PLEASE TYPE The University of New South Wales Thesis/Dissertation Sheet Surname or Family name: Fryer First name: Other name/s: Denna Abbreviation for degree as given in the University calendar: MPHIL School: Faculty: HUMANIITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES UNSW Canberra Title: Rethinking the Dominant Narrative: an Analysis of Indonesian Approaches to Ethnic Conflict in Abstract 350 words maximum: (PLEASE TYPE)

This thesis examines the way in which the dominant, Western-centric narrative of ethnopolitics limits a comprehensive understanding of the underlying causes and features of ethnic conflict in Indonesia. This is achieved through a comparative analysis of the way in which ethnic conflict is understood in the dominant narrative compared to the Indonesian context as it presents in and Indonesianist scholarship. In particular, alarmist images of an ‘arc of instability’, a ‘balkanised Indonesia’ and an ‘archipelago of fear’ conveyed through the dominant narrative as destined, natural or inevitable will be challenged.

Analysis of Indonesian scholarship and commentary revealed two main themes divergent from the dominant narrative of ethnic conflict. Firstly, the consideration of political and economic factors as the underlying causes of ethnic conflict, and secondly, the dual comprehension of ethnicity as both primordial and instrumentalist. Themes of political and economic drivers of ethnic conflict in Indonesia thus provided the theoretical structure for this thesis. Initially, this may appear to convey Indonesian understandings of ethnic conflict as strictly instrumentalist, however deeper examination of Indonesian discourses surrounding concepts of , SARA, religion, and communal identity, revealed strong primordialist notions that work to complement, rather than oppose instrumentalist theories. In so doing, this thesis reveals the way in which Indonesian understandings of ethnic conflict illuminate alternate interpretations of ethnicity emphasising notions of political nostalgia, the nature of conflict in society, and ideas of conflict entrepreneurship. This thesis proposes the need for a new framework with which to analyse ethnic conflict and fully comprehend ethnic conflict in Indonesia outside of the rigid, traditional confines of international relations and ethnic studies frameworks.

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Rethinking the Dominant Narrative: an Analysis of Indonesian Approaches to Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia

Denna Fryer

A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Philosophy

School of Humanities and Social Sciences

UNSW Canberra

March 2015

Foreword

In the Translator’s Note at the beginning of Social Science and Power in Indonesia, Max Lane wrote,

I hope too that more non-Indonesian Indonesianists will take on tasks of translating into English the works of Indonesian academics and intellectuals. Indonesian studies as an international endeavour seems to have become almost an imperial business dominated by non-Indonesians, despite the theoretical decline of foreign Indonesian studies since the late 1970s. This can only be rectified if more Indonesian works are translated into English and other international languages and enter into international circulation to be read by a wider body of scholars. New students of Indonesia in schools, universities and social movements also need access to these ideas.

Such a commitment by foreign Indonesianists to such translation work is essential if a genuine engagement with analysis and thinking deriving from within Indonesia is to occur. Such a commitment also makes sure that Indonesian thinking and analysis is not just seen as an object of study as part of Indonesiana but as a contribution to the collective effort to develop knowledge and understanding.1

Having focused the majority of my research on the translation of materials from Bahasa Indonesia, I immediately appreciated the foresight and prudence a number of Indonesian scholars had already put towards translating Ilmu Sosial dan Kekuasaan di Indonesia into English. Were it not for this English translation, I would not have read this Translator’s Note, which made my years spent researching seem all the more valuable as part of something much bigger than a thesis on ethnic conflict in Indonesia.

This thesis is a tribute to the toil of Indonesian scholars and commentators, often rejected or persecuted as dissidents in pursuit of critical, reflective and independent thought. It is a humble contribution to exposing students of Indonesia to the ideas of Indonesian scholars. It is a challenge to a dominant narrative of ethnic conflict transcendent throughout foreign policy rhetoric, which pits ‘the West against the rest’. It is evidence of a revolutionary perspective that rejects the boundaries and confines of traditional international relations and ethnic studies theories in lieu of a pragmatic approach. It is an Indonesianist perspective of an Indonesian narrative.

I have been inspired by my research; despite the fact that the majority of scholarly discourse and commentary in Indonesia occurs outside the boundaries of refereed journals – the widely acknowledged cornerstone of professional academics – there nonetheless exists a significant body of intellectual engagement in other forums. The knowledge that these ideas existed outside of mainstream academic channels spurred my enthusiasm to give them a mainstream medium – a voice for students of what Lane considered “knowledge and understanding” not “Indonesiana”.

1 Lane, Max. 2004. Translator’s Note. In Vedi R. Hadiz and Daniel Dhakidae, Social science and power in Indonesia, ed. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (: Equinox, 2005). ii I like to think that this thesis, in analysing an alternate narrative to the dominant one, reflexively endows relevance back onto external analysts of foreign cultures. It is more relevant than ever in today’s inter-connected world, that foreign students have an intimate and nuanced understanding of the causes of conflict and strife in a country that is not their own. What this thesis argues is that this understanding must be attuned to the context of the country of analysis. This is relevant to academia as well as to policy. Moreover it is relevant in the pursuit of peace and harmony.

iii Table of Contents Foreword ii List of Figures v List of Indonesian Words and Acronyms vi Introduction 1 An ‘Arc of Instability’? 1 Research Aims and Methodology 6 Chapter 1. Challenging the Dominant Narrative and Rethinking Ethnicity 12 Limitations of the Dominant Narrative 12 The Problem with ‘Ethnicity’ 15 An Old or New Theory of Ethnicity: Developing a Theory for Indonesia 17 Rethinking the Dominant Narrative: the Indonesian Narrative 19 Chapter 2. Background: Indonesia’s Post-Colonial Ethnic Conflict History 24 Independence and the Orde Lama 25 The Orde Baru and SARA Conflicts 26 The Post-Soeharto Era and Reformasi 28 Understanding Ethnic Conflict: the West Meets Indonesia 30 Chapter 3. Political Factors to Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia 34 Dominant Discourse on Politics and Ethnic Conflict 34 The Indonesian View 35 The Politics of Religion in Indonesia 35 The Politics of Representation in Indonesia 53 Chapter 4. Economic Factors to Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia 66 Dominant Discourse on Economics and Ethnic Conflict 66 The Indonesian view 68 Economic and Resource Conflict Theories 69 Production and Primitive Accumulation Theories 74 Decentralisation and Democratisation: Economic Policies and Ethnic Conflict 78 Case Study: Kuantan Mudik 82 Chapter 5. Rethinking Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia 86 Ethnicity as a Characteristic, Not a Cause of Ethnic Conflict 86 The Eventuality and Necessity of Conflict 88 Political Nostalgia as a Unifying Force 90 Conflict Entrepreneurship as a Social Norm 92 Conclusion 95 Where to From Here? Developing a Framework to Solve the Problem with ‘Ethnicity’ 99 Bibliography 102

iv List of Figures

Figure 1.The Five Principles of Pancasila ...... 37 Figure 2.Garuda Pancasila ...... 50 Figure 3.The Production of Profit...... 75

v List of Indonesian Words and Acronyms

Abangan Javanese cultural group of villagers who follow Hindu, Muslim and animist elements of faith Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesian Armed Forces Indonesia, ABRI Adat Customary Ahmadiya Islamic minority group in Indonesia Aliran Stream/following Aliran Kepercayaan Traditional Indonesian belief systems/cults Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the dengan Dunia , KISDI Islamic World Antisipasi Disintegrasi Negera Ini The Anticipation of the Disintegration of this Sebuah Wacana Mengantisipasi Nation: A Discourse to Anticipate the Terjadinya Perpecahan Negera Ini Fragmentation of this Nation Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Committee for the Preparatory Work for Kemerdekaan Indonesia, BPUPKI Indonesian Independence Bahasa Indonesia The Indonesian Language Bantuan Langsung Tunai Cash Transfers Unity in Diversity Bidang Marturia – Persekutuan Marturia area of the Community of Gereja-Gereja di Indonesia Indonesian Churches Bupati Regent Dana aspirasi Aspirational funds Danpaspampres - Komandan Commandant of the Presidential Guard Pasukan Pengamanan Presiden Desentralisasi Decentralisation Dewan Perwakilan Daerah Republik Indonesian Regional Representatives Council Indonesia, DPD-RI Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication DDII Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR Indonesian House of Representatives Dinamika Kekerasan dan Konflik di Dynamics of Violence and Conflict in Indonesia Indonesia Ekonomi Politik Konflik: Akumulasi Economy of Political Conflict: Primitive Primitif dan Sumber Daya Alam di Accumulation and Natural Resources in Indonesia Indonesia Front Pembela Islam Islamic Defenders Front Ghazwu al-Fikr Thought War (from Arabic) Gotong royong Mutual aid Hizbut Tahrir Party of Liberation

vi Huria Kristen Batak Protestan Batak Christian Protestant Church Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se- Association of Indonesian Muslim Indonesia, ICMI Intellectuals Institut Agama Islam Negeri State Islamic Institute Institut Titian Perdamaian Peace Building Institute Jamkesmas – Jaminan Kesehatan Community Health Scheme Masyarakat Jaringan Islam Liberal Liberal Islam Movement Kampung Small village Kawasan Timur Indonesia Eastern Indonesian Regions Keroyokan Mob Ketuhanan yang maha esa dengan The state is based on the belief in one kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam almighty god, with the obligation for its bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya Muslim adherents to carry out the Islamic law/Syari'ah Komisi Untuk Orang Hilang dan Commission for the Disappeared and Victims Korban Tindak Kekerasan, KontraS of Violence Kompas A daily Indonesian language newspaper owned by Kompas Gramedia Group Kompasiana A social media blog owned by Kompas Gramedia (KG) Media Group Laskar Jihad Warriors of Jihad - Islamist and anti-Christian Indonesian militia Lembaga Ilmu Pengatahuan Indonesian Institute of Sciences – Centre for Indonesia – Pusat Dokumentasi dan Scientific Documentation and Information Informasi Ilmiah, LIPI – PDII Lemhannas RI – Lembaga National Resilience Institute of the Republic Ketahanan Nasional Republik of Indonesia Indonesia Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia Indonesian Mujahedeen Council Majelis Ulama Indonesia Indonesian Council of Ulamas Massa Masses/mob Masterplan Percepatan dan Master Plan for Accelerating the Expansion Perluasan Pembangunan Ekonomi of Economic Development 2011-2025 Indonesia 2011-2025, MP3EI Masyumi – Partai Majelis Syuro Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations Muslimin Indonesia Melawan Gurita Neoliberalisme Against the Octopus of Neoliberalism Muhammadiyah From Arabic - followers of Muhammad Musyawarah mufakat Consensus or democratic decision making Nahdlatul Ulama A traditionalist Sunni Islam group in Indonesia

vii Nasakom – nasionalis, agama, Nationalist, religion, and communist komunis Nekolim – neo-kolonialisme- Neo-colonialism-imperialism imperialisme Orde Baru Orde Lama Old Order Padnas – Kewaspadaan Nasional National Vigilance Pancasila The official philosophy of Indonesia - from Old Javanese words (originally from ), ‘pañca’ meaning five, and ‘sīla’ meaning principles Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN National Mandate Party Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle Perjuangan, PDI-P Partai Demokrat Democratic Party Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat, Hanura People’s Conscience Party Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya, Great Indonesia Movement Party Gerindra Partai Golongan Karya, Golkar Party of the Functional Groups Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS Prosperous Justice Party Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB National Awakening Party Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, Crescent Star Party PPP Partai Komunis Indonesia Indonesian Communist Party Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI Nationalist Party of Indonesia Pedagang Kaki Lima, PKL Street Vendors Pemekaran Daerah Territorial splitting Pemekaran Daerah dan Konflik Regional Expansion and Spatial Conflict: Keruangan: Kebijakan Otonomi Regional Autonomy Policy and its Daerah dan Implementasinya di Implementation in Indonesia Indonesia Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah Union for Islamic Education Piagam Jakarta Jakarta Charter Pilkada Pilihan Kepala Daerah - Regional Head Elections Javanese cultural group of traditional bureaucratic elite from pre-colonial times Proklamasi Kemerdekaan Indonesia Proclamation of Indonesian Independence Pusat Penelitian Kemasyarakatan Research Centre for Society and Culture – dan Kebudayaan - Lembaga Ilmu Indonesian Institute of Sciences Pengatahuan Indonesia

viii Ramadan Ninth month in the Islamic calander – often observed by Muslims as a month of prayer an d fasting Ratu Adil Just ruler movement Reformasi The Reformation Santri Javanese cultural group of urban middle class, stricter adherents to Islamic teachings Sarekat Islam Islamic Association Satpol PP – Satuan Polisi Pamong Civil Service Police Unit Praja Sekolah Tinggi Teologi (STT) Theological College Jakarta Jakarta Sekularisme, Liberalisme, Pluralisme Secularism, Liberalism, Pluralism within the dalam Tubuh Umat Islam Indonesia Indonesian Islamic Body Serangan fajar Dawn Attack Serikat Buruh Garmen Tekstil dan United Employees of Textile Garments and Sepatu Gabungan Serikat Buruh Shoes - Combined Union of Independent Independen, SBGTS-GSBI Employees SARA - suku, agama, ras, antar- Tribe, religion, race, inter-group golongan Taman Mini Indonesia Indah Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature Tim sukses Success teams Tentara Negara Indonesia, TNI Indonesian National Army Umat Islam Indonesia Indonesian Islamic Community Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation Indonesia

ix INTRODUCTION

An ‘Arc of Instability’?

Referring to the band of “weakness” to Australia’s north, the notion of the ‘arc of instability’ arose as a lexicon and metaphor in Australian strategic and political thinking in the late 1990s.1 In defining the parameters and nature of this arc, scholars such as Paul Dibb, claimed it to be “the arc of instability to the north and east of Australia”, which included the threat of “a balkanised Indonesia.”2 Benjamin Reilly declared it as the “string of weak, fragile, and artificial states and sub states in a region which ranges from the separatist Indonesian province of Aceh bordering the Indian Ocean in the west, to the coup-stricken Fiji islands in the South Pacific Ocean to the East.”3 This generic and broad-brush image of the region to Australia’s north was bestowed political validity through its use by politicians such as Bob Sercombe, Australian Ministers for Defence Robert Hill, Brendan Nelson, and Kim Beazley, as well as Prime Ministers John Howard and Kevin Rudd.4 Former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans went so far as to expand the arc of instability “of too many fragile, collapsed and internally warring states” from West Africa to East Asia.5 Outside of Australia, the ‘arc of instability’ has resonance with US Department of Defense characterisations of other troubled ‘axis’ regions, such as the Middle East and Northeast Asia.6 In both the Australian and wider global context, ‘the arc of instability’ has been referred to as analogous to an ‘arc of chaos’.7 In the South East Asian (or Indo-Pacific) region, the archipelago of Indonesia is central to this euphemism.8

Alarmist terms, or sound bites, such as the ‘arc of instability’, the ‘arc of chaos’ and the ‘balkanisation of Indonesia’ have been criticised for over-generalising and dramatising a series of individual situations across a diverse region. Stewart Firth considered these arguments to have utility only in so far as sensationalist and xenophobic terminology

1 Robert Ayson, "The ‘arc of instability’ and Australia's strategic policy," Australian Journal of International Affairs 61, no. 2 (2007). 220. 2 Paul Dibb, David Hale, and Peter Pince, "Asia's Insecurity," Survival 41, no. 3 (1999). 18. 3 Benjamin Reilly, "Internal conflict and regional security in island Asia: Stabilizing the ‘‘arc of instability’’," in The unraveling of island Asia? Governmental, communal, and regional instability, ed. Bruce Vaughn (Westport: Praeger, 2002). 6. 4 R. H. Huisken and Meredith Christine Thatcher, History as policy: framing the debate on the future of Australia's defence policy (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2007). Chapter 6; Bob Sercombe, ABC Radio Australia Pacific Beat, ed. Gareme Dobell (2006).; Duane Robert Worley, Waging Ancient War: Limits on Preemptive Force (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2003).; Thomas C. McMullen. The Bush Doctrine: Power Concepts, Preemption and the Global War on Terror. DTIC Document, 2004. 5 Gareth Evans, Waging War and Making Peace, International Crisis Group, accessed 05 March 2015, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:zMBSA0p- FT4J:www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2003/waging-war-and-making- peace.aspx+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=au. 6 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial defense review report (Washington DC: US Government Printer, 2001). 4. In other instances, the ‘arc’ stretches “from the Western Hemisphere into North Africa and the East Asian Littoral” see: Paul Wolfowitz, Testimony on US military presence in Iraq: Implications for global defense posture, accessed 01 January 2015, www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2003/sp20030618-depsecdef0302.html. 7 Sercombe, "ABC Radio Australia Pacific Beat." 8 Wolfowitz, "Testimony on US military presence in Iraq". 1 might be used to support a bolstered regional defence programme among domestic audiences in Australia.9 The strongly connotative language employed in these lexicons can be seen not only as an oversimplification of a broad range of cultures and peoples, but as driven by a deeper and more innate culture of what Robert Ayson revealed to be “a convenient and effective cognitive shortcut… in a world of very bounded rationality... the ‘arc’ becomes a well understood symbol of a particular political argument.”10 Such critical analyses show how words and images can shape strategic posture and resonate with other analyses of ‘ethnic’ conflict, such as Adam Roberts’ observation that “the words used to characterize a conflict matter deeply… They often imply the type of interpretation to be placed on it, and even the policy prescription to be followed.”11 Lexicons of the ‘Cold War’ and the ‘axis of evil’ acted in this way as powerful organisational frameworks – policy prescriptions – to agitate and mobilise people to counter-act so called forces of instability.12 ‘Not dissimilarly, descriptive language of states as ‘weak’, ‘fragile’ and ‘failing’, embedded within the image of ‘arc of instability/chaos’, are problematic not only because they tend to pigeon hole conflicts that are multi-faceted, but because they can decisively frame strategic policy.

Not only can such language be said to act as a powerful conceptual-organisational framework, it can also operate as a paradoxical catalyst. Descriptions of an ‘arc of instability’ and ‘failed states’ can themselves generate umbrage at these characterisations, which in turn lead to increases in defence measures, and thereby perpetuate and solidify the original fear.13 What this demonstrates is how language has a reflexive effect of portraying security issues as befitting of the dominant world view and policy prescriptions. The way negative and fearful connotations are created through the use of language is exemplified in the slogan used by conflict journalist Andre Vltchek in the title of his 2012 book, Indonesia: Archipelago of Fear.14 Not only does the title evoke ideas of a looming and ominous threat, but throughout there are images of ‘infection’ and ‘inoculation’, “scavenger birds on garbage dumps,” a nation “stumbling and confused”. Chapter Eight elucidates the material effect of these problems through the use of subheadings invoking policy failure: “ferries sink, airplanes crash, terrible roads and rotting trains.”15

Metaphors in security and ethnic conflict studies can also be understood not so much as statements that merely describe a geographical region, but as subjective projections of fear. Ethnic conflicts have often been euphemistically compared to natural disasters such as fires, floods and epidemics.16 As Chamsy el-Ojeili and Patrick Hayden observed,

such naturalist images and tropes, connoting irrationality and savagery (Mount, 2000), are perhaps more important in illustrating the way in which Western

9 Stewart Firth, The Pacific "Arc of Instability", ed. Graeme Dobell, Correspondents Report (ABC 2006). 10 Ayson, "The ‘arc of instability’." 224. 11 Adam Roberts, "Communal Conflict as a Challenge to International Organization: The Case of Former Yugoslavia," Review of International Studies 21, no. 4 (1995). 390. 12 Ibid. 13 Huisken and Thatcher, History as Policy. 14 Andre Vltchek, Indonesia: archipelago of fear (London: Pluto Press, 2012). 15 Ibid. xv, 26, and 37. 16 Ibid. 7. 2 commentators have tended to ‘other’ those outside the West – seeing identity here as immutable, historical, pure, and barbaric.17

This terminology conjures strong emotive reactions, and leads people to perceive ethnic conflict as a natural phenomenon which requires a commensurate rapid and urgent response, such as fighting a fire or cleaning up debris after a cyclone – after a “destined, natural or inevitable” occurrence.18 This use of language emphasises the necessity of a rapid, disaster, or emergency response to ethnic conflict, rather than portraying it as an issue that should be resolved through a long term political process.

In the case of Indonesia, Vltchek uses this natural disaster-laden language to describe the crippling and seemingly intractable poverty, violence and criminality throughout the archipelago, despite the fact that conflict and turmoil is not homogeneous throughout the nation. Themes and notions of natural disaster and arcs of instability/chaos arguably form the focal point of dominant discourses surrounding ethnic conflict studies in Indonesia. What these sound bites, slogans, terms and titles overlook is the civil, inclusive and dialogical political practices that exist, and detract from a comprehensive understanding of conflict situations.19

Following this line of thinking, notions of the natural inevitability and intractability of chaos and conflict seen in the ‘arc of instability’ can viewed as part of wider global narratives of post-Cold War thinking. In particular, it appears linked to Samuel P. Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations theory of global disorder, whereby some inter- civilisation relations were deemed to be more conflict-prone than others, and fault lines were drawn between Islamism, Orthodoxy, Hinduism, and the African and Western Christian others.20 Huntington’s argument plays out at the macro level as a feud between the “West and the rest.”21 This argument was consistent with those of other post-Cold War commentators – such as Benjamin Barber’s Jihad vs. McWorld, and Mark Juergensmeyer’s The New Cold War – in juxtaposing an image of Western order against a conflict prone disorder of ‘the rest’.22 It also illuminates the existence of a Western narrative to conflict, which exists in stark opposition to the narrative of other cultures – ‘the rest’. However, the utility of Huntington’s argument is limited.23 Describing the ‘clash’ between the West and non-West, or more clearly, “Western arrogance, Islamic intolerance and Sinic assertiveness,” Huntington failed to describe a

17 Chamsy el-Ojeili and Patrick Hayden, Critical Theories of (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 164. Citing Gavin Mount, The Problem of Peoples: global politics, ethnicity and the struggle for legitimacy (Saarbrucken: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010). 18 Mount. “A World of Tribes?” 2000. In Greg Fry and Jacinta Hagan, Contending images of world politics (Basingstoke: New York, 2000). 154. 19 Gerry van Klinken, Communal violence and democratization in Indonesia: small town wars, Routledge contemporary Southeast Asia series (London: Routledge, 2007). 170. 20 Samuel P. Huntington, The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). 21 Ibid. 184. 22 See Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld (New York: Times Books, 1995). and Mark Juergensmeyer, The new Cold War?: religious nationalism confronts the secular state, Comparative studies in religion and society; 5 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 23 See Richard E. Rubenstein and Jarle Crocker, "Challenging Huntington," Foreign Policy, no. 96 (1994). and Ted Robert Gurr, "Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System: 1994 Presidential Address," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (1994). 3 large number of conflicts in the post-Cold War world, such as intra-group violence within Western, Islamic or Sinic communities.24 Furthermore, the idea that civilisations could indeed “clash” conjures notions of an imminent and violent confrontation, which is unlikely and geographically unrealistic. To address these shortfalls, Huntington later wrote an article The Age of Muslim Wars, which dealt with the issue of intra-Islamic conflict directly, stating that

if one or two states dominated the Muslim world, which has not been the case since the end of the Ottoman Empire, less violence would occur among Muslims and, probably between Muslims and non-Muslims.25

That a return to the era of the Ottoman Empire is the answer to religious fundamentalism, militant Islamism, ideological radicalisation, inter-religious and inter- ethnic violence is a bold and somewhat unrealistic claim. It demonstrates a polarised realist and orientalist view of non-Western cultures. Nonetheless, the image of a ‘clash of civilizations’ has been very influential in the dominant narrative of ethnic conflict discourses. In particular, Huntington’s revisionist modernisation theory has played a significant role in shaping the development of Indonesian political thought. This is because, as Vedi Hadiz and Daniel Dhakidae explained, achieving modernity was considered vital to the Orde Baru (New Order), and ‘modernity’ was deemed to be a measure of

the state’s ability to maintain political stability and pursue capitalist development… [This] fitted quite nicely with the New Order ideologues’ assertion that the institutional framework of the regime was tailored to ensure the stability required in guaranteeing economic progress. It suited their idea that liberal democracy, with its potentially destabilizing characteristic, was not in accordance with development aims and also culturally un-Indonesian.26

Strongly informed by Huntington’s theory, the dominant narrative influenced the formulation of policies and the engineering of social sciences for political and economic purposes in Soeharto’s Indonesia; alternate views, independent research and critical analysis were disincentivised or quashed. This legacy will be challenged in this thesis through analysis of the Indonesian narrative, the narrative of ‘the rest’.

Robert Kaplan’s ‘coming anarchy’ has been another powerful image of ethnic conflict in the dominant narrative.27 Kaplan reinforced the idea that countries afflicted by ethnic conflict were institutionally weak and lacked the bureaucratic processes to protect their people thereby creating an intractable security dilemma.28 Kaplan’s idea that anarchy could be brought about by ethnic conflict was, however, counter-intuitive to prevailing assumptions in international relations. If anarchy describes the inherent structural condition of the inter-state system, it is itself a concept that regards states as the most primary agents of that system. Ethnic groups tend to be treated as epistemologically

24 For empirical disproval of Huntington’s hypothesis see: Andrej Tusicisny, "Civilizational Conflicts: More Frequent, Longer, and Bloodier?," Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 4 (2004). 25 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Age of Muslim Wars," Newsweek 2001. 26 Hadiz and Dhakidae, Social science. 16. [This] added to the quote. 27 Robert D. Kaplan, The coming anarchy: shattering the dreams of the post Cold War (New York: Random House, 2000). 28 Kaplan in Mount, Problem of Peoples. 8. 4 separate or marginal to world politics and not as primary political agents. In arguing that ethnic groups create anarchy, Kaplan appears to have contorted the system by treating ethnic groups as significant political agents of change.29 In this seemingly fragmented and chaotic post-Cold War context, it is a stretch to assert that the harbingers of a ‘coming anarchy’ are ethnic groups, ordinarily considered in dominant discourse to have no significant political or moral agency.

Furthermore, Kaplan’s argument that ethnic conflict should be understood in the context of “scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism and disease” disregards the legitimacy and political potency of non-state entities, such as ethnic groups, and has been criticised as an unhelpful, alarmist and orientalist outlook of ethnic conflict.30 The idea that ethnic conflict is associated with a ‘coming anarchy’ aligns with concepts of an ‘arc of instability’ in the dominant narrative of ethnic conflict in Indonesia; an idea that will be challenged through the establishment of an alternate narrative – an Indonesian narrative – in this thesis.

Francis Fukuyama’s theories also play a part in constructing the dominant narrative of ethnic conflict discourses. In his influential 1989 essay, The End of History? he claimed that the end of the Cold War brought about the victory of Western liberal political principles over all other ideologies, including the primal and irrational expressions of culture or ethnicity. “The triumph of the West, of the Western idea”, he claimed, “is evident in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism.”31 Even so, Fukuyama admitted that despite this clear victory, “there would still be a high and perhaps rising level of ethnic and nationalist violence, since those are impulses incompletely played out, even in parts of the post-historical world.”32 In this sense, it can be said that Fukuyama claimed the ‘end of History’ heralded the coming of an enlightened age where people would forevermore exist in a peaceful equilibrium, with free trade and universal human rights, but from time to time experience ‘impulses’ – which Fukuyama implied are the more regressive and degenerate qualities of man – until such a time as those who experience impulses are inevitably suppressed. This argument is problematic however, as it inherently denies the legitimacy of groups who seek to express themselves outside of a liberal democratic system, relegating them to the arena of the primitive and the irrelevant.33 If these cultural and ethnic groups are insignificant compared to ‘civic’ and ‘democratic’ identities in a liberal democratic state system – an anarchic inter-state system – then it stands to reason that a new framework is required to counter the euphemistic organisational frameworks that engender sound bites like the ‘end of History’ or an ‘arc of instability’, which inform the dominant narrative.

This thesis is, in part, a critical response to these epistemological tendencies in traditional Western political and moral philosophy to systematically marginalise ethnic

29 Ibid. 9. 30 For an orientalist critique of Kaplan’s theory see: Luca Anceschi, Gervasio Gennaro, and Andrea Teti, Informal Power in the Greater Middle East: Hidden Geographies (New York: Routelage, 2014).; and Dag Tuastad, "Neo-Orientalism and the new barbarism thesis: aspects of symbolic violence in the Middle East conflict(s)," Third World Quarterly 24, no. 4 (2003). 31 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?," The National Interest Summer (1989). 32 Ibid. 18. 33 For a critique of Fukuyama’s theories see: Timothy Burns, After history? Francis Fukuyama and his critics (Lanham: Rowman Littlefield, 1994). 5 peoples from political philosophy and legitimate politics. It challenges tacit assumptions perpetuated by the dominant narrative that ethnic conflict is a natural or inevitable occurrence, and the reflexive formulation of policies that perpetuate notions of ethnic groups posing a problem to their host states. Grand notions of ‘clashing civilizations’, a ‘coming anarchy’, and the ‘end of History’, are influential in international relations theory and have dominated discourses of ethnic conflict throughout the non-Western world more generally and will be shown to have influenced Indonesia in particular. This thesis will argue that this dominant narrative has hindered a comprehensive understanding of the underlying causes and features of ethnic conflict, by analysing an alternate narrative – the Indonesian narrative. Research Aims and Methodology

The purpose of this research is two-fold; to identify and analyse the themes of Indonesian scholarship on the matter of ethnic conflict in Indonesia, and to combine these themes to form an Indonesian narrative of the dynamics and nature of ethnic conflict, with which to challenge the dominant narrative. The outcome of this analysis and comparison is a more comprehensive and culturally applicable understanding of the way in which ethnic conflict in Indonesia is perceived by Indonesians in comparison to the way it is understood in the dominant narrative. This will assist external parties to the conflict, i.e. neighbouring countries, external commentators and policy makers among others, to gain a deeper understanding of the underlying factors to ethnic conflict in Indonesia, ordinarily eclipsed by the dominant narrative. It will also present an argument for the cross-pollination of analytical frameworks in studying ethnic conflict.

In pursuit of these two aims, I will begin by exploring the limitations of the dominant narrative. From this critique, three main problems with understanding ethnic conflict in the dominant narrative are proposed; firstly the inflexible boundaries of international relations theories, secondly the lack of a moral and political vernacular for understanding ‘ethnicity’, and thirdly the rigid terms of ethnic studies theories. Realism and liberalism will be analysed as the two dominant international relations theories in ethnic studies discourses and will be critiqued for their utility as theoretical frameworks with which to analyse ethnic conflict in Indonesia. Primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism will be analysed as the three main ethnic studies theories that underpin the dominant narrative as frameworks to understand and define ethnicity. This critical analysis was conducted largely in the English language, using journal articles, books, newspaper articles and media releases. It illuminated vast inadequacies in understanding ethnicity, ethnic groups and ethnic conflict within the dominant narrative, which when applied to the case of Indonesia, was just as inadequate.

These inadequacies led me to the following questions: how did we get here and why are these theories so inadequate? In response to these questions and subsequent critical analysis, I then embarked on a preliminary reading of a broad range of Indonesian commentary on ethnic conflict, largely in previously untranslated texts from Bahasa Indonesia. I conducted a ‘preliminary reading’ of Indonesian texts for two main reasons; firstly to establish what, if any, were the theoretical frameworks employed by Indonesian scholars and commentators, and secondly, to reflect on which theoretical

6 framework, if any, I would choose for my own analysis. As such, Chapter One is the product of this deliberation. Not only does it find the dominant narrative inadequate in understanding ethnic conflict in Indonesia, but so too the dominant international relations theories, multifarious definitions of ethnicity, and ethnic studies theory frameworks.

I will suggest a discursive approach that is not limited to the confines of one international relations or ethnic studies theory framework and invoke their individual elements, as applicable. This is because a discourse analysis of Indonesian commentary on ethnic conflict reveals a perception of ethnicity as real, tangible, affective and apriori, and at the same time, a pragmatic agent to achieve representation. This means that Indonesian commentary draws on both primordialist and instrumentalist concepts, and is not limited by the confines of either framework.

In this discourse analysis, a wide range of Indonesian commentary and scholarship in Bahasa Indonesia was read, translated and analysed. This was difficult because the field of ethnic conflict studies as an academic discipline in Indonesia is limited for a number of reasons. Instead, I found that discourses on conflict in Indonesia took place in the form of workshops or collaborative studies, such as those of the Institut Titian Perdamaian, ITP, (Peace Building Institute) an institute of Indonesian intellectuals who study the principles of peace, law, justice and the creation of a non-violent culture in Indonesia.34 Similarly, the Pusat Penelitian Kemasyarakatan dan Kebudayaan – Lembaga Ilmu Pengatahuan Indonesia, PMB-LIPI, (Research Centre for Society and Culture) is an Indonesian Government Institution and source of literary writing on the subject of conflict in Indonesia. Its goal, as made explicit on the LIPI website, is to conduct research “in accordance with the provisions of the applicable legislation.”35

In other instances it was more difficult to find Indonesian scholars that published independently of a think tank or institute, who had academic backgrounds. One such example of this is Mr. A. Kadarmanta, who is a retired Police Chief considered to have a clean career and is well respected.36 Kadarmanta’s writing is largely based on his opinion and his direct experience, but the fact that his work is not a scholarly, peer- reviewed text is indicative of the education system in Indonesia, rather than the author’s ability to intelligently comment on the Indonesian system of government.37 It is difficult to find more than a couple of scholarly articles published in peer-reviewed journals or academic articles independently published in universities by Indonesian intellectuals on ethnic conflict in Indonesia. Perhaps this is the result of what Hadiz and Dhakidae argued is a “continuing legacy of the New Order on Social Sciences.”38 In his inaugural lecture, The Lonely Road of the Intellectual: Scholars in Indonesia, Arief Budiman described this legacy as a bureaucratisation of the social sciences, and put forward an anecdote popular among Indonesian intellectuals of the time:

34 Peace Building Institute, About ITP – Profile, accessed 01 June 2014, http://www.titiandamai.or.id/EN/konten.php?nama=Profil&op=profil. 35 Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Social Sciences and Humanities, accessed 01 June 2014, http://www.lipi.go.id/ 36 Kadarmanta, Antisipasi Disintegrasi Negeri Ini (Jakarta: PT. Forum Media Utama 2008). 37 Discussion with Edward Aspinall, 27 March 2013, ANU. Research notes on file with author. 38 Hadiz and Dhakidae, Social science. 23. 7 Indonesian people have three main characteristics: intelligent, honest and pro- government. Unfortunately, each Indonesian can only have two of these three characteristics. So, when somebody is honest and pro-government, he/she must not be intelligent. If he/she is intelligent and pro-government, he/she must not be honest. If he/she is intelligent and honest, he/she must be anti- government. This reflects the condition of the scholars in present Indonesia. Since scholars are considered as intelligent people, therefore for those who are pro-government, they are considered as being dishonest.39

In highlighting the difficulties of being a scholar or intellectual in Soeharto’s Indonesia, Budiman also illuminated the foundations upon which academia in the post-Soeharto era was built. As outlined by Hadiz and Dhakidae, the fall of Soeharto did not bring about change in the bureaucratic culture and practices of educational and research institutions in Indonesia overnight. Instead of championing Soeharto’s idea of Indonesian modernisation, higher education and research institutions in Indonesia in the post-Soeharto period tended to shift their focus on market-orientated theories, or “dogmatic, narrow, neo-liberalism”.40 This effectively perpetuates an instrumental and pragmatic view of social sciences in Indonesia propagated during the Orde Baru; not the confident autonomy and powers of critical reflection otherwise considered essential to social science. As Soedjatmoko prophesised, “the unavoidable disappointment in the decision makers at the contribution of the social sciences and the sneering at the low quality of research will ultimately backlash on the social sciences.”41

This legacy of favouring the pragmatic over the critical also affects the ability of Indonesian academics at Indonesian Universities to finance independent studies for publication, at the expense of teaching full time. Discussion with experts in the field of Indonesian publishing, academe and human rights – Prodita Sabarini, Edward Aspinall, and Andreas Harsono respectively – suggested that as a result, much of the commentary surrounding issues of ethnic conflict in Indonesia would be published independently through the use of blogs and opinion pieces, if not in conference proceedings, books and research initiatives such as Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group, and Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE).42

That the evolution of social sciences in Indonesia has been problematic is not to say that high quality Indonesian social science research does not exist. In fact the existence of reflective and critical Indonesian scholarship and commentary on ethnic conflict in Indonesia is the premise of this thesis. The need to find different avenues for research where there is a lack of Indonesian scholarship in the field is raised in Sidel’s work, On the ‘anxiety of incompleteness’: a post-structuralist approach to religious violence in Indonesia, where he credits a number of sources of evidence for his

39 Arief Budiman, The lonely road of the intellectual: scholars in Indonesia, ed. Languages Melbourne Institute of Asian and Societies (Parkville, Vic: Melbourne Institute of Asian Languages and Societies, 1999). 20. 40 Hadiz and Dhakidae, Social science. 23. 41 Soedjatmoko in Ibid. 42 Email correspondence with Prodita Sabarini on 16 September 2014 and interview with Andreas Harsono on 18 September 2014, Jakarta. Research notes on file with author. 8 arguments; drawing heavily on anthropologists who have conducted ethnographic field work in various parts of Indonesia as well as Indonesian investigative journalists, human rights activists and other researchers, who he considers indispensable for understanding Indonesia.43 Sidel states that “this kind of non-academic but often quasi- academic Indonesian-language literature on the country’s politics and society constitutes another rich trove of research and writings,” which is unparalleled by academic writings on the subject of religious violence in Indonesia.

