DOCSLIB.ORG

Assessing Us Policy in Iraq and the Middle East

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Assessing Us Policy in Iraq and the Middle East SPECIAL PRESENTATION “ASSESSING U.S. POLICY IN IRAQ AND THE MIDDLE EAST” WELCOME BY: MELODY BARNES, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT FOR POLICY, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS INCLUDING FEATURED REMARKS BY: CONGRESSWOMAN ELLEN TAUSCHER (D-CA) AND LUNCHEON KEYNOTE ADDRESS: CONGRESSMAN LEE HAMILTON (D-IN) 8:30 AM – 1:30 PM MONDAY, MARCH 19 TH , 2007 TRANSCRIPT PROVIDED BY DC TRANSCRIPTION & MEDIA REPURPOSING PANEL I: EXAMINING IRAQ'S IMPACT ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND REGIONAL DIPLOMACY MODERATOR: BRIAN KATULIS, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS SPEAKERS: JON ALTERMAN, DIRECTOR AND SENIOR FELLOW, MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES MARA RUDMAN, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS JUDITH YAPHE, DISTINGUISHED RESEARCH FELLOW, INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY PANEL II: U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY MODERATOR: PETER RUNDLET, VICE PRESIDENT AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FOR NATIONAL SECURITY, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS SPEAKERS: KEN ADELMAN, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL JOHN M. KEANE, UNITED STATES ARMY, RETIRED, AND SENIOR MANAGING DIRECTOR AND CO- FOUNDER OF KEANE ADVISORS, LLC LAWRENCE KORB, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, AND SENIOR ADVISER, CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION (Partial transcript follows.) MR. JOHN PODESTA: Congressman Hamilton is here and we’ll get started in just one minute, so if you please stay in your seats. Again, I want to thank this morning’s panelists and I want to thank Congresswoman Tauscher. We really appreciate her ideas and leadership in trying to change the current course of policy in Iraq. It’s now my great pleasure to introduce our luncheon keynote speaker, the Honorable Lee H. Hamilton. Congressman Hamilton is a preeminent voice on national security and defense issues and we’re honored to have him back here at CAP. I should note at the beginning that about half of our national security team was trained under – (laughs) – Congressman, Chairman, Vice Chairman Hamilton’s leadership and you trained them well, Mr. Hamilton. Congressman Hamilton served for 34 years as the United States congressman from Indiana. During his tenure, he served as the chairman and ranking member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, now the Committee on International Relations, and chaired the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East from the early 1970s until 1993. Mr. Hamilton also served as the chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, the so-called Iran-Contra Committee. Mr. Hamilton remains an active voice on matters of international relations and U.S. foreign policy. He served as a commissioner on the influential United States Commission on National Security in the 21 st Century, better knows as the Hart-Rudman Commission. He was also co-chair with Former Senator Howard Baker of the first Baker-Hamilton Commission which investigated security issues at Los Alamos. In December of 2002 he was appointed vice chair of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, better known as the 9/11 Commission. He is currently a board member of the 9/11 Public Discourse Project – the legacy organization of the 9/11 Commission – and he’s currently a member of the president’s Homeland Security Advisory Council. On March 15 th of last year, just a year ago – almost a year ago yesterday, I guess – a couple of days ago, Congress announced the formation of the Iraq Study Group organized by the United States Institute for Peace. Mr. Hamilton was named co-chair along with former Secretary of State James Baker of the Iraq Study Group. I think we thought when he retired that he was going to be in residence at the Smithsonian tower and have to take it a little easy, but I think every time our country has called, he has answered that call. Lee Hamilton is a national treasure. His distinguished service in government has been honored by numerous awards for his public service and promotion of human rights. I want to get you up here, so I’m not going to through them all, but his accomplishments are many and I want to get him up here so that he can make his opening remarks and then he’s agreed to take questions from the audience. Thank you. (Applause.) REP. LEE HAMILTON (D-IN) [Former Congressman]: Well, good afternoon to all of you. John, thank you very much for that gracious introduction. I’ve been looking over the schedule you’ve had here this morning and I’m not sure that I’m going to be able to add that much to it because you’ve had a very talented group of people already speak to you. Let me begin, then, right away with a few observations about Iraq. I suppose all of us would agree that there are no really satisfactory answers in Iraq and anything that is proposed, you can find plenty of things wrong with it. Four years after this war began, it is obvious to all of us that where we go from here is an exceedingly difficult task and indeed may be virtually impossible to fix it. The question in Iraq that has always been kind of uppermost in my mind has been whether the means that we employ can achieve the ends that we proclaim. If the consequences of failure are as dire as has been stated over and over and over again – the president’s word is “incalculable” – then the gap between the stakes and the effort is striking. The resources, the commitment, the