<<

FALLS FROM POLITICAL POWER IN 1922 '" v ROBYN KELLER e Communicated by: Dr. Roy Schreiber n Department ofHistory s ;. y ABSTRACT t. Two factors led to Winston Churchill's political downfall in 1922. First, Churchill was seen as a key figure t. y promoting force in Chanak, . Secondly, the in power was losing the popularity n that it needed to remain in place. is re ly The political consequences of Chanak were substantial. The crisis had been played out in public and the ie newspapers were well informed ofprocesses going on in the . Churchill's part in propelling the Cabinet ie Df to the brink of a totally unexpected and unnecessary war caused him to lose support from all parties. In addition at to this already shaky foundation, the Coalition was weakening and had been acquiring disapproval before the 1e m crisis in Turkey. The pattern of these two events occurring simultaneously was enough to cause the downfall VO of the Liberal Coalition in . in, JP of Had Ministers and F .E. Smith accepted advice to abandon Lloyd George and form a ed en center party with Winston Churchill, who would have been the leading Liberal left to receive Unionist support, he Churchill may have survived the turmoil in 1922. Instead they publicly supported George which forced 1ry rm Churchill to fight for his Parliamentary seat in , as a Liberal and Free Trader. This meant that the Liberal vote would be split three ways.

The public view that portrayed Churchill as a warmonger, due to the reports of his handling the situation in ,f Turkey, and the already faltering Coalition government caused Winston Churchill to be forced out of political 10. 1lla power for the second time in his career in the public arena. 1

On , 1922, fifteen days before his forty-eighth a town on the Wes tern Shore of Turkey and the Coalition 11 birthday, Winston Churchill was to fall from political power government was losing the popularity it had previously held for the second time in eight years. This date marks his defeat and was on the verge of collapse.' at Dundee, Scotland, a seat in Parliament he had held for fourteen years. Churchill went down to overwhelming defeat. A strange coincidence made the town of Chanak, on the His previous majority at Dundee in 1918 had been fifteen Eastern Shore of the , the waterway that thousand votes; in 1922 he was rejected by than 10,000 separates Turkey in Europe and Asia (Asia Minor), the (Gilbert 456). The fickle nature of politics had been dramatically demonstrated. 1 The English Government has a prime minister. The prime ~ minister is the leader of the majority party in the House of Commons. Two main factors led to Churchill's political downfall in Assuming there is no majority party, a prime minister would have a 1922. He was seen as a key figure promoting force in Chanak, majority coalition or at least a coalition that was not rejected by the majority. 52 R. Keller

Moslem world, and so relieving ourselves of the disastrous realization both military and financial to ··-·-· ·--··- -.....-.-., "'""" 3 which our anti-Turk policy has exposed us in the Middle East and in ... I am convinced that

-~·\.•ii~ the restoration of Turkish sovereignty or suzerainty ~1~:~~~~ over the Smyrna Province is an indispensable step .. ;· 01~.JmJAf!Jait' ; S5b""'1 TURKEY· to the specification of the Middle East. (Cabinet IN· ~· EUROPE Minutes and Memoranda, Cabinet 23/31) •• MiliT11p11 JJ,... '3'4}1Ht' : Churchill went to Lloyd George with a warning of what he felt • GALLIPOLI would happen if the Greeks went on the offensive against the PENINSULA Turks to gain pieces of Asia Minor; "If the Greeks go off on another half-cocked offensive, the last card will have been played and lost, and we shall neither have a Turkish peace nor a Greek army" (James 156).

Churchill's observations seemed to be coming true. On , 1922 Mustaphe Kemal, a powerful Gallipoli commander, had driven out the Greek forces in Turkey (Gilbert 821). The Greeks reached the port of Smyrna in confusion, followed by the Kemalist army. The victorious Kemalist army turned north and advanced upon the neutral ASIA zone of the Dardanelles created by the Treaty of Sevres in Ml NOR 1920 (Gilbert 821).

