Stephen C. Rowell , Lietuvos istorijos institutas

1446 AND ALL THAT*

The election of Grand Duke Casimir of Lithuania as king of in 1445-47 marked a return to Jogaila's vision of a Lithuano-Polish union under the rule of a single prince. The version of events leading up to Casimir's royal coronation in June 1447, as seen from the point of view of the Little-Polish nobility, survives from Dlugosz's chroni­ cle. This view dominates nineteenth- and twentieth-century Polish scholarship, which tends to minimalise the importance of the Lithua­ nian prince in favour of one Polish political community, thereby ig­ noring not only the crucial stance taken by the but also the diversity of political communities within the Crown of Poland itself. The best and fullest modern account remains Anatol Lewicki's 1897 article, Wstapienie na Iron polski Kazimierza jagiellon- czyka, on the basis of which both O. Halecki and L. Kolankowski com­ posed their versions in 1919 and 1930. The same narrative has been established in Lithuanian scholarship by Bronius Dundulis's solid monograph, Lietuvos kova dėl valstybinio savarankiškumo XV amžiuje (1968 and 21993), which presents another monolithic view of the subject, in this case as evidence of a Lithuanian desire to achieve or maintain political 'savarankiškumas'. To a certain degree both Polish and Lithuanian scholarship remains entrapped in a nine­ teenth-century struggle mentality further petrified by the constitu­ tional historians' obsession with documents as prescriptions of reality for perpetual application. This is the background against which

