Crashworthiness of Small Poststandard School Buses: Safety Study

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ED 461 910 EA 028 055

TITLE Crashworthiness of Small Poststandard School Buses: Safety Study. INSTITUTION National Transportation Safety Board (DOT), Washington, DC. REPORT NO NTSB-SS-89/02 PUB DATE 1989-10-11 NOTE 243p. PUB TYPE Reports - Evaluative (142) EDRS PRICE MF01/PC10 Plus Postage. DESCRIPTORS Accidents; *Bus Transportation; *Design Requirements; Elementary Secondary Education; Federal Regulation; Injuries; *School Buses; *School Safety; *Standards; Student Transportation

ABSTRACT In 1977, a series of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) for school buses became effective, mandating different performance standards for school buses compared to other buses. Because data on the crash performance of school buses built to these standards were lacking, the National Transportation Safety Board conducted a series of in-depth accident investigations from 1984 to 1988. The study sought to determine how well federal school bus standards were working to protect passengers from injury and whether changes in the standards were needed. This paper reports on the crash performance of small poststandard (manufactured after April 1, 1977) school buses and vans used for school transportation. Occupants of the small school buses generally fared well in the accidents investigated. As a result of this safety study, recommendations were issued to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, manufacturers of small school buses, and various associations of school-transportation officials and contractors. The recommendations include: conduct research on the design of restraining barriers; determine the feasibility of requiring lap/shoulder belts or other restraints with uppertorso support for passengers; collect data on roof and joint strength; amend federal performance standards for school bus windshield retention; develop performance standards for boarding door controls in certain small buses; and correct improper installation and use of lapbelts and other restraints. Appendices contain case summaries and indexes of cases, bus-design information, data on injuries and accidents, and a list of FMVS standards mentioned in the recommendations. (LMI)

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Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made from the original document. Crashworthiness of Small Poststandard School Buses: Safety Study

U.S. National Transportation Safety Board Washington, DC

October 11, 1989

NTSB Number SS-89/02

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION Office of Educational Research and Improvement EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC) This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it. 0 Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy. 4,,t14-441q,.;.14-.6-.4araratjairAlkir

PB89-?17003

Crashworthiness of Small Poststandard School Buses: Safety Study

(U.S.) National TransportatioSafety Board. Washington, DC

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KS. Wetted if Cam= W belied kbrestio Unto 2 I\ REPRoaucAo ev U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE own...new,NATIONAL TECHNICAL " .04FORMATV+ SERvICE The National. Transportation SafetyBoard is an independentFederal agency dedicated to promoting aviation, railroad,highway, marine, pipeline,and hazardous- materials safety: Established in1967, the agency is mandatedby the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974to investigate transportationaccidents, determine the probable cause of accidents,issue safety recommendations,study transportation safety issues, and evaluate the safetyeffectiveness of government agencies involved in transportation.

The Safety Board makes public its actions and decisions through accidentreports, safety studies, special investigationreports, safety recommendations, reviews. Copies of these documents and statistical may be purchased from the NationalTechnical information Service, 5285 Port Royal, Road,Springfield, Virginia 22161.Detaiis on available publications may be obtained bycontacting: Public Inquiries Section National Transportation Safety Board 800_Independence Avenue, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20594 (202)3826735

4 T CH Report No. 2.Government Accession No. 3.Recipient's Catalog NTSB/SS-39/02 PH9-917003 No. . Title and Subtitle 5.Report Date Safety Study: Crashworthincssof Small 0c...ob,.:r 11, 'r9 Poststandard School Buses ...Performing Organization 7. AJthor(s) Code g.Performing Organization Report N.

. Performing Organization Nameand Address 10.Work Unit No-. 5139A atioral iraosi,orl,:ation Safi::.y 20ard i;ureaJ of Safc:', Program II.Contract or Grant No. ...:ashi.igoo, D.C. 20594 I3.Type of Peport and . Period Covered I2.Sponsoring Agency Name and Address

/ -. Safnty S;uJy !9- NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETYBOARD Washington, D. C. -20594 ...... I47Ponsoring AgencyCode

15.Supplementary Notes J

lo.Abstract

This study reports on the crash performance of small poststandard (manufacturedafter April 1, 1977) school busesand vansused for school transportation. Occupants of these small school buses generally fared tefl in the accidents investigated. As a result.of this safety study, recommendations were issued to the National-Highway Traffic Safety Administration, manufacturers of small school buses.- and various associations ofschool officials and contractors. transportation The- recommendations fccuson the following safety issues: design of restraining barriers; feasibilitynf providing lao/stJulder belts or other restraints with upper tcrso support forpassengers; deficiencies in roof and joint strength; lack of Federal performance standards fs!' sChool bus . windshield retention; design of the boardingdoor controlsin cer'.1in small school buses; and the need to correct improper installation anduse of lapbelts and other restraints.

I7.Key Words .

, :.Distribution Statement School 1.Juses; sLhoni vAl;; restrai..:,ing barr12rs4 -,.':is strength; Ff-,:eralstaniArs:1; 101eltS; avallabll ,:*.rourIti toe rt:srairzs nne ":"chli..:al :nforma:Aor Service Snrin9f162, V4 Z?lfl -19.Security Classification 20.5ecurity Classification 21.No. 0 Pages 22.Price (of this repurt) fof this page/ UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 228 NTSR-Form 17t'A.2 (I.ev. W74)

5 BEST COPYAVAILABLE CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTROOUCTION Definition of Small VersusLarge School Bus I Why This Study Was Conducted 2 Previous Studies of LargeSaool Buses 6 Studies of PassengerCirCrasi...s. 7 Accident Selection Criteria 7 How the InvestigationsWere Conducted IC 12 DIFFERENCES IN FEDERAL MOTORVEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS FOR SMALL AND LARGE SCHOOLBUSES lapbelts 14 Vehicle Structure 14 Seating 14 14 OVERVIEW OF RESTRAINT USE-ANO INJURY ANALYSIS 18 RESTRAINT USE Deficiencies in Official 20 Reports of RestraintUse Restraints Incorrectly Codedas Lapbelts 21 .. _Improper Use of Lapbelts ____ _ .21 Unusual Configuration andInstal:ation of Restraints 22 22 INJURY OUTCOME Overall Passenger Outcome 28 Minor Injuries 28 Moderate and Above Injuries 28 Importance of Seating Position 28 Differences Between SafetyBoard and -Police 30 Accident Report Dataon Injury Severity Uniform School Bus AccidentReporting Form 30 31 RESTRAINING BARRIERS Crash Performance of Barriers 33 Consequences of Barrier Design .34 Risk of Head Injury 34 Canadian Crash Testson Risk of Head Injury 38 Anchorage Strength forRestraining Barriers 39 Criteria for Head Protection 40 . Lack of Criteria for Thoraxor Abdominal Injury 40 Possible Solutions to the 43 Problem of RestrainingBarrier Design Removal of RestrainingBarrier 44 Redesign of Barrier 44 Instaltation of Lap/ShoulderBelts 44 Rear-Facing Seats 46 Summary 48 49 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY 51 Windshields 51 Inadvertent Door Opening 52 Joint Separations 55

EVACUATION 61 Fire and Fuel Tank Leaks 63' Emergency Exits 63 Special-Students 64 Lapbelt Release 54

CONCLUSIONS 66

RECOMMENDATIONS ,69

REFERENCES 72

APPENDIXES 75 A Index to Safety Board Study Case..: Involving School Vehicles Built to Fed6ral School Bus Standards 75 B Case Summaries of School Buses Built to Federal School Bus Standards 73 C Summary of Safety Issues by Case Number 160 0 Index to and Case Summaries of Small School Vehicles Not Built to Federal School Bus Standards 164 E Examples of Conflicting Classifications of School Buses 181 F Data on Public School Transportation, 1986-87 185 G School Bus Sales by Body Type, 1974-88 186 H School Bus Type Designations 187 I Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) 189 J Comparison of KABCO and AIS injury Scales 191 K Limitations of the KABCO Injury Codes 194 L Oata on Fatal School Bus Accidents .196 M Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (MSS) Mentioned in Safety Recommendations 197 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 1977,a series of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards(FMVSS) for school buses became effective, mandating different performance standards for school buses compared to other buses.Data on the crash performance of school buses .builttothesestandards were lacking, so the NationalTransportation Safety Board conducted a series of indepth accident investigations from 1984 to 1988 to determine how well Federal school bus standards are working to protect passengers from injury and whether changes in the standards are needed.

Federalstandardsfor the design and operation ofschool buses diffFn. according to the passenger capacity and gross vehicle weight rating of the bus. The Safety Board, therefore, studied the performance of large and small school buses separately, and two reports were planned.

Thefirst report,published in 1987,examined the crash performance of largeschool buses builtafter the newstandards for school buses became effective. The Safety Board found, -overall, that large poststandard school buses provided excellent crash protection to their passengers but issued recommendations to further refine the safety of these school buses. The Safety Board concluded that the first priority for improving the safety of school bus passengeri should be the rapid retirement of prestandard school buses, followed by expenditure of funds toward accident prevention in the form of improved driver trainingand -equipmentto reduce_the number of student__fatalities occurring during the loading and uploading of large school buses. Two to three times as many students are killed each year inthe loading zonesas are killed while riding on the school buses.

This is the secondreport on school bui safety; it focuses on the performance of small school buses and vans used.for school transportation. The report is based on review of past :esearch, crash tests, and the Safety Board's investigation of accidentsinvolving vehicles usedfor school transportation manufactured after April 1, 1977. Safety Board highway investigators, working out of eight Regional Offices, established notification networks with Stat( and local police, hospitals and emergency personnel, and safety groups, and.asked to be alerted whena crash meeting the Safety Board's criteria occurred. To be investigated for the study, the crash had to meet at least one of the following criteria: damage to the school vehicle that required it be towed from the scene, the schoolvehicle rolled over,or one or mor, bus passengers was seriously injured or killed. Accidentsin which these e)ements occur put passengers at riskof injury. As a result,the design ofthebus, in terms of occupant protection, can be evaluated. The typical school bus accident, which results in property damage only and in wh the bus is driven from the accident scene, does not "test" the crashworthiness of the vehicle.

The Safety Board found that occupants of the small school buses built to Federal school bus standards generally fared well in the accidents investigated. Injuries, when sustained, were generally minor and were primarily to the face, head, or lower limbs. Unrestrained andlapbeltedpassengers showedsimilar patterns of minor injuries, and seating position, more than restraint status. appeared .to influence .the severity of injuries. Passengers seated in the front rows of certain types of small school buses appeared to be at increased risk of head or facial injuriesbecause ofthe -absence or peculiar design of a restraining barrier. Lapbelted passengers, in particular, appeared to be at risk of injury from interaction with the restraining barriers.

-Lapbelt -use did not appear to hamper emergency evacuation ofpassengers, primarily because adults on the scene rapidly released the passengers fromtheir belts No postcrash fires or leaks from the school bus fuel tanks occurred. In many accidents,however,school bus passengers were limited inthe -number of emergency exits available: after the crash, exits were. often blocked or inoperable.

-Other issues addressedin this report include: inaccurate reporting of restraint status and injuries; improper .use andinstallationoflapbelts; windshield dislodgement;inadvertent opening_ of the boarding door during the crash; and separation of body .:!eibts.

As a result of thissafety study,recommendations were issued tothe National Highway Taffic Safety Administration, manufacturers of smallschool buses, and vark, associatio..s of school transportation officials and contractors. The reeommendations focus on the following safetyconcerns:

desigri of restraining barriers in small school buses;

feasibility of providing lap/shoulder beltsor uther re-traints with upper torso support for passengers;

deficiencies in roof and joint strength;

o lao: of Federal performance standards-for schoolbus windshield retention;

design of the bc-;:ding door controls in certainsmall sct--ol buses; and

need tu correct improper installation of lapbeltsand other restraints and to use restraints properly.

vi 1

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY POARD WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594

SAFETY STUDY

CRASHWORTHINESS OF SMALL POSTSTANDARD SCHOOLBUSES

INTRODUCTION

The driver of a school bus transporting six studentsto school lost control when negotiating a rightcurve. Th'e school bus traveled onto theleft shoulder of theroad, struck two utility poles,.rolled onto its right side andcame to rest. Theinitial impact was -aDelta V of 10 mph.1Of the six passengers, ages 5 to 18, fourwere- uninjured and _two sustaine linor contusions and abrasions. (Case 11, Denville, New Jersey.)

The good outcome of this school bus accident is not unusual. Most school bus passengers involved in a crash are-either uninjuredor r2ceive minor injuries at most, even in accidents in which rollover occurs.z This school bus, however, was not a 4pical big, yellow school bus. It was a 16-passenger school van, painted yellow,- equipped (as all vans are required to be)with-a-lapbelt for every passenger. At the timeof- the crash,four of the sixpassengers were wearing their lapbelts; one cf the passengers who was wearing a lapbelt andone who was unrestrained received minor injuries.3

The typical school bus used in the United States to transport students isa large, yellow bus with seating capacity for more than 50-passengers, witha gross vehicleweight rating (GVWR)4 of morethan 10,000 pounds, and is -equipped .

I The severity measure used in the Safety Board's casesis Celts V, considered by most crasil researchers to be the best single measure of collision severity.Botta V, as used in the Investigations of fs the instantaneous rate of these cases, speed change undergone by a vehicle atimpact. The Delta V -estimates were generated primarily frommeasurements of both the location and extent of the vehicles' deformation, along with the vehicles, weights. structural

2 According to the National Safety Council (MSC), about 80 percent of allschool bus accidentsinvolve no. injuries to passengerson the bus. If injuries -do occur, MSC estimates that about 89percent InjuriesIn nonfatal accidents are minor and about 10 percent of the are moderate. These figures are besed on 16 years of data Including school vehicles of all types.

3 In this eese, seating position, more than restraint status, influenced Injury outcome. The unrestrained passenger and the other lapbelted passengers were uninjured. other

4 Thegross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) is used by the federalgovernment in its motor vehicle safety, standards.GVUR is the value specified by the manufacturer-as the loadedweight of a single vehicle. school bus Can be designed One . to carry fewer passengers than another school bus but still have a higher gross vehicle weight Mint% In other words, passenger capacity dbes not determine if a school bun isbuilt to! "large" or "small" school bus performance standard* set by the federalgovernment.

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with a seatbelt for the driver only.5Obviously,notall vehicles usedfor school transportation fit this description. School districts also use passenger cars, station wagons, minivans, and smaller school buses (including van conversions) to transport students.

Schools typically use a small vehicle rather than large school bus for special purposes suCh as transporting special education and handicapped students, Head Start students, and athletic teams to out-of-town-meets,-and for activity trips by school-sponsored clubs. Smaller school buses are preferred for a variety of reasons: (1) lower purchase price;(2) lower operating costs; (3) bus routes with fewer students;(4) ea5e of handling in an urban environment where door-to-door service is .required;0 (5) closer pupilsupervision (because cf fewer passengers); (6) ability to retrofit additional . exits, such as wheelchair lifts; and (7) ability to provide extra leg room between seats.

7 The Safety Board was interested in documenting the crash performance of small school buses but faced two immediate questions: what is a school bus, and what distinguishes a large school bus from a small school bus?

Definition of Small Versus Large School Bus-

There is no general agreement on what.a school bus is or what distinguishes a small school bus from a large one. _Theterm "schoolbus"hasno common definition, unlike the terms "passenger car" cr "truck."- The only consensus is that a school bus cannot be a public carrier, such as a municipal bus, or be the family's private vehicle.

There are two basic approaches for defining.a vehicle as a school bus: by use, or by body type. The most common approach is by use. Using this definition, the term "school bus" describes any vehicle, regardless of body type, used to transport students. Thus, buses and vans built to Federal schoolbus standards as well as other types of vehiclec--such as converted airport transit buses, and minivans and station wagons (other than the family car)--used to transport students can be called schoolbuses. Most-statistics- -aboutschool buses of this type relate only to vehicles used ta transport students at public expense; vehicles used by private schools are excluded. For example, school bus statistics from the National Safety Council(NSC), the most widely referenced data, includeonly vehicles usedfor public school transportation (National Safety Council 1987).

A school bus Can also beanyvehicle with a school bus-type body, regardless of its use. Underthis definition, the term"school bus"would include school buses used by public and private schools along with vehicleswith

5 Only a few of the Nation's 15,480school districtshave ordered large school buses equippedwith passenger lapbelts.

6 Many school districtsare required by State orlocal statutes -to- provide specialstudents with door-to- door serviceand/or to limit thetime the studentsare in transit betueen homeand classroom. these requirements result in a need for small vehicles.

11 3 schoOl bus bodies used by day camn:.:.chka-ches, private activity groups--such as Boy Scouts, migrant-workers, and community shelter programs--as wellas school buses converted to motor homes. Anj vehicle with other than a bus body would be excluded; van-conversion school buses, for example, would not be included in such data.

The Federal Government uses both of these definitions of school bus, and other definitions, in its standards, operational guidelines, and accident data collection. Perhapsthe mostimportant definition is that used in theU.S. Department of Transportation's Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS), which vehicle manufacturers must follow. The definition of school btrqs used for the FMVSS's has both passenger capacity requirement and use qualifications. For a vehicle to be defined as aschool bus, it must first be a "bus"--that is, "a motor vehicle with motive power, except trailer,designed to carry more than 10 persons." Further, a "schoolbus" is"a bus sold or introduced in interstate commerce, for purposes that include carrying students to and from schooland -related events.." Under this definition,Thoth a van-based-vehicle and a bus, if built to FMVSS for school buses, would be termed a school bus.

In this study, the Safety Board used the FMVSS definition of school bus because it was interested in documenting'the crashworthiness of vehicles built to theFederal schoolbus performance standards. In addition, the Safety Board investigated four cases involving vehicles that were not built to Federal school bus standards because some States permit use of such school vehicles. Discussions in the text and appendixes A-0 distinguish between vehicles built to school bus FMVSS and those that_ were not.

The problems inherent in defining a small versus large school bus were ever more difficult. A uniform definition, based on either vehicleweight or passenger capacity, does not exist. School districti, States, school bus manufacturers, and the Federal Government have their own and different methods of classifying schoolbuses. The size of a school bus can be based on passenger capacity (for example,16 passengers or less, or more than 16 passengers--the source of some Type I versus Type II school busclassifications), vehicle configuration (for example, van-type body versus bus body), gross vehicle weight rating(GVWR of 10,000 pounds or iess,or more than 10,000pounds), or a combination of these factors (for example, school bus Types A,B, C, and D as used by school bus manufacturers; see fig. 1).

The size designations and definitions of school buses overlap and conflict with one angther, making itimpossible to compare data sets with one another (appendix E). Deciding how to differentiate between a small versus large school bus for the study was difficult. At first, the Safety Board believed it could restrict case vehicles in the study tu those with a GVWR of10,000 pounis or less, the basis for theFMVSSsize distinctions. However, another Federal guideline, Highway Safety Program Ilandard No-.17, which currently distinguishes between school buses by passenger capacity,complicated matters.A school vehicle couldbea "large"bus under one set of Federalrequirements and a "small" bus under another (passenger capacity does not always correspondwith GVWR). The CommercialMotor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-570)also distinguishes between school buses by passenger capacity; theAct, administered

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A Type A school bus is a conversion or body constructedon a van-type compact truck or a front-section vehicle,with a gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or lesS, designed for carrying more than 10 persons.

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A Type B school bus is a conversionor body constructed and installed on a van or front-section vehicle chassis, or stripped chassis, with a gross vehicle weight ratingof more than 10,000pounds, designed for carrying more than 10 persons. Partof the engine is beneath and/or behindthe windshield and beside the driver's seat.The entrance door is behind the front wheels.

Figure 1.--These models of one manufacturerare classified by the industry-wide system of school-bus type definitions.

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A Type C school bus is a body installed on a flat. back cowl Chassis with" a cross vehicle.weight rating of more than 10,000 pounds, desipned fo- carrying more than 10 persons. All of the engine is in front of the windshield and the entrance door is behind the front wheels. (Type C school buses are also sometimes referred to as "conventional" school buses.)

A Type 0 school bus is a body installed on a chassis, with the engine mounted in the front, midship, or rear, with a gross vehicle weight rating of more than 10,000 pounds, designed for carrying more than 10 persons. The engine may be behind the windshield and beside the driver's seat, at the rear (behind the rear wheels),or midship (betweenthefront andrear axles). The entrancedoor is aheadof the frontwheels. (Type 0 school buses also are sometimes referred to as "transit-style" school buser..)

figure 1(continued).

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under the responsibility of the Federal Highway Administration, applies onlyto vehicles "designed to transport mare than 15 passengers, including the driver." Then too, States and school districts routinely refer to school busesas either Type I or Type II, a designation loosely based on passenger capacity. Most available school bus data use this Type I or Type II designation.

In thii study, the Safety Board sized school buses using the school bus industry system of classifying school buses as either Type A, B, C,or D, a system that takes into account -GVWR end-vehicle configuration (definitions and examples are given in figure 1). .This report presents data for school bus Types A and B. Types A and B are referred to in State and industry statisticsas Type II ("small") school buses. Only Type A is a small school bus as defined by the ROSS because of its GVWR. A Type 8 school bus is a small school bus that is built to the" large school bus FMVSS because of its GVWR. This report distinguishes between Type A-and Type B school buses in discussions of vehicle. crash performance and seatbelt installation.Most -cases were Type A school_ buses.

Why This Study" Was CondUcted

In 1977, a series of new and modified FMVSS relating to school buses becalm effective, mandating different performance standards for school buses comparedto other buses. Data on the crash performance of schoolbuses builtto these standards were lacking, sothe Safety Board conducted a seriesof accident -investigations from 1984 to 1988 to determine how well the standardsare working toprotectpassengers from injury and whether changesin Ihestandardsare needed. Tworeports wereplannedbecause Federal standardsand guidelines differentiate between school.....bus.es by size.

The first report, published in 1987, examined the crash performance ofType C and Type 0 school buses (the types commonly called largeor Type I school buses)built to Federalschool bus standards (National Transportation Safety Board 1987b). The Safety Board -found, overall, that these large poststandard school buses provided excellent crash protection to their passengers butissued recommendations to fUrther refine the safety of these school buses. The Safety Board concluded that the "first priority for improving the safety ofschool bus passengert should be the rapid retirement of prestandard school buies. followed by expenditure of funds toward accident prevention in the form of improveddriver training and equipment to reduce the number of student fatalities.occurring during the loading and unloading of large school buses.Two to three times as many students are killed each yearin the loading zones as are killed while riding on the school buses.

This is the secondreport onschool buses; it focuses on thecrash performance of Type A and Type 8 school buses, the types referredtoin sone statistics as Type II or small school buses. In the report, both vehicles with bus bodies and van oonversion bodfesare Teferred to as school buses. Discussions distinguish between types of vehicles when appropriate.

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Type A and Type B school buses combined constitute about 15 percent of the public school bus fleet (about 41,000 of the 362,000 public school ve1icles7), but sales of these smaller school vehicles in the schocl bus fleet have increased every year for the last 5 years (appendixes F and G). These small school buses frequentlycarry passengers whoare the most vulnerable of all school bus passengers, very young students or passengers with some form of disability (that is, emotional, physical, or learning disability).

Itis important to note that-small school buses are not Simply miniature versions of large schoolbuses. Small school buses differ from large school buses not only in size and weight--important factors in the magnitude of crash forces acting on school bus passengers--but also in structural configuration and interior features. These differences _are especially pronounced in Type A school buses; which represent most of tho accidents discussed in this report. Eraisid_ausagyses.-- Because of these differences, the conclusions drawn by the Safety Board regarding the crashworthiness of Iarce ,schoolbuses(NationalTransportation Safety Board 1987b)do not nece;sarily apply to smallschool buses..For example,-the Safety Board did not recomend that States or school -districts Allocate funds to retrofit or purchase large school buses with lapbelts because it found that passengers on large school buses would, overall, receive no net benefit from lapbelt use. That conclusion did not consider the possibility of lapbelt-induced injuries; had this possibility teen included, the overall net effect of lapbelts would have been negative for large school buses. This conclusion does not necessarily mean that passengerson small school buses would not benefit from lapbelts. The advantages or disadvantages of lapbelt use may well be different in a school bus designed for 16 or fewer-passengers compared-wtth a school bus designed for 54.passengers- separate analysis was needed for small school buses'because they may perform tore like a car than a bus in a crash. Certainly a small school bus is closer in size and weight to a passenger car than to a large school bus (figs. 2 and 3).

Studies of oassenur car crashes.--Accidents involving small school buses have been of interest to_groups advocating the installation of passenger lapbelts on large schoolbuses and to those concerned that the same types of lapbelt- induced injuries that have_occurred in rear seats of passenger cars (National Transportation Safety Board 1986)would occur to lapbelted passengers in school buses.

As previously stated, the disparate size and mass of a small school bus compared with a large school bus means that findings about the advantages or disadvantages of passenger lapbelts on large school buses hive little relevance to whether or not passenger lapbelts are needed on smallschool buses. For similar reasons, studies of the crash performance of lapbelts in the rear seat of a passenger car are not necessarily applicable to lapbelts in a small school bus. The differences in size and interior features between a passenger car and school bus-are too great.

the number of small school brio, and vans used bv private schcols is not Snow+.

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Figure 2.--A small school bus is closer in size andweight to a passenger car than to a large school bus. In this photo, a 66-passenger school bus anda 22-passenger schoolbusare parked alongsidea Chevrolet Caprice. If a school bus is involved -in a collisionwith a car, the crash forces experienced by passengers riding on the small school buswill be much more severe than if they had been ridingon the large school bus.

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Figure 3.--Passengers seated in a small school bus are cioser to the ground, and closer to the level at which a passenger car would impact, than passengers seated ina large school bus. (A school van is pictured at left; a large school bus is at right. The difference in heights of seatbacks from road level is indicated.)

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For example, General Motors (GM) recentlY estimated that use of a lap-only belt in the rear seat of a passenger car can reduce fatalities by 18 percent + 9 percent8 (Evans 1989)."The effectivenes- of lapbelts in preventing fatalities in rear seats flows mainly from ejection prevention," GM concluded._ Lapbelts were able to reduce collisionsbetween occupant and vehicleinterior only 1 percent + 9 percent.9 In other words,lapbelts were unable to prevent most interior contacts, and their effectiveness was mainly due to ejection prevention. Considering the differences between a passenger car and school bus, the effectiveness of lapbelts is likely to be even less on the school bus because ejection is less possible from the bus.Occupants of passenger -cars are ejected most often through the car side door, followed in frequency by ejection through the adjacent window or through the windshield.Unrestrained passengers on a school bus are less likely to be ejected than occupants of passenger cars because they are not- seated next- to a door; windows are usually partitioned, seatbacks are usually, closer, and higher, and passengers arefarthee from the windshield.

Accident Selection Criteria

Thi purpose'of this safety study was to determine how wellsmallschool buses protect their student passengers from injury. The purpose of the study was notto document how welladults were protected in_ a-smallschool bus or the problems of transporting physically handicapped passengers.10

Investigations were limited to vehicles built after April 1, 1977, the date when all Federal school_bus standards were in effect, and that met the industry- wid-e definitionofa Type A or a TY0e.8 schoOl bus11,12 (school bus models are

8 That is, the overall effectiveness of a lapbelt could be as high as 27 percent or as low as 9 percent.

9 According to the GM research, lapbelts, at best, can prevent10 percent ofinterior ctacts,on and In the worst case, te a negative factor,increasing harmful Interior contacts by 8 percent. The estimates by GM are Cased on comparing the outcome of mmotched pairs" (restrained versus unrestrained occupants) ofpessenger cars from datain the FatesAccident Seporting System (FARS) for 197585.-FARS, a data base maintained by the NationalHighway trefaic safety Administration (NNTSA),is derived from police accident reports; data on restraint use and injury outcomeare not comprehensive and- ccatain inaccuracies. Estimates about tho effectiveness of rear seat lapbelts arenot uniform.- Prior to his 1989 study, Evans reported lower estimatesfor the effectiveness oflapbeltsin redUcing fatalities: 7 percent 12 percent, tesed on FARS datafor 197583. Other research,notablii by NNTSA, has estimmted the effectiveness of rear seat laptelts to be as high as 40 percent.

10 sneelchair restraintsandrestraints for thehandicapped, and howtosecure themto a school toms intericr, are except frac meeting Federal standards. The evaluation ,f such restraintsis beyond tho scePe Of this study.

11 Type A and Tne e school buses are commonly equipped with lapbelts-for passengers.

12sems States(including Connecticut, Michigan, New Hampshire, and Vermont) appearto allow vans not built to Federal school tus standsrdsto be used to transportstudents on regular routes. Mostaro stock vans bought from dealer's lot. Other States allow such v3MI to te used for student activity tries or other special transportaticnpurposes. The SafetyBoard, since 1983, hasurged that onlyvehicles built to Federal school tus standants be used forstudent transportation. The Safety Board alsoinvestigated four accidents involvingvehicles that were not tuilt to Fecaral school tus standards (appendix 0).Sams passengers were fatally injured in these crashes, sceetimes by lapbelt.induced injuries. The crashes involving the nonstandard vehicles were so much more severe thatin scae cases the differencesIn vehicle performsnce and iniury outcome could be due to higher crash forces rather than the lack of creshworthiress of the vehicle.

BEST COPY AVALABLE 19 11

identified in appendix H andfig. 1). The case vehicle had to be primarily occupied by preschool or school-age children (not all of whom were in wheelchairs), andthe accident hadto meet at leastoneofthe following criteria:

thecase vehicle was involved in a moderatespeed collision13 that disabled the bus (occupant injuries need not have resulted); or

o the case vehicle overturned; or

one ormore of the case vehicle's passengers was seriously injured or killed, regardless of the type of

accident- . :

The cases presented in this report are not a census or a statistical sample of all accidents involving Type A and 8 small school buses in the United States during the investigation period. The number of crashes involving poststandard small school-buse occurring nationwide-during the -span of the Safety Board's study is unknown.14 This report is a "case" study, based on investigations of accidents meeting specified criteria to collect atcurate.and complete data on crash performance and injury outcome for those accidents.

The accident criteria specified allowed the Safety Board to examine the crash performance of small-school buses in accidents that put the occupants at risk of fnjury. This type of accident is-not typical,hcwever. According to available data, the typical school bus accident is minor, a "fender bender," and does not result in injury. Consequently, such an accident would not "test" the crashworthinesS iii-the vehicle and "Qould preclude an evaluation of whether the vehicle's design offers-adequate protection for the occupants. Likewise, such an accident would not be useful for evaluating the benefits of d passenger restraint system (such as lapbelts) because the paisengers, regardless of restraint status, are at little risk of injury. In addition, a school bus accident resulting in minor injuries to unrestrained passengersdoes not peld data useful for analyzing the benefit of lapbelt use. Seatbelt-use does not guarantee that an individual will be unharmed, nor does it eliminate minor (A1S 1)injuries. The National Highway TrafficSafety Administration (NHTSA) has estimated that lapbelts and lap/shoulder belts in passenger cars are only 10 percent effective in preventing minor (AIS 1) injuries.

13 Thephrase mmoderstespeed" was incite:WS to precludethe Safety goard beingnotifid of- aainor accident,such ss a bus that backed into an object or struck another vehicle when COO were nearly ata stcnctstill. The term "cellisionm had to appearin the accident reportNitrous* khe criteria also specified "no injury need to have resulted."

14 Avallobleaccident statisticscombine all types of school venicles and pMestandard and postscrelare buses together. Nationwide, an estimated 5,000injury-producingaccidents -involvingelktypes- of ichook vehicles occurred doing the 1966-07 school year. This total ncl4cles accidents resulting ininjuries only to" occupants of the other vehicle and pedestrians.According to16 years of National Safety Council data, most Injuries to scnool bus occupants probsbly were minor.

BE$T COPY AVAILABLE 20 4i4X-

This report,unlike others, also distinguishesbetween typesof small school buses, an important distinction because Type A schoolbusesmeet a different-set of FMVSS requirementsthan Type B school buses, which in termsof FMVSS requirements, are "large"school buses.

Data about the accidents and vehiclesinvestigated presented in table 1. in thisstudy are

How the Investigations WereConducted

The investigationS for this study were conducted by Safety pard headquarters staff and staff ineight Regional Offices the beginning of the study, each during 1984-88.1.0 At Safety Board RegionalOffice set up-an atcident notification plan, involving4network of law enforcement:and in the multi-State region medical authorities surrounding the office,. Localand State authorities each region agreed to notifythe Safety Board investigitors in the Safety of a crash meeting Board'scriteria .as soon as they became awareof it, notification, theinvestigators determined kon if--the crash;- in fact, met selection criteria, and ifso, began a detailed investigation. the

Damage -to the exterior or interior of the schoolbus was documented analyzed, especially in relationship to ,each and passenger'sseating position. Information on each occupant-(age,weight, and-height) and determined seating locationwas to the extentpossible. For each occupant, the investigators attempted to determine whethera restraint system was correctly, the probable used,*whether itwas used source of each injury, and thenature and severity of each injury sustained, expressedin terms of the. Abbreviated (appendix I). Injury. Scale (AIS)

Throughout this report, occupants are frequently describedin terms of his or her maximum AIS levelinjury (MA1S).Use of the AIS injury helps eliminate individual bias coding system when discussing injuries;a "serious' injury to one person may te a "moderate" toanother person. injuries are listed in Under the AISsystem, all a coding -manual and onlyone code-OW-specific injury be assigned. _ can

15 the Safety *ord. hoshighway investigators in the- -following Regional Offices: Oenver, fort vorth, tenses City, Los Angeles,New York, end kettle. Atlanta, Chicago,

21 '

Table 1.--Data about accidents and vehiclesinvestigated for study on crashworthiness of 24 small poststandard school buses, 1984-88

I tem Number Item Number

Type of vehicle:a Other vehicle(s) or object(s) involved:c Type-A -ScHool busb 19 Type B school bus 5 Passenger car or van 9 Light truck 3 Hec:y truck 2

Manufacturer of Other school bus 1 school Dus bogy: Otherobject 7

Collins Bus Corp. 3 T,P.I. (Sturdivan) 3 Type(s) of_accident: - Wayne Corp. 3. Blue Bird Body Co. 2 Collision A 21 Carpenter Body Works Noncollision" -3 Coach & Equipment (Fortivan) 2 Rollover! 12 Van-Con, Inc. 2 Nonrollover 12 Sheller-Globe 1 Superior Coach Int'l. 1 Thomas Built Buses 1 Principal direction of AmTran (Vanguard) 1 impact in collision -Other 5 accidents:

Frontal 9 Manufacturers of school Side 5 bus chassis: Rear 1 Chevrolet 13 Multiple Dodge 6 GMC Ford 3 a Vehicles are classified by the school bus industry system (adopted at the national Minimum Standards Conference 1980) that takes into account both gross vehicle,weight rating (GVWR) and vehicle configuration.

Includes school.. vans. Type A school vehicles have a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less and must therefore meet federal standards for small school buses. Some accidents did not involve other vehicles or an object, and some accidents involved multiple vehicles or objects. All noncollision accidents were rollovers. e All but three of the rollovers were precipitated by a collision. Safety Board accident criteria undoubtedly resulted in a higher proportion of rollover accidents than would be found in accidents involving small school buses nationwide. Includes head-on collision and front angle.

22 14

DIFFERENCES IN FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS FOR SMALL AND LARGE SCHOOL"BUSES

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety.Standards (FMVSS) specify for schoolbuses with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less, different performance standards and, in. some respects, less stringent standards than those required for larger school buses. Type A school buses are the only type of school bus considered "small" or "light" school buses by FMVSS. NHTSA proposed a "combination of requtrements for light schoolbuses that differ from those for heavier buses, -because-the crash pulse experience& by-smaller vehicles is more severe than that of larger vehicles in similar collisions" (41 FR 4016, January 28, 1976). Three of the most substantialdifferences between Type A schoolbuses and other types of school buses are outlined below.

Lapbelts

Type A schoolbuses, like all passenger cars and multipurpose vans, are required by FMVSS to be manufactured with at least a lapbelt at every occupant Seating position. In the preamble to FMVSS 222, "School Bus Seating and Crash Protection," NHTSA stated "such restraintsarenecessaryto provide .crash protection in small vehicles" (41 FR 4016, January _28,1976). Other.types of schoolbuses(Type B, C, and 0)are not required by FMVSS to have passenger lapbelts installed and, if they do, theyneed notmeet Federal seatbelt standards.

Vehicle Structure

Type A school buses are-notrequired by FMVSS-to have the same-level of- structural integrity as larger school buses. They are exempt from the Federal standards that specify joint strength, and a less stringent test of roof strength is applied. In 1973, during rulemaking connected with FMVSS 221,"School Bus Body Joint Strength," NHTSA found"no evidence that the mode of (joint)failure found in larger traditional school buses also occurs in smaller, van-type school buses currently manufactured by automobile manufacturers for use as II- to 17- passenger schoolbuses....Until information to the contraryappears or is developed, these vehicles should not be covered by the requirement" (41 FR 3872, January 27, 1976). The Safety Board believes this report presents such information. The application plate usedin roof performance tests in =all school buses was increased in size when some industry commenters stated they would find it necessary to discontinue production of small school buses if the same testing requirements a: for larger school buses were imposed (41 FR 3874, January 27, 1976),

Seating

Seating standards are'also different for Type A school buses than for other school buses: compartmentalization is incomplete. When Federal-rulemaking regarding school bus seatingwas first proposed, the seats of all size school buses were required to meet identical requirements in terms of seat spazing and seat performance. Several commenters objected to the applicability of the

23 15 standard to school buses with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less, asserting that the special requirements of the standard for small buses were inappropriate, or unachievable, within the_9-month lead time for compliance mandated by Congress. Since NHTSA had "specified adequate numbers of seatbelts for the children that the vehicle would carry," different equirements for seatingin small school buses were_considered ''reasonable," and NHTSA exempted seats of Type A school buses from Certain requ1re7Ants. (41 FR 4016, January 28, 1976).

These are not the only differences in standards for Type A school buses and- other types of buses. -.Figure 4 provides additional examples.

24 w4J-N4-=,

16 Exterior Requirements

Small Settool Bus- Rquover Prutection IFMVSS 220)-- Test requires a vertical force equal to Emergency Exits (FMVSS 217) Rear 1,2 times the unloaded vehicle weight emergency exit must comply with be applied to roof. Force application provisions of standard for small plate is wider and longer then roof, school buses. Dimensions and resulting in woe luad-aosort:ng clearance of side emergency exits surface. not specified.

Joint Strength Not recuired to meet any Federal Standard: exempt hem school bus mint strength Fuel Tank Integrity IFMVSS 201) Sarre ,,Jerlcfmance standard (FMVSS 2211. and left renuifemerqc af> that required fcr all uuses and multipurpose vericir,s: Zr frontai parrief crash test, a rear inoving flat rnsinw a lattral moving hat barr.dr tem, ii static rollover Test, with-fuel spillage net toer ceed

Large School Bus

Rollover Protection More stringeill Emergency Exits Same number of test requirements result in greater exits (equired as small school bus: roof strength. Force application plate but rear exit must have twice the Clearance and be slightly larger la narrower and shorter than roof: the latter aspect stresSOS the 1001 Dimensions and clearance Or side structure more than the test for small emergency earl specified. school buses,

Joint Strength Must meet Federal school Inn joint strength standerdIFMVSS 2211. Fuel Tank Integrity Standard swills§ different testing requirement one test Only. a moving contoured brunet crash Same fuel spillage limitations.

INOte: FMVSS distinguish school butes On the bows of gross vehicle weight rating Small och001 buses hove a DVWR " 10,000 lbslarge scnoolbusel 10.000 lite

Figure 4.--Structural differences affect both the exteriorand interior of small and large school buses.

BSSTCOPYAVAILABLE 25 17

Seating Requirements (FMVSS 222)

SmaH School Bus

\1. VII pio. Seats can be as far as desired

SRP

At least a lapbelt required a every Frontal barrier(s) not requ'irect occupant seating position. Must meet installed, no spacing or size same standards as belts in requirements or any of the restraining multipurpose passenger vehicles barrier requirements of FMVSS 222 IFMVSS 208, 209, 210). apply, Head protection zone requirements in force, though. Large School_Bus

0 0. ,k No more than 24 inches

SRP

No seatbelts of any kind required for Frontal barriers required. Must meet passengers. If installed, do not have spacific requirements for size, spacing to meet any Federal requirements. and crash performance.

Note: SRP is the Seating Reference Point, pi.vot point of hip.

Figure 4 (continued). BEST COPY AVALABLE 18

OVERVIEW OF RESTRAINT USE AND INJURY ANALYSIS

A case study,like this report,can provide data that are not usually availableand that are needed before -discussion of the in,jury outcome for restrained or unrestrained passengers on sMall Echoolbuses can be discussed. Before analysis can begin, certain questions must be answered:

o Where wastheoccupantseated in relation tocrash forces and deformation of the vehicle?

o Was the Occupant restrained at the time of the crash?

If restrained, what kind of restraint-was used?

Was the restraint correctly installed and worn properly?

What was the severity and location ocrir.jury?

What was (were) the agent(s) of injury?

Police accident records or media reports of schoolbus crashes-generally cannot supply answers to these questions, and the reliability of data they can supply is sometimes questionable. Table ? illustrates differences between data collected by the Safety Board and the data ayailable from official.reports school bus accident.

-There are several reasons forthe- discrepancies between severity of- injuries reported in policeaccident recordsand the severity determined by Safety Board investigators. The priority of police at. the accident scene is to have the inji!....ed transported to hospitals as quickly as possible and to establish traffic coy,- ol, not to code injury severity. Police generally receive littl _training in coding and evaluating injuries, and the inj:ry scales they use ay.

simplified. In addition, certain types of injuries may no.. be readily apparent f. immed.'.ately after the accident.

Reports of belt use are usually higher than actual use. Nearly afl States and local school districts have statutes or regulations requiring P.c, school bus driver to be restrained when the bus is in motion. Failure to wear tne available belt, especially if involved in an accident, may be grounds for dismissal.Some school districtsalso require that passengers_ of school buses equipped w!th lapbelts be buckled up whenever the school bus isin motion. deral Highway Safety Program Standard No.17 currently recommends that passengers in school- vehic' .s that carry 16 or fewer pupils shall be required to wear lapbelts when availaole and whenever the vehicle is in motion. Furthermore, some school buses have adult aides on board charged with ensuring that students buckle-up.

Analyses of restraint use and injury outcome are discussed in the fcdlowing Chapters. Theanalyses also discuss differences between theSafety Board's flindings and official accident reports. 19

Table 2.--Differences in restraint use and injury status coded for case 15. Perrysburg, Ohio

Determined by investigators Coded on Stare police of the National Transportation Item coded accident form Safety Boarda

Restraint use;

Passengers 17 were wearing laPbelts 1 was unrestrained 14 were.wearing lapbeltsb 1 was restrained in a misused child safety seatc. 1 status undetermined°

Driver Was wearing lapbelt ReStrained by a loosely adjusted lap/shoulder belt (the only belt available .at the seating position)

e Injury status:

PassengeeS 1 was uninjured 1 was uninjured 15 received minor injuries 11 received minor injuries 1 received seriouS injunies 2 receivea moderate injuries 3 received serious injuries

Received midor injuries Received moderate injuries (including two fractured

. ribs) a Based on physical evidence, reconstruction of the accident, and statements of witnesses and vehicle occupants.

All but one of the lapbelts were adjusted with excessive slack considering the small size of the occupants,- She lapbelts thus provided little restraint.

The roliCe report indicated the passenger was lapbelted and received minor injuries. The passenger was attually restrained in an improperly secUred child 5afety seat with half of the safety seat's harress around her body.The child received a serious injury.- a fractured femur. d The police report indicated this 5-year-old passenger was wearing a lapbelt. The Patsenger's seating position was actually occupied by an unsecured child safety seat lying on its side. The lapbelt at the position showed no physical evidence of having been in use at the time of the accident. e The Ohio State police use the KABCO injury scale, which provides five injury codes from which to choose: fatal, serious-, minor, no visible injury. or not injured. National Transportation Safety Board investigators use the AIS injury scale, whicn provides nine classifications: vninjured, minot,_moderateserious.,. severe, critical, maximum (virtually uhsurvivable), injured (unknown severity), unknown if injured. The differences in injury severity shown in the table are not necessarily the result of inaccurate coding by the police; they may just reflect the limitations of the KABCO injury Scale compared with the.AIS scale.,

BEST COPY AVAILABLE 20

RESTRAINT USE

Restraint use-was high among the drivers of school vehicles in this study. N:arly three-fourths ofthe drivers werewearing the lap or lap/shoulder belt available at their seating positions at the time of the crash.16

Restraint use among passengers in the study _was lower than that of the drivers, but still high.Two-thirds of the passengers with restraints available at their seating positions were determined bythe- Safety Boardto have been restrained in some fashion at the time of the crash.- (Restraints included child safety seats; properly and improperly used lapbelts and lap/shoulder belts; and substandard, jury-rigged "belts" and secured wheelchairs.)Data were collected on III lapbeltedpassengers -(97 on vehiclesbuilt to -Federal school bus -standards; 14-on'vehicles- not built to these standards).

The level of restraint use among passengers in this .stedpwas far greater than that reported ina survey'conducted in New York State in 1988,the only State to require that all new school buses, regardless of size, be equipped with lapbelts....for passengers-.17 The survey found that in the-school districts w:th formal policies mandating seatbelt use, fewer than-25 percent of passengers nn the belt-equippel buses wore the 'available belts. The lapbelts on some buses had been vandalized.I8-

Many of the school vehicles in the Safety Board'sstudy are the type in which belt-use is required by State or local policies, contributing to the higher belt use rate in thisstudy compared to the New York survey.The higher rate also occurred because the school buses carried few passengers, passengers were __usually young (grade school age or younger),18_or handicapped, or because aices were aboard vehicles to encourage passengers to buckle-up.Not surprisingIY: restraint use was higher in the six buses with aides aboard than in buses without aides. Only one of the seven aides, however, was restrained at the time of the accident.

Of tto 20 reltrained -schoolaus drivers; II worelocbelts and 9 wore lap/shoulder bolts. This wes_s swh higher telt use rate than observed in the Safety Board's stufy oflarge school Woes: of 43 crstows, nearly half the school bus drivers were unrestrained.

If Large schoolbuscm ordered for usein mew York State ere also rnquirod to have more sea:backparsSirg end, since1968, .highor seatbacks than required by Federalstandards. Seetbocksin New York school tales ere 28 inches from the Sestina Reference Point; Federal standards specify a minimal of 20 Inches.

