Monitoring North Korean Coal Exports

North Korea February 16, 2018

Overview Rajin Port AllSource Analysis has identified multiple instances of probable North Korean coal export transfers between June 2017 and January 2018, possibly violating United Nations sanctions designed to contain its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. This could indicate North Korea continues to generate income from exporting coal in support of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. AllSource Analysis will continue to monitor the North Korean coal export industry to assess compliance with United Nations sanctions.

Background Wonsan Port North Korea repeatedly demonstrated accelerated development in nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology between 2016 and 2017. The United States seeks to contain this development trajectory Nampo Port through advocating several United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) designed to sanction North Korean income derived from various exports. North Korea’s most lucrative export is coal, which by some estimates accounted for as much as one-third of North Korea’s export income between 2010 and 2015. UNSCRs 2270 (March 2016) and 2321 (November 2016) imposed strict limits on exports of North Korean coal to other UN member states, and then UNSCR 2371 (August 2017) completely banned the Location: export of coal and other commodities from North Korea to any country. Nampo Port According to multiple reports, North Korea has systematically worked to undermine these sanctions with Wonsan Port some assistance from Russia and China. AllSource Analysis was tasked with providing an independent Rajin Port assessment of North Korean compliance with sanctions against its coal export industry. To assess this issue, AllSource conducted GEOINT analysis of PlanetScope (three-meter-resolution) and SkySat (one- meter-resolution) satellite imagery according to the following methodology: Coordinates: 38.7281, 125.4169 • identified three targets directly associated with North Korea coal exports beginning in June 2017; 39.1577, 127.465 • characterized process flow and key areas of transshipment at each target; 42.2287, 130.2828 • documented instances of probable coal transshipment in possible violation of UNSCRs at each target; Date of Report: • conducted a one-month study of each target during January 2018 to assess current levels of export February 16, 2018 activity. Dates of Imagery: June 2017-January 2018

Analysis According to analysis of GEOINT, declassified United States (U.S.) government information, and open source media reporting, AllSource Analysis has identified North Korea’s Nampo Port, Wonsan Port, and Rajin Port as locations associated with coal exporting during the last six months, possibly in violation of UNSCRs. These ports lie at the end of coal supply chains originating towards the north of the country, are served by rail lines and roads, and contain infrastructure capable of transshipping coal to bulk cargo vessels. Following is an overview of each port, to include an assessment of coal transfer processes, coal transshipment areas, specific instances of coal transfers, and an assessment of coal transshipment during January, 2018. Nampo Port According to analysis of GEOINT, Nampo Port lies at the mouth of the Taedong River approximately 40 kilometers southeast of Pyongyang. Nampo Port includes one dock dedicated to loading coal onto bulk cargo vessels and a nearby road-served quay to the southwest that probably facilitates coal transshipments. (Figure 1) The coal transfer dock lies at the end of a coal receiving area served by two rail lines and equipped with two large cranes and several smaller cranes and other earth-moving equipment. Coal is probably shipped from northern mines by rail to a coal receiving area between the two rail lines and adjacent to the coal loading dock. Cranes then move the coal to a probable conveyor system running through the coal receiving area, where it is transported to a dock equipped with a portable conveyer that loads the coal to berthed bulk cargo vessels. (Figure 2) According to multiple sources, the Chinese-owned bulk cargo vessel Bai Mei 8 turned off its GPS and loaded coal at Nampo’s coal transfer dock on 16 June 2017, in violation of the Chinese government’s own ban on North Korean coal imports and probably in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2270 (UNSCR 2270, March 2016) and UNSCR 2321 (November 2016). According to analysis of GEOINT, AllSource confirmed this information, indicating that Nampo Port’s coal loading dock bears continued monitoring for coal export activity. (Figure 3) Additionally, according to U.S. government sources, the Bai Mei 8 transferred coal to Vladisvostok, Russia, where it was then loaded onto a different bulk cargo vessel and delivered to a third country as part of a scheme to evade detection. According to analysis of GEOINT, AllSource confirmed Bai Mei 8’s probable transfer of coal at Vladivostok. (Figure 4) Analysis of GEOINT revealed additional instances of coal transfer at Nampo Port’s coal transfer dock between July 2017 and January 2018, possibly indicating additional violations of U.N. resolutions. According to analysis of GEOINT, AllSource most likely identified another instance of Bai Mei 8 loading coal at Nampo Port’s coal transfer dock in July 2017 that has not been reported in open sources. (Figure 5) Most recently, analysis of GEOINT from January 2018 revealed several bulk cargo vessels periodically berthed at Nampo Port’s coal transfer dock and the probable coal transshipment quay, possibly indicating ongoing North Korean coal export activity in violation of UNSCR 2371 (that bans the export of coal from North Korea with no exceptions).