* This essay forms part of a wider study of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania under Casimir I and IV which is now under preparation. The texts cited below in short­ ened form will be published in full in the first volume of Casimiriaiia (Vilnius, 2001). Frequent reference is made to manuscript sources held in Berlin, Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Preussischcr Kulturbesitz, OBA [Ordensbrief Archiv] and OF [Or dens Folianten]. fruitless squabbles over the authenticity of the 1385 Kreva text multiply. The aim of the present sketch is not to retell events of 1445-47 in great, detail but to outline an argument in favour of the Jagiellonian view• point and to question the use of one undated document as an „act of union" from 1446'. In the winter of 1444-45 Casimir led a Lithuanian army against Muscovy in revenge for a Muscovite-provoked Tatar raid on Viazma and Briansk2. It was in the midst of this campaign that news of his brother Wladyslaw II and Ill's death in battle with the Turk at Warna was brought to the grand duke at Polotsk by the king's comrade-in- arms Jan of Sienko in December 1444 or early 1445. Wiadyslaw's death could have come at a better time for the Polish barons. In September 1444 the latter, convened in a at Piotrkow, wrote to the king, reminding him how they had accepted him and his brother as 'heredes, naturales dominos et paterni splendoris veros successores'. This phrase is worth bearing in mind when we read in Dlugosz that Casimir reigns merely through noble consent. They ar• gued that sharing a prince (in this case with Hungary) is harmful because of the discord which arises during his absence (a point which tends not to be appreciated fully by modern scholars, who seem to interpret opposition to sharing a ruler as simple patriotism). In par• ticular, they cite recent calamities which have befallen Poland: the Tatars have ravaged Rus', especially Podolia; Casimir and his Lithua• nians with Tatar help have attacked Mazovia and Lukow in Crown Rus'; Mikolaj of Raciborz and Boleslaw of Opole have created havoc in the western borderlands. Jan Pilecki and the bishop of Wroclaw bear the Piotrkow Sejm's report to the king and envoys are sent to Casimir and Boleslaw to make peace or a truce until Wladyslaw re• turns3. The political situation in Malopolska and the territories where its interests were directly involved (such as Hungary, , Moldavia) was hardly propitious. The economy also seems to have been in considerable disarray with a Crown debt of 58,000 grzywny. Krakow appears to have been suffering from inflation and a deval• ued silver currency. The University preacher Jan z Ludziska in his address to Casimir in June 1447 would speak of agricultural condi• tions worse than the servitude of ancient Egypt and the archbishop of complains of excesses on the part of Crown servants. During the festivities surrounding Casimir's coronation in June 1447, village women are said to have made public demonstration of their mistreatment at the hands of royal officers requisitioning cattle4. In short, the Polish barons, especially those of Malopolska were under attack, social regulation was weak and the Polish regents unsure where to turn for help. Wtadyslaw, however, did not return. For Casimir too the news was not of the timeliest. However, the years of open revolt in Žemaitija and Rus' were over (with discon­ tent smouldering now rather than blazing) and relations with both the Order and the towns of Prussia thriving. Casimir was not with­ out rivals (as the course of events in 1445-7 illustrates), but his posi­ tion and that of his 'court' party (Goštautas and friends) was more stable than it had been. The Vilnius government could risk waging war on Mazovia and Moscow. The adolescent grand duke was climb­ ing slowly out of his 'protectors" shadow. It is highly likely that the young grand duke was able to pursue his own policy for the first time, a dynastic policy in which he was aided by his Alšėniškiai un­ cles and his mother, Dowager Queen Sofia, the aim of which was to maintain Jagiellonian precedence in both Lithuanian and Polish poli­ tics by exploiting the weaknesses of Goštautas in Vilnius and Olešnicki in Krakow. At eighteen years of age Casimir was no longer the cal­ low youth who had come from Poland to Vilnius in 14405. In economic terms the Grand Duchy was growing in strength. The impulses gained by western commerce in Vilnius and Kaunas and the links with Gdansk and, to a lesser extent, Königsberg, not to men­ tion the continued importance of the Dvina trade route to Livonia allowed the grand duke to payroll his noble supporters. The history of Lithuanian commerce in the first half of the fifteenth century, es­ pecially between 1430 and 1447 remains unclear. Assumptions are made from relative silence that such trade was either weak or non­ existent, especially in Žygimantas's day6. The documentary base for such studies is meagre. However, the records which do survive al­ low one to justify the conclusion that, although trade in the years of civil war following Vytautas's death was not strong enough to meet the exaggerated demands of financing Žygimantas's conflict with Švitrigaila fully, economic life during Casimir's early reign, especially with Gdansk thrived. The route to Tartary, tariffs for various furs (marten, mink, beaver) and regulations concerning wax and the im• port of foreign cloth via Kaunas and Vilnius, linking up with mer• chants from Krakow, Wroclaw, England, Flanders and Holland were brought for discussion with the grand master by Casimir's embassy (led by the grand duke's marshall and certain Vilnius burghers)7. Regulation of the Prussian trade became more frequent from 1444 or so, with complaints over mistreatment of merchants in and from Vilnius and Kaunas, dealing with excise, quality control (of poor English cloth imported via Holland and Gdansk to Kaunas) increas• ing8. Although the Grand Duchy could certainly not rival the Teu• tonic Order seriously as a market for the goods of Prussian merchants, her western towns (Kaunas, Vilnius, Brest, Grodno, Mogilev) were firmly integrated into the Polish and Prussian eastern trade network - linking up with Krakow, Wroclaw, Poznari and, perhaps more im• portantly, the Mazovian centre - Warsaw. Merchants with interests in Kaunas and Vilnius included council• lors of the Prussian towns (Arnd Finckemberg, Heinrich von Staden) who were delegates to the Stiindetage, and the Lithuanian towns (Goschewicz of Vilnius)9. Merchants and administrators of merchant towns act as ambassadors, au fait with political developments. We should try to step outside the narrow confines of the Jagiellonian monarchy to understand the context in which Casimir was wooed by Krakow and which influenced both Polish and Lithua• nian responses to the interregnum. The Duchy of Mazovia, as we have seen, was in conflict with Lit• huania. In an embassy to the Order, the Cexverbe zcum Prewsschen- markte of August 25 1444, Casimir remarks on the outcome of the Podolian war. Similar themes were expressed by Boleslaw IV in his June embassy to the Knights when he informed the Order of Casimir's war over Drohiczyh and other 'stete, dorffer, slosser' and complained (without grounds, the Grand Master replies) that the Knights had helped Casimir10. Boleslaw turned to Olesnicki and the Polish lords for mediation with Casimir11. Some time in 1445 Boleslaw IV mar• ried Barbara, daughter of Olelkaitis of Kiev12. Although the exact date of this marriage is not known, an hypothesis to the effect that it was connected with political events in Lithuanian and Poland seems ten• able. With Mazovia defeated by Casimir's forces and its duke mar- ried to the daughter of one of the grand duke's supporters, dynastic issues became complicated further. Mykolas Žygimantaitis, Casimir's second cousin and rival was married to his third Mazovian bride, Katarzyna, daughter of IV13. Mykola's support was restricted to his affines in Mazovia and the Olešnicki party in Krakow which saw in him a convenient means of weakening central authority in the Grand Duchy and by extension in Poland. Such a point of view is not 'anti-Lithuanian' (the same policy applied in Poland cannot be accused of working against the Grand Duchy) so much as anti-monarchical. The Teutonic Order re­ sisted attempts to embroil the Knights in both Mykolas' Lithuanian campaigns and Casimir's counter-attacks by pleading that the Treaty of Brest required the Order to keep its roads open and not to aid grand-ducal enemies. The powerful discontent which swept through Žemaitija in 1441 and 1442, culminating in battle between Mykolas' supporters, led by Kantautas and Casimir's army, was neutralised by the issue of a charter for Žemaitija and the division of the staro- staship between Kantautas and Kęsgailą. Further attempts at reviv­ ing the competition between the court and country parties in 1444 and 1446 would come to nought14. The Teutonic Order should have been expected to take advantage of regional conflicts, especially of dissension within and between Poland and Lithuania. There were even several deliberate attempts on the part of Mazovia and Mykolas Žygimantaitis to draw them into action. However, the Knights' realm was itself embroiled too deeply in disputes with its neighbours and subjects to exploit the situation fully. Indeed, the Order's own weaknesses were exploited by Casimir and later perhaps by the archbishop of Gniezno. The main political and economic problem facing the Order from 1445 was the strength of the Prussian League and its leading mem­ bers' refusal to pay the poundage tax, or Pfundzoll. In 1445 Chelmno and Torun declined to pay this duty to the Knights on the basis that, as the holders of a Chelmno Charter, they were free from all such exactions. The Knights hoped to solve the problem amicably, since these towns had a strong influence on the smaller Prussian towns. The Grand Master referred the question to Magdeburg for delibera­ tion. The Torun commander was so poorly finaced that he had no money for salt and fish for his brethren and took out loans with the of Nessau. The dispute was brought to the attention of the king of the Romans and the Holy See. The League was a threat to the Or• der's security, both financial and military. In April 1446 Bishop Franz of Warmia denounced Bund as being „widder alle gotliche und naturliche Rechte", and against the letter of papal and imperial char• ters. On June 19 the commander of Gdansk announced over-optimis- tically that the smaller towns were ready to leave the Bund; the com• mander of Torun reported that Strasburg will do as Chelmno and Torun do. And so it came to pass, but not to the Order's benefit: on July 17 at the Marienwerder diet, the towns rejected all plans for dis• solution of Bund. Accusations of agreement-breaking would prove embarrassing not for the Bundists but for the grand master15. The elector of was in dispute with the Order over the New Mark and demanded payment of 15,000 gulden; matters here did not improve until mid-summer; only relations with Stolp were friendly. In 1446 the conflict with Brandenburg increased over the building of a bridge across the Warta near Santok16. In economic terms by 1446 only Gdansk (of independent inclina• tions) had good links with England, while connections between the Ordensstaat and France and the Low Countries were weak. Relations with Denmark were also cool. It is no wonder that the Order sought to extend its trade with the Grand Duchy. In 1447 new links were established with England, France, Flanders, Holland, Denmark, the Hansa, Spain and Portugal17. The Livonian branch of the Order was in a state of war with Nov• gorod, which was under the military control of Lengvenaitis, Casi- mir's kinsman and competitor. Casimir maintained a policy of con• sidered neutrality in this conflict, despite papal admonitions to intervene (on the Knights' behalf). Casimir rejected this plea, but the Knights intercepted Gdansk weapons merchants en route to Lithua• nia18. Livonian relations with Polotsk were strained. The Order's in• terest in Lithuanian affairs and especially the whereabouts of Casimir, Švitrigaila and Lengvenaitis in 1447 is connected not with any desire to intervene in Lithuanian and Polish affairs (i.e. seek an alliance with Casimir's enemies or rivals) but to make sure that all the Lithuanian princes were busy with events in Krakow so that the Order could launch its attack on Novgorod during Casimir's coronation19. Cross-border raids between north-eastern Prussia, Livonia and Lithuania (both Žemaitija and Lithuanian Rus') disrupted relations between the two states. Refugees fled to both sides - especially Curonians who left Nehrung for Žemaitija, to the dismay of the Or­ der's leadership20. Casimir's greatest success, building on his satisfaction of Švitrigaila and Lengvenaitis's desire to maintain control of their own patrimonial lands sensu stricto (that is, Volyn' and Mstislav respectively, not the Grand Duchy as a whole) was the removal of the Teutonic Order from the coronation dispute in Lithuania, whilst using it to worry the Olešnicki faction in Poland. On January 10 1446 the houptman of Kaunas, Sudewoj, presented an embassy to the Grand Master. The Teutonic Order was to be drawn more closely into events in Poland-Lithuania this time by Casimir rather than his rivals. Sudewoj reported on the outcome of the Vilnius sejm of November-December 1445, which had been attended by Švitrigaila, the bishop of Vilnius, Olelko and all his sons and all other dukes and nobles from Lithuania, Žemaitija and Rus'. The Grand Master rejoiced to hear that the king was well and announced that his wishes conformed with the wishes of the Lithuanian nobles. Sudewoj announced that Casimir had heard from his 'Rathe' that Russdorff and Švitrigaila had good relations (a reference to the treaty of Christmemel, 1431) and has sent him and švitrigaila's man to dis­ cuss the possibilities of concluding a similar agreement. The Master promises to consult his men. Švitrigaila's man announced that his master was faithful to Casimir, whilst Lengvenaitis's secretary wishes the Grand Master to intercede with Casimir to regain his confiscated patrimony. It is thus clear that Casimir enjoyed the support of his rival in Podolia and the south (Uncle Švitrigaila) and in Novgorod (Uncle Lengvenaitis - in a state of war with the Livonian branch of the Teutonic Order). This state of affairs was deliberately and unam­ biguously demonstrated to the grand master. Jonas Matusas offers two comments on Švitrigaila's involvement in these discussions. He reminds us that the Grand Duchy was not only švitrigaila's 'father­ land' (tėvynė) but also his 'father's land' (tėviškė). The old duke's behaviour should be interpreted as a recognition of Casimir's right to inherit the Gediminid patrimony. The Lithuanian insistence on respect for patrimonial rights runs through all these discussions. 