18 Only 13 percent of the school districts reverted no orthicon with seattelts. Of the districts reporting prcblems, IS percent had cut belts, 19..percenthed buckles -removed, 12 percent hod brutal buckles, 18 percent had improper adlustment, 30 percent had belts tied together, end 14 percent hod multtpla problems. According to the survey, repair costs and down time related to seetbelts on buses hescrested added expenre inclialing replacement ports, later, end loss of,vohIcle use. This cost factoris awojected to xceed SI,000,000 per year acroes the State.

19 Grede school pupils ere more likely tobuckle p than high school pupils (U.S. Department of transportatios, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 1986).

29 21

_ Deficiencies in Official Reports of Restraint Use

In mostaccidents,Safety Board investigatorsdid not rely solelyon statements regardingbelt use of witnessesor vehicle occupants or on the restraint status in the police report, but rather looked for physicalevidence of use. Reconstruction of the crash events, information on the fitof the belt and size of the occupant, and medical records on the injuriessustained assisted the Safety Boardinvestigators in evaluating restraint use.- Insome cases, the restraint status reported by the school bus occupant was directlycontradicted by physical evidence; in others, the status reported was questionable. Four examples follow:

1. Theschool bus driver'slap/shoulder belt was fou6C, pinned behind- his deformed seat,with itslatchplate splattered-with blood. The opening where the latchplate would fit in the buckle-stalk was filled withasphalt, which had spilled into the bus when itwas struck by a truck transporting hot asphalt. (Case 25.)

2. _All lapbeltson -the school .bus wereunusable: they either had been. vandalized or were stowed beneaththe bottom seat cushions. (Case 4.)

3. The 5-foot 2-inch, 190-pound driver's aidewas found in the stairwell following the crash; her pelvis was fractured. The adjusted length of the lapbeltat-her seating position was.22 inches. (Case 15.)

4. The school_bus driver refused_to start the busunless all passengers were lapbelted, so to give theappearance -of being belted, the passenger inserted thebuckle into his latchplate,.but not far enough toengage the buckle. He slipped from his seat during the crash. (Case 5.)

Police accident reports indicated that these schoolbus occupants were restrained. Many of the ocupants hid-told law enforcementofficials on the scene'that they had been using the-available restraint at thetime of the crash. Safety Board investigators determined from evidence,however, thatall were unrestrained. Deficiencies in accident reports of othercases are documented in the case summaries (appendixes B and D).

Police may be inclined to take occupant statementsabout restraint use at face value, or to list uninjured occupants.as-restrained and injured occupantsas unrestrained.In cases 4and 24,for example, allpassengers were listed as lapbelted in the police report although there were no lapbelts available foruse at their seat on the bus. Restraint use is probably overstated inmost of the official reports.

Restraints incorrectly coded as lapbelts.--Not all lapbeltsreported in use were actually lapbelts. Police reported other devicesaslapbelts: a child safety seat, a lap/shoulder belt, a large belt formed by joiningthe latchplate of the aisle-side lapbelt with the latchplate of the lapbelt atthe window seating position, and a jury-rigged "restraint" consisting oftwo car lapbelts tied together and slipped over the top of a bench seat.

30 22

_ _Improper use of lapbelts.--Police reports do notindicate whether the lapbelt was being worn properly. The Safety Board investigators found instances of lapbelts that were being worn improperly rather than snug and low on the abdomen as recommended. The design of lapbelts commonly installed for passenger use on school buses may encourage misuse.

Nearly all lapbelts installed for passengers on school buses are "static° lapbelts, the type commonly found in airplanes and the center seating position of cars. Static belts are not equipped with retractors that automatically tighten the belt around the occupant; instead, the schoolbus passenger must manually

_ adjust the belts--shorten or lengthen them--to ensure proper fit.

Safety Board investigators often found that the lapbelts had excess slack (cases 2,5, 13,15,17, 19, and 25). A loosely worn lapbelt cannot provide the samelevel---cif protection as -asnUgly Worn belt and "exposesthe occupant to injury: in the Safety BoarCs, cases, passengers slipped out from the restraint in a crash, incurring injuries from contact with components of he vehicle interiornormally notreachable.20 Loosefitalso increases thechance of ejection,- and an occupant with a loosely fitted lapbelt may be-at more risk of _ . abdominal' or spinil_injury.

Unusual Configuration and Installation of Restraints

Some of the restraints reported in use were improperly installed or of such a design that they would not meet Federal standards. Federal safety standards for seatbelt design -and installation (FMVSS 208,209, and-210) apply only to belts provided by the mufacturer in motor vehicles required by FMVSS to be provided with seatbelts.41 The owner can alter the seatbelts,even cut them out of. the vehicle. and not be_in violation of anyJederal_standards. (They may, however, be in violation of a State law.) The restraints described in table 3 violate established installation guidelines and some basic tenets of seatbelt design.

The "lapbelts" and jury-rigged restraints describedin table 3provide schoolbus passengers with a degraded levelof protection at best. Moreover, some of them expose the occupant to dangei. of injury, from the belt itself, as in the loopbelt held together by a metal plate with exposod bolts (fig. 5). The unrestrained child seated on the bench seat neXt to the two children encircled by this belt could have been harmed in an accident by contact with the metal plate and protruding bolts. The children within the loopbelt also were in danger of injury caused by their bodies slipping around in this large belt and interacting forcefully with one another.Moreover, because the loopbelt was not secured to theseat orfloor, it could move upward,beyond the children's chests, and position itself near the neck.

20 See ono 15 , -foe example.

21 The TypeA chool buses in tho studyoriginally wereequippedby themanufacturer with Impbelts meeting 'Were standards,es required by Federl rogulationa. 1!.4 Typo e school buses inthy OtWN b*fe notrequired by Federalregulation to hove factorrinatalled lagbelts: if loptielts wereinstalled bY TT* school district, they-did-net have-to-meet -Federal seatbelt standards. 7-7E.F7-rjr--'-F7PPP7FFi'-r.xtt!_

Table 3.--Examples of unusual passenger restraints and installations in small school buses

Type of school bus and case number 'Inusual restraints and installations ------Type A:_a

Case 3 Lapbelts were available for every passenger, but two types had been installed. Some lapbeltS had pushbutton release lat6iplates, like those commonly found on passenger cars; others had lift-type release buckles like those in airplanes..This mix waS found throughout the vehicle, even on the same bench seat.

Case 15 A child'safety seat was improperly installed and , misused: the right side shoulder strap of the harness was not attached to the safety seat, and the

vehicle-lapbelt.was improperly routed around the . restraint.

Case 17 -Two lapbelts had been shortened by loopingover the webbing, punching a hole through the looped-over webbing,-and then remounting the belt to the seat using a bolt, The "adjustment' had been done to --meet parents' complaints.that the belts were too large to fit small children.

Type 8:P ----

Case 21 The drriver hdd "knotted" the webbing of two of the available lapbelts, in an attempt to shorten the. belts. One belt was too long because it was anchored to the wheel well rather than to the floor on one side. adding 9 inches to the belt-webbing (the wheel

well was higher than-the floor); this effectively . prevented the child from securing the belt snugly around Ais body.A child safety seat was also secured by a knotted belt. (Other cases in the Study also had knotted. belts.)

Case 22 A pusenger was restrained by a lapbelt and an improperly installed E-Z-ON.vest:. only the two upper loops of the vest were secured to the school bus floor. The lower loops were loose.

32 . ivVe.=9* ;. .rAue

Table 3:--Examples of unusual passengerrestraints and installations in small school buses (continued)

Type of school bus- Unusual restraints and installations and case number

Type B (cont'd): Passenger seatbelts were not installed, but theschool Case 24 bus contractor had jury-rigged twounusual restraints on two of the six benchseats. The first consisted of_ two lapbelt assemblies, joined togetherby two metal plates and secured with four bolts. The plates were -exposed-and the bolts protruded 1 3/8 inches. The restraint was looped around the junction of the seatback and seat cushion and was designed to beplaced around three children.Two'children shared this. "loopbele and an unrestrained child sat next to them on the same bench seat.

The second restraint consisted of two belts: one was a form of shoulder strapand the other a large loopbelt. The shoulder strap was wrapped horizontally around the seat; the other belt was placed overit, like a large lapbelt encircling the seat. The lap portion of the restraint fit across the occupant's upper torso.

Neither restraint was anchored to theseatframe or floor: they were merely wrapped around the seat frames.

Van not built to Federal school bus standards: variety.of unconventional_ Case 27 Lapbelts demonstrated installations.:. two belts shared an anchor point; lapbelts were all different lingths; and buckle-tolatch configurations were irregular.

Type'A school buses are required byFederal standards to be manufactured with at least a lapbelt at every passengerseating position. Type B buses._ Type B school buses are exemptfrom the lapbelt requirement. with however, often are orderedwith passenger lapbelts or are retrofitted belts. Safety ivard has urged that only vehiclesbuilt The National Transportation to Federal-school -bus-standardsbe used to transport pupils.

33 4.`

Figure5.--Such *restraints* pose danger to the occupants. The jury-rigged loopbelt (A) and unusual three-point restraint (B and C) were found in case 24. Neither was secured to the seat or floor. Other examples of improper installation were shared saatbelt anchorages (D) and unusual configuration of buckles and latchplates (E).

34 '; ,t; ;, , ;tit

,1,1t A:1,"

fr 4 '4,14

Figure 5 (continued

A restraint, by definition,is designed for use by one person only. Crash testsperformed at University of Michigan Transportation ResearchInstitute (WeberandMelvin 1983) have demonstrated a substantial increase in injury potential to occupants who share a seatbelt as they collide violently with one another. With a shared restraint,proper fit--crucial for goodrestraint performance--is impossible: the loopbelt cannot be properly positioned over the pelvic areas of two children.

Prior to this study, the Safety Board investigated cases involving large school buses (both prestandard and poststandard) that had been retrofitted with a form of these loopbelts. Regardless of the size of vehicles on which such belts are found, they are not restraints.They pose a danger to occupants and should be removed from the school bus.

Based on the occurrence and potential dangerous crash consequences of the unusual restraints and installations documented in these cases, the Safety Board believes that the National Association of State Directors of Pupil Transportation, the National Associationof Pupil Transportation, and the National School Transportation Asssociation should-alert their members to the dangers of such systems and urge them to correct the installations.Students also need to be instructed in the proper use of restraints.

38 28

INJURY OUTCOME

Overall Passenger Outcome

Restraint use cannot guarantee that an occupantwill be uninjured in a crash. Although restraint use was high in the Safety Board's cases, two-thirds of the passengers in small school busesbuilt to Federal school bus standards wereinjured. Those who were unharmedincluded restrained and unrestrained passengers (cases 2, 3, 11, 12, 21,and 23). In some accidents, an unrestrained passenger was the only uninjured occupantin the vehicle; in others, a restrained passenger was uninjured.

Fortunately, when school bus passengers were injured, minor injuries were .usually all that they received. For example, 122 of the 167 passengers in the case vehicles built to Federal schoolbus standards were known to be injured, but of these 122, 100 suspined minor injuries only. Few passengers,regarAless of thlir restraint status, received more than moderate injuries (table4).2z

Minor Injuries ' The mostcommon minor injurywas a facial laceration, followed by contusion to leg or arm. Minor head and facial injuries were especially common amonglapbelted passengers. Because a lap-only belt does not provide upper torso restraint, the upper body of the lapbelted passenger isfree to move, in some situationsmoreviolently than an unrestrainedpassenger due to the jackknife effect. Lapbelted children also received minor abdominalcontusions from the belt in several cases (cases 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 17, and 22) (see footnota 22).

Moderate and Above Injuries

Only 22 of the 167 passengers received more than a minor injury. Moderate injuries accounted for half of these injuries. Unrestrained passengers were not overrepresented in these injuries. Of the 12 passengers sustaining moderate injuries, 7 were restrained,4 were unrestrained, andrestraintstatus was unknown for 1. The same pattern held true for the 8 passengers with serious injuries: 6 were restrained and 2 were unrestrained.

For more detailedanalysis of thedifferences in injury outcomefor restrained versus unrestrained passengers,the reader is referred to the case summaries in appendix B.The Safety Board did not conduct further numerical comparisons because of the smallI numbers of passengers in the study and the importanceofcrash severity in injuryoutcome. For example, one accident involved 2 1/4 revolutions in which 11 passengers were unrestrained; another case involved a minor head-on collision and 9 lapbelted passengers. These cases are too dissimilar in severity and crash dynamics to draw any comparisons about the

22 This cutcomewas not true in thecases involving school vehicles not built tofederal sstv:01 bus standards (see appendix 0).These crashes were generally more severe than those in *kith vehicles were built to school tus standards, and leobeltedstudents Taredworse, sometimes incurring total lapteltinduced injuries (case 26).

37 Table 4:--InjuryFederal outcome school of buspassengers standards on investigatedvehicles built foe to this studya (By number of passengers) numberCase Uninjured. (A15 1)Minor Moderate(AIS 2) (AISSerinus 3) Severe(AIS 4-6)and above unknown if Unknowninjured severity(AIS 9) (A1S 7) and; Total 1 2 1 62 432 2 1 .4 53 1 75 765 2 49 2 1 B279 B10911 423 82 1 11 63 1312 1 '9- 9 1 1 11 9 14 16 11 4 : 2 . 3; 17 171615 2 . 7.2 2 31 2" 9 1918 4 ' 4 584 20 - 2 3 r 2221 231 3:5 573 : 2423 1 2 . - 3 becausea their seat andThe surrounding school bus environmentdriver was fatallyis farTOTAL moreAnjured in two casps: 45 100 12 8 hostile7 and S. than that of the passengers. 2 Ijrivers are not included in the table O.i - . The 167 wheel;theschool other;gear bus shift, MAISdriver. 6and that'proved Thesefor dashboard. example..nas two passengersfatal. no passivewere fatally protection injured: and 33 one passenger 'sustained MA1S 5 injuries is exposed to the windshield, steerin9 that proved fatal; #14:5Aimt'N11,0,4§041," 4.,Lmskt, :

effect of restraint use. A more useful compari-son is to look at the outcome for restrained versus unrestrained passengers in the same vehicle.Even within a - single accident, comparisons based on restraintst-atus can be misleading if the occupant's seating position and its relationship to the crash forces,intrusion, or other causes of injury arenot considered.

Importance of Seating Position

Seating position, more than restraint status, appeared to influence injury outcome in most of the accidents investigatedfor this study.23 Lapbelt use, however, appeared to have contributed-to-head injuries sustained by occupants of the front rows who faced a restraining barrier. In a frontal crash, a lapbelted passengerwill jackknife over the belt and strike the barrier. Barrier design, or absence of a- barrier, alsomay have led to injury for unrestrained passengers. In the cases investigated, two passen-gers in vehicles built to Federal school -busstandardsdied fromtheir injuries (case 17). Onewas lapbelted; theother was net. Interaction with an abbreviated restraining barrier aggravated their injuries.

-Differences Between Safety Board and Police Accident Report Data on Injury Severity

Many law enforcement officials use injury classification systemsfhat have very broad classifications forinjuries, tJch as the KABCO scheme. In KABCO, for example, a broken arm and a broken skull are both coded as "A" _(incapacitating) injuries, despite their vastly different threat_to life. Internal-injuries, such as intra-abdominal lacerations, arenot likely to be coded at all.

Accident reports examined for this study --that--werefiledby police or schools sometimes underestimated the severity of injuries sustained. In case 19, for example,the lapbelted schoolbus driver was listedin police records as having sustained minor injuries: the driver stated such to police immediately following the accident. These "minor" injuries ultimately prevented the driver from working for 48 days. Safety Board investigators determined that the driver had sustained at least moderate (A1S 2)inju;sies.24

The KABCO coding classification also obscured important differences in injury severity among passengers. For example, in case 16, all nine passengers were listed in the police accident report as receiving"A' level (incapacitating)_ injuries. TheSafety Board determinedthatthe severity ofinjuriesvaried widely; two passengers were uninjured,two received minor injuries only,two sustained moderate injuries, and three were seriously injured.

23 This study collected data on laptelt performance in the crashes investigated for the study;it did not ettmlet todetermine whether lapbelts couldcause or prevent injury in noncrash situations. The 1989 survey of New York State SINNA districts found thatlapbelts cen- cause injuriesin -noncrash situations: 204 Injuries resulted frcel seatbelt useseattelts wereused as weapons, used to trip passengers,and metal splinters caused injuries.Seattelt.related injuriesincreased 460 percent since the 1988 New York survey while ,the miter of buses with seatbelts increased 38.6 percent.

2- L The driver had sustained deep contusions co herfacefrom contactwith the- rearview--mirror -and deep contueicms on her atdonen inckiced by the lapbelt (she had slipped off her seat during rollover but remained suspencihd by thetelt webbing; the schoc,l bus had come to fest on its right side).

40 1,v.q

Safety -Board investigators found that injuries, particularly minor injuries, often went unreported by the police. In case 10, for example, the police accident report listed 8 of the 10 students on the bus as uninjured. The Safety Board investigator determined that only two students were unin'jred. In other cases, injury information on the police reports was inconsistL dith the evidence:cases 1, 2, 5, 12, 13, 15, and 16. Minorinjuriessustained by lapbelted passengers often were not reported.

Limitations of the KA6C0 injury coding system are illustrated in table 2 and in appendixes J and K.

School accident records also are not complete and do not provide detailed data onlocationor severity of injuries. Mostschool districtshavean established policy that all school bus passengers involved in a crash, regardless of observed injury status, must be transported to an--emergencyroom for examination. The hosital emergency room records then become the source_ of injury information. The Safety Board found instances when some parents,alerted by local news reports of the accident, drove to the crash site and took their child home or_ to the family physician for examination;injury_ information for such instances may not find -its-way into officialschoolrecords. Then too, some injuries, such as muscle sprainsorabdominal bruising, may not manifest themselves until days after the accident.

Uniform School Bus Accident Reporting Form

The reportingproblems documented in this study are part Of_ alarger concern: school busaccidentand injurystatistics, overall, are lessthan adequate for research purposes and hamper analysis of what safety countermeasures are needed and would prove most effective. For example,--there is no standard definition of "school bus accident" or "school bus-related accident." Iniury reporting is also widely divergent. For example, in 1987, Maryland reported :oat less than 10 percent of all-school bus accidents resulted in injury.New York State, however, reported that 60 to 66 percent resulted in injury.

These shortcomings are not new. As a Congressionally funded Transportation Research Board study (Transportation Research Board, National Research Crnncil 1989) pointed out, theSecretary ofthe U.S. Department of Transportation outlined the problem in 1977:

Wholly reliable information on schoolbus accidents is not readily available on a national basis. This is particularly truefor ronfatalinjury accidents,and even more sofor accidents in which noinjury is present. Theinformation deficiency exists with respect to descriptive statistics as wellas to accident-injury causation data; and it stems from both inadequate investigations at the accident site and the lack of a formal and systematic data collection and synthesis process to produce aggregated information.

41 32

Solutions do exist to some of the problem. The 198E- tional Conference on School Transportation--a conference ofStatePupil Tra, )yrtationDirectors, local school district personnel, contract operators, and alvisors from the school bus industry--proposeda uniform school bus accident report form that would provide standardized reporting of school bus accident data throughout the school bus transportation industry. The Conference has adopted this form, but it is too soon to determine if school districts will use the standard form and generate the type of data useful to determine what types of accidents, nationwide, produce serious injuries to school bus passengers. (It willbe vitalthat trained personnel complete the accident forms to generate accurate data.) Had this form been in use throughout the United States, the Safety Board would have been able to compare theperformance ofthe Type AandType B school buses in its investigations to the universe of accidentsinvolvingschool buses of those types.

1 33

RESTRAINING BARRIERS

The forward portion of the interior of a school bus has many elements that can-cause injury if contacted ina craSh, including the stairwell, dashboard, windshield, and boarding door mechanism. The area immediately around the school bus driver is particularly hostile: the gearshift and steering wheel- have the potential to inflict serious injury.

Toprevent frontrow passengersfrom beingthrown into this hostile environment, Federal standards mandate a restraining barrier, sometimes called a modesty panel, to be installed on a school bus with. a GVWR More:than 10,000 pounds. These restraining barriers are to serve the same function as seatbacks: to provide a form of built-in crash protection calledcompartmentalization. _

A compartment is formed by the occupant's own seat and the back of the seat directly in-front; the seats are required to cushion the passenger's body in a crash by "giving". in a controlled deformation and are required to remain firmly attached to the floor and sidewall. -for occupants of front seats, a restrainino barrier is substituted for the back -of a seat in front. The barrier must meei the same requirements as seatbacks; that is, 'have the same spacing and dimensions and the same performance requirements- under testingconditions.Specified in the standard.

Compartmentalization has-been required on all Type B, C, and D school. buses manufactured since April 1, 1977. Becausecompartmentalization is supposed to provide the craih protection needed by passenrrs, these buses are not required by Federal regulations-to have lapbelts installed.

At least.a lapbelt, however,is required to be installed by the vehicle manufacturer__ at every seating position in_Type_ A school buses. Compartmentalization is not required on Type A schoolbuses, and- hence is incomplete orlacking on. manyTypeA school buses. According to Federal standards,for example,a restraining barrier is not required in front of the first row seats. Seatbacks must meet the same requirements for height and head impact protection zone as do larger school buses, but there is no restriction on the maximum amount of space between seats._

In contrast, Canadian school bus safety standards -requirethat allschool buses, regardless of size,meet the same compartmentalization standard's. All school buses must have front seat restraining barriers installedthat meet all therequirements for seatbacks--padding,dimensions, and forwarddeflection performance. Occupant crash protection on all school buies is provided entirely by-means of compartmenttlization, and seatbelts far passengers are not required on any size schoolbus.b

The result of the U.S.standard is that front seat occupants of Type A school buses have little, if any, built-in crash protection. Some Type A schocl buses have no frontal restraining barriers. Some manufacturers provide one or morebarriers," but without Federal standards, the barriers-canvary in height, width, padding (or have no padding at all), and attachment strength.

passengers. Crash tests conducted for 25 Canada does not rvcomond that tapbetts be &stetted for sitesofschool Transport Canadain 1984 end 1986 suggestthat lopbelt use by passengers, in ell buses. increases the chance of head injuries (transport Canada 1983; Davis IngineeringLimited 1966). i

26 Restraining barriers are required by many States am: ere-written into their school brJ5specifications.

43 4

buses provided a The -Safety Board's19 cases involving Type A school Some buses had only one barrier, on the right variety of barrier configurations. the driver's side; pasmngers seated inthe left front row faced directly into had barriers on both sides of theaisle. Barrie.s seatback." Other buses the same bus: some werefree differed widelyin design, sometimes even on standing, others had stanchionsreaching to the ceiling, still others consisted and stanchion only. Barriers also differed in the amount and of a guardrail the lower location of padding (some werenot padded, others were padded only on portion of the barrier or onthe guardrail only), and in size andShape (some The presence of barriers were narrower andlower than theseats)48._(fig. 6). such_ objects directly infront of a seated passenger--either unrestrained or lapbelted--can present a hazard (anddid in some of the accidents investigated for this study).

Crash Performance-nf-Barriers

Conseouences of barrierdesinn,--Data are available in the case summaries in appendix B of the injury outcomefor 47 front Seat occupants of-Type A school is most crucial when frontal impact is buses. The design of the frontal barrier involved because this iSithecrash configuration during which the body of tt!e passenger in the front seatwill most likely interact with the barrier. This study_provided data on the body movementsand injuries-sustained by 30 passengers seated in the front rows.of TypeA school buses in accidents where frontal impact 11 wer: was the principal event:.0f these passengers,19 were restrained, and were unrestrained and unrestrained.v In only one accident (case 17) restrained passengers seated next to oneanother on the same front seat. Thus, other than in this case,the-Safety Board -wras not able to compare directly the experience of lapbelted versusunrestrainedpassengers on the same front seat regarding _interaction with the barrier. .

When frontal barriees were present inType A school buses, their design and placement allowed closed headinjuries, sometimes of a serious nature, to occur in frontal crashes.J0 to both lapbelted and unrestrained passengers Furthermore, when barriers were notpresent, unrestrained front row passengers sustaining were thrown intothe driver's seatback or into the front of the bus, design of the injuries. Appendix C indicates the cases in which the absence or restraining barrier was a factor in occupantinjuries.

The recent school bus study issuedby the Transportation Research Board estimated that only twoto threepassengers are killed annually while riding on a small school bus(Transportation Research Board, National Research Council data forsix fatally 1989) (appendix L). The Safety Board's study presents of whom were being injured passengers of small school vehicles,only two transported by school buses built toFederal school bus standards. Both of these fatalities occurred on a Type A schoolbus and both involved interactioa with a frontal restraining barrier. Details of the accident follow.

would hove to meet porforaerce recuirervvIts for the hese 27 Insuch a case, the driver's seetbare protecticm cone. al,'srsa: hvots tworestrairdho barriers, lee barriers wereOr 28 In sontype II school buses with (Case 16, for example).

29Restraints included triptelts and chi'd safety coats. in :the United States,comi even ore. 18 Closed heed injuryis the most cannon sOriOUti neurolosic disorder (Fisher MSS).- or moderate heed trauma CAM causeIone.lastino symptoms

4 4 35

Figure 6.--The types of restraining barriers found in Type A school buses vary widely. Note the exposed bolts'in the top photograph (case 3),and exposed metal guardrailnear wall anchor in the bottom photograph (case 5). Both lapbelted and unrestrained passengers seated directly behind these barriers received facial and head injuries. .1...j,I7,

Both fatalities_occlirred in the same accident_(case 17). A lapbelted and an unrestrained passenger-31 were seated next to one anothu ',I the right front row, facing an abbreviated restrainingbarrier, which consisted of onlya metal .panel surrounded by a lightly padded, tubular steel frame. The barrier was abcla 9 inches away-from the seat and was considerably lower and narrower than the seat it faced. The barrier measured 29 1/2 inches from the floor;the.seatback was 41 1/2 inches from the fioor.The barrier was 28 inches wide; theseat was -39 inches wide, A barrier so designed would not meet Federal standards forlarge_ school buses.J4

The smallschool bus had been slowly climbing a hill when 'it Wasstruck head-on by an out-of-control truck that was overturning atan estimated Speed of .40 mph. The buS was struck again on its left side as the truckrotated (fig. 7). During the crash, a 7-year-oldin the front seat bythe right window jackknifed over-his lapbelt and_struck the_left side of his headand neck- on the tubular frame of the modesty panel. He sustained maximum -(AIS 6) -injuries, -including a lacerated larynx, a fractured and dislocated ceriicalspine, crushed spinal cord, and brain hemorrhage. He died instantly:A 17=Year-old boy .in the center front' seat received critical (AIS 5) injuries, includinga head injury and fractured- left femur 4nd right-tibia. He -died- severaldays later. This -pasSenger-was found inthe stairwell by rescuers; _Safety Board investigatorsdetermined that he had struck the left side of the restraining-barrier nhile moving forward and to his left, catching his right legon the abbreviated barrier and pivoting around it. The barrier.could not.contain him.He then continued forward into the boarding door control, fracturing tis leftfemur, and into the windshield header, where he sustained a-fatal head injury (fig.8).

The school bus also had a restraining barrier ontheleft side, of different design. It had no panel but only a lightly paddedstanchion post and horluintil bar, level WTth ttee-top of the drivie's seatback. An urii'iitrained 3- year-old sitting directly behind the-driver was propelledagainst the driver's seatback duringthe crash and- was found lying onthefloor underneath the driver's seat following the crash. Fortunately, the child received onlyminor injuries.

Case 17 was the only accident investigated by the SafetyBoard in which the designof therestrainingbarrier contributed to fatal injuries. However, survivors in other cases were injured by interaction with thebarrier as well. For example, the design of an abbreviated restrainingbarrier on the right side of the Type A school bus in case 15 may have allowedan unrestrained adult aide

31 throurtout this report, discussim is based onthe restraintstatus and body movements of studentsas injured determined bYthe Safety 'Ward investigators. Restraint statusfrequently differed from that reportedby police and themedia. For eamadle, in case 17, one of thefatally injured polmoneerso originally reported in official account, es unbelted, was determined by the Safety bard as restrained. The rorifor reported lactait.induced bruises On t%4 ViCtiMVS pelvis. In addition, this fatlly injured 7year old wits reported W media as being foind in the stairwell; 4 was actually foundseated In a bench seat, restrained by his tactett.

12 Restraining barriersin Types 5,C, and 0 school Wanare required to be equal to, orlarger, than tme facing seat. 37

Figure 7.--Damage to the small school busin case 17 was mainly to the left front, yet the fatally injured passengers wereseated on the right. Passengers on the left side receivedminoror- no injuries; restraint status -did not- influence the injury outcome for passengers on the left side.

Figure8.--Artist'ssketchof body movementsof thetwo fatally injured passengers in case 17 at the moment of initial

47 38

to sustain a fracturedpelvis. Likethe 17-year-old boy in case 17, the driver's aide was found in the stairwell followingthe crash.- A metal panel, framed by lightly padded tubular steel, was positionedbetween the right front seat and the stairwell, but it did not extendfar enough toprevent the unrestrained aide, seated on the aisle seat of the rightfront row, from being thrown forward during the frontal impact. She struck the boardingdoor control and fell into the stairwell.

Risk of head iniurv,--In the Safety Board'scases, lapbelted passengers appeared to be at risk of more serious head injuries frombarrier contact than did unrestrained passengers. . This finding is consistent with thecrash dynamici for-a lapbelted passenger versus an unbelted passenger in a frontal crash. In a frontal crash, the lapbelted passenger, restrained bythe belt around the pelvis, will pivotforward, striking the barrier with head or neck as heor she -jackknifes forward. In contrast,th-e--wholebock:, of an unrestrainedpassenger would move forward and impact the barrier. In general; when forces ofimpact are spread out- rather than concentrated on onearea of the body,they are less injurious.

In addition to the fatal head injury incase 17, nonfatal head injuries were also sustained by lapbelted passengers in Type A schoolbuses involved in frontal crashes. Examples follow:

Case 15. A lapbelted 5-year-old passenger seatedin the right front row, by the window, sustained a serious (AIS 3) closed headinjury, and contusions to his forehead and left side of face from contIct with the restraining barrier. lie jackknifed into the abbreviated barrier in front of himwhen the small school bus struck a passenger car with its left front,at an estimated speed of 50 mph (fig. 9).- Alapbelted 5-year-old--passengerseated--on the left front r-ai sustained moderate (A15-2) closed head injury, probablyfrom contact with the driver's seat back; no barrier was present.

Case 12. Both restraining barriers were closer insize and appearance to_ the type of barriers in large school buses, but onlyan inch of styrofoam padding 'covered the wooden frame on the side facing thepassengers. When the school van struck a.fixed object head-on (21.7 mph Delta V) and then rolled onto its side,a 5-year-old lapbelted passenger seated onthe aislein theright frontrow jackknifed forward and struck the barrier, sustaininga moderate concussion. This injury was the worst sustained byany passenger, restrained or unrestrained. in the van. A lapbelted passenger seated next to him,by the window, received abrasions and contusions to his head, andone of the two lapbelted passengers in the left front row also sustained minor headinjuries from contact with the barrier.

Case F. When the school van, traveling29 mph, struck apassenger car head-on, the two lapbelted passengers,ages 10 and 11,in the right front seat pivoted forward and hit the lightly padded crossbarof thebarrier. The barrier consisted of a panel supported by stanchion 4nd crossbars (see figure 6). -One pssenger received a concussion, zeld the other, a closed headinjury.

In still other accidents, lapbelted andunrestrained passengers sustained minor head and facial injuries from contact with therestraining barriers. Most involved minor crash forces, as in.case 3 (DeltaV 9.5 mph).

48 39

Figure 9.--This abbreviated restraining barrier was on the right side of the Type A school bus in case 15. No barrier was on the left side. The passenger seated behind the barrier next tothe window sustained a serious concussion when he jackknifed over his lapbelt, striking his head on the barrier. The unrestrained passenger seated next to him on the aisle was not contained by the short barrier and was flung forward, fracturing his pelvis.

Cioadiah crash tests on risk of head iniurv.--Crash tests conducted for Transport Canada also suggest that lapbelted passengers seated behirid-.--a restrainIng barrier, regardless of whether it meets large schoOl bus stahdards.or not, would be at increased risk ofhead injury- compared to unrestrained passengers in the same vehicle (TransportCanada 1985; Davis Engineering Limited 1986). The 1984tests used three different sizes of school buses_ in30-mph frontal crashes. Lapbelted anthromorphic dummies registered higher head injury scores (usuallythree times higher)than unbelted dummies, especially on the smaller school vehicles. The difference was particuarly marked for anthromorphic dummies in thefrontrow, the positions that had restraining barriers facing them. (Because the tests used Canadian buses, the restraining barriers on small buses also metthesame standards for barriers inlarge schoolbuses.) The lapbelted anthropomorphic dummies also showed severe rearward neck flexure after striking the seatbacks or restraining barriers with their heads.

49 40

Two of the three school vehiclestested- were Type A school buses.The lapbelted anthropomorphic dummy in the frontrow of the Type A school van (mg of 2,016 compared to 369 for conversion registered a head injury criteria In the Type A small school the unbelted anthropomorphicdummy next to it.3.5 bus, the lapbelted anthropomorphicdummy in the front seat measured a HIC of 2,505 compared to 893 for theunbelted anthropomorphic dummy (fig. 10).

Almost all of the crashes investigatedby the Safety Board involving Type A school vehicles were probably lowerin severity than those in the Canadian crash a whole do suggest that lapbelted tests, but the accident investigations as of head injury from contact with a passengersin the front seat run the risk restraining barrier.

Anchorage strength for restrainingbarriers.--In the Transport Canada crash tests, researchers documentedthat the frontal barriers in Type A school bum tore loose from their anchorages orbecame dislodged (Transport Canada 1985).44 In the Safety Board's study onsmall school buses, this occurred in cases 7, 10, The-anchor points of restraining barriersin Type A 16, and 17 (fig. 11). school buses in the United Statesdo not have to meet any Federal performance standards. head injuries potentially have Criteriafor head orotection.--Because development, the serious consequences on a child's cognitive and behavioral Federal Government has establishedperformance requirements for passenger head and face protection as they pertainto school bus seats and restraining barriers. These requirements are written inFMVSS 222 and apply to allsizes of school buses. Hence, front seat passengersof Type A school buses in the Safety Board's study faced barriers that satisfiedFederal head protection requirements.

The standard head protection testconsists.of a_head form device_weighing "contactable surface" within the "head protection 11 1/2 pounds striking any zone" at one of two specifiedvelocities for impact.(See figure 12 for the dimensions of this zone. The sidewall, window, and door structure are excluded from the head protection zone.) At the high impact velocity (22 feet per second, close to Delta V 15 mph), thedeceleration of the center of gravity must be such that the HIC value is less than 1,000.

experiences during the crash. It doei.not minute injury to 33 NIC Is a treasure of the forces the head The higher the NIG score, the greater the lIkellhcod of serious orfatal the neck or 'facial laceration. primed with automatic restraints not exceed a NIC of injuries. The federal Government requires that cars individJals, however, have a wide range of tolerance to injury.Consequently, 1,000In 10 sich crash tests. results and roctuelinjuries,there is no single cutoff althoughthere are relationships between dungy test indicate a higher potential risk end lower scores indicate paintfor serious injury or death. Nigher scores even a moderate head Injury can have long-tern effects on memiory and lower potentialrisk. In addition, learning ability.

in the tests contacted the forward restralnins 34 The anthropomorphicdump, in the school van used floor, and the dunst was then hurled forward into dottier,the barrier's nchorege baits pulled out of the the dash and windshield, and came to rest in the stairwell.Transport Canada concluded the dewy would hes, been ccntained within the seating coqdartment had the barrier notpulled lcose from its anchors.

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IOC smart of Its foocoo foo hood expo/lento &fog the four%If doss not mastwoSlopto IN no* or facial loom sig.,. Too otter Ow MC Wore. Mt rooter Itop IsIIIItco2 of *Mow of fst1 10ArIsA ma rotloyol gowasnt IggArag (MI eon pooped oltn saosoIII rootestoto not .zcuda NIC of 3,000 I. 10 oto0 Mon tests.H000.ot. Indmnfluolo novo I Wm* ro of totoranot la 114507. C0r0omsat1T. oltfonett thofs reshonetign Mows dummy 1st reou1Iaid &flu& topes.. Ono is no sir setoff postI fortomoinHatry Ocala Alear worm .4Ic.1.I Meow pal onnal HO end loom irdiallieslows. potoollal of*. Chan doubloons, 140 *ammo of the osamI of forst Ow bolted Amart Smoot ttporionets Artss Hs ono Import. Mew Mmot tWoolorolist loaf indleoto Hot It la man Inlay Ihilt Ofttipsoto dl saists iftslowi MII/M1 tillinakThe Icor* s Oren s rforItatIcmat snits (WM. Cato ow/Wed silt otHostotA NIPUSIMS MISS net illfM41 OS Ot in Os 30 mph coMplIallaiP NO&

) Figure10.--Summary of Transport Canada 1984 frontal crash

, tests involving Type A school buses. (Adapted from Transport

! Canada 1985.)

51 42

Figure 11.--A sharp projectile was exposed (arrow) when the anchor point for a restraining barrier in the Type A school van separated (case 10). No unrestrained passenger, fortunately,struckthearea of the roof during the 2700 rollover (10 of the 11 passengers were not using the available lapbelts at the time of the crash).

,000

1 1 HEAL, :RPOTECrION1 ZONE 1 1 SOW

1 LEG PROTECTION tsf....56m ZONE

ff555.5.0114,5affoaf)fell

Figure 12.--The dimensions of the head and.leg protection zones apply to all sizes of school buses.

52 -43

A study ddne for Transport Canada,however, indicates that the validity of this criterion is questionable(St. Laurent 1983). Earlier research, in 1979, reported on tests in which prestandardschool bus seats with and without any extra padding were struck ina manner conforming to the test requirementsof metal crossbar also produced results FMVSS 222. All impacts directly against the of HIC values less than 1,000. The Safety Board believes the head protection criteria may need to be revised.

tack of criteria for thorax orabdominal iniurv.--In contrast to head injuries, the Federal Governmentcurrently has no criteria for abdominal, spinal, know what the thresholds for these or thoraxinjuries. Researchers donot injuries are; that is, how muchforce and at what duration to these regions of The Hybrid III dummy can the body willresult in serious or fatalinjuries. measure thoraic forces,but what it means in terms of human injury is unknown. No dummy currently has been-approvedby the Federal Governmentfor recording appropriate anthromorphic dummies and injury abdominal pressure. The lack of criteria hampers researchers indiscussion of neck, spinal, and abaomen injuries in relationship to lapbelt useand barrier design. For example, the fatal neck injury sustained by the lapbelted.passengerin case 17 probably could not have the Canadian crash testsdidnot beenpredictedfrom available V crash data: measure thoraic forces.

One manufacturer,Thomas Built Buses, has conducted a series of crash tests using a Type A school bus thatsuggest lapbelts on small school buses may have the potential to inflictserious abdominal injuries, whereas lap/shoulder belts do not. In May 1986, Calspan, the companyThomas contracted to conduct the tests, crashed a 1986 Minotourbus into a frontal barrier at about 30 mph.- In this test, two 6-year-old dummiesand one 5th-percentile adult dummy were used. One of the 6-year-old dummies wassecured only by a lapbelt;_the other 6-year-old dummy and the adult dummy weresecured by lap/shoulder belts. road cells were placed on the belts to record the forcesexerted on the abdomen and pelvis.

On the 6-year-old dummy wearing thelaphelt only, tension forces in the lapbelt during the crash translated into"direct lap abdominal total pressures of 1,768 pounds at peak and in excessof 1,200 pounds on the lap or abdomen for a (Calspan 1986). For coMparison, significanttime period" according _to Calspan the director of engineering forThomas Built Buses Offered an auto investigation involving a 128-pound adult female inwhich 1,573 pounds of abdominal pressure resulted in injuries which included tearingof the liver and lacerations of the the lap/shoulder belt, colon (Cesari and Ramet 1979). The dummywearing translated into "lap registered much lower belt forces. The belt forces abdominal pressure 44G at peak and above300 pounds for a significant period of time."

In the Safety Board's cases involvingschool buses built to Federal cchool sustained more thana minor abdominal busstandards, no lapbelted passenger injury from the lapbelt. This was not the case, however, in the few accidents involving school vehicles not built toFederal school bus standards investigated as part of this study. These accidents were all of greater crash -severity-than those involving school buses built toFederal standards. It may be that higher crash forces, tnot the difference invehicle configuration, were responsible for Cases are too limited in the lapbelt-induced abdominalandspinalinjuries. number to draw conclusions. The crash test conducted for Thomas Built Buses using a Type A school bus withabdominal sensor on the belted anthromorphic dummy suggests that further testingis needed.

53 44

Possible Solutions to the Problem of Restraining BarrierDesign

The interior (that is, theseating design) of a small schoolbusmust provide crash protection to both lapbelted and unrestrainedpassengers. A basic problem occurs, however: many approaches to amelioratethe chance of more-than- minor held injuries sustained by lapbelted passengers frominteraction with the restraining (or barrier seatbacks) appear to compromise or negate the compartmentalizationthat protectsunrestrainedpassengers. Someoptions to resolve this problemappear more promising than others; a variety of approaches appear below.

Removal of restraining barrier.--Although removing thebarrier may appear, at first glance, to be the easiest solution, the Safety Boarddoes not consider this an option. Unrestrained passengers need a barrier for crashprotection, and there will be unrestrainedpassengers in small school buses despite the --availability of seatbelts; Some passengers in.the front rows willnot-wear the available lapbelts or the lapbelts may be vandalized. In case 4, for example, an unrestrained passenger seated in the left front rowwas thrown forward-into the stairwell, fracturing his leg. The school van had no restrainingbarriers and the lapbelt at his-seating position haa been vandalizedby students and was inoperable. This accident occurred in California, butdata from New York and other States suggest that vandalism is not an isolated occurrence.35

If a school district has school buses without frnntal restraining barriers in its fleet, it is imperative that district personnelensure that front seat passengers wear the available seatbelts. School bus drivers an? aidesshould place special emphasis on the need for frontseat passengers to oe restrained whenever the bus is in motion; the lapbelt is theironly crash protection. - _ -

Redesign of barrier.--The 1984 Canadian crashtests suggest that merely requiring the restraining barriers in Type A smallschool buses to meet thesame standards required for restraining barriers in largerschool buses (essentially the same performance and design requirementsas for seatback) will pot suffice. Lapbeltedpassengers sustainedunacceptable head -injury scores. The Sofety Board's accidents involving Type B school buses donot shed light on the problem. The Safety Board investigated only five accidentsinvolving Type B school buses, smallschoolbuses built to standards for large schoolbuses and hence have restraining barriers identical to those found in large school buses. The small number of accidents, only two of which did notinvolve rollover, did not yield data for comparison. The design of the restraining barrier, in terms of crash consequences for lapbelted passengers, will be most crucialin a frontal crash because of the "jackknifing" reaction of lapbeltedpassengers.

Changes in Spacing. Changes in seat spacingconceivably would lessen the possibility of harmful interaction for lapbelted passengers, but compartmentalization, which relies on closely spacedseats anddirely spaced restraining barriers to provide built-in protection to unrestrainedpassengers, could be compromised. It is not clear by how muchdistance the spacing could-be increased.

1, 35 Fairfax County, Yiroinie, for example, reported the yandalization of seatbelts and the theft as a major problem: of buckles "Hindreds of belts have already boon replaced, oyer 500 in.the lasttwo months alone." (Letter froe C. Fronk Dixon, Directorof transportation 1eryices, Fairfax County Publ;cSchoolsto the' Transportation Research Board, October 2, 1987.) 54 '7Cr

Increasing seat spacingto 40 inches, as Department of Transportation originally proposed bythe (DOT) for use withlapbelts and suggested studies as the minimumspacing needed for lapbelted by some would negate the passengers on a school bus, protection compartmentalization passengers. provides to unrestrained Increasing the seat spacingby smaller increments, of maintaining compartmentalization, with the intent may also not amelioratethe problem. 1984 Canadian crash testsexperimented with various The seat spacing (20, 26, and 27 1/2 inches), butfound that in allpractical 21, 24, passengers still susta:ned higher and seat spacing, lapbelted unacceptable head injuryscores than did unrestrained passengers (TransportCanada 1985).

_ The relevancy of the _ . Canadian school-bus crashtestshave been criticized, and dismissed bysome, on several grounds, including the facts thatthe did not use a Hybrid IIIanthromorphic dummy with tests that researchers used the its greater biofidelityand adult Head InjuryCriterion (HIC) of threshold forserious 1,000as-the and above _head injuries. The comfortable dismissing the Safety Board is not Canadian test resultson these grounds.

The anthromorphic dummyused in the Canadian testswas a facsimile of student bodies,and the type of-dummy reasonable used in U.S. car crash was.similar to thosecurrently tests. The Hybrid III dummyis currently certifying compliance with an option only in FMVSS 208; no date hasbeen set by which III must be the standarddummy. the Hybrid

No Hybrid III dummiesapproximating a school-age by DOT for compliance child have beenaccepted testing; scaled-down adultdummies are used adult female dummiesare used because they have body (5th-percentile child; that is, top heavy). mass apportionment closerto

. Critics of the Canadian tests have suggested thata H1C of 2,000, instead of 1,000, would have beenmore reasonable for children Board (Transportation Research 1989). The U.S. Governmentcurrently uses threshhold in its testing of a HIC of1,000as injury child safety seats andin all occupant tests. Thereis no agreement as towhat protection a suitable HIC forchildren may be because children have thresholdsto head injury that to age (Dejeammes and others vary dramatically according 1984, Foust and others1977, Snyder 1969, others 1977, StUrtz 1980). Allowing Snyder and a higherHIC than 1,000 potentially fatalconsequences to teenage could have passengerswho have adult tolerances; adult aides on board schoolbuses also would be Safety Board also notes at risk of headinjury.The that New lork--the onlyState to mandate that buses, regardless of size, all school be equipped with lapbeltsfor passengers--has extra padding in the seatssuch that when tested, required lower, not higher, threshold. the HIC must notexceed 800, a

Increased Padding. Additional padding on restraining barriers(and seats) may ameliorate chances of head injury. What thickness, material, padding and location of is necessary is not clear. In1986 tests for Transport thickrcss of energy absorbingfoam in the head Canada, the impact area was increasedto see if increased padding wouldreduce the severity of head impacts forlapbelted passengers (Transport Canada 1987). Two foam densities energy absorbing foam was used around were used: a denser, high the seat frame, anda less dense foam between the inner foam and seatbackupholstery. The extra foamwas localized at the top of the seat and partway down the back.

1 (S- 4.sierfeL*0:-. roz-Tty.

