. Whilst it is not possible to attribute this • Vehicle speed is the most impor- success in reducing fatalities directly to tant regulating factor for safe road traf- Vision Zero it is of more than passing in- fic. It should be determined by the tech- terest that the “top performer” in the EU nical standard of both roads and vehicle is the country with an explicit vision zero so as not to exceed the level of violence road safety policy. that the human body can tolerate. The approach is: Vision Zero requires a paradigm shift in • To create a road environment that addressing the issue of road safety (Re- minimises the risk of road users making chnitzer and Grzebieta, 1999). It requires mistakes and that prevents serious hu- abandoning the traditional economic mod- man injury when designing, operating el where road safety is provided at rea- and maintaining the state road network. sonable cost and the traditional transport • To set an example in the SNRA’s model in which safety must be balanced own operations through the quality as- World Transport Policy and Practice 118 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 surance (from a road safety perspective) etc.) of journeys and transports in all areas of 2. Safer traffic in built-up areas (e.g. activity, both those undertaken in-house a safety analysis of street networks in and those contracted. 102 municipalities led to reconstruction • To analyse accidents that have re- of streets; the efforts are continuing.) sulted in death or serious injury in traf- 3. Emphasis on the responsibilities of fic and, where feasible, initiate suitable road users (e.g. creating more respect measures so as to avoid the repetition of for traffic rules in particular with regard such accidents. to speed limits, seat belt use, and intoxi- • To stimulate all players within the cated driving.) road transport system to work resolutely 4. Safe bicycle traffic (e.g. campaign towards achieving mutually targeted ob- for using bicycle helmets, a voluntary bi- jectives conduct the work on road safe- cycle safety standard.) ty in close co-operation with all players 5. Quality assurance in transport work within the road transport system. (e.g. public agencies with large trans- • To take advantage of and further portation needs will receive traffic safety develop the commitment of the general (and environmental impact) instructions public to safer traffic. on how to assure the quality of their own transportation services and those pro- Vision Zero emphasizes what the optimum cured from outside firms.) state of the road should be rather than pos- 6. Winter tyre requirement (e.g. a sible ways of reducing current problems. new law mandating specific tyres under The main change instigated by Vision Zero winter road conditions.) is a new way of dividing responsibilities for 7. Making better use of Swedish tech- road safety. Rather than emphasising the nology (e.g. promoting the introduction responsibility of the road user alone, Vi- of technology - available or to be devel- sion Zero explicitly states that responsibil- oped - that relatively soon can be ap- ity is shared both by the system designers plied, such as seat belt reminders, in-car and the road user: speed adaptation systems (ISA), alcohol 1. The designers of the system are ignition interlocks for preventing drink- always ultimately responsible for the ing and driving, and electronic driver li- design, operation and use of the road cences.) transport system and thereby responsi- 8. Responsibilities of road transport ble for the level of safety within the en- system designers (e.g. establishment tire system. of an independent organisation for road 2. Road users are responsible for fol- traffic inspection is proposed by a com- lowing the rules for using the road trans- mission of inquiry on the responsibilities port system set by the system design- of the public sector and the business ers. community for safe road traffic.) 3. If road users fail to obey these rules 9. Public responses to traffic viola- due to lack of knowledge, acceptance or tions (e.g. a commission of inquiry is re- ability, or if injuries occur, the system viewing existing traffic violation rules in designers are required to take necessary the light of the Vision Zero principles and further steps to counteract people being of ensuring due process of law.) killed or seriously injured. 10. The role of voluntary organisations (e.g. the government is evaluating the In 1999, a short-term action plan was road safety work of the ‘Nationalföre- launched by the Swedish government, ningen för trafiksäkerhetens främjande’ containing 11 points aimed at strength- (National Society for Road Safety (NTF)) ening and stimulating traffic safety work and its use of state funds.) in accordance with Vision Zero principles 11. Alternative forms of financing new (Ministry of Industry, Employment and roads (e.g. possibilities are studied for Communications, 1999): other forms of supplementing public fi- 1. A focus on the most dangerous nancing of major road projects.) roads (e.g. priority for installing centre- guardrails for eliminating head-on colli- In the autumn of 2001 the Government sions, removing obstacles next to roads, presented an infrastructure plan, where World Transport