Why should the world care? Analysis, mechanisms and spillovers of the destination based border adjusted tax*.
Ursel Baumann [email protected] Alistair Dieppe [email protected] Allan Gloe Dizioli [email protected] Preliminary and not to be quoted Abstract Members of the US House of Representatives have proposed a major overhaul of the US corporate tax system, the so-called “destination-based border-adjusted cash-flow tax” (DBCFT). The literature on the economic implications and spillovers of such a DBCFT is scarce. This paper aims to provide a com- prehensive analysis of the mechanics of such a tax, its macroeconomic implications as well as its global spillovers using a fully structural global multi-country model. Our results suggest that the short term macroeconomic impact of the reform would depend primarily on how permanent agents perceive the policy to be. Robustness scenarios show that the magnitude of the short term impact will also depend on the extent to which exporters are reimbursed by their domestic costs; what categories of goods are excluded from the reform; how the government uses the revenues generated by the border adjusted tax; and the pricing system used by exporters. Moreover, global spillovers will depend on how easy it is to replace imported goods by domestic production; whether US trading partners retaliate, and how finan- cial markets in emerging economies react. If there is disequilibrium in relative prices in the short term, global economic activity spillovers could be strongly negative and world trade could decline substan- tially.
JEL codes: C68, E47, F41, F44, F62, O41 Keywords: Fiscal policy, International business cycle, Spillovers model based analysis.
* We would like to thank Bernd Schnatz, and Simona Delle Chiaie as well as comments during various presenta- tions. We also would like to thank Benjamin Hunt for making the IMF’s GIMF model available to us. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB or the IMF. This work was conducted while Allan Gloe Dizioli was seconded at the ECB. All errors are our responsibility. Non-technical summary
Republican members of the US House of Representatives have proposed a corporate tax reform, the so-called “destination-based border-adjusted cash-flow tax” (DBCFT). This tax would repre- sent a major overhaul of the US corporate tax system and would potentially have important eco- nomic implications in the US and globally if implemented. Against this background, this paper analyses the mechanics of this new tax, its macroeconomic implications as well as its global spill- overs using a global multi-country model. The model embodies fully structural demand for im- ports and tracks bilateral trade in intermediate and final goods. Our results suggest that the short term macroeconomic impacts of the reform would depend pri- marily on how permanent agents perceive the policy to be. This perception determines if the de- sired net foreign asset position would change in the short term, and therefore directs the pressures on the US dollar to appreciate in order to offset the impact of the border adjustment. When agents perceive the policy to be more permanent, most of the short term boost to US GDP comes from lower taxation on capital. Instead, when agents see the policy to be temporary, the border adjust- ment leads to an extra short term stimulus from the external sector because of the temporary dise- quilibrium in relative prices. The US economy rebalances away from domestic demand and im- ports towards exports. The macroeconomic implications also depend on a number of other factors that are explored in the paper. These include: (1) whether US trading partners retaliate; (2) the extent to which export firms are reimbursed by tax liabilities related to their domestic costs; (3) the extent to which some categories of goods may be excluded from the DBCFT tax base; (4) how the government uses the revenues generated by the border adjustment; and (5) the pricing system used by exporters. The robustness scenarios show that the short-term rise in US GDP and inflation would be substan- tially reduced in particular if exporters do not receive a rebate for the tax liability related to their domestic inputs. In addition, all the scenarios show that the US fiscal deficit would deteriorate over time, thus increasing the need for fiscal consolidation in the medium-term that could offset some of the positive short-term GDP impacts of this corporate tax reform. The global spillovers of the DBCFT also depend on agents’ subjective probability of policy rever- sal. Under a policy perceived as more permanent spillovers are limited. However, the spillovers to global GDP and world trade are sizeable and negative if the policy change is perceived as tempo- rary and assuming no retaliation by other countries. Moreover, there is a rebalancing in global trade deficits, with surplus regions experiencing deterioration and the US experiencing an im- provement in its trade balance. As for global trade, even in the policy perceived to last 4 years scenario without retaliation, world trade declines substantially and global economic activity spill- overs are substantially negative. Countries with large exposure to US trade are hit the hardest World trade would decline significantly more strongly if a coordinated retaliation against the US border adjusted tax materialises. Aside from retaliation, global spillovers will also depend on how easy it is to replace imported goods by domestic production, and on the extent to which the US dollar appreciation may cause stress in EME financial markets.