The performance of thesecontoured paddedseatbacks was tested using instrument-equipped lapbelted anthomorphic dummies (5th-percentile adultfemale aummies).Head-on and oblique sled tests were conducted at30 mph. The HIC results were essentially the same for the standard, unaltered seatback(Transport Canada 1987) (fig. 13).

Less Aggressive Barrier. Another possibleapproach to reducing head injuries from interaction with a barrier is to design the barrierto be more "forgiving"--that is, to deform more readily when struck. Research ;s necessary to determine if this approach has promise. The 1986 Canadian sled tf:sts testeda less aggressive seatback in combination with a lapbelted anthromophic-dummyand found the HIC remained essentially the same (Transport Canada1987) (see figure 13). (Peak head acceleration was, however, substantially lower and chest acceleration alco somewhat lower than for the unaltered seat.-)

Height.Height of the barrieris another factor_that needsto bere- examined. Perhaps the barrier must be 28inches from the Seating Reference Point; certainly it should not be lower in height than the seat itfaces, as some frontal barriers were in the Safety Board's cases.

Examination of Entire Seating System.The entire seating system must be examined as a unit to provide maximum protection for a passenger. The TransportationResearchBoardstudy (Transportation Research Board, National Research Council 1989) summarized the problem as follows:

Any attempt to characterize the safety of school bus seatsby a single factor (e.g.,seat back height or seat spacing) is overly simplistic.

FMVSS 222, as now written,does notappear to provide thesame level of protectionfor passengers in the front seats on a Type A school bus as it provides for passengers in the front seats on larger schoolbus (Types B, C, and D). This holds true whether the passenger is lapbeltedor unrestrained. The 1984 and 1986 Canadian tests- suggest to the Safety Boardthat allaspects of restraining barriers--location, size, spacing, -and anchoragestrength--should be reconsidered in light of their interaction with the bodymovements of lapbeltedpassengers (see figures 10 and 13).

Research clearly is needed to determine the optimum designof restraining barriersin Type A schoolbuses. In the meantime,if school districts order small school buses with barriers, they are advised to orderbuses with barriers more closely approximating those currently installedin a larger school bus. These barriers probably provide protection superior to theexposed metal rail, poorly padded, or abbreviated barriers seen in the SafetyBoard's cases. Restraining barriers also should be provided for both the leftand right front seats.

installatton of Lap/Shoulder 8,e1 ts,--Installation of lap/shoulderbelts, instead of lapbelts, for passengers in the front row, or at all seating positions, would immediately lesen the chance of inj!:rious headcontact with the barrier or seatback,regardles of seating design. 1.4/shoulder belts provide upper torso restraint that lapbOlts do not;A lap/shoOder-belted passenger will not jackknife forward in a frontal crash: the upper body is restrained. Lap/shoulder belt use would also lessen the chance of abdominal injury'compared to lapbelt use, because the restraining force i-s*c.Spread lout over a-largerportion of the body.

I 56 47

HVAI, Aaa, Cifc5T A:.:':ELEPATIOV5 V41,F,

HEAD GU IMPACT OBLIWE 1N2'ACT SEAT- SEkIES Rt,e,itant Pent.11t411t ResJltent. Resultent

. Peek Neal Peek Chest Peak Need - Peak Che t hccel (9) H1C Accel (9) Accel (g) NIC Accel.(g)

---Unaltered 199.8 . 1116.6- 58.9 227.6 .1181.4 79.9

Contoured 200.4 1082.0 71.6** 92.1 1154.9 64 2 Padded

Less 114.9 1077.8 49.6 145.4' 1423.8 65.0 Aggressive

RP4CW4f4 V1.1 275.6 15.1 54.8 309.2 35,4 Pecing

nrIepOint '50.2* '624:0 69.1 88.5* 117.6 72.2"

Nulti po(nt 144.3 * 558.8 6,-3" 217.7* 8)4.5 64.7**

.11otes PeakSCCIEratilin OCCJra6n.oecos.dar2 (4411ct. " Value ex-carded 60 9 for loofa than 3 01111awconds.

MAX1/8Jft BEAT BELT WADS. Ms/

HEAD ON 1NPAST 30* 061.10UE 172AC7 SEAT SERIES L'efi 'Right Left 'Right-Left-Plght --Left Right Lep LapShourler Shoulder Lap Lep Shouller Shoulder

t:nellered 1967 1953 2070 2221 -'

Contoured 2126 1296 -2608 1838 Padded

Less 1505 1501 20)0-1626 -499resslvir

P 44444 i4 35 76 116- 143- facing

Throe- . .1/10 1)24 1147 2257 1274 0/4 Point

Nut ti- 1273 1661 724 840 1524 1710 416 1163 Point

21AAInum nowt 3. oOd4

HEAD ON IMPACT- 20. 06L1,1161.111X7 _ SEAT SEPIES Left reear Pight ?vow' Loft Peso Sight resor

toed (10s) Lned (ltoe) . _Lc:41 Loed ilus) ------Une1tered 217 334 21) 5$8 Contowel 714 155; 831 708' Padded

LA4i5 894 leh; R69 441 Agirassive

Peerweri Olfi 522 113 )1! feCtng

'Inf.. Posnt 2250 14:6 Uhl 349

. Multi Point 2224 2282. 1647 508

Figure 13.--Results of Transport Canada 1986 sled tests. (Source: Transport Canada 1987.) 48

Rulemaking is underway that may result in lap/shoulderhelts being available for certain- school bus passengers.In response to the Safety %oard's lapbelt study (National Transportation Safety Board 19e6), the NationalHicjhway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has issuea anAdvance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to -require lap/shoulder belts at all outboardseating positions in passenger vehicles.This requirement would include Type A schoolbuses. 'The Safety Board is Pleased that rulemaking is underway. If lap/shoulder belts are _installed and used, some of the danger of interactinj with school bus restraining barriers (and seatbacks) will be lessened for window seat passengers.Passengers_ sitting in the middle or the aisle positions,however, will still have only a lapbelt available.

Research it needed to explore whether it is technically feasible tointtall lap/shoulder belts at all seating positions. It may be that currentFederal standards mandating school bus seat design, seatbelt anchorageand installation, and school bus joint strengthWill have to-be somewhatmodified to permit Instal- lationof- lap/shoulderbelts. Certain questions will havetobe -answered,

Where can-the shOulder harness bernounted?

If the shoulder harness must be-attached.- -to the seatframe, can added padding compensate for the increased "stiffness" of the frame Canadian researchers and U.S. manufacturers believe will-be necessary?

Can proper geometry ofr._the shoulder _beltattachment points be maintained?

-Will bus-seating capacity be altered?

Multipoint restraining systems;-that is.four- or five-point harnesses--do not, at first glance, appear to be sultable alternatives to lap/shoulder belts in terms of restraint for able-bodied passengers. Installation eroblems w,uld exist and passengers may be less likely to use the restraint becJuseharnesses can be cumbersome and difficult to put6n and adjust.properly._ Transport Canada :reported instances of submarining out of .four-point.harriess systems .during its 1986 sled tests of different seating concepts in_frontal and oblique (30 degrees from head-on) impacts(Transport Canada 1987). A new develoOment, a form of restraining bar manufactured by Transportation Equipment Corp., Offers promise. .The chest-high padded restraining bar functions as a "mechanical air bag" .and appearsto offer 4ncreased protection against headinjury for lapbelted and unrestrained passengers.in a frontal crash.

Rear-facing seats.--Rear-facing seas, perhaps with slightly.more padding and higher seatbacksthan currently mandated by U.S. or Canadianstandards, appear to be a promising solution (..; problem of providing crash protection to both lapbelted and unrestrain-..F. paslengers. In a frontal crash,lapOelted and unrestrained passengers in rear-facing, seats would accelerate backward at initial impact into the seatback, -absorbing crashforces overtheir entireback. Although lapbelted passengers might experience head contact with the seatback in front of them on rebound, this forceis considerably less thanthe initial impact.

58 49

No revision in Federal standards would be necessary to implementthis option. Small school buses --(GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less), .unlike larger school buses, arenot required--to have forward-facingseats. Therefore,States and school_districts can order Type A school buses with rear-facing seats, either throughout the bus -or for front rows only. Furthermore, because Federal standardsset the minimum requirements only,seats can be ordered thathave higher seatbacks or more padding than currently mandated.

The 1986 Canadian sled tests showed a substantial reduction for rear-facing seats in all recorded injury criteria compared to the standard, unaltered school bus seat (Transport Canada 1987)(see figure 13). Indeed,head injury scores were very low (a HIC of about 300), below.all other test conditions.

Partly from the results of these sled tests, the Canadian government began' a demonstration program that involved:three school buses.equipped with rear- facing seats. The buses were operated in four 'cities-during the 1987-88 _school *year.- Each school district using the buses was asked to record acceptance of, and attitudes -toward, the rear-facing seats,- as well-:as other pertinent information from students or parents.that might aidin the evaluation of the system. The published findings-from these,fieldAests are mot.yet available. .

Discussions with representatives of Transport Canada Indicate-that thetwo- major concernsassociated withrear-facing seatsmotion sicknessand pupil management--did not become major problems. Although some of the older children complained of motion sickness whenriding in rear=fatingseats, the younger children did not, which suggested that rear4acing seats might be phasedinto school bus fleets beginning_with buses serving elementary grades.

Summary

This study cannot provide a clear answer for how to resolve the restraining

barrier problem. Theaccidents investigated for thisstudy document that a problem exists in Type A school buses, but they do not provide enough datafor the solution. A case study provides accurate and comprehensive dataon each case in contrast to other data sources. However, because of the limited number -of cses and many variablesthat influenceinjury outcome(for-example, crash configuration and severity, barrier design, restraint status, seating position, passenger size and age), a case studycannot isolate the variables. All variables interact to influence injury outcome.

For example, this report provided data on 19 accidents involving Type.A school buses. Limited data oo the relationship between restraining bbrriersand injuries becameavailable. Some of these vehicles had nofrontal barriers: others had only one. If two barriers were present within the vehicle, they often varied widelyin design. Barriers differedin configuration,height, width, spacing from the front seat, and amount of padding.The front seat aten is not the first choice of student passengers as a desired seating position, so few passengers faced the restraining barrier. Even if the Safety Board continued to conduct in-depth investigations of TypeA school bus accidents, the lack ofdata would persist.

59 ;444

the State or Federallevel willnot Accident data files maintained at restraint and injury status provide.needed data. Aside from the inaccuracies of position (hence, the noted inthisreport,such files do not record seating researcr- has no way ofknowing what passengers were seated inthe front rows), .Without tracing nor do they recordwhether the school bus was a'Type A vehicle. (VIN); a researcher cannot know what type of the Vehicle Identification-Number frontal barrier, if any, waspresent in the bus. Even determining the make and and model of the small school buswill not reveal this information because States small school buses with custom options;for localsr.hool districts often order example, a specific type offrontal barrier.

Hence, the Safety Biaardbelieves that the NHTSA should conduct research to injuries to determine the relationshipbetween restraining barrier design and should focus- unrestrained and lapbelted passengersof different sizes. Research the on-the height, width, location,and anchorage.strength of the 'barrier, and seats. (Resultant datashould help _spacing between the barrierandfront determine the-optimum designfor seating throughout the bUs.)

Computer simulation may be needed-to manipulate the many variables that _influence injury outcome. Researchers- will--be. hindered-by the-lack of accurate instrument-equfpped real world injury -dataand datafrom crashtests using anthromorphic dummies on which tomodel injury outcome. However, variables such and size can as barrier spacing,height and width, and passenger restraint status he easily manipulated in computersimulation.

Little crash test data areavailable for poststandard school buses of any . The Safety Board acknowledgesthe high cost of conducting full-scale bus size. Sled tsts offer a crash tests using instrument-equippedanthromophic dummies. _less costly_ alternative and. an.opportunityto test whatever barrier design in any sled tests-- appears most promising. HybridIII dummies should be-O-Sed bioffdelity, and force readingsshould conducted to provide state-of-the-art include thorox and abdominal loadingin addition to HIC-, Oest acceleration, and femur loading. Test results caninfluence future rulemaking on occupant seating and crash protection for allsizes of school buses.

The Safety Board also believesthat NHTSA should determine the- feasibility of installingsome form -ofrestraint that provides upper tOrso restraint on Type A schOcl buses schoolbuses. Current Federal regulations applicable to require that at least a lapbelt beprovided for_each passenger, and other Federal guidelines state.that these beltsshould be worn. If student passengers must be the superior protection afforded by a belted, they should have the option of that providesupper torso lap/shoulderbelt oranother form ofrestraint order large school buses.with. protection. If States and school-districts wish to restraint systems, they also shouldbe able to provide upper torso restraints. finally, if lapbelts prove to bethe only seatbelt system that can be installed, NHTSA should actively research thepossibility of requiring rear-facing seats for Additional requirements for mirrors may be necessary to small school buses. allow the school bus driver to observe passengerbehavior.

60 51

STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

An occupant's chances of surviving a school bus crash are enhanced if he or she remains within the vehicle. The primary defense against ejectionis the structural integrity of the vehicle; floor, roof, and side panel joints must not separate, and bus windows and doors must not open during a crash. Any opening in the schoolbus body offers opportunity for occupants to be ejected. Another defense would be seatbelt use, but ejection is still possible if the belt is worn loosely, orif -the seat or seatbelt anchors are compromised. In addition, available seatbelts are not always worn.

In the cases investigated_ for this study, the Safety Board documented that the front windshields in schooltiuses-became dislodged, side boarding doors opened, roofs deformed,and body joints separated. Not only did this damage expose passengers to the_possibilityof ejection, but the deformation-and exposed metal ed.* created potential for injury if contacted,-

Windshields

Regardless of the size of the school bus; all Windows, except windshields, -inthe vehicle_ mustmeetspecificretentionstindards set by the Federal" Government. These standards were establishedto minimize the likeifhood an occupant would be thrown from the_bus because the window opened or wasdislodged from its mounting. (The glazing materials used in a school-bus windshield, however, must satisfy FMVSS 205,"Glazing Materials," which was established to minimize the possibility of occupants being thrown through the windows.)

Windshields in large school bUses(GVWR morethan 10,000 'pounds) are specifically exempted from the retention performance criteria set by FMVSS 217, "Bus Window Retention and Release." In _the_Safety Board's study_ on Type.0 and Type D large school buses, windshields had popped out or broken out in six cases (National Transportation Safety Board 1987b). _In two of the .six cases,school busoccupantswereejectedoutof the windshieldopening. In one (Hecla, Oklahoma), the unrestrained school bus driver was found lying inside the engine compartment following the crash: the engine hood had opened during the crash. In another crash (Swink, Oklahoma), four students reported they were ejected out of _the open windshield. All survived, most with minor or moderate.injuries only.

The Safety Boardis currently investigating afatalrollrover school buf crash that occurred on May 14, 1989. near Boulder, Colorado, in which a student seated in the front row apparently was ejected Ahrough the windshield opening and killed; the windshield had been dislodged during the rollover. The ejected passenger struck a boulder, dislocating.his neckand sustaining a heal injury. The acc4dent bus was a poststandard large (Type D) school bus (NTSB field case DEN-89-FH003).

The windshields of small schocl buses with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less also are exempt from window retention standards set by FMVSS 217. By virtue of their GVWR, however, Type A school buses fall under another Federal standard: FMVSS 212, "Windshield Mounting." This standard, which appliesto passenger cars, multipurpose vehicles, and buseswith a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less. was designed to "reduce crash injuries and fatalities by providingfor retention of the vehicle windshield during a crash...and preventing theejections of occupants

61 52

Type A school' buses are exempt from from the vehicle." However, almost all vehicles," asdefined by the they are"forward control -MSS 21Z because this standard. -(Note: a type of vehiclespecially excluded from standard,J6 of chassis as many multipurpose Type A school buses arebuilt on the 'same type the chassis.) vans. The windshield-is part of should be The Safety Board does not agreethat forward control vehicles investigations involving 212. During a series ofspecial exempt from FMVSS windshields of 10 of th:f 19 forward control vans,theSafety Board found that the retained during the crash.Two drivers were ejected through the vans were not Two passengers in front seats and windshield end a tHrd was partially ejected. seat were also ejectedthrough the windshield. As a result a passenger in a rear Safety Board of its safety study onmuitipurpOse-vans.(National Transportation recommended that NHTSA considerextending FMVSS 212 to 1979), the Safety Board still exempts. forward forward control vans. NHTSAdid cot agree, and FMVSS 212 control -vehicles. Federal standards Hence, most small schoolbuses are not required to meet although -...ome may voluntarilydo so. for windshield retention, shattered-during.the in this study, the. frOnt-windshield was dislodged-ror Fortunately, no occupant wasejeCted through the large crash in sevencases.J7 few cases, the opening served 11 opening created in thefront of th2 bus. In passengers aher tie crash.Jd exit for thedriver and some an amergency required to Windshields, however, are notdesignated emergency exits and are not meet any of the emergencyprovisions of FMVSS 217. windshield dislodgement and- the of the documented cases -of , Because Accompanying danger of occupantejection,the Safety Board believes that the Release," to include a NHTSA should amend FMVSS 217,"Bus Windowjletention and orwindshields in Ithool buses. performance standard for theminimum retention requirecito withstand Windshields, as well as windows,in a school.bus should-be If windshields are to functibn as emergencyexits, then crash forces intact. for emergency exits. they should be required tomeet Federal standards

Inadvertent Door Opening

crash,unrestrained- orimOroperly- If a Schoolbus door opens during a . ejected through the opening created. restrained occupants seated nearby can'be smallschool The controls for opening andclosing the right front door, in some the door to open during-a crish. buses appear to be 'poorly designed, allowing

ve configuration in which wore than half ofthe *mine 56 the 1041U defines a forwerd control vehicte ow end the steering wheel hub is in tne orward ienith it rearward ofthe orOmItt point of the wineshield base luiliter of the vehicle length."

8; alo cases 25 and 28 in appendin O. 57 Cases 10, 12, 13, 14, and V. in appendis in Carrollton.Kentucky, the emit* connected witha 1988 churchbus accident 38 In cublic hearings is not -dasignipted AM an emergency mentioned VW Of the winoshield area 86 anemergency gait; it, however, etit in FoOsral standarah.

BESTCOPYAVAILABLE 62 53

This led to the partial ejection and death of thedriver of the school van in case 13-. In that accident the unrestrained school bus driver lost control of the bus on a wet gravel road; the bus rotated 1800and overturned onto its right side ina ditch. The driver was partially ejected and then crushed under the frame ofthe boarding door as the bus came to rest on its side.In three other cases (5, 11, and 23),investigators doeumented that the right front boarding door either opened during the crash or was found with damaged controls after the crash.

Thedesign of the opening control appeared to be relatively similar in all cases in which the boarding door was a safety issue (fig. 14). The door control

in case 8 was described in the investigator's_ report as follows:

The passenger loading door latch consists of a handle near the center of the vehicle which is connected to the door by a long rod. The handle latches the door closed by being swung past center in an arc. This handle is easily bumped past center, allowing the door to open--several other drivers in the school district stated that, on rough roads, the latch did not keep the door from opening. The unrestrained school bus driver may have either bumped or grabbed the door handle-of the passenger boarding door as she fell against the door.The door handle on the accident bus moved easily out of the locked position. Apositive latch on thedoorhandle couldpreventthis occurrence.

Adriver restrained by a lapbelt canalso inadvertently open a door control without a positive latch. Because it provides no upper torSo restraint, a lapbelt will allow the torso of a restrained driver to strike the door handle during the accident and inadvertently open the door. The driver could also grab the door handle for support during rollover and inadvertently open the &or. A driverrestrained by a lap/shoulderbelt also could, in tertainaccident configurations, open thedoor by sliding out from under the shoulder harhess and striking the controls. In the Safety Board's cases, the right front boarding door opened in crashesin which the school bus driver was restrained. In two cases, Safety Boardinvestiptors also documented that unrestrained passengers .seated in the front rows of the bus moved forward, struck, and deformed the door controls (cases 15-and FY);

The DOThas identifiedboarding door, latches as a school bus safety problem. A report issued in 1973 stated the following:

With buses in motion, whenbrakes are applied, children standing in thearea ofthe firststep have beenthrown againstthe doorlatch connectingrod. As a result of a child's momentum, the"over center"latches have, in some cases,unlatched,allowing doors to open. Better operating door mechanisms are available and new ones are being developed by at least three manufacturers under contract to UMTA (Urban Mass Transportation Administration) In its transit bus

1 program.

63 -

i7Pfpret,. k7-7-

$ %vs,

forf

"viff, 44$k ,-0 .1Pe

Figure 14.-- A boarding door control of such design can be opened inadvertently.

A-trade-off study of service door operation could be combined with emergency door studies to determine the optimum door that should be required. Ademonstrationof the various door _concepts would_ be a valuable tool in determining the parameters to be.traded. (U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 1973.)

In the 1984 frontal crash tests conducted for Transport Canada: the rightfront door of the small school bus (Type 8) "opened early during the collision event and remAined open after the vehicle had come to a standstill (Transport Canada 1985)."49

39 A school van (a Type A venicie) lestW for Transport Canada d$0 rot eAhibit this problem. The hording door WM ocerablo after the Creoh, 55

Not only can an open door be dangerous during a crash,it can jeopardize evacuation. For example,if a door opens even partially during the crash, it creates not only an avenue for ejection, similar to a dislodged windshield, but it can easily be crushed or jammed,thus eliminatingthe door's use asan emergency exit after the accident. In seven cases involving Type A school buses, the right boarding door could not be used as an emergency exit because if was jammed, insome manner.40 The schoolbus usually had experienced a frontal impact followed by rollover.

Some of the Safety Board's cases also contained examples ofarelated safety concern: the stairwell area, immediately in front of the boarding door, was deformed following the accident. The crash performance.of the boarding door and related structures may need to be re-examined as a unit.

Because of these documented safety problems associated with the -boarding door control, the Safety Board believes that theNHTSA, the--School Bus-- Manufacturers Institute, and manufacturers of van-conversion school tusesshould work together to develop performance standards for the opening control mechanism on school vehicles with a GVWR less than 10,000 pounds that will eliminate the possibility of inadvertent door opening during _a frontal or rollover _crash. A positive_latch would eliminate this problem.

Schoolbuses currently are exempt from FMVSS 206,"Door Locks and Door Retention Components," which sets performance requirements forside doors in passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, and trucks.

Joint Separations

Deficiencies in school bus Joint strength were among the safety shortcomings Congress directed the DOT to correct in the 197.0s.__In1977, DOT enacted FMVSS 221, "School Bus Body Joint Strength," to establish the minimum strength of body panel Joints. However, small school buses with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less were exempt from this standard.As a result of this exclusion, Type A school buses do not have to meet Federalstandards for joint strength, which were instituted to "reducedeaths and injuries resulting from the structural collapse of school bus bodies during crashes."

TheSafety Board is concerned aboutthis excfusion for three primary reasons. First,in most crash scenarios, the body Joints of a small school bus will be tested far more than those of a large cchool bus. Size and mass of a motor vehicle are extremelyimportant consitrations in crashseverity. For example, in a collision between a school bus weighing 20,000 pounds and passenger car weighing 4,000 pounds.41 the crash forces acting on the school busand its occupants will be far less than if the school bus weighs 6,000 pounds. Similarly,if a small schoolbus collides with a heavy truck,the crash will stress the small school bus far more a large school bus.

-40 Cases s,a, 11, is-, is, 17, and 19 in acicArndis B; also see case 23, which involved a Type 0- school -bus-. In case 14, the rear emergency door orened during the crash and was torn Iron its hinges. This woG the only stuly case involving inolvertent rear door opening. In case 6, both the left and right front doors jammed.

41 Because passengercarsare the Meatcowman type ofmotor vehicle on therood, thiskind of occident would be the typical aulai.ehicle crash involving a school bus.

65 56

Second, the degree of compartmentalization required in a Type A schoolbus by Federal standards is far less than that required in a larger= bus. Passengers of a small school bus, especially one without restraining barriers, will beable to move about the-bus mere freelyina, crash. Third, not all school bus occupants wear the available seatbelts, or wear them snugly. Joint separation or an opening caused by roof deformation is consequently a concern even in school buses equipped witJ-lapbelts. Federal tests for roof rollover strength are less stringent f-- a szhool bus with a GVWR of_10,000 pounds or less (fig. 15). In addition, such school buses are exempt from Federal requirements for school bus joint strength.

Joint separations were documented in six gcidents involving Type A school vehicles (cases 10, II, 13, 14, and 16);4 five of the six were van conversions (fig. 16).4J In two of the cases (cases 13and 14), the joint separations probably still-would have occurred if-the vehicles had been required tomeetthe joint strengthstandards for largeschool buses. On-eof -the accidents involved an 8100rollover-and multipleimpacts, events-that are outsidl the parameters of Federal test requir-ements. The other case involved separation ofa maintenance accesspanel, andsuch panels are exempt_ from compliance with FMVSS 221."

Safety Board investigators found joint separations inore of the five cases investigated involving a Type B school vehicle. Type B school buses, although considered small (Type II) school vehicles, are required to be built toFederal standards for large school buses. In case 24, the small school bus sustaineda rear-end impact fo;lowed by 900 rollover. One of the six panel seamsin the ceiling toward the back of the bus separated in two places; the_separationswere 6 inches long and 1/4 inch wide.

Passenger injuries- wereattributed tojoint separations--in--onlyone accident (case16), In the other accidents, the separations clearly had -the potential to cause injury, but occupant kinematicswere such that the occupants' bodies did not contact the sharp metal edges thatwere exposed when the joints separated (fig.16; cases 10,11, 13, 14, 16, and 24). Separated joints have injury potential to-restrained and unrestrained occupants alike,and because the integrity of the structure is thereby compromised, they increasethe chance of ejectionfor unrestrained passengers and-for passengers with loosely fitted belts.

42 Joint separation may have also occurred in coao 17.

43 Soperetions of barrier restrining ttachment points are discussed in the section "Restraining Barriers."

44 Even forlarge schoolbuses, meintenance access panelsare specifically excluded from currentFederal standards for jointstrength. As a result of a fatal accident involving a largo school bus fin St. Louis, Missouri, in 1965, the Safety Board recommended thatthe Willaincl,ma maintenance access panels in the joint strengthstandard (National Tronsportation Safety Board 19670). Rulemsking toamend FMVIIS 221 is under consideration. 57

FMVSS 220 FORCE -APPL I CAT I ON PLATE S I ZE SHALL SCHOOL BUSES

CD,v106, AL4 f a0049 PM= MN% IC.4 flay oc,4,y

-1*---*-I---,*--

figure 15.--A larger force application plate is used to test roof strength in small school buses compared to that used in tests of larger school buses. The result is that the roof of a small school bus must pass a lessstressfultest of roof rollover performance. .(Source: School Bus Manufutlirers Institute 1989.)

67 58

FfrIVSS 220

FORCE APPL I CAT IONPLATE S 1 ZE

LARGE SCHOOL BUSES

a 15 (continued).

88 59

SEPARATION

figure 16.--Sharp metal edges were exposed in the roof of the Tye, A school van, posing a safety hazard (case 10). Interior roof of the vehicle looking toward the rear: arrows indicate separation of sheet metal panels where 13 rivets broke loose.

In case 16, the only accident in which joint separation caused injury,. the Type A schoolbus impacted an unsecured concrete barrier. The sheet metal from the B-pillar to the left rear axle was peeled back and extended well outside of the original width of the bus (fig. 17). The left side structural supports for the roof were torn away, allowing the roof on the left side to collapse down to near the tops of the seatbacks. The body of the bus was torn loose from the chassis along the right side and across the rear. The left sidewall next to rows 1-3 was torn away or crushed.The anchor of theleft side restraining barrier was dislodged, and the barrier was displaced rearward into contact with the front row seat. Had the passengers been in a large school bus, they would_ have been ieated higher off the ground andthe concrete barrier would have contacted the bus below their seating positions.

Lapbeltuse couldnot preve;it thepassengers' injuries, and mayhave contributed to the severity of some injuries,as lapbelted passengers pivoted forward around their belts, striking the seatbacks before them with their heads.

g :AA," tr ," ' - -1' *: ;,?4,4`'

Poo

Figure 17.--Joint separation occurred on the left side of the small school bus in case 16.

--The Safety Board investigator, however, determined that at least two of the..:a four passengers were prevented by their lapbelts from being ejected. They ktad been sitting by the outside of the bus and had clear, open spaces to their left. , The.other two were not ejected because the side panels cf the school bus body, were deformed around them, blocking their access to the outside. Wbether their injuries would have been more severe had they been ejected is not known.

Because of the_ increased stress subjected to body joints (including roof) of a smallschoolbus compared to a large schoolbus in most crash scenarios (that is, the small bus lacks the advantage of larger size and mass) and the risk of injury joint ,Aparation poses for passengers, the Safety Board believes that the NHTSA during its ongoing review of school bus FMVSS, should review FMVSS 224. "School Bus Rollover Piotection," to determine if roof performance tests of small school buses should be identicalto the tests required of large school buses. Similarly, NHTSA should consider extending FMVSS 221,"School Bus Body Joint Strength," to small school buses.

1 61

EVACUATION

School bus evacuation has emerged as a topic of increased:concernfollowing the May 14, 1988, fatal crash-of a church bus near Carrollton, Kentucky(National Transportation Safety Board 1989). Twenty-six passengers, all but two of whom wr.re school-aged children, died in the fire that broke out following the crash; the passengers could not exit the bus in time. The vehiclewas a 66-passenger,- large, Type C, retired school bus, owned and operated by a church.

Since that crash, the Safety Board has investigated two additionalcases involving school bus fires. The first case, occurring in March1989, invOlved a Type A school bus. (NTSB field case All-89-FH001). A fire started in the engine compartment of a schebl van oUtside Memphis, Tennessee, thatwas transporting wheelchair-bound student:. Because of the van's configuration, the enginewas partiallywithin thq passenger compartment, near the driver's.seat. The fire was not contained Within the'engine, spreal to the vam's interior,and 'Was fed by _the. material used for seat constructiw.. Jhe forward_portion of the bus *Was engulfed in flames. Evacuating the studrAts was difficult: theselectritalsystem controlling the wheelchair lift was aimaged by the fire. Only with the help of passersby were the students evacuated before.the fire_consumed the interiorof the _valf. The other.case, also 6cCurring in March1989, involved a large poststandard schoolbus near Kansas City, Missouri, damaged-whenit.-strucka stopped tractor-trailer (NTSB field case OCA-89-SH-001). The impact pushed the fuel tank rearward and the fuel lines of the school bus fueltank pulled loose; a fire started. Theinterior of the schoolbus was consumed. Fortunately,no stldents were aboard; however, the driver was Pinned in and sustainedburn injuries over 10 percent of her body and suffered-imokeinhalation..

Fire was also involved in an earlier investigatioh conductedby the Safety boardinvolving, a_ small school_bus 1981, outside lieTmanville, (National Transportation Safety Board1982). A schoolvan transporting Head Start students ran off a bridge and rolled Over. The, sidedoor could not be opened, and not all of the occupants could be evacuated in-time; 5 of the 32 occupants(the van was overloaded) perished inthe fire. As a result of the accident,the Safety Board issued the following safety recommendationto the NHTSA:

H-82-33

Examine the crash performance of vansin rollovers andall accident types, through its, crash testihg and accident investigation programs, to determine if there isany tendency for doors and other escape areas to unnecessarily jamor be blocked in low-speed 'crashes. If necessary, establish additidnal crash performance standards for vanescape areas, especially those used for public transportation.

The NHTSA reiponded that it could not identify.any, specific instancesof, exits jamming because of crash damage; the Safety Board closed,the recommendation (Closed--Acceptable Action). In its 1979 study of the performance : of multipurpose vans, the Safety Board had previously asked NHISAto "study the extent to which doors jam in collisions and to determine if correctiveaction is 62

needed to prevent ejection and enhance escape (NationalTransportation Safety Board 1979). In this study on small school buses, the Safety Board has documented instances of exit doors bPing jammed from craqo damage and doors opening inadvertently. Emergency_exit availability remains a concern._

Proposals to amend Federal school bus standards for emergency exits, fuel tank integrity,and interior flammability have focused on large school buses since the fatal crash in Carr011ton, Kentucky, which promptem media attention and re-examination of .these issuesby DOT. Large school bus,rs (TypesC and 0) comprisethe majorityofschool vehicles in the pliblic school bus fleet. Nonetheless, small schoolbuses,by virtue of their design and use, deserve special attention. Emergency evacuation issues connected with a smallschool busshould be examined-separately from large.schoolbusesfor thefollowing reasons:

_1. Fuel tanks on some small school buses are exempt from Federal fuel system integrity standards fok-Sthool buseS.; tank guards are usually not present; and the.fuel tanks are located on a- different portion'of' the Chassis than on a large school bus. Fuel tanks found on/Type A and Type B school buses are almost never located on the right side of the school -bus,near the boarding door,asis the case with, most -large school buses. Instead, the fuel-tank of a small school bui is located between the chassis rails,a safer location.- The .tanks do not have protective tank guards or 'cages" as are found on large school buses. In addition,the fuel tanks of-Type A schoolbusei must meet the same perfirmaoce tests. required- of-a-passenger car, multipurpose passenger vehicle, or truck van,not the performance

tests specified for a school bus. .

2. Small school busesmay have- a smallerratio ofpassengers to emergency-exits. than-do-large-school buses, but-the vehicle itself it__ not required to meet the_ same structural integrity requirements as a large school bus. Hence, the exits on a small school bus may be more likely to be jammed after the crash, Ilue to body deformation, than those on larger school buses. Although the crash pulse experienced by a school busin a multivehicle collision will always be greater for asmall schoolbus than for a-large school bus in a _similar crash, the body of a Type Alchool bus is not required-to.be built_tn Federal school bus standards for joint, strength,:and the roof_must withstand a less stringent test for rollover strength. In addition, side emergency exits are not required lo have the same clearance as found on large school buses, and the boarding door may be more likely to open in a crash. The Federal Government alsb specifies a smaller minimum access area for the rear emergency door in a Type A school bus compared to larger school buses: only a 6- by 22-in0 unobstructed clearance compared to 12 by 22 inches in a larger school. bus.

3. Small school but.es are often used for special transportation purposes, which include transport of preschoolers and of the physically and mentally handicapped. In these cases, more time for 1 evacuation may be needed than the number of passengers may suggest.

72 63

Evacuation training becomes more difficult, especially if wheelchair- restrained or mentally disabled students are involved. (The Safety Board investigated a survivable accident occurring in March 1988 in which a wheelchair-bound student died when her bus overturned [NTS8 field case FTW-88-HFRO5]).

4. Small school buses customarily are equipped with at leasta lapbelt at every passenger seating position; large school buses are not. If passengers are wearing lapbelts at the time of the crash, the belt must be released before evacuation can proceed. Depending on the crash configuration and the age and ability of the passengers, school officials have worried this could slow evacuation.

With these factors in mind, the Safety Board closely examined evacuation in its study cases. little,if any, postcrash data on schoolbus accidents are routinely available; for example, through what_door(s) the _students evacuated, how many were injuredduring the evacuation itself, andwhatexits were inaccessible or jammed. Evacuation data are not available from Stateor national school bus accident data banks,and accident reports filed by local school districts rarely include such information. This report supplies such data.

Fire 'and Fuel TankLeaks

Fires in school buses,regardless of the vehicle's size,_ appear to be relatively infrequent events. When they do occur, fires are most likely not to be connected with a crash, butrather associated withfire in theengine compartment resulting from poor maintenanceor from vandalism by students on the bus. Available data suggest that when -a fire does occur in connection-with a schiol bus accident, the fire more often results from a fuel leak from theother vehicle involved than from the school bus itself.An analysis of 10 years (1977- 1987) df data on fatal-accidents found that-no-fatalities of occupants of school bus-type vehicles were attributed to fire or smoke inhalation. The accidentin Carrollton, Kentucky, changed that record.

In the Safety Board's cases investigated for this study, fuel tanks of small school buses did not leak following the crash, and therewere no postcrash fires.

Emergency Exits

Small school buses frequently have more exits than large school buses have, although they generally transport fewer passengers. Some small school buses may have a door on the left side by the driver or a side exit, sometimes with double doors or equipped with a wheelchair lift. The additional exits are fortunate: in about half of the study cases, occupants reported that one of the schoolbus exits could not be opened. The right boarding door was the exit most often reported as being jammed or unusable (7 out of 24 cases); therear emergency door andthe driver's door onthe leftside were rarely cited (2 and 3 cases, respectively). These findingsmay reflect the crash configurations represented by the study cases--mainly frontal, involving rollover--as well as deficiencies in boarding door design. roof, and joint strength.

The rear emergency door was the most commonly used exit (more than three- fourths of the cases). The boarding door on the right side was rarely used.

73 -

Special Students

Four cases in the study involvedschool buses transporting Head Start or Seven other cases involved school buses physically handicapped students. transporting passengers classified asemotionally disturbed or learning disabled. because of their These types of childrencould have more problems in evacuation age and disabilities. The one notable evacuation problems were encountered, however. Few The driver--who had exception involved transportof deaf students in case 13. but received minor injuries only--wasremoved from the accident scene first; because he was the only adultwho knew-sign language, emergency personnel were children aboard the bus. Safety Board unable to communicate with the investigators found that the buscarried no identification to alert rescuers that minor deaf children were aboard. Fortunately, no passenger received more than injuries, so no one suffered becauseof delays in treatment.-

Successful evacuation in most cases wasnot a result of frequent evacuation practice--indeed, some pupils told theSafety Board investigators they had never practiced evacuation (cases 8and 23)--but rather_ resulted fromthe presence_of rendered by adult passersby and aideson thebus- and -the swift assistance (cases 1 and 21),the school bus emergency rescuepersonnel. Intwo cases drivers had instructed passengersto remain in their seats until rescue personnel arrived.

lapbelt Release

Some school authorities have expressed concernabout whether lapbelt use by schovl bus passengers would hinderevacuation, specifically, if lapbelted school able-to-release themselvesfrom their belts.---Not all bus passengers-would be school buses have adult aides onboard, and the driver is often the only adult. Rollover crashes have been ofparticular interest, because students on the "high by their belts or might be afraid (or even side of the bus would be suspended unable) to release their belts andfall to the lower side.

passengers didnot relea$e In the Safety Board's studycases, most either bus occupants or_ rescuers,. themselves from their lapbelts. Adults, released the belts for the children(cases1, 9,13, 16, and 19). This may carried by small school buses--the reflectthe typeof passengers often handi.-.6i,eed or the very young.

In four cases (case$ 12,19, 22, and 23), students were held suspended by their their teltsafter a rollover crashand required assistance releasing students were injured when they released theirbelts belts.4 In two cases, seatbacks; only minor injuries- and fellto the lower side of the bus, striking resulted.

45;The school bus driver in UM, 23 w86 0160 suspended by belt.

BEST COPY AVA!LABLE 65

lapbelt use substantially delayed passenger evacuation in only one accident inyestigated,-a -nonrollover.accident."A student was unable to release his_ lapbelt because hot asphalt, from the dump truck that collided with the school van, had spilled-onto his seat, burying the seatbelt latchplate. The lapbelt was subseciuently cut by the truck-driver and the student was freed.

. .

46 cosirs,oppendli O.

75 66

CONCLUSIONS

(size, mass, exterior and interior features) 1. Because of the differences school bus, findings basedon between a small school bus andlarge large _school buses cannot be investigations ofaccidents involving extrapolated to smaller schoolvehicles. for the The small school busesinvolved in the 24 accidents investigated 2. crash protection to both Safety Board'sstudy generally provided good restrained and unrestrained passengers.. injured, injuries usuallY were Minoi, regardless 3. If student passengers were of their restraint status.The head and face were the body parts most commonly injured'among bothlapbelted and-unrestrained passengers.s___

iMportant factor thanrestraint status -in 4. Seating '-position wasa more -determining injury severity.

study offeredexamples ofboth theadvantages- and 5. _ Accidents- _in this disadvantages of lapbelt use.

and seating lOcation of occupants often 6. Restraint status, injury severity, were not accurate in official police reportsof the school bus accident. Evaluation of lapbelt performancebased on these sources may be misleading. school bus occupants in the study, probably 7. Restraint use was high among reflecting that States or local schooldistricts have policies requiring that occupants of small schoolvehicles wear .the available seatbelts, the limited number and-youth of the passengers, and preseriee-ofadult aides on drivers and two-thirds some buses. Nearly three-fourths of the school bus of the passengers were restrained.

aides on board the school bus. Only one 8. Restraint use was low among adult of seven adult aides, who werecharged with ensuring passenger belt use, was wearing a seatbeltat the time of the crash.

and passengerssometimes did not weartheir 9. Theschool bus drivers the seatbelts properly.The most common mistake was failure to adjust manual lapbelt to fit snugly. Almost one-third of'the lapbelted passengers were wearing their beltsimproperly.

passenger lapbelts and otherrestraints- had been installed 10. !n .'terInitial purchase ofthe vehicle by employees of the a manner inconsistent with Federal scnuo." or bus contractor in standards for seatbelts,diminishing crash protection and increasing the potential to induce injury. 67

11. Passengers seated.in tne front rows of Type A school buses are at special risk of injury in a frontal crash. Type A school buses ire not required to have a restraining barrier forward of the front seats, and if they do, these barriers do not have to meet the same standards as those found in other types of school buses. The Safety Board has documented the danger of being unrestrained in a school bus without a frontal barrier as well as the danger of being lapbelted and interacting with a barrierin a frontal crash.

12. Restraining barrier supports and anchors in Type A school buses sometimes came loose during the crash. Sharp metal edges were sometimes exposed, and the separations allowed the barrier to move rearward -into passenger seating space.

13. Data from Canadian crash tests suggest that-merely requiring that_Type A school buses have frontal restraining barriers identical to those mandated in larger schoolbuses (Typcs 13,C, and 0) will not provide a solution for head protection. Lapbelted anthromorphic dummies seated in the front seats of Type A school buses equipped with large school bus barriers registered unacceptable head injury scores, more than twice the allowable limit.

14. TheFederalGovernment currently has noinjury criteriafor abdominal, spinal, or thorax injuries. Researchers do not know how much force and at what duration will result in fatal or serious injuries to these regions of

the body oflapbelted andunrestrained occupants. , Hence, performance standards for restrainingbarriers and seatbelts regarding abdominal, spinal, or thorax injuries do not exist.

15. In multivehicle crashes and other crash scenarios, small school buses lack the built-in crash advantage of superior size-and weight providedby large school buses. Current Federal standards allow-Type A school buses to-be built with roofs less able to withstand rollover forces than larger school buses. Body joints in Type A school buses are exempt from Federal joint strength standards.

16. Jointseparations were documented in 6, possibly 7, of the 19cases involving Type A school vehicles; 5 of the 6 were van conversions. Joint separations were documented in1 of the 5 cases investigated involving Type_ B school buses.

17 In some accidents,the right side boarding doors openedinadvertently during the crash, and front windshields were displaced. Retention within the vehicle is advantageous to survival, so any opening in the school bus body poses danger to an unrestrained or improperly restrained occupant.

18. School bus windshields are exempt from FMVSS 217, "Bus Window Retention and Release."

19'. The boardfng door controls of some small school -buses have -no- posftive latch locking mechanism.

77 68

20. In 7 out of 24 cases, the passenger boarding door was unavailable foruse as an emergency exit because of damage sustained during the accident due to poor design of door control, structural weakness near the door area, or deformation of the roof above the door.

21. For a variety of reasons, student passengers rarely released themselves from their lapbelt; after the crash. Adults at the scene usually released the student passengers.

22. Lapbelt use usually did not hinder evacuation efforts, even in rollover crashes when the school bus came to rest on its side. _ 23. In the Safety Board's cases, the fuel tanks of the small school buses (both Type A and B) did not leak after the crash, and there wereno postcrash fires.

24. The definitions of "small" Versus "large" school bus used.in the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, in Federal program.-guidelines, by Congress, by State and local school transportation officials, and bythe- school buS industry,-are not_uniforM. _

78 69

RECOMMENDATIONS

As a resultof this study, the _National Transportation Safety_ Board recommends:

--to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration:

Determine the feasibility of requiring lap/shoulder belts or other restraint systems that provide upper teirso restraint at front seat passenger seating positions on Type A school buses (gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less). Amend Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 222, "School Bus Passenger 'Seating and Crash Protection," -and FMVSS 210,-"Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages," or any other standards, as needed, should standards prove incompatible. (Class IL_ ,Priority Action) (H-89-46)

Conduct research, including computer simulation and sled crash tests using Hybrid III dummies if needed, to determine the relationship between restraining barrier design and_injuries to unrestrained and lapbelted passengers of different sizes on small school buses (gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less). Research should focus on the height, width, padding, location, and anchorage strength of the barrier, and the spacing between the barrier and front seats. Amend Federal MotorVehicle SafetyStandard 222, "School Bus Passenger Seating and Crash Protection," as needed. (Class II, Priority Action) (H-89-47)

.Amend Federal Motor Vehicle Safety-Standard 217,"Bus Window -Retention and Release," to include a performance standard for the minimum retention of windshields in allsizes of school bu.is. (Class II, Priority Action) (H-89-48)

Cullect and Pvaluate accident data on the crasn performance of the rnof anJ emergency exits on small schoolbuses (gross vehicle weight rating of 1),000 pounds or less) in ruilovers. Data should not belimited to van-based buses. Basedon analysis, ascertain whether it is appropriate to amend Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 220, "School BUS Rellover -Protection," to make roof performance tests for smallschool buses (gross vehicle weight of 10,000 pounds .or less) to be identical in all aspects to those now required of large school buses (gross vehicleweight rating of more than 10,000 pounds). If such tests are not appropriate, modify the test forsmall school buses tostress the roof morethantne present force application plate test does. (Class II, Priority Action) (11-89-49) 70

Collectand evaluateaccident- datainvolvingsmall school buses to ascertain whether school buses witha gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less should berequired to meet jointstrengthrequirements of FederalMotorVehicle Safety Standard 221, "School Bus Body Joint Strength." (Class II, Priority Action) (14-89-50)

Specify in new rulemaking or in an amendment to FederalMotor Vehicle Safety Standard 206, "Door Locks and DoorRetention Components," a requirement for a positivelatch locking mechanism on the passenger loading doors of small schoolbuses (gross vehicle weight ratingof 10,000 pounds or less) to eliminate the possibility of inadvertent door opening duringa frontal crash or rollover, Work with sch.00lbus and school vanmanufacturers to develop the performance standards. (ClassII, Priority Action) (H-89-51)

Urge manufacturers to provide means to retrofit positivelatch locking mechanisms on existing door controls of small school buses (gross vehicle-weight ratingof 10,000 pounds or less). (Class II, Priority Action) (14-89-52)

--to members of the School Bus Manufacturers Instituteand manufacturers of van conversion school buses:

Work with National Highway Traffic SafetyAdministration to develop performance standards for a locking mechanismfor the boarding doors of school buses with agross vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less- to eliminatethe possibility of inadvertent door opening during frontalor rollover crash. (Class II, Priority Action) (H-89-53)

Provide retrofit kits for small school buses(gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000 .pounds or less)currently without positive latch door controllocking mechanisms. (ClassII, Priority Action) (H-89-54)

--to the National Association of State Directorsof Pupil Transportation, the National Associationof Pupil Transportation, and the National School Transportation Association:

Alert your members to the dangers inherent in improper installation ofseatbelts and/or installation of restraint systImb not meeting Federal standards or guidelinesin school buses and urge them to correcc ruch ;nstallations. Also alert your members of tne need to instruct students towear lapbelts properly. (Class II, Priority Action) (11-89-55) 71

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

/s/ JAMES L. KOISTAD Acting Chairman

/s/JIM BURNETT Member

/s/JOHN K. LAUBER Member.