Similarly, Heryanto argued that one of the biggest barriers to South-East Asian scholars being part of the international debate is the language barrier, stating that “the notion of using Southeast Asian languages for writing theses, teaching, or conferences has not been seriously and widely pursued”.44 Because languages are “socially bound discursive practices… they are never entirely and readily translatable… Different languages construct and present the world differently.”45 Here Heryanto credits Benedict Anderson’s earlier works for their intimate understanding of the language of the cultures he is analysing. As such, this thesis has drawn upon the works of many Indonesian commentators writing in the Indonesian language so as to capture themes and nuances that may be otherwise lost in translation.

In translating Indonesian texts in detail, an initial reading was conducted to draw out themes and ideas that may be relevant to this thesis, followed by an in depth translation of each text – word by word, line by line – in order to capture both the strict translation as well as the author’s more nuanced meaning. Throughout this process, consideration was given to my own context and bias, as well as the way I might perceive meaning in a text, which I sought to verify and discuss with various Indonesian commentators in interviews and meetings to ensure I had the right idea. Once a considerable database of translated text and ideas was compiled, a second reading – constantly referring back to the original text – was conducted, to draw out themes among Indonesian commentators.

Consideration was also given to the location in which the text was published, the background of the author, and the works of other scholars and commentators in the text in order to provide context to the analysis of each argument. Once themes were illuminated, the process of analysing these themes could begin by sorting points, ideas and authors under sub-headings, which initially didn’t appear to reflect the subheadings I have come to deliver in this thesis. This is because the first sorting was not enough; re-reading and comparison to Indonesianist – being non-Indonesian scholars and experts who specialise in understanding and interpreting Indonesia – commentary drew out new ideas and narrowed my subheadings from what was initially four or five, to simply two – political and economic factors to ethnic conflict in Indonesia. This was also achieved by frequent referral to what I had originally outlined as the central problem for instigating this thesis – inaccuracies in a dominant narrative of ethnic conflict.

43 John T. Sidel, "On the 'anxiety of incompleteness': a post-structuralist approach to religious violence in Indonesia," South East Asia Research 15, no. 2 (2007). 44 Ariel Heryanto, "Can There Be Southeast Asians in Southeast Asian Studies?," Moussons 05 (2002). 45 Ibid. 9 As such, this thesis is the product of a broad ranging analysis of Indonesian commentary from a wide range of sources, including journal articles, books, newspaper articles, interviews, discussions, blogs and conference proceedings. Some non- Indonesian commentary was also analysed where the author has a background in Indonesian studies or is referred to specifically in the writings of Indonesian commentators as a point of reference for a theoretical framework, such as in Chapter Three, where Novrian and Swanvri draw on David Harvey’s theories in his works Social Justice and the City and The Urbanization of Capital.46

In summary, this thesis presents as a discursive analysis of two main catalysts to ethnic conflict – the political factors and economic factors – because they are the themes resonant throughout Indonesian commentary. Analysis of the Indonesian understandings of ethnic conflict illuminated the fact that over and above issues of ethnicity in ethnic conflict, political and economic issues were considered the underlying catalysts for ethnic conflict in Indonesia. Religion plays a direct role in hostilities largely as a result of extreme interpretation of Indonesian laws or religious teachings, or due to the use of religious symbolism linked to ethnicity throughout a conflict. The connectedness of concepts of religion, culture and ethnicity in Indonesian discourses leads to the consideration of more primordial understandings of ethnicity apparent in Pancasila and SARA. This view is intricately interwoven into a more instrumentalist understanding of ethnicity, conveyed in Indonesian discourse through consideration of political and economic factors driving ethnic conflict.

The structure of this thesis follows the themes derived from this discourse analysis. The initial chapter examines the three problems underlying the dominant narrative. The second chapter provides a brief background of the post-colonial . The political factors to ethnic conflict in Indonesia are outlined in Chapter Three, and the economic factors constitute Chapter Four. Chapter Five examines four central themes resonating throughout this discourse analysis. The conclusion summarises this thesis and proposes further areas for study.

It should be noted that due to the scope of this thesis focusing on the comparative discourses of ethnic conflict in Indonesia, and the requirement to remain within the parameters of word count limitations, the complexity of a number of situations, events and details cannot be included. This is a major constraint of this thesis as these details are crucial to understanding the context surrounding different approaches to understanding ethnic conflict in Indonesia. The way the socio-political turbulence surrounding Indonesian independence, concepts of national unity, notions of language and power, and international relations theory (especially post-structuralist theory) interact with discourses of ethnic conflict in Indonesia, are but a few topics that require more diligent attention. However, it is anticipated that this thesis will catalyse further research into the areas that require more detailed consideration.

46 David Harvey, Social Justice and the City (Revised Edition) (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009).; The Urbanization of Capital: Studies in the History and Theory of Capitalist Urbanization (USA: John Hopkins University Press, 1985). 10 It is hoped that this research will make two scholarly contributions. In general terms, it proposes a unified approach challenging the inadequacies of dominant Western narratives to understanding ethnic conflict in Indonesia. More specifically, it seeks to fill a gap in the scholarship where there appeared little to no consolidation of understanding of what Indonesian commentators and scholars thought were the causes and dynamics of ethnic conflict in Indonesia. Drawing extensively upon Indonesian sources, this thesis challenges the alarmist and prescriptive lexicons and language surrounding ideas of an ‘arc of instability’ through the presentation of a distinctive Indonesian narrative.

11 CHAPTER 1. CHALLENGING THE DOMINANT NARRATIVE AND RETHINKING ETHNICITY

Understanding the nature and dynamics of ethnic conflict in Indonesia first requires critical consideration of the way in which ethnicity has been theorised. This chapter will examine three key problems with the theories underlying ethnic conflict analysis and demonstrate how they may inform the dominant narrative and hinder a comprehensive understanding of ethnic conflict in Indonesia. The first problem is the way in which ethnic conflict is conceived in international relations theories and generates lexicons such as the ‘arc of instability’ discussed earlier. The second problem is the lack of consensus in defining ‘ethnicity’. The third problem is the inherent rigidity of the separate schools of ethnic studies theories, which hinders comprehension of ethnic conflict outside the boundaries of primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism. In response to these problems, the last section of this chapter will consider rethinking the dominant narrative through an approach that incorporates elements of a number of theories, and how they operate discursively to present an Indonesian narrative.

A discursive approach will be employed because, as this chapter will show, the dominant narrative is preoccupied with Western and state-centric theoretical frameworks that have tended to perpetuate a confusing and inadequate way to think about ethnic conflict in Indonesia. In determining a conceptual framework for this research, no single international relations or ethnic studies theory correlated with the way in which Indonesian commentators and scholars perceived ethnic conflict in Indonesia. This led me to choose a discourse analysis of Indonesian understandings of ethnic conflict, as it allows for greater fluidity across a number of different international relations and ethnic studies theories as appropriate. Where elements of realism or liberalism fail to appropriately conceptualise ethnic conflict in the Indonesian context, a discourse analysis revealed a Marxist approach to be more applicable. Where primordialism speaks for the apriori, ineffable and affective characteristics of ethnic conflict in Indonesia, instrumentalism explained the way in which these traits are manipulated by the Indonesian political and economic elite. In this way, the grand images of a ‘clash of civilizations’ or a ‘coming anarchy’ are challenged through the proposal of a hybrid approach to viewing ethnic conflict in the Indonesian context. Limitations of the Dominant Narrative

The dominant narrative is problematic in part because of the way in which ethnic conflict is conceived in the international relations theory frameworks of realism and liberalism. As Mount argued, “the prevailing state-centric and modernist assumptions of conventional international relations theory have served as profound theoretical obstructions” for pursuing an analysis of ethnic conflict in world politics.1 Realism views society in the absence of a sovereign power to be like man in a ‘state of nature’ or in a state of perpetual fear.2 Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’, for example, portrays a

1 Mount, Problem of Peoples. 67. 2 Ibid. 35 12 state-centric Hobbesian hysteria towards non-state actors who catalyse the disintegration and destruction of civilised world order.

It should also be noted that the Hobbesian concept of fear inherent in the realist tradition links political agency with emotion, which are also pivotal assumptions in primordialist theories of ethnicity. Primordialist theories of the affective, ineffable and apriori are not dealt with directly through realism, because of its preoccupation with interactions at the inter-state level.

This preoccupation is clear in that other realists, such as Mearsheimer, argued that ‘ethnic nationalism’ is an aberration of the inter-state system.3 Nonetheless, some neo- realists such as Stuart Kaufman have tried to incorporate ethnic groups into their structural theories by applying notions such as the security dilemma and reframing the anarchic inter-state system as a framework for analysis to the domestic mechanisms of ethnic conflict.4 However, these theoretical moves are problematic because they assume that the domestic life of a state can be anarchic – a claim Hobbes considered difficult to imagine.5 In so much as realist theories are unable to address the significance of concepts of agency and emotion in ethnic conflict, and consider ethnic groups as unimportant ‘aberrations’, a realist, state-centric framework is therefore too focused on concepts of anarchy and actors in the inter-state system to appropriately conceptualise ethnic groups or ethnic conflict.

Not so dissimilar to realism, liberal theories of international relations likewise see the role of non-state or non-civic entities problematically. Favouring democratic and civic institutions, ethnic and cultural groups are relegated to the borders of liberalist thought.6 This is because in a liberal democracy, ethnic nationalism is juxtaposed and subordinated to civic nationalism; the ethnic is perceived to work towards an essentialist communal or ‘ethnic’ goal, the civic towards a higher ‘civic’ purpose.7 A higher civilisational standing is thus bestowed to civic identities, while other identities – ethnic or cultural – are portrayed as barbarous phenomena. This juxtaposition is evident in the liberal rules based order, where war is regarded as an exclusive privilege reserved for sovereign states, not the ethnic ‘other’.8 Ethnic conflict is therefore “seen to undermine ideals of individualism, civic participatory politics and universal human rights”, rather than constituting a form of political struggle.9

3 John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 1 (1990). 4 Stuart J. Kaufman, "An 'International' Theory of Inter-Ethnic War," Review of International Studies 22, no. 2 (1996). 5 Hobbes claimed the life of man in the state of nature to be “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short” without industry, science or arts. Mount considered it improbable that civil war can lead to anarchy if industry, science or arts were previously experienced in the state, because unless all memory of them was erased entirely, they would arguably still have a lasting impact on society. Mount, Problem of Peoples. 39. 6 Ibid. 42. 7 Ibid. 43. See: J. Snyder. From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict, New York: W.W. Norton. 2000. 8 Ibid. 46. 9 Ibid. 13 The distinction between ‘progressive’ civic ideals and ‘backwards’ ethnic beliefs resonates in Juergensmeyer’s delineation between secular and religious governance.10 Similarly, Fukuyama’s consideration of liberal democracy as the most progressive political ideology regards the non-liberal and non-civic as backwards looking.11 Since only a handful of governments – including Cuba, North Korea and China – are communist and the majority of the Western world are liberal democracies, liberalists feel empirically vindicated in this position. The implicit subtext behind this claim is the celebration of the civilised and advanced ideals of liberalism over the rudimentary and parochial ideals of ‘other’ political systems and ideologies. This view is problematic, because it neglects the significance of the existence of the ethnic ‘other’, rendering it inappropriate as a framework for analysing ethnic conflict.

The inadequacies of the state-centric theoretical frameworks of realism and liberalism led me to consider the suitability of ‘other’ ideologies, arguably estranged from dominant international relations discourses.12 Marxism challenges the overwhelming state-centricity of these discourses, as it regards the state not as an ethical political organisation, but purely as an expression of the ruling classes in a capitalist system. Marxism also has a difficult or dismissive view of ethnicity but not because, as realists and liberals argue, it exists apart from the state system or civility. Instead, a preoccupation with the economic masses (as opposed to minorities) and with the forces and relations of production mean Marxism largely dismisses culture as a bi- product of elite ideology used to control the labouring class.13 Marx’s allegation that religion is “the opium of the people” reveals how he regarded culture as being an instrument of the ruling class.14 The dismissal of culture has led Marxist analyses of ethnic conflict to be accused of attempting to relegate ideas of ethnicity into economic class structure. This, however, allows ethnic conflicts to be interpreted within the broader framework of material inequality and capitalist class domination for materialist ends. Richard Thompson provides a typical example of a Marxist analysis which treats ethnic-social relations as part of a wider form of social stratification.15 This is a valuable framework for analysis because it considers ethnic groups as part of the majority, rather than an estranged minority or barbaric ‘other’. Not only does this challenge the place of ethnic groups in the dominant narrative, but it enforces a reflexive evaluation of the epistemological assumptions surrounding definitions of ethnicity.

10 Juergensmeyer, The new Cold War?: religious nationalism confronts the secular state. 11 Fukuyama, "End of History?." 12 Gill argued that Marxism has been marginalised in international relations theories: Stephen Gill, Gramsci, historical materialism and international relations, ed. Stephen Gill, vol. 26, Cambridge studies in international relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 02. 13 J. Friedman, "Being in the World: Globalization and localization," Theory, Culture, & Society 7 (1990). 76. 14 Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). 131. Marx wrote: “Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people.” 15 Richard H. Thompson, Theories of ethnicity: a critical appraisal, Contributions in sociology ; no. 82. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989). 14 The Problem with ‘Ethnicity’

There is a critical absence in international relations and ethnic studies theory of an accepted or comprehensive definition of ‘ethnicity’ that represents it as a meaningful conceptual category in world politics.16 This impacts the way ethnicity, and in turn, ethnic conflict is considered to be an apolitical, obstructive force that challenges world order, rather than a fiercely political, transformative force that represents the legitimate concerns of a group of people. This is largely due to the rigid analytical frameworks from which scholars and analysts approach the concept of ethnicity. These frameworks tend to bind definitions of ethnicity firmly in the distinct parameters of each individual theory; ‘state-centric’ definitions for instrumentalist theories; ineffable, affective and apriori definitions for primordialist theories; and ‘imagined’ definitions for constructivist theories. Moving away from these rigid theoretical parameters, analysing the ‘cluster’ of features of ethnicity – such as religion, language, territory, race, class or custom – and the way they are endowed with ‘diacritical significance’, may provide a more pragmatic definition.17 This is because despite its common use in modern parlance, concepts of ‘ethnicity’ elude consensus of academic definition.

Problems in defining ethnicity stem from a tendency to view ethnicity as an apolitical, cultural agent.18 This may be because ethnicity is usually associated with certain symbols of identity – being stories, art, folklore, rituals, and dance – as opposed to the officially sanctioned symbols used to solidify the nation state.19 Anthony Smith defines an ethnie as “a named human population with a myth of common ancestry, shared memories and cultural elements; a link with a historic territory or homeland; and a measure of solidarity.” 20 This definition is significant in the attribution of cultural elements to an ethnic group. However, it is also problematic because it could just as easily be attributed to a social or nationalist movement within a state. Smith was less concerned with what constituted an ethnic group, than how they “are endowed with diacritical significance that these cultural attributes come to be seen as objective, at least as far as ethnic boundaries are concerned.”21

Other definitions of ethnicity argue ethnic groups define themselves as such only after reflexive comparison to other groups. David Eller claimed that this reflexive character of ethnic identity endows a consciousness and objectification of difference upon an ethnic group.22 In this sense, the ascription of identity depends on the existence of an

16 Mount, Problem of Peoples. 17 Cynthia Enloe, "Religion and Ethnicity," in Ethnicity Reader, ed. Hutchinson and Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 197-202. Her argument is that “ethnicity is difficult to define because it is composed of an intertwining cluster of attributes and not a singular cultural characteristic. Language, religion, territory and custom – by themselves – are insufficient to identify or sustain an ethnic group. Moreover, the cluster of attributes assigned a collective value by a group will vary.” (Ibid. 197.) 18 Ibid. 19 C Keyes. in Mount, Problem of Peoples. 184. 20 Anthony D. Smith, The ethnic origins of nations (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1987). 28-29. 21 Enloe, "Religion and Ethnicity." 197; Smith, The ethnic origins of nations. 23. Enloe outlines the cluster of features approach to defining ethnicity and claims these features will vary by group (Ibid. 23.) 22 Jack David Eller, From culture to ethnicity to conflict: an anthropological perspective on international ethnic conflict (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999). 11. 15 ethnic group relative to other groups, or perhaps even within a state. Eller argued this ascriptive identity is formed only once the ethnic group experiences their culture problematically, as “people who live their culture unproblematically tend not to be ethnic in the proper sense of the word.”23 This problematic experience of ethnicity correlates with Ted Gurr’s view of ethnic people being those who experience “invidious treatment within a dominant society.”24 Once again the problem in defining an ethnic group appears to be related to their significance or relevance within a society or state.

There is a sense of circularity and uncertainty that permeates discourses surrounding definitions of ethnic conflict. Perhaps difficulties in defining ethnicity as a form of political or moral agency rest with the fact that ethnicity manifests itself in real material ways, but speaks to the sentimental and symbolic nature of groups of people, which in itself is difficult to define.25 Gilley defined ethnic conflict “as political or social conflict involving one or more groups which are identified by some marker of ethnic identity.”26 In so doing, he suggested that the loose definitions of ethnic conflict are severely limiting and questioned whether ethnic conflict studies frameworks are the most appropriate for studying conflicts with ethnic characteristics.27 This is because there is a plethora of characteristics applied to ethnic conflicts that make them appear beyond the parameters of conventional international relations theory. An example of this is the way ethnicity is used to describe groups with a local connectedness in a localised area; therefore international war is defined as between non-local actors.28 As international affairs are the preoccupation of international relations theory, localised ethnic groups are insufficiently conceptualised.

Strangely enough, ethnic groups are insufficiently conceptualised in civil war as well. Perhaps this is because of the consideration that anything ethnic is “apolitical, pre- modern and irrational” unlike civil war, or other social science categories.29 In this sense, ethnic conflict can be seen as a “discursive struggle for legitimacy”, because the conceptual frameworks of ethnic conflict studies are entrenched in Western political and social thought “that simultaneously privileges civility and sovereignty while marginalising, depoliticising and disempowering ethnicity have made certain ‘peoples’ appear to lack moral or political agency.”30 Unlike civil or interstate war, ethnic conflict

23 Ibid. 24 Ted Robert Gurr, Peoples versus states: minorities at risk in the new century (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000). 25 Mount, Problem of Peoples.184 26 Bruce Gilley, "Against the concept of ethnic conflict," Third World Quarterly 25, no. 6 (2004). In this article, Gilley draws upon the definitions of ethnic conflict in the following studies: B. Crawford, and R. Lipschutz. The Myth of ‘Ethnic Conflict’: Politics, Economics, and ‘Cultural’ Violence. University of California International and Area Studies Digital Collection, Research Series 98 (1998); J. Mueller. “The banality of “ethnic war”,” International Security 25, no. 01 (2000). 43–72; N. Sambanis. “Do ethnic and non ethnic civil wars have the same causes? A theoretical and empirical inquiry,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 03 (2001). 259–283; V. T. Levine. “Conceptualizing “ethnicity” and “ethnic conflict”: a controversy revisited,” Studies in Comparative International Development 32, 02 (1997). 45–76; C. King. “The myth of ethnic warfare,” Foreign Affairs 80, no. 06 (2001). 165–171. 27 Ibid. 28 Mount, Problem of Peoples. 29 Ibid. 32. 30 Ibid. iv. 16 has cultural characteristics that exist irrespective of and separate to the state or nation, which make it difficult to conceptualise in international relations theories.

Attempting to overcome the problem with ‘ethnicity’, I propose the following definition of an ethnic group for the purposes of this thesis:

An ethnic group encompasses the symbolic and sentimental group identifiers, combined with a sense of shared history, shared ‘homeland’ and shared plight; juxtaposed to a dominant political and state-centric narrative.

This definition is useful in highlighting the role of ethnicity as a sub-narrative to a dominant narrative. It suggests there is an alternate narrative to that of the state, which is critical to understanding ethnicity and reflexively, the state itself. This is the underlying premise of this thesis. An Old or New Theory of Ethnicity: Developing a Theory for Indonesia

Considered an ‘aberration’ or ‘impulse’, the dominant narrative subordinates the ethnic to the civil and presents a confusing and circular definition of ethnicity that insufficiently conceptualises ethnic groups or ethnic conflict. This problem exists in part because the field of ethnic conflict studies likewise struggles to comprehend ethnicity outside of the rigid confines of the theories of primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism. Primordialists consider ethnicity to be ancient, constructivists argue it is imagined, and instrumentalists believe it to be a tool of mobilisation. The preoccupation with whether ethnicity is ‘old’ or ‘new’ detracts from the ability of each theory to fully appreciate ethnicity.31 Instead, ethnic conflict studies should focus on how ethnic groups view themselves and why they view themselves as such, rather than if ethnicity is old or new, or which ethnic studies theory should be exclusively employed. This section will briefly consider the merits and limitations of ethnic studies theories, and propose a hybrid approach be used that incorporates elements of each theory into a discursive analysis of Indonesian commentary on ethnic conflict in Indonesia.

Primordialism studies the perceived significance of ancestral linkages. Often confused with sociobiological theories of ethnicity, which rely on biologically determined essentialist ideas of ethnicity, primordialism sees ethnicity as apriori, ineffable and affective.32 Concepts of kinship, symbology and ineffable emotional attachment are central to primordialist theories, as is the intuitive significance of how identity is formed. Primordialist analyses have been criticised as backward looking, primal or the result of ancient animosities.33 However, its utility as a theoretical framework is especially potent in explaining the inexplicable. For example, primordialist theories seek to explain why factors such as mass literacy encourage the solidification of ethnic identity, and why conflicts often don’t resolve without consideration of the apriori, ineffable and affective

31 Ibid. 111. 32 Jack David Eller and Reed M. Coughlan, "The poverty of primordialism: The demystification of ethnic attachments," Ethnic & Racial Studies 16, no. 2 (1993). 33 Ibid. 17 aspects of group identity.34 Not only useful in explaining the inexplicable, primordialist definitions are borrowed in instrumentalist theories that emphasise the marketing of primordialist sentiments as a means of conflict entrepreneurship. This is because a primordialist view explains the reasons behind how ethnocrats are able to mobilise ethnic groups, and in some cases, fight and die under an ethnic identity.35 As Walker Conner put it, “men don‘t allow themselves to be killed for their interests; they allow themselves to be killed for their passions,” which gives considerable power to the emotional or non-rational motivations.36 This non-rational element to ethnicity and ethnic conflict is a fundamental consideration of primordialism, but is especially powerful as a theoretical framework in conjunction with elements of instrumentalist theory.

Instrumentalism considers ethnic identity as a tool of political or personal interest, but fails to explain its ineffable characteristics that make it so remarkably potent to certain groups. Max Weber emphasised the role of political interest in defining ethnicity, in that “it is primarily the political community no matter how artificially organized, that inspires the belief in common ethnicity.”37 Political interest in sustaining an ethnic community hinges on rational choice theory, as James McKay regarded ethnicity resultant from the “conscious efforts of individuals and groups mobilizing ethnic symbols in order to obtain access to social, political and material rewards.”38 This view is supported by scholars such as Lake and Rothchild, who see no utility in ethnicity outside of desired collective ends.39 Likewise, ethnic people themselves may view ethnicity as a “weapon of revenge against centuries of discrimination.”40 That instrumentalism is predicated on the rational, and primordialism delves into the irrational would lead to the conclusion that the two theories are incompatible. It seems that the rational and conscious decision to use symbols of ethnic identity to mobilise people for material or political ends, relies on the premise that these symbols have an apriori, ineffable and affective power over their beholder. In this sense, elements of both primordialism and instrumentalism together provide a comprehensive framework for understanding why and how ethnic conflict takes place.

Considered a middle ground theory, Daniel Bell summarised the constructivist approach as combining “material interest with an affective tie.”41 Seeking to theorise ethnicity as neither old nor new, constructivism has been criticised by Valery Tishkov as being “no less essentialist than a primordialist vision,” and John Comaroff, for

34 S. Van Evera in Mount, Problem of Peoples. 125. 35 Ibid. 36 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 206. 37 Max Weber, Economy and Society, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968). 1.2.5. 38 James McKay, "An Exploratory Synthesis of Primordial and Mobilizationist Approaches to Ethnic Phenomena," Ethnic and Racial Studies 5, no. 4 (1982). 399. 39 Mount, Problem of Peoples. 132; David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement: The International Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict (San Diego: Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 1996). 40 A. Melucci in J. Hutchinson and A. D. Smith, Ethnicity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 368. 41 Daniel Bell, "Ethnicity and Social Change," in Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, ed. Glazer and Moyniham (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975). 18 having nothing original to say in the ethnic studies theory debate.42 Comaroff continues to provide an insightful analysis of the problem with ethnic studies theory frameworks:

What is remarkable is the sheer tenacity of this theoretical repertoire: it has changed little in the past two decades, despite the fact that existing approaches have repeatedly been discredited. How many more times is it necessary to prove that all ethnic identities are historical creations before primordialism is consigned, finally, to the trash heap of ideas past?43

Perhaps what is most striking about Comaroff’s argument is his consideration that “the conditions which give rise to a social identity are not always the same as what sustain it.”44 This statement regards the characteristics of ethnicity as evolving over time, therefore no one ethnic studies theory alone is adequate as a framework for analysis. Viewing ethnicity through the lens of either primordialism or instrumentalism, or a constructivist middle ground, should not be the focus of ethnic studies frameworks. A more pragmatic and evolutionary framework would allow for greater fluidity between the theories as applicable. A hybrid approach has merit in this thesis as a discourse analysis, because it allows the theory to support and bolster the commentary as applicable to the discourses.

A hybrid approach, as a methodology for this thesis, was considered appropriate after a preliminary reading of Indonesian and Indonesianist commentary revealed a fluid employment of primordialism and instrumentalism. The idea that ethnic identity is a tool of political interest is a re-current theme throughout the works of many Indonesian scholars, who likewise convey themes of the apriori, ineffable and affective features of ethnicity. While this could be thought to prescribe a constructivist methodology, it was clear that the Indonesian scholars cited in this thesis rarely, if ever, view their ethnicity from a middle ground point of view. Nonetheless, prominent Indonesianists such as Benedict Anderson and Clifford Geertz have developed comprehensive and nuanced constructivist theories of Indonesian ethnicity. While these theories are important in understanding how communities imagine themselves into existence, constructivism speaks more to nationalism and the dominant narrative of ethnic conflict. As a theoretical framework, it does not sufficiently comprehend how ethnic groups may be disenfranchised or ‘unimagined’; a central problem addressed in Indonesian discourses of ethnic conflict in Indonesia.45 Rethinking the Dominant Narrative: the Indonesian Narrative

So far this chapter has outlined the problem with ‘ethnicity’ and the way in which this informs, or misinforms, the dominant narrative. A definition of an ethnic group was proposed that implied the need for an alternate narrative, in this case, an Indonesian

42 Valery A. Tishkov, "Forget the ―nation: post-nationalist understanding of nationalism," Ethnic & Racial Studies 23, no. 04 (2000). 628.; J Comaroff, "Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Politics of Difference in an Age of Revolution," in The Politics of Difference, ed. E. Wilmson and P. McAllister (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 164. 43 "Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Politics of Difference in an Age of Revolution." 44 J. Comaroff in Mount, Problem of Peoples. 153. 45 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism (London: Verso, 2006). 19 narrative. Through a discursive analysis of Indonesian commentary and scholarship on ethnic conflict in Indonesia, a deeper more comprehensive understanding of its causes and dynamics will be achieved. This section outlines the difficulties faced in writing an Indonesian narrative, and why it is so important it is written.

In his seminal essay Can There Be Southeast Asians in Southeast Asian Studies? Ariel Heryanto wrote that “Southeast Asians are central to the operation and existence of Southeast Asian studies, and yet they have always occupied a subordinate or inferior position within the production and consumption of this enterprise.”46 Given the level of difficulty it takes for a Southeast Asian to become a Southeast Asianist, local scholars and analysts with an intimate understanding of their country’s languages, culture, history and customs have, paradoxically, had a waning interest in studying Southeast Asian disciplines. This is reflected in the minimal academic writing in the field published by locals of the target country and affects the way non-Southeast Asian Southeast Asianists view local scholars and experts as assets for research assistants and fieldwork hosts, but also suspects due to their alleged bias and connection to the target of analysis.47 In the Indonesian context, Indonesian scholars are often able to provide more direct and insightful research on conflict in their own region than outsiders.48

While the argument for the need for Indonesian scholarship in the field of ethnic conflict in Indonesia seems to view Western-domination of conflict studies as restrictive and orientalist towards the involvement of local subject matter expertise, nativism is not the answer. By no means does this dissertation advocate the privileged role of local scholarship in ethnic conflict studies. Instead, its inclusion and presence in modern discourses is required to counter the dominant narrative and bolster the field of ethnic conflict studies, not only with research conducted with the assistance of local fieldwork hosts, but qualified by the works of local scholars, commentators and experts.

Western academic dominance of the social sciences is problematic to non-Western scholars and experts who have something to say outside the common and rigid boundaries of classical and non-classical theoretical frameworks. As such, they must seek alternative methods and means to articulate and represent their responses. This is exemplified in that

Southeast Asians can only hope to take an active part in the production of Southeast Asian studies if they acquire the right intellectual training, rhetorical conventions, and cultural vocabularies of the American, European, or Australian practitioners, and pay due respect to all of these.49

While Heryanto illuminates the issues surrounding publishing theses, journal articles, conference proceedings and other scholarly commentary in the vernacular of the

46 Heryanto, "Southeast Asians." 5. 47 Ibid. 6. 48 Brett R. Noel, Ann Torfin Shoemake, and Claudia L. Hale, "Conflict resolution in a non- Western context: Conversations with Indonesian scholars and practitioners," Conflict Resolution Quarterly 23, no. 4 (2006). 49 Heryanto, "Southeast Asians." 10. 20 region of study due to the dominance of the field of Southeast Asian studies by English language discourse, there nonetheless exists a strong reactionary and revolutionary undercurrent of academia and analytical writing in Indonesia in Bahasa Indonesia.

A cause celebre for human rights activists and advocates of freedom of expression, Pramoedya Ananta Toer is an example of an Indonesian writer, novelist and intellectual who despite being fiercely critical of his government, wrote his whole life in Bahasa Indonesia and published his writings in Indonesia, instead of enjoying the relative freedom enjoyed by critics who publish in English in a Western country away from the scrutiny of those who would throw him in jail (again).50 Among the many lessons we can draw from Pram’s writings, is that writing his Indonesian novels in Bahasa Indonesia, he maintains the purity of expression unique to his language and culture, which is clear in reading the Bahasa Indonesia version of his novels next to the English language versions.51 This is because some amount of nuance of expression is lost in translating meaning from one language or culture to another, especially where it is written in the language of its context.

Furthermore, writing in Bahasa Indonesia exposed Pram’s ideas to an Indonesian speaking audience, where otherwise they may not have been accessible. At the analytical level, however, there is an argument for translating a text – aside from increasing readability – as Salmon Rushdie claimed the questions the author must grapple with may in fact make the translation more analytically valuable.52 “What does it mean to be translating this text?” “How can I preserve the culture and meaning without becoming ossified?” “How do I criticise the text without seeming to support the dominant narrative?” “How do I convey a meaning that may not exist or be valued in another language or culture?” All of these questions, lead the translator to one: “What do these ideas mean?”53

In this sense, the assumption that an academic work should be conducted in English – the most common language used for Southeast Asian studies despite it not being the first language spoken by the majority of Southeast Asian countries – is not far estranged from colonial orientalism.54 A number of ‘post’ analytical theories – post- modernism, post-colonialism and post-structuralism – have become popular by providing a framework with which to challenge the dominant discourses in the field. Reid argued that while orientalism refutes “the canon of European classics written by dead white males [it] has led not to a courageously pluralist exploration of the world’s cultural and social diversity, but to a new canon of self-referential theory.”55 Local

50 Pramoedya Ananta Toer was imprisoned for two years (1947-9) during Dutch Colonial Rule and for ten during the Orde Baru (1969-79). The Buru Quartet (see below) was written whilst he was imprisoned by Soeharto on Buru Island. 51 See: Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Anak semua bangsa: sebuah roman (Jakarta: Hasta Mitra, 1980).; Bumi manusia: sebuah roman (Jakarta: Hasta Mitra, 1981).; Jejak langkah (Jakarta: Hasta Mitra, 1985).; Rumah kaca: sebuah roman sejarah (Jakarta: Hasta Mitra, 1988). 52 Salman Rushdie, Imaginary homelands: essays and criticism, 1981-1991 (New York, USA: Granta Books in association with Penguin Books, 1991). 53 Ibid. 54 E. Said in Heryanto, "Southeast Asians." 55 A. Reid, "Studying ‘Asia’ in Asia," Asian Studies Review 23, no. 2 (1999). [it] added to the quote. 21 commentators, experts and scholars are conducting research into ethnic conflict in their own country already, both with and without the analytical frameworks commonly used in social science theories.

In Indonesia, difficulties in publishing academic articles and scholarly works in Bahasa Indonesia and within Indonesia are often overcome by collaborative works by think tanks such as the ITP, PMB-LIPI, Institut Agama Islam Negeri, IAIN (State Islamic Institute), Walisongo Mediation Centre, Bidang Marturia – Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja di Indonesia, PGI (Marturia Section of the Community of Indonesian Churches) and numerous other groups who publish their conference proceedings.

There is also an important role played by non-Indonesian non-government organisations (NGOs) such as International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch and the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE), which have offices in Indonesia and employ Indonesian analysts and experts to conduct local field work in Bahasa Indonesia to publish and disseminate their findings throughout both English and Bahasa Indonesia speaking circles. Other NGOs, such as the World Bank, have backgrounds in Indonesian field research and publish working papers on various issues within Indonesia, but don’t always employ Indonesian researchers or publish their reports in Bahasa Indonesia. As a result of the lack of Indonesian input, some studies sponsored by the World Bank are criticised for replicating the prevailing assumptions found in the dominant narrative by a number of Indonesian commentators, such as Didi Novrian and Swanvri from the LIPI.