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1 Introduction
In 2016, US House Republicans released their “blueprint” for a reform of the US tax system enti- tled ‘A better Way: Our Vision for a Confident America’. This plan covers changes to several as- pects of the US tax system. One aspect is the new proposed way to tax corporations. This so- called “destination-based border-adjusted cash-flow tax” (DBCFT) would potentially represent a major overhaul of the US corporate tax system. The main features of the proposal are (i) a signifi- cant reduction in the corporate income tax rate from currently 35% to a cash flow tax rate of 20% and (ii) border adjustment, which is economically equivalent to an export subsidy and an import tariff.
There is little real world experience with cash-flow taxes, with only origin-based cash-flow taxes having been implemented in practice, see European Commission (2015). In addition, despite be- ing intensely debated in policy circles, the literature on the macroeconomic implications of a bor- der-adjusted cash-flow tax is rather scarce.
From a theoretical standpoint, the literature has focused on the debate surrounding the potential reaction of the US dollar and the impact on tax revenues. As regards the exchange rate, propo- nents of the DBCFT, including the ideological originators, Auerbach and Holtz-Eakin (2016), ar- gue that the US dollar will adjust sharply to offset economic effects on US inflation and the trade balance. According to them, due to an immediate exchange rate reaction, the border-adjusted tax would not distort trade. In line with this view, Feldstein (2017) argues that the border-adjusted tax would essentially have no impact on US inflation, since higher import prices would be immediate- ly offset by a rise in the US dollar. To preserve the original trade balance (despite the border ad- justment), with a 20% cash flow tax rate, the value of the dollar would have to rise by 25%. How- ever, as argued by Hufbauer and Zhiayao (2017), this reflects an assumption that US national sav- ing and investment and, by implication, the trade deficit would remain unchanged.2 Viard (2017) points out that the impact on trade depends on whether the design of the DBCFT reform includes a full refund to exporters. If the latter was not given, the tariff on imports and subsidy rate on ex- ports would not be equal, thus leading to trade distortions. In a widely quoted earlier paper, Feld- stein and Krugman (1990) discuss the impact of border adjustment in the context of a Value Add- ed Tax (VAT). They show that the absence of distortionary effects from a VAT depends on the rebate of VAT on exports. They also argue that in the absence of an export rebate, a VAT would act like an export tax-which in general equilibrium is equivalent to an import tariff. Moreover, they argue that a VAT without border adjustment could also be neutral with respect to trade, if the currency of the country introducing the VAT adjusts to a large extent to offset the trade distor- tions.
Turning to the impact on US fiscal revenues, Feldstein (2017), focusing only on the border- adjustment element of the tax reform, argues that border-adjustment would lead to a substantial rise in tax revenues, which - since the value of US imports exceeds that of US exports - would not be borne by US consumers or firms. Static microsimulations based on a panel of US corporations
2 Private-sector economists are also sceptical that the US dollar will adjust fully. A number of private-sector economists have done some quantitative assessments of the impact of the DBCFT. Overall, these suggest that the border-adjusted tax is expected to have an impact on US CPI inflation of an order of magnitude of between 0.5-1.5pp, while increasing the US dollar by around 10-15%.
4 by McClelland and Patel (2017) confirm this. The authors analyse the impact on the size and cy- clicality of the tax base of replacing the current corporate tax system with a DBCFT by comparing the two steady-states. Their main findings are that the tax base under the DBCFT would be larger and less cyclical on aggregate compared with the current corporate income tax base. However, this assumes no behavioural changes to the tax reform. Instead, as discussed by Cline (2017), be- havioural changes in the economy coupled with an incomplete exchange rate offset would eventu- ally erode the trade deficit and, thereby, the expected revenue from the cash flow tax.
Critics of the tax point to its distributional effects and possible trade retaliation by other countries aside from potential fiscal revenue losses. Summers (2017) strongly criticises the proposed re- form, summarising four major flaws: (i) the change would exacerbate inequality, with more than half the benefits going to the top 1% of Americans; (ii) the tax would redistribute income, increase uncertainty and put some sectors at disadvantage; (iii) the change would harm the global econo- my, could be seen as a protectionist act that violates WTO rules and may cause protectionist re- sponses by other countries; in addition it could lead to a strong rise in the US dollar that hurts dol- lar debtors (while benefiting countries with large dollar reserves such as China); (iv) the reform could erode the revenue base, thus requiring other tax increases or spending reductions.