Policy and Practice 119 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 the traffic safety work will fulfill the 2007 resides with the European Union; target. • The existence of social dilemmas, that is situations in which measures that 4.2 Implications of Vision Zero for are cost-effective from a societal point of road fatalities view are loss making from the point of view of individual road users; Proponents of Vision Zero see human life • Priority given to other policy objec- as a basic human right to be protected tives, which cannot be adequately as- from fatal injuries. While humans are fal- sessed by CBA, primarily objectives re- lible and make mistakes in using the road lated to regional development. system, these mistakes should not carry the death penalty (Elvik, 1999). The ethi- Elivk (2003) concludes that the amount of cal principle on which Vision Zero is based resources that are currently spent on road is that death is unacceptable means that safety policy in Sweden are sufficient to there is a moral obligation to design cars, cover all cost-effective road safety meas- roads and the rules of the road to pro- ures, provided the use of inefficient meas- tect road users from being killed in traf- ures ceases. fic. Vision Zero explicitly rejects the trade of human life against other objectives. It Elvik (1999, 2003) is rather sceptical also rejects the use of cost-benefit analy- about Vision Zero and presents an eco- sis (CBA) to guide priority setting in road nomic argument against the concept. safety policy. Tingvall (1997:56) states: Other authors e.g. Rosencrantz, Edvards- son and Hansson (2007) conclude that the “If a new road, new car design, new policy has strengthened Sweden’s efforts rule etc. is judged as having the poten- to eliminate death and serious injuries in tial to save human life, then the oppor- road crashes, a view supported by Nihlen tunity must always be taken, provided Fahlquist (2006) who argues that adopting that no other more cost-effective ac- Vision Zero as a national transport policy tion would produce the same benefit.” goal has signified an important shift of responsibility from individual road users to Although Sweden has a comparatively system designers. good road safety record, Swedish policies are still considered to be ineffective in 4.3 UK focus groups improving road safety. Elvik and Amund- sen (2000) indicate that current policy Twenty-nine focus groups were held priorities are inefficient in Sweden and throughout England and a total of 232 concluded that road safety could be sub- people participated in the focus groups. stantially improved if policy priorities were On average eight people attended each based more on CBA then they are today. focus group. Participants were recruited They argue that cost-effective road safety from the local community e.g. via existing measures can prevent more than 50 per citizens panels, advertising in local com- cent of road fatalities in Sweden. Howev- munity newsletters and at the local library. er, current policies prevent approximate- The participants covered a wide range of ly 10–15 per cent of the current number ages from 19–88 years old. Attempts were of road fatalities over the next 10 years. made to achieve an equal gender balance Many cost effective measures are not be- for each focus group; however, this was ing implemented. By rejecting the use of not always possible. Of the 232 focus CBA to set priorities, Elvik (2003) argues group participants 51 per cent were men that advocates of Vision Zero are in effect and 49 per were women. rejecting a road safety policy that would give far better results than current road Each focus group lasted for approximately safety policies. 60 minutes. In the first part of the meeting, participants were given a short pres- The main sources of inefficiency in current entation on the level of road traffic fatali- road safety in Sweden are (Elvik, 2003): ties and injuries in the UK and the Swedish • Lack of power to introduce new ve- approach on Vision Zero. After the presen- hicle safety standards – this power now tation, participants were asked a number World Transport Policy and Practice 120 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 of questions including: it would be “difficult”, if not “impossible” 1. What do you think about Vision to change the mindset in the country. The Zero? biggest stumbling block would be chang- 2. What is an acceptable level of death ing people’s attitudes. from car crashes in the UK? “You’ve got to be realistic otherwise The aim of the questions was to test opin- people would not take the policy seri- ion on the current UK policy and as well ously.” as Swedish Vision Zero policy. Additional “People in Britain do not easily accept information on the Swedish approach to Utopian ideas. Not sure about it being road safety was made available during the a government policy” meeting on the request of the participants. “It’s a good idea to have a [zero] policy The following is an analysis of the main is- but it’s like everything, if you’ve got sues, arguments and concerns raised dur- something where there’s no way of ing the focus groups. Particular issues were achieving it, somehow it has a nega- repeatedly raised at each focus group. tive effect.”