The arrival of the Kemalist forces at Chanak presented a difficult situation for Churchill. Although Churchill had previously been opposed to George's support of , he now reversed his position. He viewed the line of water __.,... AJl;er;hvarshlpS. l~ ~c:h 19t5 • t..ne...,..,2!/...,.,1.. 5 separating Asia from Europe as imperative to the Empire and •••• Mi:H. t9>5 Churchill felt that if they did not fight for the piece of land Figure I: On the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles, the town of Chanak A where Chanak sits on the shores of the Dardanelles, then all neutral zone had been imposed here under the Treaty of Sovres in 1920, In the lives lost in the Balkan War would have been for nothing. 1922, the Turkish Army advanced on the Greeks towards Chanak (Source: Gilbert, Martin, Churchill A life, : Henry Holt and Company, Inc,, 1991) The Chiefs of Staff were concerned for the safety of the small British forces off Chanak. Due to the safety of the men at Chanak, the Cabinet was ready to concede to many ofKemals' indirect cause of political disaster for Winston Churchill for requirements for a peaceful settlement. However, several of the second time in eight years. the Ministers, Churchill being one of the most prominent, balked at being forced to negotiations under pressure by In 1915, he had been thrown into a political wilderness by Kemal. allegations of mishandling the Dardanelles campaign. He had been relieved of First Lord of the Admiralty due to At a cabinet meeting in , questions facing accusations of mismanagement. Churchill had been blamed Chanak spurred ministers into resolute judgment (James 157). for the "loss of three cruisers and the faulty disposition which Some ministers had now concluded, (perhaps swayed by led to the action off Coronel" (Gilbert 319). A serious Churchill's enthusiastic and persuasive speeches) that accusation was that he interfered with naval experts and their "Chanak had now become a point of great moral significance recommendations. to the prestige of the Empire" (James 157).

The foundations ofChurchill 's renewed political power began Churchill and Lloyd George continued their struggle against to crack in with his view of the Middle East. the Kemalists and disapproved of any proposal to bargain with He had consistently opposed Prime Minister Lloyd Georges' the Kemalists over the safety of the Greek army, which would pro-Greek policies and opposed the open support given to the "in any way compromise our European policy" (Cabinet Greeks in their quest for pieces of Asia Minor. On December Minutes and Memoranda, Cabinet 23/31 ). Churchill stated in 11, 1920, Churchill stated his opinion in a memorandum: the same meeting:

We should make a definite change in our policy in The Asiatic arrangement should be kept separate. direction of procuring a real peace with the The line of deep water-separating Asia from Winston Churchill Falls from Political Power in 1922 53

Europe was a line of great significance, and we the British Governnient had already angered its allies and must niake that secure by every means within our isolated itself from them. power. If the Turks take the Gallipoli Peninsula and Constantinople, we shall have lost the whole The Governnient also had to face the grim reality that they fruits of our victory and another Balkan War would were not going to receive support from Britain's people. be inevitable. (Cabinet Minutes and Memoranda, There had been virtually no indication that a military situation Cabinet 23/31) was looming and the British people were not in favor of entering another war. The Prime Minister's statement about the dilemnia was as strongly stated as Churchill's stance: The very factors mentioned above that had gotten the :lt ministers into trouble, the communique Churchill had issued ie In no circumstance could we allow the Gall.ipoli to the press, the anger of the Ministers and the m Peninsula to be held by the Turks. It was the most French Governnient at reading of their proposed stance in the :n important strategic position in the world, and the paper, and the uproar of the British people who were just or closing of the straits has prolonged the war by two informed that they were on the brink of war, ironically niade years. It was inconceivable that we should allow the ministers even more determined not to compromise their the Turks to gain possession of the Gallipoli position. )n Peninsula, and we should fight to prevent their )li doing so. (Public Records Office, Cabinet 23/31) The situation escalated on . The Cabinet ey decided that any Soviet subniarines, subniarine chasers, and m As a whole, the cabinet resolved "any attempt by the Kenialist mine-layers arriving in the Straits should be attacked; that us to occupy the Gallipoli Peninsula shall be resisted by force" "any such craft approaching the Straits on the surface from the ral (James 157). Black Sea under the Russian flag should be warned off; and in that, in the event of risk to any Allied ship from the approach The Cabinet discussed the stand and strategy they would take of any such craft encountered in the Black Sea or Straits, it on the fifteenth of September. It was beginning to look as if should be sunk. It was not deemed expedient to warn the l a Britain might be heading to war. Churchill stated that it was Soviet Governnient at present of these intentions" (Cabinet 1ad "vital to have real forces to meet the Turkish challenge" and Minutes and Memoranda, Cabinet 23/31 ). he that he was "wholly opposed to attempt to carry a bluff ter without force" (James 158). He went on to say that the Empire The explanation for this potential offense against was 1nd needed to preserve Gallipoli and inferred that it might be that it was believed that the Bolsheviks were helping the 0). willing to do so without the cooperation of . Kenialists, so they were subject to British wrath by proxy. md The ministers sent the subniarine attack instructions to the all The cabinet arranged for an early conference where they Admiral who was the Naval Comniander-in-Chief in the ng. instructed Lord Curzon to contact the Mediterranean. Serbian and Runianian governnients to get "their active and tall immediate military support in dealing with the present menace On , the Cabinet was stressing the importance of tat to the freedom of the Straits" (James 159). Lord Curzon was publicity of the Governnient's policy regarding the situation ils' also to ask the Greeks for help, and inform the French in the Near East. They had realized that the public needed to l of governnient that the British would send a division to be niade aware of the potentialities of war. They had also :nt, Constantinople if the French did the same. decided to refer the niatter to the in the by event that Lord Curzon could not convince the French Churchill was asked to draft a telegram to the Dominion Prime Governnient to support the initiative. Ministers asking for their support. Churchill was also asked :ing to issue a communique for the press stating what they were Churchill and other Ministers had been aware that the Cabinet 57). asking of Dominion Ministers. might take this view and pointed out to Lloyd George that the by League might insist upon British withdrawal from Chanak. that An unfortunate error in timing resulted in trouble for the Lloyd George overruled the decision of the Cabinet to refer nee Cabinet. Many of the Dominion Ministers read of the appeal the niatter to the League in the event that Lord Curzon was in the newspaper before they had received their official copy unable to convince the French for support. (Taylor 93 ). As a result, the Dominion Ministers reacted to the .inst appeal from Britain's Cabinet Ministers coldly. The only The situation in Chanak seemed to be easing when, on .vith favorable response came from and , Kenial agreed to listen to Allied peace mld Newfoundland. proposals. Churchill viewed this as a success of the hard line 1inet he and other Ministers were advocating. Disregarding :din Another serious problem facing the Ministers was the peaceful negotiations, the Cabinet ordered the Turkish indignation of the French governnient at being implicated, comniander to vacate Chanak. General Charles Harrington, along with the Italians, in supporting the defiant British Comniander of the forces in Chanak, was to designate a time stance. The effect of this combined string of errors was that for this. 54 R. Keller