'Pa• triotism' as a concept has very little significance here, pace Matusas21: In his response to Sudewoj's embassy issued on February 14, the Grand Master remarks that he has held a secret meeting with 'wenig seyne gebietiger', since he has heard that „der herre grosfurste welle ulisetczen lassen" the treaty of Brest. Note is made of the fact that Casimir has restored Lengvenaitis to his patrimony. A report on this embassy and its 'herte reden' was made to the Master of Livonia on February 16. News of this secret meeting, provoked by the Lithua• nian side, may lie behind the rumours which spread through Poland that the Order was planning to renounce the treaty and attack Po• land. Whether this was intended by the Lithuanians to form the basis of a new alliance in the wake of Casimir's rejection of the Polish throne, or simply an attempt to alarm the Polish council and dis• credit the Order, such talk of renunciation dominated Polono-Teu- tonic relations until after Casimir's coronation22. The situation was especially dangerous for the Order, which, in accordance with clause 43 of the Treaty of Brest, would ipso facto release its subjects from their oaths of loyalty if they were to wage aggressive war on Poland (or Lithuania) - not an attractive prospect for the grand master who was accusing the Prussian League of breaking its oath to the Order. This card had been played with success by the Prussian Estates against Grand Master Russdorf in 143323. Casimir's cat-and-mouse behaviour with the Polish, and to a lesser degree the Lithuanian nobility, seems to have been a deliberate and very carefully played gamble (in the style of his father Jogaila) which forced the various parties in Poland to show their hand and realise that they were weaker than Casimir himself: that a Brandenburg or Mazovian election was out of the question, no matter how hard vari• ous groupings within Poland pressed their bluff. Casimir as Jogaila's only living heir had no intention of surrendering his paternal inher• itance to anyone, as he announced after his coronation that no sepa• rate grand duke would be sent to Lithuania. He waited carefully for his opponents to discover for themselves the inferiority of their posi• tion. He trapped the Teutonic Order in a ruse which strengthened his own position as a possible defender of Poland and Lithuania against neighbourly aggression, while at the same time exploiting discontent within the Ordensstaat. From letters of August 29 and September 2 1446 it appears that rumours were still spreading in Poland that the Order was prepar• ing for war. The Grand master denied this strenuously and repeat• edly. It seems now that the , who may have been intimidated by such rumours at first now used them against the Order by deliber• ately delaying in their confirmation of news that the grand master had not sought a dispensation from the treaty of Brest from the Coun• cil of Basel - Archbishop Wincenty was issued a papal announce• ment to this effect in September 1446 but informed the master of his knowledge only in March of the following year24. On September 1 1446 at Sthum the grand master issued a safeconduct for his servant Arnolt von Morttangen to visit the Council of the Polish Crown in• cluding: 'dem erczbisschoff zcu Gnefien, Grosfursten zcu Littauwen, bisschoffe zcu Leslaw, den herczogen Vlotken und Bolislao und houptmann zcur Wille"25. The grand master's first request of the new king in late June 1447 was that he make a public declaration to the effect that the Order had never received or sought to obtain absolu• tion from its oath to uphold the treaty of Brest26. In September 1446 under the shadow of a threat of Tatar invasion from the Lithuanian side, the Polish magnates foregathered at Parczew. Sonka was also there. The counsellors of Poland required Casimir to attend, as indicated by Piotr Kurowsky. Rumours were passed on to the Lithuanian side by a Polish nobleman, Andrzej Rohatyriski to the effect that the Poles were planning violence against the grand duke's party. Casimir agrees to come to Brest and no fur• ther. The Poles sent a delegation of at least fifteen lords to Brest from Parczew, where Olesnicki and certain of his associates remained. From Dlugosz we see that the Crown delegation at Brest included the archbishop and wojewoda of Lw6w, the bishop and wojewoda of Poznari, the castellan of Krakow and the chancellor and vice chan• cellor of the Crown of Poland27. EHugosz's account appears to be an• other example of his editing of details of events so as to make Casimir's election appear to have been achieved with the support of only a minority of Polish noblemen. At the sejm the Lithuanians de• manded that , Podole and Olesko should be Lithuanian. The Poles refused and threatened to go to Boleslaw. When Casimir changed his mind, the Poles offer him the crown, right to dispose of Lutsk, Podolia and Olesko, as Jogaila did during his reign to Spytko, Švitrigaila and Vytautas. The grand duke promised to respect Polish liberties and his coronation was set for June 24 1447. Piotr de Sczekocin, vicechancellor of Poland, received letters to this effect28. Casimir removed Lomazy and Polubice from the Parczew tenuta and transferred them to that of Brest. As for the Mazovian candidate, he was not accepted, Diugosz explains, because of sins of his fathers - St Stanistaw had been murdered by Bolestaw, Conrad of Mazovia had invited the Teutonic Order to Poland. The Kingdom had been divided by Piasts, Diugosz notes, and even Casimir III (the Great) was accused of repressive measures towards the clergy, of divorcing his wife and drowning a priest. This episode should be borne in mind by scholars who take Dlugosz's remarks on the Jagiellonians as al• iens who oww their position merely to the favour of Polish magnates at face value. Even the Piasts can be dismissed by pride. On September 19 the plenipotentiary Polish sejm gave Casimir a letter confirming his election and agreement to come to Krakow for his coronation; they acknowledge his right to 'tenere, habere et fovere' servants of either 'lingwagium' (i.e. Lithuanians or Poles), that he may dwell in or travel to Lithuania and Poland as he wishes and not be hindered in this by any subject of any condition. Lewicki is surely right to note that this document represented a 'salvus conductus' along the lines of the letter which Jogaila required from the Polish nobles before he came to Poland in 138629. This then is the outcome of negotiations in accordance with the alternatives outlined in Grodno in October 1445. This is the only document which clearly emmanated from the Parczew-Brest sejm. Lewicki produced a hypothesis to the effect that another proposal was presented to the Poles during the sejm by the Lithuanians, but this was later rejected by the Polish side. This text refers to the union of Poland and Lithuania effected by Casimir and an agreement over control of certain Rus'ian territories: Lutsk, Vladimir, Olesko, Ratno, Wyechlye, Lopaczyn and Podolia30. The text survives in two maunscripts: one is Krakow, Biblioteka Czartoryskich 1399, p. 51-53 and was discovered by Lewicki; the sec• ond more extensive text was found by Ulanowski in a Poznan manu• script, known as Ada episcopalia posnaniensia, 1:1439-57 and published under Ulanowski's name by Stanislaw Kutrzeba31. Both manuscripts are undated and the texts differ slightly from one another. There• fore, it seems likely that Lewicki's small doubt whether the text actu• ally existed seems to be unfounded. According to Kutrzeba the Poznan document is written on one side of a series of blank folipes - the previous three and following seven folioes are empty; the near• est preceding texts date from 1451-53 and the subsequent document is dated 1449. The hand is datable to the mid-fifteenth century and is consistent with that which penned other documents in the codex. The Czartoryski text is shorter and follows on from an account of a Lithuanian delegation to the Grand Master in April or May 1446. The reference to Jogaila's baptism and the acceptance of Casimir and his brother which separates this text from the „union text" may be a scribal note, as Lewicki suggests, or even a part of the 1446 docu• ment itselP2. The manuscript itself was written relatively late, at least sixty years after the [estimated] date [of the document]"33. Lewicki's copy of the text is thus later than the Poznan version (and therefore its abbreviated form is not so surpsrising). The text is not dated and its two manuscripts are inconclusive in this matter. The earlier codex (in Poznan) fits some time in the mid- fifteenth century. The order of documents its contains leans towards supporting a date in the early 1450s. The Krakow mansucript is less helpful. It dates from the early sixteenth century and its the order of contents is also quite erratic. However, once more this order is just as favourable, if not more favourable to a dating of 1453. From page 31 to where our text begins at the foot of p. 51 we come across a letter from the Queen-Mother to the Pope (p.35), a sermon on the death of Wladyslaw III (1444-5) [p.36-7], a letter celbrating Olesnicki's final elevation to the cardinalate (in 1452) [38-9], St John Capistrano's let• ter to OleSnicki (p.42-3) and Casimir's embassy to Ladislaus of Hun• gary and concerning his marriage to the Hungarian king's sister, Elisabeth - in August 1453 (p.46-7). It is this marriage which concerns the Lithuanian Union with Poland and the 1446 embassy to the Grand Master (p.50) also bears witness to Casimir's dynastic position. We also find Malgorzata Siemowitowna of Mazovia's sur• render of her property in 1452-5334. The mere fact that our text fol• lows on directly or indirectly from the account of the 1446 Lithua- nian mission to Marienburg does not mean that it also dates from that year. The connection may either not exist or even be thematic rather than chronological. Therefore, we must try our best to date the document from internal evidence. The text clearly refers to a period before Casimir had heirs of his body (therefore before his marriage of 1454, if not later). Casimir re• fers to himself as king of Poland in both cases (which he was not in 1446) and declares that his aim to is solve conflicts which have arisen between his two dominions (i.e. between his two actual possessions, not between one possession and what is soon to belong to him). He notes that he has „in fraterna equalitate et amicicie sinceritate confederavimus, complicavimus, composuimus, colligavimus" both realms and that the present writ does the same, so that the friend or enemy of the one shall be friend or enemy of the other. Such a con• federation was established, or rather, continued by his coronation; the issue of a document, other than the Brest letter of September 19 1446, was not strictly necessary for the confirmation of the Union in 1447. Lewicki's argument that the agreement could have been pre• sented only in 1446 because it reflects great weakness on Poland's part is more than circumstantial; Prochaska terms it „golostowne"35. Severe disagreement with Lithuania over Podolia was still raging in 1451-53 when Poland was on the brink of war with the Order and Casimir faced open revolt in the Grand Duchy and was very nearly killed. Since by this time Švitrigaila was dead (1452), the Rus'ian question was in need of even more serious discussion. The reference to the letter's being issued at Parczew (where Casimir was not in 1446, but was in 1453) and the fact that he is called 'rex' rather than 'electus rex' (the style used correctly in the 1446 document which precedes the text in its sixteenth-century manuscript copy) does not appear to be a scribal error or 'correction'36. According to Dtugosz, the envoys of the Lithuanian delegation who were sent to parley with Casimir and the Polish counsellors in Parczew in June 1453: duo petebant: ut terrae Podoliae, Rathno, Oleszko et Wyethly Lithuanis restituerentur, et Ducatus Magnus Lithuaniae eos haberet fines, quos tem• pore Ducis Magni Withawdi habuit; item ut litterae et inscriptiones veteres penitus abrogarentur, el novaefirmarentur37 This is exactly what the alleged 1446 document seeks to do - among other things. Casimir confirms the fraternal equality and sincere friendship established between the two realms and stresses their ob• ligation to hold common allies and enemies and acknowledge that „nec unum alteri sit subiectum aut incorporatum sive appropriatum, sed prout alias liberum et speciale extitit dominium"38. The [Jagiellonian and] Vitoldian boundaries are to be maintained and „omnes litteras et inscriptiones quorumcumque principum, ducum et dominorum Lithwanie et Russie aut aliorum quorumcunque sonantes et vergentes contra libertatem et in detrimentum magni ducatus Lithwanie ... presentibus abolemus, destruimus, anullamus et in nichilum redigimus"39. Casimir then speaks of oaths sworn to him and, in the future, to his successor. The stress on equality (with an agreement to hold a common sejm alternately in Parczew and Brest Litovsk), mutual assistance and the sanction that Lithuanian failure to respect this agreement will lead to the reconfirmation of the old terms and that Polish violations will invoke the complete annulment of earlier grand-ducal charters which restricted Lithuanian rights seem to be a pacification of Lithuanian demands (together with terri• torial concessions) at a time when Poland needed to ensure her secu• rity. If we must look for a period when Poland was particularly weak (Lewicki's argument for 1446), then September 1453 fits the bill: this was the time when Cardinal Olesnicki and Queen Sofia fell at Casimir's feet begging him to show favour to Poland. It is the time when Casimir himself had recently survived a serious attempt on his life. No wonder Casimir says that he „regnum Polonie ... cum magno ducatu ... confederavimus"40. The proposal to hold alternateim in Poland and Lithuania also seems a political masterstroke, albeit one which did not take root. Proposing such an arrangement under• lines the proclaimed equality of both sides in the Union whilst pro• viding a means to control magnate outbursts - a Polish contingent would not feel too comfortable on Lithuanian soil and vice versa (as we see from various occasions when certain Lithuanian nobles re• fused to cross the Grand Duchy's border to attend a sejm41. It may also be significant that the Parczew sejm of 1453 was close to the sending of an embassy to arrange Casimir's marriage to Elisabeth, daughter of Albert, king of the Romans, Hungary and Bohemia - an embassy where the Grand Duchy was represented by Sakaitis and Nemiravicius who had been present in Parczew too. It would seem normal for relations between the two dominions to be reviewed after an old, or before a new dynastic marriage (as was the case with Jogaila after Jadwyga's death). That the agreement seems to have had little lasting effect does not deny its authenticty. To denounce it as en• tirely without effect is also ill-judged. According to a summary of a document issued at Brest Litovsk on April 4 1454, recorded in Jan Zamoyski's Inwentarz, Casimir made a grant „ex consilio certorum consiliarorum tarn Regni quam Magni Ducatus Lithuanie" whereby a Polish gentleman exchanged land he had held hitherto in Volyn' for Lithuanian holdings in Drohiczyn42. As Halecki imself admits in Ostanie lata Swidrigielly, but overlooks in his later Dzieje Unji, when dealing with 1446, from 1453-4 these Rus'ian territories remained under Lithuanian control until the Union of . Where then the Polish rejection Lewicki had to adduce to explain events after 1446?