competence that we have brought to match the urgency of averting incalculable catastrophe really do not match at all. I think that victory in Iraq will not come in any normal sense of the word. I do not think that Iraq will become a model of constitutional democracy. It is likely to remain violent and even chaotic for a number of years. But we do not want to see a partitioned state. We do not want to see an al Qaeda with a sanctuary. We do not want to see a country that is in thrall to Iran. We do not want Iraq to be hostile to our interests. So what we should strive for, it seems to me, is a stable region and a stable Iraq, and our overriding goal must be to find a responsible way to extricate American forces from Iraq, doing the best we can to contain the suffering of the people and emerge with the best achievable results for the protection of American interests in the region. Now, we’ve got a lot of resources that we’re putting into Iraq. With the right policies, the right implementation, and maybe a little luck, we can come out of this with some stability. On the Iraq Study Group, we tried very hard to find the right balance – the balance among American interests, among political realities in both Iraq and Washington, and a right balance with our ideals and, of course, our power. You cannot help but be struck by the uncertainties that dominate in this Iraq equation. One, obviously makes everybody very uneasy and that is the performance of the Maliki government or principally whether it can achieve national reconciliation. Secondly, the uncertainty of the performance of our own government whose record in Iraq has been marked by several years of astounding incompetency, and another uncertainty – our ability to build a political center supported in the region by so-called moderate Arab nations. We never anticipated in the Study Group that things would get better immediately if our recommendations were implemented or for that matter anybody else’s. We did think that what we said offered the best course of action to meet achievable goals in the United States. I’ll not go into our recommendations because I’m assuming all have all read very carefully that report, which is right up there for a couple of weeks with Harry Potter on the bestseller list. Now, the president has acknowledged the first chapter of the report. If the Study Group made any contribution, it was, I guess, in our assessment of the situation. If you look, for example, at the White House statements prior to the report, they were just unrelentingly optimistic. After the report, their tone changed dramatically and they basically agreed that the situation was dire and getting worse. So we had the surge of the 21,000 or maybe almost 30,000 troops to stabilize Baghdad. The president is pressuring the Malaki government to meet the benchmarks – I’ll have more to say about that in a moment – and he is balancing a more confrontational stance with Iran and Syria with a beginning, at least, of engagement. I think that the surge as a military approach needs a good bit of elaboration. What we really need in this area is not just a surge of the military, but you need a surge of the diplomacy and a surge of the economic reconstruction and a surge of the political efforts at national reconciliation. And what has been lacking and I think is still lacking is an integrated approach to dealing with the problems. In order to succeed in Iraq, you’re going to have to do a lot of things very well and do them very quickly. And there is a real question, frankly, on my mind whether the two principal governments involved can achieve that kind of effort. One of the things that has not been generally noted, I think, in the press is the whole question of sequencing. On the Iraq Study Group we took the view that you cannot separate the security and the political progress.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Iraq: Oil and Gas Legislation, Revenue Sharing, and U.S. Policy
    Order Code RL34064 Iraq: Oil and Gas Legislation, Revenue Sharing, and U.S. Policy Updated July 2, 2008 Christopher M. Blanchard Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Iraq: Oil and Gas Legislation, Revenue Sharing, and U.S. Policy Summary Iraqi leaders continue to debate a package of hydrocarbon sector and revenue sharing legislation that would define the terms for the future management and development of the country’s significant oil and natural gas resources. The package includes an oil and gas sector framework law and three supporting laws that would outline revenue sharing, restructure Iraq’s Ministry of Oil, and create an Iraqi National Oil Company. Both the Bush Administration and Congress consider the passage of oil and gas sector framework and revenue sharing legislation as important benchmarks that would indicate the current Iraqi government’s commitment to promoting political reconciliation and long term economic development in Iraq. Section 1314 of the FY2007 Supplemental Appropriations Act [P.L.110-28] specifically identified the enactment and implementation of legislation “to ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources of the people of Iraq without regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients” and “to ensure that the energy resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner” as benchmarks. The Administration reported to Congress on these benchmarks in July and September 2007. A draft framework law approved by Iraq’s Council of Ministers (cabinet) in July 2007 did not include revenue sharing arrangements. Iraq’s Council of Representatives (parliament) has not taken action to consider the legislation to date because of ongoing political disputes.