A telegram was sent to General Harrington that stated the from retirement now provided a leader in a Cabinet's view on Kemalist troops in Chanak. It read: successful political revolt.

If his forces are not withdrawn by an hour to be The Coalition had been acquiring disapproval before the crisis settled by you, at which our combined forces will and their reputation was already tarnished. The Government be in place, all the forces at our disposal- naval, of Lloyd George was coming apart. One critic said that it had military, and air- will open fire... The time limit "produced at the center an atmosphere more like an oriental should be short and it should not be overlooked court at which favorites struggled unceasingly for position that we have received warning regarding the date than anything seen in Britain for a century or more" 1 h for Turkish operations against the (winstonchurchill.org/actsrl922.htrn). Arnold Bennet noted neutral zone from our intelligence. (James 160) after a weekend with Ministers, Austen Chamberlain, Lloyd George, and F .E. Smith, at Cherkley, "I never heard principles The orders given to Harrington had left some latitude in his or the welfare of the country mentioned" (James 154). hands. The members of the Cabinet waited anxiously for word of what was going on, and were stunned when Harrington As the revolt against Lloyd George gathered momentum, the reported on that the immediate crisis appeared to be leaders of the Coalition conceived a plan of their own. The over and he was to meet Kemal (James 160). Harrington had Coalition decided to hold the election before the chosen not to deliver the ultimatum. In the British press, Conservatives held their annual conference in November. It Harrington was viewed as a hero when headlines extolled the was to be determined at the Carlton on Thursday, military brilliance and tact Harrington had used. The Cabinet , whether the Conservatives entered the election Ministers criticized Harrington of "mixing himself up in with the Coalition or as a separate party (James 154 ). political problems" and "misleading Ministers about the military situation" (Charmley 187). As in the case ofChanak, the Coalition gave an ultimatum that backfired. The purpose was, as Chamberlain put it, "tell the On , a conference was to be held between the Conservatives bluntly that they must either follow our advice Turkish and Allied generals at Mudania (Gilbert 854 ). Few of or do without us, in which case they must find their own the Cabinet Ministers believed anything would come of the Chief, and form a Government at once. They would be in a conference, Churchill being one of the most ardent with this damned fix" (Charmley 188). Only Members of Parliament view. He was wrong. War had been averted and public would be permitted to attend and vote. The meeting was opinion was that of relief, tinged with a little alarm. deliberately timed to take place on , immediately after the result of a by-election at was declared. It The political consequences of the Chanak Incident were was expected that an Independent Conservative candidate substantial. Much of the crisis had been played out in public, would be at the bottom of the poll and thereby prove to the and the national newspapers were surprisingly well informed Conservatives they needed to remain in the Coalition (Gilbert of many of the processes within Cabinet itself. In 455). and The Daily Express, Bonar Law, who had recently retired but who nonetheless posed a serious threat of alternative The plan went terribly wrong for the Coalition. Bonar Law leadership of the Government, had a letter published, emerged as the alternative leader for the Coalition and was expressing his concern at the unilateral action of the scheduled to speak against the Coalition at the . Government (James 161 ). His opinion most likely represented Law's speech made it clear that there was an alternative what a majority of the Conservative Party within the Coalition Unionist Prime Minister. were thinking. Churchill's part in propelling the Cabinet to the brink of a totally unexpected and unnecessary war was not The Newport results arrived just as members were going into likely to win any friends on the Conservative side. the meeting. The results were to seal the fate of the Coalition. The Independent Conservative had won easily and the By itself, the Chanak incident probably would not have been Coalition's Lloyd George came in third. The meeting voted the decisive event in the history of the Coalition. It is possible against George's Coalition, 185 votes to 88 (James 163). that it might have survived the initial stand of , Lloyd George resigned that afternoon. The Coalition had and that Kemal's message of the twenty-sixth would have collapsed. been attributed to the stand the Cabinet had taken. The Coalition's probable downfall was the ultimatum of the At the moment of the Coalition's downfall, Churchill was twenty-ninth, which had received substantial press. The Times recovering from an emergency appendectomy. When he had printed on that "an immediate conflict between awoke the following morning, he learned that he was out of a British and Kemalist troops has been averted mainly by the job. This was only the beginning of the struggle Churchill was tact and wisdom of Sir Charles Harrington" (James 161 ). to face to remain in the political arena. Churchill wrote upon hearing the results, "In the twinkling of an eye, I found myself Chanak may fairly be regarded as the event that finally drew without office, without a seat, without a party, and even together Conservatives who were divided on continued without an appendix" (James 165). support of Lloyd George and the Coalition. The emergence of ;:r Winston Churchill Falls from Political Power in 1922 55 a Most Unionists were still in favor of some sort of Coalition even though Dundee was a two-member constituency, the after the