In short, Lewicki found an interesting, undated document and fell to the temptation to force it to fit the 1446 situation. Other schol• ars seem to have been more interested in arguing over the imple• mentation of the document's clauses than in questioning the dating and nature of the text. While it is possible that a later scribe 'cor• rected' a reference to the 'king-elect', on the whole the text reads like a declaration from King Casimir. The nineteenth-century legal histo• rians' interpretation of the Lithuano-Polish union, especially its fif• teenth-century vicissitudes deserves serious re-examination but not in terms intended to support nineteenth-century political aspirations. Casimir's acknowledged consent to be crowned and the coronation of 1447 ipso facto, like the „Act of Kreva" (1385) and Jogaila's corona• tion of 1386, embodied the union of the two realms. The election of Casimir as grand duke by the Lithuanians in 1440 did not break the union, nor did it fundamentally change it (from the Jagiellonian perspective). Casimir was sent with Polish agreement and was made grand duke, a situation Wladyslaw III accepted, re• taining the earlier distinction between 'magnus dux' and 'supremus dux'. Casimir's tenacious hold on both realms reflects the intentions of Jogaila in 1385-6 which the old king could not sustain in the face of Vytautas's ambitions. When we look more closely at the circumstances surrounding the Polish interregnum of 1444-47 and the election of Casimir as king of Poland we are struck by the weakness of the Crown, whose nobility, especially the Little-Polish barons, had very little choice other than to elect Jogaila's last son - it was, after all, what they had sworn re­ peatedly to do, and the alternatives were unrealistic, as Dlugosz's haughty deprecation of the Mazovian Piasts illustrates, malgré tout. The Teutonic Order was hampered both by its disputes with the burghers of Prussia and the campaign of whispers spread in Poland, Prussia and the Holy See which was probably inspired by the Jagiellonian camp (that is, by a young adult grand duke and his Alšėniškis kin). Casimir played a waiting game which neutralised internal Lithuanian competition and the self-important bluff of Olešnicki's Polish faction. A similar attempt at neutralising opposi­ tion through exploitation of the „new" political instrument, the sejm, in 1453 did not succeed. Patrimony, not patriotism is a key to under­ standing interregnum politics and for that reason we belittle the grand duke and his kin at our peril.