1. What do you think about Vision Zero? Some participants felt that “accidents will always happen” due to the existence of All focus groups gave a positive response human error and there is a level of “risk” to the notion of a Vision Zero policy. Par- associated with travelling that needs to be ticipants felt it was “essential” to reduce accepted. road traffic deaths and injuries and that Vision Zero was an “admirable” policy and “Yes, it would be nice to have zero but that it made a “good political statement” unless we make cars out of cotton wool which was “inspiring”. It was an objective it will never happen. There’s an inher- that society could aspire towards achiev- ent risk.” ing – “aim for the sky and hit the pinnacle “People in Britain do not feel responsi- of the church steeple”. Comparisons were ble for road safety as a whole” made with zero tolerance policies and the taboo now associated with drink driving. The difficulties of implementing current “I think it’s very commendable. We road safety policies as well as a vision zero have zero tolerance of crime. Why not policy were an area of concern. It was felt zero tolerance in road safety as well?” that ineffective or incompetent implemen- “I think having a Vision Zero policy is a tation of existing policies would affect the laudable aim. You need a goal.” implementation of a future vision zero pol- “I’d second that. I think it’s an ex- icy. tremely good goal.” “A Zero Policy says that it is actually “We’re lackadaisical about enforce- […] unacceptable that people die this ment” way and we all kind of take it for granted that people will die and that’s just Participants felt that sentences for road the cost of having a transport system”. traffic deaths and injuries should reflect “We need a system where the road the seriousness of the offence. It was felt network accommodates the mistakes that the police should enforce the Highway that people make.” Code. “I think there is a need to set a target.” “Rather like striving for perfection isn’t “The average driver’s attitude to road it? “ safety is horrible. As illustrated by speed cameras – it’s a joke. We slow However, while Vision Zero was a good down and pass the camera and off we ideal the following concerns were raised. go again.” “It is a challenge between the road en- Achievability in practice forcers, the system and the individual driver.” A zero target was seen as being “idealis- “The car is a lethal weapon.” tic”, “unrealistic”, “unattainable” and that World Transport Policy and Practice 121 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 2. What is an acceptable level of death deaths will always happen” from car crashes in the UK? “At the moment we accept nine a day being acceptable because we have not The majority of the participants felt that done enough to stop it.” the ‘zero’ was the only acceptable level of “The reality is that we just play at it … deaths from car crashes in the UK: we still don’t mind nine people a day being killed” “It is ethically wrong to say a certain number will die on the roads” Some participants felt that road improve- “There is nothing that is acceptable ments only happened after several acci- about death”. dents had occurred despite warnings from “You can’t say any death is acceptable local residents. They had “no faith in traf- at all” fic engineers” and that we “must spend as “One death is too many – I can’t see much as possible to reduce the risk”. anybody arguing with that. If it’s my child …” Some of the focus group participants ob- “No level of death is acceptable espe- jected to the question being asked: cially if you bring it down to your own family. Would you accept the death in “It’s a question that shouldn’t be asked” your family?” “… in principle you have to say of course that no deaths are acceptable. However, participants were also aware of One death is unacceptable. But we the difficulties achieving a zero target due know that‘s not real, that is an unreal to the inherent risk associated with road question”. transport: “I think it’s an abuse of language. I don’t think there is an acceptable level. “Doesn’t matter what you do there is al- It’s the wrong question”. ways a risk associated with it. Whether “The wrong question is being asked. All you are walking the street or going on that can be said is risks must be mini- holiday on a plane. There is a risk that mized”. is attributable to that transport and no matter what; you will always have a Over 90% of those taking part in the focus risk attributed to driving.” groups expressed varying degrees of sup- “If it’s not acceptable ban all cars com- port for the Vision Zero concept and in do- pletely” ing so often used language that is current “We are becoming such a nanny state in Sweden and Norway when this policy is no-one will venture from the womb be- discussed. Participants were of the view fore long”. that one death in a road crash is one too “There will always be accidents on the many, that this is an ethical issue and we roads so a target of zero is unattain- should commit to zero fatalities and seri- able” ous injuries and that we have to do whatever it takes to get down to that level. The Some participants attempted to define citizen viewpoint could not be clearer. an acceptable level of road fatalities and commented on the current levels: 4.4 UK Stakeholder on-line questionnaire “10%, 20%, 40% - these are improvements but they are not acceptable” The aim of the on-line questionnaire sur- “Present levels are tolerable but not vey was to gain the views of a range of UK acceptable” stakeholders on Vision Zero. Approximate- “As low as possible” ly 55 stakeholders were contacted and re- “As low as reasonably practical (ALARP) quested to complete an on-line question- is what should be the going principle in naire survey. The stakeholders included that any death or serious injury is un- central government, members of parlia- acceptable”. ment, local government associations, mo- “It is definitely a good idea to strive for toring organisations, health organisations, as low a number as possible, but road non-governmental organisations, the po- World Transport Policy and Practice 122 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 lice and other organisations including road not feel that an adoption of a Vision Zero safety specialists. would be helpful.

A total of 85 people completed the on- For the question “Do you think that the line questionnaire survey. This number Swedish Vision Zero policy should be included private individuals who had be- adopted as a road safety policy in the UK?” come aware of the project either via the 79% of responded did not wish a vision internet or through advertising for focus zero polity to be implemented in the UK. group recruitment. Figure 1 presents the The questionnaire then asked “Swedish in- different types of questionnaire respond- terviewees have explained that setting a ents. While a number of organisations “Vision” has major advantages in setting were contacted the people who responded road safety policy on a new and re-invig- to the questionnaire preferred to respond orated course. Do you think this would be in a personal rather than institutional ca- the effect of introducing Vision Zero in the pacity. The majority of the responses were UK?” A total of 72% of responded said that individual responses at 59 per cent fol- this would not be the case if Vision Zero lowed by campaign groups (13 per cent) was introduced in the UK.