/s/JOSEPH T.-NALL Member

-LEMOINE DICKINSON, JR. *Member

October 11, 1989 72

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American Association for Automotive Medicine. 1985. The abbreAatedinjury scale. Arlington Heights, IL. 80 P.

Calspan. 1986. Crash testing of Thomas Minotour vehicle, 1986 Thomasbus, intermediate school bus. 3uffalo, NY; Rep. 7481-1; final report forThomas Built Buses. [Not paged]. _ Carpenter, K. 1973. Injury reporting reliability. RePort from the NewYork State Department of Motor Vehicles, Albany. [Pages not known].

Carroll, P.S.; Scott, R.E. 1971. Acquisition of informationon exposure and on_ non-fatal crashes.: 2---Accident.data inacturacie. Report from the Highway Safety Research Institute,-University of Michigan. [Pagesnot known].

'C6sari, D.; Ramet,-M. 1979. Evaluation of human tolerancein frontal impacts.- . . In: Proceedings of the 23d Stapp car crash conference. Pap: 791032.Warrendale, PA: Society of Automotive Engineer's: 873-911.

Davis Engineering Limited. ,986. School bus seat development study.Ottawa, ON; final report; Transport Canada contract 0SZ85-00139, 186p.

Dejeammes, Maryvonne; Tarriere, Claude; Thomas, Christian; Kallieris,Dimitrios. 1984. Exploration of biomedical data towards a better evaluationof tolerance for children involved in automotive accidents.'In: Advancesin belt restraint systems: design, performance and usage: Proceedings ofthe international congress and exposition; 1984 February 27-March 2; Detroit, MI. P-141. Warrendale, PA: Society of Automotive Engineers: 427-440.

Evans, Leonard [Operating Sciences Department, General MotorsResearch Laboratories]. 1989. Restraint effectiveness-, occupantejection from cars, and fatality reductions. Pap. No. 880596. Presented at the 68thannual meeting of the Transportation Research Board; 1989 January 22-26;Washington, 'DC. 15 p.

Fisher, Jerfd M. 1985. Cognitive and behavioralconsequences of closed head injury. In: Seminars in neurology. Pap. 85-010. Southborough,MA: National Head

Injury Foundation. 4 11,-.

Foust, David R. Bowan [Bowman], Bruce M.; Snyder, Richard G.1977. Study of human impact tolerance using investigations and simulationsof free-falls. In: Proceedings of the 21st Stapp car crash conference. Pap.770915. Warrendale, PA: Society of Automotive Engineers: 3-51.

Huang, L.C.; March, J.C. 1978. A1S and threat to life.In: Huelke, 0.F., ed. Proceedings of the American Association for AutomotiveMedicine 22nd conference, and the International Associationifor Accidentand Traffic Medicine 7th conference.' Morton Grove, IL: American Association forAutomotive Medicine. Vol.I: 242-254.

82 73

Hutchinson, T.P. 1987. Severity classification by American police: In: Road accident statistics. Adelaide, South Australia:.Rumsby Scientific Publishing (p. 190-191). 292 p.

National Safety Council. 1987. Accident facts. Washington, DC. 104 p.

National Transportation Safety Board. 1979. Special study: safety of multipurpose vans. NTSB/HSS-79/1. Washington, DC. 44 p.

National Transportation Safety Board. 1982. Highway accident report: Pattison Head Start Center school van run-off bridge and fire near Hermanville, Mississippi, December 17, 1981. NTSB/HAR-82/5. 24 p.

National Transportation Safety Board. 1986. Safety study: performance of lap belts in 26 frontal crashes. NTSB/SS-86/03. Washington, DC. 236-p.

National Transportation-Safety Board. 1987a. Highway accident report: Schoolbus loss of control and collision with guard rail and sign pillar, U.S. Highway 70 near Lucas and Hunt Road, St. Louis County, Missouri, November 11, 1985. NTSB/HAR-87/02. 45 p.

National Transportation Safety Board. 1987b. Safety study: Crashworthiness of large poststandard schoolbuses. UTSB/SS-87/01. Washington, DC. 474 p.

National Transportation Safety Board. 1989. Highway accident report: Pickup truck/church activity bus head-on collision and fire near Carrollton, Kentucky, May 14, 1988. NTSB/HAR-89/01. 87 p.

School BusFleet. 1989, [School bus statistics]. Redondo Beach,JA: Bobit Publishing; 34(6): 11, 14,_58, 60.

School Bus Manufacturers Institute. 1989. Congressional briefing for the House Surface Transportation Subcommittee. May 17.

Scott, R.E. 1972. Evaluation of severity codes in accident data. HIT Lab Reports. Ann Arbor: Highway Safety Research Institute, University of Michigan. [Pages not known].

Shinar, D.; Treat, J.R.; McDonald, S.T. 1983. The validity of police reported accident data. Accident Analysis and Prevention. 15: 175-191.

Snyder, Richard G. 1969. Impact injury tolerances of infants and children in free-fall. In: Proceedings of the 13th annual conference of the American Association for Automotive Medicine; 1969 October 16-17; Minneapolis, MN. [Place of publication unknown]: (Publisher unknown]: 131-164.

Snyder, Richard G.; Foust, David R.; Bowman, Bruce M. 1977. Study of impact tolerance through free-fall investigation. UM-HSRI-77-8. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan, Highway Safety Research Institute. 140 p. plus appendixes.

83 74

St. Laurent, Andre. 1983. School bus accidents andpassenger injuries: a literature review. Ottawa, ON: Biokinetics and Associates;Doc. R83-14; prepared for TES Limited. 40 p.

G. 1980. Biomechanical data of children. In: Proceedings ofthe 24th rp car crash conference. Pap. 801313. Warrendale, PA: Society of Automotive neers: 514-559.

Transport Canada. 1985. School bus safety study. TP 6222E. [Placeof publication unknown]. 2 vol.

Transport Canada [Farr, G.N.]. 1987. School bus seat development study.TP 8445E. (Place of publication unknown]. 37 p.

Transportation Research Board, National Resea.-ch Councn. 1989. Improvingschool_ :bits safety. Spec._Rep. 222.:WAth-itigton,--0C-. 214

U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway TransportationSafety Administration. 1973. Pupil transportation safetyprogram Plan. DOT HS-820-.267. Washington, DC (p. 30). [Total pages not knbwn].

U.S. Department of Transportation. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 1986. School bus safetv belts: theiruse, carryover effects aril administrative uses. DOT-HS-806-965. Washington, DC. 60p.-

-Weber, K.; Melvin, J.W. 1983. Injury potential with misused, childrestraining systems. In: SAE child injury and restraint conference prpceedings;1983 October 17-18; San Diego, CA. SAE/P-83/135. Warrendale, PA: Societyof _ _ Automotive Engriirei-rS:537:59.-

84 75

APPENDIX A

INDEX TO SAFETY BOARD STUDY CASES INVOLVING SCHOOL VEHICLES BUILT TO FEDERAL SCHOOL BUS STANDARDS

This appendix lists the 24 case summaries in appendix-8 by type of school vehicle. The types are classified by the school bus industry system that takes into account the gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) and configuration of the vehiCle. The classifications and definitions were adopted at the National Minimum Standards Conference of 1980. Both Type A and Type 8 school buseswere formerly referred to as Type II school buses.

Type A school buses ire grouped by van conversions'ind small school buses. Within each group, nonrollover accidents are listed first, then rollover accidents, in order of increasing severity.. The list also-identifies the accident location and date, chassis manufacturer of the sehool vehicli, makeand .model of the body; and the type of accident in terms of the school vehicle;

Tvoe A School Vehicles (19 cases)

_ A Type A school-vehitle is a van conversion or body constructedon a van- type compact truck or front-section vehicle with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or; less, designed for carrying more 10 persons.

Van conversions (Type A)

Number of cases: 14 - Type of accident: Nonrollover 7 (all frontal impact) Rolicver 7 (3 noncollision) _

alt_nmmtar Pat4

1 Bedford, New York September 23, 1986 1983 Dodge chassis with I6-passenger body by Ram Van Left front impact --

2 Laurel Hollow, New York' February 5, 1987 1980 Chevrolet chassis with 16-passenger body by Van Con, Inc. Left front impact

New Castle, New York February 2, 1987 1983 GMC chassis with 16-passenger Sturdivan body by T.P.I. Left front impact APPENDIX A 76

Carson, California May 18, 1987 1981 Dodge chassis with 16-passenger body by Collins Bus Corporation Multiple frontal impacts

5 Lake Zurich, Illinois October 10, 1985 1984 Chevrolet chassis with 16-passenger Fortivan body by Coach and Equipment Manufacturing Corporation Head-on collision

6 Pomona,-California June 11, 1987 1987 Dodge chassis with 16-passenger Bantam body by Collins Bus Corporation Frontal impact

7 Allegan, Michigan December 5, 1984 _ 1978 Chevrolet chassis with 16-passenger hdy by Shaller-Globe CGrporation Head-on collision

Fort Dodge, Iowa March 15, 1984 1980 Chevrolet chassis with 16-passenger body by

Superior Coach International - Noncollision rollover (900)

9 Las Angeles, California April 8, 1987 1976 Ford school van configured for 16 passengers Noncollision rollover (900)

10 New York, New York April- 19, 1985 1978 Dodge chassis with 16-passenger Fortivan body by Coach and Equipment Manufacturing Corporation Noncollision rollover (1700)

11 Denville, New Jersey March 9, 1987 1986 Chevrolet chassis with 16-passenger body by Van Con, Inc. Multiple frontal impacts, followed by rollover (900)

12 Gresham, Oregon January 14, 1987 1979 Dodge chassis with 14-passenger Sturdivan-body by T.P.I. Frontal impact, followed by rollover (900)

86 77 APPENDIX A

13 Houston, Texas February 25, 1986 1980 Dodge chassis with 16-passenger body by Collins Bus Corporation Frontal impact, followed by rollover (3600)

14 Westchester, New York March 25, 3987 1982 Ford chassis with 16-passenger Sturdivan body by T.P.I. Rollover (8100), followed by multiple impacts

Small School Buses (Type A)

Number of cases: 5 Type of accident: Nonrollover 3 Rollover 2

Case- number-- Dan

15 Perrysburg, Ohio April 6, 1987 1981 Chevrolet chassis with 23-passenger Busette Body by Wayne Corporation Left front-collision, followed by secondary impact --

16 Elmhurst, Illinois February 7, 1986 1982 Chevrolet chassis with 23-passenger Vanguard body by

American Transportation Corporation - Left side impact, followed by secondary impact

17 ^ Chester County, Pennsylvania February 26, 1988 1983 Ford chassis with 22-passenger Busette-body by Wayne Corporation Head-on collision, followed by secondary side impact

18 Vista, California December 3, 1986 1985 Chevrolet chassis with 20-passenger.Micro-Bird body by Blue Bird Body Company Left side impact, followed by rollover (900)

19 San Antonio, Texas February 5, 1985 1981 Chevrolet chassis with 20-passenger Busettebody by_ Wayne Corporation Left side impact, followed by rollover (900) APPENDIX A 78

Type B School Vehicles (5 cases)

A Type B school bus is a van conversion or body constructed andinstalled on a van or front section vehicle chassis or stripped chassis, with a GVWR cf more than 10,000 pounds, designed for carrng more than 10 persons. Part of the engine is beneath and/or behind the windshield and beside the driver'sseat. The entrance door is behind the front wheels. Note: Type B vehicles must meet the Federal standards for large school buses although they alsoare considered small (Type II) school buses. The gross vehicle weight of_these vehIclesmay be under 10,000 pounds but their GVWR is over 10;000 pounds. The rating includes passenger load.

Number of cases: 5 --Type of accident: Nonrollover 2 (all multiple collision) Rollover 3 (all collision rollovers)

Case number Data

20 Clarkston, Georgia May 8, 1987 1982 Chevrolet chassis with 18-passenger Cadet body by Carpenter-Body Works, Inc. Head-on collision, followed by rear-end colliiion

21 Williston, Vermont Novemter 21, 1987 1979 Chevrolet chassis with- 18-passenger Min-i--Birdbodyby Blue Bird Body Company Multiple collision: sideswipe, followed by head-onimpact

22 Greensboro, North Carolina January 14, 1986 1980 Chevrolet thassis with 20-passenger Mighty Mitebody by Thomas Built Buses_ (bus reconfigured to 10-passenger capacity) Right side'impact, followed by rollover (900)-

23 Little Rock, Arkansas May 2, 1983 1981 Chevrolet chassis with 15-passenger Cadet Body by Carpenter Body Works Head-on collision, followed by rollover (900)

24 Flower Hill, New York January 24, 1986 1979 GMC chassis with 14-passenger Coachette body Rear-end collision, followed by rollover (900)

88 79

APPENDIX B

CASE SUMMARIES OF SCHOOL BUSES BUILT TO FEDERAL SCHOOL BUS STANDARDS

Case No. 1 Safety Board Investigation No. NYC-87-H-S802

Location of Accident Pea Pond Road; outside Bedford, New York

Date and Time September 23, 1986; 8:04 a.m. - Description oF School Vehicle Type A van conversion: 1983-06dge'thassis with 16-passenger body by Ram Van

Type ofAccident Left front impact

Severity of Accident Delta V estimated to be less than 10 mph

Summary of Evints-

A school van was transporting two students to school on a two-way, asphalt county road on a rainy day.. All occupants of the van were restrained. As the school van negotiated a left curve, a 1984 Buick LeSabre station wagon, traveling. in the opposite direction, crossed the centerline and.struck the left front of the school van head-on.

After the crash, the school van driver and two students remained in their seats until emergency personnel arrived,- The driver and one i.Assenger eXited -the-bus unassisted. The remainingpassenger was removed from .the vanbyemergency response personnel. The passengers were treated for injuries and released by the hospital.

Damage tothe poststandard school van-was minor;damage was confinedtothe exterior of the bus, except for a radialfracture of the left front passenger window. Slight rearward deformation was found at the left front front bumper, and grill.

Outcome of Occupants of School Vehicle

Of the 2 passengers, ages_7 ard 10: 2 sustained MA1S 1(minor) injuries.

Both passengers were wearing static lapbelts anchored to the seatframes.Each restraint system was equipped with adjustable, cinching latchplates and- Pushbutton release buckles

The lapbelted passenger spated en the left side in the front seat next to the window received a contusion on the bridge of his nose, from contact with the left lide window. At impact, he most likely pivoted around the belt, moved forward

89 APPENDIX B 80

of pain in his and then to the side, .striking_the window. He also complained rfght leg. Had this passenger abdomen, probably from the lap belt, and in his minor injuries,pnly. been unrestrained, heprobably still would.have sustained seat_next to the passenger sitting onthe right side in the front The lapbelted lower abdomen, caused by the lapbelt. Had window receiveda contusion onhis he probably still would havereceived only minor injuries. .he been unrestrained, that the occupant The use of lapbelts, likeall forms of seatbelts, cannot assure will be uninjured. ?Mir belt; -:t Was' The driver of the school van waswearing the availabTe'lap/shoulder sidewall- equipped with an emergency lockingretractor, a cinching latchplate, a and a.pushbutton releasebuckle mounted toa flexible stalk. mounted D-ring, to the 'right knee. Although the driver was notinjured, she complained of pain three-point-belt, -she-probably would have been . Had-she-mot been wearing the thrown forward and to the left andcould have received at least minor injuries. a more hostile environmentthan.are the The schoolvan driveris. seated in passengers.

Notes About the Accident

The interior of the school vanhad a padded roof.

90 APPENDIX 13

Bedford, New York Case Number 1

Principal Direction of Force

Left Side of Bus Right Side of Bus Driver Row 1D MAIS 0 WO, MAIS 1 Row lA M-7, MAIS 1

:Mt '4 0 e lin, 0.4 1.060

0 I 4.w.. _.oup 11.,1 0 C 0 0..0 6.44 SA4 0 y I \ Wt.44,41V.,

1,Poo ape 1! ..W. *rat...VMS aaNa 16.; CRAM 3 iwf 5... 0 1./..p.00 I [MK 4. U.no, Ws...v. ...osae ,400.- ,a,raa I S.... 0 The school bus shown 11.611.0.4A It,. A.10.01.. 0... is representational only. itatmay,00 %s. 54 1

91 APPENDIX B -82

Case No. 2 Safety Board In-Irmstigation No. NYC-87-H-S804

Location of Accident Intersection ofState Route25A andMooreshill Road; Laurel Hollow, New York

Date and Time February 5, 1987; 3:40 p.m.

Description of SchoolVehicle Type A van conversion: 1980 Chevrolet chassiswith 16-passenger body by Van Con, Inc.

Type of Accident Left front impact

Severity of Accident Delta V 13 mph for school van

Summary of Events

A school van transporting six students homefrom school, was making a left turn when it collided with a1977 Chevrolet Malibu. After impact,- the van-rotated counterclockwise and came to rest--upright. -Safety -Board investigators determined that all of the students and the driver wereunrestrained at the time of the crash;two students and the driver claimed they were restrained, but evidence proved otherwise.

A 13-year-old student made an unsuccesful attempt to openthe rear emergency exit. All passengers evacuated the bus throughthe right side door. The schoolvan driver lay unconscious in theaisle; students had to step over her. The driver was taken to the hospital; all of the students werereleased to their patents- at-thescene and were later examined byprivate-physicians.

The left front bumper and sheet metal of the van weredisplaced rearward and inboard from their normal position. The left front wheeland A-frame assembly were displaced rearward into theinner fender well, causing them and the left door to be deformed. The floor beneath Ahe driver's seat buckled but did not presenta hazard. The poststandard vehicle remained intact and provided good crash protection to the passengers.

Outcome of Occupants of School Vehicle

Passengers

Of the 6 passengers, ages 7 to 13: 2 were uninjured, and

4 sustained MAIS 1 (minor) injuries.

No passenger was wearing the lapbelt available atthe seating position. Although the two students in the front row claimedthey were wearing lapbelts and they had "popped open," the Safety Board investigatorsfound no evidence to support the claims. When the lapbelts wereexamined, they worked properly and had no lorce 1;:ading scars or defects. Theadjustmept lengths, 42 inches for the 9-year- old girland 41inches for the 8-year-old !boy, would be too loose to provide proper fit for the two passengers. APPENDIX 8 83

Four of the students received minor contusions and lacerations to theirfaces and upper limbs. Had the passengersbeen lapbelted,these injuries would still have occurred because each student could easily have reached thesame contact points. Lapbelts provide no upper torso restraint.

Driver

A lap/shoulder belt was available at the driver's position.The driver claimed to have been wearing the restraint, but two passengers reported that the driver was lying in the aisle of the passenger area following the crash, indicating she had not been restrained. Her position reportedly blocked evacuation routes, and the passengers had to step over her to exit the vehicle through theright side passenger door. loading In addition, the driver received moderate (AIS 2) injuries (a cerebral concussion and a large laceration to the right sideof the head), which are not consistent with lap/shoulder belt use ina frontal _crash. Had the driver been wearing the lap/shoulder belt, injuries wouldprobably-have been less severe.

Notes About the Accident

The van conversion was equipped with heavily padded modesty panelsforwa-d of both the left and right front seats; no stanchions were present.

The student who attempted to open the rear emergency door did so.bytrying to push dcwn on the door release handle with her right hand. In her position, the right side of her body would have been'in front of the instructiondecal affixed to the lower.-portion-of the left door, blocking it from her_view. Theinstructiom decal affixed to the right -rear door was also hidden from her viewby the right seatback. She did not attempt to lift the door release handle, whichwould have . opened the door.

The instruction decals had been affixud to the reardoorswhen the van conversion was done by Van Con,Inc. Van Con wa-s notified of the circumstances of this accident and agreed to place decals in the immediate vicinity ofthe door handles on_future conversions. They also agreed to implement a retrofitprogram for their school vans currently in use. APPENDIX B 84

Laurel Hollow, New York Case Number 2

Principal Direction of Force

Heavily padded Heavily padded modesty panel modesty panel

Left Side of Bus Right Side of Bus Driver Row 1D F-38, MAIS 2 M9, MAIS 1 Cerebral concussion Laceration to right forehead Row 2D Contusionio right thigh M-9, MAIS 0

Row 1A Row 3D F-9, MAIS 1 F-13, MAIS 1

Row 2A M-8, MAIS 1

Row 3A F-7, MAIS 0

AcEt,0 o e L.OG 0e-- eLo,..., 1140 o Cn..i %ego, sole

MeS 2 .$6.,0 Woe The school bus shown M /\ 0.,, 6.50 is representational only.

£45 C64.

0 ! MaIG, ) .n4150 I I5; UI11A01.1 gt./4.e.,..,,Gtot ,44 4,0.4AIr APPENWX 85

Case No. 3 Safety Board 1nvestigatiOn No. NYC-87-H-S803

Location of Accident Whippoorwill Road; outside New Castle, New York

Date and Time February 2, 1987; 7:46 a.m.

Description of School Vehicle Type A van conversion: 1983 GMC chassis with 16-passenger Sturdivan body by T.P.I.

Type of Accident Left front impact

Severity of Accident Estimated Delta V 5 mph

Summary of Events

A school van transporting five students to school-was traveling alonga road with patches of snow-and ice. The driver was wearing the available lap/shoulder belt; only one of the student passengers was wearing the-available lapbelt. As the van approached a cross street, an oncoming 1978 Ford sedan crossed the centerlineand collided with the left front of the van. The school van came to rest in its lane near the shoulder, and the Ford was ang1Pd toward the van with its rear axleon the centerline.

After the crash, the school van driver unbuckled his belt and the lapbeltworn by one of the passengers. He led all passengers to the rear of the bus, openedthe emergency exit door, and then assisted each student out of the vehicle. Three

students were treated-for injuries and_released by the hospital. _

The left front of the van was crushed inward; the maximum deformationmeasured 10 inches at extreme left corner. The driver's door was buckled,the left front tire was flat,the wheel was pushed rearward, aid the van bodywas scratched along the leftside- behindthe driver's door. This poststandard school van well performed in this collision: all of the damage wasconfinedto the exterior, and there was no intrusion into the passenger compartment.

Outcome of Occupants of School Vehicle

Passengers

Of the 5 Passengers, ages 7 to 13: 2 were uninjured, 3 sustained MA1S 1(minor) injuries.

Two unrestrained passengers were seated en the left: one in the front seat next to the window, and the other in the third seat from the front nextto the window. Both received minorinjuries, probably fromcontacting the sidewall. Most likely they still would have made contacthad they been wearing the available lapbelts because lapbelts provide no.uppe- torso restraint. APPENDIX 8 86

The only restrained passenger was sitting on the left side in-thesecond seat from the front, next to the window. She sustained no injuries. The passenger seated directly across the aisle from her was unrestrained_ and sustained no injuries. Hence, evaluating the benefit of lapbelt use is difficult in this collision.

Two unrestrained passengers were sitting on the right side of the van next to the window. The one in the front seat received a laceration on the forehead, while the one in the second seat from the front was uninjured. Had the passenger in the front seat been wearing the available lapoelt, her injuries would most likely have been the same because the lapbelts are not designed to prevent minor (MAIS 1) Injuries-. Seating position, more than restraint use, appears to be important- in this collision. priver - The driver of the van was restrained with a lap/shoulder belt and receiveda bruised left forearm anda laceration on his left knee,both minor (AIS 1) injuries. Had he not been wearing the restraint,he Would have been thrown forward and to the left. Because the area surrounding-the- drfver's.seat is more-- hostile than that provided for the students, he.might have received more serious injuries if unrestrained.

Notes About the Accident

The passengers' bench seats were equipped with manually adjustable lapbelts; some belts had pushbutton release buckles, and others had lift relea;:e type buckles. -This mix of buckle releases wassometimes .found installed onthe same-bench seat. The belts were anchored to i.he seatframes and wer: routed beiween the seat cushions and the seatbacks.

The school van was equipped with a padded restraining barrier with lightly padded stanchlons in front of bath fron't seats. The unrestrained passenger seatea in the left front seat sustained a laceration to the lower gum' and a contusion.to *the left eyebrow, both .from contact with the barrier. The _unrestrained passenger in the right-front seat sustained.a small triangular laceration to her forehead from contactwith the barrier. Had thesepassengers been wearing lapbelts at the time of the crash, the same injuries, as well as other facial or head injuries, couldhave .been sustained. Head and face injuries are not eliminated by lapbelt use. In a frontal crash, lapbeltedpassengerswould jackknife over their lapbelts, and contact the restraining barrier.

243 7`7.V.,W.,"-"3""

APPENDIXB 87

:ESEM) ',el Chi ro New Castle, New York 0" eLW" go' a...qr.; Case Number 3 0 C.4 -.V-. Soal

741r.p:. SALIS 7 "4.1...v 1.4 U ro: r...

'oo ...Awn* 141. 8,4 0, .: Prihcipal Direction 0,",,,. 'or of Force *

- -

AMA." 41,4,1 no,

Lightly padded modesty Lightly paddee modesty panel and aisle stanchion panel and aisle stanchion 0

Leh Side of Bus Right Side of Bus Driver Row 1D M.58,_MAIS 1 Le±1 F13, MAIS 1 Row 1,4 Row 2D M8, MAIS 1 3 F.8, MAIS 0 Row 2A F.8, MAIS 0 Row 3A F.7, MAIS 1 PH 4

The school bns shown is toprosonlational only -wows

APPENDIX B 80

Case No. 4 Safety Bo4rd Investigation No. LAX--87-1-1-:S811-

Location of Accident Normandie Avenue; Carson, California

Date and Time May 18, 1937: 7:59 a.m.

Description of School Vehicle Type A van-conversion:1981 Dodge chassis with 16-passenger body by Collins Bus Corporation

Type of Accident Multiple frontal impacts

Severity of-Accident Delta V unknown

Summary of Events _ . A schoolvan traveling about 45Mph was transporting- seven_ special.,cducation students-to school. The van was equipped with seatbelts for only some seats. All students were unrestrained. The driver lost control of the vehicle, which left-the road and mounted the sidewalk. As the van traveled alongth2 sidewalk, I6-inch-diameter-wooden power pole withits right 'it impacted and sheared a front, then sheared a 5-inch-diameter lightstandard before striking and coming to rest against a second wooden pewerpole,

No information was available on exits orevacuation. The damage to the van was concentrated onthe- right front, with a maximum deformationof 33inches of rearward crush. Most of the damage to the interior was in the area of the stairwell. No interior panelseparations were noted. No passenger seats were within thearea of deform-NU-on: -Thts poststandard van performed_ well considering the severity of the collision.

Outcome of Occupants of School Vehicle

Passengers

Of the 7 passengers, ages 8 to-22: I was uninjured, 5 sustained MAIS 1 (minor) injuries, and

I sustained MA1S 2 (moderate) injuries.

all seating All passengers were unrestrained.Lapbelts were not available at positions; only the two front benches had lapbelts installed, which had eithe1 been vandalized or stowed beneaththe seat cushiln.

The passenger sitting on the lettsidein the front seat neAtto the w!ndow received only minor (AIS I) injuries: contusions and abrasions to rinht head, right knee, and elbow.' These or similar- minort-njuries might also have beeo sustained had the passenger been wearing a lapbelt.

98 APPENDIX b

the right side in thefront seat next to the win.lot: The -passenger sitting on ind multiple contusions- and abrasions; received a fracturedleg (probably AIS 2) of the injuries wereunavailable. Because the impact was detailed descriptions froht corner, the passenger was from the front andconcentratred on the right no-barrier (modesty panel) was presentto limit forward probably thrown forward: wearing a lapbelt, or had afrontal barrier movement. Had the passenger been leg. been present, he probablywould not have fractured his

. _ the aisle his The passenger seated on theleft side in the fourth seat next to (all seated adjacent to windows), received The remaining passengers uninjured. Had lapbelts been lacerations, abrasions, andcontusions. minor_ injuries: probably'-still have sustaimmr available and been Worn,these passengers would have prevented_ their contact withthe minor injuries: the lapbelts would not sidewills and windows.

Driver the available lapbelt. He complained cf pain to the. The driver was not wearing coded due to lack of medical chest and right leg;the injuries could not be Deformation of the upper steeringwheel rim W3S noted. The outcome diagnosis. different had he been reetraited for the driver wouldunlikely have been much torso. because the lapbelt wouldnot have restrained his upper

Notes About the Accident - equipped with any fora of Only the driver's seatand the two front seats were Two of the four lapbelts onthe two front seats.had been disabled by 'seatbelt. attachment points for che four lapbelts, =in students. Of the eight possible tampering. Students hadremoved the webbing had been rendered unsafe by ititching that attached thelatchplates.

The school van was notequipped with restraining barriers.

99 APPENDIX 8 90

Carson, California Case Number 4

Principal Direction Secondary of Force, IMpact First Impact

Right Side of Bus Lett Skie of Bus Row 10 Driver M.18, MA1S 2 M.21, MAIS 0 Fractured leg Row 1A Multiple contusions M-14, MAIS 1 and abrasions Row lA Row 2D M.22, MAIS 1 M.17, MA1S 1 Row 48 Row 4C M.9, MAIS 0 M.8, MA1S 1 Row 4D M-16, MAIS 1 LgGp.0 eMr, vo.4 eOw :moo 0 4000- 0 C0.300 %to 0IP1 f .0~0 .04 tr.*. \ 44. Th. school bus shown 000 ars is roptosontational only. Ant 3, "we..

C Ira 0 d;01 Co.., 181. 4 4 8 Memo. 114. DO0 Wad*

11 000,,4a. . 4., 0 ...I So 100 APPENDIX 8 91

Case No. 5 Safety Board InvestigationNo. CHI-86-H-ORC1 Location of Accident Midlothian Road; LakeZurich, Illinois Date and Time October10, 1985; 8:29a.m.

Description of School Vehicle Type Avan conversion: 1984 Chevrolet chassiswith I6-passenger Fortivan bodyby Coach and Equipment Manufacturing Corporation Type of Accident Head-oncollision, with principal, direction of force at about the Io'Clock position--

Severity of Accident Delta V unknown

Summary_of_Events

A school van, equipped with lapbelts for allpassengers and a lap/shoulder forthe driver,was transporting eight belt elementary students to driverand all butone school. The passenger wererestrained.. One passengers of the .restrained was misusing the lapbelt at hisseat. 40 mph on an urban, The van was travelingabout two-lane, two-directionwet road when, to stopped in her travel lane, the avoid a vehicle school van driverveered to the right gravelshoulder. Ilhen the onto the driver attempted tosteer back onto the lost control of the.van_ on-the rain-slicked pavement, road, she opposite lane into oncoming traffic. and Ihe van- enteredthe The schoolvan, traveling at a Tachograph- recorded speed of 29 mph, struckthe front of a Honda the van. Civic CRX travelinytoward After impact, the schoolvan traveled about 40 feet rest upright. before coming to

The driver of-the van exited through the left sidedoor. exited the van through the All eight pas-sengers rear emergency exit withoutassistance; The school van received extensive damage to itsexterior right front with rearward collapsereaching over 20 inches structure,' at the bumper level. The frame, axle, suspension, and sheetmetalmoved rearward. jammed shut by damage, The right side servicedoor was and the floor at theentrance step was buckled. significant interior damagewas No noted within thepassenger seating area of the van. The poststandard school van Chassis and body performed well in -thismoderate speed collision,dissipating the crash forces to its occupants. without serious injuries

Outcome of Occupants of SchoolVehicle

Passengers

Of the 8 passengers,ages 8 to 12: 2 were uninjured. 4 sustained MA1S 1(minor) injuries, and 2 sustained MAIS 2 (moderate)injuries.

101 APPINDIX ft 92

The lapbelts were -equipped withpushbutton release buckles. One of the restrained passengers,however,had created a huge lapbeltby combining the_ latchplate from one belt system with the buckle of another on the same seat.

Both passengers sitting on the left side in the front seatwere Wearing lapbelts; theyreceived minor (A1S 1) contusions and abrasions. Had neither been wearing his restraint, eachprobably would stillhave received at least minor injuries. Theprincipal direction offorcecame from the 1' o'clock direction-. both of these passengerswould have been .thrown Olt() the modesty panel and stanchion crossbar in front of them. All components were padded, but some minor injuries probablywould still hive resulted. (Note: The passenger seated next _tothe window indicated to medical _personnel that his belt came loose. The statement is not supported by the types of injuiries sustaircedi

Both passengerssitting onthe rightside -in the front seat were wearing lapbelts: they received moderate (A1S 2), unspecified closed head injuries frr, pivoting forward al.the hips and hitting- the'r heads on the stanchion crossbar that provides--the upper frame for the modesty panel. Had neither been restrained, each would have been thrown forward into the modesty panel and probably would have received at leastsome minor injuries. However,because most of the impact would have been spreaa out over the entire body, rather than concentrated on their. heads. their injuries might well have been lessened.

The two passengers sitting on the left side in the secend seat claimed to be wearing lapbelts; neither was injured. However, the passenger next to the aisle told the Safety Board investigator he had not actually buckled his belt: he had inserted the "tongue" of-the belt into the buckle latchplate. but not -far enough to engage the buckle. He also stated that AS the belt opened,the passenger seated adjacent to the window grabbed him and held him in place.

The passenger sitting 06 the left side in the third seat next to the window was wearing a lapbelt. His only injury, was a bruise from the lapbelt.

The passenger sitting in the last seat on the right side was next to.the window and was misusing the restraint furnished at his seat. He had fastened the buckle. from the lapbelt at one side of the seat to the latchplate from the lapbelt on the other side of the seat. forming 4 large lapbelt with excessive slack. He received minor (AIS 1)injuries (two bruises and a laceration .to his head), from pivoting forward at the hips and striking his-head on the seatback in front of him. Had henot been wearing the-restraint.he probablystill would have received some minor injuries from being thrown against the seatback in front of him.

Driver

The driver of the schoolbus was wearing a lap/shoulder belt equippedwith dual retractors and a windowshade tension relief feature. She received minor (A1S I) contusions and abras)ons. from the driver's description, itappears that the lapbelt portion of the restraint was properly adjusted, but the shoulder strap was worn loosely over the driver's left chest, sagging to an areaprobably lower than that usually considered proper.Had the driver not been restrained by the lap/shoulder belt, she would have been thrown forward into the steering wheel and instrument panel. probably receivingadditional minor andperhaps moderate injuries. 102 93 APPENDIX B

Notes About the Accident

Although most passengers in the school van apparently were restrained, they may nothave been wearing thelapbeltscorrectly. Thesestudentshad behavior disorders and required constant supervision. The school district furnishes no formal direction or education regarding the, proper placement or snugness of restraints. The students are told by the driver to use the lapbelts and pull them 'tight."

This schoolvan was equipped with restraining barriers forward of -bothfront seats. The panels were supported by stanchions and crossbars which,though padded, present a contact surface to passengers in the front s?ats.

103 APPENDIX B 94

Lake Zurich, Illinois Case Number 5

Principal Dowctum of F orce

Lightly padded modesty Lightly ihidilffil panel arid ai%le stanchion and

Left Side of Bus Right Side of Bus Dover Row IC F 5 I. MAIS 1 M 11, MAIS CII)s.,(1 head ninny, unc.orist..lo.t." Row lA ley.; thari 15 minute.. M 9. MAIS 1 Contusion on troth knees Row 18 M 9. MAIS 1 Row ID M 10.MAIS Row 7A CI:11:111.11 M 11. MAIS COM Wili/n1 rn.ilit knee Row 78 Row 4 M 11. MAIS M 12, MAIS 1 Row 3A M 8. MAIS 1 SpeciM Notes: Passenger in Row 4 tietwiwni CAND was using the buckl hum one position and the latcholjt,r- from the other position

The school bus thiiwn r item "von t ahoiJt only

1 0 4 95 APPENDIX B

Case No. 6 Safety Board Investigation No. FTW-87-F-S815

Location of Accident Intersection ofGarey Avenue at Grand; Pomona, California

Date and Time June 11, 1987; 2:40 p.m.

Description of School Vehicle Type A van conversion: 1987 Dodge chassis with 16- passenger Bantam body by Collins Bus Corporation

Type of Accident Frontal impact

Severity of Accident Delta V unknown

Summary of Events

A smallschool van was transporLing_nine_special educationstudents Ori.afive- lane city street. The driver and all nine student passengers were restrained, by the lapbelts installed in the van. Witnesses stated that the van was trave?ing at about 35 mph when it veered from the second traffic lane and struck thecurb. The-students reported that the 72-year-old. driver grasped his chest,and then slumped behind the steering wheel. The van rode along the curb for about 250 feet before overriding the curb and striking front first intoan 18-inch-diameter utility pole.

No_ information is available on evacuation.

The poststandard ichool van received substantial damage to the frontand left front. The 18-inch utility pole penetrated more than 20 inches into thedriver's seating area. The steering column was displaced rearward, and the floorand firewallaround the driver's seat were buckled.The driver's seat was also forced rearward and displaced from its mounting tracks. Induced damage was found all about the van's body; both the left and right front doorswere jammed. The rear emergency exit doors and the double doors onthe rightside remained operational.

Dutton* of Occuparts of School Vehicle

Passengers

Of the 9 passengers, ages 6 to 12:

9 received MATS 1 (minor) injuries.

All passengers reportedly we: wearing the lapbelts available at their seating positions at the time of the crash. The Safety Board investigatorwas not able to confirm their restraint status. howeverT.

1015 APPENDIX B 96

All passengers reported minor (AIS Most of the injuries 1) contusions, abrasions,and lacerations_ were to the face or lowerlimbs, with two abdominal trauma. The pattern of injuries, complaints of pain, especially compaintsof abdominal are consistent with lapbelt use. Most passengers sustained injuries of probably would have similar severity hadthey been the passengers unrestrained, except for in the front seats. This van conversion installed forward of the did nothavebarriers front seats; even in thismoderate speed passengers in the front seatscould have suffered collision, the had been thrown forward additional injuries ifthey into the frontal interiorand stepwells. Driver

The lapbelt-restraineddriver received critical fatal: (AIS 5)injuries that proved flailed chest, lacerationof the left lung, multiple abrasions a_cardiac contusion,and andlacerations. Because of the severe intrusion driver's compartment, the use of a lap/shoulder belt into the reduced his injury level. probably would nothave

Notes About the Accident

This school vanwas not equipped with padded barrier, restraining barriers,or any type of forward of thefront seats. Consequently,unrestrained would be free to bemove forward into the frontal passengers On the other hand, had interior and doorstepwells. restraining barriersbeen present, lapbelted could have sustainedneck passengers head injuries fromcontact with the jackknifed forward duringthe frontal collision. barrier as they A review of the "1-year-old drlier's medicalhistory revealed diagnosed in197 is having chronic pulmonary that he had been obstruction and heart disease. The autopsy report atherosclerotic revealed 85 percentocclusicn of the descending branch cf theleft coronary artery, anterior coronary artery, an 75 percent occlusionof the right 117.1s percent occlusionbf the circumflex coronary artery. At the time of Li accident, the driverpossessed a valid driving a school bus medical certificatefor 97 APPENDIX B

LE '1E743 0 eLap 8e, t.:10 ',Wed 0 /..lov lowed

Pomona, California Case Number 6 7.4 17 Va,,,IN MS.

C9e7. 444 ir.aa Principal Direction 5 C,,,ca. e of Force 7 I.71014 al.raal, ollIg 9 Umeno., .? w.o.otel

V444.

Unpadded handrail Left Side_of Bus Driver M-72, MAIS 5 Lacerations of left lung with hemothorax Cardiac contusion Flail chest Fracture sternum Fracture - left femur Right Side of Bus Contusion - right iung Row 3C Multiple abrasions F.9, MAPS 1 Multiple lacerations Row 30 Row 1A M.6, MAIS 1 F-12, MAIS 1 Row 4C Row 2A. M-8, MAIS 1 F-11, MAIS 1 Row 2B F-8, MAIS 1 Row 3A Special Notes: M-7, MAIS 1 The restraint status Row 38 all passengers M-13, MAIS 1 ) could not be confirmed. Row 4A M-9, MAIS 1 The scbool bus shown is representational only. 107 APPENDIX B 98

Case No. 7 Safety Board Investigation No. CHI-85-H-OR06

Location of Accident 128th Avenue and 26th Street; Allegan, Michigan

Date and Time December 5, 1984; 12:15 p.m.

Description of School Vehicle Type A vanconversion: 1978 CheVrolet chassis with 16-passenger body by Sheller-Globe Corporation

Type of Accident Head-on Collision

Severity of Accident Delta V unknown

Summary of Events

A school van'was transporting sevenHead Start students. All passengers were restrained: threeby lapbelts and four by child_safety seats. The driver was wearing the available lapbelt. The van was traveling ona two-lane,two-way rural highway when an oncoming tractor/trailercombination unit (27,710 pounds) crossed over the centerline into theschooT van's lane. When the truckdriver braked, attempting to get out of the pathof the school yan,the.trailer unit jackknifed and rotated counterclockwise. The van struck the trailer head-on with its extreme left front, striking theright drive axle of the tractor and crushing the van rotated in the entire front structure of the van. At impact, counterclockwise 90 degrees, traveled 38 feet backward,and came to rest upright.

- The driver of the van was pinnecil,in thewreckage and was uhable t6 assist with evacuation of the passengers. At least two of the passengers were removed from the van by passersby; the rest were removedby emergency response personnel and other persons assisting at the accident scene.

The front structure of the school van wasdestroyed, with structural collapse reaching a depth of more than 35 inches atthe exterior left front,- past the driver's compartment, ending just forward of thefirst row Of passenger seats. No major damage was noted to the passenger seatframework or to the van interior behind the restraining barrier.Restraining barriers mounted just behind the driver's seatand the loading door were displaced rearwardattheir bottom attachmentsdueto 'the buckling ofthepassenger compartment floor. This- rearward displacement probably increased the severity ofcontact for passengers in the front seats.

Most of the damage to the poststandard school vanin thissevere crash was sustained at the driver's compartment. The integrity of the passenger compartment was not violated and, consideringthe impact forces involved, the -passengers fared well. From severity of the crash and differencein vehicle weights, the van driver had little chance ofsurvival; she was fatally injured.

1 OS ,141,Aqe tiriW

99 APPENDIX B

Outcome of Occupants of School Vehicle

'Passengers

Of the 7 passengers, ages 3 to 4: 4 sustained MAIS 1(minor) injuries, 2 sustained MAIS 2 (moderaie; injuries, and 1 sustained MAIS 3 (serious) injuries.

Three of the passengers'were restrained by lapbelts; four otherswere in child safety.seats secured to the bench seats by lapbelts.

The major impact forces of this collision acted at the extreme front of theyane While the front stopped in a very short distance, the rear rotatrdvery rapidlY away from the direct force line. This increased-the distance over which therear of the van decelerated, in effect, greatly reducing the G forces at the seatin% positions nearer the rear of the van:

The most seriously injured passengers were seated in the frontarea of the van; all moderately injured passengers were seated along the left side. Injuries to the children in the.front seats were a direct result of the collapsing front structure; the other passengers in the van were injured by contact with the seats in front of them. Most of the passengers who sustained minor injuries were seated at the rear and right rear of 'the van,the portion of the passenger compartment that experienced less crash forces

The passenger on the left side in-the front seat next to the-window, ina Ford Tot Guard child safety.seat, sustained serious (AIS 2) injuries: fraCtures of left arm and leg. ihe passenger on the right side in the 'front seat nextto the window, also in a Ford Tot Guard child safety seat, sustainedserious (AIS 3) injuries: displaced-fractures of left leg. Had these two passengers not been restrained, they probably wo'uld have been propelled into the collapsing sheetmetal and would have sustained more serious injuries.

The passenger on the left side in the second seat next to the window,restrained by a lapbelt, sustained minor (AIS 1) injuries: contusionsandabrasions, attributed principally to the lapbelteThis passenger mighthave been more seriously injured had the restraint not been used.

The lapbelted passenger seated on the left side in the third seat nextto window sustaineda moderate (AIS2) injury (fracture of the left wrist)and minor contusionsfromthelapbelt. This passenger could .havebeen more seriously injured had she been unrestrained.

The lapbelted passenger on the right side in the third seat next to the window sustained minor (AIS 1) injuries: contusions and abrasions.His injuries might have been more serious had he been unrestrained.

The passengers of both fourth row seats next to the windowswere in Ford Tot Guard child safety seats. Both received minor (AIS 1) injuries: contusions and abrasions. The child safety seats worked wellin preventing additional or more serious-injuries.

109 _

APPENDIX B

Driver

The driver used the available lapbelt. Because of the structural occurred at impact, the driver received collapse that multiple traumatic injuriesthat proved fat,-.1. Specific injuries listed by emergency room records .included near amputation of the left arm and left leg (ATS 3), multiple lacerationsabout the abdomen and face,arid facial contusions. Restraint use was irrelevantfor the driver because no survivablespace remained at his seating position.

Notes About the Accident

This school van was equipped withwell:padded restrainingbarri both frOnt bench seats.- forward'of

110 fkl..7-7MWST-MTI;T"TT' -M1mMM,X!tg.nrOrTANIST

APPENDIX 3 101

Allegan, Michigan Case Number 7 0 0 8.4

0 , 6,44, 11.11 Vs4 0 ® A 0 C.-.0!...41, So

2 :14.0 to, Principal Direction y of Force Vti AC. Y,y-. *at-

A,S S.y. t:^ S :,rt. : .1,4 ? ,n...01 ...,.., - 1 c..1.0.1 _ , Jnrc 4 ',...... 1 .4.1 40,11 .Ora V, 5

Heavily padded Heavily padded modesty panel modesty panel Left Side of Bus Right Side of Bus Driver Row 1D F-26, MAIS 3 F-4, MAIS 3- Neal amputation of left arm Displaced fracture of left tibia Near amputation of left leg Fracture of left fibula Laceration on abdomen Multiple lacerations on face Row 3D- Laceration on right leg M-4, MAIS 1 Contusions on face Row AD Row 1A MAIS 1 M-3, MAIS 2 Fractured left radius Fractured left ulna Fractured left tibia

Row 2A M-4, MAIS 1

Row 3A- F-4, MAIS 2 Nondisplaced fracture of left wrist Contusion on right hip Contusion on left hip

Row 4A The school bus shown M-4, MAIS is representational only.