    [Show full text]
  • Robert Gates on the Middle East
    MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 1160 On the Record: Robert Gates on the Middle East Nov 9, 2006 Brief Analysis esterday, President George W. Bush announced that he was nominating former CIA director Robert Gates as Y secretary of defense following the resignation of Donald Rumsfeld. Gates, currently the president of Texas A&M University, served as director of central intelligence from 1991 to 1993. In all, he spent twenty-seven years as an intelligence professional, having originally joined the CIA as an analyst in 1966. In February 2005, he announced that he had been offered the new post of director of national intelligence but had declined it. In 2004 he served as co- chair, with Zbigniew Brzezinski, on an independent task force on Iran sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations. He is currently a member of the Iraq Study Group, co-chaired by James Baker and Lee Hamilton, which is expected to report shortly on alternatives to U.S. policy on Iraq. The following is a range of quotes made by Gates, or conclusions with which he has been associated, on a range of subjects related to the Middle East. On Iraq On August 24, 2004, Gates was interviewed by Bernard Gwertzman of the Council on Foreign Relations: Gwetzmann: “Do you have any predictions as to how Iraq is going to turn out?” Gates: “No. We have the old line in the intelligence business that everything we want to know is divided into two categories: secrets and mysteries.” Gwertzman: “And Iraq is which?” Gates: “Iraq is very much the latter.” On Iran The following quotes are taken from the executive summary of Iran: Time for a New Approach, a report issued in July 2004 by the previously mentioned independent task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations: “[T]he current lack of sustained engagement with Iran harms U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • The Dubai Initiative
    The Dubai Initiative Working Paper Securing the Peace: The Battle over Ethnicity and Energy in Modern Iraq Justin Dargin Securing the Peace: The Battle over Ethnicity and Energy in Modern Iraq Dubai Initiative – Working Paper Justin Dargin Research Fellow, The Dubai Initiative Better Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard University June 2009 SeCURIng THe Peace: THe Battle oveR eTHnICITy AnD eneRgy In MoDeRn IRAq | 1 “There is something very sinister to my mind in this Mesopotamian entanglement.” Winston Churchill letter to Prime Minister David Lloyd George, August 1920 I. Introduction This article examines the legal and political impediments to the Kurd- ish Regional Government’s (KRG) exploration and production contracts, which the central government in Baghdad has refused to recognize. The newly estab- lished Iraqi national constitution significantly opened as many petroleum-control questions as it resolved. Negotiated in 2005, the constitution not only separated branches of government, but established Federalism as its lodestar. When faced with unresolved issues over regional and national control over petroleum resourc- es, however, International Oil Companies (IOCs) function in an ambiguous legal environment that fails to clearly distinguish between federal and regional powers Article 112(1) of the constitution grants the central government a condi- tional right to “…undertake management of oil and gas extracted from present oil and gas fields…” (emphasis mine). Reflective of Iraq’s commitment to federalism, the right to manage oil fields is shared by the central government, the produc- ing governorates and the regional governments. Article 112(1) could, therefore, be construed to mean that the central government has no right to exercise authority over nonproducing fields and future fields: rights that are not explicitly granted to the federal government may be held as residual rights by the regional authori- ties.