Analysis, continued Wonsan Port Wonsan Port lies on North Korea’s southeast coast in Kangwon province. It contains a rail-served coal receiving area and a bulk material transshipment area. Coal is probably transported via train to the coal receiving area, moved via cargo truck to a nearby bulk material transshipment area, and loaded onto bulk cargo vessels via portal jib cranes and at least one portable conveyer. (Figure 6) According to analysis of GEOINT, the east side of the quay is the primary area associated with coal transshipment, but coal is also possibly transshipped at a secondary, adjacent area along the quay. (Figure 7) According to multiple sources, the North Korean bulk cargo vessel Rung Ra 2 turned off its GPS and loaded coal from Wonsan and Taean Ports to Russia’s Kholmsk Port in August 2017 as part of a scheme to evade detection of North Korea’s violation of UNSCRs. According to analysis of GEOINT, AllSource identified a bulk cargo vessel with the same size, shape, and configuration as the Rung Ra 2 berthed at Wonsan Port’s primary coal transshipment area on 22 August 2017, possibly confirming this information. (Figure 8) Most recently, analysis of GEOINT from January 2018 revealed several bulk cargo vessels periodically berthed at Wonsan Port’s primary and secondary coal transshipment areas. Rajin Port Rajin Port lies on North Korea’s northeast coast in Rason province, approximately 40 kilometers southeast of the North Korean-Russian border. Rajin Port contains three piers associated with bulk transfer operations, numbered one through three from north to south. (Figure 9) Pier three is part of a rail-served, separately secured, Russian-leased area dedicated to transferring Russian coal from the Khason region for export to other countries. (Figure 9) Piers one and two are most likely North Korean controlled piers; according to analysis of GEOINT, pier two and its adjacent quay probably facilitate coal transshipment, with a wall separating North Korean and Russian probable coal stockpiles. (Figure 10, Figure 11). According to analysis of GEOINT, North Korea probably loaded coal from pier two and its adjacent quay onto a bulk cargo vessel during September 2017, after the passing of UNSCR 2371 that banned all coal exports from North Korea. Between at least 20-27 September, a 100-meters-long bulk cargo vessel berthed at the quay adjacent to pier two, and during this period AllSource observed adjacent portal jib crane position changes and probable indications of less coal on the quay. (Figure 12) Then, by 25 September a 120-meters-long bulk cargo vessel berthed at pier two, and AllSource observed adjacent portal jib crane positon changes and indications of less coal on pier two. (Figure 13) Most recently, between 14 and 16 December 2017 AllSource observed possible indications of coal loading from the quay adjacent to pier two onto a 100-meters-long bulk cargo vessel, to include observations of an open cargo hold and adjacent portal jib crane position change (Figure 14), but no indications of coal transshipment during January 2018 at either pier 2 or its adjacent quay. Conclusion AllSource will continue to assess North Korea’s compliance with coal export-related UNSCRs through monitoring known facilities, characterizing newly discovered facilities, and identifying additional coal export facilities. First, AllSource will continue monitoring the targets identified in this report for indications of coal transshipments. Second, AllSource will characterize two additional ports identified in media sources as being associated with North Korean coal exporting in violation of UNSCRs: Songnim and Taean Ports. Last, AllSource will continue to identify additional coal transshipment facilities in North Korea.

Sources: Berger, Sebastien. “Corée du Nord: le charbon est en rade mais les affaires russes sont florissantes.” United Press International (UPI.com), 4 December 2017. http://www.lavoixdunord.fr/273743/article/2017-12-04/coree-du-nord-le-charbon-est-en-rade-mais-les-affaires-russes-sont- florissantes. Billingslea, Marshall. “Sanctions, Diplomacy, and Information: Pressuring North Korea.” Presentation at the United States House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington D.C., 12 September 2017. https://democrats-foreignaffairs.house.gov/legislation/hearings/sanctions- diplomacy-and-information-pressuring-north-korea. Faulconbridge, Guy, Jonathan Saul, and Polina Nikoskaya. “Korea Exported Coal to South, Japan, via Russia – Intelligence Sources.” Reuters (www.reuters.com), 25 January 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-coal-russia/exclusive-despite-sanctions-north-korea- exported-coal-to-south-japan-via-russia-intelligence-sources-idUSKBN1FE35N. Gordon, Michael R., and Chun Han Wong. “Six Chinese Ships Covertly Aided North Korea. The U.S. Was Watching.” Wall Street Journal (www.wsj.com) , 19 January 2018. https://www.wsj.com/articles/six-chinese-ships-covertly-aided-north-korea-the-u-s-was-watching-1516296799. Lawrence, Susan, Mark Manyin, et al. “China’s February 2017 Suspension of North Korean Coal Imports.” Congressional Research Service, 25 April 2017. Macdonald, Hamish. “U.S. Intel Reveals North Korean Sanctions Evasion Methods.” NKNews.Org, 12 September, 2017. (https://www.nknews.org/2017/09/u-s-intel-reveals-north-korean-sanctions-evasion-methods/). Ministry of Commerce. “MOFCOM and GACC Announcement No. 12 of 2017.” People’s Republic of China, 18 February, 2017. http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/buwei/201702/20170202520711.shtml. “N. Korea Likely Skirted Sanctions Via Russia: Intel Sources.” Reuters TV, 25 January 2018, https://www.reuters.tv/v/wjd/2018/01/29/n-korea-likely- skirted-sanctions-via-russia-intel-sources. United Nations Security Council. “Resolution 2371 (2017).” United Nations, 5 August 2017. United Nations Security Council: Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. “Security Council Toughens Sanctions Against Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2371.” United Nations (www.un.org), 5 August 2017. https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12945.doc.htm.