11 '?'"4,,,,,,.5;i;`,V,O.,

APPENDIX B 102

Case No. 8 Safety Board Investigation No. MKC-84-H-S1321

Location of Accident Anunnumbered Webster County road;outside Fort Dodge, Iowa

Date and Time March 15, 1984; 12:25 p.m.

Description of School Vehicle Type A van conversion: 1980 Chevrolet chassis with 16-passenger body by Superior Coach International

Type of Accident Noncollision rollover (900)

Severity of Accident _ Delta V not calculable

Summary of Events

A schoolvan, equipped with lapbelts for all occupants, was transporting two kindergarten students home from-school on a-wet, two-lane, two-way gravel road. Alloccupants were unrestrained-. The driver allowed the van to travel to the left edge of the road and then back across-the road to the right edge. The van then veered back to the left,rotating counterclockwise 1800,and overturned onto its right side in a ditch. The driver was partially ejected and crushed.

The two passengers opened the rear emergency door and exited the van_

The interior.of the poststandard schoolvan was not damaged,and only minor damage occurred to the exterior. The boarding door, which had been partially open as the bus rolled-over, was damaged- as was the right rear corner of the-- school van. The structure of the van held up well in the rollover. Crush forces- wereminor. No panel separations occurred, and thevehicle- body wasnot distorted.

Outcome of Occupants of School Vehicle

Passengers

Of the 2 passengers, age 6: 2 were uninjured.

One passenger had been on the right side in the second row next to the window; the other was on the left in the third row next to the window. The pa;senger in row 3 probably slid to the right side during the rollover.Neither of them was wearing the available lapbelts. The passengers told the Safety Board investigators they had never been instructed or encouraged to use the available belts. (The school district policy, as stated by the bus supervisor,is that if a seatbelt is available, it is tobe worn.) Because bothpassengers were uninjured, their lapbalt use in this accident would not have been of benefit.

112 te'r .41 Vg.:1;,NV tf "A1,1-.71.14

103 APPENDIX B

Driver

The driver of the school vanreceived injuries that proved fatal: chest compression syndrome. As the van rolled to the right, the unrestrained driver probably fell out of her seat and against the boarding door. The driver was partially ejected and then crushed under the doorframe as the bus cane to rest on its right side. If the driver had morn the available lapbelt, her ejection and resulting death could have been prevented.

Notes About the Accident

The school van was equipped with padded restraining barriers forward of the front row of seats.

The passenger loading-door latch cOnsisted.of a-handle near the center- of the vehicle that is Connected to the door by a long rod. -The handle latches the dmr closed by being swung past center in an arc. The handle is easily bumped ar jarred past center,allowing the door to open:- several other -drivers -inthe- school di-S.6=kt stated that, on roUgh -roads', the latch did not keep the door from opening. The Safety Board found that the door handle on the accident van mowed easily out of the locked position. A positive latch.cin the door handle could prevent this occurrence.

The unrestraineddriver either may have bumped or grabbed the door handle ofthe passenger boarding door asshe 'fell againstthe door. -Thus, shemay hale 'unlocked the door, permitting her ejection.

See also cases 11, 15, 17,-and19.

113 lleeefili.- '01,1ea .1'14 "

APPENDIX 104

Fort Dodge, Iowa Case Number 8

Rollover

Heavily padded Heavily padded ...b. modesty panel modesty panel A B Left Side of Bus Right Side of Buz. Driver Row 20-- F-29, MAPS 7 Chest compression syndrome M.6, MAPS 0 Contusion-lower abdomen

Row 3A F-6, MAPS 0

o 0111411V, P., .1 0 Joy. 15.:of

e:- Soh' VW. - -,.rod 0,..4 1 ..4 , t ...wt.. ee Ve ag,. A. 1,6 Cale r4 1. Th school bus shown ...441 C... is representational only. 1 V . 4 V;44 , I V...1 . i.IPS. 4.11 ,1 11.. Astet,. 4.0 . .Ileete . 104 I%e

114 -

105 APPENDIX 8

Case No. 9 Safety Board Investigation No. LAX-87-11-S808

Location of Accident State Route 134; Los Angeles, California

Date and Time April 8, 1987; 8:30 a.m.

Description of School Vehicle Type A van conversion: 1976 Ford school van configured for 16 passengers

Type of Accident Noncollision rollover (900)

Severity of Accident Delta V not calculable

Sumary of Events . _ A school van, transporting three special education stUdents, was traveling on a four-lane freeway at a-driver-estimated speed of 35 mph. All occupants were_ reported to be-restrained-by the lapbelts available at each seating position.. The driver had to br-akesuddehly,-the van skidded-forward, and the driver made a, sharp right turn to avoid collision with a vehicle ahead. The school van rota1k' 1800 clockwise and overturned onto its left side.

The driver exited through the right door of the bus. Two of the passengers were able to release their lapbelts and extricate themselves.One passenger was: unable to release the belt and was helped by the driver.A passerby also helped the passengers exit the bus through the right front door.

DaMage to the poststandard school vehiclewas slight and-was limited to-minor- dentirig at the D pillar, displacement of the overhead signs and the left side mirror, and minor sheet metal scraping. The driver's door window and the front section ofa leftside adjustable window shattered. No interior damage was evident. The van performed well in this low speed rollover.

Outcome of Occupants of School Vehicle

Passengers

Of the 3 passengers, ages 12 to 15: 3 were uninjured.

Although no one was injured, one passenger complained of leg pain.

Reliable information was noi available about the exact seating position of the passengers; the lapbelts displayed no force loading marks to confirm restraint use. Had the passengers been unrestrained, the injury outcome probably would have been similar in this low speed rollover, but analysis is hindered by-lack of information about seating poslition.

115 , al''11

APPENDIX B 106

Driver wa'S not injured, but she did experienceneck pain. The lapbelt-restrained driver injury outcome probably would have beensimilar. Had she not been restrained,

6 0,,,vd_mtay, 0-

107 APPENDIX 8

Los Angeles, California Case Number 9

Rollover

Driver F-36, MAIS 0

D Seating position of passengers is unknown

All reported. wearing .lap belts, and all were uninjured

2 M12, MAIS 0

M-14, MAIS 0

y15, MAIS 0

JUA4) 0 4.40- C e4v Iv. .1.0.1 0 c teio. Ivy The school bus shown 4044 ft.. oil is ropsesonlationol only V .W.0 11. 44' V 44. 4..4 *4 4 C.V. v4 ) v C.44 i .4r 4444.44,.. 4. I 114rar .44.44 ...me. . 1 1.6.4.4 S vs ...roe Alm.. t 4.....0.0* Mb.- ...fir 1 /*I 110;. Cat?

APPENDIX 8 108

Case No. 10 Safety Board Investigation No. NYC-85-H-SBIO

Location of Accident Southern State Parkway; outside New York City, New York

Date and Time April 19, 1985; 3:30 p.m.

Description of School Vehicle Type A van conversion: 1978 Dodge chiisis with 16- passenger Fortivan bodybyCoach and Equipment Manufacturing Corporation

Type of Accident Noncollision rollover(2700)

Severity of Accident DeltaVnot calculableAdriver reportedshe was traveling 45 mph before loss of control)

Summary of Events

A schoolvan was transporting 10 learning-disabled students and an adult aide home from school on a rainy day. Only one passenger andthe driver were restrained. As the van negotiated a curve, at a driver-estimated speed of 45 mph, the driver lost control and the van struck the curb of the center median. The van rolled over onto its left side in the median, continued to roll until it completed three-quarters of a revolution, and came to rest on its right side.

The 10 students were evacuated through the rear emergency door; the driver and aide-evacuated the van through the front windshield area (the windshield had-been dislodged).

The top portion of the poststandard van was shifted slightly to the right and showed scratch marks from the rollover. Two sections of sheet metalon the midsection of the inside roof had separated, exposing the edges of the metal. The seats on the right side were undamaged. The seatbacks on the left side were pushed slightly inboard. The left side window frames were displaced toward the center about 7 inches and were up against the seatbacks. The padded restraining barriers were dislodged from their anchors.

Outcome of'Occupants of School Vehicle

Passengers

Of the 11 passengers, a 26-yar-old aide and 10 students, ages 9 to 13: 2 were uninjured, 8 sustained MAIS 1(minor) injuries, and 1 sustained-MAIS 2 (moderate) injuries.

ita '44.11.1,14'.'

109 APPENDIX B

Only 1 of the 11 passengers was restrained although a lapbelt was available at every seating position. The lapbelted passenger was seatedon the right side in the second row next to the window, and reportedly was uninjured.

Of the 10 unrestrained passengers, only one received more than minor injuries: the student seated in row 1 on the left aisle received a moderate (AIS 2) injury (a fractured left clavicle, contact point unknown) and a contusion on the left shoulder (AIS 1) from contact witha window frame. Lapbelt use might have reduced the moderate injury to a minor one, because the fractured clavicle most likely occurred when the passenger fell from the left to the right side of the van during rollover.

Difference in the minor injuries sustained by the other unrestrained passengers would have been unlikely had lapbelts been used. In a rollover of more than 180°, passengers sitting next to the windows will likely strike their heads, arms, and legs against the vehicle Anterior, fven if lapbelted.-

The adult aide received the most extensive assortment of minor (AIS 1)injuries of any- passenger: lacerations to the right side of head, abrasions on left wrist, contusion to left leg, contusion near-eight-eye, and laceration to left elbow. She had been seated on the right sit:e in thefirst row next to the window.

The initial ground contact was on the left side, near the top of the windows. Passengers seated on the left side of the poststandard van would have sustained more severe initial impact.

Driver

- The driver of the school van1 was wearing the available lapbelt and received minor (AIS 1) injuries: contusions on abdomen (from lapbelt) and laceration on bridge of nose (contact unknown). It is difficult to determine whether the injuries would have been different had the driver not been wearing the belt.

Notes About the Accident

Analysis of injuries based on official police reports can be misleading.The New York police accident report filed with the Department of Motor Vehicles lists 8 of the10 students in the bus as having no visible injury.The Safety Board investigator however,determined that two students were uninjured, seven had minor injuries, and one sustained moderate AIS 2) injuries.

An adult aide had been provided by the school district to ride the school van to assist the driver with the special education students. One of the aide's duties is to instruct the children to buckle up (the aideis not asked to physically fasten their seatbelts). Despite this charge, the aide and 9 of the 10 students were unrestrained at the time-of the accident. Because the laphelts on this bus were manually adjustable, students would have to adjust the belts before they would fit properly.

119 4 ' . ._ ,- t6fq '4,441.* ,

APPENDIX B llO

One of the poles supporting the restraining barrierscame loose,leaving am exposed anchor point in the ceiling that couldhave causedinjuryto the passengers. One unrestrained passenger is known to haye struckthe ceiling, but not at this location.

This van, retrofitted to Federal school bus standards,held up relatively well during the rollover. Although the roof panels separated, exposingedges of sheet 11;etal, they apparently didnot injure any ofthe passengers. Such panel separations pose a hazard to passengers. 44*-0

111 APPENDIX B

Nassau County, New York Case Number 10

A,f; Coors,v,d f.4.

S I U..). 6 2 1,644,10,ea Se,covi UPI,. .16.fro4A ,ep W04, Rollover 14"...Wid nmw ks.

Lightly padded modesty panel Lightly padded with aisle stanchion modesty panel / with aisle stanchion

C Left Side of Bus Right Side of Bus Driver 0011 Row 10 F-38, MAIS 1 F-26, MAIS 1 Row 1A Row 20 F-12, MAIS 1 z F-12, MAIS 0 Row 18 Row 3D F-11, MAIS 2 Fractured left clavicle M13, MAIS 1 Row 4C Contusion on left shoulder 3 Row 2A M-11, MAIS 1 F9, MAIS 1 Row 40 Row 3A F10, MAIS 1 F12, MAIS 0 Row 4A 00.00 M-11, MAIS 1 Row 48 M10, MAIS 1

Tho school bus shown fon51060r1101iOnai only.

121 APPENDIX B 112

Case No. 11 Safety Board Investigation No. NYC-87-H-SBO5

Location of Accident Palmer Road; Denville, New Jersey

Date and Time March 9, 1987; 8:40 a.m.

Description of School Vehicle Type A van conversion: 1986 Chevrolet chassis with 16-passenger van body by Van Con, Inc.

Type of Accident Multiple frontal impacts, followed by rollover (900)

Severity of Accident Delta V 10 mph for initial pole impact

Summary of Events

A school van, transporting six students to school, was negotiatinga right curve.. on a two-lane roadway when the driver lost control _of _the vehicle. The van traveled onto the left shoulder, struck two utility poles, rolledover onto its right side, andcame torest. Fourofthe passengers were restrainedby lapbelts; the driver was restrained by a lap/shoulder belt.

After the crash, the driver unbuckled his lap/shoulder belt and walkedover the passenger. seats to the rear of the van, opened the emergency exit door,and assisted each student out of the van. The driver and students then waited at the side of the road for the police to arrive.

Thepoststandard van sustained moderate damage totheleftand rightfront fenders from contact with the utility poles.Only minor damage occurred to the van body fromthe rollover. There was a minor separation of the innersheet metal from the window frame of the rearmost windowon the right side and at the right front behind the -passenger loading door.The boarding door had opened during rollover. The flooring was buckled underneath the driver'sseat and the engine cover. The instrument panel between the engine cover and steeringcolumn ^ was cracked, and the right side passenger door control arm was deformed. Blood and hair were embedded in the second window frame on the right side.

Outcome of Occupants of School Vehicle passengerl

Of the 6 passengers, ages 5 to 18: 4 were uninjured, and 2 sustained MA1S 1(minor) injuries.

Four of the six student passengers were restrained with static lapbelts. Of the two passengersthat were injured,one was wearing a lapbeltandone was unrestrained. Both were seated on the right side, and both received minor (AlS 1) contusions and abrasions to the right side of their bodies. 'Passengers on the left side of the vehicle (the high side of the vehicle during ttie rollover),were uninjured; two were lapbelted and one was unrestrained.

122 113 APPENDIX B

There appears to be no correlation between belt use or nonuse and the injuries sustained in this accident.

Driver

The driver, who was restrained by a lap/shoulder belt, sustained a minor (AIS 1) contusion to his left knee. This injury was probably caused by the deceleration when thebus struck the first utility pole.The lap/shoulder belt may have prevented additional injuries to this driver.

Notes About the Accident

The passenger'seats were equipped with manually adjustable lapbelts that'had cinching-type, lift release-type bucklesThe_belts_were anchored to the seat_ frames and were routed between the seat cushions and seatbacks.

It .appears that therightside- passengerloading door openedduring the collision; the door control arm did not have locking mechanism. Although the open door did not result in additional injuries in this accident, it did present% a potential hazard by creating an opening through which an occupant could have.- been ejected. (See case 8, Fort Dodge, Iowa.)

123 = 'At-W.iri,14;11 tt

APPENDIX B 114

LEGEND LInalmrao e Eta, 01.1 Loa:, Su6,6,7.164. f_j_jtri,taed e Denville, New Jersey 0 many 0,00.e aloom 640 'ased Case Number 11 0 WIsam Co64 C000 Sate SAmt

E. wropor MMS 2 4:144C N. 14 17 °CAWS,. Aviv? Rollover Ma..rnan AiS AA" Ay 17 Injury .t. oMS-2, Principal Direction A IS Cole ar.0 tn,ury SrverI 0-M0014.1.c 5-Cmu:41 of Force 164.nof 6 Mmanum .e6Loro 2 MAIAVat, 7 lfj,4d unor0.44 3 St-Uni-noAn of 4.5.44.04 .6014ncan km:4,ms for it,Iconohn tied.c.n .^Atly Sceie tALS,

Heavily padded Heavily padded modesty panel modesty panel

Left Side of Bus Right Side of Bus Driver Row 1D M-26, MAIS 1 M-6, MAIS 0

Row 1A Row 2D M-10, MAIS 0 0 M. MAIS 1

Row 2A k,-_vw *ID M-5, MAAS 0 M-15, MAIS 1

Row .4:4 M15, MAIS

The school bus shown is representational only.

124 115 APPENDIX B

Case No. 12 _Safety Board Investigation'No. SEA-87-H7S805

Location of Accident West Powell Boulevard; Gresham, Oregon.

Date and Time January 14, 1987; 1:98 p.riL

Description of School Vehicle Type A van conversion: 1979 Dodge chassis with 14.- passenger Sturdivan. body by T.P.I. (van was painted brown)

Type of.Accident Frontal impact, followed by rollover (900)

Severity of Accident Delta V 21.7 mph

Summary of Events . _ A school van, equipped wfth lapbelts for all occupants, was transporting 11 Head Start students home from school, traveling at a witness-estimated speed of 40- mph. Of :the -11 passen9ers, 10 were wearing lapbelts; the driver was-- unrestrained. ThedrIver lost control-of the Van on-a two-lane asphalt road; the *vehicle crossed.over into the opposing lane, left the roid, and jumped a curb. After it struck a large brick and concrete pillar, the van slowly rolled over onto its left side and came to rest.

A passerby saw the van turn over, went to the bus, entered through the front windshield (which had been displaced), and began helping students out-of the van. She handed them to another passerby standing outside the bus. She later recalled finding one student dangling from the belt but could not recall if other students _ Were in such position.

The van sustained most of its damage to the front end,just to the right of center, with the maximum crush measuring 29 inches. Minor scratches and dents- were noted on the left side. Considering the severity ofthe impact, this poststandard school van-performed well.- All of the damage was confined to the exteriorof the vehicle. Theentirewindshield wasdisplaced during the accident.

Outcome of Occupants of School Vehicle

Passengers

Of the 11 passengers, ages 4 to 5: 1 was uninjured, 9 sustained MAlS 1(mihor) injuries, and 1 sustained MA1S 2 (moderate) injuries.

Of the 11 passengers,10 were wearing lapbelts; Ahe unrestrained passenger-was the only one uninjured.

125 APPENDIX B 116

the left side in the first seat receivedminor 'The two lapbelted passengers on Both had bruises On Aheirabdomens from the lapbelts; the passenger injuries. her.face, most likely caused .by next to the windowhad bruises and abrasions on barrier with-her head: hinging forward at herhips.and striking the restraining laceration on his left hand and the other, seated next to the aisle. received a restraining abrasions on his left handand right knee. He probably hit the been wearing lapbelts, barrier and his knee. Had these passengers not injuries probably stillwould have been minor. The The front seat on the rightside was occupied ty two lapbelted passengers. a moderate 5-year-old next to the aisle wasthe only passenger who received in this crash. His head concussion,the worst injurysustained injury, a forward at-the_ hips and_his: injuries were probablycaused when he "jackknifed" him. Nis other injuries the restrainingbarrier in front .of headstruck his lower lip, consisted of bruises on hisface, a laceration on the inside of abdomen from the__ and a bruise on his right arm, He 'also had abrasions on his lapbelt, he most likely would have hit the lapbelt: Had he not been wearing the restraining'barrier with his entirebody. The forces would have been distributed injuries might have'been only a:nor over a largerportion of his body, and his (MATS 1). window, The other passenger in thefront seat on the right side, next to the sustained bruises and a minorabrasion to the head and complained ofabOoninal lapbelt. Had 'this daysafter theaccident, probablyfrom the pain for 5 but probably passenger been unrestrained,the injuries might have been different still would haw, been minor. side receiNed ninor Both lapbelted passengersin the second seat on the left had abrasions on the right si..te of injuries. The passenger next to the window of the seat infront of him. ?hp his bead,probably from hitting the back to the aisle received asmall laceration on the left ear.,ah passenger next complained- of abrasion on her chin, and a bruise on her right shin. Both Had neither of these passengers beenwearing the lapbelts, they abdominal pain. them and most likely would have beenthrown forward into the seat in front of still would have received Atleast minor injuries. side The only unrestrained passenger,sitting in the second seat on the right Although he told Ihe next to the aisle, was theonly passenger not injured. investigator he was wearing hislapbelt, two other passengers stated'he was not. He also had no abdominalbruises or pain. Had he been wearing the available lapbelt, he might have experienced someabdominal pain or bruising. abrasions on the The other passenger in theseat, next to the window, received The head injuries were right side of her head andcontusions from the lapbelt. probably caused by hitting theseatback in front of her as she hinged forward lapbelt. her injuries might have from her hips. Had she not been wearing the been different but stillwould have been minor. 117 APPENDIX B

The remaining lapbelted passengers were sitting in the third seat:one on the left side next to the window, and two on the right side.All three received bruises around the abdomen, caused by the lapbelts. Other injuries were contusions and abrasions on the face, most likely caused by striking the back of the seat in front as they jackknifed forward from their hips. Had they-not been wearing the laobelts, the energy of impact with the seatback in front of them would not have been concentrated on their faces and heads,but they probably still would have received minor injuries.

Driver

The driver was not wearing the available lapbelt.She was thrown-forward- on impact and most likely contacted the windshield and/or steering Wheel, causing AIS I abrasions, lacerations,and bruises on her face.The contact with the steering wheel and the bruise on her right thigh could have been resulttd frNi hitting the engine cover. Had she been wearing the lapbelt, she probably still would have-received some minor injuries.--

Notes About the Accident

The driver told the Safety Board investigator that she had been distracted by the students' behavior immediately before the accident. She said she was playing a tape on school bus safety at the time of the accident. She also related that this group of students was the most unruly of the groups she drove, and thatno parents ride on this run (on other runs, parents ride along, which helps with discipline). This van was equipped with lapbelts and all passengers butone were belted atthe time of the accident. :The driver, however, was not wearing her lapbelt. . _ - The sehool van was equipped with padded restraining barriers. fr.

APPEND I X 118

GE NO Gresham, Oregon 0 eL. 0, :mod C Ei46.v Case Number 12 0 sr., ....ego eo .t.-rt 0 Rollover 4. V . V.. , 4.5 Principal Direction 31, Ao ...a,. of Force ; 65

4 C.f.t OA ,. 444,.... ALLerff csn

Heavily padded Heavily padded...4r ..10-0, modesty panel A modesty panel Right Side of Bus Left Side of Rue Row 1C Drivei M5. MAIS 2 F.44, MA;S 1 Mild concussion Contusion around right eye Row 1A 2 Laceration on lower IV M.4, MAIS 1 eeOe Abrasion on chin Contusion on right arm Row 18 Abrasions on abdomen M.4, MAIS 1 3 Row 10 Row 2A M.4. MAIS 1 M-4, MAIS .4 Row 2C Row 28 M5, MAIS 0 F.4, MAIS 1 Row 20 Row 3A F.4. MAIS 1 F.4, MAIS 1 Row 3C F.4, MAIS I

Row 30 F.5, MAIS 1

Ths school bus show- ) is.regnesontatsonal only 119 APPENDIX B

Case No. 13 Safety Board Investigation No. FTW-86-H-5803

Location of Accident Alternate U.S. Highway 90; Houston, Texas

Date and Time lebruary 25, 1986; 3:35 p.m.

Description of School Vehicle lype A van conversion: 1980 Dodge chassis with 16- passenger body by Collins Bus Corporation

Type of Accident Frontal impact, followed by rollover (3600)

Severity of Accident Delta V not calculable (van was probably traveling less than 25 mph when it vaulted from-the'guardrail. into 3600 rollover)

Summary of Events

A school van, equipped with lapbelts for all occupants, was transporting nine deaf students home from school. All occupants were restrained. As_the vehicle was traveling a divided section of four-lanehighway, the driver, lost control. The van left the roadway,struck and overroada metal W-beam guardrail, and rotated 900 clockwise over about 30 feet. It then vaulted from the guardrail, rotated 1800 degrees about its vertical axis and landed on its roof, continuing a 1800 rotation before coming to rest upright.

Evacuation from the van occurred through the rear emergency exit because the front door was jammed by impact forces during the rollover. The older students reportedly kicked open the emergency exit and assisted the younger students and driver.--The- aislecontained no displaced seat cushions_or-other obstructions. The driver and students reported no problems in disconnecting their lapbelts.

The van body sustained exterior damage to the left front, extending 24inches laterally with approximately 6 inches of rearward crush. The roof was cfAlapsed inward and down 8 inches at the ri9ht front and 12 incLes at the leftfront. Buckling of the roof and door frame dime the passenger loading door rendered the door inoperative. Thewindshield wasdisplaced from its frame during the rollover7- The interior of the bus body sustained moderate crushiny damage during the rollover and ground impact.

The panel above the rear emergency exit door was distorted, with five attachment screws displaced, but the door remained fullyoperational. The steering wheel was deformed forwardand downward approximately 2 inches, and the driver's rearview mirror was shattered. A maintenance access panel, on the interior left side just to the rear of the driver's seat, was displaced about 2 inches, posing a potential hazard to passengers.

The poststandard van performed well in this moderate speedimpact and full rollover. The only major Itructuralfailure occurred at the rightfront and resulted in the disablement of the passenger loading door.

129 APPENDIX B 120

Outcome of Occupants of SChool Vehicle

Passengers

Of the 9 passengers, ages 14 to 19: 9 sustained MAIS 1(minor) injuries.

A11 passengers were restrained by lapbelts. Only one passenger, on the left_side in the front seat on the aisle, received anabdominal contusion attributed to lapbelt-use.

Injury outcome in this accident,in which every passenger was restrained, was similar to accidents investigated ty the Safety Board inwhiCh passengers were unrestrained. The lapbelted passengers were prevented from being thrown about the bus interior but were not prevented frominterior.contacts..that caused their minor (AIS I) injuries: abrasions and contusions. Lapbelts are not designed to prevent, nor are they cpable-of preventing, minor, (AIS -1)injuries. -In-this particular accident, however, lapbelt use probably prevented additionalinjuries-

during the_vault and subsequent 3600 rollover. .

Driver

The lapbelted driver received minor (AIS 1) injuries: a laceration of the lip from contact with the rearview mirror and multiplecontusions of the left arm. Thedriverprobably would have beenmoreseriously injured had she been unrestrained. The driver, however, apparently had her lapbelt loosely adjusted, because she came up off her seat and contacted the rearview mirror. Measurements from the driver's seating position indicated that the latchplate was adjusted out 25 inches and that the buckle was adjusted out 30 inches.

Notes About the Accident

The driver was the first person to be taken from the scene by rescue personnel. This hampered rescue personnel because she was the only person who knew sign language; without her,rescue personnelcould not communicate with the deaf students to determine the nature of their injuries.

130 -11. 800.,...,ii;-1114.,14.:

121 APPEND I X B

Hounon, Tomas Case Number 13

Rollover

Principal Direction of Forte

0 .)«....01 e ." 00..6.4 *oat 5p- Driver 0 e 07e F31, MAIS 1 -010A0: .0C.-, la.s f¢000 0.04A 1 -1 10 .0 .4. - F.14, MAIS 1 U. ',40

F.19. MAIS 1 ,11 :0 3 C' 2 10 re' F16, MA1S 1 11.1W S tS 0 81-7 M.19, MAIS 1 te Lwow. oaf 1K &S. F-19, MAIS 1

F18. MAIS 1

F.17, MA1S 1 111j1 The seating pattern on the bus

ame,- was determined, but the exact F.18. MAIS 1 location of individual students -31111rw"-- is unknown. M18. MAIS 1

The school kos shown is representational only.

131 APPENDIX B 122

Case No. 14 Safety Board.Investigation No. NYC-87-H-SB06

Location of Accident Saw Mill River Parkway; Westchester, New York

Date and Time March 25, 1987; 8:30 a.m.

Description of School Vehicle Type A van conversion: 1982 Ford chassis with 16- passenger Sturdivan body by T.P.I.

Type of Accident Rollover (8100), followed by multiple impacts

Severity of Accident Delta V unknown

Summary of.Events

A school van was transporting 11unrestrained, learning-disabled students on a scheduled route from Bedford to Irvington, New Vork. The van...was traveling a straight and level section of a four-lane divided highway, at an estimated speed .gf 62 mph, when it departed the right side of the road, rolled 2-1/4 times, - struck a signpostand two trees, and came to rest on its left:side. A 14-year- old passenger who had been seated in the left front afilé- seat-Was partially ejected through a left side window and was pinned under the bus.

After the crash,allof the passengers, except the student who was partially ejected, walked unassisted out of the vehicle through the rear emergency exit and waited at the side of the road for the police.Rescue personnel cut the seatbelt restraining the driver and assisted her from the vehicle. They were also able to pull the partially ejected boy from underneath the overturned van without having to lift the vehicle.. -^

The tops of both front fenders of the postitandard van were pushed downward.The front of the roof, both A pillars, and the window frames of both side doors were pushed downward and rearward. The remainder of the roof was dented and scraped, and both side doors were buckled; the windshield, right side door window, and second passenger window on the left side were allshattered.- The right rear -emergericy exit door was detached from the vehicle, its hinges still attached to the door but pulled from_the door frame anchors. Both rear passenger seats were twisted and pushed rearward, whereas the right front passenger seat had pulled away from its sidewall anchor and was tilted leftward. The front ceiling had been pushed down into the driver's compartment, and it was buckled with several seam separations.

Outcome of Occupants of School Vehicle

Passengers

Of the_11 passengers, ages 13 to 17: 6 were uninjured, 4 sustained MAIS 1(minor) injuries, and

I sustained MAIS 2 (moderate) injuries.

132 123 APPENDIX B

Allpassengers were unrestrained. The passenger who was partially ejected out the second passenger window on the left side sustained a fractured pelyis (AIS 2). Had the passenger been wearing the available lapbelt, he would not have been, ejected and possibly would have sustained a iksser injury; his specific injury, a fractured pelvis,could not have occurred. Had he been unrestrained but not ejected, he might have sustained injuries more comparable in severity to those sustained by other passengers: six were uninjured and four sustained only minor (A1S 1) injuries.

Driver

The driver was wearing the available lap/shoulder belt and sustained only minor (AI5 1) injuries._ Had the driver not been restrained, she couldhave sustained more serious injuries from being propelled into the sheet metal of the collapsing roof.

Notes About the Accident

A witness stated that the van "weaved"; the driver stated that the van "wobbied= until she lost control.

During the rollover, the right rear emergencyexit -dooropened and was subsequently torn from its hinges. This provided another for a possible passenger ejection. No substantial deformation occurred to the door frame or tm the left rear door; hence, the two rear emergency doors should have remained closed throughout the crash sequence.

The driver had been hired 5 days before the crash and had not previously driven a school van. She had received no training in operating the van, and had driverti the van only once 2 days befOre the accident. -When hired, she passed-a stx- question written test and a road test administered by another company employee. -; ,14" ,

APPENDIX B 124

Weschester, New York Case Number 14 oe.A4 Bo ,1 "...3 Se. 61, I 0 ,e. ,s V.e.fr 60' -.sal 0 0 ' CP -NI !.1.40.1 Rollover t.1, - 1 fc. 4,41 0 17 arS Ayr ,? Direct crush force LA 1 on top from rollover S Cwta e4 voNn,wel C.f.* ; 44,10,0 4,44.4.4,..,04/ J,..4 4 U.,. II AIM, 4 sr 'VS.,* 44 144' eel le

Modesty panel typo unknown

Left Side of Bus Right Side of Bus Driver Row 1D F-35. MAIS 1 M.14, MAIS 0 Row 1A Row 2C M.14. MAIS 0 M16. MAIS 1 Row 18 Row 20 M.15, MAIS 2 M.14, MAIS 0 Fractured pelvis Row 3D Abrasion on left knee M.13, MAIS 0 Row 2A Row 4D M.16. MAIS M.17, MAIS 1 Row 3A M.15, MA1S 1 Row 38 M.17, MAIS 1 Row 4A M-17, MAIS 0

The school bus shown is esprosentstionat only.

134 125 APPENDIX A

Case No. 15 Safety Board Investigation No. CHI-87-H-S812

Location of Accident State Route 199 at Dunbridge Road; Perrysburg, Ohio

Date and Time April 6, 1987; 11:55 a.m.

Description of School Vehicle Type A small school bus: 1981 Chevrolet chassis with 23-passenger Busette body by Wayne Corporation

Type_ of Accident Left front collision, followed by secondary impact

Severity of Accident Delta V unknown

Summary of Events

A smallschool bus was transporting 15 students and- 2-aides -home from a Head Start day-care program. Of the 15 preschoolers, 13 Were wearing loosely adjusted static lapbelts, 1 was seatedin a misused child safety seat,and reitraint status for the other was unknown. One of the aides was restrained by.a lapbelt, and the driver was wearing the available lap/shoulder belt.As the school bus crossed an intersection, ata driver-estimated speed of 50 mph, -itstruck passenger car with its left front. The bus continued about110feet before veering to the left into a drainage ditch and striking a dirt embankment. The bus came to rest upright.

The occupants were evacuated through the right front passenger loading door and the rear emergency exit door.

-ThePost-standard bus received substantfal -damage-6h the left front and left front side from the impact with the passenger car. Damage was also noted from the secondary collision with the dirt embankment. Thecombination of impacts resultedin 30 inches of rearward crush atthe left front of the bus. The collapsed structure intruded 20 1/2 inches into the driver's compartment, pushing the instrument paneland steering assembly into contact with the driver. -The floor in front of the driver's position buckled, rotating the top of the driver's seat rearward.

Outcome of Occupants of School Vehicle

Eusenciers

Of the 17 passengers, a 16-year-old aide, a 35-year-old aide, and 15 students, ages 4 and 5: 1 was uninjured, 11 sustained MAIS 1(minor) injuries, 2 sustained MAIS 2 (moderate) injuries, and 3 sustained MAIS 3 (serious) injuries.

135 ,,ip.00004 *Wee 4 OA.

APPENDIX B 126

Reports indicated that all occupants were wearing some type of restraintat the time of the acident. Safety Board investigators, however, determined thatone of the aides was probably unrestrained And that most of the lapbeltsused by passengers were not adjusted properly.

The 4-year-old passenger on the left side in the front seat nextto the window was in a Kantwet Safeguard model 301 child safety seat. Inspection of this seat and the lapbelt used for attachment found that the lapbeltwas not routed in accordance with the instructions provided with the seat.The right side shoulder strap of the safety seat was not attached to the system. The passenger received a- serious (AIS3) fracture of her leftfemurand multiple minor (AIS 1) contusions. The serious injury probably occurred as -a direct result ofthe misuse of the child seat, because it allowed the passenger sufficientforward movement to contact the left side bulkhead at the junction of thevan chassis and the school bus body. Had the seat been properly secured to the benchseat, the passenger's injuries would likely have been reduced.

The 5-year-old passenger seated on the left side in the frontseat next to the aisle was reportedly wearing a static lapbelt. Inspection of the lapbelt found the cinching latchplate adjusted to 22inches from the function of the seat cushions--an excessive distance for the passenger's size. The passenger received a moderate (AIS 2) closed head injury, probably from contact with the driver's seatback asit rotated rearward. The absence of abdominal contusionsor other trauma indicates that the lapbelt probably provided little restraint:excessive slack was found in the webbing. An unsecured child safety seatwas found in this passenger's seating position, thus the restraint status is unknown.

The adult aide on the right side in the front seat next to theaisle stated she was restrained by the static lapbelt available at her position. The driver, howeverT-reported that the aide was thrownforward from her seatat impact into thestairwell ofthe passengerloadingdoor. The driver's account appears correct, because major forward deformation was foundto the door'sopening hardware. That damage was also consistent with the serious (A1S 3) fractured pelvis and moderate (AIS 2)lacerations sustained by the aide. It's unlikely that the lapbelt's adjusted length of 22 inches would have fit theaide, who,. according to medical records, was 65 inches talland weighed 190 pounds. The Safety Board believes the aide was unrestrained,

The 5-year-old passenger on the right side in the front seatnext to the window was reportedly wearing the static lapbelt available at his position. The adjustmentof the lapbelt, however,- wasprobably very loose: thecinching latchplate was22 1/2inches from the junction with the seat cushions. The passenger's serious (AIS 3) closed head injury likely resulted fromcontact with the lightly padded frame of the restraining barrier forward ofthis seating position. Consideringthe contact pointsinvolved, severity of injury would unlikely have changed with a properly adjusted lapbelt.

138 -114,4.0...,..1;.41.^. KS, - "3.4-.^4,r

127 APPENDIX B

The 4-year-old passenger on the left side in the second seat 'next to the window was also wearing a lapbelt with excessive slack:the cinching latchplate was adjusted to 18 1/2 inches fromthejunction with the seat cushions. The passenger received a moderate (AIS 2) fracture of his right lower leg, probably' from contact with the lower framework of the seat in front of him. It is unknown what difference a properly-adjusted lapbelt would have made. At 41inches in height, the passengerwould have been decelerated entirely by the 2-inch-wide webbing of the lapbelt; serious injuries might have resulted.

The 4-year-old on the left side in the second seat in the center nosition was reportedly wearing a lapbelt. The latchplate was adjusted to 23 ' 'es from the junction with the seat cushion, much too great a distance for effective restraint of this 37-inch-high, 45-pound passenger.

The remaining passengersreceived minor (AIS 1) contusions, abrasions, and lacerations.All were reportedly wearing the available lapbelts. Safety Board investigators found,however, that .allbut one of the lapbelts were adjusted with excessive slack, for the passengers' sizes. Latchplate adjustment lengths varied fromover 18 inches to 25 inches. The single exception was the lapbelt of 16-year-old aide. The latchplate adjustment length of 20 1/2 inches probably provided some degree_of restraint to this person.

Driver

The driver was restrained by a lap/shoulder belt equipped with dual emergency locking retractors, a sewn-in latchplate, and a stalk-mounted buckle attached to the side of the pedestal seat. The driver received moderate (AIS 2) fractures of threeadjacentribs on herleft sideand her maxilla, primarilyfrom the instrument paneland steering assembly crushing rearward into her space. She also sustained multiple minor (AIS 1) contusions-and lacerations of her face and limbs. Considering the intrusion into her compartment,the lap/shoulder belt performed aswell ascould be expected.Had this driver been unrestrained, greater injuries might have resulted.

_Notes.About the Accident

This small bus had no restraining barrier between the front seat on the left side- andthe driver's seat. An abbreviated metal panel, framed bylightly padded tubular steel, was positioned between the front seat on the right side and the stairwell; however, this barrier did not extend far enough forward in the center of the' bus to prevent the *aide from traveling forwardinto the dm. components. Some of the serious (AIS3) injuries sustained by the passc:igers in thefront seats mighthave been prevented hadlarger, padded barriers been installed in the bus.

The floor of the bus forward of and underneath the driver's seat buckled from the impact, resulting in the rearward rotation of the driver's seat at its top. The rotation Alas beneficial to the driver, because it_moved_her rearward away. from the collapsing structural components.

The lapbelts on the bus had pushbutton release latchplates and were anchored to the seatframes.

137 .rt.

APPENDIX B 128

Perrysburg, Ohio LEGEND eL.So Br!' Vtcl Case Number 15 e :gr.;

0 V.07. -19. capt oUr.n,e, 0 I _ Principal Direction i.fv.r.te of Force .1.7w4

A,. I 7 tnp, .1 m..0 AIS 2 r

C+40 t7n,nv.ren S COcat

Mocree 7 in,jeC over.!. 2 Scr.oa f trwer, Severe A...1,48n A11....,1 Armtev,alwo Star. rAIS.

Left Side of Bus A 13 E F Lightly padded Driver modesty panel F.43, MAIS 2 Fracture, left 7, 8, & 9th ribs 01 0 Maxilla fracture Right Side of 13us Row 10 Row IA F-35, MAIS 3 MAIS 3 eeekrOoe Fractured pelvis Fracture - left femur Large laceration Multiple contusionsz face above left eye (misused child safety seat) 3 above 000 right eye Row 1C Multiple contusions M.5, MAIS 2 Cerebral concussion 4 Row 1F M-S, MAIS Row 2A Serious cuncussion M-4, MAIS 2 Contusion - for,ead Fracture : right tibia Contusion - left side of fact: Abrasion - left leg Row 28 Contusion - left pelvis F-5, MAIS 0 Row 2D Row 4D F4, MAIS 1 M-5. MAIS 1 Special Notes: Row 2C All lapbelts worn, F-5, MAIS 1 Row 2E Row 4E except the one worn by F-5, MAIS 1 M-4, MAIS 1 ttte passenger in 3C, were so loosely Row 3A Row 2F adjusted relative to F-5, MAIS 1 Row 4F the occupant's size F-4, MAIS M-5. MA1S 1 that they provided Row 38 little restraint. 7 5, MAiS 1 Row 3D- M-4. MAIS 1 how 3C F-16, MAIS 1 The school bus shown is reptesentetional only.

138 129 APPENDIX B

Case No. 16 Safety Board Investigation No. CHI-86-H-5807

_ . Location of Accident Interstate 294; outside Elmhurst, Illinois

Date and Time February 7, 1986; 2:30 p.m.

Description of School Vehicle Type A school bus: 1982 Chevrolet chassis with 23- passenger vanguard body by American Transportation Corporation

Type of Accident Left side impact, followed by secondary left sice impact

Severity of Accident Delta V unknown

Summary of Events

A small school bus, equipped with restraints for all occupants, was transoortin.t

an adult aide and eight emotionally disturbed :tudents home fn.m school: . Th aide was the only unrestrained occupant. The driver lost control ef the vehicle and swerved to the left, striking a section of eight unanchored New J,7rsey-style

concrete medianbarriers. Theunanchored barriers were pushedout zif their positions, allowingthebus tostrike the end ofthe permanentlyaochored section. Witnesses reported that as the boswas deflected to :Jic right, baci.. into traffic, it was struck near the rear axle cn the left side by a1-481 St. Regis.

According to the aide,two of the students openedthe right front passenger loaang doorand exited onto the roadway foliewing_the.accident. One student-was trapped betwe'm deformed seats .for a time, but all other passengers were either evacuated from the bus by emergency personnel or were able to leave the bus without assistance. The aide stated that she was not able to open the rear emergency exit.

Contact damage occurred from the left front corner of Ihe bus back to the rear axle. The sheet metal from the B pillar to the left rear axle wes peeled back to the rear axle and extended well outside the original width of the bus. The left side structural supports for the roof were torn away, allowing the roofon the left side to collapse downward to near the tops of the seatbacks.The body of the bus was torn loose from the chassis along the right side and across therear. The seats in this bus were attached to the sidewalls on the outboard ends and supported by two pipe legs per seat at the inboard end. All four seats on tte leftside of the bus were torn loose from their outboard anchor points and rotated counterclockwise. The left side modesty panel was displaced rearward to contact the front seat on the left side.

The portions of the poststandard bus that contacted the exposed end of the anchored. barriers_were badly damaged. Most of the left side to the rear of the e pillar was torn Away, destroying the outboard anchor points for all of the left side seats andexposing thoseoccupants to greater hazards. Of the five passengers seated on the left, four received moderate (AIS 2) to serioes (AIS 31 injuries and one -had minor (AIS 1) injurlies. Of the four seated on the right. two were not injured, one had minor (AIS 1) injuries,and one had moderate (A1S 2) injuries'.

13 APPENDIX B 130

Outcome of Occepants ofSchool Vehicle

Passengers

Of the 9 passengers, ages9-to 21: 2 were uninjured, 2 sustained MA1S I(minor) injuries, 2 sustained MAIS 2(moderate) injuries, and I sustained MA1S 3(serious) injuries.

adult aide were restrained bylapbelts. Passengers on. All passengers except the prevented Jrene the firsttwo rows next to the window were. theleft side 'in resulted in ejection by use of thelapbelts. Use of their lapbelts, however; prevent other serious injuries. some head andfacial injuries and did not the left side )n the frontseat next tc) the window The lapbelted passenger on the major injury. She was-seated-at the-beginning-of sustained 3 serious (A1S-3) this When the side of the busand seat anchor points were torn away, intrusion. the barrier and the sheet metal. The. passenger may havehad direct contact with barrier in front of her seat wasfound protrnding_baek frame for the restraining -probablycaused by eiteee into her seating position.The fractueed femur was by the restraining barrier;. contact with the sidewall as it was torn away or The fractured and the dislocated wristlike.: it WAS pushed into herposition. the displaced components. Her concussionand :tic resulted- from contact with she-"jackknifed" over her lephelt: hee minor facial injuriesprobably occurred as of the restraining barrier asit was moving back teward head contacted the frame because the not been restrained,she could have been ejected her. Hadshe might have been sidewall had been torn away. Had she been ejected, her injuries

moreesevere. . the aisle received 3 The lapbelted passenger onthe left side front seat next to At impact, she also would moderate (AIS 2) concussionand abrasions on her face. injury. She probably have "jaaknifed" forward,exposing her head to greater restraining barrier in front ofher. Recause she wae not struck.the frame of the with the seated directly next to the areaof impact,-she did not come in contact lapbeit, she would sheet metal as it was tnrn away. Had she not been wearing the into the restraining barrier andprobably- still would have been-thrown forward She could have been ejected but with have received minor tomoderate injuries. less likelihood than for the passengeron her left.

sitting on the ieft side. in thesecond seat next to the The lapbelted passenger She receieed open fractures of window was also in the areaof major intrusion. tibia,and femur (allserious, A1S 3- injuries), which the left tibia, right barrier. !he probably contacted the movingsheet metal and possibly the concrete when the seat in front closed fracture of herleft femur could have resulted into her seating area.- Shecould have been ejected and of her pushed back lapbeit. sustained even more seriousinjuries had she not been wearing the the left side in the third seatnext to the window The lapbelted passenger on lefthim left femur and a closed head injury that received A fractured Ne was in the unconscious for more than anhour (both seriuds, A1S 3 injuries). had been Pushed back to hiS area of major impact,and sheet metal from thd side occurred as hd violently pivotedforward from the seat. His head injury probably

140 131 APPENDIX 8

hips over the lapbelt and strucle the back of the-seat in front of .him. The' fractured left femur could have resulted from the displaced metal around him. He probably would not have beea ejected had he .been unrestrained because he was not next to the opening. Without the restraint, he probably would have received sone minor to moderate iejuries, but his head injury probably would not have been as severe: the impactforces would have been more evenly distributed over his entire body rather than concentrated on his head.

The lapbelted passenger on the left side in the last seat next to the window was just-beyondthe area of major impact. His injuries werenot serious: a laceration on hisscalp and on his left leg. Had he not been wearing the lapbelt, he probably-would have received some minor injuries.

Two laebelted passengers were or the right side in the front seat, The passenger next to the-aisle was uninjured, and the one next to- theewindow received cAly abrasions. These passengers were seated out of the area of intrusion and impact. Had they not. been wearing the la0belts,they might have received soMe-minor injuries.