1 Jan Dlugosz, Historiae polonicae, V (lib. xii), ed. A. Przezdziecki (Krak6w,1878), 1-34 [henceforth: Dlugosz]; A. Lewicki, 'Wstapienie na tron polski Kazimierza Jagielloriczyka', Rozprawy i sprawozdania z posicdzien ivydz. hist.-filozof. Akademii Umiejętnošci xx (1897), 1-40; O. Halecki, Dzieje Unit Jagiellonskiej, 1: iv iviekach šrednich (Krakôw,1919), 352-64; L. Kolankowski, Dzieje Wielkiego Ksiestwa Li- tezvskiego za Jagiellonow, i: 1377-1499 (Warsaw,1930), 240-51; A. Prochaska, 'O rzekomej unii z 1446 r.', Kwarialnik Historyczny [KH] xviii, 1904, 24-32; B. Dundulis, Lietuvos kova dėl valstybinio savarankiškumo XVamžiuje (Vilnius,1993), 180-9; VV. Fatkowski, Elitą wladzy w Polsce za panowania Kazimierza Jagiellonczyka (1447-1492) (Warsaw,1992), 45-51. Nothing is added by the posthumous publi­ cation of Lowmiariski's study of Jagiellonian politics: H. Lowmiariski, Polityka Jagiellonow prepared for press by K. Pietkievvicz (Poznari,1999), 215-22. I offer a longer account of events between 1445 and 1447 in S.C. Rowell, 'Casimir Jagiell- oriczyk and the Polish gamble, 1445-7', Lithuanian Historical Studies iv (2000), 1- 20. The account given most recently in M. Jučas, Lietuvos ir Lenkijos Unija (XIV a. vid.-XIX a. pr.) (Vilnius,2000), 174-76 is unexpectedly full of mis-citings and cu­ rious interpretation which seeks to rebuff certain Polish historical hypotheses without resort to primary Quellenkritik.