This paper aims to fill the gap in the literature by conducting a model-based macroeconomic anal- ysis of DBCFT, modelling its key features in its design and the possible implications for the US economy and the global spillovers. We explore in depth the mechanisms of the DBCFT reform, deriving in a simple example how different designs of this tax can affect or not firm’s trade deci- sions and exchange rates. Moreover, using a variation of an established global multi-country structural model, we show how price frictions and assumptions about agents’ expectations can determine the impact of the tax on the short term dynamics of the US economy and spur large spillovers to the global economy. While several scenarios are simulated, in particular we find whether agents consider the new regime to be transitory or permanent will be important to deter- mine how the USD exchange rate would respond. We show that the macroeconomic implications and global spillovers depend on a number of additional factors including (1) to what extent ex- porters would be reimbursed by their domestic costs; (2) what categories of goods could be ex- cluded from the reform; (3) how the government wants to use the revenues generated by the bor- der adjustment tax; (4) how easy it is to replace imported goods by domestic production; (5) whether US trading partners retaliate, and (6) how financial markets in emerging economies react. The paper is structured as follows. The next section outlines the details of the proposed corporate tax reform, as well as its motivation. Section 3 discusses mechanics in technical terms by outlin- ing how firm’s decisions and government revenues are affected by the introduction of the tax. It also derives the conditions under which the proposal would be trade-neutral. In Section 4, model- based simulations results of the tax reform on the US macro-economy are shown, while Section 5 describes the resulting spillovers to the world economy. This is followed by a number of sensitivi- ty checks to key assumptions in Section 6 and to different parameters in Section 7 before conclud- ing.
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2 Proposed reform of the US corporate tax system
Republican members of the House of Representatives have proposed a major overhaul of the US corporate tax system which seeks to move towards a “destination-based border-adjusted cash flow tax” (DBCFT). The main features of the proposal would be (i) a significant reduction in the corpo- rate income tax rate from currently 35% to a cash flow tax rate of 20% and (ii) border adjustment, which is economically equivalent to an export subsidy and an import tariff.
Figure 1: Headline corporate Figure 2: Corporate tax rev- Figure 3: Indirect tax reve- tax rates in OECD countries enue OECD countries (per- nue in OECD countries (indi- (percent) centage of GDP) rect tax revenue as percentage of total tax revenue) 0 10203040 02468 0 204060 United States Norway Chile 35 France Australia Turkey Belgium Luxembourg Hungary Mexico New Zealand Greece Australia Chile Estonia Greece Japan Latvia New Zealand Czech. Rep Slovenia Portugal Iceland Israel Italy Slovakia New Zealand Norway Canada Portugal Israel Belgium Poland Spain Israel Mexico Netherlands Korea Slovakia Austria Portugal Ireland Chile OECD average 2.8 United… Japan Switzerland Czech. Rep OECD average 23 Sweden Finland Luxembourg Denmark OECD… 33 Korea Netherlands Iceland Slovak… Mexico Denmark Sweden United… Korea Denmark Ireland Netherlands Estonia France Luxembourg Iceland Italy Norway Finland United States 2.2 Spain Turkey Austria Sweden United… Spain Germany Poland Finland Austria Hungary Greece Italy Czech… Turkey Australia Slovenia Poland France Germany Germany Belgium Latvia Estonia Canada Canada Latvia Switzerland Ireland Hungary Japan Switzerland Slovenia United States 17
Source: OECD. Notes: Latest observation: 2014. Headline corporate tax refers to the basic central government statutory flat or top mar- ginal rate. Indirect tax revenue refers to taxes on goods and services.
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A key motivation behind the introduction of the border-adjusted cash flow tax is that the current US tax system has significant shortcomings and is seen by many Americans as putting US com- panies at a competitive disadvantage. As shown in Figure 1, the US has the highest corporate tax rate among OECD countries (at 35%), but at the same time, revenue collections from corporate income taxes as a percentage of GDP are slightly below the OECD average (Figure 2). This sug- gests that as corporations exploit loopholes, the system is inefficient in terms of tax collection. Efficient taxation is usually based on two principles: first, to impose the lowest tax rate consistent with raising the required revenue and second, to impose the tax as broadly and evenly as possible across all goods and services to avoid distortions (see Cecchetti and Schoenholtz, 2017). In the current US corporate tax system, which is origin-based (implying that US corporations are taxed on their world-wide profits), there are strong incentives for corporate inversions, whereby compa- nies move overseas to reduce their tax burden (see McIntyre et al., 2015). Figure 3 shows that the US system also does not fulfil the second principle of efficient taxation: most tax revenue is col- lected via direct taxes, as opposed to indirect taxes as in most other OECD countries, likely caus- ing a greater distortion. The US does not have a nationwide sales tax and indirect revenue collec- tions via state-specific sales taxes are small compared with the OECD average. To reform the corporate tax system, Republicans in the House of Congress have made a compre- hensive proposal for a destination-based border-adjusted cash flow tax (DBCFT), based on an ac- ademic paper by Auerbach and Holtz-Eaking (2016), with the following four main features: 1. Border-adjustment: Firms can deduct receipts from exports but can no longer deduct imports from taxable income. This is economically equivalent to a tariff on imports and a subsidy on exports. 