No injuries were reported fer the laphelted passenger on the right side in the second seat next to the window. Because sheins nOte in- the area Of intrusion, she was not exposed to the deforming sheet metal. She might have sustained some minor injories had she not been wearing the lapbelt.

A 21-year-old aide was on the right side in the third seat next to the window. ene of her duties was to make certain that all of the students were wearing their lapbelts. Although she stated that she was wearing the available-lapbelt, she' also stated that she fell onto the floor, which resulted in a dislocated left shoulder. _Safety kard investigators determined that an occupant in that seating position could not have- fallen to the floor, even with an improperly-adjutted- lapbelt. A properly worn liObelt might have prevented the dislocated shoulder, but moderate injuries could still have resulted.

Driver

The driver, restrained with alap/shoulder belt, receiveda moderate(A1S 2) concussion. Even though he wasin front of the area-ofintrusion, the roof collapsed above him and probably came into contact with hishead, producing the concussion. Withoutthe restraint, he probably would havebeen thrown forward and to.the left, sustaining minor to moderate injuries.

141 APPENDIXa 132

eII* 4. eb 0 . 0 : I t *I.*; , / , *a. E:rnhurst. : Case 'ii.mber 16 1 V,,

t- .fe .1 4.0....c. Pr:ncipal Directi of Force Heavily padded modesty pane:

He 3:4 pe...3'.kc1 nictleiltv 8 C 0 E F

-1 1 Left Side of Bus Driver Right Side of Bus M.34, MA:13 Row 10 M mric.ision F.14, MAIS 0 !lu1ur zr.irasions J Row 1F _ M11, MAIS 1

F-16 M.".!S 3 Row 2F Commirutel) ft ai.tut F-9, MAIS 0 Of ;eft fem.,: F:acture : OiStocjticm of "Row 3F lett wfist F-21. MAlS 2 Ceritura; cOncuSs;Gr, Dislocated left stioulaer natijma ,-;r1 tioht loreneisO ADrasItms on right hand P(74.11t/i014`4:: !:JrtkIt:

Row 1C Row 3A F 11. M.VS 2 M-15, MA1S 3 Metate coricucsiun Closel heipi injury. unconscious moro then 1 hour 411r.tsiCir.t. ur t!u:Ad Ctoefoctufe of tett femur Con:;Iilon CM the nose. Rcw F .1P. 3 kg.in Opvn f-Jr.u:ii of M MAIS Opei. :.tbn of 10; t;:f !tut TOW utiout to,41 anovin as ,OPO11011111601101 only

142 rawnw,,r7,,,

133 APPENDIX B

Case No. 17 Safety Board Investigation No. NYC-88-H-S808

Location of Accident Route 113, West Pikeland Township; Chester County, Pennsylvania

Date and Time February 26, 1988; 8:10 a.m.

Description of School Vehicle Type A school bus: 1983 Ford chassis with 22-passenger Busette body by Wayne Corperation

Type of Accident Head-on collision, followed by secondary left side impact

Severity of Accident, Delta V unknown

Summary of Events

A smallschool bus, equipped with lapbelts for all occupants. was transporting eight students and the driver's 3-year-old son.to school on a two-lane highway,_ Four of the nine passengers were restrained by-lapbelts.and the driver.wle__ wearing a lap/shoulder belt. As the small school bus traveled southbound, it was struck in the front by a northboundtruck that wasout of control and overturning. The initialimpact was followed by a secondary impact at the left side of the school bus'as the truck rotated counterclockwise.on its right side. The collision sequence pushed the school bus rearward for several feet before it came to rest on tne west shoulder against a metal guardrail. Four vehicles were involved ir this accident; however, only the truck collided with the school bus.

The driver of a passenger carAnvolved in the accident entered_ the_school bus through the rear emergency door, released several of the students' lapbelts, and 'assisted the studentswith minor injurits from the bus. -He was assisted iv passing motorists. Both the fatally' injured and the critically injured passengers were left onboard until evacuated by emergency rescue personnel. The driver was trapped from amassive structural collapse at_her seating position; the right front passenger loading door was jammed by crush damage. The driVer waS freed after several hours by fire rescue personnel.

The front structure of the poststandard school bus was destroyed, with more than 41 inches of rearward co;lapse at the left front. Additionally, the left side of the bus body was crushed.24 inches inboard at the second and third-rows of bench seats.

The integrityof the passenger compartmentwasaffected by thestructural collapse. The forward roof area and left side A pillar were pushed rearward and down intothe driver'scompartment, and -the instrumentpanel and steering assembly were pushed rearward toward the driver's seat. Buckling of the floor occurredin the forward area of the bus; The support leg of the righc modest panel Wal displaced fromits lower mounting bracket,andthe wall mounting bracket for the panel was partially displaced. Control components for the right front passenger door were deformed, .caused by occupant contact and structural collapse. The inboard collapseof the left sideof thebus resulted in substantial deformation to the seatback and frame assemblyl of the 'second and third bench seats on the left side.

143 APPENDIX 8 134

Outcome of Occupants of School Vehicle

Passengers

Of the 9 passengers, 8 students and thedriver's son, ages 3 to 18: 7 sustained MAIS i(minor) injuries,' 1 sustained MAIS 5 (critical) injuries that provedfatal 1 sustained MAIS 6 (maximum injury, virtuallyunsurvivable) injuries that preyed fatal

Four ofthe passengers were wearing thestatic lapbeits available at their seating positions. The lapbelts 'were mounted to the individual seat frames and were furnished with pushbuttonrelease beekles. An inspection revealed that one of the lapbelts in use had been altered by theschool district; the alterations-- which compromised the belt--did not, however, affectthe outcome of -injury: Another lapbelt not in use also had been modified._

Six nf the passengers receivedonly minor (AIS :) contusions, abrasions, lacerations, and strains. Of that number, theee were restrained.and three were --unrestrained. All were seated behind the frontseats Ande_thus _wereafforded compartmentalization by the high backed, padded seats in front. uf their positions.

The other passenger with minor injuries was the3-year-old son of the driver seated directly behind the driver on the front bench seat nextto the window. An attorney for the child's family indicated that the driverhad lapbelted him in seat 45 minutes before the accident. A witness found the boy on the floor behind the driver'sseat when thebus 'wasentered only secondsafterthe crash.. Examination of the latchplate-portton of..the beltrevealed that the cinching type latchplate was adjusted to 26 1/2 inches from its anchor point on the seatframe, and that the belt was tucked into the area betweenthe seat cushion and the seat back. Rased onthis evidence, Safety Beard investigators determined that the child was not wearing the lapbeit at the timeof the crash. Given the minor injuries sustained by this- child, neither restraint use nora padded modesty panel could have improved the outcome. The child's forward traiel was contained by the rear of the driver's seatback, thusallowing him.to decelerate into a "friendly surface.

The two fatally injured passengers were seated next to each other on theright side in the front seat. The 7-year-old next to the windcw and wearingea static lapbelt received AIS 6 injuriei from contact with anAbbreviated modesty panel in front of his seating position. _He died from theseinjuries. An unrestrained 17- year-nld,in the center of the seat, received critical (AIS 5)injuries, which a110 werefatal. The 17-year-old struck theleft side of themodesty panel while movingforwardandto. theleft; the amount ofbarrier- deflection is unknewn. He was found in the stairwell; Safety Board investigatorsdetermined that after striking the left side of the restrainingbarrier with his right leg, he ptvoted around the barrier and continuedforward. He hit the boarding door control, fracturing his left leg, and continued into thewindshield header where he sustained a fatal head injury.

144 ' "I .6tr'

4.4

135 APPENDIX 8

The 7-year-old seated next tothe window probably jackknifed over the lapbelt and struck the left side of his headand neck on the tubular frame of the srodesty fractured and dislocated cervical panel. He sustained a lacerated larynx, a spine, crushed spinal cord, and brainhemorrhage. The modesty panel was about 11 1/2 inches shorter than those installedin large, poststandard school buses; it was also much-1,wer.

Driver

The lap/shoulder belted driver received severe(AIS 4)injuries, allresulting from the collapsed structure surroundingher seating position. Given the extreme intrusion that occurred, the drivermight have been fatally injured had she not been restrained by the lap/shoulderbelt.-

Notes About the Accident

_ This small bUs wat- furnished.witha_lightly padded stanchion post and horizontal bar, at the level of the driver'sseatback top, between the front seat on the left side-and the driver's seat. There Was no modesty panel on the left side. An abbreviated modesty panel waslocated on the-right side of the bus-,placed between the front seat and thestairwell. This barrier 40 suri-dunded by a lightly padded, tubular steel frame.

Examination of the lapbelts installed atthe leftfront window seat' and the. second right window seat revealed thatboth had been altered. The webbing for the buckle side had been shortened bylooping the belt over,making ahole through the webbing, and then remountingit to the seat frame. These altered lapbelts were used to restrafn smaller and youngerstudents after parents had commented to the school aboutiJw_difficillty.inproperly adjusting the belts around smaller children. The after-market alteration, performed by employeet of- the school district, was not consistentwith mOunting guidelines outlined in FMVSS 209, "Seat Belt Assemblies.°

145 APPENDIX B 136

c.: .. .1 S4 - est, tee: kJ Cnester Co . Pennsylvania Case Number 17 /\

Pr,ncipal Direction of r orce ,. e ,e te

Lightly padded stanchion potr,1 Aribrewated moest-i panet an,l horizontal lightly OaCtE7.4e0 cross Dar frame

Lett Side of Bus Right Side or Bus

Ciiyar Row 1E MAIS M.17, MAIS 5 Myocardial cortusicn Head v Fractured lelt femur Fractured left 1e-r-nur ------Factufed left patella Fractufed own Fractured lett acetaOulum- Fractured right pubic rain' -Row IF Open nasal fractute M 7, MA1S 6 4,u1sion of Ieft &Mlles tendon Fracture.dislocaz..ibn of Ooen left humeru4 cervical spine CeretNil concussion Crushed medulla & spinal Fractu:ed spieen crud Open iracture. left fibuIa Subaural herno-rhaue Subarachnoics werriptrnage Contused lung Row 14 Lao/fa:ion of laryroin AA 3 MA,S 1

Row 2A Row 7 F M 15. MA:5 1 M 10, MAIS 1

Row 34 Row 3E 10, MA:5 1 4.17, MAIS I

ROAdA Ross 4E

r 14ni.1%s r 17. MAIS 1 .

rhoschaso1 buts shown eS tingirsMal'eoftel only

146 137 APPENDIX B

Case No. 18 Safety Board Investigation No. LAX-87-H-SB03

Location of Accident Intersection of Escondido Avenue andPala Vista Drive; Vista, California

Date and Time December 3, 1986; 1:15 p.m.

Description of SchoolVehicle Type A smallschoolbus: 1985 Chevrolet chassis with 20-passenger Micro-Bird body by Blue Bird Body Company

Type of Accident Left side impact, followed by rollover (900)

Severity of Accident Delta V unknown

/ Summary of Events

A smallschool bus transporting four Head Start students home from school was Crossing an urban intersection when it was struck at its left rear tire .by a 1979 Volkswagen_ Rabbit. The four passengerswere restrained by the avail-able lapbelts;the driver was wearing alap/shoulder belt. After impact,the van rotated counterclockwiseabout 450 before slowly overturning onto its right side and coming to rest.

The driver reported that a passerby released the passengersfrom their lapbelts and assisted the children out of the van through the.rear emergency exit.

The collision_ produced some slight sheet metal deformation at the left rear of the van and also some scrapes on the left rear wheel 'rim: The only other damage on the van resulted from the900 rollover. The mirrors and-some of the metal joints on the right side had been deformed. No e4idence of any interior damage was foum:. The poststandard van neld up well in the collision and rollover. Most of the repair costwas to fix damageto the bus that resulted from the tow truck righting the bus after overturn.

Outcome of Occupants of School Vehicle

Passengers

Of the 4 passengers, age 4: 4 were uninjured.

The driver and a witness confirmed that allfour passengers were wearing the available lapbelts; the passengers' seating positions were unknown. All passengers reportedly were uninjured, but the Safety Board wasable to locate and interview only .one. The passengers may have beenbruised. Because seating positions were unknown, the SafetyBoardcould not analyze the value of lapbelts in this crash. For example, hadthe passengersbeen seated on the right side of the bus, the side that impacted the ground, the outcome of injurie would have been the same, regardless of lapbelt use.

147 rp,79"'",:.-72;4777:27.7.77.771,.".7777"7",

APPENDIX B 138

Driver

The driver of the van was wearing a lap/shoulder belt and receivedno injuries_ Had the driver not been wearing the restraint, she might 1.!ave been injuredas the van rolled to itsright side. She would have fallen out of herseat, hit the gearbox, and fallen to the right side intothestairwell. Thedriver's environment is more 'hostile" than that of thepassengers becauseno containment is provided.

Notes About the Accideni

There was no barrier between the driver andthe front passenger seat on the left side. On the right side, between the door stairwell andthe front seat, was a Metal modesty -panel and stanchion. The cross support bar andstanchion were lightly padded;the panel itself was bare metal. In afrontal_crash,. these design aspects could significantlyaffect injuryoutcome of both unrestrained and restrained passengers.

148 pcsrrer_737,, .miTM'5?r7.',77"1"G° ,

APPENDIX El 139

o UA.d e Sir IA40 ; fa 674t7.7". 0 Oh.. e 00, 0.x 1.)**0 Vista, California Case Number 18 50 .oRs

180.A0,0 MArS, 2 011001 IV ...Wed Y If Ott.foAto A11. Gskr A. " ,1/14,01,11 Agt 7.

IrS C641- S... 0 u.,Ar.W0 5 C.,:s M.Ade .0ttwr Rollover 1 &knives cdott-.- t 4 .Ar,..1

a4c..444 A4IACi(O' fr,. .;.otr, kft140./ Ato,...sed 10c4. S.. alt.

Modesty panel with lightly Driver padded aisle stanchion F-67, MAIS 0 and cross support; panel was bare metal.

All passengers were wearing lap belts; seating positions unknown. Injury status Principal Direction could be confirmed tor of Force only one passenger, F-4, MAIS 0 M-4, MAIS 0 M-4, MAIS 0 F-4, MAIS 0

The school bus shown Is representational only. 149 APPENDIX B 140

Case No. 19 Safety Board Investigation No. FTW-85-H-0R20

Location of Accident Intersection- of Groos Street at Hermitage Street; San Antonio, Texas

Date and Time February 5, 1985; 3:25 p.m

Description of SchoolVehicle Type A small schootbus: 1981 Chevrolet chassis with 20-passenger Busette body by WayneCorporation

Type of Accident Left side.impact,_followed by rollover.(909

Severity of Accident Delta V 11.5 mph, followed by rotation, then by slow rollover

Summary of Events

A small-school bus, equippedwith lapbelts for all occupants, was transporting two-way residential seven handicappedstudents and an-aide home from school on a A 1978 Ford F-150 pickup truck (4,300 street. All- occupants were -restrained. pounds) ran a stop sign and collided into the left side of the school bus. The continuedanother34 feetbefore school bus rotated700 counterclockwise, striking the concrete curb withits right rear tires, and turned overOnto its right side. The school bus then. slid31 feet before coming to rest.

The driver of the school busrelated that unidentified persons opened the rear emergency exit door andassisted in evacuating the passengers. This assistar,ice -was reportedly providedquickly,with only one passenger-havifig time-to,-release. ex-cited his lapbelt independently. One passenger's parent reported that the-boy, the high side of the4`z, by the rescue efforts, releasedhis own belt and fell from overturned bus into contact withthe lower side seats; facial rbrasions resulted. No other difficulties duringevacuation were reported.

The-poststandard bus received moderatedamage on the left side near the rear dual wheels and moderate damage-onthe right side:where the bus slid on itsside. Much of the daMage occurredduring the rollover. Several-df the interior seat cushions were displaced into the aisle during the rollover sequence. Another seat-cushion; although it remained onthe seat, was completely freed from its mounting brackets.

not affectedby impactor The integrity of the passenger compartment was rollover,-and the rigid frameworkpl.aced to protect the fuel tank performed as designed by preventing any penetrationto the tank.

Outcome of Occupants of SchoolVehicle

411.1.22Prl

Of the 6 passengers, an adultaide (age unknown) and 7 students, ages 3 to 10: 4 were uninjured, and 4 sustained MAIS 1 (minor)injuries.

150 141 APPENDIX B

All passengers reportedly were wearing the lapbelts available at their seating positions at the time of the crash.

Injuries, if sustained, were minor (AIS 1), and primarily occurred during the rollover. Restraint use was of greatest benefit during the rollover, especially to passengers seated on the left side of the bus: they were not flung to the right side when that side contacted the ground.

Driver

The lapbelteddriver received moderate injuries: AIS 2 contusions on.her face when she contaCted the rearview mirror,-and AIS-2 contusions on her abdomen induced .by the lapbelt. She also sustained AIS 1 contusions on her shoulder and .arm fromcontact .with the steering wheel and oR her wrist from contact with the door'control.

The lapbelt was equipped with dual aatomatic retractors. From the appearance and length ofdamaged webbing on the latchplate side of the system, the retractor apparently ellowed .5,to 6 inches of webbing to spool out. The driverrreported she slipped off her seat but remained-suspended by restraint webbing.

Had a three-pointlap/shoulderbeltbeen available and used, the driver's injd-ries would have been reduced. Had she not used the lapbelt, her injuries would probably have remained the same, or been less serious because her upper torso would not have pivoted forcefully over the iapbelt. The lapbelt-induced abdominal contusions caused the driver to miss 48 days of work.

Notes-About the Accident--

This small bus was furnished with a lightly padded stanchion post and horizontal bar, at the level of the driver's seatback top, between the front seat on the left side and the driver's seat. The left side hadno restraining barrier. An abbreviated restraining barrier was located on the right side of-the bus, placed between the front-seat and the stairwell. The barrier was surrounded by a lightly padded tubular frame.

The driver and all passengers were restrained accordingtoschooldistrict policy. The driver told Safety Board investigators that she normally did not wear a seatbelt in her private vehicle but did follow the district's policy while on- the job. Responsibility for enforcing the policy is shared by to the driver and by the aide who is furnished for each bus.

The lapbelts on the bus had pushbutton release latchplates and were anchored to the seatframe. Leading marks were found on some the lapbelts to substantiate use.

The driver told police that she -had suStained minor injuries; this informatiam was entered in the police report. These "minor" iniuries resuited in the driver losing weeks of work. Ddring an interviewconductathe second day following the accident, Safety Board investigatorsdetermined that the driver had sustained moderate or greater injuries.

151 APPENDIX 6 142

LE,E,D O e 3en Lnd

".,.'13 6 Loop (1

C1od Ske. 5,111 1..,e MAIS-2 Wu-, 9., ,n,ore.0 acruyorra owe' San Antonio, Texas 61 17

Case Number 19 M.* Age 17 11,4, 045feggetee S''' Rollover DL.,Anwret1 5-Ce.t.eAl 1-1,A.Agr 6 Maven,. 2 MoOvate 7.1^1,40 11, 3 4-Seeire AM.I.Ion411X ..amn tc, <.1c.+ov. Lightly padded AN:A.seggeC stanchion post arid horizontal cross - member Modesty panel with lightly padded tubular frame Left Side of Bus D E Driver F-22, MAIS 2 Large facial contusion Right Side of Bus Large contusion on abdomen Row 1D Contusior . on left shoulder F-3, MAIS 1 Contusion on left elbow Abrasion on right lower arm Row 1E (adult aide) 0 G F.aga unknoW1,-MAIS-0"-- Principal Direction of Force Row 2E F-4, MAIS 0

Row 3D ._M-5, MAIS 0

Row IC M.13, MA1S 1

Row 2A M.10, MAIS 1

Row 2C F-6, MA* 0

Row 38 The school.bus shown M-6, MAIS 1 is representational only.

152 143 APPENDIX

Case No. 20 Safety Board Investigation No. ATL-87-H-5817

Location of Accident North Indian Creek Drive.;.C%rkston, Georgia

Date and Time May 8, 1987; 3:00 p.m.

Description of SchoolVehicle Type B school bus: 1982 Chevrolet chassis with 18- passenger Cadet body by Carpenter Body Works, Inc.

Type of Accident Multipleimpacts: head-on collision,followed by rear-end secondary collision

Severity of Accident Delta V unknown .

Summary of Events

-.A smallschoolbus was transporting fivedeaf studentS. to their homes. The driver and all passengers were reportedly wearing the lapbolts installed on the .bus. As the bus traveled northboun.j at a driver-estimated speed .cif10 mph, a southbound 1-Aon truck veered across the centerline_and struck the.bus Following this collision, the bus was struck in the rear by,a"28-nassenger school bus. The second collision did not produce passenger injuries.

Information on evacuation is not available.

The poststandard school bus received damage primarily to itsfront structure: the front bumper, right side frame, grill, hood, and radiator were deform-ed. The interior of the bus was undamaged.

. Outcome of Occupants of School Vehicle

passengers

Of the 5 passengers, age 6 to 11: 2 were uninjured, and _3 received (minor) injuries.

Thepassengers were restrained bystatic lapbeltsequippedwith pushbutton release buckles.

The passengers who received minor (AIS 1) injuries were reportedly seatedin the two front seats and the second seat on the left side. Information on specific seating positions, injury descriptions, and restraint adjustment is not available. The seatingpositions of Ahe two uninjUred passengers is not available. Use or nonuse oflapbeltsin this relatively low sped collision likely had little effect on injury outcome for the passengers. All passengers had the additional benefit or well-padded barriers, either restraining harriers or seatbacks, in front of their seating positions.

153 APPENDIX 6 144

Driver

The driver of the schoolbLis was restrained by a lapbelt and received (AIS I) contusions and abrasions about her abdomen, shoulder, and limbs.

Notes About the Accident

This schoolbus was equipped with padded restraining harriers in frontof tie first row of seats.

The lapbelts provided for the student passengers were mounted to thesnatfrares and passed between the upper and lower seat cushions, Pushbutton releas buckle:- were furnished.

154 145 APPENDIX B

Clarkstcn, Georgia Case Number 20

Principal Direction of Force

Heavily padded modesty panel

Heavily padded _Driver modesty panel F-44, MAIS 1

Injured passengers (all wearing lap beltsl: F6, MAIS 1 F-s, MAIS 1 F.11, MAIS 1

Uninjured passengers: seating positions unknown lag wearing lapbeltsh

.M-9, MAIS M;6, MAIS 0

e A.' w

A". _Special Notes: 0 Seating pattern for injurd v. I. 4f.fr40 passengers is known, but / AA' not the specific locations V. .11,1. Abe. of the individuals, aS %. 1 5 4C.14. 411.01 Y...., Ur.40"114 ,.on Sao !a:4 4 V4,.. oa

40.1441. 60, 0.4+ 40 The school bus shown 1Wi rd VI 4S is repcssentationst onty 155 APPENDIX 146

Case No. 21 Safety Board Investigation No. NYC-87-H-S801_

Location of Accident West Oak Hill Road; Williston, Vermont

Date and Time November 21, 1987; 7:50 a.m.

Description of School Vehicle Type B school bus: 1979 Chevrolet chassis with 18- passenger Mini-Bird body by Blue Bird Body Company

Type Of Accident Multiple collision: sideswipe, followed by head-on impact

Severity of Accident DeltaV estimated at 10 to15 mph forhead-on impact

Summary of_Events

A-small school bus, transporting three learning-disabled students to school, was traveling at a driver-estimated speed of 30 mph on a two-way, snow-covered road. The driver and two of the three passengers were restrained irtstme fashion: -A 1984 Chevrolet Citation, traveling in the -opposite- direction, crossed the centerline and sideswiped the left side of the-bus. The bus then veered to the right, left the road, and struck a.tree head-on before coming to rest.

After the crash, the passengersremained in theirseats until checkedby ambulance personnel. The bus driver then unlatched the lapbelt securing the child safety seat used to restrain one passenger and carried the child, still in _his safety seat, from the bus._ lhe driver also unbuckled the other restrained passenger from her lapheit; thirOissengiFand the-Unrestrained passenger exited through the side door.

The left front corner of the bus had an inward crush of 10 Inches. The front left side of the body was deformed toward the center from 3 to 5 inches. Damage from the tree was found near the center of the front of the bus where-the bumper was pusheo back 6.5. inches. .All window glass was intact.

The poststandard school bus performed well. Damage Was confined to the exterior body panels and front bumper.

Outcome of Occupants of School Vehicle

bEilnler;

Of the 3. passengers. ages 4 to 15: 3 were uninjured.

Two of the three passengers were restrained": one in a Chtld safety seat and one by a static lapbeit. Determiningthe value of restraintuse is difficult because allpassengers were uninjured. The passenger in the child safety seat probably benefitted most from restraint use because he was not throw0 forward into therestraining barrier or onto the floor. Use or nonuse of! lapbelts probably had little effect on the injury of the other passengers.

158 147 APPENDIX B

-Driver

The only injured occupant in the bus was the lapbelted driver who receiveda minor abrasion (AIS I) on the right side of his hip,most likely caused by the lapbelt.

NoteS About theAccident

The lapbelts on this bus were an aftermarketaddition by the schooi district. Safety Board investigators determined that the lapbeltused by the passenger in the secondseat on therightside was installed and usedimproperly. The webbing with the buckle end was anchored to the wheelwell instead of the floor. The wheel well Was much-higher than the floor,adding 9 inches of extra length and preventing the belt from properly fitting thechild. Te take up the slack,. the-driverThad knotted the belt webbing. Had this collision beenmore violent, the knot might have caused an injurybecause the passengerwould have 'jackknifed" overAhe belt and the knot. The childsafety-se-at was also secured with a knotted laOlaelt.

157 APPENDIX 8 148

Williston, Vermont Case Number 21

Second Direction of Force

Initial Direction of Forc(1

.Heavily padded modesty panel "Ns

Heavily padded modesty panel--

Left Side of Bus Right Side of Bus Driver F-4-7 2 77 Row 2D M-54, MASS 1 M-4, MAIS 0 ROW-3A- Row 3D F-15, MAIS 0 LO M.13, MAIS 0

4 (of 9 - 0 . - e Mb-

CO i 01W). A 'do .-er p It <140 e ,,44 V ; tor.4...e 4.-41 - 1 i / IU 4 Vo1. in 4,041 *..e. r. Ai The school ous shown is representational only.

153 149 APPENDIX B

Case No. 22 Safety Board Investigation No. ATI-_86-H-S804

,Location of Accident Intersection at Wautuga and Cascade Drive; Greensboro, North Carolina

Date and Time January 14, 1986; 3:30 p.m.

Description of School Vehicle Type Bschool bu,s: 1980 Chevrolet chassis with 20- passenger Mighty Mite body by Thomas Built Buses. The bus had beenreconfigured to 10-passenger capacity,

Type of Accident _Right side impact, followed'by rollover (900) (bus speed estimated at 25 mph; Severity of Accident - Delta V unknown and-car speed estimated at 5 mph)

Summary of Events

A sChOol. bus, transporting six students (some mentally disabled, others physically disabled) and a driver's aide, wastraveling on an urban street. -All but one of the occupants were restrained in somefashion (restraints included a misused harness, secured wheelchair, and lapbelts). As the bus crossed an intersection, a 1980 Oldsmobile 98 sedan struck the.bus onits right side. The right rear dual' tires of the bus rode up overthe front of the car, lifting the bus uR and starting the clockwise rotation of thebus as it continued to travel away from theimpact. After a 950 clockwise rotation over 60 feet,the bus overturned onto its left side and came to rest.

_ . The driver unlatched her lapbelt and beganto organize the evaduatibn,' assisted by the aide. Paramedics,the driver,the aide,and an unidentified passerby assisted some of the students to release their restraints;the two students on the right side of the bus remained suspendedfor only i few minutes. The rear emergency door -was easily opened by apassersby; all entries.and exits were made through.this door during the rescue.

The poststandard School bus received minor exterior damage on itsright side and moderate damage to its drive axle. Minor buckl int-4- of the interior roof occurred at the left side; however. no panelseparations occurred.

Outcome cf Occupants of School Vehicle

Efusengers

Of the 7 passengers, a 39-year-old aide and 6 students. ages5 to 13: 1 was uninjured, 5 sustained MAIS 1(minor) injuries, and 1 sustained MA1S 3 (serious) injuries.

15.9 APPENDIX B 150

Six of the sevenPassengers were restrained in somefashion:- the unrestrained passengerwas the driver's aide who wassqueezed onto the third seat on the -right side, which wasalready filledto capacity, so she couldassist the handicapped student seated next to her. Because the aide was not in a designated seating position (the bench seat wasdesigned for only one person), no lapbelt was-available for.her. The unrestrained aide received the most serious (MS 3) injuries: a displaced fracture of her right wrist,which occurred when she struck the left side of the bus, possiblycontacting the wheelchair secured to -the left side, as the bus overturned. She also sustained abdominal trauma that threatened her pregnancy.

Of the six passengers who were restrained,four Were secured by lapbelts, one was secured by the upper torso strapsof an E-Z-ON vest.and lapbelt, and another was in a special wheelchair equipped with-several straps. The wheelchair was secured by two lapbelts.

The lapbelted passenger on the left side in thefront row next to the window was reportedly not injured. The lapbelted passenger on the left sideenext:e to the Window in the second seat:received minor injuries:-a small bruise on left knee from contact with the side wall.or another passenger. The lapbelted passenger on -the left side in the. second seat next to theaisle received a small abrasion on the left side of his abdomen from thelapbelt. Passengers on the left side of- the bus prebably received less benefit from their restraints duringetherollover than those seated on the right side: the bus came to rest on its left side.

The passengerseated onthe right sideofthebus in the secondseat was restrained in a special harness, an E-Z-ON vest, but the harness wasimproperly' used: Although designed to be secured to the floor by four loops, only the two upper loops were secured. The available- lapbelt was used instead of the other attachments. The passenger received a minor injury: a small bruise on his right forehead from -hitting the seatback in front of him. -Hadhe not_been restrained, he would have been thrown to the left during the rollover and probably could have received additional minor injuries.

One passenger wasin a special wheelchair secured to the third seat on the left side with specially -adapted straps. The passenger wasseverely disabled and could .not silor hold his head erect: the restraintdevice was necessary to keep the -Passenger in-an upright position. He received a minor contusion: a bruise on hiseyelid, Had henotbeenrestrained, .he could_have received additional injuries.

The lapbelted passenger on the-right side in the third seat next to the-window received minor injuries: small bruises toher thighfrom flexingoverthe lapbelt, and a lower leg eorasion from contact with the seatframe. Had she not been restrained, she mighthave fallen tothe left during therollover and received other injuries.

arier The lapbelted driver received multiple minor (AIS 1) bruises andabrasions from contact withthe steering assembly, -interior sidewall,and window area. The lapbelt-induced deep bruises on her left hip at the groin indicatedthat the impact was. forceful. She also complained of soreness in her beck and headaches.

160 151 APPENDIX B

Notes About the Accident

The school bus had been reconfigured for the transportation ofdisabled students; its original 20-passenger seating capacity was reduced toallow only10 bench positions. The design left space at the extreme leftrear for securing one conventional wheelchair. Three bench seats, all 26 inches wide,were installed on the right side of the bus; three 39-inc5-wide and one 26-inch-wideseats were installed on the left side. The reduced width of the seat atthe left rear position allowed greater access to an automated wheelchair liftinstalled on the right side of the bus.

The improper inifallation of the E-Z-ON vest did not resultin injuries in this accident but might have in other accidents. Extrapolating injury outcome ofa passengerin a specially designed harness or wheelchair restraintfrom the outcome of a passenger in a conventional restraint, suchas a lapbelt, cannot be done with certainty. APPENDIX B 152

Greensboro, North Carolina Case Number 22

Rollover

Heavily padded; modesty panel A B Heavily padded modesty panel LE

Left Side of Bus Driver F-32, MAIS 1 19-LO 2 Row 1A Principal Direction MAIS 0 Force Row 2A F-13, MAIS 1 4 Row 213 Right Side of Bus M-5, MAIS1 Row 2C -- Row 3A M-7, MAIS 1 M-13, MAIS 1 (misused harness)

Row 3CX Wheel chair F-39, MAIS 3 position Displaced fracture of right wrist Contusion on lower abdorn i,./. /V Row 3C 40. 4. F-11, MAIS 1

' V 1 woe i Se The school bus shown

r ors Va 114 is representational only, re 182 153 APPENDIX B

Case No. 23 Safety Board Investigation No. FTW-83-F-H001

Location of ACCident Colonel Glenn Road; outside Little Rock, Arkansas

Date and Time May 2, 1983; 3:50 p.m.

Description of School Vehicle Type B school bus: 1981 Chevrolet chassis with 15- passenger Cadet body by Carpenter Body Works

Type of Accident 4ead-on collision followed by rollover (900)

Severity of Accident Delta V unknown (bus speed at impact was about 30 mph; pickup speed at impact 20 mph)

Summary of Events

A small -sChool..bus, equipped withlipbelts for.all occupants, W3S transporting- five physically handicapped students from school. Four of the five passengers and the driver were restrained. The bus was traveling 30 mph in a teavy rain on a two-lane road.-- When the bus approached a soarp.right curve, the driver applied -the brakes; the rear began *to sideslip,--and the bus rotated clockwit,e out of control. The school tus *slid across the road center and collided right front to right front with a 1977 Chevrolet pickup truck. The collision pushsd the pickup truck back And caused it to rotate 450 clockwise. As the bus forced the pickup rearward, the right front wheel of-the bus overrode the right front wheel of the pickup, causing the bus to lean to the left and overturnslowly onto its left side.-

Evacuation of Ihe schoot bus went smoothly, although the pasengers had never practice:if evacuation. Two -114S-Sengers reqUired assistance 'rele-asilig- thEar lapbelts: Onestudent was- hanging from the upper side of the bus and Was reluctant to release his latchplate until the bus driver was there to cushion his fall; another student needed assistance to walk, so he waited for help. After assisting the passengers, the driveropened the emergency door, andthe passengers helped each other out. A passerby held the door open.

The -right front- corner of-the poststandard schoolbus- was crushed rearward a maximum.of 28 inches, and the crumpled metal extended rearward to the side exit door. This door was jammed and the students were evacuated through the rear exit, which was_not damaged.

No interior damage occurred.

Outcome of Occupants of School Vehicle

Passengers

Of-the 5 passengers, ages 14 to 18: 2 were uninjured, and 3 sustained MAIS I (minor) injuries.

163 ',r77,77777-t7,271,

APPENDIX B 154

Four of the five passengers weriwearing lapbelts.

Two of the four pass'engers.wearing lapbelts and the unrestrained passenger abrasions. - Lapbelt use madelittle sustainedminor (AIS I) contusions -and difference in this'accident:both.restrained and unrestrained passengers received passengers, however, were wearing minor injuries. Both of the uninjured from the lapbelt. lapbelts. No student complained of soreness

Driver to her hip, _The 35-year-old lapbelteddriver received miner (AIS 1) contusions aitributed to the lapbelt becauseshe was suspended by the webbing before likely helped to reduce the number releasing the belt. The use of the lapbelt and severity of her injuries.

Notes About the Accident both This bus was equipped with39-inch-high restraining barriers in front of front row seats.

_ The bus was transporting a dear-mutepass:Inger and a passenger who, although able All passengers were seated on to move with crutches,normally used a wheelchair. wheelchair. the bench seats-at the time ofthe accident; no passenger was in a

164 r.`!'7777.1-717-77"'"7777'""'"77-4747747.:777-73170177777777777557.77:771-

APPENDIX P

155

Little Rock, Arkansas C33e Number 23

- Rollover Principal Direction of Force

HeaVily padded. modesty panel 7.\

A fi Heavily padded modesty panel Left Side of Bus DriVer F-35, MAIS 1 Row 18 M-13, MAI-S-CTI Right Side of 13u-t Row 28 Row 2C M-17, MAPS 1 M-17, MAIS i Row 38 Row 3C F-14, MAIS 1 M-14, MAIS

1.141140 4 0 e 49.1

1149 DOI V./ 0 .111MINIMMII/

6.0.4,V6.1 ho *mom! lows, *. WS P.N..* MS Coo .66 .66.l

a ilis.0.4 6 C. 944 M 6 Wheel-chair 4666.,o. I *004. *WWI" W... The school bus shown 1 ts,awfo 9 yaw... 8 AWNS 67.6.6 position le representation& only. A...4a. Aliomin.66 Ic6 Moomou6s 444 .MS.

185 APPENDIX B 156

Safety Board InvestigationNo. N7C-86-H-SB04 Case No. 24 of Port Washington Boulevard and Accident Location Intersection Bonnie Heights Road; FlowerHill; New York

January 24, 1936; 8:45 a.m. Date and Time bus: 1979 GMC chassis with Description of SchoolVehicle Type B school 14-passenger Coachette -body _ Rear-end collision, followed by rollover (90°) Type of Accident Delta V uNknown- (bus wasjust accelerating from Severity of Accident stop.).

Summary of Events students Ao was transporting.three preschool and' elementary A small- sChool bus were-sharing a substandard belt.The School school. Two-of thethree passengers and--then proceeded across.afour-lane, two-way, stopped at_an intersectiOn bus struck in the right rearby'a'passenger car.At divided highway when_it was rolled oi/er onto its left side. impact, the,school busrotated clockwise and unbuckled his belt and went tothe After the schoolbus cameto rest, the driver was lying on hisleft side by-the window frame passengers. The-unrestrained-boy two and alert. The driverunbuckled the belt shared by the and ceiling, conscious stood also conscious andalert and remained calm. They other children; they were the-passengers.out of the rear emergency__ up on their ownand tht-driver assisted exit. school bus remained relativelyintact; however. thn The body of the poststandard about from the windows to theroof, was displaced inboard left side of the body, the restraining barrier andthe three rows of seats behind 1 inch. The padded One ceiling the sidewall becauseof this displacement. driver's seat abutted separations were 6 inches longand one-fourth in two places; the seam separated frame. The doors__ The windshield crackedand was dislodged from its inch wide. lift were rendered inoperative. on the right rearfor the wheelchair

Outcome of Occupantsof School Vehicle Ilasignata

Of the 3 passengers, ages5 to 6: I was uninjured, and 2 sustained MAIS I(minor) injuries. restrained by one large,substandard form of seatbelt, Two of the passengers were "Notes About the (see descriptionofbelt under jury-rigged in the bus frent seat at These passengers wereseated on the left side in the Accident"). One received a bone bruise(AIS 1), and one was the window and centerpositions.

166 :APPENDIX B 157 uninjw-ed. Use of the substendard belt unlikely affected their infUry -outcome because of their proximity to the side onto which the bus rolled. The nature.of the substandard belt, however, increased the chance .of greater injuries. The passenger on the left side in the front seat next to the aisle was unrestrained; he received a minor laceration (AIS 1) to his chin from the window frame. Had he been restrained, his injuries probably would have been about the same because of the dynamics of the bus and his close proximity to the side onto which the bus rolled.

Even if all of the passengers had been restrained by properly installed lapbelts, injury outcome would not have improved over the minor to no injuries that were actually sustained.

The lapbelted driver received minor (AIS-1)injuries. The contosions to the driver's.left shoulder could have been caused by theclockwise rotation of the bus whenit was stuck in tne right rear or bythe driver striking the left .inside wall of the bus ar: it overtorned onto its left side.

Notes About the Accident

The jury-rigged restraints, erroneously reported to be.lapbelts, were installed by employees of the bus company, not the schoolbus manufacturer. Bus company 'policy for the last 5 years states that the driver is to fasten the belt around prekindergarten passengers and to suggest to kindergarten and older passengers that they wear the belt.

Each of the six passenger seats had a 29-inchtall seathack, Only two belts were provided: for the first and third-seats on the left side. Both improvised belts created potential injury-producing hazards.

The belt on the front scat was-made up from two sets of lapbelts j9ined together

by two metal plates, each about 7 inches long, and four bolts, each about 1 3/8 inches long. The belt was looped around the Junction of the .seatback and seat cushion rather than anchored_to.the floor or seatframe.The installation allowed up to three children to be restrained by the belt. The exposed metal plates and protruding bolts presented a hazard for any occupant coming in contact with. them. A passenger restrained-by the device would -probably sustaina serious -injury during a crash ifthe bolts and plates were in frontof or alongside the passenger's torso.

The device on the third seat had been installed in a manner similar to the one on the front seat. It consisted of two belts: one wrapped horizontally around the seatbick about 8 inches above the top of the seat cushion, and one looped around the cushion. Theloopedbelt, withpaddingstitched to it, servedas .the lapbelt. This device also compromised the safety of an occupant Testrained by it. The lap portion of the belt would fit around the upper torso, not low and across the hips. Because the lap portion of the belt wrapped around the belt on the seatback, it could slide to the inboard and outboard position; of theseat.

1 APPENDIX B 158

According to the label on the belts, thewebbing latches and buckles conform to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards209 and 302. Neither of the belts however, conform tothe Federal standards. For example, FMVSS 210 stipulates that "anchorages for-an individual seatbeltassembly shall te located at least 6.50 inches apart laterally, measuredbetween the vertical centerline of the hnit holes"; the jury-rigged restraints werenot anchored at all. Section 571.209 of shall be designed for use by one, and the FMVSSstates that "a seatbelt assembly only one, person at any one time,"and that the seatbeit shall be capable of adjustMent to fit the occupant. The devices did not meet these requirements.

In the Society of AutomotiveEngineers bookentitled "Motor Vehicles Seat Belt Assembly Installations," section SAE-0800C states that attachment parts shall be spaced laterally so that the lapbeltportion of the seatbelt assembly essentially forms a "U"-shaped loop when in use. The standard states that in no case shall -both-ends of one assembly be connected atthe same anc!toracie or attachment point. 159 APPEldr3IX

.1;E '4; . f Flower Hill, New York 0 Case Number 24 V \ yo ..!. A.5 Rollover 4-.4-

40.1.,..- 'A-. A

Heavily padded modesty panel \ _ . Heavily padded modesty panel

Left Side of Bus Drivcr M.56, MAIS 1 j

Row 1,4 3 F-5, MAiS 1 L I Row 18 FiS, MAIS 0

Row IC Principal Direction M!5, MAIS 1 of -Force

4-7 Two wheel zhair Specie: Notes: -Both-passengers in positions positions IA and IB were using one juryrigged belt wrapped erdurid the seat back,

Tlio school hos shown Is terootontalional unfv /69 APPENDIii C SUMMARY OF SAFETY ISSUES BY CASE NUMBER ' stanchion/Involvement of . . 1 Inaccurate Improperunusualuse Of (includesoccupantbarrier in absenceinjuries frontall . Joint or orCrushed other roof blockedRimmed/ exit doerrcontrolBoarding numberCase 1 statusofreportin9 restraint restraintsavailableinstisilation of dislodgementoxof frontalanchor barriets,) accessmaintenanceseparation panel compartmentintrusionpassenger into buthledFloor tounableor openexit jammeddoorcomponent! shut Other 1 a a i I . Air Mix of pushbutton 3 x x II (driver' door) , releaseonlatch same latchplates seat. plates and lift 1 1I a (vandaliaed belts) it (absent) x deformed.stairwellsea;;;igavailablelapbelts posit:ons; not at all x x . x x ) (jammed) x -- stepFloor buckled. at entrance 6 x 1 , heartDriver conditionwith chronic. 170 a floor buckle)(moved by x 1 171 1 useImproper os stanchion.Involvementbarrier in frontal of Joint or I CriOied roof . blockedJammed! exit . dooi:controlBoarding Case ofseprAtinginaccurate tc,i;trat tri installationwiuwatav ailable of (includesrxcupantoof anchor ftontal absence inlulieti bairi e.rs; accessmaintenance panel pi passengerintrusionother into buckledFloor tounableof openexit jammeddoorcomponent shut Other , number stanis . restraints. dmlodgement separation (tnipartment x x Children not 8 (opened) , instructed on 9 .1 _ . _ __._ . ______.... _ _ _ _.,..______evacuxiionbelt wearing' 1 . , Windshield 10-- . _ ____!dislodged ._ ___ frcars anchor) __.. N dislodged 1:11 I It ll (opened) x x byDriver lapbelted distracted . _. displaced.windshieldstudents; . 11 ... ______* ______x ir Evacuation of deaf . . - ' . _ (Inoperable) language,personwhenstudents driver, knowing hampered was the signonly 172 1 1 displacedremoved: windshield 173 1 Involvement of stanchion: frontal . . . uSeImproper Or barrier in Crushed roof ! Jammed. . Boarding Case _.._ ofreportingInaccurate remotest restraints:availableinstallationunusual of ocor(includesoccupant crcastalanchor absence injuriesbarriers).. Jointseparationaccessmaintenance n panel - -r or compartmentpassengerMtrusionother into buckledFloor sounableorblocked exitopen exit jammeddoorcomponent'dooriconteol shut Other number 14 status dislodgement - N 1 ($icle itzicirs 1 Windshieldrea: emergency shattered, door t!ut I, iidi' , Newhingesopened driver during and had torn rollover. never from r.acr. , anchorage.detacheddriven a van. from Seats 15 x a . x x A contact with(injuriesaide to (tom X I. . components) a S it 16 & (dislodged from it (left side & ' seatsSheet torn metal loose. torn away; 17 x & anchor) 1 peeled back). , . I 1 x X (jammed) a Bench seats deformed. . (dislodged (rom . 18- 174 anchor) a It 175 Improper j Involvementstanchion/frontal of . I! Ca.e iInaccurate eporting installationunusualuse of Of of(inoccupantbanter fron(al in injbarners) uries cludrb es "sence accessmaintenanceJoint or panel ' I passengerintrusionorCrushed other roofinto Floar unableorblockedJammed' exit exit doorcomponent/door/controlBoarding number 19 statusof restraint restraintsvailable a dislodgement.or anrhor separation compartment buckled to open jammed shut (miuries to a detachedSeatOther cushions 4 contact driverwith from control) , 2120 I a - 22 a 1 Minor roof buckle n , .______2423 a a a a (lammed) windshieldattapbeitspract:ced.Evacuatton all seating dislodged.not neve, availablepositions. 262S x st ..-:- a Seatfractured.andBelts floor. deformed. anchored windsh:eld to sejts 282:1 176 MIMIa till glass out. ...- 177 164

APPENDIX

INDEX TO AND CASE SUMMARIES OF SMALL SCHOOL VEHICLES NOT BUILT TO FEDERAL SCHOOL BUS STANDARDS

Number of cases: 4 Type of accident: Nonrollover 3_

Rollover 1

Case number Data

25 Wallingford, Connecticut November 10, 1987 1985 Ford E-350, 15-passenger- van (not built_ to Federal school bus standards) Frontal collision

26 Schaumburg, Illinois -April5-; 1985 1984 Ford 19-passenger Econoline van (not built to Federal school bus standards) Head-on tollision

Zedford, New Hampshire October 1, 1985 1981 Opdge_Van Space Porter Custom SE (previously.used (or afrport service; retrofitted to imefNiWkarip's-Kire schooi bus standards; van not built to Federal school bus standards) Left side impact

28 s, TT

fesei 23, ;S: *1980 Ford Superwagon, 15-passenger vanlnot. buiit to Federal school bus standards) Noncollision rollover (7200)

178 165 APPENDIX 0

NYC-88-H-S804 Case No. 25 Safety Board Investigation No.: Durham Road; Wallingford, Connecticut Accident Location. November 10, 1987: 2:45 p.m. Date and Time (painted blue, Description of School Vehicle 1985 Ford E-350, 15-passenger van not school bus yellow).The van was not built to Federal school bus standards.