    [Show full text]
  • Statement on Senate Confirmation of Robert M. Gates As Secretary of Defense December 6, 2006 the President's News Conference W
    Administration of George W. Bush, 2006 / Dec. 7 Statement on Senate Confirmation of Robert M. Gates as Secretary of Defense December 6, 2006 I am pleased the Senate has overwhelm- empowered them to successfully address ingly voted to confirm Dr. Robert Gates complex issues. I am confident that his as the next Secretary of Defense. In his leadership and capabilities will help our confirmation hearing, Dr. Gates dem- country meet its current military challenges onstrated he is an experienced, qualified, and prepare for emerging threats of the and thoughtful man who is well respected 21st century. by members of both parties and is com- I thank Chairman Warner and Ranking mitted to winning the war on terror. Member Levin for leading dignified and Throughout his career, Dr. Gates has trans- constructive hearings, and I thank the Sen- formed the organizations he has led and ate for moving quickly on this nomination. The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom December 7, 2006 President Bush. Thank you all. Please be Security Council. I talked to him about the seated. I just had a good visit with Prime consultations I’m having with the United Minister Tony Blair. I appreciate you com- States Congress. ing back, Mr. Prime Minister. I always We agree that victory in Iraq is impor- enjoy our discussions. And I appreciate tant. It’s important for the Iraqi people; your clear view that we are confronted with it’s important for the security of the United a struggle between moderation and extre- States and Great Britain; and it’s important mism, and this is particularly evident in for the civilized world.
    [Show full text]
  • Post 9/11 Civil-Military Relations
    Post-9/11 Civil-Military Relations Room for Improvement Thomas Sheppard and Bryan Groves Abstract Civil-military relations between the president and his key military leaders carry significant implications for strategy making and war out- comes. Presidents and their national security team must prioritize prop- erly developing that relationship. Civilian leaders must understand the various biases military leaders may harbor in different scenarios, while military leaders must present the president with genuine options, serv- ing as professional advisors in the “unequal dialogue.” It is essential the next president bridge the civil-military gap—thereby facilitating greater understanding and trust. Stronger bonds of confidence between princi- pals and agents result in more effective organizations, as does the ability to figure out what works, why it works, and how to implement it. ✵ ✵ ✵ ✵ ✵ The year 2016 will mark a major transition for the US military. If Pres. Barack Obama sticks to his timetable—and all indications are he will—the last American forces will vacate Afghanistan by the end of that year, ending the longest war in American history. What will follow in Afghanistan is uncertain, but recent events in Iraq and persistent en- emy elements in Afghanistan and Pakistan paint a pessimistic picture. It is a real possibility that the blood and treasure poured into Afghani- Thomas Sheppard completed his doctorate in military history at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His research focuses on civilian control in the early American republic. He was the recipi- ent of the 2013–2014 Smith-Richardson Predoctoral Fellowship through Yale University’s International Security Studies Program.
    [Show full text]
  • The Iraq Study Group Report
    The Iraq Study Group Report James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin Meese III, Sandra Day O’Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, Alan K. Simpson Contents Letter from the Co-Chairs Executive Summary I. Assessment A. Assessment of the Current Situation in Iraq 1. Security 2. Politics 3. Economics 4. International Support 5. Conclusions B. Consequences of Continued Decline in Iraq C. Some Alternative Courses in Iraq 1. Precipitate Withdrawal 2. Staying the Course 3. More Troops for Iraq 4. Devolution to Three Regions D. Achieving Our Goals II. The Way Forward—A New Approach A. The External Approach: Building an International Consensus 1. The New Diplomatic Offensive 2. The Iraq International Support Group 3. Dealing with Iran and Syria 4. The Wider Regional Context B. The Internal Approach: Helping Iraqis Help Themselves 1. Performance on Milestones 2. National Reconciliation 3. Security and Military Forces 4. Police and Criminal Justice 5. The Oil Sector 6. U.S. Economic and Reconstruction Assistance 7. Budget Preparation, Presentation, and Review 8. U.S. Personnel 9. Intelligence Appendices Letter from the Sponsoring Organizations Iraq Study Group Plenary Sessions Iraq Study Group Consultations Expert Working Groups and Military Senior Advisor Panel The Iraq Study Group Iraq Study Group Support Letter from the Co-Chairs There is no magic formula to solve the problems of Iraq. However, there are actions that can be taken to improve the situation and protect American interests. Many Americans are dissatisfied, not just with the situation in Iraq but with the state of our political debate regarding Iraq.