election; few thought that they could win a majority Liberal vote was being split three ways. The three-way battle of the new democratic electorate (Kinnear 130). Bonar Law was between Churchill, E.D. Morel, a leading :is formed a government of sorts, and promptly called a general figure, and Edwin Scrymgeour, who was standing as an nt election. This election has been described as one of the most Independent with Labour sympathies. ad confused of modem times, "with a whole variety of Liberals tal standing under various prefixes, or none, some owing As the campaign developed, its tone became notably sharper. :m allegiance to Lloyd George, others to Herbert Henry Asquith, The Daily Express accused the Lloyd George Liberals of e" another former Prime Minister, and some to no one" being warmongers. Churchill was still down from having his ed (Charmley 189). appendix removed, but fought the accusations from bed in a yd statement, describing the Law Ministry as "the Government of es The election results established that Bonar Law was now in the Second Eleven," declaring that he would "never stifle charge and he emphasized the differences between himself myselfin such a moral and intellectual sepulcher"(J ames 163 ). and Lloyd George, promising, "the minimum of interference he at home and of disturbance abroad, stem economies, and the Others came to the front to fight for Churchill while he was he reduction of the personal power of the Prime Minister" (James convalescing. Clementine, who was still recovering from the he 164). The Conservatives had won 45 seats, Labor 142, birth of their seven-week-old daughter Mary, went to the It Asquithian Liberal 60, with 57 going to Lloyd George Liberal Dundee constituency to represent her husband. She spoke at 1y, (Gilbert 457). The sarcastic comment pertaining to the six meetings and graciously faced hostile crowds. So on election results by newsman Philip Guedalla stated: umeceptive were the crowds that sneezing powder was released by someone to break up a meeting that Clementine Mr. Bonar Law ... became Prime Minister of was speaking at. F.E. Smith also came up to speak for his 1at England for the simple and satisfying reason that friend, but Clementine told Churchill "he was no use at all, he :he he was not Mr. Lloyd George. At an open was drunk" (Gilbert 880). ice competition in the somewhat negative exercise of wn not being Mr. Lloyd George that was held in Churchill did not arrive in Dundee, Scotland until three days ri a , Mr. Law was found to be more before polling. He was still pale and weak from his operation. ~nt indubitably not Mr. Lloyd George than any of the On the first night, before a crowd of some four thousand in iaS other competitors; and, in consequence, by the Caird Hall, he defended the Chanak policy and the record of ely mysterious operation of the British Constitution, he the Coalition. His second meeting at Drill Hall did not go . It reigned in his stead. (James 164) well. Churchill stated, "I was struck by the looks of ate passionate hatred on the faces of some of the younger men and the These developments, which were out of Churchill's hands, women. Indeed, but for my helpless condition, I am sure they 1ert had profound significance on his political career. Had Austen would have attacked me" (James 164). Chamberlain and F.E. Smith, two major figures in the Coalition government, accepted the advice they were getting Even drunk, Smith was probably a charismatic speaker, but aw from many quarters to abandon Lloyd George, the Coalition neither he, nor a last minute personal appearance by Churchill, vas would have remained intact. Churchill, as the leading Liberal could avert the damage done by the Liberal split and the Labor ub. left in, would have been in the position to receive Unionist attacks on Churchill's past record that often seemed to ive support when Bonar Law called an election. As it was, advocate war. The cry 'What about the Dardanelles?' still Chamberlain and Smith had issued a public statement haunted Churchill. Even though it may have been unfair, it declaring their continued adherence to Lloyd George and worked against him when any argument of substance was nto refused to form a 'centre party' with Churchill (James 164). lacking. on. Churchill would have to fight the election to come as a Liberal the and Free Trader (Gilbert 455). The split would work to the advantage of E.D. Morel and 1ted Edwin Scrymgeour, who were elected. Churchill received less 53). As soon as he could, Churchill wrote his Dundee constituency than fourteen percent of the total vote. He was out of had saying he would stand as a Liberal and asked for their support Parliament for the first time in twenty-two years. He later told against the Labor and Communist candidates, hoping that the the King that "he had always held Dundee by speeches and Conservatives would stay with him. Churchill's campaign put argument, which required three weeks campaigning. He could was emphasis on the dangers of Socialism and the need for not do it in three days" (winstonchurchill.org/actsrl922.htrn). he national unity. This campaign strategy put him in the circle ofa with moderate Unionists with whom he was willing to unite, The pattern of events in 1922 that occurred together brought was but his attempt to rally the electors of Dundee for the fifth about Churchill's fall from power. The Chanak Incident pon time was limited by his own fragile health and Liberal propelled him and the Coalition leaders into action that were self divisions. not supported by key elements they needed. They had ignored ven important factors that would lead to their downfall. They The Unionists agreed not to oppose him, but the presence of ignored the necessity ofjoint action of the French and Italians, another National Liberal and an Asquithian Liberal meant that, who were also guarantors of the Treaty of Sevres. Also 56 R. Keller