Aside from Indonesian commentators, scholars, think tanks, and non-government groups, there is a wealth of analysis and commentary conducted by non-Indonesian Indonesianists, such as Benedict Anderson and Clifford Geertz.56 Challenging the confines and boundaries of traditional discourse surrounding nationalist, anthropological, and cultural studies theories of their time, Imagined Communities and The Interpretation of Cultures are seminal works in the field of ethnic conflict studies because of the substantial insight they provided into the political, religious, social and customary lives of ethnic groups in Indonesia. This can largely be attributed to their deep intimacy with Indonesian languages and culture and the fact that both scholars lived in Indonesia, with Indonesian people, for an extended period of time. The seminal works of Anderson and Geertz arguably set the standard for future scholars of Indonesia – Indonesianists – to gain an intimate relationship with the country, the language, and the people, to analyse it in any meaningful way. Despite the fact these texts have come to be widely recognised as seminal and universally applicable, Indonesianists thinking is still neglected in the dominant narrative of ethnic conflict in Indonesia.

56 Anderson and Geertz both have extensive resumes in the field of Indonesian studies and are arguably considered the original ‘Indonesianists’. Anderson’s list includes various studies on power and culture in Indonesia, with an OCLC/WorldCat search of his work returning over 1000 titles. “Imagined Communities” and “Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia” are but two. Geertz likewise has an extensive list of works to his name, most notably on religion and culture, “Religion as a Cultural System", and most of which are in the context of Indonesia, such as “The Religion of ”. OCLC/WorldCat returns 838 results attributed to Geertz’s authorship. 22 Building on the works of Anderson and Geertz, more contemporary Indonesianists such as Edward Aspinall, Jon Fraenkel, John Sidel, David McRae, John Haseman, Gerry van Klinken, and Jacques Bertrand among others will be considered in this thesis. These scholars provide Indonesianist commentary to both support and correlate ideas put forward in Indonesian scholarship on ethnic conflict, as well as provide critical analysis and expansion on ideas and nuance in Indonesian texts. Indonesianist commentary was also useful because it tends to encompass experience and lessons learnt from studying other conflicts around the world (such as Ashutosh Varshney, whose model of ‘civic life’ and studies of have global ramifications). Indonesianists complement the work of Indonesian scholars and commentators because they have greater ability to publish their work widely where Indonesian academics often do not. Furthermore, in studying the language and culture of Indonesia deeply, the problems surrounding Indonesian discourses which “do not have the sort of pretensions of secular rationality, impartiality, and modernist universalism that the various post-isms subvert and deconstruct,” can be challenged where necessary.57 It was unusual to find a divergent point of view between Indonesian and Indonesianist scholarship, but it did occur where Indonesian scholars had religious affiliations and differed from the more secular vantage point of Indonesianist scholars (see Chapter Four, which discusses the belief in conflict as a requisite feature of society, and the work of Indonesian scholars such as William Chang whose affiliation with the Christian Church permeates his writing).

There is an underlying and unspoken understanding that resonates throughout the Indonesian commentary analysed in this thesis. It views ethnicity as having primordial features, and at the same time a tool for political and economic gain.58 Ideas of religion and culture are considered interchangeable with ethnicity in some instances, and in others were considered a tool used in advancement of political interests.59 There is also an acknowledgement of the superiority of Western scholarship throughout the works of a number of Indonesian scholars similar to the way in which Ariel Heryanto asserts Southeast Asian scholars do so.60 This is seen in the writings of Novrian and Swanvri, as well as Denica Widodo and Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin, who use Western, analytical frameworks applied to the context of Indonesia. These themes will be analysed in the following chapters, formatted to intuitively reflect the key ideas articulated throughout Indonesian discourses of ethnic conflict in Indonesia; as a given or apriori characteristic that informs one’s identity, but at the same time is manipulated for political and economic ends.

57 Heryanto, "Southeast Asians." 19. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 D. Novrian and Swanvri in Amien Tohari et al., Dinamika konflik & kekerasan di Indonesia, ed. Amien Tohari (Jakarta: Yayasan Tifa: Institut Titian Perdamaian, 2011).; Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin, Explaining collective violence in contemporary Indonesia: from conflict to cooperation, Critical studies of the Asia Pacific series. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).; Danica Widodo, "Expensive and Dangerous: Revisiting the role of natural resources on conflict in Indonesia" (Erasmus University, 2011). 23 CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND: INDONESIA’S POST-COLONIAL ETHNIC CONFLICT HISTORY

“Southeast Asians need neither a Foucauldian nor a Derridean philosophy or analysis to help them see that power is everywhere, that power produces knowledge, or how “carceral” their schools, offices, or factories are… One must go far beyond them for any radical examination of the way power and dominant discourses operate in many post-colonial societies of Southeast Asia.” Ariel Heryanto1

As an archipelagic nation, the Republic of Indonesia encompasses a myriad of different cultures, religions, ethnicities and people. In many ways this diversity contributes to the richness of Indonesian culture, but at the same time it also causes rifts in society that pose a significant challenge to harmonious government and co-existence. This is in large part due to the difficulties faced in identifying the root causes of conflict in Indonesia; far from slogans that suggest an ‘arc of instability’, conflict in Indonesia cannot be homogenously labelled under any one category, nor by any one cause. While this situation is complex, it is not intractable; a thorough understanding of the cultural and contextual background in which these conflicts are set is required to forge a way forward. A brief examination of the history of tensions and conflict in Indonesia will serve as a reference point and timeline from which to analyse the way in which Indonesian and Indonesianist discourses view ethnic conflict in Indonesia and rethink the dominant narrative.

This chapter will consider ethnic conflict in the post-colonial period in Indonesia for a number of reasons. Firstly, the focus of this dissertation is contemporary Indonesian perceptions of ethnicity as they pertain to the modern nation of Indonesia, not the nation formerly known as the . In so doing, by no means does this analysis dismiss the significance of colonial and pre-colonial claims to ancient animosities and apriori assumptions regarding ethnicity where they are considered to influence modern day conflicts in Indonesia. Instead, this dissertation is limited to a post-colonial time frame due to the boundaries of time, linguistic resources and available Indonesian language literature. Not only is the post-colonial timeframe considered most relevant to this thesis, but Indonesian discourses tend to focus on ethnic conflict in post-colonial Indonesia. As such, this thesis is structured around discourses of ethnic conflict in Indonesia since the nation of Indonesia, as we know it today, came into existence. This chapter sets the background for this structure through three distinct eras of Indonesia’s post-colonial history: the Orde Lama, the Orde Baru, and Reformasi. These three eras provide the context to understand how the Indonesian narrative of ethnic conflict is created throughout discourses of ethnic conflict in Indonesia, which is addressed as the final section to this chapter.

1 Heryanto, "Southeast Asians." 96. 24 Independence and the Orde Lama

On the 17th of August 1945, the numerous islands of the archipelago of the Dutch East Indies and the plethora of cultures and ethnies that lived therein were brought together by the proclamation of Indonesian independence, signed, sealed and delivered in the Proklamasi Kemerdekaan Indonesia by President Soekarno and Vice President Hatta. To unite all people from the westernmost town of Sabang, to the easternmost, Merauke– a distance of over 5,000 km – a myth of common ancestry and sense of common community was inculcated.2 This was swiftly orchestrated through the establishment of a common national language, Bahasa Indonesia, and a common national destiny outlined in the Pancasila. In forming a national identity throughout the archipelago, Soekarno set out to unite all islands peripheral to Java thereto as the administrative capital. With the majority of Indonesian’s being Javanese, as Donald Emmerson contended, this could well have led to the formation of “Javanesia” if Soekarno had followed the example of Malaysia, which was effectively named after the majority Malay people.3 Friction throughout the archipelago spread, especially in peripheral areas, highlighting one of the greatest difficulties Indonesia’s founding fathers faced in reengineering a homogeneous Indonesian culture governed from Jakarta; the discordance between the perceived need for unification and its practical implementation.

Tensions between national unity, its enactment by government and its reception in the wider community have fuelled conflict in the name of ethnicity since Indonesia’s independence, in part because of difficulties in balancing pluralism and national unity – two of the fundamental goals of Indonesia’s founding fathers. The motto Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, from an old Javanese poem, means “Unity in Diversity” and was chosen to adorn the national crest in an effort to counter the disintegrative potential pluralism might have had on national integration.4 The motto was a quintessential part of the founding ideology of the nation outlined in the Pancasila– a word also from old meaning ‘five principles’ – and took its place of significance in the preamble to the Indonesian Constitution of 1945 as one of the juridical stipulations and philosophical foundation of Indonesia. Since this time, Pancasila has been described as a compromise between the conflicting ideologies of Islamism, socialism and secular nationalism or else the brainchild of President Soekarno who believed Islamism, nationalism and Marxism could combine as a national philosophy.5 In either instance, the Pancasila reflects the difficulties Indonesia’s leaders have faced in bringing together a vastly diverse nation with vastly diverse challenges.

2 See: Anderson, Imagined Communities. 3 Donnald. K Emmerson, "A Tale of Three Ethnicities," Journal of Democracy 10, no. 9 (1999). 4 Sutanto in Andi Masmiyat, Konflik SARA: integrasi nasional terancam!: konsepsi dan implementasi tentang kewaspadaan nasional (Jakarta: Pensil-324, 2007). 5 H. Tampubolon, Pancasila Birthday Event Stirs Controversy, accessed 01 June 2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/06/02/pancasila%E2%80%99s-birthday-event-stirs- controversy.html. 25 The Orde Baru and SARA Conflicts

While the ideals of Pancasila focus on integration and unity, the nation building process in Indonesia has been marked by coercive consensus.6 The Orde Baru succeeded in consolidating itself as the ‘Order of Development’ and during this time, compromise was enforced by the government through coercion rather than actual resolution; differences were not tolerated and uniformity was considered important above all else. In fact, except for anti-Chinese violence and one episode of ethnic violence in West in 1997, this policy saw that communal fighting was almost absent during the Orde Baru.7 It was during this time that the term SARA, which stands for suku, agama, ras, antar-golongan (tribe, religion, race, inter-group), became a negative notion because diversity was considered a threat to integration and was flatly denied or refused by the Soeharto Government. This was clearly articulated in the 1982 Press Law number 21, which stated that “press publications have to be kept safe from matters that will hurt the public … for example, stories that would generate ethnic, religious, racial, or inter-group conflict.”8 This kind of broad definition of SARA as anything that could “hurt the public” saw SARA become analogous with not only tribal, religious, racial and inter-group violence, but all things cultural, ethnic, class-related and communal; anything not strictly political or with non-political elements such as religious conflict. In other words, SARA was created to resemble anything that challenged the enforced social harmony Soeharto’s elites worked hard to censor and maintain.9

SARA was dealt with as a single and homogeneous concept by the Soeharto Government. Cultures and peoples were integrated and assimilated throughout the archipelago, making analysis of the discrete elements of SARA problematic as Greg Acciaioli wrote, “these factors emerge as mutually reinforcing parameters”.10 Lorraine Aragon examines how SARA conflicts were discussed in the media during the Orde Baru in a “technical way” rather than with any analysis of the form or specific details of the violence. In one instance in Poso in 1998, Kompas reported on a clash between neighbourhoods which involved the burning of houses, Mosques and Churches. Despite a clear religious element to the violence, Kompas quotes the Police Chief of Central stating that the conflict did not contain SARA elements and instead was purely criminal.11 She wrote,

here an official spokesperson presents as normative and comprehensible the fact that a "criminal" fight between two youths could immediately launch a

6 Dave McRae, A few poorly organized men: interreligious violence in Poso, Indonesia, Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut (Boston: Brill, 2013). 7 Ibid. 8 Janet Steele, "Review," Indonesia, no. 97 (2014). Translation from Penjelasan atas Undang- undang Republik Indonesia No. 21 Tahun 1982 Tentang Perubahan atas Undang-undang Nomor 11 Tahun 1966 tentang Ketentuan-ketentuan Pokok Pers, Indonesia Media Law and Policy Center. 9 Jacques Bertrand, Nationalism and ethnic conflict in Indonesia, Cambridge Asia-Pacific studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 80. 10 Greg Acciaioli, "Grounds of Conflict, Idioms of Harmony: Custom, Religion, and Nationalism in Violence Avoidance at the Lindu Plain, Central Sulawesi," Indonesia, no. 72 (2001). 85. 11 Lorraine V. Aragon, "Mass Media Fragmentation and Narratives of Violent Action in Sulawesi' Poso Conflict," ibid. (Cornell University: Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2005). 26 destructive and rage-filled street action among hundreds of "massa" carrying sharp weapons and Molotov cocktails in five neighbourhoods in a district capital.12

This exemplifies the way in which concepts of SARA were viewed by the Indonesian people during the Soeharto period as a non-political agent, or even one of more primitive cultural and ethnic persuasions. It also demonstrates the way in which they were dealt with by the authorities, which had implications on how cultural and ethnic tensions have since been considered. This also has implications on the way in which many Indonesian commentators view ethnic conflict as a compound entity consisting of religious, tribal, class, community, racial and ethnic elements. However, as Chang argued, despite the fact they are often considered analogous, ethnic identity is not the same as religious identity; “permasalahan mendasar… adalah kecenderungan sejumlah orang dan lembaga untuk mengidentikkan (menyamakan) etnisitas dengan agama” (the fundamental problem… is the tendency of a number of people and organisations to identify and equate ethnicity with religion).13 The individual elements of SARA and their negative connotations will be untangled in Chapter Two, in examining more closely the dynamics of SARA that contribute to conflict in Indonesia.14

In examining the individual components of SARA, former Police Chief Inspector General, Andi Masmiyat defined SARA as a term to describe traditional bonds or primordial linkages and considers it to be a source of conflict in Indonesia.15 This is because the concept of SARA is ingrained into the Indonesian psyche, due to the speed and ruthlessness with which SARA conflicts were dealt with during the Soeharto era.16 During this period, public expression of difference and diversity – including expressions of culture or religion – were not allowed, despite the fact that inter-ethnic and inter-religious tensions were a chronic problem. As Bernard Adeney-Risakotta asserted, the apparent successes and social uniformity achieved by the Soeharto Government were in fact shallow; after 32 years of authoritarian patriarchal rule, the Orde Baru ended and the people no longer had one commander to answer to so were left to the guidance of their own values, goals and interests.17 To this day, the legacy of SARA marks political and separatist sentiments for various reasons, not least because of the way in which political issues, such as the division of administrative areas resultant from post-Soeharto policies of decentralisation, cannot be dealt with separate from areas of residence, which is a highly emotive topic in Indonesia due to its linkages with the interlocking concepts within SARA.

The relative instability experienced from the process of decentralisation of the Indonesian Government since the fall of Soeharto created tension at the regional and

12 Ibid. 13 W. Chang in INIS, Konflik komunal di Indonesia saat ini, Seri INIS (Jakarta: INIS, PBB, 2003). 31 14 Ibid. 15 Masmiyat, Konflik SARA. 02. 16 Cristina Montiel and Noor Noraini Mohd, Peace psychology in Asia, Peace psychology book series. (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer, 2009). 05. 17 Bernard Adeney-Risakotta, "Power from Below: Deconstructing the Dominant Paradigm of Power," Asian Journal of Social Science 33, no. 1 (2005). 27 local political levels over the management of valuable natural resources.18 Dani Yudi Supatra from the ITP asserted that the management of natural resources as well as the economies that surround these resources, is also a major contributor to conflict within Indonesian society.19 Chinese-Indonesian Sociologist Mely Tan emphasised that ethnic conflicts are strongly connected to political and economic issues.20 For example, although not denying the fundamental ethnic component to hostilities between ethnic groups in places such as Ambon and East Timor, she emphasised the dominance of economic and political factors. Relations between tribes and between religions are exacerbated by engineered policies, especially during the Soeharto era. She also suggested that what is considered “the China problem” only makes up a small part of the greater problem of nation building in Indonesia.21 A number of Indonesian scholars agree with the sentiment that while ethnic tensions in Indonesia often play a part in ethnic conflict, in reality the actual catalysts for so called ethnic conflict are economic and political. The Post-Soeharto Era and Reformasi

In Indonesia’s long history of conflict, the post-Soeharto era is considered a formative period for Indonesian conflicts due to the fall of the Orde Baru exciting ethnic, religious and separatist conflicts anew.22 Ethnic and capital cleavages in Indonesian society grew more pronounced during this period, due to the rising backlash against Soeharto’s latent fear of political Islam as an anti-state force, combined with backlash against the way Soeharto cultivated a military and business elite dominated by ethnic Chinese and Christians.23 State neglect and persecution during Soeharto’s pro- Western and pro-capital regime marginalised local small and medium scale producers as well as radical Islamists, who sought the rise of political Islam in the country after the fall of the Orde Baru. This meant riots and pogroms took a more religious and less ethnic-communal character entering the Twenty-first Century. Tan believed the emphasis on religious harmony and the heavy use of empty religious rhetoric during the Soeharto period played a critical role in fuelling religious violence in the post- Soeharto era.24 In denying the people of Indonesia the ability to express SARA concepts as playing a critical part in conflict, it is likely that many problems from as far back as the Orde Baru were not dealt with effectively and can now be seen in Indonesia’s many ethnic and religious conflicts today.25

Dany Saputra, like many Indonesian scholars, suggested that social control and propaganda used to promote nationalism during Soeharto’s Orde Baru, shaped

18 Saputra in Tohari et al., Dinamika konflik. 19 Ibid. 20 M. Tan, Proceedings Lokakarya "Etnisitas dan Konflik Sosial di Indonesia", ed. Pusat Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kemasyarakatan dan Kebudayaan, PMB-LIPI (Jakarta: Puslitbang Kemasyarakatan dan Kebudayaan, Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, 1999). 21 Ibid. 22 Bertrand, Nationalism and ethnic conflict in Indonesia. 23 F. A. Noor, "Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia," Religion, State and Society 38, no. 04 (2010). 24 Tan, Proceedings Lokakarya. 25 John B. Haseman, Security policy in Indonesia by guess, or golly?, Asia-Pacific Center for Secuirty Studies, accessed 01 May 2015, http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Ocasional%20Papers/OPIndonesia.htm. 28 numerous conflicts since his fall, including conflicts in Sanggoledo, Poso, Sambas and Ambon, which he considered to be based on “identitas primordial” or primordial understandings of ethnicity, and have ethnic and religious foundations.26 It was during this time that phenomena such as keroyokan became socially accepted as a way to address social injustices and criminal offences by taking the law in to ones’ own hands – perceived criminal offences were punished within the community and no prosecution was taken against the offenders by law enforcement agencies, thereby perpetuating the rule of vigilantism and violence.27

The post-Soeharto period has also seen a weakening of nationalistic sentiment, feelings of solidarity and a sense of national unity among the Indonesian people, thought to be the result of an increase in communal conflicts across the archipelago.28 It is held by some Indonesian commentators that one of the greatest threats to the existence of the Indonesian nation-state is waning public support, which is required to increase stability and support the repair and reintegration of groups into the state structure.29 This combined with large-scale damage to public facilities and infrastructure has caused such disruption to government activities, public services and education that there is a fear it will lead to disintegration similar to the collapse of the Soviet Union.30 In the words of an Indonesian activist during Reformasi, “the only difference between then and now is the atmosphere – then it was a barrage of slogans about unity, development, togetherness and so on. But now these slogans are challenged in places such as Kalimantan, Sulawesi, , and Aceh, not to mention in areas commonly considered more favourable to Indonesia”.31 Since Independence, the Republic of Indonesia has struggled to maintain the staunch support across the archipelago it requires to maintain the authority and capacity to govern.32 With the fall of Soeharto and the Orde Baru, this task has become even more difficult as new-found transparency and greater freedom of speech has allowed dissenting ideas to be discussed in an open forum, often without the mechanisms to resolve issues or unify goals.

Reformasi brought about radical changes in the paradigms and policies which were important to the life of the nation and the state. Lessons learnt from the Orde Baru were implemented, including the recognition and reinstitution of pluralism as a founding principle. This time however, the new paradigms underwent heavy scrutiny; SARA conflicts still erupted but the scale and intensity varied. The government clearly identified potential insecurities and threats to national integration, as defined in the 2003 Republic of Indonesia White Paper, Defending the Country entering the 21st Century, which states:

In addition to external factors there are also a number of internal factors that could potentially destabilise national security. These factors include the impact

26 Saputra in Tohari et al., Dinamika konflik. 02. 27 Noel, Shoemake, and Hale, "Conflict Resolution." 28 Masmiyat, Konflik SARA. 08. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 J. Sangaj in Masmiyat, Konflik SARA. 06. 32 Ibid. 29 of an ethnically heterogeneous Indonesian nation and the heavy economic burden resultant from the economic situation, as well as political and social factors, amongst others. This accumulation of external and internal factors are a threat and disruption to national security, and on a wider scale could disturb the stability of the region.33

The Indonesian White Paper of 2003 also acknowledges the fact that because of the heterogeneity of Indonesian society combined with the geographical characteristics of the island nation, there is considerable potential for the eruption of communal conflict. These communal conflicts can be triggered by exclusivism; in ethnicity, religion, race and amongst groups (SARA) but can also be triggered by social and economic inequalities.34 This identification and acknowledgement of the various threats to society both externally and internally is a step forward for Indonesia and Indonesian freedom of expression since the restrictive times of the Orde Baru; the admission of internal governance problems such as ethnic conflict in a public document such as a White Paper would have been unthinkable in Soeharto’s era. Understanding Ethnic Conflict: the West Meets Indonesia

Reformasi has not only allowed greater freedom of expression for Indonesians in conjunction with the rise of social media and internet access throughout the archipelago, but it has also opened the doors for a number of foreign commentators to enter the country to conduct field work and research on ethnic conflict in Indonesia. This has likewise opened the door for a number of Western sponsored studies to be conducted in Indonesia which are often critical of the Indonesian Government, political system and social circumstances.35 For a country that had been closed for the better part of three decades to both internal and external scrutiny, the post-Soeharto era opening up of Indonesia to foreign analysis and internal criticism has been powerful. While these studies approach the concept of ethnic conflict in Indonesia from different vantage points with different agendas, there is a growing understanding of the need for

33 Ministry of Defence, Mempertahankan Tanah Air Memasuki Abad 21 (Indonesia: Government of Indonesia). 34 Ibid. 35 Significant research centres include the University of Sydney (Indonesian Studies Working Papers Series), University of Sussex (Micro-level analysis of violent conflict: MICROCON papers), Australian National University (the Indonesia Project), University of Oxford (Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity: CRISE), Monash University (Centre for Southeast Asian Studies and the recently formed Australia-Indonesia Centre), Universeiteeit Leiden (Asian Modernities and Traditions: AMT), to name a few. Not for profit organisations include groups such as the United Nations (who sponsors various research initiatives in Indonesia including the United Nations University – World Institute for Development Economics Research Working Papers and UNSFIR papers), Human Rights Watch research papers, the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER Working Papers). Non-government organisations with economic interests in Indonesia include the World Bank (Violent Conflict in Indonesia Study, ViCIS, paper and various other studies). The list also includes government funded research projects (such as by the US State Department, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and finally, independent researchers, journalists and commentators analysing Indonesia’s ethnic conflict through various mediums. See: http://sydney.edu.au/arts/indonesian/research/working_paper_series.shtml for some examples of research initiatives. 30 consultation with Indonesian scholars and experts, with at least one local scholar generally making authorship of each of the working papers mentioned above. What is also apparent throughout these Western sponsored studies, is an acknowledgment of the fact there are great difficulties in listing and categorising ethnic conflict in Indonesia, let alone developing the most appropriate and effective strategy for their future study.

One such example of the way in which Western sponsored studies seek to define and explain ethnic conflict in Indonesia is in a United States Department of State funded work shop conducted in 2003 that focused on Western approaches to conflict resolution compared to Indonesian approaches. Shoemake and Hale identified seven categories to encompass the entire suite of conflicts throughout the Indonesian archipelago. The first four included: 1) interreligious (such as those in Central Sulawesi, Ambon, West and Central Kalimantan), 2) anti-Chinese (in parts of Java, , Sulawesi and Lombok), 3) separatist political (West Papua, Aceh and East Timor) and 4) ‘bizarre’ murders which appear to stem from cultural beliefs such as the sorcerer-healer murders in and parts of .36 In a fifth category, conflict in Indonesia was categorised as ‘ethnic’ in nature. The example used to support this claim was a conflict in Kalimantan where, in 2001, more than five hundred ethnic Madurese were killed by Dayaks who were considered to be Kalimantan’s original indigenous inhabitants. Tens of thousands fled from the province in the wake of the massacre as well as purported acts of cannibalism by Dayaks who reportedly reinvented traditional “head hunting” practices.37

A sixth category identified was that violence in the provinces of Indonesia is also exacerbated by an influx of private militias and out of area fighters in local conflicts. This was the case in Maluku, where the Muslim militia group Laskar Jihad from inserted itself into the conflict. For the seventh category, the study acknowledged low-level localised youth violence, especially in urban areas, where fighting takes place between poor and working class residents of adjacent neighbourhoods, mostly amongst teenage to adult males involved in gangs and petty crime or political parties and paramilitary groups.38 This study highlights the problem with categorising ethnic conflict in Indonesia; that in almost all of these individual conflict categories there exists elements of the others. This is because, unlike the way in which social groups express themselves in many Western countries – for example in Australia, where religious migrant communities tend to live together in ethnic enclaves that almost entirely constitute whole suburbs of cities – concepts of ethnicity, religion, race, tribe, class and community in Indonesia are fluid and defy strict categorisation.39

There have been a number of Indonesian language and Indonesian authored studies on ethnic conflict in Indonesia, as discussed in the methodology of this dissertation. In providing a brief background to the post-colonial conflict history on Indonesia, an

36 Noel, Shoemake, and Hale, "Conflict Resolution." 428. 37 Ibid. 430. 38 Ibid. 39 The Sydney Morning Herald, Is Sydney a city of enclaves?, accessed 23 November 2014, http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/the-question/is-sydney-a-city-of-enclaves-20111111- 1nb68.html. Interview with Sydney Lawyer Mariam Veiszadeh, Politician Bronwyn Bishop, Councillor Benn Banasik, and UTS Sociologist Andrew Jakubowicz 31 example of the way in which Indonesian commentary tends to differ from Western and Western sponsored studies is illuminated in the writings of retired Tentara Negara Indonesia (TNI) Major General Wingarta, the former commander of the Presidential Guard (Danpaspampres) to President Gus Gur, who writes a blog at “putusastrawingarta.wordpress.com”, which addresses issues of national defence, disintegration and conflict.40 Wingarta regarded Indonesia’s reactionary view to globalisation as a cause for violence in the nation. He outlined how he considered globalisation to have brought about a rise in violence in Indonesia, precipitated by non- state actors frustrated by economic inequality, social injustices, xenophobia, political separation and demands for religious solidarity.41 This he considered to be contrary to the expectations of the international community, who expect the reduction of violence and the establishment of world order under UN control.

Wingarta cited the work of Professor Muladi from the National Resilience Institute of Indonesia (Lemhannas RI), a think-tank in Indonesia established by President Soekarno to preserve the national goal of unity, sustainability and vigilance/awareness (Padnas), as the basis for his argument.42 Professor Muladi outlined the manifold threats to Indonesia in his Lectures on KRA Framework XXXIX/2006, which can be simplified to cover four main categories of conflict. First of all, Muladi calculated the threat posed by globalisation to communities in Indonesia who cannot deal with change and seek shelter from it.43 Globalisation and people’s reaction thereto has economic impacts, including the way wealth is distributed throughout communities, and in this way causes tensions. The second threat Muladi explained concerns regional autonomy and challenges faced in implementing national distribution of power. This is problematic because of the difficulties Indonesia faces in coordinating central and local government, whilst maintaining the proper functioning of law enforcement agencies across the archipelago. The third category is problems associated with governance, such as issues regarding the non-accountability of Indonesia’s political parties, the separation of the functions of the Department of Defence and the Government, and the need to find renewable energy alternatives whilst properly managing existing energy deposits.44 Finally, the incongruity between religious tolerance in the Constitution and religious intolerance in practice creates tensions, and often pre-existing political and economic issues will have a religious element that works to catalyse conflict. This final category is a reflection of Wingarta’s belief that Indonesian society is diverging from the fundamental tenets of the original constitution. This is exemplified in his statement that

the life of our community, nation and state in terms of understanding nationalism feels as though it has increasingly lost its direction regarding efforts to achieve the goals and objectives mandated in the preamble to the national Constitution

40 P. S. Wingarta, Urgency Kewaspadaan Nasional Dalam Mencegah Disintegrasi Bangsa, Wordpress, accessed 24 March 2014, http://putusastrawingarta.wordpress.com/tag/putu-sastra- wingarta. 41 Ibid. Padnas is an acronym for “Kewaspadaan National” (National Vigilance). 42 See: http://www.lemhannas.go.id/portal/en/about-lemhannas/history.html 43 Wingarta, "Urgency Kewaspadaan". 44 Ibid. 32 of ’45... Our national insight is alarming, if not in decline, and if we don’t pay attention, it will bring about the disintegration of the nation.45

Throughout the four categories put forward by Muladi, it is evident that there are residual themes that provide a framework to the study of ethnic conflict in Indonesia, which will be used as chapter headings for this dissertation. The first of these is the political dimension to ethnic conflict in Indonesia, including the way in which SARA, Pancasila, secularism, and religion are politicised and how this is understood to cause conflict. The second theme is the economic factors to ethnic conflict in Indonesia, which is closely related to the distribution of wealth, management of natural resources and political issues associated with decentralisation. Analysis of these two main themes constitutes Chapters Three and Four.

45 Wingarta. Urgency Kewaspadaan. Translation of: “kehidupan kita bermasyarakat, berbangsa dan bernegara dalam bingkai paham nasionalisme terasa semakin kehilangan arahnya dalam hubungannya dengan upaya mencapai cita-cita dan tujuan nasional seperti diamanatkan dalam pembukaan UUD 45… Wawasan kebangsaan kita terasa masih memprihatinkan kalau tak mau dikatakan menurun, yang apabila tidak diwaspadai dikhawatirkan akan melahirkan sebuah disintegrasi bangsa.” 33 CHAPTER 3. POLITICAL FACTORS TO ETHNIC CONFLICT IN INDONESIA

Dominant Discourse on Politics and Ethnic Conflict

In 2008, a major United Nations Report entitled Religion in World Affairs: Its Role in Conflict and Peace, concluded that religion is a source of international conflict, citing the work of Philip Jenkins from Pennsylvania State University, who argued “when historians look back on this century, religion will be seen as the prime animating and destructive force in human affairs, guiding attitudes to political liberty and obligation, concepts of nationhood and, of course, conflicts and wars.”1 This view aligns with the argument of Samuel Huntington, who proposed that people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, which creates animosities surrounding ‘us’ and ‘them’.2 At the strategic level, Huntington argued these animosities express themselves as “the efforts of the West to promote its values of democracy and liberalism as universal values, to maintain its military predominance and to advance its economic interests [which] engender countering responses from other civilizations.”3

Huntington drew from the Orientalist ideology of Bernard Lewis, whose article The Roots of Muslim Rage outlined the perceived division between the modern, secular West and the fundamentalist, Islamic East, and “why so many Muslims deeply resent the West, and why their bitterness will not easily be mollified”.4 As outlined in the first chapter of this thesis, these views depict a world in which concepts of religion and culture cause conflict, rather than characterise it. Huntington’s thesis was controversial and generated many critics. For example, in a 2001 article entitled, The Clash of Ignorance, Edward Said remarked that,

the personification of enormous entities called "the West" and "Islam" is recklessly affirmed, as if hugely complicated matters like identity and culture existed in a cartoonlike world where Popeye and Bluto bash each other mercilessly, with one always more virtuous pugilist getting the upper hand over his adversary. Certainly neither Huntington nor Lewis has much time to spare for the internal dynamics and plurality of every civilization, or for the fact that the major contest in most modern cultures concerns the definition or interpretation of each culture, or for the unattractive possibility that a great deal of demagogy and downright ignorance is involved in presuming to speak for a whole religion or civilization. No, the West is the West, and Islam Islam.5

1 D. Smock. Religion in World Affairs: Its Role in Conflict and Peace. In United Nations Special Report 201. Washington DC, 2008. 2 Huntington, Clash of Civilizations. 29. 3 Ibid. [which] added to the quote. 4 B. Lewis, The Roots of Muslim Rage, accessed 04 January 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1990/09/the-roots-of-muslim- rage/304643/?single_page=true. 5 E. Said, The Clash of Ignorance, accessed 04 January 2015, http://www.thenation.com/article/clash-ignorance#. 34 Defining and interpreting culture is of utmost importance to understanding the dynamics of conflict and violence in a particular context. Mount argued that one of the greatest problems with defining the importance of religion to a cultural group, let alone to a conflict, is that “Christianity is viewed as the lens through which other religions are judged, both in Western nation states as well as in dominant philosophical and political doctrines, despite their ‘universalist’ claims.”6 As Stange and Clammer observed, “religiosity is one salient feature of social life in Asia that analysts of Asian societies have blatantly failed or refused to deal with in any satisfactory way.”7

This chapter will address the failure of analysts to deal with ‘religiosity’ in Indonesia, and counter the dominant narrative that views ethnicity and religion – especially Islam – as the antithesis to Western liberal democracy. This view will be challenged in the first half of this chapter through an analysis of the politics of religion in Indonesian society, revealing how religion characterises, rather than causes, ethnic conflict. Tensions resultant from the implementation of ideologies of Pancasila and secularism, concepts of Islamic leadership, and policies of SARA, will be considered as catalysts for ethnic conflict. The second half of this chapter will consider the role of attaining adequate representation in the Indonesian political system in fuelling ethnic conflict. This section will examine the way in which policies and processes of desentralisasi, pemekaran daerah, and pilkada have contributed to what is commonly considered to be ethnic conflict. The Indonesian View

The Politics of Religion in Indonesia

Religion is often associated with ethnic identity – as an internal self-ascription, a boundary mechanism and as an external label.8 This is because religion and religious ceremonies, rituals and behaviours serve to solidify a group with a transcendental purpose – through concepts of ‘faith’ – which in turn is perceived as a significant group marker by those outside the group. In some cases, religion and religious faith lead ethnic groups to claim myths of being a ‘chosen people’ and as such can be seen as responsible for bestowing a sense of ‘holy righteousness’ upon a group. Primordialists such as Clifford Geertz draw upon these religious ‘senses’, classifying the importance of religion to ethnic groups alongside ineffable entities such as “environment, political power, wealth, jural obligation, personal affection, [and] sense of beauty,” which all work to shape social order.9 The role of religion in shaping social order is critical in secular religious societies or societies where there is a dominant religion, because groups that don’t conform are often characterised as ‘ethnic’.

However, the claim that religion determines ethnic identity is problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, in many instances, religion is used less to describe institutionalised and organised religious concepts, but instead to describe ideas of spirituality, faith and

6 Mount, Problem of Peoples. 149. 7 Stange and Clammer in Heryanto, "Southeast Asians." 8 Mount, Problem of Peoples. 9 Clifford Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System," in Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion, ed. Michael Banton (London: Routledge, 1966). 35-36. [and] added to the quote. 35 sacredness which characterise collective human identity.10 Often ethnic groups value the teachings of one religion or many religions, but do not attribute themselves with a religious identity. In other instances, highly religious ethnic groups incorporate the teachings of shamanism, animism and other spiritual beliefs but still identify predominantly as one religion.