Type of Accident . Frontal collision

Severity of Accident Delta V 13 mph

Summary of Eventt

_ (an A Ford- v:n being used as aschool 'vehicle was transporting 14 passengers rural road. adult aide and 13 junioe highschool students) hume from school on a least Some form of belt system wasavailable at each seating position, but at four passengers ind the deiver wereunrestrained. As the van entered aleft . traveling in the opposite direction, lost curve, a 1972 Chevrolet dump truck, road and crossed into the van's lane. The dump controlon the snow-covered truck, which was rotatingcounterclockwise, struck the left front of the van with load of hot asphalt to its left side. Impact forces caused the dumptruck's spill onto the van's roof andinto the van through the broken side windows.

evacuated the bus. The passenger seateci Of the 14 passengers, 13 safely directly behind the driver wasunable to release his lapbelt because hot asphalt lhe lapbelt was subsequently had spilled_onto his.seat,buryl_m_the_latchplate. The unresteainki'dFiVer .cut by the truck driver, and the student was freed, personnel. the school van was trappedin the vehicle until extricated by rescue

The left front of the van wasruched rearward 17 inches and 13 inches rightward windshield-was fractured at the left A pillar,_ andthe at maximum collapse. The driver's door and 1.he middleleft side window were broken. The dashboard and buckled steering *eel -werepuihed .iearward towardsthe driver's.sc.t. The roof rearward of.the Bpillar__

Considering the difference in massbetween the dump truck and the van. the van caused by the spillAge of hut performed wellin the trash. Most injuries were asphalt into the van, not by thecrath itself.

Outcome of Occupants of SchoolVehicle WW1= Of the 14 passengers, oneadult and 13 students, ages 11 to 15: 13 sustained MAIS 1 (minor) injuries, and 1 sustained MAIS 2 (moderate)injuries.

179 APPENDIX D 166

Of the 14 passengers, 8 were wearinglapbelts,I was wearing a lap/shoulder belt available at his seating position, and restraint usefor 1 was undetermined. The adult aide was unrestrained.

The passenger wearing the lap/shoulderbelt was seated in the bucket seat to the right of the driver.The shoulder portion of the belt was equipped with an emergency locking retractor;the lap portion was equipped with anautomatic minor (AIR 1) injuries: nose locking retractor. The passenger received laceration from contact with thedashboard, firstdegree burns on top of his head from hot asphalt,and contusionvs to midchest and right hip from the shoulder by the lap/shoulder belt, he harness. Hau this student not been restrained probably would have contacted thedashboard more forcibly and sustained more availableon the adjustmentof his serious injuries. _Informationwas not shoulder portion _lao/shoulder -belt; -some slack probably-was present in .the beCause.he contacted the dashboard in thisDelta V 13 mph collision.

The lapbelted passenger bythe window in the front row of bench seats received the-worst injury (moderate, A1S-2) sustainedby a passenger: a fractured cheekbone from contact with the doorframe on-the driver's side,which was dislodged during the crash. He also sustained minor forehead and lip lacerations (AIS 1)from contact with.the-door frame andfirst-degree burns on hands and no upper torso upper legs from hot asphalt. Because the lapbelt offered restraint,it could not prevent his upper bodyfrom swinging forward at iopact and hitting the door frame.

The lapbelted passenger seated in the middle of the front row received minor in (A1S 1)injuries: contusions on his left knee from contact with the seatback front of him and multiple minor burnsfrom hot asphalt. The outcome probably would have beeff-timilar had he beenunrestrained. ---

The adult aide seated next to him, onthe right side of the front row, was not using the available lapbelt and sustainedminor (AIS 1) injuries: contusions on her left shoulder, her chest, rightknee, and left foot. If lapbelted, she still probably would have sustained minor injuries.

The lapbelted passenger by the windowin the second row of bencti seats sustained minor-(AIS 1) contusions on her head,left knee, and shin-from contact willithe chin and hands from seatback infront of her and first-degree burns on her because upper and lower asphalt. Lapbelt use could-not prevent these injuries extremities are free to flail about in acrash.

Lapbelt use al!, did not prevent the passengerin the middle of the second row from ;training his left wist or fromsustaining first-degree burns on his hands, LapbeTt use did not prevent the fore:ams, and left cheek from hot-Asphalt. passengar on the right sideof the secuLd row from spraining his left ankle.

At least two of the three passengers onthe third bench seat wore the available lapbetts. The -passengerin the--middle claimvi to have been re:trained, _but examination of the belt'siatchplate adjustment indicated that,if worn, the webbing would have provided norestraint: the belt Was extended to its maximum contact-induced contusions, length. All three sustained minor (AIS 1) injurles:

18 APPENDIX D 167 strains, and burns frometheasphalt. The occupant in the middle also sustained nose and forehead abrasionsand knee abrasions from contact with the seatback, and abrasions to the hip-area. The other two sustained neck or back sprains, origin unknown.

The fourth bench seat wasequipped with lapbeits for the four seating positions. Only one of the four studentsseated on the bench was restrained at the time of oniy minor injuries. the crash. All four students, however, received

Qrivqr

The.driver was unrestrained,but restraintstatus probably had little -effect because of the intrusion at hisseating position. He sustained moderate (A15 2)* fractured five adjoining ribs on his left injuries:a fractured left knee and He side when he contactedthe left door and steering wheel during Ihe collision. also received a kidney injury ofunknown severity (A1S 7). Hot asphalt caused first-degree burns-of both hands,,left forearm, back, and left thigh.

7he driver was trapped in thevehicle es a result of the vehicle collapse at his seating'position and the-hot asphaltthat had spilled on top of him. He was freed by fire rescue personnel.

Notes About the Accident

Passenger injuries,for the most part, were caused by thehot asphaltthat Restraint use could have spilledinto the van throughthe- broken windows. provided little benefitin those circumstances. Seating position,rather than restraint status, was the major'factor in injury outcome.The two passengers receiving the worst-injuries Wereseated-i-n-the-iwact 2one.

Although the driver stated he waswearing the lap/shoulder belt available at his that he probably was position, Safety Board investigators determined three-point belt was found wedged unrestrained. The shoulder portion of the_ behind the driver's seat with bloodsplattered on the latchplatee and asphalt concrete filled the bucklelatchplate-slot.

The lapbelts provided at 13 of the14 passenger seating positions-were General Motor lapbelts, with pushbuttonreieese iatchplates, requiring manual adjustment lo ensure a snug fit. Safety Board investigators suspect at least one of these lapbelts had not been adjustedproperly: the student seated in the third bench seat, middle position, claims tohave beer wearing the available lapbelt but slid forward under the seat infront of her-during_the crash. The lapbelt at her seating position was found extendedto its maximum length. If worn, it probably had not been adjusted to fitpeuoerly and allowed the student to slide under the belt and onto the floor. release The lapbeltson me seats were equipped with pushbutton bench seat were anchored.to the floor; the latchplate4. others weee ;:nc:*:07.1 to theneatcrale.

181 , --,-""7117Trr"-,--,.....,..,..,,

APPENDIX D 168

LEr,E..C.1 evs.1

Wallingford, Connecticut 0 e Case Number 25 :-<1 !..er fVIfoR MA,S ; ,,,, OA 11 / S5. 1.1 1. .tv: 11, g LlS At; vmo Inose-I, ,-..., 116i.,re 0.0,q4,111, 1, Principal Direction 3 !oven's -4 of Force 1.1-14,N Atoo,50ASV, Aaff.. Ir-7,1 Ater,-.010 t,

Lett Side of Van . Right Side of Van Driver Row ID M-68, MAIS 2 M.11, MAIS 1 Fracture of left knee Row 2C Fracture of five adjacent F-53, MAIS 1 ribs on left. P.ow 3C Kidney injury, unkncwn severity M.13, MAIS 1 Firs( degree burns on-both Row 4C hands, left forearm, lower F-13, MAIS 1 _-back-and left thigh Row 5C M-15, MAIS Row 2A _ Row 5D M-11, MAIS 2 M.15, MAIS 1 Fracture of left cheek bone Laceration of forehead and lips First degree burns on hand and both upper thighs

Row 28 M.13, MAIS 1 Row 3A F-12, MAIS 1 Hów 38 F-11, MA1S 1 Row 4A F.12, MAIS 1 How 48 F13:MAIS 1 (restraint status unknnwnl Raw 5A m.14, MAIS 1 The van shown is Row 58 rtnaresentztlonat only. M.13, MAIS 1 182 .13,10"1"

APPENDIX D 169

Case No. 26 Safety Board Investigation No. CHI-85-H-0R18

AcOdent Location Schaumberg Road and Plum9fove Road; Schaumberg, Illinois

Oate and Time April 5, 1985; 12:49 p.m.

Description of School Vehicle1984 Ford 19-passenger Ecenoline van. The van was not built to Federal school bus standards.

. . _

Type of Accident Head-on collision

Severity of Accident Pelta V 25-28 mph

Summary of Events

A van used 2s,a school vehicle wastransporting 12 students on an activity trip. While-traveling-eastbound on 2 four-lane roadway divided by a16-foot-wide flush divider island, -the driver lostcontrol. The vancrossedoverthemedian divider, entered the opposing -traffic-.:lanes,. and _struck .a 1984 Lincoln Continental sedan head-nn. After impact,buth vehicles came to rest in the westbound left lane still engaged in the impact position.

Of the 12 passengers in the van, 7 were wearinglapbelis and 5 wire unrestrained. The driver was-also unrestrained. --

Collision damage waS found across the entirefront of the van, with maximum rearward-crush reaching 20-inches at the right front, There was no intrusioninto the passenger compartment of the van. Interior damage occurred to'the steering assembly and- instrument panel forward and inboard of thedriver's seat position. The lower framework and the seatback of each bench seat weresubstantially deformed. A spare tire and wheel, stored but unsecuredbeneath the rearmost bench seat, was displaced forward during the impact.

The' van performed wellin thiscrash,-allowing -the-passenger compartment to maintain its structural integrity without_ contributing topassenger injury. Although the vehicle did not conform to Federal school busstandards, this does :not appear to have affected thecrash outcome. Many injuries ware attributable .to lapbelt use rather than to theinterior features of.the van.

.Outcome of Occupants of School Vehicle Wing= Of the 12 passengersi ages 6 to 7: 5 sustained MIS I(minor) injuries, -3 sustaimed-MATS 3 (serious) injuries, 3 sustained MAIS 5 (critical) injuries (theinjuries for one proved fatal), and

I sustained MAIS 7 (unknown severity) injuries,

183 APPENDIX D i70

the left window Although the paseenger in the front bench seat (bench 1) eext to said that he was wearing thelapbelt provided, eeidence indicated that he was abrasions.and a laceration. Considering unrestrained. He received_ minor (AIS 1) -the injuries sustained by thelapbelted passengers irithis ven, this passenner might have received a greaterlevel of injuries had he been restrained. restrained by a The passenger in bench 1 in the second seat from the le,t was static lapbelt and sustained abilateral pelvic fracture (AIS 2), contusions and abrasions on and above the bridgeof his nose (AIS.2), a cicsed heed injury with eeeralgic defect (41S 3), and abrasionof the left-and right flanks -(AIS 1). The ear's :injuries canbe attributed directly to his -weariegthelapbeit. the lapbelt was- ideringthelocation and type of hispelvic injuries, a propermanneie The .leently worn in what is usually consideredto be bilateral pelvic-fracture was causedby.decelerating into the belt webbing while- the upper tors-o-jackknifed-giver belt causine head Lontect with the rigid base-of the driver's seat. Had a lapbeitnot been wnrn, thi; child's deceleration would have been into the rear cushionof the-driver'S seat, the driver's body, -and the surface of the engine cover,with the deceleration forces distributed over more of his bodyesome level of moderatetorserious injury could.have occurred. lepbeit and The passengerin behch 1 in the right seat .was-restrained by a comminuted fracture of the left iliac wing and minor sustained a serious (AIS 3) (AIS 1) contusions and abrasioni' tohis abdomen and limbs. Because his height was much greater than 'thatof the-passenger on his left,his head was directed into the upper area nf the seatbackin front of him (the right front seat). The deceleration. seatback deformedforward, allowing acontrolled or conta41ed Although the serious pelvic injury wasthe result of his wea-ing the lapbelt, the passenger did not receive aserious head injury, unlike h:e seatmate.

window.was not wearingthe* static The passengerin bench 2 next to the left lapbelt available and su:tained a minor(A!S 1) contusion to his lower left leg, which did not require medical attentiOn.He was fully contained by the seatback occurred in the directly in front of him. Extensiveforward displacement seatback along with multiple scuffed areas.

The passenger in bench 2 next tothe-righ, vindow.wae not_weariner the static, onlyminor (A1S 1) lapbelt availableat ,that positionandalsce_sustained Extensive ierward deformation occurred to injuries:- abrasions and contusions. the:lower framework of bench 2 alongwith the seatback at this position. The seatback directly' in front was pushedforward several inches, with scuMd areas on the uphclstered rearsurface.

.The: passenger in bench 3 next tothe left_window was wearing the etatic lapbelt available at that position and sustainedserious (AIS 3) injuries that-included a fracture of the left iliac crest,a head injury, and a bleddercontusion. The passenger was hospitalizedfor 4 days. Her serious injuries can be attributed to her wearing the lapheit. The locationand nature of her pelvic injuries strongly suggest- proper belt placement. The bench seat directly in front was.extenslvely deformed: the lower framework wasdisp' ed forwari several inches and the back cushion was pushed forward into conta L.with the;ewe- cushion.Scuffed areas were observed on theupholstered rear surface of the back cushion.

184 APPENDIX D 171

The passengers in bench 3in the second seat from the left and theright seat were not wearing the static lapbelts available at the.positions. Both passengers sustained minor (A1S 1) contusions andabrasions, and were both contained by ttee impact forces, without seatbacks in front, allowing them to"ride down the serious injury.

The passenger in bench 4 next to theleft window was wearing the staticlapbelt available at that position and sustainedcritical (AIS 5)injuries that proved a contusion (6 x 6 inches) on the left hip fatal. This passenger suffered retroperitoneum hematcma (A1S 2),bilateral pulmonary contusions (AIS 3), (A1S 3), subarachnoid hemorrhage (AIS3), serosal tear (AIS 4),torn mesentery the, colon (AiS 5), laceration -(A1S sebdural hematoma (A1S 4), laceration of of the small bowel (A1S 5),and loss of consciousness (A1S 5'. The passenger treate4 with the aid of never regained consciousn-essfollowing the crash. She was life support equipment for 3 daysbefore being pronounced dead. The injuries resulted 'from ianbelt-use. The severity of the injuries was increased by the presence of an unsecured sparetire and wheel that moved forward at impact to a position beneath andforward of the passenger. The-jackknifing action-cver the-- lapbelt accelerated her headinto violent contact with thetire and wheel, resulting in brain and spinal injury. Theiapbelt itself penetrated her abdomen, resulting in massive internal trauma. The movementof the spare-tire blockedthe downward Collapse of the lower seat cushion,presenting a rigid surface that resUlted in compression of thc paesenger'schest and pulmonary contusions. Had the lapbeltnot been worn,the passenger's head would nothave accelerated .downward into the spare tire and wheel or into thelower framework of bench 3.-

The passenger in bench 4 in the secondseat from the left was wearing the static lapbelt available and sustained critical (A155) injuries:a bilateral fracture of iliac crests (AIS 2), a eubarachnoidhemorrhage (A1S 3), and severe brain stem injury (A1S 5). The passenger received tnitiel care et an area hospital for before'being transferred for-rong-et:erm-e-areee Hie-injuries, like those of- the passenger to theleft, are attributed to tile lapbelt being worn. These injuriesprobably wouldhave been lesseevere had tne paesenger net been lapbelted.

The pasSenger in bench 4in the second seat from the right was also wearing the static lapbelt available and sustainedcritica1.015 5)injuries:a contusion with hematoma of the forehead (XIS 2),eabrasion/contusionof the lower abdomen. (ALS 3), contusion with hematoma of the cecum (AIS3), subarachnoid hemorrhage-of the cranial/cervical junction (AlS 3),subarachnoid hemorrhage of the posterior fosse (AIS 3), perforation of small bowel (A1S 5), and aspinal cord contusion (vedriplegic)-(AIS 5). The passenger epent extended- time at a local hcspital and was then transferred to an extended-carefacility. The passenger would not havt-recetvtd such serious injuries had he not beenlapbelted.

The passenger in the bench 4 next to _the rightwindow seat Was wearing the_static lapbelt available. Severalinches of forward deformation -occurred at the right side lower framework of bench 4. The tubularframe members were bent forWard to a point of contact between the bench's leading edgeframe and the ineer fender of the right rear ttre.The back cushion of the-bench was displaced ;.orwardby several inches at its top. This passenger sustained.a moderate (AIS 2) injury, a

185 APPENDIX D 172

full-depth laceration of the tongue. She was afforded somedegree of deceieration by the interior sidewall of the van andthe forward deformation of the lower frameworkof the seat: she didnot sustain serious to critical injuries comparable to the other lapbelted-passengers.

()Hype-

The driver of the van, who was notwearing the available lap/shoulder belt, thigh (AIS sustainedsevere Injuries: a largelaceration of the left 2), contusion of the upper left chest (AIS 2),multiple facial contusions (AB 2), -concussion with_ amnesia (AIS 3), avulsionfracture of the right elbow (AIS 3), and a bilateral pulmonary contusion(AIS 4). _ Witnesses statedthatthe driver apparently passed out just beforetothe collision and-leaned over to the right. Hadthe driver had been wearing the lap/shoulder belt, her leaning to the rightwould have taken her out of the shoulder belt and left her restrained bythe lapbelt only.

I 86 APPENDIX D 173

Scheer," Der% efino.s Case slumber 26

Row 38 F.24, MAUS 4 MAIS 1 8,!atera! pulmcnary conturoons Row 30 Concurithori M-6, MAI'S 1 Aeunrm fr..tture of rert elbow Row 44 Mu Iht%le :oritus,uns to the face f 6. MAIS 5 Ceonutuor, uh,hr lett chev Cenrutal aaloi G,slocamon Large lacerahon ie _ Pric,oil; 0,rechon Closed head mier-1 Multiple small latmr;ispes face of Farce LaCelattonarral1 benreet _FraCIOe.: Silt 1St & 2nd rits- Lace:a:qui color: Contwoor. rGht elevcle arej Sutzur41 hernatorra Multfolh contusonsleft !et; Torn rnetentery- WOW eanttroons rsght led Sarnia/ mat AbraT3ne rht hard Sutarachnon; hemorrhage Abrahorsleft ttatitt hetri)behlonevni ?lomat:ma 8,1acinai pulmonary corrusons fion IA Contomon 6- a 6"left thp MA5 1 Contusion - ht cheek flow 18 Contue,on tower patiee area M.7, MA!S 3 Conftnudnleft him COStd bead ;None right COM:US.CR Inwo, left leg net, r6.!0;a; Peft.:1 ADmsnr; lownr ngr.t4erg COnil)S:Or /11414SICP Pow 48 Orott,44 of rOseOPCiatPrliit 6.MAIS 5 8,1;elefclely.0 f:4:tuf S,eere. pram veers asp:1'y At),at,06icT Suraachno,p helmorrtiagv Ahvivonynt fla FI,N4ti,N11 toolufa011fC creel P.,,e,/ 10 -Ctecr.o.ifenIViah htfohetOrile tO Iorehoad M7. MA:5 CzPviivon Icyos! loft ilidorreo !,50eg ' Coot .)/1:;,ver17111 hrip.ant:n lefl &ix Vrn; ..,,...... -....! CCIrIttOonflfiritif 4ek le COttiii.00to:OM, 17177,74:J1 .40eat.Oh nvht tdh4 wea Caetub,un :Owe/ X.A.10fileir OP er:Ili $ Atmrb;..to.101 raqrs 1 .--...... ;...... Z...! 1 lb Sde: ..I Poe, 10 4t.ttdSCgt100+1/, 101 44 tute MAiS . . \ AtgallOn 41 r,011 So,o41cofd turifut.Oo ROY. :A Pirflof.,thor of veloi!Oowri M 6. NIA, .5ut;w4v:htiod herndr.hevjl. Row 7U 11111111 MI=.1111111. OsAlejlgit tt,tieiES M ;, MA,S r 5404,t1Cttltut: rigelorrhars Row 3A o crenal crov,4I rrnevon 4.MAS3 :orntuourt N he/mitt:ma 0 Cortucon w;ft, Nirlorortia forehead C'nerri1 neeP 0 '. RIaller atl7f! Aprapon cum:5qm tower abdomen' g (.0,1479 -4771 a . tree, Fin* 46 Ceem,on g1t t,C - f .7, MAIS 7 Unepocihed tko re;uy COMW1:mtt WI ;t11:1 I . .. 4.7 t AWISS.Ors tOrtild.Otr e/ Cull cepth loceAtioll t.0 to1,0140- ICrfo !art ,yto iV Aortmorirurt ii.de tsf fun/head / .1. " a.e, Cohlut;,o,03 e.m r lett 1.41 a : Atuetou Fuel 5:de ot too, hdod Cootpi Or,:oni %.46 ot 1. ,,,,, Conlioi.c,nt Caleo%40, legøt o V:lb,"5

OA e 7 Mt.... 0. ,,. .... een elgev4 cb.s, Ittfit*.e,lobunut 041, 0. ',A .011 1 4 f

187 APPENDIX D 174

Case No. 27 Safety Board Investigation No. MYC.-85-H-5801

-Accident Location Route 101 at Wallace Road; Bedford, New Hampshire

Date and Time October 1, 1985; 6:50 a.m.

Description of School Vehicle1981 Dodge Van Space Porter Custom SE. The van, previously used for airport.limousine service, met New Hampshire standards for a multi-purpose school bus; it had not been retrofited to meet Federal school bus standards. (The van was painted white, not school bus yellow.)

Type of Accident Left side . impact, with principaldirection of force at the 10 o'clock position

Severity of Accident Delta V unknown

-Summary of Events

A- van, equipped withsomeform of seatbelt at all seatingpositions, ,as transporting two unrestrained students to school.The driver was restrained-bY a lap/shoulder belt. When the driver attempted to turnfrom one roadway to another in heavy fog, it was struck in the left front side- by a dump truck, whica was traveling at 35 mph. The dump truck pushed the van acrossthe center of the road, where the truck struck a 1984 Chevroletsedan.

The van received extensive damage on theleft side, with MAXIMUM inward crush -reaching 39iiches- at the driver's door.The.bench :eat behind the driver's seat was displaced rearward and tothe right.

The van was not built according to therequirements of.the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) for school buses;therefore it cannot be evaluated by these standards. Thevan, which was rated at leisthan 10,000 poundsgross vehicle.weight rating. was struck on the left side by a loaded dump truck that weighed 51,900 pounds traveling at about 35 mph. Thedifferences in weight and in any structural rigidity -between thetwo strikingvehicles makesirrelevant discussion ofcrash performance ofvansconforming to Federal school bus standards versus nonstandard conforming vans.

Outcome of nccupants of Vehicle

Of the 2 passengers, ages"15 and 18:

I sustained MAIS 3 (serious injuries), and 1 sustained MAIS 5 (critical injuries).

88 175 APPENDIX D

The unrestrained passenger in the right front seat rcceived critical (.IS 5) :njuries: intervo.triculee and intercerebral i)emorrnenes: oe W4S unconsci,:us for nore than 24 hours, The contact points for the passenger were not confirmed. The dynamics of the collision moved hiM forward and to the left at impact,into the area of maximum intrusion: The use or nonuse of restraint probably did not affect the injury outcome for this passenger because of the massive intrusion into the forward area of the van.

The other unrestrained passenger WaS in one of the three rows of bench seats; the exact position is notknown.'_ The passenger Was ejected out of aleftside window. (The windows did not conform tofederal school bus standards). She sustained serious (AiS 3)injuries.: a comminuted pelvic fracture, closed head injuries, anda massive lower leginjurythat. necessitated amputation ofthe limb. The type and severity of the lower leg injury indicate that the limbwas run over by the dump truck tires followirsg the ejection. The pelvic fracture and head injuries could liave occurred from contact with the pavement. The_jntrusjon or-the school van was on the.left front, away from this passenger's seatiegarea. The forces, however, would remain extreme, and had she been lapbelted, she would probably have still sustained serious injuries.

2Iar .

The driver was wearing the lap/shoulder belt proided.She sustained severe (AlS 4) injuries that proved fatal: skull fractures; brain-hemorrhage; fractured ribs, femur, and pelvis;and lacerated liver,spleen,kidney, andlung. The injuries were caused by impact forces and severe intrusion into the driver's seatingarea. The icapact forceand penetration bythe dumptruck into the driver's door,at belt line height, resultedin an unsurvivable crash forthe dr;ver, belted. ottonolo_ _

Notes About the Accident

Lobelt; were installed inthe van, but the installation-and configurationW2S unusualand notin compliance with the Federal Motot '.fhicle Safety Standards. The lapbi,Its were different lengths, ranging from 9 to CO inches tu the cushion junctiOn. The Safety Board investigator sat in various seats in the van and tried to fasten the-seat belts: belts often woOld not fit around his body.

In the rearmost seat. buckle.to.latch configurations were irregular.Iwo buckles lay next to each other-on one side of the seat, two latchplates togetheron the other side, and a huckle/latchpiate combination on each of the outboard locations (theconfiguratFon shouldbe buckle/latchplate across 'the 'ire seat). At another position, .two belts were-anchored by one bolt.Feder. Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 209 specifies that seatbelt anchoragesfor an individualbelt assembly shall be located at least 6,5 inches apart laterally, measured between the bolt holes. A passenger restrained in such a beltin afrontal collisten would pivot forward and would be forced to the loft er right, dependingon the side of the bus he or she was sitting on:

189 APPENDIX D 176

The Dodge van was previously used for airport limousine service.Theschool district leased the van and nude certain mndificaticr.s soit could be certified as a multipurpose. school vehicle.The modifications, according to the State's regulationsregardingschool transportation,du notrequirethe vehicles to conform to Federal school bus standards. -

190 APPENDIX 0 177

Bedford, New Hampshire Case Number 27

0 1

V. !Mi.', ^t.,, Vs-,.. Principal Direction ro-rce ::V.,.

Left Side-of Van r i jht Side of Van Driver Seat 2 MAIS 4 M-15, MAIS 5 SUbdural hematoma Conwssion-unconscious (right cerebral) more than 24 hours Laceration of liver Multiple inter-ventricular and Laceration of left kidney inter,cerebral Fieinorr hid-a Subarachnoid hemorrhage Laceration on back of head Laceration of .spleen Abrasion on left front temple Collapsed left lung Laceration on right hand Retroperitoneal hemorrhage Fracture of right femur- Seating position unknown Skull hairline fracture P-18, MAIS 3 (left temporal) (UnrestrainedH Skull hairline fracture Comminuted pelvic fracture (right temporal) Compound fracture of left tibia Fractured pelvis ileft ischium) Compound fracture of left fibula Fractured pubis Fractured acetabular Fractured left 7th and 8th ribs CoMpound tra. of Feactured left tibia left metatarsal toes Fracture of left -tarsus Fractured right radius Fractured left phalanges *Laceration of rightcheek Abrasion and contwaon on contra! forehead

The van shown fa representational only. 121 APPENDIX 178

Case No. 28 Safety Board Investigation No. FTW-84-H-S1311

Accident Location State Highway 158; outside Odessa, Texas

Date and Time June 23, 1984; 5:15 p:m.

Description of School Vehicle 1980 Ford Superwagon.I5-passenger van. The van was not built to Federal school bus standards.

Type of Accident Noncollision rellover (7200)

Severity of Accident Delta i not calculable

-Summary of Events

An overloaded church van,inot built to school bus standards, was transporting 21 passengers to a you.th revival; the van was built for 15 passengers. Some form of _restraint was provided at each of the 15 seating positions, hut-none of the passengers was re-strained. The driver was also. unrettrained. As the van traveled at about 50 mph on a two-tene,.two-way,_straight and level rural road, the left rear tire blew out and the driver Iost control of the vehicle. The van continued 660 feet, veering onto the shoulder and back into opposing traffic lanes. When the van rotated clockwise about 1100, the exposed ieft rear wheel rim dug into the asphalt, caLising the van to turn ever'onto its left side. The van completed two-revolutions (7200). covering a distance cf 90 feet-before itcame to rest on its wheels. Three passengerswere ejected and fatally -injuredduring the rollovers.

Damage to the van was typical of a vehicle r011over,-confined principally to the sheet metal body with little structural deformation. Striations foundon the van body were consistent with ground scars found at the accidentscene, indicating two complete rollovers. All glass areas of the van, except on the left side,were broken out and missing. The roof and side pillars were pushed toward the leftas a result ofthe. rollover._Jhe van's body structure perfomcd'well in the double rollover. The occupants' injuries were not caused by the structure deformationor collapse-

Outcome of Occupants of School Vehicle.

ellmaggrl

Of the 21 passengers, ages 3 to 40.: 3 were uninjured, 11 sustained MAIS 1(minor) injuries. 4 sustained MAIS 3 (serious) injuries or greater, and 3 sustained fatal injuries (A1S coding not possible due to lack of medical records).

192 APPENDIX 179

No passenger was restrained. Lapbelts were available at each designated seating position,but the van Was carrying more passengers thanit was designedfor ("more" in number, not weight). Six, passengers were not in a designated seating position; they were either sitting An the aisle or sqUeezed onto a bench seat that was-already full.

Proper use of the lapbelts would have prevented or reduced some of the injuries received in this accident. The three fatally injured passengers were ejected from the vehicle as it rolled over. These ejections and the fatalinjuries would have been prevented had the restraints been worn. No major structural collapse of the vehicle occurred;the passengers tot- ejected received injuries mainly due to their freedom to be thrown about the interior of the vehicle.

Driver

Iiii'driVer of the van was not wearing tile lap/shoulder belt provided at his position. The driver sustained at least minor injuries, but specific information is not available. He was' not hospitalized. Medical information is not available-- so he is coded as injured, unknown severity (AIS 7).

Notes About the Accident

Of the _15 lapbelts- furnished by the vehicle manufacturer,7 were lying on the floor of-the_van, out-of position for passenger use.

The van,with -the exception of itsleft reartire, .was "in good mechanical condition. The tire probablyhad been usedas a spare until recently. An inspection before the trip would have identified the poor condition of the tire. APPENDIX D 180

-Odessa, Texas Case Number 28 eit. :

C 1. MA'. .4 lel:. V ...EA.( %r., m.

Rollover V ). ' 4,4,, g4 .5, eatre, 4,4 A. ly

Driver Row 3CX M-20, MA* 7 M-2, MAIS 7 Row 1B - .Row 4A F-16, MAAS 1 MAIS 1 Row 1C Row 48 F-9, MAPS 1 M-27. MAIS 0 Row 10 Row 4C F21, MAIS 1 M-11, MAIS 1 Row 2A Row 4AX M-19; MAIS 1 M6, MAIS 3 Rpw_213 Specific injuries unknown F 2.1,MATS 1 Row 4BX Row 2C M-3, MAIS 0 M-32, MAPS 1 Row 4CX Row 2 8 C M-4, MAIS 1 F-29, MAIS 7 Row 5A Specific injuries unknown M711, MAPS 1 Row 3A Row 58 M-8. MAIS 3 M-17, MAIS 0 Specific injuries unknown Row 5C Row 31 M-14. MAIS 3 F-11, MAIS 3 Specified injuries unknown Specific injuries unknown Row 50 M12, MAIS 1 Row 3C F-40, MAIS 7

The yen shown is representational only.

194 181

APPENDIX E

EXAMPLES OF CONFLICTING CLASSIFICATIONS OF SCHOOL BUSES clasLIILJElmhtirst, Illinois)

School Vehicle: 1982 Chevrolet van chassis with 23-passenger Vanguard body by American Transportation Corporation.

Classifications: Leskralfg_lto. Safety Standards.--Classified as a small school bus because its-gross vehicle weight rating is- less than 10,000 pounds. Atleast -a lapbeltfor every passenger is required at manufacture;the lapbelts- must meet all Federal standards for belts on multipurpose vehicles.The bus is required to meet federal requirements fo-r small school buses: no minimumjoint strength is specified, and no frontal barrier is required.The. bench seats do net-have toimeet any seat spacing reqUirements.

Federal HighWftlafetv, kaansm_51mOrd No: 17.--Classified as a -Type I large scilool bus because its passenger capacity is more than-15. Pes_sengers.of_Type I school buses are not required tV wear their seatbelts (if seatbelts are present).

yiumai Minimum StanjarellCor;ference (School Pm, InItutalc-Classified as a Type A small school bus (formerly called 2 Type_II) because its gross vehicle weight rating is less than 10,000 pounds and its passenger capacity -is more than 10.

Case 23 ( 1r 1 liJALSIOLL. 61:11.4.012.q

schoOl Vehicle: 1981 Chevroletchassiswith 15-passenger Cadetbody by Carpenter Body Works.

Classifications: Fgdgral Mstor ,VehicleLlafely tandards.--Classified as a large school-hus. because its gross_ vehicle weight rating is over 10.000 pnunds..Japbelts-for -posenoers are .not required; ifinstalled, they do not have to meet Federal re(4uirements for spatbelts. The schoolbus must meet all design and performance standarOs for large sch.oel buses, including compartmentalization. fqdaral Hi ohway_afsiy_lnarlunkaL' jj -Classified as a Type 11 small school bus because its passenger capacity Is less than 16. Passenws on a Type 11 school bus must .wear their lapbeits whenever the vehicle iss in motion.

Nat ional Minimum Standards Ladwittyl.,--Classified as a ,Type 8 small school bus (formerly called a Type II) because it$ gross vehicle weight rating is more.than 10,000 pounds and its capacity is more than 10 persons.

195 S.Classifications and definitions uf school hoses ty crg3nilat'.,41 GC entIty, li$41 . er.Oiy In4 vehicle r11.7stion wetght-Gross iehicle' (.1,2t,sliitjtien classifictian Ratner Pe..:nds capacitsyPassenger%umber Other sLneelMater t/t.0c)t, Lus TrAr6):j l0,000 or less 10 Or more A bus taat is sold or introduced in thahtransport(designed 10 persons) moreto operationincludeschooltnterstate;commerce or asacarrying busrelateda comnon dosignosi studeotsevents, carrier.for andpurposes butto sold anddoes forfoanthat not tiy3r stra,:el tos More lOo/10than Id or more A busincludeinterstate that carrying1S,Sold commerce orstudents introcucedfor purposes to and in fromthat +?7.74.4r,14wAy ,:efery operationschoolinclude or asrelateda busa vaamon designed events. carrier. andbut solddoes fornot Pi-f4a1 SY.SCW-17'"ilAreScan sctooi ii) 443s. 16 or few& motorAm to motorvehicles or fromvehicle usedschool. usedZo carry to carrymembers pupils of Excludes peivate lZfre(I.Pe ir1)00i I) More than 16 exceptA motortothe and owner'sa vehicle trailer,from household.school. with used motive to . carry power, pupils Includes vehicles 196 exclusivelyschoolthat ire children at.any Excludes'conuon andtime school used top.Asdnnel carrycarriers. 197 lable S.Classifications and definittons of schbol buses ty organitat,bn or enttty, 1988 (continued) classificationentityOrlanizaticn and vehicle O. classification former weigntCross venicZerating iti'Nn) capacityPasstnger Other S.J1051 bas inaustrx:cSnot: school bus-- Foutvas Nun:her ly?o A lype Z1 1C,000.or less . 10 or ii.ore Van con:ersion or school bus body Joe a 'type 11 Hor10.0C4 than 10 or' mere constructedVanorconstruCte frontsection:venicle.conversion onon a.van-typeaor van-type school buscompactcompact body trucktruck, wheels.driveror:behind-thechassis:front-section Seat. windshield vehicle, andor stripped-beside the Part of the engine is beneath Entry door is behind front Urge school Ws-- lype C. I'pe w*f10.000 'than 10 or.more chassis.aody installed en a flat tack cowl All of the engine is in front (cotorentional style) 1,pe ; Wore than 10 or vore tAidybehindof the installed thewindshield, front on wheels. aand chassis. entry door is Engine may (transit1e 0 s(yle) 10,000 be shieldmatinted and In beside front (behindthe driver the seat),wind- : of table. En:ry!doerormidship in the (between rearis ahead (oehind froht of fronttheand rear wheels. wheels).axles), 198 199 Tat,le 5,--Clasificatic.:.> and deffnition3 ct oy organi:ation or e.izit). I9as (continued) scnool'bases clas:ificationentttyUrilanl:i,tiOn and kier4iile or -.classificatiou fomer weightGr-iss vehiclerating FouhdAIGVWR) : capacityPassenger Nusber Other Not:ona;.Safetr count-11betweenTne p6C1. %SC largeoes not and distinguist, small Atlischoolon.scnool vehicle buses buses.reported and other in StAtt vonfamil)-owned includes regular statistics srhool buses. SChOWstationwagons.,,andvehicles buses).. used-to transport buses otncr pupils than (vans, I. 1+;atzuhalligl2wao.lrafficSsietl Aiministra6on Sy:tomNational/41111Al: (NASS)-- Accident Sawling School'buses areI defined by function. fatal Acci:ient kepoltbetweenandlne otherUPSS van-tyge oistingdiesschoel stwol buses. tole!. only J,te41 itARS)--!Alla car tl.e retrieved tWu by: ._function, is notA school necessaril bus, 6! distinguished by. to roffuctson federalA school standards bus, for schtal buses. s distinguished by body solely van.L'ase.e6.)dy ty?e Ous be:J.9 ie,su:. hothe.churchfortype, school doesbus, transportation; notdayt'omp have tohos, be aruscOit acan z)e a owbi:e citectio.le6S SI.!i:LZrd1-0,1kle ....o.)4ntc. n.v; An: este_DI cr414, petfor. 17 is Ut0...i revised hy the Departaent or. -rani.pdrtatioo Ilic stal..lvdc Are t.art Of the ¶:ode of Fedr.'al Regulations. 200 t..tze 201 185

APPENDIX F-

DATA ON-PUBLIC SCHOOL TRANSPORTATION, 1986-87

The following table presents data for school buses classifiedas Type 1 and Type 11 school buses. Type 1 buses are classified by the school bus industry (National Minimum Standards-Conference of 1980)as Type C and Type 0 large school buses. Type 11 buses are classified by the schoolbus industry as Type A and Type B small school buses. Type 11 also includes other types of small vehicles used for school transportation.

_ Bus Ownership 1T0961 i TWO I, Slaw Tran5011411566 Transported I ; , Number Mites E49e061r14451(9) ; . at Pub0c 1 i Oistriai Contracto I W I of 1 IneloWn95 i (4006110 : TyP 1TeD 11 T05101 7264 1 Type 11 TOW I Buses. I Some,* I r vne Outlay !

.. 411644.4 441.1IS 6.360 176 6 516 . 0 0 6.536 53,815,116 543,66: 209 MOMS 41 576 I07 6 112 456 86 6110 862 5.805.080 73,*31.374, 4.3460,4 7)5,nt 370 3 065 3 455 67 0 67 3522 37.961.729 50,186 410 6144111145 264,474 WA N/A WA MA WA WA -4.179 38 222=0 48 633 6X` C46Aco,.. 1 064 867 10,949 2,506 13.555 3,447 3.314 6.761 70.316 177.969, 'Cd ..... 647 7435 0= Worsen 776 563 4 023 399 422 N/A WA WA 4.422 44 6'1167 5i,736 n Con0er441 54.6 163 WA twA suA 3 634 1.001 4 656 4 674 110.014 OX Neter* 83 63; 339 30 169 ON 41 939- 1 376 16 477.596 77 742 10, Nerna 749 344 8 7.42 300 6 342 646 0 649 7.991 *73 136 135 Yet 341 Oil -.546/14 1 034 907 .41 A 7616 10 331 suA ses. 9 10,340 bs III 060 41 536 oite -44 44 47. 777 , s o is 508 240 746 763 7 740138 1 / e54 Km,* '72 4+73 1 476 10 . 4456 529 f0 513 7 06s 20 665 380 33 631 6X 0.04/e 979 300 N/4 NM 8 767 VA VA 12 450 11 730 MO 014 393 316 211 367 5.6444 56. 411 7 X7 164 7 467 2 404 P4/A 2 444 9 9S* 05 796 104 'IX 260 We :owe 244616 5 816 430 4646 774 i6 242 6 017 62.364 292 1.4 342 499 64/46 162 433 5345 3 462 010 66/6 NM 1201 5 27* 41671007 SI 674 067 Aentece, 434 501 7 NY 477 7 618 174 11 161 74161 76 Lt3! 930 57 031 561 ; nesar SY. 736 3 7)7 121 3 VA ) 747 140 3102 3 247 65 1C4 54 173 '.'74 74.1 34 !70 7.0 164 1 716 1 916 56 403 439 2 )95 29 4/6 474 V 4.41 306 vemro 441 399 2 419 '4 2 492 2 591 47 2 644 S 1*-3 ...... 79 430 513.- 113 326 661 wwwwwn5 4146 km we te 1 784 4/6 sua 5 206 7 *go 56 3), 103 130 6i7 ST? 1645.940 70 674 WA 16' 13 460 VA NM 702 . 13 660 126 520 008 257. 74 300 wwww34 634 347 7 VA 797 646 366 965 5555 10210 1,6 4?3 00ff 171 511 0 111 V43.1100. 761 WO 4414 NM S 700 2 o 7 3701 41 373.249 35 615 1,51 16,610.1 041,36 4 613 1 139 5 947 3 375 792 a 167 10 IN 107,767:336 ,55 Ohl 136 u6016,41 60 105 332 40 660 593 44 661 o WI 16 614 157 17 14 660 wawa 76) 568 33A se t4/4 w WA WA 3 531 29 977 677 72 554 5719 4666616 110 Are 09 OP 966 0 0 0 966 13313332 79 175 464 Newant.$400. 'CZ00) 291 29 140 1 3t7 363 I 610 7 000 13 500 003 26 trt4 54 8' New Arse, 616 744 5 547 7 741 -11 .*24 ' ;4,3 1,336 /SAO 13213 1111 II% WO 764 765 MY AS V I CO , 16 797 71 301 574 i 440 303 1.543 2,117 29 200 03t. _ 40 9 2.2 143 sews res 1 91 7 616 11 619 3 663 WA If 702 we 12.000 77302 sw :43 0084 $OO 136 713 Now. twerne 366 3119 +3 153 0 , 3 153- 0 0 0 13.153 116 spe eep 141 536 141 NOM N4,44 19 6'6 1 711 160 / 199 444 61 506 1 008 26 476 000 ONO , 710 906 24 34) SCIP 10 666 154 I'. 020 4447 XI 479 1 1 VA r63 37i 000 AI 960 31t7 061474.4 766 667 6 757 171 6 NM N/A 544.4 we 6 786 34,116 408 44 373 009 C4419, Pf 63, 2 647 354 2 99C 1 516 '21 1 660 4 436 43 170 444' 71 st)311 ft...4e34.4 IV 437 4 915 712 5 147 '7 VI 2 93A 13 442 70 349 792 537 603 347 434 7/5 Anode 661.$ 60 WV VA 664 7 ?() 1./A 14,1 'IOC 1 )50 WA 44111 504*6 Coons 636 763 3 160 13 S 963 NJ 1111 306 6,319 47 XII 375 34 1.3,7 067 Seers °sada 0 666 I IS 101 1 230 391 :7 419 1 657 18 797 470 - - I do r7 Yennewse 357 9744 6 860 131 3 011 1 360 t 30 t 640 6 661 74273,765 77 0,2 MO 7was 1 010 OX 72 932 * 338 74 440 631 24 OM 75.166 300 1079 330 .6e I,* MO 1.7166 133771 . 679 07 496 76 2 Oa 1 37/ 16 1765% 75 3114 476 virimon 7, 36? 367 so 477 itu 120 603 ¶ $44) I.S.1, 479 16 667 6614 wawa* 735 SO 6 866 410 9 270 Nit 0 761 0 66? 64 MG 110 133 656 13311 Wasweam 365170 5 206 343 3 369 660 151 411 9600 69 763 757 197 662 0,4 WW.6,61 OC 3 16 I WA NM 141A 141A NA IVA t40 7 020 003 VA MAO 09064 779 MO 1.771 296 1 017 0 63 63 3 010 37.746.930 94 132 950 16640996 del 413 NA WA 1 V% VA 6614. S *13 7 013 73 506 035' 120 732 *le wyomv 47 703 1 193 331 1 510 31 14 40 IS80 *6,146 940 11 ) 20 11 .2. 70146 ) fl woo 179,139 SAWIMMO Win 9911MSS SCOW 7.01.111111111 14 NS MOO

SOLACE The 64486640 56466411470 of 6460 0400,3 of Pefs 'rerwooneuan %owes and 6604 0.44enwg%sawn 01614449944 0414 aro tataA4a4 4i4444 Law *A. 04414 445007 at" so 16% 4164 sow ewe vs aroma, trot 1*44 vor sae

Source: Reproducedfrom SchoolBusFleet magazine, December/January 1989 issue, withpermission from Bobit,Publishing Co., Redondo Beach, California 202 186

APPENDIX G I

SCHOOL BUS SALES BY BODY TYPE, 1974-88

U.S. School Bus Body Sales 1974-1988 Typo A , 8 72 Handicap/special purpose (tormerty Type In

Typo C j Conventional 24-78 passangars (forrnany Typo I)

45,00° Type 0 Transit aty10 78 passengers (lormerty Type I) 40.327 40,000 40:057 _ . 361911 37 870 2,442 35.000 711.350 125 33.293 31.945 30.000 27,585 27.792 M 3F .26,900 16.762 25.002 25.000 24.478 ISSB16.92 20.000 31142

15,000

10.000

5.000 1,143 5.272

1974 1975 1976, 977 675 979 CIO 198 _982. :983 414 94151986 987 r3111 Colonialfew A4c0r41.n9 to me **tors ol SCHOOL BUS FLEET. tne 1988 calendar year writ see me second rughem numb., ot whoa bases ow bud! Bus 001y and C1145114 th.4 0015 ,118,1444C1u4043 10.097 ICI1001 bulet, nearly matt/wig Me record number bon n 1971. Foess to, 1988 eve cellemoo 140m niant,011Cluse41 and component suppers us weeks ono( to 1Ni/10011NC8111100/14 yaw and thus ulcsaa estimates toe Doc om0Oes 040471.41,0n. tne mafgm oo error is miniscule as manufacturers are atasi 10 +K00184011 PratclCooducl

Source: Reproduced- from School Bus Fleetmagazine, December/January 1989 issue, with permission from Bobit Publishing Co., Redondo Beach, California

203 187

APPENDIX H

-SCHOOL BUS TYPE DESIGNATIONS

School Bus Type Designations S.0001 T....nay:AU! to, r, 1960 Ine lel 114,Ft ,f." scrvol Dvses*.ve csangeo !(.. '-. " ' 4-41 'yr!. 3 T nes. ,e 04ANI.f3S 43d ,IendeAl to 4c0,.,,,,,,ady to n,..4 vcr,chn 404 5!, 4 ;hi a: t :.,11e^.70t Canna tr ,..r,1,.41:0 SOO 4 tow§ under ledefil 9031,011

C.)/APAlly e 01

/PE A fYPE 8 TYPE C TYPE 0 A mfran

864 e.cd 04d1 Co, C...811

V 4. ,) /./ .5/ -

.!..":".3/4"/"

to A

A. ". P.. ;

(cont inued)

204 ';,411x,k' : *W.V.