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq: Politics and Governance
    Iraq: Politics and Governance Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Carla E. Humud Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs March 9, 2016 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RS21968 Iraq: Politics and Governance Summary Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic divisions—muted toward the end of the 2003-2011 U.S. military intervention in Iraq—are fueling a major challenge to Iraq’s stability and to U.S. policy in Iraq and the broader Middle East region. The resentment of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs toward the Shiite- dominated central government facilitated the capture in 2014 of nearly one-third of Iraqi territory by the Sunni Islamist extremist group called the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL, ISIS, or the Arabic acronym Da'esh). Iraq’s Kurds are separately embroiled in political, territorial, and economic disputes with Baghdad, but those differences have been at least temporarily subordinated to the common struggle against the Islamic State. U.S. officials assert that the Iraqi government must work to gain the loyalty of more of Iraq’s Sunnis—and to resolve differences with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)—if an eventual defeat of the Islamic State is to result in long-term stability. Prospects for greater inter- communal unity appeared to increase in 2014 with the replacement of former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki with the current Prime Minister, Haydar al-Abbadi. Although both men are from the Shiite Islamist Da’wa Party, Abbadi has taken some steps to try to compromise with Sunnis and with the KRG. However, a significant point of contention with the KRG remains the KRG’s marketing of crude oil exports separately from Baghdad.
    [Show full text]
  • Iraqi Oil and Revenues from Its Sale: a Review of How Existing Security Council Resolutions Affected the Past and May Shape the Future
    The European Journal of International Law Vol. 18 no.3 © EJIL 2007; all rights reserved .......................................................................................... Iraqi Oil and Revenues from Its Sale: A Review of How Existing Security Council Resolutions Affected the Past and May Shape the Future Rex J. Zedalis * Abstract The newly proposed Iraqi oil and gas legislation is currently making its way through Iraq’s political process. The specifi c content of that legislation may be criticized for a variety of rea- sons. Nonetheless, while early Security Council resolutions addressing Iraq’s oil and gas, and revenues from its sale, demonstrated extensive supervision over such by the international community beginning in the 1990s, more recent resolutions assign Iraq the kind of control that suggests its peoples are entitled to manage those resources and monies as they see fi t. At the same time, the international community cannot ignore the importance of oil and gas to the economic well-being of Iraq, and the link between economic health and the survival of that country’s nascent democracy. As a consequence, despite the fact that Security Council resolutions have seen fi t to permit Iraqi authorities to resume autonomous control over that nation’s hydrocarbons and the revenues produced by the sale of such, serious consideration should be given to the adoption of a new resolution, extending beyond the current 31 Decem- ber 2007 date Iraq’s protection against legal claims from existing and potential creditors. 1 Introduction The civil unrest that has plagued Iraq over the last couple of years may be traced to sectarian rivalry, ambitions of autonomy for specifi c regions of the country, the * Professor of Law and Director, Comparative and International Law Center, Fellow, National Energy- Environment Law and Policy Center, University of Tulsa.
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq Study Group Consultations
    CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PRESIDENCY IRAQ STUDY GROUP Iraq Study Group Consultations (* denotes meeting took place in Iraq) Iraqi Officials and Representatives * Jalal Talabani - President * Tareq al-Hashemi - Vice President * Adil Abd al-Mahdi - Vice President * Nouri Kamal al-Maliki - Prime Minister * Salaam al-Zawbai - Deputy Prime Minister * Barham Salih - Deputy Prime Minister * Mahmoud al-Mashhadani - Speaker of the Parliament * Mowaffak al-Rubaie - National Security Advisor * Jawad Kadem al-Bolani - Minister of Interior * Abdul Qader Al-Obeidi - Minister of Defense * Hoshyar Zebari - Minister of Foreign Affairs * Bayan Jabr - Minister of Finance * Hussein al-Shahristani - Minster of Oil * Karim Waheed - Minister of Electricity * Akram al-Hakim - Minister of State for National Reconciliation Affairs * Mithal al-Alusi - Member, High Commission on National Reconciliation * Ayad Jamal al-Din - Member, High Commission on National Reconciliation * Ali Khalifa al-Duleimi - Member, High Commission on National Reconciliation * Sami al-Ma'ajoon - Member, High Commission on National Reconciliation * Muhammad Ahmed Mahmoud - Member, Commission on National Reconciliation * Wijdan Mikhael - Member, High Commission on National Reconciliation Lt. General Nasir Abadi - Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Joint Forces * Adnan al-Dulaimi - Head of the Tawafuq list Ali Allawi - Former Minister of Finance * Sheik Najeh al-Fetlawi - representative of Muqtada al-Sadr * Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim - Shia Coalition Leader * Sheik Maher al-Hamraa - Ayat Allah