This is the case in parts of Indonesia, where an estimated 20 million people, mostly in Java, Kalimantan and Papua, practice animism and other traditional belief systems known as ‘Aliran Kepercayaan’, but combine these belief systems with one of the government-recognised religions in order to register with the government, as they are required by law to do.11 In other instances, religion is combined with the pre-existing cultural beliefs of an ethnic group. This is seen clearly in travelling through Batak North Sumatra, especially in the Lake Toba region, where the Batak people are predominantly Christian, but incorporate animism and ancestral worship into their practice of Christianity.12 This is expressed as homage to both a Christian God by displaying large statues of the Christian cross, alongside masks, statues and tombs designed for homage to local gods and rituals. Aside from the Batak people, many ethnic groups throughout Indonesia have traditional beliefs strongly linked to cultural markers such as language, region, race and class, which are arguably more solidifying than their religion. This combined with the fact that some of the most violent and bloody conflicts to date have been between people of the same religion, and the vast majority of war-related deaths are caused by ‘civic’ fundamentalism, signifies that religion is not, as commonly thought, the harbinger of conflict.13

Secondly, as Budiman put it, “social riots, triggered by this class conflict… become more difficult to handle because most of the time, they are articulated in religious and racial conflicts.”14 Alluding to a sense of “something much bigger” underneath a veneer of religious or racial violence, Budiman’s statement correlates with the idea put forward by Gurr and Harff that “religious difference usually combine with or reinforce ethnic conflicts that are based on nationality or class differences.”15 Here Gurr and Harff combine an instrumentalist position where religion is used as a means, rather than a reason, for conflict, with primordialist claims to the ineffable and abstract sense of ‘faith’ and the spiritual, which as discussed in the previous chapter, are potent in their ability to rally people to a cause. This can be clearly seen in the use of religion throughout numerous societies to provide the ethical foundation for the moral architecture not only for ethnic groups, but whole societies. For example, many modern secular nations implicitly endorse a particular religion – in the United States through such phrases as “In God We Trust” on the national currency, in Australia and a number of other western nations who demark Christmas as a national holiday, in Turkey where the national flag

10 Mount, Problem of Peoples. 149. 11 US Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report for 2013, Washington DC, accessed 04 January 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper 12 D. O'Gilvie, Lake Toba, Land of the Bataks, The Jakarta Post, accessed 29 December 2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/03/17/lake-toba-land-bataks.html. 13 Mount, Problem of Peoples. 14 Budiman, The lonely road. 09. 15 Ibid; Ted Robert Gurr, Ethnic conflict in world politics, ed. Barbara Harff, Dilemmas in world politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994). 25, 93. 36 depicts the Islamic symbols of a white ay-yıldız (Turkish for star-crescent), and in Indonesia, where Ramadan is a national holiday and the country all but stops during this time. For a state to be secular it must ‘tolerate’ diversity of faiths, but in reality it is often the case that a state favours one. Indonesia is no different; the most populous Muslim nation in the world claims to be secular because it allows its people to follow one of five (six if you differentiate between Catholicism and Protestantism) religions, as outlined in the Pancasila.

Pancasila and Secularism

"Let us make Pancasila the basis for reform. In this period of transition, many of us tend to create new realities and directions but abandon the old values, which should become part of our identity and be used as a tool for unity."

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono16

Figure 1.The Five Principles of Pancasila17

The preamble to the 1945 Indonesian Constitution establishes the five tenets of the Pancasila, listed in English above, as the embodiment of the basic principles of the newly independent Republic of Indonesia.18 Controversy surrounded the introduction of Pancasila as a founding philosophy, as Muslim nationalists insisted on the creation of an Islamic Indonesian state. Instead, Soekarno promoted what he considered to be a culturally neutral state identity, compatible with democratic or Marxist ideologies and his own ideology of Marhaenisme, in order to bridge the gap of cultural differences in a vastly heterogeneous population.19 This thinking is evident in his famed defence

16 S. Yudhoyono, SBY Urges End To Debate on Pancasila, accessed 01 September 2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2006/06/02/sby-urges-end-debate-pancasila039s- merits.html.f 17 English translation of the five principles of the Pancasila from Indonesian Embassy, Pancasila, Indonesian London embassy, accessed 04 January 2014, http://www.indonesianembassy.org.uk/human_right-2.htm. 18 W. Frederick and R. Worden, Indonesia: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1993). 19 Ibid. A definition of Marhaenisme is provided by Hadiz and Dhakidae, Social science.111-112, who wrote that Marhaenisme is an ideology developed by Soekarno in 1924 when he was “walking through the countryside south of Cigelereng near Bandung, [and] met Marhaen, the Sundanese “chicken-flea peasant” (petani sieur) whose situation as owner-operator of a small 37 speech of 1930, Indonesia Menggugat (Indonesia Accuses), where he stood up against Dutch colonial rule and claimed an independent Indonesia should be modelled on socialist ideals:20

Your Justices, as far as our convictions, the principle of the PNI is not unlike the principle of the struggle of the working class in Europe and America, not unlike the principle which says that in order to implement socialism, the working class must first achieve Government.21

Despite these intentions, and perhaps as a result of the controversy surrounding its establishment, Pancasila represents a tension within Indonesian society between national secular ideals and the societal reality of a majority Muslim country. Consciously or otherwise, Pancasila has been used by Indonesia’s leaders since Soekarno as a nation-building tool. As such, this section will outline two main sources of conflict in Indonesian society which can be associated with Pancasila. Firstly, the tensions resultant from an anxiety and uncertainty caused by the first tenet of the Pancasila, which states that one and only one God is to be followed. Secondly, conflict arising due to the use of Pancasila ideals as a tool to create an Indonesian identity.

In addressing the first source of conflict associated with Pancasila, Sitompul claimed that tension exists between the idea of religious tolerance espoused by Pancasila and its practical implementation in Indonesian society. The existence of this tension, Sitompul argued, raises questions regarding the legitimacy and saliency of government intervention in the religious life of its people.22 This is because Pancasila itself is a product of an anxiety the Soekarno Government experienced in choosing the nature of the Indonesian nation in the lead up to independence; anxiety over the choice to either enforce a secular Indonesian state, or an Islamic Indonesian state. This is exemplified in that the first tenet of the Pancasila originally read “Ketuhanan yang maha esa dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya” translating to “the state is based on the belief in one almighty god, with the obligation for its Muslim adherents to carry out the Islamic law/Syari'ah.”23 The final clause of Pancasila regarding Islamism and Islamic law was omitted by the Badan Penyelidik Usaha farm… seemed to have been a genuine source of political revelation. Marhaen (and his notional Javanese counterpart ‘Kromo’) became the standard referents in Soekarno’s (and Soekarnoist) discourse for a specific, non-Marxist-textbook kind of poverty and agrarian structure that is frequently alluded to in some of Soekarno’s most important works of the 1930s, including his electrifying defence plea, Indonesia Accuses!” 20 After establishing the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) in 1927 and becoming its first leader, Soekarno was arrested in 1929 by Dutch colonial authorities. During his trial, Soekarno made a series of speeches called Indonesia Menggugat (Indonesia Accuses), criticising imperialism and colonialism, and outlining the ideology of the PNI, which arguably set the ideological foundations for the independence movement. 21 Soekarno, Indonesia menggugat: pidato pembelaan Bung Karno di depan pengadilan kolonial Bandung, 1930 (Djakarta: Seno, 1951). Translated from: “Tuan-tuan Hakim, sepanjang keyakinan kami, asas PNI yang demikian ini dalam hakikatnya tidak beda dengan asas perjuangan kaum buruh di Eropa dan Amerika, tidak beda dengan asas yang mengatakan bahwa untuk melaksanakan sosialisme, kaum buruh itu harus lebih dulu mencapai kekuasaan pemerintahan.” 22 E. Sitompul, Agama-Agama Dalam Konflik (Indonesia: Bidang Marturia –BGI Conference Procedings, 2005). 23 Ibid. 38 Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, BPUPKI (Committee for the Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence) on 18 August 1945, who decided to remove any mention of obligations to Syari’ah or Islamic followership (i.e. the first principle became “Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa” or “Belief in the one and only God”).24 This meant that the Piagam Jakarta (Jakarta Charter) – a document marking a compromise between the Islamic and nationalist interests of the members of the committee – was also altered to reflect the removal of references to Islam. However, while the removal of reference to Islam in the first tenet of the Pancasila was intended to ensure Indonesia was founded on an official secular ideology, unofficially Islam maintained a potent influence on government and Indonesian society.

The inclusion of references to Islam in the original draft of the Pancasila exemplifies the strong Islamic influence throughout the political leadership of Indonesia at the time of independence, which continues to influence Indonesian politics even today. Pastor of the Huria Kristen Batak Protestan (HKBP) church and lecturer at the Sekolah Tinggi Teologi (STT) Jakarta, Einar Sitompul argued that conflict in Indonesia is the logical consequence of pluralism because the removal of the Islamic elements in the first principle of the Pancasila led to the subordination of religion to concepts of national unity.25 Not only was the removal of this clause ineffective in resolving the conflict between Islamic and non-Islamic political elements at the time of writing, but it was also ineffective in guaranteeing peace throughout the archipelago. Sitompul claims that this meant that Indonesia was founded on compromise, which in itself causes tensions.

This compromise is seen between the legal representation and ideological expression of the first tenet of the Pancasila. “Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa” or the belief in only one God, is both correlated by, and in tension with, the Indonesian constitution. On the one hand, the constitution endorses religious freedom in that “all persons [have] the right to worship according to their own religion or belief.”26 On the other hand, the Indonesian state interprets this requirement to mean only one of the official religions are to be followed, with the Ministry of Religious Affairs enforcing official status to six religions only; being Catholicism, Protestantism, , Hinduism, Confucianism and Islamism.27

Discussing the role of the state in providing the freedom of religion and resolution of religious conflict, H.A.M Musahadi from the IAIN argued that this lack of freedom of choice of religion – outside of the six official religions – is often considered to play a pivotal part in conflict in Indonesian society.28 Musahadi drew on the findings of the International Religious Freedom Report of September 2004, which outlines Indonesia’s track record of discrimination and violence towards religious groups, especially minority religious groups. The report found that discrimination was considered to be “common place”, only allowing people to worship one of six official religions and when religious

24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 164. 26 US Department of State, "International Religious Freedom Report for 2013". [have] added to the quote. 27 Ibid. 28 H. A. M Musahadi, Mediasi dan resolusi konflik di Indonesia: dari konflik agama hingga mediasi peradilan (Semarang: Walisongo Mediation Centre, 2007). 39 institutions voiced criticism of the Government they were immediately silenced. Musahadi contends this common place discrimination and silencing of religious difference is largely due to Indonesia’s strident goal of ‘unity in diversity’ which tacitly assumes that no one can merely be Indonesian, but instead must be part of an ethnic group within Indonesia. This is because the Pancasila enforces a requirement for strict group identities within parameters set by the government, which is problematic because it restricts and denies any organic claims a group may have to an identity.

The second problem arising from the implementation of Pancasila as a national ideology is also considered by Musahadi; being that not only does Pancasila make the formation of individual group identities problematic, the formation of a coherent Indonesian identity is likewise difficult due to the differences Indonesia’s leaders have had in imagining it. Frederick and Worden suggested that due to the generalised nature of its ideals, Pancasila was successfully used by both Soekarno and Soeharto as national ideologies, but were less successfully adapted as policy content under both regimes.29 This is exemplified in Soekarno’s 1959 declaration of unity under a slogan called Nasakom – a combination of nasionalisme (nationalism), agama (religion), and komunisme (communism) – to combine the powers of the Army, the Islamic community and the Communists under a Guided Democracy. To oppose the Communist party under this new policy, was to be anti-Pancasila, and therefore un-Indonesian.30

Similarly, Soeharto drew upon the ineffable characteristics of Pancasila that appealed to the Indonesian people’s sense of identity, in proclaiming that any opposition to his government was in opposition to Pancasila. This was exacerbated by the national indoctrination of Pancasila values in school children and civil servants, most notably through the P4 programme, which in English translates to the “Upgrading Course on the Directives for the Realization and Implementation of Pancasila” implemented in 1978,31 turning the Pancasila from an abstract statement of national goals, into an instrument of political and social control.32

This instrumentalist view of the way Pancasila was used by Indonesia’s leaders to control the Indonesian people is perhaps founded on an intimate understanding of the ineffable linkages between the ideals of Pancasila and an idealised egalitarian Indonesian village, wherein concepts of mutual self-help (gotong royong) and democratic decision making (musyawarah-mufakat) are most highly valued.33 This love of Pancasila and the reflexive hatred of anything anti-Pancasila allowed the Soeharto Government to demonise SARA as un-Indonesian because diversity of tribe, religion, race and group was considered to threaten the authority of secular governance. This concept will be analysed in a following section on the role of SARA in ethnic conflict in Indonesia.

29 Frederick and Worden, Indonesia. 30 Ibid. 31 M. Morfit, "The Indonesian State Ideology According to the New Order Government," Asian Survey 21, no. 08 (1981). 32 Frederick and Worden, Indonesia. 33 Ibid. 40 After the oppressive policies of the Orde Baru that saw Pancasila used as a tool for social control, President Abdurrahman ‘Gus Dur’ Wahid sought to take a more inclusive approach to secularism during the period known as Reformasi, whilst outwardly rejecting militant and radical Islamic groups. Considered by many Indonesians “as a fighter for democracy, a great intellectual and an inclusive and genuine Ulema,” Gus Dur is criticised by commentators such as Islamic and Indigenous Religions Scholar Samsul Marif, who argued “if we are right that Gus Dur is the father of pluralism and , the “children” would (probably only) be those receiving benefits from the state’s officiating (the imported) religions.”34 This is an important point to consider, in that the legislative interpretations of the Pancasila allowed for religious freedom within the parameters of the six official religions only – those who follow beliefs outside of these six religions are forced to pretend, lest abstain from officially denoting a religion and be marginalised or radicalised. The paradox of religious freedom to choose one of six official religions in Indonesia has a detrimental impact on the ascriptive agency of religion as an ethnic or group identifier, and can be said to contribute to a sense of anxiety among those without a recognised religion.

Thoha Hamim illuminates the way in which official religion, more specifically Islam, is used as a battle cry by politicians in Indonesia, and how it is common for politicians who pursue a literal or textual understanding of the al-Qur'an to form a political followership based on an exclusive ideology antagonistic towards other political groups.35 One such battle cry was that of President Gus Dur who implemented the policy of ‘cultural Islam’ and in so doing oversaw the inculcation of Islam into the everyday life of Indonesians. While Gus Dur’s cultural Islam policy was predicated on the belief that to follow Islam, one must be able to easily accommodate it into their everyday lives and it must be “peaceful towards the environment in which they live”, in practice, accommodation of Islam meant the replacement of the role of local cultural symbology in exchange for the exclusive symbols of Islam.36

Hamim argued that during this time, the teachings of Islam effectively became analogous to the beliefs of Indonesian society. However, despite the wide-spread enforcement of Islamic slogans and symbology, at the grass-roots level, the Indonesian people were still “the least Arabised Muslims” in the world.37 Here, Hamim suggested that despite the forced Islamisation of Indonesian society, the Indonesian people maintained a sense of their traditional “Indonesian-ness”, which as discussed earlier regarding the incorporation of religion with Aliran Kepercayaan, pervades much of the religious practices throughout the archipelago today. Despite this amalgamation of official religions with Aliran Kepercayaan throughout the archipelago, issues arise from discrepancies between the way in which the they are regulated separately; official religions are the domain of the Department of Religion, while Aliran Kepercayaan are

34 S Marif, Gus Dur: Is he really the father of pluralism?, The Jakarta Post, accessed 14 October 2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/02/23/gus-dur-is-he-really-father- pluralism.html. 35 T. Hamim. Konflik dalam komunitas beragama di Indonesia. 3-33. In T. Hamim, Resolusi konflik Islam Indonesia, ed. Institut Agama Islam Negeri Sunan Ampel. (Surabaya: Kerjasama Lembaga Studi Agama dan Sosial (LSAS) IAIN Sunan Ampel, IAIN Press, dan Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial (LKiS) , 2007). 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 3. 41 regulated by the Department of Culture. Nicolaas Warouw provided an example of how conflict is created by this perceived discrepancy, in that proselytising is legal for followers of Aliran Kepercayaan, but not for followers of the six official religions. As a result, a change in statistics of religious followership is often perceived as the result of another religion proselytising, which is illegal.38 Inconsistent bureaucratic policies combined with a sense of “Indonesian-ness” infused into Indonesian religious practices can be said to cause a sense of anxiety and uncertainty regarding the place of religious freedom in Indonesian society. This view, combined with Hamim’s analysis of the way in which Islamism spread during Reformasi highlights the difficulties faced by Indonesian Governments in implementing policies throughout an archipelago of such diversity of religions and cultures.

The Reformasi gave opportunities to all religious and non-religious groups to express their aspirations in ways they had not been allowed to previously during the Orde Baru. This likewise gave rise to extremist Islamic groups such as Hizbut Tahrir, Laskar Jihad, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia and Front Pembela Islam, who saw the non-incorporation of Islam in the first tenet of the Pancasila, combined with the secular nature of the Indonesian nation based on Pancasila ideals, as examples of the set back of Islam resultant from the incorporation of the political and economic systems of the West enforced on Muslim states.39 Didin Nurul Rosidin argued that these fundamentalist groups are becoming increasingly popular and remain open to the possibility of contributing to or triggering sectarian conflict in Indonesia.40 Justifying their radical beliefs through exclusive interpretations of the al-Qur'an, these groups tried to establish Islamic communities in what was believed to be the “Islamic era par-excellence”.41 Sidel outlines the way in which Islamic groups in Indonesia tend to cause conflict during “periods of heightened ambiguity, anxiety and anticipation with regard to the position of Islam and those forces claiming to represent it in Indonesian society.”42 This idea of ‘anxiety’ in Indonesian society is a theme that correlates throughout Indonesian commentary on ethnic conflict in Indonesia, and will be discussed in more detail as well as in other contexts, later in this thesis. Likewise, the role of Islamism and Islamic organisations in ethnic conflict in Indonesia will be discussed in more detail in a following section.

Islamic Organisations

The denial of plurality of understanding of religion is one of the more common sources of tensions and conflict in Indonesia, because the way people perceive and interpret religion can also be a source of conflict. Conflict over the interpretation of religious and spiritual teachings has for a long time been a characteristic of Indonesian society, and different groups of people have traditionally differed in their expression of and adherence to faith. For example, Geertz described how in traditional there can be said to be three main aliran, or cultural groups; santri, abangan and

38 Statement from Nicolaas Warouw, UNSW, on 26 February 2015. Research notes on file with author. 39 N. Rosidin in Musahadi, Mediasi dan resolusi. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 3. 42 Sidel, "Anxiety of incompleteness." 164. 42 priyayi.43 The santri group are likely to be urban middle class who attend mosque, read the al-Qur’an and in some instances adhere to Syari’ah law. The abangan class tend to be villagers who follow both Hindu and Muslim elements of faith and in some instances incorporate animism and folk law in to their beliefs. The third is the priyayi group, which constitute the traditional bureaucratic elite class from pre-colonial times, who follow strong elements of Hindu-Javanese tradition as their religion. These three religious- social groups are important as examples of the way in which Indonesian society has traditionally divided itself along spiritual and class lines, often using their interpretation of their faith to explain their position in society as the poor, middle or ruling class.

Professor Syafiq A. Mughni from the IAIN argued that ideas of santri and abangan have political implications.44 Mughni refers to an historical example of the political involvement of the aliran is the 1965/66 communist purges, where the santri, aligned with Islamic orthodoxy, and Soeharto’s Orde Baru, were in stark opposition to the abangan class, who tended to align themselves with the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), whom Soekarno garnered support from in the 60s.45 While religion played a role in this conflict and other similar conflicts between the santri and abangan, it is clear that the interpretation of religion and the associated political aspirations of different groups in Indonesian society cause violent and bloody conflict, rather than the belief in religions diametrically opposed and destined to eliminate each other in a ‘clash of civilizations’.

This problem of perspective or interpretation is likewise visible in Indonesia where radical Islamic movements seek to integrate Islam into the secular state system. Not only does this aim cause friction between Muslims and non-Muslims, but also between differing adherents to Islam. Mughni argued that while Islam is a peaceful religion and peace is its goal, war in Islam is justified when it is waged to bring about peace, justice and long-term harmony46. This mentality is widely open to interpretation amongst the Islamic community in Indonesia, because there is also a division within the Indonesian Islamic community regarding their own degree of commitment to Islamic doctrine.47 The way of interpreting religion is important as it determines ones' affiliation with a religious movement and there is an extensive list of movements to be affiliated within Indonesia; Sunni/Shi’ite, literalist/rationalist, universalist/‘particularist’, pro-khilafah/pro-modern nation-state and radical/gradualist in terms of orientation to change.48 Adherence to a particular teaching of Islam determines affiliation with a religious movement, which in turn determines affiliation with a political group, and therefore access to influence and power at the local, regional or national political level.

Due to the moderate nature of Islam in Indonesian secular politics, Mughni considered more radical Indonesian Islamic movements – who favour radical interpretations of the al-Quran – a divisive force in Indonesian society. This is not surprising, as even among

43 Clifford Geertz, "The Santri Variant," in The Religion of Java ed. Clifford Geertz (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960). 44 Ibid. 133. 45 Hamish McDonald, 's Indonesia (Sydney: Fontana/Collins, 1980). 09-10. 46 S. Mughni. Religion: a source of harmony or conflict. In Hamim, Resolusi konflik. 129-134. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 134. 43 the ideologies of these radical Islamic groups there is divisiveness. Mughni exemplified this divisiveness as the difference between the ideology of groups such as Al Qaeda, who perceive the Islamic religion as global ideology, and those such as the ratu adil (a just ruler) movement, who see religion as messianic.49 What these movements have in common is that they tend to predicate their beliefs on concepts of ‘truth claim’, whereby one religious community claims there is only one version of the truth – their version – and do not accept plurality of religious understanding. In radical Islamic teachings, concepts of truth claim are linked to a belief in exclusive salvation, whereby followers of one religion undervalue those of another, because they believe followership of their own religion is the only way to achieve ‘salvation’.50 This may be used in conjunction with economic grievances, to present an unfaltering and uncompromising case against another group.51 This radical and hard-line ideology is in stark opposition to the ideals of Pancasila and secularism, which espouse the harmonious co-existence of religious beliefs. As such, the uncompromising and hard-line beliefs of radical Islamic groups in Indonesia – which as a category, are themselves divided – can be considered an agitating force for conflict in Indonesian society.52 The way in which interpretations of religion can be a source of conflict in Indonesia is exemplified by Mughni’s statement that when “religion [is used] as an ideology… [it] becomes a source of conflict.”53

Exclusivist claims by radical Islamic groups are refuted by many leading Islamic leaders in Indonesia and the global Islamic network, including Luthfi Assyaukanie of the Liberal Islam Network (Jaringan Islam Liberal, JIL), who argued there is no mention of an Islamic state in the al-Quran or classical Islamic texts.54 Instead, this notion has arisen as an extension of the idea of an Islamic caliphate (khalifah) which Assyaukanie considered at the time of writing in 2011 to have been in decline since 1925, when the idea of the nation-state arose.55 In April 2013, the concept of an Islamic khalifah as a territorial reality has been revived by the group known as ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham).56 While Indonesian official estimates claimed approximately 60 Indonesian nationals are fighting in Iraq and Syria, unofficial estimates argued the number is closer to 200.57

49 Ibid. 133. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 132. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. [is used] and [it] added to the quote. 54 Luthfi Assyaukanie, Ideologi Islam dan utopia: tiga model negara demokrasi di Indonesia (Jakarta: Freedom Institute, 2011). 55 Ibid. 56 Jihad & Terrorism Studies Project, ISI Confirms That Jabhat Al-Nusra Is Its Extension In Syria, Declares 'Islamic State Of Iraq And Al-Sham' As New Name Of Merged Group, accessed 01 March 2015, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/7119.htm. ISIS has also been referred to as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, but also referred to as ISIL, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and more recently referred to by the Arabic acronym Da'ish). For a discourse analysis of the naming of ISIS, ISIL or Da’ish, see: Ishaan Tharoor, ISIS or ISIL? The debate over what to call Iraq’s terror group, The Washington Post, accessed 01 March 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/06/18/isis-or-isil-the-debate-over- what-to-call-iraqs-terror-group/?_ga=1.75244306.1823250761.1403224335. 57 G. Dunlevy, Aust, Indonesia face new wave of terror, The Australian, accessed 01 March 2015, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/latest-news/aust-indonesia-to-discuss-terror- threat/story-fn3dxix6-1227030016624. 44 Despite these estimates, there is little support for the khalifah among the Indonesian Islamic community, with ISIS being condemned by a number of influential Islamic organisations, such as Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), or the Indonesian Council of Ulamas. MUI released a fatwa against ISIS stating “Lembaga-lembaga Islam Indonesia menolak keberadaan ISIS dikeranakan ISIS dinilai sebagai kelompok yang memecah belahkan persatuan umat Islam Indonesia” (Indonesia's Islamic institutions reject the existence of ISIS because ISIS is considered a group that breaks the unity of Indonesian Islamic community).58 Other Indonesian Islamic organisations likewise condemn ISIS, with Muhammadiyah urging their followers to reject them – “lSlS bukanlah gerakan Islam” (ISIS is not an Islamic organisation) – and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) claimed not to aspire to a caliphate (“tidak mencita-citakan sebuah khilafah”).59 Other organisations such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia support the idea of a khalifah, but not ISIS.60 The different interpretations of Islamic texts and teachings demonstrates the division of religious views among Indonesian Islamic groups, which constitutes a source of conflict and divisiveness in Indonesian society.

This divisiveness is mirrored in the political sphere in Indonesia, as was reported in an opinion piece in February 2014, entitled Sekularisme, Liberalisme, Pluralisme dalam Tubuh Umat Islam Indonesia, (Secularism, Liberalism, Pluralism within the Indonesian Islamic Body), by Indonesian Newspaper and editorial Kompasiana. The article suggested the current discourse surrounding pluralism, liberalism, secularism and religion in Indonesia is controversial – especially since MUI announced a fatwa against pluralism, secularism and religious liberalism in July 2005.61 Kompasiana stated that MUI does not believe in the view that all religions can co-exist because this ideology counter-acts their theory of ‘truth claim’. MUI believes Indonesian Muslims are faced with a ‘non-physical war’ or ghazwu al-Fikr (thought war) because secularism and religious liberalism deviate from and counter the teachings of Islam. Claims to exclusivity in religion as the basis for individual and group liberties is viewed by Abdulaziz Sachedina as a fundamental problem of identity politics, because it uses its members as tools for confirming and proving hegemonic collective group identity.62 This is at odds with the secular and nationalist claims of the Indonesian state based on the ideals of Pancasila, and likewise causes tensions with all other groups who are considered to be illegitimate.

58 Ahmad Nuryani, Rasyidin Abdul Latif, and Anwar Fakhri Omar, "Jihad ISIS Dalam Perspektif Ulama Islam," Fikiran Masyarakat 03, no. 01 (2015). 59 Muhammadiyah, Pernyataan Sikap Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah Tentang Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, accessed 01 March 2015, www.muhammadiyah.or.id.; Ahlulbait Indonesia, NU dan Muhammadiyah Tolak Tegas Seruan ISIS, accessed 01 March 2015, http://ahlulbaitindonesia.org/berita/3979/nu-dan- muhammadiyah-tolak-tegas-seruan-isis/. 60 Abdul Wahid, Mendukung Khilafah Bukan Mendukung ISIS, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, accessed 01 March 2015, http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2014/07/09/mendukung-khilafah-bukan- mendukung-isis/. 61 Kompasiana Editorial, Sekularisme, Liberalisme dan Pluralisme, Kompasiana, accessed 01 September 2014, http://filsafat.kompasiana.com/2014/02/03/sekularisme-liberalisme-dan- pluralisme-630750.html. 62 A. Sachedina, Beda Tapi Setara: Pandangan Islam Tentang Non-Islam, Blogspot, accessed 01 January 2014, http://atullaina.blogspot.com.au/2012/02/abdulaziz-sachedina-beda-tapi- setara.html. 60-61. 45 M. Basya argued this radical monotheistic view of Islam as the only true religion sees pluralism as a force that threatens to diminish the Islamic faith, since it urges Muslims to recognise other religions aside from Islam.63 Anis Thoha and Adian Husaini argue that pluralism, secularism, and liberalism propagate the hidden agenda of the West and Christian groups who wish to attack Islam.64 Similarly, the view that secularism exists to support colonisation and therefore the rejection of secularism in the Islamic world is a reflection of the sentiment of post-colonial states.65 Dawam Rahardjo suggested that during the Reformasi, authorities under pressure from the general public saw liberalism, pluralism, secularism, and religion as a reflection of the process of radicalisation of Muslims in Indonesia due to the proximity of MUI with radical groups after the fall of the Orde Baru.66 President Abdurrahman Wahid found MUI indirectly responsible for religious violence, because each fatwa issued by MUI ordered an attack on a certain faith group.67 MUI however consider any groups that stray from fatwa as perpetrators of blasphemy.68 According to Fazlur Rahman, this is one of the problems with religious liberalism in Indonesia, which plays a critical role in the contextual interpretation of religious texts. Interpreting texts in what Rahman argued is a “modern and peaceful way” is necessary to avoid historical dogmatism that prevents Muslims from progress, but is difficult to monitor and control. Therefore he considered the interpretation of religious texts and practices is an ongoing source of tension in Indonesia.69

A critical tension exists in Indonesian society as a result of the influence and interpretation of Western modernism, which Mughni argued helped shape the development of two different religious movements; the Indonesian modernists in support of Western ideals and Indonesian traditionalists in opposition to them.70 In an analysis of the role of Islamic law in Indonesian society, Ansari Yamamah regarded Islamic modernism in Indonesia to be in stark opposition to traditionalism.71 The Kompasiana editorial examined earlier in this section argued that modernists represented by groups such as Muhammadiyah are considered to constantly update and modernise their religious teachings, while traditionalists such as NU and the Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah are considered to maintain “heresy and superstition” in

63 M. H. Basya, "The concept of religious pluralism in Indonesia: a study of the MUI’s fatwa and the debate among Muslim scholars," Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies 01, no. 01 (2011). 69-93. 64 A. Thoha, Tren Pluralisme Agama: Tinjauan Kritis (Jakarta: Perspektif, 2005). 48; A. Husaini, Pluralisme Agama (Jakarta: Pustaka al-Kautsar, 2005). 65 N. Hashemi, Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy: Toward a Democratic Theory for Muslim Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 141. 66 M. Dawam Rahardjo, Merayakan kemajemukan, kebebasan, dan kebangsaan (Jakarta: Kencana, 2010). 156-7. 67 Priyambodo, Gus Dur Usulkan Pembubaran MUI, Antara News, accessed 04 September 2014, http://www.antaranews.com/view/?i=1199011776&c=NAS&s=. 68 Ibid. 69 Fazlur Rahman, Islam & modernity: transformation of an intellectual tradition, ed. University of Chicago Center for Middle Eastern Studies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). 70 Mughni in Hamim, Resolusi konflik. 134. 71 Ansari Yamamah, "Renewal of Islamic Law According to Jaringan Islam Liberal of Indonesia: A Reflection from Qawaidu ‘Uquli Al-ijtima’iyah," World Journal of Islamic History and Civilization 02, no. 02 (2012). 46 their practice of faith.72 The editorial considered Sarekat Islam (SI) as an example of a modernist organisation, however this is not entirely accurate, as Takashi Shiraishi outlined that SI was split into two factions in the 1920s – SI Merah (Red) aligned with the PKI, and SI Putih (White), aligned with more traditional Islamic teachings.73 While the differing ideologies of the various factions of SI are both modernist and traditionalist, this split can be seen as a pivotal point in the history of Indonesian Islamic organisations, setting the foundations for traditional and western ideologies to be divided and represented separately.

Harun Nasution argued this split over the way the role of Islam in Indonesian society is viewed, saw the ‘modernists’ as a reform movement attempting to “alleviate Indonesian society of ignorance and backwardness, with the call to break away from the bonds of sects”.74 A self-proclaimed neo-Mutazilite – or modern follower of the humanist and rationalist Mu’tazilah school of theology – Nasution regards concepts of inter-textuality and hermeneutics as changing the way Islamism is practiced in Indonesia, or in the words of orientalist Indonesian scholar Ulil Abshar Abdalla, “refresh Islamic thought”.75 As the deconstruction of these texts is an on-going process, Nasution comments that the rise of liberal Islam or neo-modernist Islam in Indonesia is not without challenges, especially since acceptance of secularism and pluralism is the acceptance of formerly taboo ideas. In either instance, neo-modernists argue that political power should not be a goal of Islamic organisations, as the secular state of Indonesia is founded on the ideology of the Pancasila, which rejected calls for the establishment of an Islamic state. In this sense, tensions between the different ideologies of Islamic organisations in Indonesia, reflected in the separation of modernist and traditionalist interpretations of Islamic teachings and texts, contribute to the polarisation of Indonesian society through the separation of their followership.