2. Tax incentives for new investment: Investment outlays can be written off immediately (rather than according to a set depreciation schedule), while interest payments are no longer tax deductible. 3. A reduction in the tax rate from 35% to a proposed 20%. 4. Shift from an origin-based system (where corporations are taxed on their worldwide profits) to destination-based system (where corporations are taxed only on profits in- curred within the US). This has implication for the incentives to repatriate profits back to the US. Currently, US corporate taxes are levied at the location where the company is established, with the tax base being revenue less capital and labour expenses. Exporters pay corporate income tax, while imports are exempt for companies not established in the US – i.e. there is no border adjust- ment. On the other hand, VAT is levied at the destination (where the sale takes place) and the tax is based on the sales price. In addition, it is border-adjusted, implying that exports are exempt from VAT, while imports are subject to VAT and treated in the same way as domestically pro- duced goods. As such, the proposed DBCFT would have elements of both VAT and corporate taxes. It would be levied where the sale takes place (as with the VAT). By contrast, the tax base would refer to revenues less a deduction of capital and labour expenses (similar to the corporate tax), although this would refer only to domestic costs. As such, the border adjustment part of the DBCFT would act like the combination of an export subsidy and an import tariff. Effectively, this would mean that the tax would be applied to the “cash flow” of domestically-produced goods. Moreover, exports of goods would be exempted from cash flow taxes.
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To illustrate how the border adjustment works, Figure 4 shows a simple example. Assuming that wage costs and domestic investment expenditure amount to 50% of sales price and the tax rate is 20%. For a domestic sale of 100 USD, the cash flow tax (after accounting for wages and invest- ment expenditure) would amount to 10 USD; the effective tax rate would be 10%. For the domes- tic sale of imported goods for USD 100, by contrast, the tax would amount to 20 USD with an effective tax rate of 20%. Ceteris paribus, such a tax would imply higher sales prices (or lower profits) for foreign goods and, effectively, act like a tariff. Only if the US dollar would appreciate and compensate for the effects of the border adjustment, equal treatment between domestic and foreign companies could be re-established. The second change would provide tax incentives for new investment. This change will affect the financing structure of corporations via eliminating previous incentives to hold debt over equity, thus reducing firm leverage. In addition, adopting a destination-based tax system would reduce US corporations’ incentives to move their tax resi- dences overseas (i.e. “corporate inversions”) and to declare domestic corporate income as foreign- source income. Effectively, this border-adjusted cash-flow tax would raise revenue by broadening the tax base. Taxing spending on imports instead of taxing profits from exports would raise feder- al revenues and thereby finance part of the planned cuts in corporate tax rates3.4
Figure 4: Illustration of the effect of border adjustment on foreign sales (where treatment is equal) and domestic sales of goods and services (where treatment is unequal) Selling abroad: Selling domestically: equal treatment unequal treatment
US
EU US
EU
Notes: The illustration is done for imports of final consumer goods as it is the simplest case. It is assumed that for the US company, wage costs and domestic investment represent 50% of its sales. Numbers are illustrative.
3 The blueprint is unclear on whether tax rebates will be considered or whether a zero bound on tax payments will be imposed. 4 In general, border-adjustment is allowed under WTO rules only for consumption taxes, but not for direct taxes. Hence, Republicans stress that the cash-flow tax resembles more a consumption rather than a corporate tax. Hufbauer and Zhiyao (2017) discuss a number of adjustments that could be made to the DBCFT that may make the tax WTO compatible, for example including wages in the tax base, but allowing for a portion of the tax revenue to be used as credit for Social Security or Medicare taxes; or allowing a deduction for the wage component of imported goods.
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3 Derivations and equivalences of the proposed corporate tax reform
In order to lay out the main features of this proposal, we will briefly discuss the firms’ decision problems and how they are affected by the introduction of this new tax. This section starts from the structure from the IMF’s Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal (GIMF) Model (Kumhof et al., 2010) and subsequently adds the DBCFT to the firms’ optimisation problem. 3.1 Domestic firms: Starting with the current system, let’s assume that there is a continuum of domestic firms indexed by i ∈∈ [0, 1] in two separate sectors indexed by Z {N, T}, where N represents non-tradable and T tradable. All these firms buy labour and capital inputs to produce their output. While firms in the non-tradable sector sell the entirety of their goods to domestic distributors, firms operating in the tradable sector can either sell their goods to domestic distributors or to foreign markets. These firms are perfectly competitive in their input markets and monopolistically competitive in the market for their output. In order to capture a realistic dynamic to equilibrium, these firms are sub- ject to nominal rigidities when setting prices.