2 Polnoe Sobranie Russkikh Lctopisei. T. XII, (Moscow,1965), 63. 5 Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti [CESXV], t. 1.1 (Krak6w,1876), No. 125, pp. 140-4 and below 4 J. Pe\c, Ceny w Krakowie w latach 1369-1600z 16 diagramami (Lw6w/1935) [= Badania z dziejdw spoiecznych i gospodarczych, xiv], 2: ducat in Polish groats, 48 in 1440, 34.33 in 1446; price of beer rise (p.28), as does that of herring (p.38), pepper (p.116) and cloth (p.50); price of pork falls (p.36); Crown debt: F. Bujak, 'Mowa Jana z Ludziska do krola Kazimierza Jagiellonczyka z roku 1447 i zagadnienie niewoli w Polsce owczesnej', Wybor pism, ii: Z dziejdw spoiecznych i gospodarczych Polski X-XX w. (Warsaw,1976), 110. Sermon text: CESXV III (Krak6w,1894), No.8, pp.13-16. In a rather intoxicated article in Ateneum Wilenskiev\(1929), 8-15 Feliks Koneczny argued that the reference to slavery was relevant to Lithuania rather than Polish. Bujak confronts this assertion with other evidence. If either researcher had paid attention to the sermon addressed to Archbishop Wincenty of Gniezno at the same time (it follows on from the address to Casimir in the Jagiellonian manuscript: Biblioteka Jagiellonska MSS 126, p,113f.), he would have noticed the same reference to slavery there (in a purely Polish context). Coronation dis­ turbance used to discredit Casimir: Dlugosz, 34.