As such, it can be said that there is a view among Indonesian and Indonesianist commentators that perceptions and interpretations of Islam and its position in society is what causes conflict, rather than the mere existence of different religions in society as suggested by Western commentators such as Huntington and Fukuyama. Sidel, in his seminal work Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia, argued that the position of Islam in Indonesian politics has impacted the dynamics of religious violence in Indonesia since the 1990s.76 This dynamic is divided in to three temporal phases: urban riots from 1995 to 1998, which mostly targeted Christian and Chinese property, pogroms and interreligious violence from 1998 to 2001, and paramilitary and terrorist activity from around 2001 to 2005.77 Pogroms occurred when President Habibie succeeded President Soeharto and Islamist forces began to gain access to central government. Needing support from the regions, these Islamic forces projected their

72 Deliar Noer, Gerakan modern Islam di Indonesia, 1900-1942 (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial, 1980).; Kompasiana Editorial, "Sekularisme, Liberalisme dan Pluralisme". 73 Takashi Shiraishi, An age in motion: popular radicalism in Java, 1912-1926, Asia, East by South (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990). 74Harun Nasution, Akal dan wahyu dalam Islam (Jakarta: Penerbit Universitas Indonesia, 1982). 34. 75 U. Abshar in Ibid. 76 Sidel, "Anxiety of incompleteness." 77 McRae, Poorly Organized men. 47 power to the regions, which resulted in the generation of political competition. Once Christian and secular interests regained central government power during the government of the more moderate Gus Dur, and even more secular Megawati Soekarnoputri, armed paramilitaries waged jihadist violence in the place of pogroms in the regions. As Sidel noted, this is because for each phase of violence in the recent history of Indonesia outlined above,

the political, sociological and discursive contextualization provided at the outset is shown to have profoundly shaped the timing, location, targets, protagonists, forms, mobilizational processes and kinds of agency associated with the violence, as well as the nature and extent of the ‘religious’ content of such violence.78

Transcendent through Sidel’s argument and aligned with the views of a number of Indonesian scholars previously discussed in this thesis, is the notion that what is commonly considered to be religious conflict in Indonesia is more aptly regarded as a sense of ‘anxiety’ over the position of Islam and Islamic groups in society, occurring during times of political and economic uncertainty. One such Indonesian scholar, Rosidin, argued that some of the issues prevalent between religious communities in modern day Indonesia stem from the hegemonic system of the Orde Baru, when Islamic groups were banned.79

From the end of Soeharto’s reign in the 1990s onwards, Islamic groups succeeded in returning to the centre of power and Muslim communities previously anti-Soeharto – such as Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII (the Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication) and Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas dengan Dunia Islam, KISDI (the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World) – became pro-Soeharto. This is exemplified in that Islamic leaders, such as Ahmad Sumargono of KISDI, voiced their newly found support for the Orde Baru. Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se- Indonesia, ICMI (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals), gained the personal endorsement of President Soeharto in December 1990 despite its constituents being former critics of the Orde Baru regime, led by B. J. Habibie, who considered himself Soeharto’s preferred successor.80

The increased accommodation of Islamic groups in Indonesian politics towards the end of the Orde Baru also saw a dualism in the Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, ABRI (Indonesian Armed Forces) emerge between the nationalists – ABRI Merah Putih (Red White) – and the Islamists – ABRI Hijau (Green).81 Fauzid Rasyid considered Soeharto to be partial to the ABRI Hijau, demonstrated by his choice of Faisal Tanjung as the Commander of the TNI.82 There is little official evidence to confirm the existence

78 Sidel, "Anxiety of incompleteness." 147. 79 Rosidin in Musahadi, Mediasi dan resolusi. 80 Martin van Bruinessen, "Islamic state or state Islam? Fifty years of state-Islam relations in Indonesia," in Indonesien am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts: Analysen zu 50 Jahren unabhangiger Entwicklung: Deutsche in Indonesien, ed. Ingrid Wessel (Hamburg: Abera, 1996). 19-34. 81 Fauzan Rasyid, "Politik Islam dan Demokrasi di Indonesia," Jurnal Pendidikan Sejarah 9, no. 2 (2008). 82 Ibid. 81. 48 of an organised ABRI Hijau/ABRI Merah Putih divide in the late 1990s, however, the rise of influence of Islamic organisations in the late 1990s can be said to contribute to an anxiety in Indonesian society over the role of Islam in a secular Indonesia.83

The increasing influence of Islamic groups in Indonesian politics towards the end of the Orde Baru saw a surge in the number Islamic parties participating in elections during the Reformasi, with as many as 17 in the 1999 elections, falling to only six in 2004.84 This surge and subsequent deflation can be explained in part, as Sidel notes, by the change in the political dynamic from the final years of Soeharto’s reign to the Reformasi, which saw the relative power gained by Islamic groups diminished, and a subsequent backlash of violent jihad and terrorist attacks.85 On a societal level, the rise of Islam in the last decade of Soeharto’s reign accompanied the estrangement of middle-class Muslims with elitist pretensions, from the “millions of unschooled and underemployed ordinary Indonesians of the faith.”86 Identifying less with these elitist pretentions to faith, the poor urban kampung dwellers demonstrated their capacity to mobilise under the rubric of causes other than Islam, such as wildcat strikes and land disputes. Furthermore, middle-class Muslims distinguished themselves from the wider umat or Indonesian Islamic community in their increasing accumulation of capital, which was considered to place them on a level formerly inhabited by the wealthy Chinese.87 As such, economic and class related factors played a significant role in what is often considered religious conflict, and will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter Economic Factors to Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia.

National Unity and SARA

As discussed previously in the section The Orde Baru and SARA conflicts, the term SARA was introduced and manipulated by Soeharto’s regime to enforce consensus and alignment of the multifarious ethnicities and cultures throughout the archipelago. One such way of doing this was through the enforcement of the ideals of the Indonesian state ideology, Pancasila, which establishes the moral foundations of Indonesian society by drawing on primordial attachments to the values of history and traditions.88 Unity and consensus were of utmost importance to the government of the Orde Baru, as it was believed that this would discourage dissent and threats to government. As such, belief and acquiescence in the unifying goal of Pancasila was a highly effective tool in preventing and ending anything that challenged Soeharto’s authority, including anything related to SARA.

83 While there is little official commentary, more recent Indonesian articles and commentary compare the ABRI Hijau/Merah Putih divide in the 2014 elections. See: A. Pambudi. Kalau Prabowo jadi presiden. (2009); DEPOKTREN. Pengelompokan ABRI Hijau dan ABRI Merah Putih pada 1990-1998. (2014); T. Larasati. Pilpres 2014; Tentara Prabowo vs Tentara LB Moerdani? (Bag 1). (2014); M. Zen. Pilpres 2014: ABRI Merah Putih –ABRI Hijau Warisi Politik Pencitraan SBY. (2014); Koepas. Pertarungan Tentara Hijau Dan Tentara Merah Putih. Fakta Nyata Seorang Prabowo Mujahid Islam. (2014); Voice of Islam. Melawan Lupa (7): Jasa 'ABRI Hijau' Ditenggelamkan 'ABRI Merah' & LB Moerdani. (2014). 84 Ibid. 85 Sidel, "Anxiety of incompleteness." 147. 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid. 158. 88 Benedict Anderson, The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture, Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990). 49 The third tenet of the Pancasila was useful in painting SARA characteristics as anti- Indonesian because it calls for the unity of Indonesia – persatuan Indonesia – conveyed in the state motto ‘Bhinneka Tunggal Ika’, which translates into English to mean ‘Unity in Diversity’. Benedict Anderson argued that embracing diversity is seen in Javanese culture to be testimony to the power of a ruler, thus unity in diversity is seen as both a primary political goal and evidence of a powerful state and ruler.89 This motto was heavily inculcated in the hearts and minds of Indonesian people, through civil service training, school and university curriculums90 and the adornment of the Indonesian national emblem, the Garuda Pancasila, which is ‘Garuda’ – a mythical humanoid creature in Hindu and Buddhist mythology adapted for Indonesia by depicting a Javanese eagle – wearing a shield adorned with five symbols representing the five tenets of the Pancasila.

Figure 2.Garuda Pancasila91

Michael Morfit argued that the Pancasila, far from a revolutionary philosophy, is a ‘static ideology’ that relies on reference to traditions of an Indonesian past in the most general form; “an ideology of containment rather than one of mobilization”.92 Pancasila was designed to unite the Indonesian people despite ethnic, social, religious and class divisions, however during the authoritarian regime of the Orde Baru, true unity of SARA characteristics were oppressed and the only diversity was at the level of material culture and artefact. Taman Mini Indonesia Indah (Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature) is an example of this; established as a showcase of cultural policy and management under Soeharto, the 160 hectare park is a scaled map of the archipelago of Indonesia that tourists can walk and paddle boat through to see firsthand the ‘unity in diversity’.93 In this sense, SARA is diametrically opposed to the unified state sanctioned diversity of the Orde Baru. Despite this ideological opposition, it has left its mark on contemporary Indonesian society in that it is “one of Jakarta’s most popular recreational spots, crowded on weekends with families and teenagers from the metropolis’ growing middle class.”94

89 Ibid. 90 Morfit, "Indonesian State Ideology." 91 Image accessed online at http://indonesia.go.id/ 92 Ibid. 486. 93 Judith Schlehe, Staging the past themed environments in transcultural perspectives (Bielefeld2010). 94 N. Salazar in Ibid. 96. 50 It is likely that there is tension between the concepts of SARA and those of national unity in Indonesian society, not only because of the way in which SARA was depicted as the antithesis to national unity during the Orde Baru, but because of the misrepresentation of the individual concepts that form SARA at their fundamental levels. While notions of tribe (suku), and group (golongan), can arguably be seen as ascriptions of ethnic identity stemming from notions of common ancestry and kinship, race (ras) can be seen as a phenotypical or biological characteristic that is more difficult to define.95 Its importance in solidifying group identity through facilitating a sense of what Smith termed ‘diacritical significance’ is probably more significant to people external to the racial group, rather than to the racial group itself, as many ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious groups do not determine their membership according to obvious physical characteristics – if this is in fact what race is. The concept of race is more useful if considered in terms of Enloe’s idea of a ‘cluster of features’, where groups of people with strong emotional attachments to geographical locations, a “homeland”, kinship or “blood ties”, and with similar physical appearance build on the narrative of a concept of ‘race’.96 This narrative invokes strong emotional and sentimental attachments to kin and group, similar to the way ‘ethnicity’ does. In so far as they have tended to occupy lower socio-economic position in social stratum, ideas of class and gender can be considered similarly to ideas of race – as mutually reinforcing systems of oppression.97 In this sense, concepts of ‘race’ can be differentiated from concepts of tribe and group; all of which are vastly separate from ideas of religion (agama), as discussed earlier in this chapter. However, the four concepts are gracelessly lumped together to form the acronym SARA, which by definition should represent four different concepts that constitute four different characteristics of identity. In practice, these four concepts combined to mean anything that is not the state sanctioned ideology.

Chang argued that numerous conflicts in Indonesia with elements of ethnicity or SARA are incorrectly labelled.98 This is perhaps as a result of the way in which concepts of tribe, religion, race and group were categorised together as SARA during the Orde Baru. This is supported by Mughni’s description of how what is often considered to be a religious conflict in Indonesia is often a “racial or ethnic” conflict.99 Mughni draws on the example in Java where the majority of Chinese are Christian and the majority of Javanese are Muslim, so what is often seen as an intractable religious conflict is in fact a racial one, made more complicated due to the different religions and cultural practices followed by the different ethnic groups. Here even in Mughni’s writing, race and ethnicity are used as interchangeable concepts. However, the crux of his argument is that conflict in Indonesia is often perceived as religious due to the two conflicting parties being of different religious backgrounds. Likewise in the case in central Kalimantan, where conflict is caused by tensions between the practices and beliefs of the two cultural groups – the Christian Dayaks and Islamic Madurese – but is often misrepresented as religious opposition. In this instance religion is not the cause of the conflict, but another differentiating characteristic between the two groups.

95 Mount, Problem of Peoples. 150. 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid. 98 Chang in INIS, Konflik Komunal. 99 S. Mughni in Hamim, Resolusi konflik. 51 Similarly, Masmiyat describes how in the last decade of the twentieth century SARA conflicts and social riots broke out in a number of villages throughout the Indonesian archipelago, which despite considering them to be caused by a number of factors, argued that religious symbols and sentiments were the most obvious and important targets.100 Here Masmiyat refers to the way in which religious symbols and sentiments are targeted in conflict and so characterise the conflict as religious, despite it not being caused by religious reasons. An example of this is in the conflict in East Timor, where during the 30 years of integration into the Indonesian state, the Javanese Muslim population developed economically faster than the Timorese Christians. This characterised the conflict as religious, due to the different groups having different religious orientations, despite the large economic gap and the inherently different political and cultural heritages being largely to blame for the tensions.101

Masmiyat argued that violent conflicts involving the use of symbols of religion are highly dangerous in Indonesia.102 He continues that if a social conflict evolves into one between religious groups, the resolution becomes almost intractable and infinitely more intricate and complex.103 He believes Pancasila is in part to blame for this, in that Indonesian people are limited to following one of only six official religions, compounded by the assertion that there are only two races in Indonesia: indigenous Indonesian and Chinese Indonesian, but under these racial groups there exists various indigenous tribes, languages and cultures, all of whom view themselves as distinctly separate and unique.104 As Franz Magnis-Suseno argued, conflict and violence in Indonesia are often characterised by religious and ethnic sentiments which mean they are often categorised as religious or ethnic, and therefore intractable and complex, despite their being various other socio-cultural, economic and political facets underlying the tensions.105

In outlining the way in which social conflicts are misrepresented as religious conflicts, Masmiyat draws on the findings of Neil Smelser of the University of California, to provide a framework to analyse the various factors required to cause a riot or violent collective behaviours in a society. These include the requirement for ‘structural suitability’ to support social frameworks; tensions, including feelings of injustice within society that push many people to extreme actions; the appearance of divergence of views; accelerating factors; mobilisation by leaders with defined goals; and the collapse of social control.106 If these factors cannot be regulated through leadership, policing, propaganda, policy changes by the government and legislative arms, and other forms of social control, violence is likely as a legitimate recourse for grievances.107

Masmiyat’s understanding of Smelser aligns with Sidel’s view of violence to some degree, as conflict in Indonesia being the result of “anxieties” regarding a group’s

100 Ibid. 101 Donald L. Horowitz, "Patterns of Ethnic Separatism," Comparative Studies in Society and History 23, no. 2 (1981). 102 Masmiyat, Konflik SARA. 103 Ibid. 104 Ibid. 105 Franz Magnis-Suseno in INIS, Konflik Komunal. 119. 106 Translated from Masmiyat, Konflik SARA. 107 Paul B. Horton, Sociology ed. Chester L. Hunt (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968). 52 position in society resultant from political or social changes, such as those outlined above. These social grievances, including SARA grievances, have been ingrained into the Indonesian psyche as anti-Indonesian, due to the speed and ruthlessness with which SARA conflicts were dealt with during the Soeharto era.108 This contributes to feelings of “anxiety” experienced by SARA groups, who since having greater freedom of expression, seek to find their place in Indonesian society. As such, it is clear that there is a strong sense amongst Indonesian and Indonesianist scholars that what is often considered religious conflict in Indonesia, is in fact caused by a myriad of social, economic and political factors.

The Politics of Representation in Indonesia

As previously established, Indonesia’s political ideology was founded on the ideals of Pancasila, in an attempt to stop fragmentation and disintegration throughout the archipelago. However, scholars such as Aspinall and Fraenkel argued this system in fact achieves the opposite of its goal.109 Mount put forward in his chapter on Civic Solutions for Ethnic Problems that “the root causes of contemporary struggles between peoples and states have been significantly shaped by policies that were celebrated as civic solutions in the past.”110 This quote seems applicable here in that some Indonesian commentators argue that conflict in Indonesia is caused by the representation of cleavages in the Indonesian political party system, which were intentionally designed at the time of democratic transition to ensure all regional and ethnic parties were represented.111 The aim was to stop any disintegrative tendencies that threatened democracy, but instead the system reflected pre-existing socio- religious cleavages and led to the formation of huge support bases based on these divisions.

Some of these support bases include socio-religious organisations with political influence, such as Muhammadiyah representing modernist Muslims, and NU, representing traditionalist Muslims. Religio-political support bases are likewise strong; of the nine political parties currently represented in Indonesian parliament, four are Islamic.112 The formation of strong societal divisions based on the political party system in Indonesia is an example of how civic solutions often work to calcify ethnic identities and animosities, despite the notion held by many Western liberal commentators, that

108 Montiel and Noraini Mohd, Peace psychology in Asia. 05. 109 Edward Aspinall and Jon Fraenkel, Comparing Across Regions: Parties and Political Systems in Indonesia and the Pacific Islands (Canberra: CDI Policy Papers on Political Governance, 2013). 04. 110 Mount, Problem of Peoples. 11. 111 Aspinall and Fraenkel, Comparing Across Regions. 112 Marcus Mietzner, Money, power, and ideology: political parties in post-authoritarian Indonesia (Honolulu: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2013).; Nadia Bulkin, Indonesia's polical parties, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed 02 March 2015, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/10/24/indonesia-political-parties. Secular parties include: Partai Demokrat (Demokrat), Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar), Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P), Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra), and Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (Hanura). Islamic parties include Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), and Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP). 53 democracy is an “immunological key.”113 This section will analyse the way in which Indonesian scholars such as Amien Tohari, from the ITP believe the cleavages in the Indonesian political system – the system designed to represent the Indonesian people – create an environment of anxiety that leads to conflict, commonly considered to be religious or ethnic in nature.

Tohari made the argument that over the last decade in Indonesia, these calcified animosities combined with pro-democratic policies that changed the power dynamic between state and society and were not conducive to democratic and transparent processes and policies, causing uncertainty and unrest.114 Policies such as direct vote legislation, pemekaran daerah policies, open market policies, and policies surrounding electoral campaigning, Tohari argued, have allowed the business class and other elite social groups to dominate the social and economic realm, making it difficult for working class Indonesians to achieve political representation. As Mount argued, the enforcement of liberal democratic notions in non-democratic societies compounds crises of identity and anxiety in the midst of social, environmental, cultural, economic and technological change.115 This aligns with Tohari’s view of the changing power dynamic in Post-Soeharto Indonesia, as the anxiety experienced during Reformasi as new ‘democratic’ changes were enforced, resulted in the reactive formation of informal and non-governmental civil society and religious organisations. This was partly an attempt to counter new power imbalances, and as suggested by Sidel, determine their relative position in society once more.116 This anxiety and uncertainty brought with it associated violence and conflict, from political demonstrations to riots, in an attempt to achieve greater representation.

The ‘anxiety’ Sidel described Islamic groups in Indonesia experience during times of political and social change is compounded by the ‘ideological malleability’ of the Indonesian political system. Tohari claimed this malleability allows large religious organisations to dominate Indonesian politics and influence government.117 One such way Tohari suggested the powerful Islamic organisations in Indonesia maintain their connection to politicians and military officials is through upholding conservative stances on anti-imperialism and discrediting western institutions; calling for strong non- democratic leadership and supporting the status quo of leading elites means they are a powerful and non-threatening ally to ideologically weak politicians scrambling for power. Tohari argued these movements cause conflict by encouraging the discrimination of religious minorities through ideological ‘dogmata’ and strong political lobbying. Some of these organisations include Hizbat Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Forum Umat Ulama Islam (FUUI) and arguably the most important and influential group, MUI. Tohari claimed MUI successfully lobbied President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) to pass a decree based on a MUI fatwa released in 2007, which dictated what the ‘deviant teachings of Islam’ in Indonesia are and banned the public proselytising of the minority Islamic movement Ahmadiya.118 Tohari claimed that these large religious

113 Barber in Mount, Problem of Peoples. 12. 114 Tohari et al., Dinamika konflik. 115 Mount, Problem of Peoples. 12. 116 Sidel, "Anxiety of incompleteness." 117 Tohari et al., Dinamika konflik. 118 Ibid. 54 organisations in Indonesia have a wide network of influence across members of the government and the military, which explains why strong religious overtones characterise and shape conflict surrounding representation in the Indonesian political system.119 In outlining what he sees as the ‘brutal’ and ‘violent’ treatment of Ahmadiya in Indonesia, Tohari uses highly emotive language to express his criticism of what can be said to be the conflict entrepreneurship of Islamic organisations in Indonesia.

The strong influence of religious organisations in the Indonesian political system can be said to create a culture of conflict entrepreneurship, whereby religious movements such as MUI gain popular and political support by means of scapegoating. Taking an instrumentalist point of view, Tohari argued these Islamic groups discredit minority groups such as Ahmadiya as a means to gain mass political support through focusing the public’s anger and emotion on an issue that can be solved, such as the dissolution of minority groups, rather than more complex issues, such as addressing rising fuel prices and improving education.120 Using minority groups as scapegoats for deeper societal issues, especially in rural areas where judicial systems are weak, means the perpetrators of ethno-religious violence often do not have to fear retribution for their actions, and in fact receive prestigious status within their community.121 This works to undermine the legitimacy of the secular state and its authorities and perpetuates the perception that political and power driven violence is religious in nature.

Scapegoating is not an unusual practice either for Indonesian society or Western liberal democracies, in that Soeharto used concepts of SARA to marginalise minority groups, and there is an entrenched tradition in Western political thought to marginalise ‘backward’ peoples from society and political discourse.122 Similarly, the use of the word ‘oknum’ in Indonesian discourses – defined by Aspinall and van Klinken as “rogue elements” or “individuals and groups who calculatingly exploit state weakness” – which Elizabeth Pisani argued is used to describe an institutional irresponsibility that “effectively makes it difficult to discuss, let alone tackle, Indonesia’s structural and deeply institutionalised corruption.”123 Referring to an agen provokator (provocateur agent) or seorang yang tidak bertanggung jawab (an irresponsible person), oknum is often used by state officials – including the Police and Army – to describe parties to a conflict without admitting failure of the state apparatuses to keep the peace and enforce Pancasila ideals of national unity.124 One is not a corrupt official, a violent police officer, or a fraudulent Ulama, but an ‘oknum’, stripped of their agency and devoid of responsibility for their actions because they are considered a “rogue element”. The practice of using oknum to describe transgressors, and the use of scapegoating in Indonesian politics more generally, can be considered a consequence

119 Ibid. 217. 120 Ibid. 121 Tohari et al., Dinamika konflik. 122 Mount, Problem of Peoples. 123 Edward Aspinall and Gerry van Klinken, The state and illegality in Indonesia, ed. Edward Aspinall and Gerry van Klinken (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2010). 40; Elizabeth. Pisani, Where have all the oknum gone?, accessed 03 March 2015, http://indonesiaetc.com/where-have-all-the- oknum-gone/ 124 Statement from Nicolaas Warouw, UNSW, on 26 February 2015. Research notes on file with author. 55 of a wider institutional problem resultant from a lack of adequate conceptual language to comprehend ethnic groups and conflict in a state-centric dominant narrative.125

In response to feelings of disenfranchisement, and coinciding with and in reaction to the growth in influence of religious organisations in Indonesian politics, Tohari claimed a number of civil society organisations have developed since the end of the Orde Baru which attempt to provide greater representation to minorities in Indonesia. Some of these groups include the Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence (Komisi Untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan, or otherwise known as KontraS) and the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia or YLBHI). While the existence of these organisations would appear to be a step forward in opening up the political participatory processes in Indonesia, Tohari instead suggested these groups have little influence on government policies and face financial difficulties due to government funding being spread thinly amongst the numerous new NGOs that have formed since the Orde Baru. Funding is also difficult for organisations such as KontraS and YLBHI because, as Tohari claimed, the Indonesian Government tends to provide financial aid to its beneficiaries and circumvent the civil society organisations that are impartial towards, or critical of, the Indonesian Government. Furthermore, there is a perception in some Indonesian communities of NGOs being recipients of Western funding and only providing their services “in terms of their own pecuniary interests.”126

Tohari continued that this neglect of democratic political agitation has meant in recent times that people in Indonesia are reluctant to establish formal organisations and are instead more likely to turn to protests and violence, which they consider to be the only other way to have their views heard.127 This view is evidenced in the fact that over the last two elections prior to the election of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) in July 2014, Aspinall and Fraenkel identified the emergence of two trends; the trend of traditionally Islamic-identified parties seeking to appeal to the median voter by deemphasising the religious aspects of their campaigns, while secular-nationalist parties have tended to increase their expressions of support for Islamic causes.128 As opposed to demonstrating a trend away from radical Islamic and radical secular views in Indonesia, this trend towards the moderate centre instead exemplifies how the Indonesian political party system uses the ideological, philosophical and religious underpinnings of the party as a tool to attain and hold power, with political elites more interested in power itself rather than progressing their underpinning causes.129 This further supports an instrumentalist view proposed by Tohari and the ITP to describe the use of religion – especially Islam – to further political aspirations. Conflict and anxiety over achieving representation have in this way characterised the Indonesian political system, especially since the fall of Soeharto; representation and representative politics being potent concepts laden with religious overtones because of the deeply entrenched connection with Islamism and power in Indonesian society. Three issues surrounding

125 Mount, Problem of Peoples. 12. 126 Sue Kenny, "Reconstruction in Aceh: Building whose capacity?," Community Development Journal 42, no. 2 (2007). 219. 127 Mount, Problem of Peoples. 128 Aspinall and Fraenkel, Comparing Across Regions. 129 Ibid. 56 concepts of representation will be analysed in the following sections – desentralisasi (decentralisation), Pilkada (Regional Elections), and pemekaran daerah (regional expansion) – to demonstrate the way in which Indonesian commentators such as Firman, Dwiyanto, Harmantyo, Adeney-Risakotta, and Tohari consider the Indonesian political system contributes to violence and conflict commonly considered to be ethnic.

Desentralisasi

Decentralisation and democratisation policies were implemented after the fall of the Orde Baru in reaction to the heavily centralised policies of the Soeharto Government. Two important pieces of legislation were passed by the Habibie government in 1999 regarding regional autonomy, devolving considerable administrative and fiscal powers to regencies, cities and provinces and allowing local parliaments (DPRD) to elect regional heads, mayors and governors where previously they had been appointed by Jakarta.130 Indonesian scholar and Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Tommy Firman, writes predominantly about population mobility and urbanisation in Southeast Asia, as well as the Urban labour market, development and decentralisation in Indonesia, and argued that a source of contention exists where not all of the authority promised to regional governments was handed down as was supposed to occur in accordance with decentralisation policies. More specifically, he argued that Law 32 of 2004 outlines how autonomous regional governments can be divided or merged so as to allow regional governments the capacity to manage their own development.131 This law is known as the pemekaran daerah law, which will be discussed in further detail in the next section.

In other instances where powers have been handed down, such as in the case of determining local development projects and receiving central government funding accordingly, Firman argued problems arise where regional government elites only play an active role in the social development of their regions in so much as to coordinate their own financial gain.132 Aspinall and Fraenkel argued decentralisation has caused the exploitation of local resources and assets, and many regional governments with their “selfish and parochial attitudes” have instituted regulations that contradict national laws and regulations.133 Firman agreed with this view of Bupati (Regent), and claimed that there are few who have “the Indonesian people’s interests at heart” and instead of directing funding to local development, they tend to encourage natural resource dependence or dependence on economic assistance from the central government. Tohari, Aspinall and Van Klinken share this view, arguing that in many instances, Indonesian political elites seem to be more concerned with fulfilling the demands of cronies, businesses and family members who financed their election campaigns, than with their duties as representatives of their constituencies.134

130 Sidel, "Anxiety of incompleteness." 131 See: the Institut Teknologi Bandung website at http://www.sappk.itb.ac.id/pwd/?page_id=24 for information on the interests and publications of Professor Tommy Firman as part of the Regional and Rural Planning Research Group. 132 T. Firman, "Territorial Splits (Pemekaran Daerah) in Decentralising Indonesia, 2000–2012: Local Development Drivers or Hindrance," Space and Polity 17, no. 02 (2013). 133 Ibid. 134 Aspinall and Fraenkel, Comparing Across Regions.; Tohari et al., Dinamika konflik.; van Klinken, Communal violence and democratization in Indonesia: small town wars. 57 Nonetheless, while “corruption is still an acute problem for regional autonomy” (korupsi masih merupakan masalah akut otonomi daerah), Tempo magazine claimed that in some instances, regional autonomy has brought about corruption-fighting leaders of the likes of Banjar Herman Sutrisno, Tri Rismaharini, and Yusuf Wally.135 Despite this good news, in giving local political elite the power to determine where funds are allocated, decentralisation policies have by and large allowed for graft in the Indonesian political system. In turn, this has caused tensions and conflict surrounding issues with dependency on government funding, natural resource economies, and the whim of political elite.

Not only was the implementation of new decentralisation policies a source of tension within Indonesian society, with decentralisation came the removal of boundaries imposed by Soeharto’s national unity/pro-Pancasila anti-SARA policies and the growth of secular and religious organisations as discussed in the section above. This brought with it tensions and unrest as animosities were calcified. In response to both internal dissent and external threats, the new Habibie administration sought to counter this anxiety of uncertainty and stood, as Sidel remarked, as the representative of Indonesian society – a Muslim society.136 The change in government for the first time in three decades had implications on the certainty of power, which Sidel notes:

Against this backdrop, the demise of the New Order and the promise of competitive elections on the horizon carried significant implications. Instead of individuated competition channelled vertically and confined laterally within the state, various streams or currents (aliran) within the political class now found themselves competing – collectively and horizontally, as it were – not (only) in and for the state, but (also) in and for society. Thus the boundaries of identities and interests in Indonesian society, long determined by a fixed, hierarchical source of recognition firmly anchored in the state and centred in Jakarta, were left in flux.137

This ‘flux’ was in part due to the failure of a decentralised political system to adequately represent its constituents. This has implications on claims to natural resources, land, space and administrative areas, presenting themselves most commonly as contestation between collective identities, whose boundaries – be it communal, tribal, ethnic or religious – were suddenly uncertain.

Pemekaran Daerah

Decentralisation and regional autonomy have brought about a political dynamic in Indonesia called pemekaran daerah or ‘regional blossoming’ according to the International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘regional expansion’ to Aspinall and Fraenkel, and ‘territorial splitting ‘ to Firman, whereby the allure of allocated funding to regional

135 Tempo, Inilah Bupati Pilihan Tempo, accessed 03 March 2015, http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2012/12/10/078447036/Inilah-Bupati-Pilihan-Tempo. 136 Sidel, "Anxiety of incompleteness." 171. Sidel sites this information from “various articles published in the October 1998 edition of Media Dakwah, a monthly magazine operated by Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia” 137 Ibid. 174. 58 government officials for use to advance and develop their regions has sparked a growth in the number of regions in Indonesia, and therefore the number of regions making claims to this funding.138 In August 2006, President SBY announced to the Special Plenary Session of the Dewan Perwakilan Daerah Republik Indonesia, DPD- RI, (Indonesian Regional Representatives Council) that the concept of pemekaran daerah needs to be addressed because of its hefty financial burden on the state, with more than 80% of newly expanded regions not demonstrating any increase in local development projects since having been given funding.139

However, senior lecturer in Geography at the University of Indonesia (UI), Djoko Harmantyo argued in his article Pemekaran Daerah dan Konflik Keruangan: Kebijakan Otonomi Daerah dan Implementasinya di Indonesia (Regional Expansion and Spatial Conflict: Regional Autonomy Policy and its Implementation in Indonesia) that pemekaran daerah has created more than just fiscal and developmental problems; the seizure of land from its traditional owners and inhabitants by regional governments has created spatial conflicts in areas such as the Mamasa district of West Sulawesi, the islands between Riau and Jambi province, and an island in the Thousand Island area.140

In their study entitled Indonesia: Preventing Violence in Local Elections, the ICG provides a background on the establishment of the direct election process in Indonesia, which it claims is responsible for allowing decentralisation to devolve fiscal and political powers to the districts since 2005, and has given permission for a new class of leaders to emerge with power to bypass provincial capitals.141 Increased funds to district government has made running for election more attractive to regional politicians, which has initiated the process the ICG calls ‘blossoming’, whereby a district is able to physically expand at a rate quicker than the political, legal and security infrastructure can accommodate.142 This causes tensions and conflict at both a horizontal and vertical level, as the political elite continue to draw and erase borders for their own political and financial gain.

Statistics appear to differ from one study to another, detailing the exact growth in regions in Indonesia since decentralisation, which is not surprising considering the difficulty Vltchek outlined in ascertaining the number of islands in Indonesia.143 This is clear in that the ICG report claimed that since 1999, Indonesia has expanded from having 292 districts in 26 provinces to 502 districts in 33 provinces.144 Harmantyo’s

138 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Preventing Violence in Local Elections (Jakarta/Brussels: Asia Report No. 197, 2010).; Aspinall and Fraenkel, Comparing Across Regions.; Firman, "Territorial Splits." 139 A. Dwiyanto, Research Report (Yogyakarta: World Bank, 2003). 140 D. Harmantyo, "Pemekaran Daerah dan Konflik Keruangan: Kebijakan Otonomi Daerah dan Implementasinya di Indonesia," 11 (2007). 141 International Crisis Group, "Preventing Violence." 142 Indonesian Home Affairs Ministry, Kode dan Data Wilayah Administrasi Seluruh Indonesia, accessed 01 May 2015, http://www.kemendagri.go.id/media/filemanager/2013/05/28/b/u/buku_induk_kode_data_dan_wi layah_2013.pdf. 143 Vltchek, Archipelago of fear. 144 International Crisis Group, "Preventing Violence." 59 study claimed different figures entirely with an average increase of about 30 new autonomous regions per year since the enactment of Act number 22 of 1999 and the implementation of Law number 32 of 2004.145 Furthermore, Harmantyo argued that less than 50% of regions in Indonesia meet the criteria for expansion, which impacts the effectiveness of achieving regional autonomy goals such as infrastructure development. This is especially problematic for large autonomous regions and regions with limited access to resources whose speed of development will be slower than well- established regions with access to resources and larger land masses.146 Despite incongruities between the exact numbers of growth, what is clear throughout these studies is that the dynamics of pemekaran daerah have had a detrimental effect on government of these regions and the ability for local people to achieve representation.

The inability of local people to achieve representation as a result of pemekaran daerah and decentralisation policies is in part the result of tensions and conflict surrounding the demarcation of boundaries of identity, which are dependant on geographic boundary lines. This is because the determination of geographic boundaries impacts the sovereignty of regions and determines which government is responsible to, and for, whom. A report by the Indonesian Department of Home Affairs stated that 79% of newly expanded regions do not have clear boundaries, increasing the potential for ‘spatial conflict’ in regions and extensive land areas with low population density such as Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku and Papua – a source of conflict that will be discussed in more detail as a product of economic policies, in the following chapter on Economic Factors to Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia.147 In instances where there are no land borders, such as in , the chances for the success of regional autonomy is greater as the relatively limited interaction across borders decreases the likelihood of cross border spatial contentions. Spatial contentions are compounded in regions with both land borders to another region, as well as high population density and often results in poor representation and access to government. Where areas do not feel they have access to government, direct voting legislature has allowed regional level voting for the House of Representatives or Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR). This has perpetuated the call for pemekaran daerah policies, as the more regions there are, the more access local elites have to central government and the funding that comes therewith.

Compounding this problem of representation is the fact the reasons used when putting a case forward for pemekaran daerah are often customary, linguistic or ethnic. These reasons can be difficult for policy makers to dispute, possibly due to what Mount described as a lack of adequate vernacular surrounding concepts of race and ethnicity in civic discourse.148 Firman continues an instrumentalist view of the way in which the Indonesian political system uses ‘representation’ as a means rather than the ends. Sceptical of the reasons for continuing a policy of ‘territorial splits’, he claimed they have been allowed under the auspices of creating more autonomous local governments to better provide services to a region, encourage local development and

145 Harmantyo, "Pemekaran Daerah." 146 Ibid. 21. 147 Adeney-Risakotta, "Power from Below: Deconstructing the Dominant Paradigm of Power."; Government of Indonesia, Laporan Evaluasi Daerah Pemekaran ( Jakarta: Depdagri, 2005). 148 Mount, Problem of Peoples. 60 provide better representation.149 However, in reality, Firman argued territorial splits are based largely on links between local elites and political actors, which has seen the increase in the number of local governments since 2009 to 2011, from 298 to 526.150

Firman outlined a framework of four main reasons for territorial reform in developing countries and what he describes are ‘former socialist states’; political motivation, financial incentives, the need to provide better public services, and as a response to economic marginalisation and neglect.151 Violent conflict often accompanied this reform process.152 This is in contrast to the largely developed world, where he stated reform is characterised by territorial amalgamation to enhance a country’s ability to compete in the global economy. He summarised in claiming that territorial splits encourage sub- national fragmentation, and there is no evidence to say that it reduces poverty levels, increases economic growth, provides better public services, or improves access to political representation. This view combined with that of Harmantyo, correlate with those of Indonesianist scholars such as Aspinall and Fraenkel in portraying the political system in Indonesia as using ideas of identity and representation as ‘tools’. This diminishes the palpability of the dominant narrative which considers ethnic conflict as anarchic and intractable, with ineffable and intangible grievances that cannot be solved, lest there be a ‘clash of civilizations’.

Pilkada

Pilkada or Pilihan Kepala Daerah, are regional head elections held throughout Indonesia, and Indonesian scholars, especially those in the ITP, have written a substantial body of work on this topic and its connection to violent conflict. Tohari argued there is a strong correlation between Indonesia’s elections – especially Pilkada – and an increase in political based conflicts, including competition for access and control of resources, leadership contestation, conflict between parties and conflict as a result of the unpreparedness of the electoral commission.153 Electoral commissions play a significant role in the outcome of an election and it has been identified that short preparation times prior to elections are problematic because organisers of the election are often appointed at short notice, so don’t have enough time to familiarise themselves with the local electoral processes. Those appointed often lack standing within community or the requisite skills to compensate for a lack of political/cultural influence. This may seem to be in line with universal understandings of the requirement for impartiality in electoral officers, but in the Indonesian context, it means that the electoral staff do not have the requisite skills or cultural knowledge required to ensure the election is run smoothly. This environment sets the conditions for poor administration and management of the election and subsequently many Indonesians feel that their right to vote is not protected or even guaranteed.154 This can be seen to contribute to feelings of anxiety or uncertainty surrounding the ability to achieve representation, which characterise many conflicts in Indonesia.