Nampo Port 16 June 2017 Planet SkySat

Rail-served coal receiving area

Road-served coal receiving area Coal loading dock

Probable coal transshipment quay

Figure 1. Overview, Nampo Port.

Nampo Port 6 July 2017 Planet SkySat

Rail served coal receiving area

Portable conveyer, probably delivering coal to cargo hold

Coal conveyer system

Rail cars, probably delivering coal

Cranes, probably loading coal onto conveyer system

Figure 2. Process Flow Overview, Coal Transfer Dock.

U.S. Intelligence Identifies the Bai Mei 8, U.S. Nampo Port Congress, 12 September 2017 Nampo Port 16 June 2017 17 June 2017 Planet SkySat Planet SkySat

Source: Marshall Billingslea,“Sanctions, Diplomacy, and Information: Pressuring North Korea.”

Bai Mei 8

Figure 3. Chinese-operated Bai Mei 8 Loads Coal at Nampo Port, June 2017.

Ground photograph, Bai Mei 8 at Vladivostok Port, 24 June 2017

Source: MarineTraffic.com U.S. Intelligence Identifies Bai Mei 8 at Vladivostok Port

Vladivostok Port 24 June 2017 PlanetScope

Source: Marshall Billingslea,“Sanctions, Diplomacy, and Information: Pressuring North Korea.”

Figure 4. Bai Mei 8 Delivers Coal to Vladivostok Port, Russia.

Nampo Port 6 July 2017 Instance of Bai Mei 8 loading coal at Nampo Port Planet SkySat on 6 July 2017 not reported in open sources

16 June 2017 Bai Mei 8 coal transfer

Nampo Port 16 June 2017 Planet SkySat Bai Mei 8

Figure 5. Chinese-operated Bai Mei 8 Loads Coal at Nampo Port, 6 July 2017; not reported in open sources.

Wonsan Port 17 June 2017 Planet SkySat

Coal receiving area, rail-served

Bulk cargo vessel

Quay-side coal transshipment area Portable conveyer

Portal jib crane

Figure 6. Overview and Process Flow, Wonsan Port.

Wonsan Port 30 June 2017 Planet SkySat

100-meters-long bulk cargo vessel at primary coal transshipment area

103-meters-long bulk cargo vessel at probable secondary coal transshipment area

Figure 7. Wonsan Port’s Coal Transshipment Areas.

Wonsan Port 22 August 2017 Planet SkySat

Overview of North Korean vessel Rung Ra 2

Possible Rung Ra 2

Source: Marinetraffic.com

Mensurated length: 103-meters-long Mensurated width: 16-meters-wide

Figure 8. Possible Identification of the Rung Ra 2 at Wonsan Port’s Primary Coal Transshipment Area.

Rajin Port 6 October 2017 Planet SkySat

Rail-served, separately secured, Russian-leased area of Rajin Port

Pier three

Pier two Source: Sebastien Berger, “Corée du Nord: le charbon est en rade mais les affaires russes sont florissantes.”

Rail-served, most likely North Korean operated pier Pier one

Figure 9. Rajin Port Overview.

Image taken from beneath a portal jib crane on pier one, Rajin Port

Source: “N. Korea Likely Skirted Sanctions Via Russia: Intel Sources,” Reuters TV.

Pier two

Pier one Rajin Port 21 October 2017 Portal jib crane Planet SkySat

Figure 10. Indicator of North Korean Area of Control, Pier 1, Rajin Port.

Rajin Port 19 November 2017 Planet SkySat North Korean portal jib crane (foreground) and probable naval vessel (background), Rajin Port

Pier two

Source: Sebastien Berger, “Corée du Nord: le charbon est en rade mais les affaires russes sont florissantes.” Quay

Wall separating North Korean and Russian areas Russian leased area (pier three) Probable coal stockpile

Figure 11. Coal Transshipment Areas Overview, Including Indicator of North Korean Area of Control, Pier Two, Rajin Port.

Rajin Port Rajin Port 20 September 2017 23 September 2017 Planet SkySat Planet SkySat

Quay

Probable indications of less coal Approximately 100-meters-long bulk cargo vessel Pier two

Portal jib crane position changed

Figure 12. Indications of Coal Transfer from North Korean-Controlled Quay to Bulk Cargo Vessel at Rajin Port, September 2017.

Approximately 120-meters-long bulk cargo vessel Quay

Pier two

Portal jib crane position changed

Probable indications of less coal

Figure 13. Indications of Coal Transfer from North Korean-Controlled Pier Two to Bulk Cargo Vessel at Rajin Port, September 2017.

Portal jib crane position probably changed

Pier two Approximately 100-meters-long bulk cargo vessel

Quay

Open cargo hold

Quay

Pier two

Figure 14. Possible Indications of Coal Loading from North Korean-Controlled Quay to Bulk Cargo Vessel at Rajin Port, December 2017.

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