Figure 1 Questionnaire respondents by category and private organisations (8 per cent). Conclusions on expert and citizens Six per cent of the respondents do not views on Vision Zero indicate any affiliation while government bodies and local authorities each repre- Ordinary citizens were almost entirely of sented 5 per cent of the respondents fol- the view that Vision Zero was sensible, lowed by motorist groups at 4 per cent. logical and the “right thing to do”. To many The questionnaire survey consisted of of the focus group participants it was un- eleven questions related to a Vision Zero thinkable that we should accept death and policy on road safety: it also provided the injury on the road with its tragic conse- opportunity for the respondents to elabo- quences for all those connected with the rate further on their views. The following death. They wanted to eliminate death section provides an overview of the results from the road traffic environment and of the survey. The section also includes warmly welcomed the Swedish Vision Zero direct quotes from the respondents. It is approach. not possible to present all the responses in this article. Instead, the common issues The response from professionals was al- raised have been grouped and presented most the opposite of the citizen group. with some sample responses. Professionals were dismissive of Vision Zero, they thought it was totally unrealis- For the question “Do you think it is helpful tic and had nothing to offer UK road safety to have a policy that establishes a vision of policy beyond what was already in place. zero fatalities and zero serious injuries?” The citizen group reacted in a way antici- a total of 62 per cent of respondents did pated by Gruen. Focus group participants World Transport Policy and Practice 123 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 made it clear that they were concerned the concept in the focus groups and a con- about children, the elderly, family mem- siderable amount of scepticism in the pro- bers and neighbours. They were connect- fessional community. The Swedish inter- ed with everyday human concerns and viewees were very confident that adopting empathized with those experiencing the Vision Zero had reinvigorated road safety dire consequences of death and injury in intervention and stimulated a high level of road crashes. They could not understand co-ordination and common purpose in all why we did not have a Vision Zero policy in the professional stakeholders. This does the UK. It was such a “good idea” and the not mean to say that it is supported by all majority of participants could not under- stakeholders. There is scepticism in Swe- stand why we should tolerate the death, den just as there is in the UK. injury, misery and disruption of family life and life-time of grieving over the loss of a The core logic underpinning Vision Zero loved one. is not susceptible to scientific analysis or logical rigour. The Swedish decision to The professionals took a detached view abandon a materialistic, cost benefit ap- based on a shared understanding of sci- proach to road safety and to ground road ence, policy and bureaucratic procedures safety in an ethical and human centered and intervention and whilst regretting the value system was intensely political. The death toll on the roads they regarded it as decision to align road safety with the tacit an inevitable consequence of the exercise Vision Zero that already applies to avia- of daily choices on the part of million of tion and to health and safety at work was drivers, pedestrians and other road users partly logical and partly political. Sweden that will inevitably spawn “accidents”. The decided that just as there should be an ex- professional represents what our society pectation of no deaths in aircraft accidents regards as “normal” in the sense that this and no deaths at the work place so by logi- is what educated, well trained individuals cal extension there should be no deaths with a great deal of knowledge think about on the roads. The logic is attractive (and the systems they manage. The citizen view meets with public approval) but the deci- whilst not regarded as “insane” is certainly sion on equivalence is political. regarded as emotional, subjective, based on ignorance and not the way to deal with Gruen has shown that human values in a this complex problem. given population can be side-stepped and discarded by the dominance of profession- This fits’ Gruen’s thesis perfectly. Societal al, scientific and mechanistic models of the norms have developed to regard those way society works. Our focus groups and operating from clearly articulated human professional survey show that this is also value perspectives as “insane” or at the the case in the UK road safety discourse. very least unrealistic and to be dismissed. The discourse is not polarized to the extent Those that exercise the power (the profes- that any group is labeled as “insane” but sionals) are “normal” and those who disa- the insights into such large differences of gree with them are not well-informed and opinion and perception as we have demon- don’t understand what is being done for strated in this research amplify the conclu- them or to them. Citizens in this expert sions of Gruen that human value centered “normal” view of the world have no role approaches to dealing with problems can to play in setting the aims and objectives easily be regarded as “insane”. The use of of road safety policy The road safety dis- the word “insane” in a road safety policy course in the UK confirms the insights of discussion might well be regarded as pro- the “insanity of normality” analysis. vocative and not capable of justification but it conveys a rather accurate picture 5 Conclusion and policy implications of the degree to which those who deviate from the norm are marginalized, discarded The Swedish Vision Zero road safety pol- and excluded from the policy process. UK icy has attracted worldwide attention and citizens have no voice in the debate about has been incorporated in the WHO 2004 Vision Zero. The professionals have dis- report on road safety. In this study we missed the concept. have found large scale public support for World Transport Policy and Practice 124 Volume 20.2/3 May 2014 The “insanity of normality” thesis carries References: with it a suggestion of what can be done Dean, J. S., 1947. 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