149 Firman, "Territorial Splits." 150 Ibid. 151 Ibid. 152 Ibid. 183. 153 Tohari et al., Dinamika konflik. 154 Ibid. 61 Proponents of this perspective, Aspinall and Fraenkel argue that ‘money politics’ in particular, provides one of the major sources of disillusionment with the party and political system in Indonesia. Slush funds or ‘dana aspirasi’ (aspirational funds) are a significant problem in the Indonesian political system, because while the system does not allow the allocation of funds directly to politicians, it instead allocates funds to projects at the ‘discretion’ of politicians. These projects are often accepted on a case by case basis to the advantage of the politician and in many instances the funds are not used for the project at all.155 Where it is not possible to derive income from allocating projects to friends and clients, misappropriation in budgeting is coordinated to allow kickbacks and graft. At the regional level, projects can attract between 7% and 10% of the project cost in fees, while at the local level, projects are directed to political allies or relatives.156 This inefficiency in the Indonesian political party system is compounded by decentralisation policies and contributes to tensions resultant from the disenfranchisement of local populations in regions where dana aspirasi are the norm.

This dynamic is further compounded by considerable evidence of vote-buying throughout the multiple stages of the Indonesian electoral process, which fuels disillusionment and conflict amongst communities. This is especially so in regions where votes are counted and announced locally before they are checked externally by election teams.157 Vote-buying at the lowest level is conducted by way of tim sukses or ‘success teams’, made up of local power brokers who influence whole villages to vote a certain way in elections.158 Serangan fajar is a term used to describe how political candidates would go to villages the night before elections and dispense money, a ‘dawn attack’. In other anecdotes, tampering with the vote tabulation and seat allocation is thought to be common as it is cheaper and involves less variables than bribing people or influencing leaders to persuade their constituents to vote a certain way.159 This combined with any inadequacies in the electoral staff and system on the day of the election, contribute to a loss of faith in Pilkada and feelings of disenfranchisement that contribute to conflict.

Similarly, problems associated with Pilkada arise where support for a political party is supplied through the provision of donations, which evolved through the Reformasi period to mean direct vote buying.160 Candidates can also be supported through endorsement by a political party, but the party is only required to have received 15% of seats in local council or 15% of votes in legislative polls in order to support a candidate in local elections.161 This encourages candidates to seek endorsements from parties that may not even have the same philosophical or ideological background as them. Not only are candidates using ideologies they don’t necessarily support to gain power, but they are indebted to these organisations, as well as wealthy elite who have financed

155 Aspinall and Fraenkel, Comparing Across Regions.; Tohari et al., Dinamika konflik. 156 Dinamika konflik. 157 Ibid. 158 Aspinall and Fraenkel, Comparing Across Regions. 159 Ibid. 160 See examples of money politics in Indonesian local elections in S. Hidayat. “Pilkada, Money Politics and the Dangers of ‘Informal Governance’ Practices in Deepening Democracy.” in M. Erb and P. Sulistiyanto, Deepening democracy in Indonesia?: direct elections for local leaders (Pilkada), ed. Maribeth Erb and Priyambudi Sulistiyanto (Singapore: ISEAS Pub, 2009). 161 Tohari et al., Dinamika konflik. 62 them throughout the election, which results in the unfair and ill-considered allocation of projects and project funds once the candidate gains power. This is because it is considered customary that once appointed to power, a politician will use their position to reward those who had supported them by allocating projects and government largesse. The ITP refers to Van Klinken’s theory on how colonial style power structures still exist in Indonesia by way of the government indirectly allocating power to a local Bupati, who can be manipulated and coerced by means of these patronage networks and bureaucracy.162 Thus it can be said that the parliamentary and political processes in Indonesia are highly monetised and have little ideological background, causing tensions and conflict in making for a system built on cronyism, nepotism and greed.

To exemplify the way in which conflict arises surrounding issues to do with Pilkada, Tohari used the case study of the elections in Tolitoli, Sulawesi Tengah, in 2010.163 Tohari claimed Tolitoli was divided into two ethnic groups; the Bugis clan majority, and the Bantilan clan political elite who held many key political positions and were responsible for managing development funds.164 Tensions in the community came to a head when a popular non-Bantilan candidate, Aziz, entered the election and lost on two occasions to the incumbent Bantilan clan Bupati – in both instances Tohari claimed that strong scepticism, rumours of vote-rigging and conspiracy theories worked to precipitate violent protests. In the 2010 election for Bupati, Aziz was disqualified when his deputy “mysteriously” died, as Tohari claimed, invoking a clause in Indonesian electoral laws, the 2004 Regional Autonomy Law, whereby:

In a case when one of the candidates or pairs dies between the start of the campaign and the day of voting and there are still two or more pairs running, the process of the election of the regional head and deputy regional head should proceed and the pair who suffered the loss of candidate cannot be replaced and should be dismissed.165

The preclusion of Aziz from running in local elections caused violent conflict – arson, destruction and damage – throughout Tolitoli. Tohari argued the violence ended after the Constitutional Court ruled that Aziz was officially unable to run.166 Tohari concluded that had the constitutional court come down with one final and firm ruling on this matter, a great deal of violence and destruction might have been avoided. Tolitoli saw conflict arise from feelings of disenfranchisement of the ethnic Bugis people, compounded by corruption and what is considered to be a lack of transparency in the electoral and political system – demonstrating the way in which a conflict considered ethnic or tribal in nature is in fact a conflict over problems of representation.

162 Van Klinken in Ibid. 163 Ibid. 164 Ibid. 165 Ibid. 170. From law 12/2008, the second amendment to Law 32/2004 on Regional Government, Article 62 (2) and Election Commission Rule 68/2009 on Technical Guide for the Candidacy in Elections of Regional Head and Deputy Regional Head, Article 68(4). Quote translated from Tohari: “Dalam hal salah satu calon atau pasangan calon meninggal dunia pada saat dimulainya kampanye sampai hari pemungutan suara dan masih terdapat dua pasangan calon atau lebih, tahapan pelaksanaan Pemilu Kepala Daerah dan Wakil Kepala Daerah dilanjutkan dan pasangan calon yang meninggal tidak dapat diganti atau dinyatakan gugur.” 166 International Crisis Group, "Preventing Violence." 63 Tolitoli is just one example of numerous instances of electoral violence and election related conflict in Indonesia, which expose institutional weaknesses. The ICG asserts that local elections in Indonesia are often characterised by intense personal rivalries for power and often are highly emotive for all parties, which in some cases works to fuel violence.167 In their 2010 report on Preventing Violence in Indonesian Local Elections, the ICG looked at four areas of field research in Indonesia, including Mojokerto in east Java, Tana Toraja in south Sulawesi, Tolitoli in central-north Sulawesi, and Poso in central Sulawesi; Poso being a case where long-standing tensions were claimed to have been managed successfully (despite there still existing violent conflict in the region today). However, in the first three cases the ICG argued that violence ensued after a candidate was prohibited from entering an election. In all of these cases, the ICG suggested that while ethnicity and religion are often closely tied to these competitions for community power, they do not trigger any sectarian schisms.168 From their findings, the ICG puts forward six points of recommendation to the government of Indonesia, summarised in that greater attention needs to be payed to the success of local elections in Indonesia, as they are the closest determinant for the people of the success of decentralisation and democracy in Indonesia. This highlights the way in which the politics of representation in Indonesia creates and fuels conflict and works to calcify animosities and anxiety within Indonesian society. Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the way in which Indonesian scholars such as Sitompul, Musahadi, Marif, Hamim, Rosidin, Mughni, Masmiyat, Assyaukanie, Sachedina, Basya, Thoha, Rahman, Firman and Harmantyo view the way in which the Indonesian political system is manipulated by the political elite, using SARA concepts or concepts of ethnicity and community, to achieve political goals. There is a residual theme throughout the works of Sitompul, Musahadi and Hamim that regards the connection the Indonesian people have to the Pancasila as ineffable and apriori and therefore easily manipulated by Indonesia’s leaders; perhaps because of what Fredrik and Worden describe as ideals that harken back to traditional Javanese community systems that are so treasured in the Indonesian national memory. Or perhaps because of the very real class linkages to traditional social cleavages, the santri, abangan and priyayi as Geertz argued. Anderson also puts forward a reason for this connection in his study of traditional Javanese leaders, who believe that unifying diverse groups of people under one kingdom is a mark of a strong ruler. However, there is no hint as to whether or not these Indonesian scholars believe any of these reasons are correct, only that it is as self-evident that these sentiments can be drawn upon and manipulated, as the Indonesian people have an expectation of conflict and violence in resolving their grievances, a concept that will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five of this thesis.

While referring to these Indonesian sentiments and attachments seems primordialist by nature, there is a sense that Indonesian discourse surrounding issues of conflict and representation and the misrepresentation of ethnicity and religion in conflict is

167 Ibid. 168 Ibid. 64 overbearingly instrumentalist. Marif and Hamim outlined how tenets of the Pancasila were used to influence and control the Indonesian people by drawing on their attachment to these primordialist linkages. Tohari takes an instrumentalist view in claiming that radical Islamic groups demonise minority groups in order to gain mass support and redirect focus from more difficult issues in Indonesian society. The misrepresentation and misuse of religion in political life is a resonant theme throughout Indonesian scholarship, with Musahadi outlining how ‘freedom of religion’ is an ironic phrase used to describe how Indonesians are restricted to following one of six religions. He considered this to be the cause of what is often thought to be religious conflict, but is in fact conflict borne of underrepresentation in the Indonesian political system. Tohari argued this problem of representation in the Indonesian political system has brought about practices of scapegoating of minority groups such as Ahmadiya, while perpetrators of violence and corruption escape responsibility for their actions because they are considered oknum, rather than criminals. Many of these issues have erupted since the fall of the Orde Baru, where concepts of SARA and ethnicity were depicted as the antithesis to national unity because of the misunderstanding of the individual concepts that form SARA at their fundamental levels – what Mount describes as “a lack of adequate conceptual language available to conceive of the struggle between peoples and states.”169

The fall of the Orde Baru and the resultant social flux is also a central idea to much of the Indonesian commentary regarding ethnic conflict. The reactive uprise of radical Islamic organisations present what Sachedina argued is not a religious problem so much as a problem of identity. This understanding aligns with Sidel’s view of religious riots, pogroms and jihad being the result of an ‘anxiety’ over the position of Islam and Islamic groups in society which occurs during times of political and economic uncertainty. This political and economic uncertainty also contributed to the enforcement of new decentralised and democratised policies – such as the pemekaran daerah policies – which Firman argued were greedy political aspirations wrongfully enacted in the name of better representing ethnic groups. This view aligns with that of Aspinall and Fraenkel, who claimed that the Indonesian political system is often manipulated to the ends of the political elite. From the analysis of these Indonesian commentators and the corresponding studies of Indonesianist scholars, it is evident that it is not the deep- seated schisms between Muslims and non-Muslims, or the impulses of ethnic groups in non-liberal democratic nations that cause conflict in Indonesia. Instead, it can be said that the politics of religion and representation – political factors to ethnic conflict in Indonesia – underlie much of what is commonly considered ethnic conflict in Indonesia.

169 Mount, Problem of Peoples. 12. 65 CHAPTER 4. ECONOMIC FACTORS TO ETHNIC CONFLICT IN INDONESIA

Dominant Discourse on Economics and Ethnic Conflict

What is often considered ethnic conflict can in many instances be attributed to real and perceived economic disparity. This is far from the liberal ideological claims of conflict erupting from what Fukuyama asserts is the “end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government,” or claims of primordialist reasons for conflict, such as Kaplan’s notions of a deep-seated and ancient hatred.1 Paul Collier argued in his article Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy that there is a dichotomy between popular perceptions of the causes of conflict and analysis of recent economic trends, largely because of the acceptance of the discourses and narratives put forward by the conflicting parties.2 This misperception stems from the differences between a political science view of the way acute grievances lead to violent conflict, compared to economic approaches, which emphasise greed and opportunity.

Proposing a more pragmatic combination of factors approach to studying ethnic conflict, William Zartman argued the basis for conflict is the denial of a perceived ‘need’, combined with concepts of ‘creed’ – generalised beliefs and identity feelings – which together make ‘tinder for the fire’.”3 The ‘match’ to ignite the tinder is ‘greed’ – the desire for self-enrichment – which makes the case for an economic explanation to ethnic conflict and violence. This combination of factors view aligns with that of Crawford and Lipschutz who argued,

cultural violence erupts most vociferously where secular economic decline, neoliberal economic reforms, and institutional transformation have broken old “social contracts”—that is, where they have broken the rules and norms by which access to political and economic resources was once granted.4

The interplay between concepts of ‘need’ and ‘greed’ is compounded by ideas of ‘creed’; what Collier and Hoeffler argued are ‘opportunities’ in both grievance and greed models. This is because both ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ models are characterised by social considerations, including “inequality, political rights, and ethnic or religious identity.”5

1 Fukuyama, "End of History?."; Francis Fukuyama. The end of history and the last man (New York; London: Free Press, 2006).; Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts (New York: St Martin's Press, 2003). 2 Paul Collier, Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy (Oxford University: Department of Economics, 2006). 3 W. Zartman, "Sources and Settlements of Ethnic Conflicts," in Facing Ethnic Conflicts: Towards a New Realism, ed. A. Wimmer, et al. (USA: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004). 4 Beverly Crawford and Ronnie D. Lipschutz, The Myth of "Ethnic Conflict": Politics, Economics, and "Cultural" Violence (Berkeley: International and Area Studies, University of California at Berkeley, 1998). 05. 5 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War (Oxford University: Centre for the Study of African Economies, 2004). 66 This chapter will outline how, just as it is applicable to the analysis of the political dynamics of ethnic conflict in Indonesia, a combination of factors approach is likewise useful in an economic context. Stemming from themes outlined in the previous chapter of the anxiety and uncertainty that catalyses ethnic conflict in Indonesia, this chapter challenges the dominant narrative by highlighting the economic causes of conflict, commonly characterised as ethnic. This is because the

perceived economic inequities, particularly those arising from current policies of economic liberalization and the longer-term effects of globalization, can undermine liberal political practices and lead to the illiberal politics that characterize ethnic and sectarian conflict.6

Economic analyses have also explored the connection between the “rich symbolic resources of ethnicity and religion” as a powerful mobilising force, especially where the illiberal democratic conditions, economic uncertainty and political transition prescribe a sense of powerlessness on groups of people.7 Far from being caused by ancient animosities or an inevitable ‘clash of civilizations’, this chapter will argue that ethnicity and religion characterise ethnic conflict – which in many instances is the result of economic grievances – rather than cause it.

The argument that there is a strong connection between notions of ethnicity and religion, and the distribution of material resources, correlates not only with liberal political science theory but also with Marxism. Marxism views religion as an “opium” and ethnicity as a

false consciousness employed to legitimise the rule of the dominant classes who, as national and religious leaders, have an ideological interest in fostering a false consciousness and political passivity among the economically weaker classes.8

In their article Ekonomi Politik Konflik: Akumulasi Primitif dan Sumber Daya Alam di Indonesia (Economy of Political Conflict: Primitive Accumulation and Natural Resources in Indonesia), Indonesian scholars Novrian and Swanvri argue a structural Marxist view of Indonesian society best explains ethnic conflict and violence in Indonesia. Overlooked in the dominant narrative of ethnic conflict studies, a structural Marxist approach is useful in its acknowledgement of how social identities are “manipulated or exploited for the interests of states and the world economic system simultaneously.”9

Similarly, Thompson argued that a neo-Marxist approach is useful in its self-reflective consideration of the epistemological assumptions surrounding concepts of ethnicity.10 These interpretations of Marxism could be said to resemble Instrumentalist ethno-

6 Crawford and Lipschutz, The Myth of "Ethnic Conflict": Politics, Economics, and "Cultural" Violence.16. 7 Ibid. 8 Mount, Problem of Peoples. 77. 9 Ibid. 80. 10 Thompson, Theories of ethnicity: a critical appraisal. 67 political theories that focus on material and political rewards, to the extent that ethnicity and concepts of group identity and religion are reduced to mere ‘means’ of production. As such, this chapter will analyse the provenance of Marxist and Liberal Instrumentalist theory on ethnic conflict in Indonesia as interpreted by Indonesian and Indonesianist scholars, to examine the way in which economic factors cause what is commonly considered to be ethnic conflict in Indonesia. The Indonesian view

Indonesian scholars such as Widodo, Tadjoeddin, Novrian and Swanvri, Muntaza, and Tohari argue there is not enough consideration given to the causal relationship between economic concerns and conflicts in Indonesia. To attempt to rectify this deficit, Indonesian scholars external to Indonesia, such as Widodo from the Erasmus School of Economics, and Tadjoeddin from the University of Western Sydney, make reference to the applicability of the Collier-Hoeffler model to define conflict in terms of greed and grievance – emphasising the role of greed in Indonesian conflicts, especially with regards to the socio-economic effect of plentiful natural resources.11 Scholars based in Indonesia, such as Novrian and Swanvri from the LIPI – PDII refer to David Harvey’s approach to primitive accumulation based on Marxist relations of production theory.12

Two points of interest are highlighted here; firstly it appears that Indonesian scholars with Western educational backgrounds tend to refer to Western theoretical frameworks, while Indonesian scholars working with Indonesian based think-tanks such as the LIPI– PDII, understand ethnic conflict in Indonesia through a Marxist lens. This is possibly a reflection of Indonesia’s Marxist socio-political background, Soekarno having forged the nation in 1945 as the head of the PKI. This contention among Indonesian discourses on ethnic conflict will be analysed in the first two sections to this chapter: Economic and Resource Conflict Theories, and Production and Primitive Accumulation Theories. Secondly, the two theoretical vantage points employed by these Indonesian scholars reveals an instrumentalist understanding of the way the Indonesian economy, and Indonesia’s economically powerful, impact and shape Indonesian society, and challenge the dominant narrative that sees ethnic conflict as the inevitable result of long-standing hatreds and ideological differences. This point will be explored in the second half of this chapter through analysis of Indonesian commentary on economic conflict as a result of democratisation and decentralisation policies, punctuated with specific examples and case studies.

11 Widodo’s thesis Expensive and Dangerous: Revisiting the role of natural resources on conflict in Indonesia is published by the Erasmus University of Rotterdam and can be viewed at http://thesis.eur.nl/pub/9693/Widodo,%20D.323054%20-%20id%20thesis9693%20.pdf. Tadjoeddin is a Senior Lecturer in Development Studies at the University of Western Sydney, Australia. 12 LIPI – PDII is the acronym of Lembaga Ilmu Pengatahuan Indonesia – Pusat Dokumentasi dan Informasi Ilmiah or the Indonesian Institute of Sciences – Centre for Scientific Documentation and Information. 68 Economic and Resource Conflict Theories

In her paper, Expensive and Dangerous: Revisiting the role of natural resources on conflict in Indonesia, Widodo argued that socio-economic tensions are at the forefront of civil unrest in Indonesia.13 This line of thinking is drawn from Collier and Hoeffler’s ‘greed and grievance’ framework, in which countries with high levels of resource dependence are more likely to experience violent conflict, and when conflict does erupt, it is more likely to be prolonged.14 This is compounded by what Michael Ross observed in resource rich developing countries such as Indonesia, how governments tend to acquire their revenue from resource rental rather than taxes, meaning the government is not incentivised to be representative and accountable.15 In CRISE Working Paper number 35, A Future Resource Curse in Indonesia: The Political Economy of Natural Resources, Tadjoeddin states Indonesia is often considered to be one of the few developing countries not to have experienced this resource curse, but its plentiful natural resources have all the same helped to magnify conflict, institutional failure and poor governance throughout the archipelago.16 While in theory it could be expected that countries abundant in natural resources, such as Indonesia, would experience high levels of wealth and development, in practice it is often not the case.

In an article entitled To make a million people unpoor, the Economist argued that Indonesian media frequently reports there are about 100 million Indonesians living on less than $2 a day.17 This correlates roughly with World Bank statistics that reported in 2011, 43% of Indonesians – around 107.5 million Indonesians – live below the poverty line.18 That these statistics exist, but Indonesia is not still considered to have experienced a resource curse is challenged by scholars at the ITP, who argued that global commodity price rises have coincided with increasing social unrest in Indonesia.19 The ITP identify the dichotomy between the fact that global commodity prices are rising and Indonesia has a population of over 100 million people living below the poverty line, juxtaposed to the notion that the country is abundantly rich in natural resources. Budiman considered the criterion used to determine the poverty line in Indonesia “unrealistically very low, and the number of people below the poverty line is still significantly very high.”20 In this sense, the consideration of Indonesia having escaped a natural resources curse – despite World Bank and Economist statistics reporting grave poverty – demonstrate a divergence of views between Western and

13 Widodo, "Expensive and Dangerous." 14 Collier and Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance.; Amy Chua, "Markets, Democracy and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and Development," 287 (2000). 15 M. Ross, "Does Taxation Lead to Representation?," British Journal of Political Science 34, no. 2 (2004). 16 M. Z. Tadjoeddin, "A Future Resource Curse in Indonesia: The Political Economy of Natural Resources," Conflict and Development, CRISE Working Paper 35 (2007). 17 The Economist, To make a million people unpoor, The Economist, accessed 01 January 2014, http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2011/08/indonesias-poverty-line. 18 P. Barron et al., Understanding Violent Conflict in Indonesia: A mixed methods approach, World Bank, accessed 01 January 2014, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/244362- 1164107274725/sdp117.pdf. 19 World Bank. Boom Bust and Up Again? Evolution, Drivers and Impact of Commodity price: Implications for Indonesia. World Bank Trade Development Report, 2010. 20 Budiman, The lonely road. 9. 69 Indonesian understandings of the role of economic factors and greed in determining the grievances of the Indonesian people.

In Dinamika Kekerasan dan Konflik di Indonesia the ITP address the matter of economic and natural resource conflict in Indonesia in some detail.21 The ITP argue it is difficult to understand conflicts surrounding natural resource economies because there is no clear and specialised framework for identifying these types of conflict.22 In the Social Development Paper number 117, Understanding Violent Conflict in Indonesia: A Mixed Methods Approach (known as the Violent Conflict in Indonesia Study or ViCIS), Varshney, in conjunction with World Bank officers Patrick Barron, Sana Jaffrey, and Blair Palmer, support this view and claimed the existing research on Indonesian conflict is limited.23 Providing an outline of the methodology used in the ViCIS, Varshney (eds) argued it was designed to deepen the United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery (UNSFIR) dataset on violence and small-scale conflict in Indonesia by focusing on Indonesian sources – compiling and analysing articles from around 100 Indonesian newspapers.24 The four main fields the study analysed include 1) patterns and trends of violence in Indonesia, 2) routine violence, 3) escalation of violence and 4) de-escalation of violence.25 While the paper is useful in filling a gap in the analysis of Indonesian primary source materials on ethnic conflict, Novrian and Swanvri are critical of the fact that the study categorises natural resource and economic conflict in one of these four fields, as ‘routine violence’, defined as

frequently occurring forms of violence (such as the beating of suspected thieves, inter-village brawls, or fights over a plot of land) which are not part of a large or widespread conflict, and where the impacts of single incidents are typically low (less than five deaths). Such incidents involve local actors struggling over local issues, rather than large-scale mobilization by identity characteristics (such as ethnicity, religion or region).26

Novrian and Swanvri argued this categorisation is problematic because of inaccuracies which arise from analysing small scale conflicts in Indonesia as ‘routine’ in comparison to ‘large-scale’ mobilisation. Instead, conflicts surrounding natural resource economies should be analysed in and of themselves, or compared to similar types of conflict. The ViCIS data set claims to quantitatively analyse 22 provinces in Indonesia, covering 341 of Indonesia’s 457 districts, or 86% of Indonesia’s population in the years 1998-2008, but the remaining 14 % – some 35 million people – remain unaccounted for.27 Novrian and Swanvri argued that categorising all small scale conflicts as routine does not allow for an accurate understanding of the context and complexity of conflict across the archipelago.

21 Tohari et al., Dinamika konflik. Chapters 3 and 4 discuss natural resources and economic conflicts in Indonesia. The title of the book translates to “The Dynamics of Violence and Conflict in Indonesia”. 22 Ibid. 23 Barron et al., "Understanding violent conflict". 24 Ibid. 25 Novrian and Swanvri in Tohari et al., Dinamika konflik. 26 Barron et al., "Understanding violent conflict". 27 Ibid. 70 In response to problems identified with the ViCIS data set, the ITP initiated their own quantitative analysis, which revealed a significant increase in violent conflicts surrounding natural resource based economies from 2009 to 2010.28 The focus on natural resource based economies was intended as an effort to remedy the perceived lack of interest from the Indonesian Government, who they considered to be heavily sponsored by international organisations with significant research arms like the World Bank. The ITP argued that the government dismisses economic conflicts as predominantly criminal in nature, thereby shifting responsibility to law enforcement agencies rather than dealing with them as endemic societal problems. However, the perception that the Indonesian Government and law enforcement agencies play a key role in causing or fuelling violence is a reoccurring theme throughout Indonesian commentary on ethnic conflict; the extent to which economic policies contribute to this violence will be analysed in the third section to this chapter, Decentralisation and Democratisation: Economic Policy and Ethnic Conflict.

Widely renowned for his ideas regarding the connection between economic development and concepts of freedom; the works of Indian economist and Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, are considered by Indonesian commentators Budi Winarno, PY. Nur Indro, Amich Alhumami, and Sri Edi Swasono as relevant to the Indonesian context. Winarno considered this connection through what he termed the “debate to mark this era of globalisation”; over whether the state or the market is the better determinant of economic development.29 Winarno argued that there are two sides to the debate – the neoliberalists, who regard the market as the driver of development, and the critics of neoliberalism, who view the state as central to development.30 This he sees as a ‘paradigm shift’ from state-driven towards market-driven development in Indonesia – likely to be the consequence of the opening of the market after the fall of the authoritarian regime of the Orde Baru. This aligns with Sen’s view that dictatorial and authoritarian political systems create poverty.31 Sen’s ‘capability approach’ to economic development focuses on what individuals are able to do in society, or the amount of ‘substantiative freedoms’ individuals have, as a determinant of development, and regards poverty as the result of capability-deprivation.32

In response to the application of Sen’s ideas to Indonesia, Indro refers to the writing of Wiyta, who outlined three reasons why concepts of ‘freedom’ hamper economic development. Firstly, Wiyata argued that concepts of individual and social ‘freedom’ are conflicting, because individual development goals cannot be focused towards greater social development goals in a ‘free’ society.33 The second argument is that

28 Novrian and Swanvri in Tohari et al., Dinamika konflik. 29 B. Winarno, Melawan Gurita Neoliberalisme (Jakarta: Penerbit Erlangga, 2010). 31. The title translates to “Against the Octopus of Neo-liberalism”. 30 Ibid. 31 B. Winarno, Isu-Isu Global Kontemporer (Yogyakarta: CAPS, 2011). 80-85. 32 A. Sen, Poverty and Famines (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). 33 Wiyata in P. Y. Indro, "Kemiskinan Global Dalam Perspektif ‘Development as Freedom’ Amartya Sen Kasus: Indonesia," Jurnal Ilmiah Hubungan Internasional 09 no. 01 (2013). Indro refers to the work of Sociology Major at the State University of Jakarta, Wiyata, who wrote a blog article in 2009 entitled “Pembangunan sebagai kebebasan: Pengantar Amartya Sen tentang Pembangunan.” (Development as Freedom: Introduction to Amartya Sen on Development), which can be accessed at http://bocahdoyanmakan.blogspot.com.au/ 71 political freedoms only need to be met after economic goals have been achieved, which Wiyata argued is evidenced by the strong economic growth experienced during Soeharto’s authoritarian rule. Thirdly, Wiyata put forward the view that ‘freedom’ is considered by some as a Western concept and is not in accordance with the values of the East. According to Wiyta, “Asian values” emphasise self-discipline, order and social freedom instead of political freedom.34 Budiman considered this sentiment to be resonant throughout the official political thinking of the Orde Baru, as well as more broadly in the region as exemplified in a statement by the former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew who once said that “Third World countries did not need democracy, they needed discipline.”35

This argument is countered by Alhumami, who suggested Sen’s definition of poverty does in fact describe the Indonesian people and their limited involvement in economic policy decision making, which results in unequal access to economic resources and poverty.36 Equal opportunity to exercise individual rather than collective rights is considered more important to Alhumami as an indicator of wealth or poverty, as he describes that policies pursued by the government to increase revenue do not affect Indonesian people at the grass root level. This increases the gap between the rich and politically powerful, and the poor and politically misrepresented, or as Swasono writes, the market serves the rich and does not care about the poor.37 Indro suggested that a neoliberalist view of development overcoming poverty only deals with material issues and tends to neglect concepts of ‘value’; the role of concepts that cannot necessarily be defined in numbers is ill-acknowledged in discourses surrounding economic issues and conflict. This illuminates a dichotomy in Indonesian discourses of the economic element to ethnic conflict. While there is agreement throughout Indonesian commentary that concepts of ‘value’ need greater emphasis in ethnic studies frameworks, the existence and role of ‘Asian’ values requires further clarification and consideration.

The effect of concepts of ‘value’ is explored in some detail by Western scholars such as Zartman as ‘creed’, and Collier and Hoeffler in the ‘greed or grievance’ framework for conflict. While Collier and Hoeffler emphasise ‘greed’ as the most significant predictor of the onset, duration and intensity of a conflict, some Indonesian scholars such as Tadjoeddin, considered grievances more relevant to economic – especially natural resource based – conflict in Indonesia.38 Tadjoeddin suggested greed spurs conflict from competition between parties where patronage networks characterise relationships, while grievances arise where parties are excluded from receiving benefits from increasing value of natural resources. This causes what he coined an “aspiration to inequality” or “rage of the potentially rich.”39 Tadjoeddin exemplifies this paradigm through the cases of four of the most resource rich provinces in Indonesia –

34 Ibid. 35 Budiman, The lonely road. 08. 36 A. Alhumami, Menggugat Makna Kemiskinan, Harian Kompas, accessed 01 January 2015, http://www.bit.lipi.go.id/masyarakat-literasi/index.php/menggugat-makna-kemiskinan. 37 S. Swasono in Indro, "Kemiskinan Global." 38 Collier and Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance.; Tadjoeddin, "Future Resource Curse." 39 M. Z. Tadjoeddin, I. Widjajanti, and S. Mishra, "Regional Disparity and Vertical Conflict in Indonesia," Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy 06, no. 03 (2001). 72 Aceh, West Papua, Riau, and . In each of these regions, he argued that ‘resource rent’ collected by the central government has fuelled secessionist sentiments.40 In explaining why the greed hypothesis does not suit Indonesia, Tadjoeddin stated “rebel groups” do not receive any significant financial funding from natural resources – specifically in the case of Aceh and West Papua – and “secessionist rebel groups” don’t exist in lieu of minor political groups with secessionist motivations – in the case of the former Riau and East Kalimantan. In naming these groups “rebel” and “secessionist”, Tadjoeddin highlights the legitimacy of the community groups – as opposed to rebel groups – that exist in these regions to represent the economic interests of their constituents. Tadjoeddin argued that these community groups seek to gain greater representation as a consequence of the deprivation, exclusion, marginalisation and comparatively low levels of community welfare they experience despite the relative wealth they perceive a resource rich region could gain. As such, the grievance model of ethnic conflict can be applied to ethnic conflict in Indonesia, as it highlights the way in which economic issues fuel conflict in the absence of legitimate political recourse.

Tadjoeddin, does however, concede that one instance where greed motivations fuel conflict in Indonesia is surrounding the “greedy behaviour of military officers in conflict regions for the sake of their business and personal financial interest, like in Aceh and Papua.”41 George Junus Aditjondro agrees with this, stating that in regions such as Poso in Central Sulawesi, through connections with business and the expansion of allocated budgets, the military receives economic benefit from the conflict and thus has no interest in seeing it resolved any time soon.42 In both greed and grievance hypotheses, Muntaza argued conflicts are intensified where identity issues already exist, such as in regions where groups are already divided by ethnicity, religion or other power structures.43 This aligns with the arguments of both Mughni and Masmiyat, outlined in the previous chapter, who put forward that strong religious sentiment and symbols work to intensify and compound a conflict only at best tangentially linked to religion.

Similarly, Sidel locates the roots of Indonesia’s “Muslim anger” not in religion or even pious politics, but instead in the economic and material foundations that underpin these movements rising in the wake of the fall of Soeharto.44 During Soeharto’s reign, politics was heavily regulated whilst the economy was highly liberalised. Tirtosudarmo suggested this created a climate of uncertainty throughout Indonesia, especially among the educated and intellectual groups who believed it impossible to liberalise the economy without deregulating civil rights.45 The lack of checks and balances in the economy allowed the uncontrolled accumulation of wealth and economic power by a

40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 32. 42 George Aditjondro, Al-Qaeda, atau PermainanTentara? Kepentingan Militer di Balik “Konflik Antar Agama” di Poso, Sulawesi Tengah, accessed 09 June 2014, http://www.oocities.org/kariu67/gja110402.htm 43 Muntaza in Tohari et al., Dinamika konflik. 44 John T. Sidel, Riots, pogroms, jihad: religious violence in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006). 45 R. Tirtosudarmo, "Economic Development, Migration, and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia: A Preliminary Observation," Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 02, no. 02 (1997). 73 privileged few, notably Soeharto’s own family and some ethnic Chinese business tycoons.46 Tadjoeddin contends that this policy of greed was firmly established during Soeharto’s presidency, when laws were enacted surrounding foreign investment, mining, and forestry, allowing for the exploitation and abuse of natural resources. Budy Resosudarmo argued that generous tax concessions afforded to international investors saw Indonesian land come under state control and its subsequent exploitation by mining and forestry industries.47 These economic policies were intricately connected to Soeharto’s authoritarian regime of conflict entrepreneurship.48 As such, Muntaza argued that good governance is the answer to economic conflict, whether they be caused by greed or grievance; institutions and systems of governance must be open and strong enough to counter people’s ability to physically take the products of their labour or natural resources to generate their own income, or rent. The disparity between those who benefit from the exploitation of labour and national resources, and those whose labour creates wealth for others, is a source of conflict in Indonesia often considered to be ethnic, which will be discussed in the following section on Production and Primitive Accumulation Theories.

Production and Primitive Accumulation Theories

By independence in 1945, Indonesian politics was coloured by the influence of Marxist ideology, which in many ways can be said to be reflected in the semi-centralised economic planning and government regulation of the market in Indonesia.49 Despite a violently anti-communist period in the mid-1960s, which continued to resonate throughout the Orde Baru, some Indonesian scholars such as Novrian, Swanvri, and Muntaza, propose a Marxist theoretical framework with which to analyse conflict in Indonesia. A Marxist approach to the analysis of ethnic conflict in Indonesia by Indonesian scholars is of note because as Hilmar Farid argued, “those who observe modern Indonesian history will quickly relate the disappearance of the concept of, and discourse about, class from the Indonesian social sciences to the rise of the New Order.”50 Hadiz and Dhakidae suggested this is because “notions of class conflict were anathema to the New Order’s discourse of harmony and co-operation under the aegis of a wise and benevolent state.”51 That Novrian and Swanvri use a Marxist framework for their analysis can be seen to challenge not only the dominant discourses of the ‘defeat of communism in the face of liberal democracy’, but also the discursive silence surrounding ideas of communism in Indonesia since the Orde Baru.