5 Where maturity is concerned individuals differ. However, an eighteen years-old prince, even one as weak as Henry VI of England, was capable of pursuing inde­ pendent policy. In the end it was neither Goštautas nor Olešnicki but Casimir whose terms were accepted for the coronation. A contemporart parallel of mi­ nority rule is provided by Henry VI of England, who appears to have pursued his own policy at the age of sixteen - J.Watts, Henry VI and the politics of kingship (Cambridge, 1996), 120 and n. 92, p.133-5

6 Payrolling supporters with land in the 1440s and later with the proceeds of trade taxation is clear from the so-called 'kniga danin' which survives in the Lithua­ nian Metrica: Lietuvos Metrika. Knyga Nr.3 (1440-1498) Užrašymų knyga 3, ed. L. Anužytė and A. Baliulis (Vilnius,1998), 19-58; Akly litovsko-russkogo gosu- darstva, I: (1390-1529) (Moscow, 1899), 19-51. An assumption that trade was halted in the years 1430-40 is reflected in M. Biskup, Stosunek Gdanską do Kazi­ mierza jagiellonczyka w okresie wojny trzynastolctniej 1454-1466 (Toruri,1952), 13-14. 7 Ordens Folianten [OFJ 15, 212-6 8 OF 16 pp. 1099-1100, 1102-03, 1130, 1131, 1161-3'; OBA 28523; Gdansk, WAP Liber Missivarum 4, fos. 193v-194», 219, 233"-234; WAP 300 D8, 14, 15. * Gdansk councillors: von Staden - Ms: Gdansk, WAP, Liber Missivarum 4, fo.194, 219, Akten der Standetage Preussens unler der Herrschaft des Deutschen Ordens, ed. M. Toppen, II (Leipzig,1880, Aalen,1974), 7, 55, 66, 110, 208, 233, 256; Finckem- berg- ibid., 501, OF 16 p.2234; Vilnius councillor and merchant, Goschewicz - see S.C. Rowell, 'Winning the living by remembering the dead? Franciscan tac­ tics and social change in fifteenth-century Vilnius', Tarp istorijos ir būtovės: Studijos prof. Edvardo Gudavičiaus 70-mečiui ed. A. Bumblauskas and R. Petrauskas (Vil- nius,1999), 90 n.5, 94-5.

10 OF 15, p.280-82, 134-5 " C£SXVT.l No. 124,pp.l38-40: Olešnicki's letter to Casimir sent from Bodzanczin ( area). The letter is not dated but 1444 seems to fit certain criteria better than 1443, as suggested by Szujski: mention of ravage of Drohiczyn and Mazovia, reference to truce until Wladystaw returns (the same policy mentioned in the Piotrk6w sejm letter of September 1444 - see above n.3) 12 J. Tegowski, „Anna i Barbara księžne mazowieckie z XV wieku. Przyczynek do gencalogii Piastow mazowieckich", Spoleczenstxvo i polityka do XVII wieku. Ksiega pamiatkoxva ku czci Profesorei doktora Waclaxva Odynca w 70-lecie urodzin (Olsztyn, 1994), 100-101 13 Mykolą was married in turn to Anna (d.before 1435), daughter of Siemowit IV; Ofka (d.1436), daughter of Jan, sister of Bolestaw IV; Katarzyna (d.1475) daugh­ ter of Siemowit IV 14 S.C. Rowell, 'Rusena karas Žemaičiuose: keletas pastabų apie 1442 m. privilegijos genezę', Žemaičių praeitis viii (1998), 5-11; idem, „Bears and traitors, or politi­ cal tensions in the Grand Duchy ca. 1440-1481", Lithuanian Historical Studies ii (1997), 32-7

15 E. Lüdicke, 'Der Rechtskampf des deutschen Ordens gegen den Bund der Preu­ ßischen Stände 1440-1453', Altpreußische Forschungen xii (1935), 10; J.Voigt, Geschichte Preussens von den aeltesten Zeiten bis zum Untergange der Herrschaft des Deutschen Ordens, viii (Königsberg,1838), 77-80, 97-106 16 Voigt, Gesdu'dife viii, 77-106. 17 Ibid., 115; OF 16, 586 18 CESXV, II (Kraköw,1891), No. 302, p.450-1: Eugenius IV to Casimir, Oct. 3 1444; OF 16, p. 1163—1163a, Dec. 21 Thomas Samedhand weapons shipment, also OBA 9268 (Feb. 1 1447). For Novgorod campaign see Rowell", 'Casimir Jagiellonczyk'.. " Rowell, 'Casimir Jagiellonczyk' 20 Liv-Est und Kurländisches Urkundenbuch nebst Regesten, ed. F.G. von Bunge, X (Riga- Moscow,1896; Aalen,1981) [henceforth LU], 128, 170, 171; OF 16, 1136 21 J. Matusas, Švitrigaila Lietuvos didysis kunigaikštis (Vilnius,19912), 162-3 22 Ibid. 15-16; OBA 9298, 9361, OF 16, 1108-11; Feb. 16 letter: LU X, 299 23 Die Staatsverträge des Deutschen Ordens in Preußen im 75. Jahrhundert, ed. E. Weise, I (Marburg,1970), No. 181 § 44, p. 210; 1433: M. Burleigh, Prussian society and the German Order. An aristocratic corporation in crisis c.1410-1466 (Cambridge,1984), 142-3. 24 OBA 9298 (xxv No.87), March 3 1447 with papal letter from Aug. 29 1446. See papal letters to the Grand Master and Olešnicki, printed in M. Dogiel, Codex diplomaticus Regni Poloniae el Magni Ducatus Lituaniae IV (Vilnius,1764), nos. 101, 102, pp.139-41 25 OF 16, 206-7 26 OBA 9361 fo. 5'". Text quoted in Rowell, 'Casimir Jagiellonczyk'. 27 Dtugosz names eight delegates; the account issued by the sejm of its agreement with Casimir was signed by 13 Polish lords, the names of six of whom coincide with Dlugosz's account - Lewicki, 'Wstapienie', 21-3, CESXV 111 No.4, p.6-7 28 Dtugosz 26-28; CESXV 1.2 no.6 29 CESXV III No.4, p.6-7; Lewicki, 'Wstapienie', 23 30 Ibid., 23-40 31 Ibid., 23-4 and CESXV III No.5, p.7; B. Ulanowski, 'Projekt unji polsko-litewskiej z r. 1446', Archiwum Komisji Prawniczej vi (1897-1926), 237-9 31 Bib. Czart. 1399 p.51, Lewicki, „Wstapienie", 15 and n. 3: „idem qui supra Vla- dislaus primus baptizmum accepit cum Lythvanis et isti duo filii eius, dux magnus et rex assumptus, qui periit". There is no sign from the manuscript that this sentence does not belong to the longer text which proceeds it. The subsequent text is clearly marked „Item". 33 Lewicki, 'Wstapienie', 26