    [Show full text]
  • The Iraq Study Group Report: the Way Forward
    The Iraq Study Group Report James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin Meese III, Sandra Day O’Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, Alan K. Simpson vintage books A Division of Random House, Inc. New York FIRST VINTAGE BOOKS EDITION: DECEMBER 2006 All rights reserved. The Authorized Edition of The Iraq Study Group Report is published in the United States by Vintage Books, a division of Random House, Inc., New York, and in Canada by Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto. Maps © 2006 by Joyce Pendola Vintage and colophon are registered trademarks of Random House, Inc. ISBN: 0-307-38656-2 ISBN-13: 978-0-307-38656-4 www.vintagebooks.com A portion of the proceeds from the purchase of this book will be donated to the National Military Family Association, the only nonprofit organization that rep- resents the families of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and the Commissioned Corps of the Public Health Service and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, prepares spouses, children, and par- ents to better deal with the unique challenges of military life. The Association protects benefits vital to all families, including those of the deployed, wounded, and fallen. For more than 35 years, its staff and volunteers, comprised mostly of military family members, have built a reputation as the leading experts on mili- tary family issues. For more information, visit www.nmfa.org. Printed in the United States of America 10987654321 First Edition Letter from the Co-Chairs There is no magic formula to solve the problems of Iraq.
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq Study Group Report
    The Iraq Study Group Report James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin Meese III, Sandra Day O’Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, Alan K. Simpson Contents Letter from the Co-Chairs Executive Summary I. Assessment A. Assessment of the Current Situation in Iraq 1. Security 2. Politics 3. Economics 4. International Support 5. Conclusions B. Consequences of Continued Decline in Iraq C. Some Alternative Courses in Iraq 1. Precipitate Withdrawal 2. Staying the Course 3. More Troops for Iraq 4. Devolution to Three Regions D. Achieving Our Goals II. The Way Forward—A New Approach A. The External Approach: Building an International Consensus 1. The New Diplomatic Offensive 2. The Iraq International Support Group 3. Dealing with Iran and Syria 4. The Wider Regional Context B. The Internal Approach: Helping Iraqis Help Themselves 1. Performance on Milestones 2 2. National Reconciliation 3. Security and Military Forces 4. Police and Criminal Justice 5. The Oil Sector 6. U.S. Economic and Reconstruction Assistance 7. Budget Preparation, Presentation, and Review 8. U.S. Personnel 9. Intelligence Appendices Letter from the Sponsoring Organizations Iraq Study Group Plenary Sessions Iraq Study Group Consultations Expert Working Groups and Military Senior Advisor Panel The Iraq Study Group Iraq Study Group Support 3 Letter from the Co-Chairs There is no magic formula to solve the problems of Iraq. However, there are actions that can be taken to improve the situation and protect American interests. Many Americans are dissatisfied, not just with the situation in Iraq but with the state of our political debate regarding Iraq.
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq Study Group Fact Sheet
    CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PRESIDENCY IRAQ STUDY GROUP Iraq Study Group Fact Sheet Contact Information: Ian Larsen Lauren Sucher 202-429-3870 202-429-3822 Updated: December 4, 2006 1. How was the Iraq Study Group created? The Iraq Study Group (ISG) was launched on March 15, 2006 at a meeting on Capitol Hill. It was created at the direction of a bipartisan group of members of the U.S. Congress. Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA) was the leading supporter of the group’s creation. Wolf had been calling for a “fresh eyes” assessment of the situation in Iraq since the summer of 2005. From its inception, the ISG was designed to be bipartisan, and the initiative has attracted broad, bipartisan support among members of the House and Senate. 2. Was the Bush administration involved in creating the ISG? The Bush administration was not involved in creating the ISG, but the White House welcomed it, and has provided access to people, documents, and travel to Iraq. President Bush met with the ISG members on June 14, 2006 and again on November 13, 2006. He has met further with the two co-chairs. The White House respects the independence of the group. 3. What role does United States Institute of Peace play with the ISG? Congressman Frank Wolf, who chairs the House Appropriations Subcommittee that funds the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), asked USIP to act as the facilitating agency for the ISG, with the support of the Center for the Study of the Presidency, the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the James A.
    [Show full text]