Novrian and Swanvri believe the Marxist concept of ‘primitive accumulation’ is evident in resource rich parts of Indonesia. This is because at the most fundamental level, ‘primitive accumulation’ is considered to be a process that establishes the social relations of capitalism, which they believe is evident in resource rich parts of

46 Ibid. 47 B Resosudarmo, The Politics and Economics of Indonesia's Natural Resources (Singapore: ISEAS, 2005). 48 Benedict Anderson, Violence and the state in Suharto's Indonesia (New York: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2001). 49 Novrian and Swanvri in Tohari et al., Dinamika konflik. 50 H. Farid in Hadiz and Dhakidae, Social science. 167. 51 Ibid. 18. 74 Indonesia.52 Novrian and Swanvri draw parallels with Marx’s interpretation of how primitive accumulation occurred in England and the way it is occurring in Indonesia; claiming that in both instances, farmers were driven from their land by the capitalist class. No longer owning or working the land and without any other skills, these farmers had either the choice to become soldiers and work for the state, or become destitute and be persecuted by the state, thus precipitating class struggle. Novrian and Swanvri considered this process relevant to the process of Indonesian development since the Orde Baru, with commercial interests and industry forcing traditional farmers from their land.

However, a Marxist framework is not only applicable to analysis of the dynamics of instances where farmers were forced from their traditional lands in Indonesia. Novrian and Swanvri also refer to Harvey’s theory of the ‘Dynamics of Capital’ to provide the theoretical foundation to explain economic based conflict arising from industrial relations and urban space issues in Indonesia.53 What differentiates Harvey’s theory from other theories of economic based conflict is that it introduces the concept of ‘capital’ as the primary unit of analysis rather than analysing political and societal factors alone. This reasoning is in line with Western conflict theorists such as Collier and Hoeffler, who argue that economic grievances are intricately linked to societal issues such as ethnicity and race. Likewise, Amy Chua analysed the role of economic factors in what is commonly considered to be ethnic conflict, through examination of the role of market dominant minorities – such as the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia – in fuelling conflict.54

With the introduction of capital as the primary analytical unit in conflict analysis, the power structures that cause conflict become evident through greater consideration of the profit-making process, considered to be integral to our modern lives. Novrian and Swanvri explain this as the process of exchanging money (M), for commodities (C), and converting these commodities once more to create more money (M’). To make profit you require labour power (LP), and means of production (MP), which in turn provides more commodities (C’), and more money (M’), as per figure 3.

Figure 3.The Production of Profit.55

In line with this theory, profit is produced by the accumulation of capital from the surplus value of surplus labour time that workers are not paid for. When the workforce is applied to machines and technology to produce commodities, the formation of classes occurs because of the discrepancy between those who own the means of production and those who sell their time and labour because they do not own the

52 Novrian and Swanvri in Tohari et al., Dinamika konflik.; Karl Marx, Capital Volume One (London: Penguin Classics, 1976). 53 Ibid. 138. 54 Collier and Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance.; Chua, "Markets, Democracy and Ethnicity." 55 Novrian and Swanvri in Tohari et al., Dinamika konflik. 75 means of production. Industrial relations conflict thus occurs between employees and owners over issues of wages, allowances and conditions.

Here Novrian and Swanvri draw the comparison between Harvey’s model and an example of where it could be applied in the context of Indonesia. In late 2008, PT Megariamas Sentosa (PT MS), a Jakarta based manufacturer of under-garments for brands such as Pierre Cardin, Sorella, Falancy and Young Hearts, fired 446 employees for exercising their right to strike.56 Novrian and Swanvri claimed the employees – mostly women – had gone on strike over their treatment by PT MS. PT MS requested police disperse the demonstrators, which resulted in in thirty women injured and two hospitalised.57 Novrian and Swanvri argued this incident is one of many violent conflicts in Indonesia, caused by grievances to do with the process of ‘primitive accumulation’. The fact that law enforcement agencies used force to disperse the demonstration is a common theme throughout Indonesian commentary on conflict in Indonesia, one which will be discussed briefly in the final chapter of this dissertation.

This anecdote highlights how concepts of ownership and space are considered to be factors to violence and conflict in Indonesia. This is because what is commonly misconstrued as ‘ethnic conflict’ due to the lack of appropriate vernacular for describing community groups – a concept outlined by Mount in the previous chapter – could better be described as ‘class conflict’. Contentions over physical space, especially where the space has ineffable connections to a people’s homeland, can be especially problematic in a developing country. This is because development catalyses the rapid growth of cities, which affects social and class dynamics; inter-personal and inter-group relationships, power structures, economic nodes and troughs, and the quality of life of citizens.

Harvey’s framework is useful here in outlining how these dynamics are intricately linked to profit, produced through the ownership of urban space, which is highly valuable because of its scarcity in large developing cities.58 Cities are a critical entity in the economic development of a nation and the success of a city occurs when high levels of private and state investment are achieved. This is done through the development of public infrastructure, office buildings, transportation, and communications systems. Thus urbanisation should be considered as a key process of capitalisation – the creation of infrastructure for “production, circulation, exchange and consumption.”59

56 The employees were reportedly members of the Serikat Buruh Garmen Tekstil dan Sepatu Gabungan Serikat Buruh Independen (SBGTS-GSBI), a labour union for textile, garment and footwear manufacturing employees. (Department of the Board of Joint Independent Trade Unions, PT. Megaria Sentosa PHK 446 Buruh Anggota Serikat Buruh Garment Tekstil dan Sepatu Gabungan Serika tBuruh Independen PT. MS, Blogspot, accessed 28 April 2014, http://buruhindependent.blogspot.com.au/2009/02/pt-megariamas-sentosa-phk-446-buruh.html.) There are various other websites and blogs that discuss this matter and similar instances that have occurred since, but there is no mention of the action against employees of PT MS in any Indonesian newspapers from around the time, see: http://www.cleanclothes.org/issues/archive/2008-2009-pierre-cardin-not-so-chic-underneath and http://www.infogsbi.com/2009/01/laporan-dua-hari-perjuangan-buruh.html 57 Novrian and Swanvri in Tohari et al., Dinamika konflik. 58 Harvey, Social Justice. 59 Ibid. 76 Harvey continued that in the urbanisation process there is not only the accumulation of capital but also class struggles. If the state is seen as the back bone of the capitalist class, then the logical consequence of the state allocation of urban spaces being ignored by classes other than the capitalist class, is conflict. This is seen in numerous instances in Indonesia, one most notable example is where Pedagang Kaki Lima (PKL), or street vendors, are evicted from entire provinces through a process known as ‘street sweeping’.60 ‘Street sweeping’ is a government initiative whereby the Satpol PP (Civil Service Police Unit) “violently” and “ruthlessly” relocate street vendors, and prohibit them from selling their wares on the street in certain suburbs and public spaces. Harlan Dimas, in his article Street Vendors: Urban Problem and Economic Potential regarded it as a process which demonstrates the role the state plays in perpetuating economic conflict in Indonesia because many government officials are part of or have linkages to the capitalist class themselves.61 The idea that the Indonesian Government plays a role in perpetuating conflict along class or ethnic lines is a theme throughout Indonesian discourses, and is considered in more detail in the Chapter Five.

The development of large cities creates another type of conflict over space, whereby individuals who don’t meet the necessary conditions to enter the workforce become part of violent groups.62 The principles of primitive accumulation and the development of centralised economic nodes have fuelled the need for a skilled, educated and qualified workforce in Indonesia, meaning those rejected by these same principles are forced to enter into violent groups or gangs in order to work within their own means of production. In Indonesia, there is fierce competition between gangs fighting for economic space in the cities. Commonly known as ‘turf wars’, gangs gain power by occupying public spaces such as bus terminals, markets, shopping centres, sidewalks and parking spaces.

Anderson documented how during the Soeharto era, some gangs were used for private security services and came to represent a threat to authorities and state security elements.63 In more recent times, Sudirman Nasir noted how a company in Bogor hired the services of a gang to stop employees protesting over unpaid wages. The hiring of gangs by companies throughout Indonesia to assist the reclamation or removal of people from land, is reportedly not uncommon.64 Novrian and Swanvri argue this is an example of class struggle in Indonesia, a process whereby large companies make profit from owning land and urban space while the working class receive few rights and freedoms. Where there is no political recourse or representation against this economic disparity, gang violence, ‘turf wars’, and other forms of collective violence ensue. This further stratifies the community along class lines; a division that is perhaps wrongly considered as an ethnic division.

60 Novrian and Swanvri in Tohari et al., Dinamika konflik. 61 H. Dimas, Street Vendors: Urban Problem and Economic Potential, Working Paper in economics and Developmment Studies: Padjadjaran University, Indonesia, accessed 28 April 2014, www.equitablepolicy.org/wpaper/200803.pdf 62 Harvey, Social Justice. 63 Anderson, Violence and the state in Suharto's Indonesia. 25. Anderson discusses gangs in Suharto’s era, which Tohari regarded as still pertinent today. 64 S Nasir, Empowering our young people out of gangs, Jakarta Post, accessed 29 April 2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/06/22/empowering-our-young-people-out-gangs.html. 77 Decentralisation and Democratisation: Economic Policies and Ethnic Conflict

The opening of the Indonesian market during the Orde Baru played a significant role in contributing to conflicts throughout the archipelago.65 The fact that democratisation and market liberalisation occurred at the same time in Indonesia after the fall of Soeharto made for a volatile era to follow. This has precedence in conflict studies theory, as Chua remarked, democratic transition and market liberalisation are a dangerous combination as they can breed ethnic hatred and violence.66 Tadjoeddin claimed this is because the poor majority who suddenly feel empowered by decentralisation attack the wealthy minority who benefited from liberal market policies.67 This section will analyse Indonesian discourse surrounding the role of economic policies since the fall of the Orde Baru in causing and perpetuating ethnic conflict.

Analysis in this section commences from the end of the Orde Baru, when the economic policies enforced by Soeharto’s government were dismantled and rapid changes in Indonesian society coincided with civil unrest. Indonesian commentators such as Tirtosudarmo, Tadjoeddin, Novrian, Swanvri, and Muntaza, considered Soeharto’s economic policies to have brought about economic growth and development, albeit at the expense of social and political freedoms. Tirtosudarmo argued that while economic prosperity increased, so too did the disparity between the richest and poorest Indonesians, a fact he considers to be the underlying cause of tensions in Indonesia.68 The view that tensions in society were caused by Soeharto’s economic policies is mirrored in a study conducted in 1995 by the University of Indonesia, to measure the past fifty years of integration in Indonesian society. The main finding of this study outlines the premise for this section, revealing that one of the main sources of discord in the past fifty years of Indonesian society was economic disparity between the elite, and the masses.69

Tirtosudarmo attributes this discord to the policies of the Orde Baru, enacted based on the assumption that economic growth would instigate national development, rather than national development instigating economic growth. This he sees as the “paradox of development in Indonesia,” being the way in which the poor are left “embittered” by the economic and social disparity brought about by economic liberalism, but have no outlet with which to address these concerns because of inherent political rigidity.70 Tirtosudarmo refers to the social and geographic complexity of the Eastern Indonesian Regions, Kawasan Timur Indonesia, which consist of both resource-rich provinces alongside very poor provinces, as an example of the tensions caused by economic

65 Tadjoeddin, "Future Resource Curse." 66 Amy Chua, World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability (New York: Doubleday, 2002). 67 Tadjoeddin, Explaining collective violence. 68 Tirtosudarmo, "Economic Development, Migration, and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia: A Preliminary Observation." 318. 69 University of Indonesia, Studi 50 Tahun Integrasi Masyarakat Indonesia (Jakarta: Ringkasan Hasil Penelitian. Mimeographed. ed. Laboratorium Sosiologi, Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, 1995). 70 Tirtosudarmo, "Economic Development, Migration, and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia: A Preliminary Observation." 78 liberalism and inherent political rigidity. The economic complexity of the ‘rich and poor region’ is difficult to account for through uniform economic policies generated by a centralised government, as occurred during the Orde Baru. Tirtosudarmo argued that these policies were established in order to exploit resources in the Kawasan Timur, resulting in vast economic inefficiencies and the inadequate representation of the local people’s rights and interests, causing conflict over economic concerns.

The juxtaposition between economic policies designed to support rapid development and economic growth, and social policies designed to quell diversity and unrest, contributed to a growing ‘anxiety’ throughout Indonesian society, especially towards the end of the Orde Baru.71 Combined economic and social development policies, such as those to do with transmigration, gained new importance and their implementation dramatically increased during the Orde Baru due to Soeharto’s preoccupation with development, nation building and national security measures. According to the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group Report on Transmigration in Indonesia, between the years 1903 and 1990, more than 3.6 million ethnic Javanese, and to a lesser extent Balinese and Madurese, have been resettled to peripheral regions of Indonesia.72 This is correlated in the findings of Indonesia’s Transmigration Programme – An Update, which considers the goal of the Transmigration Programme as threefold;

1. to move millions of Indonesians from the densely populated inner islands (Java, Bali, Madura) to the outer, less densely populated islands to achieve a more balanced demographic development; 2. to alleviate poverty by providing land and new opportunities to generate income for poor landless settlers; 3. to exploit more effectively the "potential" of the "outer islands".73

In reality, Adhiati and Bobsien concluded that the programme was a “development fraud” and “an environmental disaster”, encouraging ethnic homogenisation throughout the archipelago, whilst failing to alleviate population pressures on Java, and encouraging the exploitation of natural resources through the violation of customary (adat) land rights.74 Huge economic debts were created through this programme, redistributing rather than alleviating poverty in Indonesia. Massive loans were issued to the Soeharto Government in the 1980s by the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and bilateral donors, to facilitate the resettlement of people mainly to Kalimantan, Sumatra, Sulawesi, Maluku and West Papua.75 Tirtosudarmo states in the case of West Papua, strong resentment from the local population festered as transmigration

71 Sidel, "Anxiety of incompleteness." 72 World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, Transmigration in Indonesia, accessed 01 January 2014, http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/4B8B0E01445D8 351852567F5005D87B8; ibid. 73 M Adriana, Sri Adhiati, and Armin Bobsien, Indonesia’s Transmigration Programme – An Update, accessed 01 January 2015, www.downtoearth-indonesia.org/sites/downtoearth- indonesia.org/files/Transmigration%20update%202001.pdf. 74 Ibid. 02. 75 Ibid. 79 from Java was encouraged.76 Concepts of ‘Javanisation’, ‘Islamisation’ and ‘internal colonisation’ were evoked in the minds of the local population as well as by various NGOs and critics of this policy, who perceived the government as favouring the transmigrant population.77 These perceptions worked to fuel conflict resultant from economic policies, not based on ethnicity, but with strong ‘ethnic’ attachments.

Tirtosudarmo outlines four cases throughout the archipelago where transmigration policies facilitated, precipitated or enflamed ethnic conflict. Firstly, in West Kalimantan in the late 1990s, government exploitation of natural resources and the taking of adat land, combined with the migration of Madurese settlers, precipitated the onset of violent conflict. Secondly, Tirtosudarmo examines the burning of market places by local populations in 1995-1996, during violent conflict between local populations and migrants in Abepura, Timika and Jayapura districts of West Papua. The third example is of the 1995 riots in Flores, which ensued after the local population considered the sentence given to a Javanese migrant who mocked Christianity to be too light. The final example is of West Timor, where in 1997, locals allegedly attacked several Muslim migrants they considered to be undermining the Catholic Church.78 The point that Tirtosudarmo makes using these examples is the way in which economic policies, such as transmigration, have a direct impact on violent conflict; often misconstrued as ethnic or religious because of the obvious ethnic or religious differences between the two conflicting parties.

Muntaza argued that the economic policies of the Orde Baru created wealth for those compliant to his regime, namely large corporations that developed extensive mining, forestry and farming projects across the country. This created a legacy of servitude among Indonesians forced to work for these corporations in order to remain living on their own land.79 Muntaza argued that economic policies introduced in the early 1990s allowed for the exploitation of natural resources, creating conflict and violence in resource rich areas such as Aceh and Papua, where local tribes and community groups sought a greater share of the prosperity reaped from their adat land. These tribes/groups were portrayed as “separatists”, rather than groups with economic grievances because of the exploitation of their traditional lands. As a result, Muntaza claimed that the government deemed military might was necessary to eradicate the threat to Indonesian unification.80 KontraS reported that hundreds of people considered “enemies of the state” were kidnapped during this time, and hundreds more were arrested and detained with uncertain charges.81

The consideration of people as ‘state enemies’ is an example of the way nationalist rhetoric was utilised by the Indonesian Government to facilitate oppressive economic policies. In many instances this rhetoric helped to obfuscate the underlying grievances

76 Tirtosudarmo, "Economic Development, Migration, and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia: A Preliminary Observation." 318. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 319. 79 Muntaza in Tohari et al., Dinamika konflik. 80 Ibid. 81 KONTRAS, Pesan Akhir Tahun Korban Mendesak Presiden Menjalankan Rekomendasi DPR Atas Kasus Penghilangan Paksa, accessed 28 April 2014, http://www.kontras.org/index.php?hal=siaran_pers&id=971. 80 that caused violence to erupt in the first place. Conflict was the result of policies that allowed for the exploitation of natural resources and the neglect of the welfare of local inhabitants. This argument is supported by Lucky Sondakh, who claimed violence was the result of ‘nationalist rhetoric’, combined with discriminatory economic policies, and an inability to raise concerns by way of due political process.82 This contributed to a sense of resentment towards central government, felt by the local people of resource rich areas, such as in the provinces of Aceh, Riau, Kalimantan, North Sulawesi and West Papua.83 In some of these regions, local elites use religious, cultural or ethnic symbols to justify their claims to natural resources and portray opposition to this claim as support for the state, which is often resented in these regions.84 This sense of resentment, or as Tirtosudarmo considered it, a sense of “heightened primordial sentiment”, is what Tirtosudarmo claims is a natural human response to a climate of political uncertainty.85 This correlates with Sidel’s concept of anxiety borne from political, social or economic uncertainty – all of which are evident in conflicts in areas with natural resources.86 In this sense, the policies designed to increase development, economic prosperity and competitiveness in the international market were counter- acted by the consequent disparity between rich and poor Indonesians, which in many instances, resulted in violent conflict.

Not dissimilar to the way in which the liberal economic policies implemented during the Orde Baru caused conflict, Novrian and Swanvri suggested the liberal economic policies later introduced by President SBY to encourage decentralisation and give local governments a greater mandate to manage on their own, led to intense competition for control of natural resources.87 Indonesia’s decentralisation policy has a reciprocal relationship with economic policy, heavily influenced by global market forces supported by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Novrian and Swanvri suggested one such policy was the Masterplan Percepatan dan Perluasan Pembangunan Ekonomi Indonesia 2011-2025, MP3EI (Master Plan for Accelerating the Expansion of Economic Development). Designed to accelerate the realisation of Indonesia’s goal of becoming a developed country, the World Bank invested $100 million through development policy loans to support the Indonesian Government’s aim to strengthen connectivity, a tenet underpinning the MP3EI.88 The policy is based on the ethos that the government should no longer be responsible for funding infrastructure development in Indonesia, instead the private sector and government need to “cooperate closely”.89

82 L. Sondakh, Agricultural development in Eastern Indonesia: performance, issues and policy options, ed. C. Barlow and J. Hardjono, Indonesia assessment 1995: development in Eastern Indonesia (Australian National University: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1995). 83 Ibid. 84 Statement from Nicolaas Warouw, UNSW, on 26 February 2015. Research notes on file with author. 85 Tirtosudarmo, "Economic Development, Migration, and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia: A Preliminary Observation." 86 Ibid. 87 Novrian and Swanvri in Tohari et al., Dinamika konflik. 88 World Bank, World Bank Approves New Financing for Priority Reforms in Indonesia, accessed 30 March 2014, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2012/11/20/world- bank-approves-new-financing-priority-reforms-indonesia. 89 Van der Schaar Investments, Master plan for Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia's Economic Development, accessed 28 April 2014, http://www.indonesia- 81 While the MP3EI is an attempt to liberalise, deregulate and privatise the Indonesian economy, lecturer at the University of Indonesia, Syamsul Hadi, analysed the policies of SBY and argued the MP3EI is considered to be slowly implemented and without clear guidelines or incentives for private sector participation.90 There are also issues with cooperation between central and regional governments in implementing MP3EI initiatives, due to contention between decentralisation and local autonomy policies. This highlights the complexity, inefficiency and uncertainties of Indonesia’s transformation to a decentralised government, countering notions of liberal democracy being the panacea for resolving the problems of developing nations.

One of the paradoxes of democratisation and decentralisation policies illuminated by Hadi is the instigation of a suite of public welfare programmes, or ‘pro-poor’ socio- economic policies, which instead of alleviating poverty and promoting peace, worked to solidify economic and social disparities that cause conflict. One such programme, the RASKIN programme implemented in 1998, is aimed at strengthening food security in poor households, but does not equally reach all poor families. The Jamkesmas social health care programme is likewise unable to reach all the people it is targeted at, and the Bantuan Langsung Tunai (BLT) programme attempts to offset the impact of increasing oil prices on poor households, but by using cash subsidies means it is open to corruption and graft.91 While Indonesia is heralded as an example of democracy for the Middle East, if not the whole developing world, by global leaders such as Barack Obama and Hilary Clinton, Hadi argued that problems of corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency still exist, and ‘pro-poor policies’ combined with policies of decentralisation are yet to achieve what they set out to do.92 Hadi’s main point is that these pro- democratic economic policies treat the symptoms of instability and conflict, and in so doing, compound and magnify the socio-economic disparity and tensions they seek to solve.

Case Study: Kuantan Mudik

To exemplify the way in which economic factors give rise to conflict in Indonesia, Novrian and Swanvri outlined the history of conflict in Kuantan Mudik, Riau, between the traditional farmers and a corporation called PT Tri Bakti Sarimas (PT TBS). The reason Novrian and Swanvri refer to this case study is to emphasise the way that the working class are exploited by the rich land owning class. The role of the Indonesian Government in the exploitation of natural resources in Indonesia is also outlined.

The case study compares the way the natural resource rich area of Kuantan Mudik was used for traditional adat farms up until 1997, when PT TBS transformed the land investments.com/projects/government-development-plans/masterplan-for-acceleration-and- expansion-of--economic-development-mp3ei/item3064. 90 S. Hadi, "Inclusive Growth in Indonesia: Myth or Reality?," East Asian Policy 04, no. 04 (2012). 91 Ibid. 92 B. Obama, Remarks by the President at the University of Indonesia in Jakarta, Indonesia, The White House, accessed 01 January 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- office/2010/11/10/remarks-president-university-indonesia-jakarta-indonesia.; G. Thompson, Indonesia is a beacon for Islam, democracy: Clinton, ABC News, accessed 01 January 2014, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-02-19/indonesia-a-beacon-for-islam-democracy- clinton/301128. 82 into palm-oil plantations for “cheap” palm oil. Novrian and Swanvri outlined how PT TBS soon discovered other natural resources on this land and so expanded their palm oil industry to encompass other industries, such as coal mining. Novrian and Swanvri claimed this process was without prior consultation with the local people of Kuantan Mudik and the small compensation promised (approximately Rp.45 000 - 60 000 per month in 2010, which is AUD $4.40 – 5.80 in today’s standards) was never delivered.93 Conflict erupted as a result of the failure of negotiations – Novrian and Swanvri argued that the workers’ demands were “ignored” by the company – turning violent on the 10th of June 2010, when 17 armed mobile police units “stormed” the PT TBS palm-oil plantation in Nagari Pucuk Rantau and shot two farmers – one in the stomach and one in the chest.94 Novrian and Swanvri claimed that PT TBS shunned any responsibility for the violence and instead claimed the Manager of PT TBS told the media he blamed the farmers for the violence, calling them criminals.95

Novrian and Swanvri use this case study as an example of one of the many hundreds of conflicts in regions rich with natural resources in Indonesia.96 They argued that while the conflict in Kuantan Mudik was eventually resolved, the resolution did not protect the rights of the traditional farmers or see the redistribution of prosperity gained from the region’s natural resources. Instead, Novrian and Swanvri noted that the Indonesian Government Department of Farming heralded PT TBS as an example of an “ethical company” with environmentally considerate policies.97 As such, Novrian and Swanvri put forward this case study as an example of the way in which the working class is exploited by the capitalist class in regions rich in natural resources in Indonesia. That Novrian and Swanvri considered the capitalist class to have the tacit support of central government, portrays the Indonesian Government as part of the capitalist class and part of the problem.

It can be considered that other Indonesian scholars analysed in this dissertation might put forward a different, and complimentary framework with which to view this case study. Scholars such as Indro, Alhumami, and Swasono might argue that a ‘capabilities approach’ to economic development needs to be implemented here to ensure the freedom and relative prosperity of the people of Kuantan Mudik, and to escape graft and greed. Using the ‘greed and grievance’ framework, Tadjoeddin might argue that the farmers of Kuantan Mudik developed grievances caused by exclusion from benefiting from the prosperity gained by natural resources; conflict ensuing as a result of “aspirations to inequality” or “rage of the potentially rich”. What is consistent throughout these arguments is the notion that economic concerns have the potential to lead to conflict in Indonesia where they cannot be addressed through political channels, and that the concerned group often being affiliated with group identifiers (such as class, community, group, tribe, ethnicity, religion or race). Economic conflict is often portrayed as the result of intractable, apriori and ethnic differences; what Tirtosudarmo called a sense of “heightened primordial sentiment”. This could in part be

93 Novrian and Swanvri in Tohari et al., Dinamika konflik. 89. 94 Kompas, Polisi Tembak 2 Petani dari Belakang, Kompas, accessed 30 March 2014, http://regional.kompas.com/read/2010/06/08/20323164/Polisi.Tembak.2.Petani.dari.Belakang. 95 Novrian and Swanvri in Tohari et al., Dinamika konflik. 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid. 83 viewed as the result of a dissuasion from discussion of economic matters in Indonesian society, as Nicolas Warouw remarked, they are considered “culturally inappropriate and earthly aspirations”.98 As such, a preference to view problems as the result of ‘higher’ cultural and group identifiers could in part have caused this tendency to neglect analysis of the economic causes of ethnic conflict in Indonesia. Conclusion

This chapter has analysed Indonesian discourses on the role of economic factors in ethnic conflict in Indonesia, and examined where it aligns with or diverges from Western commentary on the matter. Far from positing that mainstream notions in Western discourses of liberal democratic ideals being the panacea to ethnic conflict in Indonesia, Indonesian commentators such as Widodo, Tadjoeddin, Tohari, Saptura, Novrian, Swanvri, Muntaza, Winarno, Wiyata, Ahumami, Swasono, Aditjondro, Tirtosudarmo, Resosudarmo, Adhiati, Sondakh, and Hadi, examined economic factors to ethnic conflict predominantly through three theoretical framework categories; ‘greed and grievance’, primitive accumulation and economic policy theories.

Widodo, Tadjoeddin, and Muntaza refer to Collier and Hoeffler’s ‘greed and grievance’ framework. Tadjoeddin argued that the grievance hypothesis was more applicable to ethnic conflict in Indonesia, especially in resource rich regions. Tadjoeddin also agreed with Aditjondro that ‘greed’ plays an important role in conflict regions in Indonesia where military officers act as conflict entrepreneurs.

Novrian and Swanvri advocated a Marxist theory of ‘primitive accumulation’ based on Harvey’s theory of the ‘dynamics of capital’. This approach provided insight into two main sources of economic tensions in Indonesian society not widely discussed in the dominant narrative. Industrial conflict can drive the oppressive policies of companies to instigate conflict with their workers, and spatial conflict caused by economic development and the creation of big cities, can play a key role in perpetuating poverty and gang violence.

The ability for economic policies to create conflict along ethnic lines is argued by scholars such as Tirtosudarmo, Adhiati, Muntaza, Sondakh, and Hadi, who claimed that economic stratification connected with decentralisation and democratisation played a key role in causing or fuelling ethnic conflict. This thinking aligns with the post- structuralist approach of Sidel, who highlighted the way in which the combination of aggressive industrialisation and urbanisation policies with oppressive social policies were championed during the Orde Baru and created divisions in society based along economic lines that worked to cause an ‘anxiety of incompleteness’ in reaction to the liberal policies of Reformasi. Older policies were analysed for their contribution to ethnic conflict in Indonesia, including transmigration programmes, Kawasan Timur policies, and national unity policies, as well as more recent economic policies, such as the MP3EI, and various ‘pro-poor’ policies.

98 Statement from Nicolaas Warouw, UNSW, on 26 February 2015. Research notes on file with author. 84 A similarity throughout Indonesian discourses on economic factors to ethnic conflict in Indonesia was the consideration of the exploitation of natural resources as a determinant of conflict. Tadjoeddin dismissed the assumption that Indonesia had escaped the natural ‘resource curse’, and the ITP addressed natural resource based conflict in detail; refuting parts of the framework put forward by Varshney and the World Bank in the ViCIS. Novrian and Swanvri analysed the role of natural resources in ethnic conflict through a Marxist theoretical framework, examining the way in which large corporations in Indonesia exploited their workers, thereby enforcing class divisions. Critics of some of Indonesia’s economic policies, such as Hadi and Tirtosudarmo, viewed some of Indonesia’s economic policies surrounding natural resources as problematic, due to the way they tend to focus on economic development and forsake human rights.

There is a great deal of conceptual interaction between the three different frameworks. While philosophically opposed to one another, they find agreement in a number of areas. For example, whilst Tadjoeddin adopted an economic and resource conflict theory approach to ethnic conflict, his view coincided with the predominantly Marxist analysis of Novrian and Swanvri, to agree that policies of the Indonesian Government played a critical role in fuelling ethnic conflict. The view proposed by Crawford and Lipschutz that perceived economic inequities combined with the “rich symbolic resources of ethnicity and religion” as powerful mobilising forces was mirrored by almost all Indonesian commentators in this chapter. This was evident in Muntaza’s argument that economic tensions were intensified where groups were already divided by ethnicity, religion or other power structures. Likewise, almost all Indonesian discourse on economic factors to ethnic conflict perceived community identifiers, such as ethnicity and religion, to be contributing or intensifying factors to conflict, but not the source of it. This theme resounds throughout Indonesian and Indonesianist discourses on ethnic conflict, challenging notions of ‘deep-seated hatreds’ and intractable differences causing conflict throughout the developing world, and untangling ideas of the developing and ‘Islamised’ East against the secular and democratic West.

85 CHAPTER 5. RETHINKING ETHNIC CONFLICT IN INDONESIA

This thesis has argued that a more fluid or hybrid discursive approach should be employed as a framework with which to analyse ethnic conflict in Indonesia. This approach is not limited by the traditional confines of international relations and ethnic conflict studies theory, allowing for a more appropriate definition of ethnic conflict in Indonesian discourses. A discursive analysis of Indonesian and Indonesianist commentary on ethnic conflict in Indonesia illuminated a number of key themes absent in the dominant narrative: 1) ethnicity as a characteristic, not a cause of ethnic conflict, 2) apriori consideration of the eventuality and necessity of conflict, 3) political nostalgia as a unifying force, and 4) conflict entrepreneurship as a social norm. These four themes will be summarised in this chapter. Ethnicity as a Characteristic, Not a Cause of Ethnic Conflict

This thesis began by outlining how regional images such as the ‘arc of instability’ and the ‘archipelago of fear’ resonated with global narratives of the ‘clash of civilizations’, ‘end of History’ and ‘coming anarchy’. Together they constituted a popular and powerful dominant narrative that incorrectly portrayed ethnic conflict as primitive, regressive, or the result of ‘ancient animosities’. Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations theory was particularly powerful in framing these ancient animosities as being between the Islamic East and the Christian West.1 This schism perpetuates a narrative of profound ideological cleavages caused by religiously motivated conflict. This view was challenged in Chapter Three of this thesis, which addressed the religious and symbolic factors of ethnic conflict in Indonesia and challenged the view that deep-seated hatreds between religious groups, especially Islamic and non-Islamic groups, but also between religious groups in a secular society, cause ethnic conflict. Indonesian discourses generally perceived this misinterpretation of the role of religion in ethnic conflict as connected to the fact that religion is often conflated with ethnic identity.2 Clifford Geertz outlined the way the importance of religion to ethnic groups can be compared to “environment, political power, wealth, jural obligation, personal affection, [and] sense of beauty,” which all work to shape social order.3 In Indonesia, religion is highly politicised because of the policy implications and interpretations of Pancasila, the connection between Islamic organisations and the Indonesian political elite, and the oppression of SARA during the Orde Baru.

Challenging the view that religion is the cause of conflict in Indonesia, Indonesian scholars such as Mughni and Masmiyat stated that strong religious sentiment and symbols work to intensify and compound conflict, not necessarily based on religious differences.4 Instead, ethnic conflict in Indonesia is viewed by Indonesian and Indonesianist commentators as the product of tensions surrounding issues of political representation and economic disenfranchisement – the two main themes of this

1 Huntington, Clash of Civilizations. 2 See Chapter Three: “The Politics of Religion in Indonesia.” 42. 3 Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System." 35-36. [and] added to the quote. 4 Mughni in Hamim, Resolusi konflik.; Masmiyat, Konflik SARA. 86 dissertation. In Chapter Three, the problematic interaction between the secular ideals of the Pancasila and its practical implementation in a predominantly Islamic society was analysed. Scholars such as Sitompul argued that these tensions bring to question the role of government in determining the religious life of society, highlighting the way in which political factors, rather than religious factors, influence conflict in Indonesia.5 Musahadi likewise made clear that the lack of religious freedom in Indonesia – being restricted to a choice of only six official religions – is a source of tension, and draws parallels between restriction of religious freedom and Indonesia’s track record of discrimination and violence towards minority religious groups.6 Hamim argued that not only does the restriction of freedom of choice of religion cause conflict in Indonesia, but so too does the use of religion as a battle cry by the Indonesian political elite, especially those with extreme – predominantly Islamic – religious views.7 As Rosidin argued, the politicisation of Islam has been a characteristic of Indonesian society since independence, when the mention of Islam was removed from the first tenet of the Pancasila.8 In this sense, much of what is thought to be religious causes for ethnic conflict are instead considered by Indonesian scholars to be tensions arising from political grievances, with strong religious overtones.

These political grievances are intricately linked to notions of a lack of representation in the Indonesian political system, expressed as a reaction to the restrictive policies of Pancasila, the state motto of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, and the oppressive anti-SARA campaign instigated by Soeharto. Indonesianist scholar Michael Morfit argued that the enforcement of ideals of unity meant diversity in Indonesian society was oppressed during the Orde Baru.9 Chang argued that conflicts in Indonesia with SARA or ethnic characteristics are incorrectly so called, likely as a result of the way in which concepts of tribe, religion, race and group were clustered together under the heading ‘SARA’ and demonised as the enemy of Indonesian unity.10 Mughni demonstrates this through the example of the inter-group conflict in Java between ethnic Javanese and ethnic Chinese and the way he suggested it has been misconstrued as a religious conflict between the Islamic Javanese and Christian Chinese.11 Magnis-Suseno summarised that conflict in Indonesia is often characterised as ethnic or religious, and is therefore seen as intractable and complex, when in fact other social, cultural, economic and political factors are the reason for conflict.12 Indonesian and Indonesianist commentators attribute a number of political factors to catalysing conflict, many of which arose as a result of and in response to the fall of the Orde Baru, such as tensions surrounding the mechanisms of regional elections, and policies of decentralisation and democratisation which brought about a geopolitical dynamic called pemekaran daerah.

5 Sitompul, Agama-Agama Dalam Konflik. 6 Musahadi, Mediasi dan resolusi. 7 Hamim, Resolusi konflik. 8 Rosidin in Musahadi, Mediasi dan resolusi. 9 Morfit, "Indonesian State Ideology." 10 Chang in INIS, Konflik Komunal. 11 Mughni in Hamim, Resolusi konflik. 12 Franz Magnis-Suseno in INIS, Konflik Komunal. 87 The new policies implemented by the Indonesian Government after the fall of the Orde Baru brought about an anxiety, what Sidel called an “anxiety of incompleteness”, illuminating how the dramatic changes in political, economic and social forces caused tensions and conflict, commonly misconstrued as ethnic or religious.13 The role of political policies and political representation discussed in Chapter Three resonates with how economic policies and economic representation discussed in Chapter Four caused tensions in Indonesian society. This worked to essentially stratify the Indonesian people along group or class lines.