ignored were the arguments of Lord Curzon, the Foreign Secretary who was against military action in Chanak because he believed a peaceful solution could be met with negotiations. The advice of General Sir Charles Harrington was being misinterpreted and largely disregarded. All elements for a rational solution to the Chanak crisis were ignored (James 158).

These factors working against him at the same time secured his political downfall in 1922. However, the story of a man such as Winston Churchill had many pages left before the end. The political rollercoaster he rode made him prone to much upheaval from which he would continually rise, making him the quintessential phoenix rising time and again from political ashes.

REFERENCES

Cabinet Minutes and Memoranda, 1900-1939. : Public Records Office. Charmley, John. Churchill: The End of Glory. Great Britain: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd., 1993. Gilbert, Martin. Churchill: A Life. New York: Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1991. Gilbert, Martin. Winston S. Churchill, The Stricken World, Volume IV, 1916-1922. : Houghton Mifflin Company, 1975. James, Robert Rhodes. Churchill: A Study in Failure, 1900-1939. : The World Publishing Company, 1970 Kinnear, Michael. The Fall ofLloyd George: The Political Crisis of 1922. New York: Houghton and Mifflin Company, 1967. Figure 2: Winston Churchill had been elected to his seat in Parliament four Taylor, A.J.P., et al. Churchill Revised A Critical times from the constituency of Dundee, Scotland. In 1922, he would lose his seat, receiving only fourteen percent of the electorate. (Source: Gilbert, Assessment. New York: The Dial Press, Inc, 1969. Martin. Churchill A Life. New York: Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1991) The Winston Churchill Home Page. Washington D.C. http://www.winstonchurchill.org/actsrl 922.htm. Accessed April 6, 2000.

ROBYN KELLER graduated in May 2001 with a degree in Social Studies Education and certification in U.S. History, World History, and Psychology. She became interested in the subject of Winston Churchill's political career in the spring of 2000 for 1495, Letters from Churchill, with Dr. Roy Schreiber. "Professor Schreiber has a way of studying history that makes you feel as if you were there. It was in his classes that I decided to switch majors and become a History teacher. Thanks, Professor Scheiber."