34 Bibl. Czart. 1399 p.48; Malgorzata married Konrad IX Czarny, duke of Olešno (Silesia) around 1453 -Polskishwnikbiograficzny XIX/3 (zeszy182) (Kraków,1974), 442. According to Mazovian tradition a bride was required to surrender her pa• ternal inheritance to her male kin before marriage: abrenuntialio mulieris: M. Ko- czerska, Rodzina szlachccka w Polsce póznego ircdnimoiecza (Warsaw,1975), 51f.. The Lithuanian parallel is obvious. 35 Prochaska, 'O rzekomej unji', 26 36 Lewicki, 'Wstapienie', 23-26; A similar mix up of information from the period 1446/53 may be evident from the account Dlugosz gives of an attempt on Casimir's life in 1446. The Rus'ian conspiracy reported here seems to be con• nected with the Szuchta conspiracy of 1453. A manuscript in Vilnius, MABRS Fl—15, dated July 5 1446, endowing an obscure Polish family with land in Po• land, also refers to Casimir as 'rex', but this is most probably a later forgery. 37 Dlugosz, 136 38 Ibid, 137 39 Ibid, 138 40 Ulanowski, „Projekt Unji", 237 41 Ibid, 239: „cum autem opus fuerit propter bonum commune utriusque dominii convencionem celebrare, extunc una convenció debebit celebrari in Parczow et alia in Brzescze Ruthinicali, ut exinde appareat equalitas et cuilibet parti honor deferatur". 42 Halecki, Ostatnie lata, 234-5, citing Inwentarz ¡ana Zamoyskiego ms: BOZ 1603 t. Ill p. 283 with reference to the property of Zygmunt of Grabkow and Mykolą Kurcaitis Alšėniškis of Volyn'

DAR KARTĄ APIE VADINAMĄJĄ

1446 M. UNIJĄ

Reziumė

1447 m. Lenkijos karaliumi tapus didžiajam Lietuvos kunigaikščiui Ka­ zimierui, įgyvendinta Jogailos svajonė: vienas ir tas pats gediminaitis-jo- gailaitis valdo ir LDK, ir Lenkijos karalystę. Mažlenkių diduomenės požiūris

į Kazimiero išrinkimą lenkų karaliumi aiškiai matyti Jono Dlugošo kronikos puslapiuose. Toks požiūris vyrauja XIX bei XX a. lenkų moksle, siekiant sumažinti vieno lietuvių kunigaikščio svarbą ir padidinti vienos lenkų politinės bendruomės įtaką. Tuo atveju istorikai ne vien tik ignoruoja jogailaičius, bet ir niekina kitas Lenkijos karūnos žemėse veikiančias poli­ tines jėgas. Geriausiu, išsamiausiu tų metų įvykių aprašymu išlieka 1897 m. Anatolio Levvickio straipsnis Wstqpienie na tron polski Kazimierza Jagiellori- czyka. Jo pagrindu problemą toliau tyrinėjo O. Haleckis ir L. Kolankovvskis. Panašią versiją - bet lietuvių požiūriu - sukūrė Bronius Dundulis garsiojoje monografijoje Lietuvos kova dėl valstybinio savarankiškumo XV amžiuje (1968 bei 1993 m.)- šio straipsnelio tikslas pristatyti argumentus žvelgiant iš Kazimiero Jogailaičio pozicijos bei patikrinti, ar vienas Levvickio 1446-siais metais datuojamas dokumentas iš tiesų yra būtent tų metų „unijos aktas". Trumpai kalbant, atradęs jdomų, nedatuotą dokumentą Levvickis susigundė ir pakišo jam 1446 m. datą. Kiti mokslininkai mano, esą svarbiau paklausti, ar dokumento nuostatos buvo įgyvendintos, negu kritikuoti to teksto datavimą. Galima suprasti, kad tai atitiko XIX a. mokslo poreikį surasti teisinį aktą kiekvienam politiniam pokyčiui. Pats dLk sutikimas tapti ka­ raliumi, o paskui jo karūnavimas įgyvendina glaudžius LDK bei Lenkijos karūnos ryšius. Dar vieno akto nereikėjo. Tačiau, pasikeitus dinastijos pa­ dėčiai - dėl mirties, santuokos arba įpėdinio gimimo - atsirasdavo naujas raštas. Tokiu atveju Levvickio tekstą tiktų datuoti 1453 m., kai Kazimieras ketino vesti ir jau buvo iškilę rimtų konfliktų tarp LDK ir Lenkijos ponijų dėl Voluinės ir bendrų santykių. Tokią interpretaciją remia ir rankraštinių kodeksų (Krokuva, Biblioteka Czartoryskich RS1399 ir Poznanė, Actą Episco- palia) analizė bei Oskaro Haleckio surastas tekstas, kuris liudija apie žemės nuosavybės pokyčius Voluinėje būtent 1454 m. Palyginsiu tekstą su Dlugošo duomenimis.

Žvelgdami į 1445-1447 m. karaliaus rinkimo ir karūnavimo įvykius, mes pastebime visų - lenkų, Vokiečių ordino, Vilniaus ponijos - pusių silpnumą, kurį išnaudojo Kazimieras ir jo giminaičiai. Berods Kazimieras gudriai uždelsė, kol visos pusės suprato, jog geresnės už jį alternatyvos tikrai nėra.