The oppressive political and economic policies of the Orde Baru caused conflict characterised by concepts of ethnicity and religion. Disenfranchised groups used notions of ethnicity and religion as ‘resources’. This view correlates not only with political science theory, but as demonstrated by Novrian and Swanvri, also finds providence in Marxism, as a reaction to oppressive economic policies in Indonesia residual from the time of the Orde Baru.14 Sondakh argued the Soeharto Government used ‘nationalist rhetoric’ and SARA to enact these discriminatory economic policies, oppress dissent and enforce homogeneity.15

These political and economic grievances have a history of being portrayed as ethnic or religious divisions in Indonesian society, as demonstrated by the use of the word oknum to alleviate an individual of responsibility for their transgressions. Perhaps transgressors are allowed to get away with their actions because of a cultural dissuasion from discussing ‘earthly aspirations’ of money and politics. Or perhaps it is because of an understanding of the eventuality and necessity of conflict in Indonesian society. The Eventuality and Necessity of Conflict

Resonating throughout the arguments of a number of Indonesian scholars is an understanding or awareness that ethnic conflict is a fact of Indonesian life. Masmiyat argued "there is an understanding that life in society is filled with various conflicts; private conflicts, conflict between groups and conflict between nations – all of which make up part of the existence of man.”16 Magnis-Suseno agreed with this sentiment, claiming conflict is an essential element of group dynamics, and contributes to change and progress in society, but condemns violent conflicts involving the use of religious symbols as dangerous, calling Indonesia a sick state with a culture of violence: “masyarakat kita secara umum lebih banyak dalam genggaman budaya kekerasan… Masyarakat Indonesia sedang sakit” (our society in general is increasingly gripped by a culture of violence… Indonesian society is sick).17

Magnis-Suseno continued to outline how the theme of religion and ethnicity intensify or compound a political or economic based conflict, and regarded the perception of the transformation of a ‘social conflict’ into conflict between religious groups as causing it

13 Sidel, "Anxiety of incompleteness." 14 Novrian and Swanvri in Tohari et al., Dinamika konflik. 15 Sondakh, "Agricultural development." 16 Translation from Masmiyat, Konflik SARA. 07. 17 Franz Magnis-Suseno in INIS, Konflik Komunal. 122. 88 to solidify and become more intricate and complex.18 Perhaps alluding to a more spiritual rather than religious aspect to ethnic conflict, Chang asserted that “conflict is cosmically connected to the life of mankind.”19 Here Chang takes an essentialist view of conflict as a consequence of social interaction, and a fundamentally significant part of human nature and social culture.20 This aligns with Masmiyat’s statement that conflict in Indonesia is seen as potentially beneficial because the resolution or result is considered more thorough and all-encompassing than allowing a third party to dictate a resolution.21 However, the view held by a number of Indonesian scholars that conflict is necessary in society fails to emphasise the point that where it is not successfully resolved it can continue to be problematic. In arguing that riots are excessive in conflict, Masmiyat appears to recognise an arbitrary acceptance of a certain threshold for violence prior to reaching ‘excessive’ levels, which could impact the way in which violent conflicts are perceived and resolved in Indonesia.

Tohari argued that political violence and conflict is a political process and a process of political competition between local actors fighting to represent their region’s best interests as part of decentralisation processes.22 Likewise, Masmiyat argued that due to the condition of plurality that Indonesian’s are forced to live by, conflict is accepted as part of the complex social interaction in a pluralistic society.23 Implicit in this argument is the acceptance of some level of conflict in the process of decentralisation and in reaction to political policies, which in a Western context is arguably unlikely to be so accepted. The inherent understanding here appears to be an apriori consideration of conflict as part of social dynamics in Indonesia, which aligns with aspects of a primordialist view of ineffable connections to group identifiers.

Throughout this thesis it was evident that Indonesian scholars tended to have a primordialist leaning in terms of the way ethnicity is understood as apriori and ineffable, and this may in part influence the way conflict is understood as necessary and inevitable. This appears to be simultaneously complimentary to, and in spite of the fact that Indonesian discourses consider political and economic factors to be the underlying causes of ethnic conflict in Indonesia. A combination of primordialist understandings of ethnicity and instrumentalist views of ethnic conflict in Indonesian discourse means that elements of both primordialist and instrumentalist frameworks must be employed together in order to understand ethnic conflict in Indonesia from the Indonesian perspective. Furthermore, in using elements of both frameworks, primordial ideas work to explain the sense of apriority, ineffability or inevitability of ethnic conflict, while instrumentalism clarifies how it is necessary to use conflict to achieve certain goals.24

18 Ibid. 19 Chang in INIS, Konflik Komunal. 28. Chang writes “konflik antarperorangan dan konflik antarkelompok telah menyebabkan konflik lain dalam kosmos kehidupan manusia” (inter- personal conflict and inter-group conflict has caused another conflict in the cosmos of the life of mankind). 20 Ibid. 28. 21 Masmiyat, Konflik SARA. 07. 22 Tohari et al., Dinamika konflik. 23 Masmiyat, Konflik SARA. 24 Eller argued that primordialism sees ethnicity as apriori, ineffable and affective. (Eller and Coughlan, "The poverty of primordialism: The demystification of ethnic attachments.") 89 Political Nostalgia as a Unifying Force

In her analysis of oppositional discourses in Mexicano (Nahuatl) language ideology, Jane Hill examined the role of ‘discursive nostalgia’ and argued “not only is it made up of a set of propositions about the past, but through the implicit and explicit positive evaluations of the past that the discourse asserts.”25 These “implicit and explicit positive evaluations of the past” are used by politicians in order to “benefit from practices that they believe are legitimated by tradition.”26 In this sense, discursive or political nostalgia is a theme that resonates through Indonesian discourses of ethnic conflict in Indonesia.

Paul Friedrich asserted that in both the ideational and pragmatic senses, a discourse of nostalgia is ideological.27 This ideological theme is evident throughout Indonesian and some Indonesianist discourses surrounding ethnic conflict. As Siegel notes, the violent departure from the Orde Lama to the oppressive era of the Orde Baru created space for the Indonesian people to re-imagine Soekarno as a touchstone or talisman for mobilisation.28 Likewise, Karen Brooks wrote that the challenge of establishing a new order – the Orde Baru – was that it was fated to be psychologically juxtaposed with the Orde Lama as a reference point, or perhaps even as a performance indicator.29 Being the stylistic and ideological opposite of his predecessor, Soeharto perpetuated Soekarno’s popularity by not discrediting him in the early years of the Orde Baru and then later seeking to co-opt Soeharto’s popular image by presenting himself as a continuation of Soekarno’s legacy.30

The mark Soekarno made as the founding father of Indonesia and over 20 years of charismatic and ideological leadership was intensified, as Sidel noted, by the fact that he had “presided over the period of most populist politics in the immediate aftermath of independence”.31 Soekarno’s legacy as a popular and charismatic figurehead of Indonesian independence from Dutch colonialism, as well as Western capitalism, is demonstrated in the popularity of his audacious statement to the United States to “go to hell with your aid”.32 This meant support for the memory of Soekarno was solidified, not only in the minds of those who had experienced the Orde Lama first hand, but also in the minds of Indonesian youth who had not even been alive to experience Soekarno’s rule.33

That a nostalgia for Soekarno still exists purely from his myth or legacy, is perhaps resultant from a connection Soekarno sought to make with the spiritual symbols of the

25 J. Hill, "Today There is No Respect: nostalgia, “Respect” and Oppositional Discourse in Mexicano (Nahuatl) Language Ideology " Pragmatics 2, no. 3 (2010). 26 Ibid. 27 P Friedrich, "Language, Ideology and Political Economy," American Anthropologist 91 (1989). 28 J. T. Siegel, A New Criminal Type in Jakarta: Counter-Revolution Today (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998). 29 K. Brooks, "The Rustle of Ghosts: Bung Karno in the New Order," Indonesia 06, February (1996). 30 Ibid. 9, 7. 31 Sidel, "Anxiety of incompleteness." 154. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 90 Indonesian nation. Brooks argued that the incorporation of , which is a traditional Indonesian form of shadow puppetry, into Soekarno’s speeches propagated the widely held belief that Soekarno himself “moved in the world of wayang”.34 This spiritual connection combined with a reflexive comparison to the sterile and oppressive Soeharto regime, arguably nurtured an ideological nostalgia deep set in the psyche of the Indonesian people. This is despite the fact that Soekarno himself championed autocratic policies in the final years of his presidency during his Guided Democracy.

The irony of Indonesian political nostalgia is that it appears to embrace cultural amnesia in order to perpetuate myths of Soekarno as a national hero. Not dissimilar to the authoritarian polices of Soeharto, Soekarno’s Guided Democracy policy saw the Indonesian parliament disbanded and replaced with one whereby half the members were appointed by Soekarno himself in order to counter or control the power of the Army.35 Similar to Soeharto’s SARA policy, which combined ideas of tribe, religion, race, and inter-group conflict together, Soekarno implemented the ideology of Nasakom, which clustered concepts of nationalism, religion, and communism under one category. In both instances, these acronyms fell short of comprehending the individual concepts they represented and were used as tools of political oppression and manipulation. Fransiskus Borgias writes in his article “Nasakom: Soekarno’s Failed Political Move” that Nasakom was part of Soekarno’s penchant for ‘rhetoric art’, as he devised a number of acronyms and slogans throughout his leadership in an attempt to garner popular support – some, such as Pancasila and Nekolim (an acronym for neo- kolonialisme-imperialisme, or neo-colonialism-imperialism), were more successful than others.36 As Anderson writes,

the Nasakom-politique, pursued by Soekarno during the period of Guided Democracy, was designed to encourage mutual trust and cooperation between the groups and parties normally classified under each of these three rubrics.

These rubrics were the Army, the Islamic community and the Communists, each ideologically diametrically opposed.37

It seems to be a seldom-remembered fact in Indonesian discourses that by the mid- sixties, when Soekarno was brutally overthrown, he had enforced reactive and ineffective autocratic measures to counter the poor state of the Indonesian economy, which he had created through bad economic policies. It was also in an attempt to quash growing dissent in society, particularly from the military, the nationalists and Islamic organisations. Instead, as Sidel notes,

34 Ibid. 35 Van der Schaar Investments, Soekarno's Old Order: the Birth of Indonesia, accessed 01 December 2014, http://www.indonesia-investments.com/culture/politics/soekarno-old- order/item179. 36 F. Borgias, "Nasakom: Soekarno’s Failed Political Move," Indonesian Journal of Inter- Religious Studies 01, no. 02 (2012). 37 Benedict Anderson, Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990). 29. 91 for millions of working-class Indonesians, the figure of Soekarno signified the long suppressed possibility of radical, or at least redistributive, politics after years of harsh restrictions on labour organizing and repression of popular protests. ‘In the kampungs of Surabaya,’ one historian noted with reference to the New Order years, ‘Soekarno was a local hero, “one of us”.’ For small merchants and artisans marginalized by the rise of the konglomerat under the New Order, moreover, the name of Soekarno resonated with nostalgia for what were remembered as the ‘halcyon years’ of the 1950s and early 1960s.38

Remembering these decades as ‘halcyon years’ could not be possible were it not for a cultural amnesia that erased the final years of Soekarno’s reign. These tumultuous final years had to be forgotten so that a narrative of a unified independent Indonesia could be remembered. Moreover, this cultural amnesia worked to erase the fact that much of the ‘rhetoric art’ created to unify and define the Indonesian people at independence (such as Bhinekka Tunggal Ika and Pancasila) was later used by Soeharto as a tool of oppression.

It may also be postulated that the Marxist foundations of Soekarno’s unified Indonesian ideology laid the foundations for class stratification and subsequent conflict surrounding natural resources, industrialisation, and urban spaces, as discussed in Chapter Four. This also correlates with themes of the creation of social cleavages along political lines outlined in Chapter Three, where during the 1965/66 Communist purges, the santri aligned with the Orde Baru and the abangan with the Orde Lama. A deeper analysis of how Soekarno’s ideology affected ethnic conflict and conflict entrepreneurship throughout subsequent governments would be useful to understand the causes of ethnic conflict in Indonesia. It would also work to shed light on the trend in Indonesian discourses to focus on the oppressive policies of the Orde Baru as the causal factor of ethnic conflict in Indonesia. Conflict Entrepreneurship as a Social Norm

Challenging the dominant narrative of ancient enmities and ‘clash of civilizations’, Espen Barth Eide in his article ‘Conflict Entrepreneurship’: On the ‘Art’ of Waging Civil War, outlines the role of political actors in waging modern civil wars for personal gain and describes them as conflict entrepreneurs.39 These conflict entrepreneurs are

actors who use a specific situation or condition for the purpose of establishing a conflict in order to gain something through the exploitation of new power relationships. The gain can be personal (economic wealth, political power) or it can be seen by the conflict entrepreneur to benefit a collective with which he identifies. Instigating a conflict can even be seen as a prerequisite for preserving and protecting that collective against (perceived or real) external threats… Any conflict entrepreneur worthy of the label will mobilize ‘his’ or ‘her’ group for conflict by convincing the potential group members that the mobilization is for a

38 Sidel, "Anxiety of incompleteness." 154. 39 E. B. Eide, 'Conflict Entrepreneurship': On the ‘Art’ of Waging Civil War, ed. A McDermott, Humanitarian Force (Oslo: PRIO Report 4, 1997). 92 collective good or in order to avoid the disastrous effect of the other group’s mobilizing first.40

Eide comes to this description through a critical school of security studies and a constructivist approach to ethno-politics and conflict analysis, and provides case studies of the Balkans to reinforce his argument.41 Eide theorised that for conflict entrepreneurs to succeed, they must unite a group and establish themselves as the uncontested and sole leader, which is often forged through violent conflict with another group. This theory correlates with Smith’s emphasis on the diacritical significance of ethnic identity in forming group identity, and was identified as a theme consistent throughout Indonesian discourses of the epistemological understanding of ethnicity. The requirement of conflict entrepreneurs to unify their group against real or perceived threats was evident in analysis of the role of Islamic leaders of large Islamic organisations in mobilising groups to enforce extreme interpretations of Islamic texts in society, including Syari’ah law, outlined in Chapter Three. Ideas of ‘truth claim’ and ‘exclusivity’ are perpetuated by Islamic leaders in order to solidify and unify their group and endow them with diacritical significance in contrast to the moderate Islamic groups, non-Islamic groups, and secular society, who in return endow diacritical significance unto the extreme Islamic organisation by rejecting their extreme views. Combined with strong connections to the Indonesian political elite, the leaders of these large Islamic organisations are examples of conflict entrepreneurs, because they use violent conflict, and the fear of violent conflict, to gain popular support and political influence.

In other instances, the policies of the Indonesian Government analysed throughout Indonesian discourses in this thesis can be seen as eliciting conflict, or at least not resolving it, where they created hardship and injustice in a community or did nothing to resolve apparent hardships and injustices. More specifically, policies of desentralisasi that resulted in ethnic conflict surrounding local elections or Pilkada, as well as the dynamic known as pemekaran daerah, have been identified by Indonesian commentators analysed in this dissertation as stemming from the inability of the Indonesian people to raise their concerns through proper political representative channels. Increases and changes in policies and funding surrounding Pilkada as outlined in Chapter Three, saw an increase in graft and nepotism leading up to and during regional elections. This worked to fuel the competition for access to and control of natural resources, as well as contestation of political power, and conflict as a result of the unpreparedness of the electoral commission. As was demonstrated through the example of the 2010 Tolitoli election in Chapter Three, conflict can be a powerful bartering chip of politicians who promise to bring about change, as well as for those who fear change and seek to maintain control of natural resources or power for their own benefit. Likewise, Soeharto could arguably be considered a conflict entrepreneur, using concepts of SARA and national unity and their forced indoctrination in Indonesian society to perpetuate the narrative of Indonesian-ness and violently quash dissent for his own personal gain, the benefit of his party, the political elite and his family.

There is also the question as to whether commentators have a role to play in perpetuating narratives of ethnic conflict. As outlined in Chapter One, one of the

40 Ibid. 44. 41 Ibid. 41. 93 reasons Western discourses of ethnic conflict are predominant is because of the ability for Western texts to be published widely in English and receive wide readership. This is compounded by a tradition of Western scholarship to be self-referential.42 If discussing or analysing a conflict reinforces notions that work to perpetuate or justify conflict and brings about personal acclaim or wealth as a result, can this in fact be considered a form of conflict entrepreneurship? If this were the case, perhaps commentators such as Huntington, Kaplan and Fukuyama have more to answer for than the criticisms of their arguments outlined in this thesis. However, further consideration and analysis is required here, which could potentially form the basis for another highly interesting discourse analysis of its own right.

42 Heryanto, "Southeast Asians." 94 CONCLUSION

This thesis began by outlining images of an ‘arc of instability’, a ‘balkanised Indonesia’ and an ‘archipelago of fear’ that combine to make a powerful policy prescriptive dominant narrative of ethnic conflict in Indonesia as “destined, natural or inevitable.”1 Chapter One of this dissertation outlined how the dominant narrative is informed by the rigid and state-centric analytical traditions of international relations and ethnic studies theory. This has hindered a meaningful definition of ‘ethnicity’, which has implications on the way in which ethnic conflict is viewed. In defining ethnicity, Gilley considered the preoccupation of ethnic studies theory with loose definitions of ethnicity to be detrimental to its understanding.2 Providing a more specific definition, Smith argued that it is not so much the characteristics of “common ancestry, shared memories and cultural elements” which define an ethnic group, but the diacritical significance these features are endowed with.3 This definition resonates with the problematic or invidious treatment that scholars such as Gurr and Eller proposed a group must experience within a dominant society to be considered ethnic.4 These ideas have merit because rather than emphasising the characteristics or identifiers an ethnic group may affiliate with, they consider the relative worth – as both an internal and external ascriptor – as key to an ethnic identity. An ethnic group was therefore defined for the purpose of this thesis as:

encompassing symbolic and sentimental group identifiers, combined with a sense of shared history, shared ‘homeland’ and shared plight; juxtaposed to a dominant political and state-centric narrative.

That there is a state-centric narrative implies there must be an alternate narrative; this thesis analysed Indonesian discourses of ethnic conflict as an alternative to the dominant narrative that sees ethnic conflict as an ‘impulse’, an ‘aberration’ or the result of ancient animosities.

In examining the reasons for this problematic understanding of ethnic conflict in the dominant narrative, this thesis argued that the strong influence of international relations theories that inadequately understand ethnicity and ethnic conflict are in part to blame. This is because they fail to sufficiently conceptualise the significance of ethnic groups in society; either because of realism’s focus on the anarchic inter-state system, or liberalism’s epistemological estrangement of ethnic groups in society. Likewise, the preoccupation of ethnic studies theories with defining the rigid parameters of each theory hinders a comprehensive understanding of ethnicity, ergo the causes and characteristics of ethnic conflict; as Comaroff claimed, “the conditions which give rise to a social identity are not always the same as what sustain it”.5 To overcome these

1 Mount, Problem of Peoples. 2 Gilley, "Against the concept of ethnic conflict." 3 Smith, The ethnic origins of nations. 4 Gurr, Peoples versus states.; Eller and Coughlan, "The poverty of primordialism: The demystification of ethnic attachments." 5 John Comaroff in Mount, Problem of Peoples. 153. 95 limitations, this thesis therefore began with the search for a theoretical framework – a medium – for which to conceive and conceptualise ethnicity in the Indonesian context. As the problem with ‘ethnicity’ is a discursive one, a discourse analysis of Indonesian and Indonesianist commentary and scholarship was employed. This methodology highlighted elements of international relations and ethnic studies theories as they arose in Indonesian discourses, rather than apply them rigidly as a framework of analysis. A discursive analysis was also chosen after reading the works of Indonesian scholars such as Ariel Heryanto, Arief Budiman, Vedi Hadiz and Daniel Dhakidae who conveyed strong messages regarding the difficulties and shortcomings of Indonesian scholarship in the wider social sciences.6 This is, in part, a reflection of the historical political and social context that studies of ethnic conflict in Indonesia were entrenched in; a background to which was briefly outlined in Chapter Two of this thesis.7

Chapter Three focused on the role religion has played in the political life of Indonesia and the way this relationship has been understood to cause tensions and conflict. This involved an analysis of concepts of Pancasila, secularism, national unity and SARA together with the role of Islamic organisations in Indonesian politics. Throughout this analysis a sense of significance endowed to the symbolic and apriori connection to ancestral linkages and traditions was revealed. This affective and ineffable connection between ethnicity and religion often sees religion or ethnic differences framed as the cause of ethnic conflict in Indonesia. However, as Chapter Five examined, Indonesian discourses argue that ethnicity and religion are characteristics, not causes of conflict.

Chapter Three also addressed the way in which problems with achieving adequate representation in the Indonesian political system caused tensions and conflict, often portrayed as ethnic. The dynamics and processes of pemekaran daerah and Pilkada, connected to policies surrounding desentralisasi were analysed for the role they played in fuelling so-called ethnic tensions in Indonesian society. This analysis revealed how decentralisation policies allowed for graft in the Indonesian political system, which causes conflict between ethnic groups in areas dependant on government funding, natural resource income, and the whim of political elite. Similarly, pemekaran daerah dynamics have contributed to ethnic conflict through allowing for the drawing and erasure of borders by local political elite in pursuit of government funding, which has also resulted in spatial conflicts over the seizure of traditional lands. Processes of Pilkada, or regional elections, are considered by Indonesian and Indonesianist commentators to catalyse greater competition for access and control of resources, leadership contestation, conflict between parties and conflict resultant from the unpreparedness of the electoral commission. Chapter Three also identified a theme of conflict and tensions resultant from a social ‘flux’ or ‘incompleteness’ in Indonesian society; what Sachedina called a problem of identity, Sidel considered an ‘anxiety’ and Magnis-Suseno coined a ‘sickness’.8 This theme permeated Indonesian discourses of

6 Heryanto, "Southeast Asians."; Ariel Heryanto. Ideological Baggage and Orientations of the Social Sciences in Indonesia in Hadiz and Dhakidae, Social science.; Budiman, The lonely road. 7 See: Translator’s Note at the beginning of Social Science and Power in Indonesia discussed in the Foreword to this thesis. 8 Sachedina, "Beda Tapi Setara".; Sidel, "Anxiety of incompleteness."; Franz Magnis-Suseno in INIS, Konflik Komunal. 122. 96 political factors to ethnic conflict in Indonesia, which challenges ideas of ethnic conflict caused by intractable religious or civilisational differences espoused by the dominant narrative.

Chapter Four examined the way economic factors were considered to be responsible for causing ethnic violence and tensions. This chapter analysed Indonesian discourses that theorised the role of natural resources in fuelling ethnic divisions, as well as the application of Marxist theories of primitive accumulation. Proposed by Novrian and Swanvri, a Marxist framework was found to be useful in revealing how ‘ethnic’ tensions in Indonesian society can be perceived as being stratified along class lines. This approach challenged the dominant narrative by viewing ethnic conflict within the broader framework of material inequality and capitalist class domination, and categorised ethnic groups among the majority of society, rather than viewing them as outsiders. These interpretations of ethnic conflict and ethnicity resonated throughout Indonesian discourses of economic factors to ethnic conflict.

The application of primitive accumulation theory also highlighted notions of the exploitation of agricultural, adat, and natural resource rich land by business owners (with the support of government), frames businesses as capitalists, and local workers as the working class masses in a Marxist world. Novrian and Swanvri argue this framework was applicable to Indonesia because business owners – the capitalists – often have a distinct affiliation with a certain ethnic community, while the local workers – the masses – affiliate with another separate ethnic community. This makes an economic conflict between the masses and the capitalists appear to be an ethnic conflict because of their association with separate ethnic groups. Concepts of conflict over urban space in cities are likewise considered through a Marxist lens in this chapter, as stratifying groups of people as ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ tends to also fall along ethnic lines.

The last section of Chapter Four outlined the way in which economic policies associated with decentralisation and democratisation policies established in the wake of the fall of the Orde Baru play a role in causing or fuelling ethnic conflict. This chapter focused on Indonesian and Indonesianist discourses of economic policies established during the Orde Baru and Reformasi, including aggressive urbanisation and industrialisation policies designed to support rapid development and economic growth. Drawing on the idea of an ‘anxiety’ surrounding political issues in Indonesia outlined in Chapter Three, the juxtaposition of economic liberalism and societal oppression during the Orde Baru created an ‘anxiety of incompleteness’, further compounded during Reformasi when Soeharto’s policies were redressed.9 The policies of both the Orde Baru and Reformasi were examined in order to determine their contribution to ethnic conflict in Indonesia; including transmigration programmes, Kawasan Timur policies, national unity policies, the MP3EI, and various ‘pro-poor’ policies. While a number of theoretical frameworks are analysed or employed in this chapter – the ‘greed and grievance’ framework, resource curse theory, primitive accumulation theory, instrumentalist theory – throughout Indonesian and Indonesianist discourses on economic factors to ethnic conflict it appeared that community identifiers such as

9 Sidel, "Anxiety of incompleteness." 97 ethnicity and religion are contributing or intensifying factors to conflict, but not the source of it.

Chapter Five proposed four themes transcendent throughout Chapters Three and Four, which reveal facets to ethnic conflict in Indonesia absent in the dominant narrative. The first of these was the notion that ethnicity was understood as a characteristic, rather than a cause of ethnic conflict in Indonesia. This theme challenges ideas of the Muslim East versus the Christian West as they are portrayed in slogans of a ‘clash of civilizations’. The second theme observed was that the consideration of conflict as a necessary part of Indonesian life was strongly linked to primordialist ethnic theory and its emphasis on the apriori, affective and ineffable characteristics of ethnicity. This was significant as it highlighted the importance of considering an alternate narrative to the dominant schools of thought in ethnic studies. The Indonesian narrative conveys a more essentialist conception of conflict than might ordinarily be considered from a liberalist reading; but it is also significantly informed by political and economic understandings usually associated with instrumentalist theories of ethnicity. The third theme proposed there was a strong sense of political nostalgia surrounding memories of Soekarno in Indonesian society, which heralded the image of Soekarno as the spiritual and ideological founding father of Indonesia, and demonises Soeharto and his Orde Baru in comparison. Understanding the interaction between amnesia and nostalgia has implications on the way in which Indonesian discourses in some instances have portrayed the Orde Baru as the root cause of many of Indonesia’s contemporary problems. Finally, the fourth theme identified in this discursive analysis is conflict entrepreneurship as a social norm in Indonesian society. This idea sees the perpetuation of ethnic conflict for the gain of local political elite, government officials, security forces in conflict regions, and Soeharto himself. Reflexively it also implies an instrumentalist view of how the factors that cause ethnic conflict are used to maintain and perpetuate it. This brings to mind Comaroff’s statement that “the conditions which give rise to a social identity are not always the same as what sustain it.”10

What these four themes illuminate is the utility of a hybrid or fluid approach to the analysis of ethnic conflict in Indonesia. Primordialist ideations resound throughout discourses of the characteristics of ethnic conflict, while the dynamics and mechanisms of ethnic conflict appear to be more instrumentalist. Indonesian commentary and scholarship was not limited to the confines of analytical frameworks intuitive to the dominant neorealist and neoliberal narratives of ethnic conflict in world politics. Instead, this thesis found that Marxism, resource curse theories, ‘greed and grievance’ models and critical analyses were far more readily employed by Indonesian and Indonesianist commentators. Alone these frameworks do not sufficiently address the multifaceted causes and characteristics of ethnic conflict in Indonesia. Combined they provide a way of viewing ethnic conflict in Indonesia more attuned to cultural context and meaning.

However, in rethinking the dominant narrative of ethnic conflict in Indonesia, this thesis was not able to encompass a number of significant areas of research. This chapter

10 Comaroff in Mount, Problem of Peoples. 164. 98 concludes this thesis with a discussion of the future directions for research on ethnic conflict in Indonesia; those identified as gaps in Indonesian or dominant narratives, or in some instances, where a wealth of commentary exists but unfortunately could not be afforded space in this thesis. Where to From Here? Developing a Framework to Solve the Problem with ‘Ethnicity’

Discourse analysis allows for the comprehension of patterns and understandings both of what is said, the way in which it is said, and what is not said at all. Marianne Jørgensen and Louise Phillips defined a discourse as “a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)”, which is useful in challenging dominant discourses of ethnic conflict by emphasising the importance of cultural awareness and language in understanding the causes for conflict.11 Foucault considered discourses to be “more than ways of thinking and producing meaning. They constitute the 'nature' of the body, unconscious and conscious mind and emotional life of the subjects they seek to govern.”12 As such, it can be said that challenging dominant discourses of ethnicity means modern concepts of ‘self’ and identity are also challenged and questioned. Challenging the ‘grand narratives’ of Western philosophy, ideas of representation so readily accepted by most in liberal democratic societies draws attention to paradoxes of recognition and alienation.13

In the first chapter of this dissertation, the concept of an epistemological tendency in traditional Western political and moral philosophy to systematically marginalise ethnic peoples from political ideology and legitimate politics was established. This thesis challenged this misrepresentation of cultural or ethnic agency by analysing how Indonesian discourses viewed ethnicity and ethnic conflict in Indonesia. In turn, this meant challenging the dominant narratives of the meaning of ethnicity to the ethnic group, to society, to the international political system, to ethnic studies theory, and to policy. Rather than relegating ethnic studies to the borders of international relations theories, or portraying ethnicity as a backward expression of group identity as is the case in neoliberal frameworks, future studies of ethnic conflict should seek to comprehend the way in which individuals understand themselves as social, cultural and economically motivated beings – as the critical determinant for how and why groups form and interact. A discourse analysis approach is particularly useful in doing this, as exemplified in this dissertation. Through analysing how Indonesian discourses were divergent from the dominant narrative in their understanding not of the apriori, ineffable and ascriptive characteristics of ethnicity – what some may say form ‘ancient animosities’ – but of the real gravity of Indonesian belief in these concepts. This belief is held despite the predominantly instrumentalist views of many Indonesian scholars regarding the way these sentiments can be used as ‘resources’.

11 M. Jorgensen and L. Phillps, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method (London: SAGE Publications, 2002). 01. 12 Michel Foucault in C. Weedon, Feminist Practice and Post-structuralist Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987). 108. 13 Mount, Problem of Peoples. 245. 99 This leads to the second point for further study illuminated in writing this thesis, which is the search for an appropriate vernacular for future analysts to employ in order to adequately comprehend concepts surrounding ethnicity and ethnic conflict in Indonesia. In Chapter One it was divulged that there is a lack of adequate conceptual language to describe the significance of the rights of minority groups in Western-centric systems of government as well as frameworks for scholarship, which is likely to have implications on the way in which conflicts are examined from a resolution, mediation or transformation point of view. This was clear in that the four concepts of SARA were clustered together by the Soeharto Government, and how this in turn has affected concepts of ethnicity and ethnic conflict in subsequent times. It is also evident in that the word oknum is used in Indonesian discourses to strip perpetrators of their agency and alleviate them of any responsibility, where it may make official institutions look bad. In the case of natural resources conflict outlined in Chapter Four, Novrian and Swanvri argued there exists no specialised framework for the study of natural resources conflicts in countries considered to have escaped the natural resource curse. As such, further research on ethnic conflict in Indonesia should seek to develop a language with which to understand concepts of ethnicity from an Indonesian point of view, and use this vernacular in line with a theoretical framework – whether it be through a Marxist, instrumentalist, primordialist, or other – to lay the foundations for future analysis that is contextually and culturally apt. Consideration should also be given to publishing in Bahasa Indonesia where possible.

Thirdly, not only should future studies be published in the Bahasa Indonesia, but they should also seek to incorporate a great deal more Indonesian authored as well as Indonesian language materials, so as to comprehend both what is said, the way it is said, and just as importantly, what is not said at all. Varshney (eds.) writes in the introduction to the Social Development Working Paper on the ViCIS, that there are a number limitations with existing research on conflict in Indonesia.14 The first of these is neglecting to incorporate Indonesian materials into the theoretical and methodological frameworks and literature on conflict. This has created a pool of knowledge among a small circle of Indonesian specialists, which Varshney (eds.) argued hinders comparative analysis in the wider pool of conflict studies that would otherwise usher “creative engagement with theory and comparative experience [that] nearly always illuminates uncharted dimensions of a problem, inaugurating newer ways of thinking and, in some instances, suggests new policy and project interventions.”15 In suggesting new policy and project interventions, it may also be useful to embark on an investigation in to the way in which studies have previously been conducted on ethnic conflict in Indonesia, some of which have been referred to in this thesis, to ascertain the best methods and frameworks with which to conduct research in Indonesia.

The fourth area for future study is the incorporation of Dutch language scholarship, as both an important part of the discourses of Indonesian culture as well as point of departure or comparison to Indonesian language literature. This may naturally arouse parallel colonialist and post-colonialist arguments, which would add to the complexity of understanding Indonesian perceptions of ethnic conflict in Indonesia. This

14 Barron et al., "Understanding violent conflict". 01. 15 Ibid. [that] added to the quote. 100 consideration is also significant in light of the fact there exists a strong scholarly relationship between the two countries, as was illuminated in preliminary readings for this dissertation, whereby a number of Indonesian topic and Indonesian language theses were sponsored by universities in the Netherlands. There are also a number of Dutch-sponsored studies conducted in Indonesia, but those in the Dutch language could not be analysed in this thesis due to my linguistic limitations. This is supported by statistics cited by Hadiz and Dhakidae from a study conducted in 1987 that showed some 56% of European social science researchers considered Indonesia their country of interest, and 64% of European Southeast Asianists were likewise focused on Indonesia; both of which Dutch students were the majority.16 For purposes of “creative engagement with theory and comparative experience”, future analysis of Indonesian discourse on ethnic conflict in Indonesia should incorporate Dutch and Dutch language literature.

Finally, one of the most significant reoccurring themes in Indonesian discourse aside from political and economic causes for ethnic conflict in Indonesia, is violent ethnic conflict as a result of civil-military-police dynamics. In Chapter Three of this dissertation, Tadjoeddin and Aditjondro argued that the “greedy behaviour” and economic interest of military officers in regions marked by conflict means they often have no real interest in seeing the conflict end. While these accusations were not explored in depth in this dissertation, in conversations with Indonesian commentators such as Lieutenant General Agus Widjojo (Ret) and Andreas Harsono from Human Rights Watch, there is a distinct sense of tension between military personnel, police officers, and local civilians throughout the archipelago where ethnic conflicts exist. In fact, during the time spent in country conducting interviews and field work for this dissertation, Indonesian news channels broadcast daily updates of a police-military skirmish in Riau, where four military officers were beaten and shot by police.17 Local sentiment considered this occurrence common place and unremarkable. As such, two main areas for further study are warranted; the relationship between conflict entrepreneurship and the Indonesian security forces in ethnic conflict zones in Indonesia, and the dynamics of the civil-military-police relationship and its role in ethnic conflict in Indonesia. These topics are sure to shed light on the way in which power and authority exist in the minds of the Indonesian people; an idea central to deconstructing and revaluating notions of Indonesia as an ‘arc of instability’.

16 Hadiz and Dhakidae, Social science.14. 17 Tempo, Batam Police Shoot Four Military Personnel, accessed 24 January 2015, http://en.tempo.co/read/news/2014/09/22/055608817/Batam-Police-Shoot-Four-Military- Personnel. 101 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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