188 APPENDIX G

School Bus Type Designations(Continued)

Mei Tv, PIrt2tV"; ' 20!PmemIr COMPANY H. _ TYPE D TYPE A TYPE D TYPE C Carpontv Body WCW11 0 :Dust) Csor.of Cacm1 00.1.,em.onal COMLI CavaJor - CoMns Sus Cap. ; Soar Barn.am

Barirn ,

. EC..30:0us Citowfl COICh Intl SucArcoacri Odlig COYp. Adisarscagl Oes.cr Bus _ . . . Mkgbvs Su041,0,

Mayon& Coach 4,20 Pass---__. _ TS* Nom ButCo. CNCYllina . Supstooy COc ,artMI Thomas DurN !Smuts 4,10040 P.m1) 010 V COPOIMasa. Sat T.;,...ws ."Yesocomat- ° VY0 T PI 50.00'.ios :sow S1..eavan ShoJes0 0;001 SMA.Con 'ff Ns,-. Worm GNP (-arum' 1.,140.10 Crmaa.cou &nom Csapecrs0 1009 sem c As gram memo M cose a.m. ma COM0.00. / rye sa a sum s..1 4 I [044,oro. P P1, 000,004 4.0 saw 11.04 144e. 4A4.4 455 I woo* m400 00004 01,00 000 00, I0 prorg P 0 Me woot AVNOS (.0.4451..4. 04 1401 dna c owe* (tomb... . ao 444/4 mei VOW "AA to 00 Novae m, ca 'S wo M .0 woos* TM 0TrPo"0- mvoor DA tech 000414en mass so (t061.100 P toray 00.00110 SW p was. gramrpm 00011 55111 A $pS Woo 554 II0'4 0 00 *Dv. ~we .550.64 4414 Mala 4144/P c5444 a Ince4c144.564. 04. %IN CA 0400 Men 10 CCO mom smaalsoo 40 ca0010000 7104 040 555 06.400,0 00 'OM) 0%401 lowed 10 0.200 Te0 e000 marf as 000 00 604000 00 00006 cetw 4454 00prIc. 14 Me 4400 00480 11**(1 040, II NW. 4 00 Pi00 00 0 Of SW, 01001 00 mg 0 t4,0011P0 .000.401 [MOO OW 54* .4, ND irge.40 fjpew .400 Wooer rho bows aroma/ mom Mg amoral maw owe 0,00,0 00 40/1 0,00.1 ow rev fis Typ C:514 C IOW. 10A II00. AV0103 upwse Wm

Source: Relproduced from kttplajigl_Fleet magazine, from December/J4nuary 1989 issue, with permission Bobit Publishing Co., RedondoBeach, California

205 , sw. Se .0"S 14..V.iii000, '

189

APPENDIX I

ABBREVIATED INJURY SCALE (AIS)

Injuries of school bus occupants were coded in this study according to the 1985 Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) (American Association for Automotive Medicine 1985).1 Injuries are describedin the case summaries (appendixes B and 0)in terms of the maximum AIS injury (MAIS) sustained by an occupant. Hence,if an individual sustained two AIS 3 injuries, one AIS 2, and seven AIS Iinjuries, the individual is assigned an MAIS 3 injury.

A University of Michigan study substantiated that approximately 98 percent of the people sustaining multiple injuries wou1,1 be properly assessed using their most severe injury as an index (Huang and March 1978). Identification of each injury incurred by a school bus occupant with an MAIS 2 or more is incTuded on the bus seating.charts in the case summarieF.

Ns Code Description Examples

0 Uninjured_

1 Minor Bruises, abrasions, superficial lacerations (less than 2 inches on face or 4inches on,body, provided they do not extend into subcutaneous tissue), fractured finger,sprained wrist, fractured nose.

2 Moderate _Dee-p laceration, mild concussion, head injury with amnesia about accident and no neurological damage, fractured clavicle,sprainedknee, fractured foot, fractured ulna.

3 Serious fractured .femur, dislocated hip, brain swelling, contused. bladder, fractOred pelvis, crushed forearm, hand amputation,headinjury with prior unconsciousness with neuro- logic deficit.

4 Severe Ruptured spleen,amputation of leg above knee, brain hematoma less than 100 cc. (Continued)

1 AIS is e standardized,universally accepted systom for oasessingthe severity of injuriesfromievects by codingindividual injuries. The first AIS was paoliiihed in 1071 under aconsorship of ajoint committee of the American Modica( Association,the American Alsociatiunfor Automotive Medicine, and theSociety of Autceotive Engineers,Since 1073, the American Aaaociation for Automotive Medicine has been the sponsoring organization. 'A!NOsig-t7.1 44.-Xf404-,,V.! "-,*" ,

APPENDIX I _ .190

AIS SCa1e (continued)

AIS Code Description Examples .

5 Critical Pulmonary artery laceration,complete spinal cord lesion (quadriplegiaor paraplegia), ruptured liver, uncon- sciousnessmore than24 hours or penetrating skull injury, brain hematoma more than 100 cc.

6 Maximum injury Torso transectlon, massive skull crush, -spinal_ cord crush witht otal. transectionC-3 or above, crushed brain stem;

7 Injured, unknown . Insufficient information is available or outcome rather than-injury -is -described;-,i.e arm trauma, closed head injury, kidney injury.

Unknowh if injured Medical report states "rednessover eye," "suspicion of " or. no information is available.

207 q: 4 4A4 Ttfe,4,4,0f.` tr*,*

191

APPENDIX J

COMPARISON OF KABCO AND AIS INJURY SCALES

The KABCO injury scale is commonly used in police accident reports. 7he AIS scale is used by accident investigatorswi,th the.National Transportation Safety Board and by highway researchers.

KABCO Seale AIS Scale _

The KABCOsystem has 5_options The AIS system ha$ 9 options: for codinginjuries:4

c2de Description Code Severity_

K Dead before report was made 0 Uninjured 1 Minor A Bleeding wound, distorted 2 Moderate member, or had to be 3 Serious carried from scene 4 Severe 5 Critical B Other visible injury or 6 Maximum, vcrtually bruises, abras!ons, unsurvivable swelling..._,Or..I imp 7 Injured, unknown_ severity C Possible injury 9 Unknown if injured 0 No indication of injury

a Definitions as used in Illinois policrrepors. -.4*.4-4WelW: ..441P-4 43.44441-,V,

APPENDIX J 192

An injury can can be coded differently, depending on _the injury scale used. The KABCO system has broad classifications that can be misleading about the actual severity of injury. The following examples, using cases from-this study on small poststandard school buses, illustratedifferences in coding. The full summary of each case is given in appendix B or D.

Case 13 (Houston, Texas): 9 passengers

KABCO Scaleb AIS Scale

Number of Injury Number's:if Injury passengers code passengers code

2 A 9 AIS 1 7

Case 16 (Elmhurst, Ill inotE): 9 passengers

KABCO Scal .AIS Scale

Number of Injury Number of Injury p2sF ngers code_ passengers code

A 2 AIS 0 2 -AIS 1 2 AIS 2 3. AIS 3

b The KABCO system is defined dtfferentlyin Texas policereports: K Killed. A Incapacitating injury-severe injury that prevents continuation of normal actions; includes broken or distortedliMbs, internal injuries, and crushed chest. B Nonincapacitating injury--evident injury such as bruises. abrasions, minor lacerations that do not incapacitate. C Possible injury-- injury thatis Oaimed, yeported, or indicated bY, behavior withoutt 'sible wounds.

20,9

1 t,..

APPENDIX J 193

Case 26 (Schaumberg, IlliroisiL 12 passengers

KABCO Scale AIS Scale

Number of Injury Number lf Injury passengers code passe,?rs code

1 K 5 A1S 1 10c A 3 AIS 3 1 C 3 AIS 5 1 AIS 7

c- The 10 passengers coded as receiving "A" injuries Aidpot actually receive injuries of the same severity. Under the AIS scale, these)0passengers were coded as follows:4, AIS 1(minor); 3, AIS 3 (serious); 2; AIS 5 (critical); 1, AIS 7 (injured, unknown severity).

210 194

APPENDIX K

LIMITATIONS OF THE KABCO INJURY CODES

Thefollowing discussion about the KABCO injury coding system has been excerpted from a University of Adelaide publication (Hutchinson 1987).-

8.10.1 The codes 8.10.2Illter- and ultra-state varia-- tionsin usage Most American police forces use the K, A. El, C. 0 code recommended by the National Safety Coun- Carroll and Scott (1971) arid ScOtt (1972) noticed cil. The wording of the definitions of these codes --- enormous differences between .states of the U.S.A., varies in minor ways from place to place. Very brief as to the proportions in which the A, B, C codes descriptions are as follows: were used: the proportion of A injuries varied from 13% to 65%, and the proportion of C injuriti var- K Fatal, ied from 9%- to--75%, in a sample of 17 states. A Incapacitating injury. The authors thought that much of the variation must be attributed to non-uniformity of scale in- 8 Non-incapacitating (evident) injury. terpretation and use.I- have compiled some nr...re recent data--see Table 8,22. C Possible injury.

0 No indication of injury,

The K, A, 8, C. 0 scheme permits rapid evalua. tion urder adverse circumstances and with min- final examination of the victim.Birt obviously many injuries in ihe A category are minor, such as superficial lacerations accompanied by moder- Jte but easily controlled bleeding, and conversely the C category could.include severe and potentially life-threatening injuries wch as a ruptured spleen. Further doubt is cast on the validity of this classification by the finding (Carpenter, 1973) that in. surance payments (in what was admittedly a small sample) for severity C were.higher then for B which in turn were higher than for A. In the course of a wider investigation, Shinar et al (1983) found that a substantial number of injury- accidents-in Indi. ana were recorded by the police as damage-only (grade 0).

211 195 APPENDIX K

Table 8.22: Percentage distribution of severity of injury in thirteen states.

South Carcaina 1985 36 22 42 Massachusetts 1981 32 32 Illinois 1983 27 26 47 South Dakota 1983_ _20 .A7 33 Idaho 1983 17 40 _44 _Washington1982-83 15 ,41 45 Michigan 1983 _ 14 31 55 Delaware 1983 13 48 39 Texas 1983 12 44 44 States 'hat may not be comparable: Alabama, 1983* 59 26 15 Arizona 19831 20 47 33 Ohio 1984+ 8 41 51 California 1983+ 5 46 49

Rural accidents only, # U.S. and state highways only, +. These states use the term "severe" in describing the most seriouscategory. Thus in California it is called a "severe wound", though the definition of this isvery similar to the usual definition of code A: "Injury which prevents the injured party from walking, driving, or performing activities he/she was nor. malty capable of before the accident." In the Ohio data table it iscalled "severe", but in the definitions it is called "serious visible injury", and is definedas "An injury other than fatal that pre-vents the injured person from working, driving, or continuing normal activities that he (she)was capable of performing prior to the accident."

212 195

UPENDIX L

DATA ON FATAL SCHOOL BUS ACCIDENTS

The Aable that follows is from a study on school bus safety published in 1989 by the Transportation Research Board, National Research Council. The values are -derived fromFARS, the fatal accident reportingsystem ofthe U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis:ration.

TABLE 3-2ESTLMATED ANNUAL SCHOOL BUS ACC'DEN FATALITIES (FARS 1982-1986) Vehicle Type Vehicles Persons Used as Fatally School School Other Injured Busesa Busesb Vehicles Total Drivers 1.6 0.8 62.6 65.0 Pedestrians Studentsc 24.0 1.8 11.6 37.4 Adultsd 4.4 1.0 1.8 7.2 Passengers Students 9.6 2.4 8.0 20.0 Adults 2.4 11.6 14.6 Bicyclists Students 1.8 0.4 1.0 3.2 Adults L2 0.2 02 1.6 45.0 7.2 96.8 -149.0 .. NOTES: Avenge valves derived from 5 years a iatal accidtmt data. Drivers and passengers were occupants of the vehicle type indicated. Pedestrians and bicyclists were struck by the vehicle type indicated. a"School bus" refers to a vehicle designed and built as a school bus, excluding . van:uased buses. Thesevehicles are predominantly Type I buses with GVWRs greater than 10,000 lb. b"Vehicle used as a school bui" refers N3 a vehicle that is externally identifiable as a school bus, but not originally designed and built as a school bus, for eXample, station wagons, standard vans, and vans modified to serve as school buses. eStudents are dermed as persons under 20 years old. dAdults are defined as persons 20 years old or olde..

Source: Transportation Research Board, National Research Council (1989, p. 35).

213 197

APPENDIX M

FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS(FMVSS) , MENTIONED IN SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

§ 571.206 49 CFR Ch. V (10-1-88 Edition)

7,71.206 :it.inti.rd No, WA: floor locks and door retention components, SI. Purpose ,and scope,. This stand-. ard specifies icouirements for side door locks and gide door retention components including latches. hinges. and other supporting means, to minimize thelikellhood of occupants being thrown from the vehicle 'as a result of invact. Si Applical:on. This standard applies to passenger ears, multipurpose pm.senger vehicles, arid trucks. S3. Definitions, -Cargo-Type Door" means a door designed primarily to ac- commodate cargo loading including. but not limited to. a two-part door that latches to itself. "Side front door- means a door that in a side view. has 50 percent or more ofits opening area forward of the rearmost point on the driver's seathack. when the driver's seat is adjust- 0 382

214 APPENDIX M 198

National Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,DOT 571.206 ed to its most vertical and rearwardmechanism with the locking mecha- position. nism disengaged). "Side rear door" means a door that, S4.1.2 Door Hinges-. Eachdoor in a side view, has more than 50 per-hinge system shall support the door cent of its opening area to the rearofand shall not separate when a longitu- the rearmost point on the driver'sdinal load of 2.500 pounds Is applied, seatback, when the driver's seat is ad-Similarly, each door hinge zystem Justed to its most vertical and 1 cu.shall not separate when a teanaverse ward position. load of 2.000 pounds is applied. 84. Requirements. Components on 54.1.3 Door Locks. Each door shall any side door leading directlyinto abe equipped with a locking mechanism compartment that contains one orwith an operating means in the inten- more seating accommodationsshall_or of the vehicle. conform to this standard. However, S4.1.3.1'SideFrontDoor Locks. components on folding doors. roll-upWhen the locking mechanism is en- doors, doors that are designed to begaged, the outside door handle . or easily attached to or removed fromother outside latchrelease control motor vehiclesi_manufactured for oper.shall be inoperative. ation without doors, and side doors- S4.1.3,2- -.Side Rear Door Locks, In which are equipped with wheelchairpassenger cars and multipurpose pas- lifts and which are linked to an alarmsenger vehicles, when thelocking system consisting of either a flashingmechanism Ls engaged both the out- visible signal located In the driver'sside and inside door handles or other compartment or an alarm audible tolatch release controls shall be inoper- the driver which Is activated when the ative. door Is open. need not conform tothis S4.2 Hinged Cargo.Toe Docirs, standard. S4.2.IDoor Latches. Hinged Doors, Except Cargo. 84.2.1.1Longitudinal Load. Each 84.1 latch system, when in the latched po- Type Doors. anion. shall not separate when a longi- 84.1.1DoorLatches.Eachdoor latch and striker assembly shallbe-tudinal load of 2.500 pounos provided with two positions consisting S4.2.1.2Transverse Load. Each ol latch system. when in the latched po- ut, A fully latched position: and Anion. shall not separate when a transverse load of 2,000 pounds is applied. b) A secondary latched position, When more titan one latch system is 84.1.1.1LongitudinalLoad.The door latch and striker assembly, whenused on a single door, the load require- In the fully latched position, shall not-ment may be divided among the total separate when a longitudinal loadof number of latch systems. 2.500 pounds is applied, When In the 84.2.2 Door Hinges. Eachdoor secondary latched position, the doorhinge system shad support the "door latch and striker assembly shall notand shall not separate when a longitn- separate when a longitudinal load ofdinal load of 2.500 pounds Is applied. 1.000 pounds Ix applied. and when a transverse load of 2.000 84.1.1.2Transverse Load. The door pounds is applied. latch and striker assembly. when In 84.3 Sliding Doors. The traek and the folly latched position, shall notslide combination or other supporting separate when a transverseload ofmeans for each sliding door shall not 2.000 pounds is applied. When in theseparate when a total transverse load secondary latched mention, the doorof 4,000 pounds Is applied, with the latch and striker assemtily shall notdoor in the clotted position. separate when a transverseload of 85. Demonstration Procedures. 1.000 pounds is lipplied, 85,1Hinged Doors, Except Caro°. 84.1.1.3InertiaLoad.The door Type Doors. latch shall not disengage front the S5.1.I Door Latehrs. fully latched position when a longdu 85.1.1.1 Long:Instinct and Trans dotal or transverse inertia load of 30grent. Loads. Compliance with pant is applied to the door latch system tin.graphs S4.1.1.1 and 84.1,1.2 shall be arrordanee with para. chiding:::e!stet: and its actuatingdvmmistrated 383

215 199 APPENDIX

§ 571.206 49 CFR Ch. V (10-148 Edition) graph 4 of Society of Automotive En. glneers Recommended Practice J839b. "Passenger Car Side Door Latch Sys- tems." May 1965. S5.1.1.2Inertia Load.Compliance with 84.1.1.3 shall be demonstrated by approved tests or in accordance with paragraph 5 of SAE Recommended Practice J83912: May 1965. 85.11DoorHinges.Compliance with 84.1.2 shall be demonstrated In accordance with paragraph 4 of SAE- Recommended Practice J934, "Vehicle Passenger Door Hinge Systems." July 1965. For piano-type hinges. the, hinge spacing requirements of SAE J934 shall not be applicable and arrangement of the test fixture shall be altered as required so that the test load will be applied to the complete hinge. 85.2Hinged Cargo-TypeDOGrl. 85.2.1 DoorLatches.Compliance with 84.2.1 shall be demonstrated in accordance with paragraphs 4.1 and 4.3of SAE Recommended Practice J839b."Passenger Car Side Door Latch Systems," May 1965. An equivalent static test fixture may be ;:lbsti. tuted for that shown In Figure 2 of SAE J839b. If required. 85.2.2DoorHinges.Compliance with 84.2.2 shall be demonstrated in accordance with paragraph 4 o! SAE Recommended Practice J934. "Vehicle Passenger Door Hinge Systems." July 1965. For plano-type hinges, the hinge spacing requirement of SAE J934 sh.sll not be applicable and arrangement of the teat fixture shall be altered as re- qiiired so that the test load will be applied to the complete hinge. 85.3Sliding Doors. Compliance with 84.3 shall be dunonstrated by ap- plying an outward transverse load of 2.000 pounds to the load bearing mem. ben; at the opposite edges of the door (4.000 pounds total). The demonstration may be performti either In the vlincle or with the door retention components In a bench test fixture. 136 FR 22402. Dee. 2, 1971. AA antrnded at 37 1711 264. Jan 5.972: 50 FR 12031. Mar, 27. 19851

I 334 APPENDIX PI 200

§ 571.210 49 CFR Ch. V_(10-1-811 Edition)

bles, and for each designated seating position for which a Type 2 seat belt assembly is required by 1571.208 in vehicles other than passenger cars. 84.1.2 Seat belt anchorages for a Type 1 or a Type 2 seat belt assembly 8571.210 Standard No. 210-. Seat beir as- shall be Installed for each designated sembly anchorage*. seating position, except a passenger Sl. Purpose and scope. This stand-seat in a bus or a designated seating ard establishes requirements for seat position for which seat belt anchor- belt assembly anchorages to Insureages for a Type 2 seat belt assembly their proper location for effective oc-are required by 84.1.1. cupant restraint and to reduce the 84.1.3 Notwithstanding the require- likelihood of their failure. ment of paragraph 84.1.1, each vehicle 32. Application. This standard ap-manufactured on or after September plies to passenger cars, multipurpose1. 1987. that is equipped with an auto- passenger vehicles. trucks, and buses. matic restraint at the front right out- 83. Definition. "Seat belt anchor- board designated seating position that .sge" means the provision for transfer-cannot be used for securing a child re- ring seat belt assembly loads to the ve--straint system or cannot be adjusted hicle structure. by the vehicle owner to secure a child 84. Requirements. restraint system solely through the 84.1Type. use of attachment hardware installed 84.1.1Seat belt anchorages for aas an item of original equipment b; Type 2 seat belt assembly shall be in-the vehicle manufacturer, shall have, stalled for each forward-facing out-at the manufacturer's either board designated seating positiiin inanchorages for a Type 1 seat belt as- passenger cars other than converti.sembly at that position or a Type 1 or 432

2 201 APPLND1X M

Notional Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,DOT § 571.210 Type 2 seat belt assembly at thatposi- S4.3.1.2In an installation in which tion. The anchorages shall consistof,the belt bears upon' the seat frame. at a minimum. holes threadedtothe-seat belt anchorage, if not on the S4,1th ofseat structure, shall be aft of the rear- accept bolts complying with most belt contact point on the seat Part 571.209 of this chapter. frame with the seat In the rearmost S4.2 Strength. position. The line from the seating ref- S4.2.1 Except forside-facing seats, the anchorage for a Type 1 seatbelt erence point to the nearest- belt con- assembly or the ;whir portion of a tact.point on the seat frame shall Type 2 seat belt assembly shallwith- extendforward from thatcontact stand a 5,000-pound force when testedpoint.at an angle with the horizontal in accordance with S5.1. of not less than 20' and not more than 54.2.2 _The anchorage_ for a Type 2 75'. In an installation in whieh seatbeltassemniy shallwithstand 54.3.1.3 3.000-pound forces when tested in ae.the 'seat belt anchorage is on the seat cordance with 55.2. structure, the line from the seating reference point to the nearest contact, S4.2.3Permanent deformation or rupture of a seat belt anchorage oritspoint of the belt with the hardware at- surrounding area is not considered to(aching -itto the anchorage shall be a failure, if the required forteis ext,;!ndforward from that contact sustained for the specified time. point at an angle with the horizontal of not less titan 21 and not more than S4.2.4ExCept for common seat belt anchoragesforforward-facingand 75'. _ rearward-facing seats. floor-mounted 54.3.1.4Anchorages for an individ- adjacent (Ira. oaf seat belt assembly shall be located seat belt anchorages for incites apart laterally, ignatedseatingpmitionsNhallbe at !eastt3.50 tested by simultatwously loadingthe mea.sured between the vertical center- those Itnes of ; he bolt holes. seat belt aa.secablies attached to S4.3.2 Seat belt anchorwps for the anchorages. upper torso portion of Type 2 seat belt . S4 Location. As used in this see- tion, "forward" means in the directionassemblies:- With- t beseat In its full- in Which the seat fares, and otherdi- rearward and downward position and rectional references are to be int er the seat back in its most upright post- tion, the seat belt anchorage for the pretedarcordingly.Anchoragesfor automatic and for dynamically tested upper end of the upper torso restt atilt seat belt assemblies that meetthe :dial! be located within the acceptable . frontal crash protection requirement range shown in Figure I. with refer of 55.1 of Standard No. 298 ;49 CFR e-nre to a two dimensional manikin de- locationscribed in SAE Standard .18201Novem 571.208) are exempt from Ihe ber 1902i .W110Se -il" point ix at t requirements of t his sect ton. point' and whow S4.3.1Sent belt a nchoroors for Tune si'atingreference .seat belt assemblres and thepeThe torso line is at the same angle from portion ol Type 2 seal belt ossembhes. I 1 vert teal its the seat back, 55.T,Ar procedures. Eacht chicle 54.3.1,1 installat um in which the seat bell -does no bear uponthe shall inept requirement); of SI 2 seat. frame. a line front the scatoutref- unrn lest ill amirding to the follmving creme point. to the nearest cootact Iffortansfes. WIWI' a range of vilifies IN point of the (elt with the hardware at-spreifird, Inv vehicle snail he able to tach:nit ii to I he anchorage for a now meet the rgqininoments at.all points adjustable seat, lir from a Want2,51) within the range. inches ft.trward of mid 0.375 inch atxtve 55.1Seals with Type 1 or rum. ,e,nr-hof firchf)filuoii. With III, !icat in the seating relereneewain 14) !hi' nearest contact point of the twitutth Its rearmost positIon, apply a hirer ot the 1aardware attaching it tothe an 5.000 Witulda in the direction in which ehorage for an adjustable seat In its the seat faces to a pelvie body block as rearmost position, shall extend tordescribed in Figure 2, restrained by a ward from. the anchorage at an angleTyne 1 or the peisie portion of a with the horizontal of not less than 2 seat helt arsembly. a.s applicable. in 3 20 and not more t luso 75 , paranni Ii. Inv imil.;,indilmi refl. 433 APPENDIX 14 202

§ 571.210 49 CFR Ch. V (10-1-88 Edition) terline of the vehicle. with an initialmore than 30.000 pounds per second. force application angle of not lessAttain the 3.000pound forces in not than 5' nor more than 15' above themore than 30 seconds and maintain horizontal. Apply the force at the them for 1') seconds. onset rate of not more than 50.000 pounds per second. Attain the 5.000- pound force in not more than 30 seconds and maintain it for 10 seconds. 85.2 Seats with Type 2 seat belt anchorages. With the seat in Its rearmost ' I "-.1...N...7 position, apply forces of 3.000 pounds '..'4"'-'' 74c:^, --)...".. In the direction In which the beat faces Oar NO Ainaeor OW ...... /..%, simultaneously to -pelvic and upper ...g..,z,...... 1 , 4. torso body blocks as described in Fig- 4.:...... ' ures 2 and 3. restrained by a Type 2 seat belt assembly. in a plane parallel to the longitudinal centerline of the vehicle, with an initial force applica-- tion angle of not less than 5 nor more than 15' above the horizontal. Apply the forces at the onset rate of not 1401AA,fl Mg.*.

434

219 203 APPENDIX PI

National Highway Traffic Safoty Admin., DOT § 571.210

BLOC/. COVED IN 1.00 Po. CZNsrri, CatiVAS CCrailf.0 Mist AMER

:.00A

Go _LC2 L. -L 2100 ru. MUSE 2BODY BLOCK /011 LAP su ANCHORAGE

8.00 R-

1.50 R 1-*--1.00 MED. DENSITY 4.00441 FOAM RUBBER OVER BLOCK

FIGURE 3 - BODY BLOCK FORCOMBINATION SHOULDER AND LAI' BE I.T ANCHORAGE

WI Owner's Manual Information.crash if their child restraints are not The owners manual in each vehicleproperly secured in the vehicle. with a OVWR of 10,000 pounds or less (b) In a vehicle with rear designated manufactured after September 1. 1087seating positions. a statement alerting shall include: vehicle owners that. according to acci- (a) A section explaining that all dent statistics, children are safer when child restraint systems are demoted to properly restrained In the rear seating be secured In vehicle seats by lap bellspositions than in the front seating po- or the lap belt portion of a lap-shoul-sitions. der belt. The section-shall also explain to In each paasenger car, a diagram that children could be endangered In aor diagrams showing the location of the shoulder belt anchorages required 935

220 APPENDIX M 204

§ 571.210 49 CFR Ch. V (10-1-88.Edition) by this standard ff..r the rear outboardinstructions shall explain the proper designated seating positions. if shoal-routing of the attachment hardware. der belts are not installed as items of (c) In each vehicle In which the originalequipmentbythevehicle automatic restraint at the front right inanufacturcr at those positions. outboard designated seating position 87,InstaffithonInstrurhons. Thecannot be modified to secure a child owrwr's rnanual in vach vehirty maim.restraintsystemusingattachment .factured on or after September 1. hardwareinstalled asanoriginal 1987. with an automatic restraint atquipment by the vehicle manufactur- the front right outboard designated and a manual lap or lap/shoulder- seating position that cannot he used to belt is not installed as an item of origi- secioa- a child restram: system. when nal...equipment by the vehicle manu- tile automatic restraint is adjusted toer.facturer, the owner's manual shall also meet the performance requirements of have: S5.1 of Standard No. 208 shall have: 411 A diagram or diagrams showing A statement that the automaticthe locations of the lap belt anchor- restraint at the front right outboardages foi the front right outboard des- desivnated :seating position cannot beignated seatini Oailtion. usyd to secure a child restraint and, as (2) A step-by-step procedure and a appropriate.oneofthefollowingdiagram or diagrams for installinx the tire, stat ements: proper lap belt anchorage hardware A statement that the automaticand a Type 1lap belt- at the front restraint at the front right outboard right outboard designated. seating Nr designated spatula position can be ad. sition. The instructions shall explain Justedtosecureachildrestraint the proper routing of the seat belt as- system using attachment hardware in- sembly and the attachment of the seat stalled as original eirripment by thebelt assembly to the lap belt anchor- vehicle mant:tacturer: ages. s2 A statement that anchorages for 138 FR 22902, Dec, 2. 1971. as amended at 37 instailation of a lap to4t to secure a FR 9323, May 9. 1912: 43 FR 21892, May 22. child restraint system have been pro- 1978: 43 F'R 53442. Nov. 16. 1978; 50 FR vidyd at thy front right outboard des- 41350, Oct. 10. 1985; 51 FR 9813. Mar. 21. ignated seating position: or 1986; 51 FR 29555, Aug. 19. 19861 1:11 A statement that a lap or manual lap or lap/shoulder belt has been In- stalled by the Vehicle manufacturer at .he front right outboard designated seating position to secure a child restraint. (b) In each Vehicle In which a lap or lap/shoulder britIs not installed at the front right outboard designated seating position as an item of Original equipment.buttheautomatic -restrain!. at that poiltIon can to adjust, ed by the vehicle owner to seellre a child restraint system using an item or Items of original equipment installed in the vehicle by the vehicle manufacturer. the -owner's manual shall also have: I 1 ) A diagram or diagrams showing the location of the attachment hardware provided by the vehicle manufacturer. (2) A atep.by-step procedure with a diagram or diagrams %lit/wing how to modify the automatic re.itraint system to twcure 8 child restraint system. The

436

221 205 APPENDIX PI

*571117 49 CFR Ch. V (10-1-88 Edition)

4-Inch diameter sphere undera force, including the weight of the sphere,of 5 pounds until any one of thefollowing events occurs: (a) A forceof1.200 poundsis reached. (b) At least 80 percent of theglazing thicknesa has developed cracksrun- ning from the load contactregion to the periphery at two ormore points. or shattering of the glazingoccurs. 571.217 Standard No. 217: Bus window (c) The inner surface of theglazing retention and release. at the center of force applicationhas moved relative to the window 81. Scope. This standard establishes frame, along line perpendicular to theun7 requirements for the retention of win-disturbed inner surface,a distance dows other than windshields In buses.equal to one-half of thesquare root of and establishes operating forces, open-the minimum surface dimension ingdimens'ions. meas- and markingsforured through the center of thearea of pushout bus windows and other emer-the entire sheet of window gency exits. glazing. 85.1.1 An increasing forceshall be 82. Purpose. The purpose of thisapplied to the window glazing standard is to minimize the likelihood through the head form specified in Figure4. of occupants being thrown from theoutward and perpendicular to theun- bus and to provide a means of readilydisturbed Inside surface at thecenter accessible emergency egress. of the area of each sheet ofwindow 83. Application. This standard ap-glazing, with a head form travelof 2 plies to buses, except buses manufac-Inches per minute. tured for the purpose of transporting 85.1.2 The requirements ofthis persons under physical restraint. standard do not apply toa window 84. Definitions. !Tusk-out window"whose minimum surface dimension means a vehicle window designed toMeasured through thecenter of Uri open outward to provide for emergen- area la less than 8 inches. cy egress. 85,2 ProMsion of emergency exits. "Adjacent seat" means a designatedMises other than schoolbuscs seating position Itemted so that some shM! provideunobstructedopeningsfor portion of Its occupant space Is not emergencyexit more than 10 inches !rem an cmergen- whichcollectively amount, in total square Inches.. toat cy exit, for a distance of at least 15leant 87 times the number of designat- Inenes measured horizontally and par-ed seating positions on thebus. At &lel to the exit. least 40 percent of the total "Occupant space"_means the space required area of unobstructed openings,com- directly above the seat and footwell.p' ,td In the above manner, shall be boundeA vertically by the ceiling andr Med on each side of a bun. Howev- horizontally by the normally posi-et.In determining the total unob- tioned seat back and the nearest ob-structed openings provided by struction of occupant motioh in the di- a bus, no emergency exit, regardless ofitn rection the neat faces. area, shall be credited with more 85. Requirements, than 538 square Inches of the totalarea re- 85.1Window retention. Except asquirement. School buses shall provide providedIn85.1.2,each piece ofopenings for emergency exits thatcon- window glazing and each surrounding form to 85.2.3. window frame when tested In accord- 85.2.1 ance with the procedure In 85.1.1 Buses with GVWR ofmore than 10.000 pounds. Exceptas provid- under the conditions of 88.1 throughed in 85.2.1.1. buses with 88.3, shall be istained by its surround. a OVWR o( Ina structure In a manner that pre-more than 10,000 pounds shall meet the unobstructed openingsrequire- vents the formation of any openingments by providing side exits andst large enough to admit the passage of a least one rear exit that conformsto 464

222 APPENDIX M 206

National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., DOT § 571.217 85.3 through 85.5. The rear exit shallhave to be operated simultaneously. meet the requirements when the bus LsRelease and opening of the window upright and when the bus is over-shall require force applications, not to turned on either side, with thc occu-exceed 40 pounds. in the directions pant standing facing the exit. Whenspecified In 85.3.2. the bus configuration precludes instal- 85.2.3.2 The engine starting system lation of an accessible rear exit, a roofof a school bus shall not operate If any exit that meets the requirements ofemergency exit is locked from either 85.3 through 85.5 when the bus isinside or outside the bus. For purposes overturned on either side, with the oc-of this requirement. "locked" means cupant standing facing the exit, shallthat the release mechanism cannot be be provided in the rear half of the bus.activated by-a person at the door with-, 85.2.1.1 A bus with OVWR of more out a special device such as a key or, than 10.000 pounds may satisfy thespecial information such as a combina- unobstructed openings requirement byHon. providing at least one side door for 85.3 Emergency exit release. each three passenger seating positions 85.3.1 Each push-out window_ or in the vehicle. other emergency exit not me-tired by 85.2.2 BuseswithaGIIWRof85.2.3 shall be releasable by jperating 10.000 pounds or less. Buses with aone or two mechanisms located within OVWR of 10,000 pounds or less maythe regions specifiedInFigure1. meet the unobstructed openings re-Figure 2, or Figure 3. The lower edge quirement by providing: of the region in Figure 1, and Region (a) Devices that meet the require- Bin Figure 2, shall be located 5 Inches ments of 85.3 through 85.5 withoutabove the adjacent seat. or 2 Inches using remote controls or central powerabove the armrest. If any, whichever is systems: (b) Windows that can be openedhigher. manually to a position that provides 85.3.2 When tested under the con- an opening large enough to admit un--ditions of 86., both before and after obstructed passage, keeping a major. the window retention test required by axis horizontal at all time, of an ellip-S5.1, each emergency exit not required soid generated by rotating about itsby 85.2.3 shall allow manual release of minor axia an ellipse having a majorthe exit by a single occupant using axis of 20 Inches and a minor axis offorce applications each of which con- 13 inches: or forms, at the option c.f the manufac- (c) Doors. turer. either to (a) or (b). The release-- 85.2.3School buses. mechaniam Or mechanisms shall re 85.2.3.1 Eachschoolbusshallquire for release one or two force ap- comply with either one of-the follow.plications, at least one of which differs Ing minimum emergency exit provi.by a 90' to 180' from the direction of slow. chosen at the option of the man.the initial push.out motion of the ufacturer. emergency exit (outward and perpen- (a) One rear emergency door thatdicular to the exit surlace). opens outward and is hinged on the (a) Lowforce application. right side (either side in the case of a (1) Location. Aa shown In Figure 1 bus with a OVWR (4 10.000 pounds oror Figure 3. less); or 12(Typeof motion.Rotaryor (b) One emergency door on the vehi.straight. cle's left side that is In the rear half of (3) Magnitude. Not more than 20 the bus passenger compartment and ispounds. hinged on its forward side, and a push . (I)) High force application. out rear window that provides a mini. (1) Location.. As shown In Figure 2 mum opening clearance 18 inches highor Figure 3. and48inches wide. This window shall (2) Type of motion. Straight, perpen- be releasable by operation of not moredicular. to the undiaturbed exit stir. than two mechanisms which are locat.face. ed in the high force access region as 13i Magnitude. Not more than 60 shown in Figure 3C, and which do notpounds. 465

223 207 APPENDIX M

§ 571.217 49 CFR Ch. V (10-1-88 Edition) S5.3.3 When tested under the con-a major axis of 20 inches and a minor ditions of S6., both before and aLer axis of 13 inches. the window retention test required by S5.4.2 School bus emergency exit ex- -85.1, each school 'Nu emergency doortension. shall allow manua ..elease of the door 55.4.2.1School bus with u GVWR of by a single person, from both insidemore than 10,000 pounds. After the re- and outside the bus passenger com-lease mechanism has been operated, partment, using a force applicationthe emergency door of a school bus thatconformstoparagraphs(a)with a GYVVR of more than 10,000 through (c) except a school bus with apounds shall, under the conditions of GVWR of 10.000 pounds or less does not have to conform to paragraph (a).86,. before and after the window re- Each release mechanism shall operatetention test requirid by S5.1. using the without the use of remote contro!s or forcelevels specifiedin85.3.3,- be tools, and notwithstanding any failuremanaalivextendablebyasingle of the vehicle's power system. Whenperson a position that permits the release mechanism is not in the (2) Ils the case of rear emergency closed position and the vehicle ignitiondoor. an opening large enoughti)-- is in the "on" position, a continuouspermit unobstructed passage of a rec- warning sound shall be audible at thetangularparallelepiped 45Inches driver's seating position and In the vi-high, 04 inches wide, and 12 inches cinity of the emergency door having deep,ceping the 45-inch dimenzion the unclosed mechanism. vertical, the 24-inch dimension parallel (a) Location: Within the high forceto tiv opening, and the lower surface access region shown In Figure 3 1, for aIs, contact with the floor of the bus at side emergency door, and in Fli,Jre 3Dall times: and for a rear emergency door. (b) In the case of a side emergency (b) Type of motion: Upwar:1 fromdoor, an opening at leut 45 inches inside the bus: at the discretion orthehigh _and 24 _inches wide. A vertical manufacturer from outside the bus. transverse plane_tangent to the rear- Buses.with a OVWR of 10,000 poundsmost point of a seat back shall pass or less shall provide interior releasethrough the forward edge of a side mechanisms that operate by either anemergency door. upward or pull.type motion. The pull- 85.4.2.2 School bus with a GVWR of type motion shall be used only when10,000 pounds or less. A school bus the release mechanism Is recessed In with a OVWR of 10,000 pounds or less such a manner that the handle, lever.shall conform to all the provIsions of or other aetivating device does not85.4.2, except that the parallelepiped protrude beyond the rim of there-dimension for the opening of the rear cessed receptacle. emergency door or doors shall be 45 (c) Magnitude of force: Not moreinches high. 22 inches wide, and 8 than 40 pounds. inches deep. 85.4 Emergency exit extension. 85.5 Emergency exit:identification. 85.4.1After the releaae mechanism 85.5.1In buses other than school has been operated, each push-outbuses, except for windows serving as window or-other emergency exit notemergency exits in accordance with required by 85.2.3 shall, under the85.2.2(b) and doors In busec with a conditions of 86.. before and after theOVWR of 10,000 pounds or less, each window retentiontestrequiled- byemergency door shall have the desig- 85.1. using the reach diatances andnation "Emergency Door" or "Emer- corresponding force levels specified ingency Exit" and each push-out window 85.3.2. be manually extendable by aor other emergency exit shall have the single occupant to a position that pro-designation"EmergencyExit"fol- vides an opening large enough tolowed by concise operating instruc- admit unobstructed passage, keeping ations describing each motion necessary major axis horizontal at all times, ofto unlatch and open the exit, located an ellipsoidgenerated byrotatingwithin 6 Inches of the release mecha- about its minor axis an ellipse havingnism. 466

224 ,^-",'"":"-^-.,,--1.7"77":'"",77.-L",.

APPENDIX M 208

National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., DOT § 571.217 EXAMPLES S5.5.3 School Bus. Each school bus (1) Lift to Unlatch, Push to Open emergency exit provided in accordance (2) Lift Handle and Push out to Open aith 85.2.3.1 shall have the designa- When a release mechanism is not lo-tion "Emergency Door" or "Emergen- cated within an occupant space of ancy Exit." as appropriate, In letters at adjacent seat, a label meeting the re-least 2 inches high, of a color that con- quirements of 35.5.2 that indicates thetrasts with its background, located at location of the nearest release mecha-the top of or directly above the emer- -nism shall be placed within the occu- gency exit on both the inside and out- pant space. side surfaces of the bus. Concise operating instructions describing the mo- EXAMPLE tions necessary to-unlatch-and open the emergency exit, fr. letters at least Emergency exit instructions located next three-eighths of an Inch high, of a to wat ahead. color that contrasts with its back- EXAMPLE "Etagacescv EXIT Insraucrforus ground,shallbe located within 6 LOCATXD NEXT TO SEAT AHEAD- inches of the release mechanism on 85.5.2In buses other than schoolthe inside surface of the bus. buses. Except as provided in S5.5.2.1, each marking shall he legible, when EXAMPLE the only source of light is the normal (1) Lift to Unlatch, Push to Open nighttime illumination of the bus inte- (2) Lift Handle. Push Out to Open dor. to occupants having corrected 86. Test conditions _ visual acuity of 20/90 (Snel len ratio) 88.1 The vehicle is on a flat, hori- seated in the adjacent seat, seated in zontal surface. the seat directly adjoining the adja- 88.2 The inside of the vehicle and cent seat, and standing in the aisle lo-the outside environment are kept at cation that is closest to that adjacent any temperature from 70' to 85' Fahr- seat. The marking shall be legible-enheit-for 4 hours immediately preced- from each of these locations when the ing the tests, and during the tests. other two corresponding locations are 86.3 For the window retention test. occupied. windows areinstalled,closed, and S5.5.2.1If the exit has no adjacent latched (where latches are provided) seat, the marking must meet the leg-in the condition intended for normal ibility requirements of 85.5.2 for occu-_ bus operation. pants standing in the aisle location S6.4 For the emergency exit release nearest to the emergency exit, exceptand extension tests, windows are in- for a roof exit, which must meet thestalled as In 86.3, seats, armrests, and legibility requirements for occupants interior objects near the windows are positioned with their hacks against the installed as for normal use, and seats (loco opposite the roof exit. are In the upright position.

467 225 CO)

ILOPCUARANCR S. AM RUTS.ARIA &WPM VIEW PARALLEL TO KAT BACK VlEW PERPENINCULAR TO BEATARIASAMUR BACKOf Mt COM NOON wriftstevom IN TN! ti ThI 11,10 OP IPATIAL ml PROPICTIONI WWI CRUM OP 11111 226 ARO OMR ONTROCTION FIGURE 1 LOW-FORCE ACCESS REGION FOR EMERGENCY EXITS HAVING ADJACENT SEATS 227 11 mauls d/ REGION G / REGION A / 01/51141105POINT OP 54041V /IA 2 MIME 11110411 A0451110 NAT poijilliARM REST FLOC% s./ MAIN MERGENCE DOT FLOOR SE REATH EMERGENCY EXIT I 04ACENT SLAT 0/10sum40LIARANC1 shag.011415 0511151111. AMAassnuenONS 51111/110 VIEW PARALLEL TO 5fAr RAM MEW PERPENDICULAR TO SEAT BACK 228 PISMIRE 2 HIGH-FORCS ACCESS REGIONS FOR EMERGENCY EXITS RAVING ADJACENT SEATS IutN 229 211 APPENDIX M

§ 571.217 49 CFR Ch. V (10-1-88 Edition)

M. Vat RRIVOURCY EXIT

ACM/ 1111010ft Pen MOO POOCI1

IL ROOF RIOCRUNCY CUT

470

230

f .161POZIOMOMMOSA APPENDIX II 212

National Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,COT §571.217

INTKAil 11...... V4 MO.0 OMIT NIXT70,01

IC. REAR EMERGENCY ClUT WITH REAR OBSTRUCTION

SO. MAR CAKROTACT CUT WITMOUT ALAN ONSTRUCTION

rico( 3 LOW APO WON. FOWL AMU 311101014 IIIIILOINCY front WIMOUTADJACINT KATI

471

:0, I -.et ...di-- IA 213 APPENDIX M

§ 571.217 49 CFR Ch. V (104-88 Edifion)

1.00

RITAININ 0.70 1103103 1001,31:11 Or 101100N OPTIONAL1 MOWN GLAZING

1001011100 00 TUTOS3 0IV14:1

Jut on ;nom.TIC 1/0131113.11, I 0 300! ft pa MOMS 011111001114 00: te 310103A11001

WaCIOAT SKIN, M1 0103040, 00 Ott Of Mt raliiONS IN 0001111 100: 003 PPOI44TICOlIN UNL111 0108 ~SI 11.101110 1000! SO ft 11103m1111111103114 sft: ft IL01030TION

noun 4 WACO FORM

(37 VR 9395. May 10. 1772, AA amended at 37 FR 18035. Sept. 8, 1972; 38 FR 6070. Mar, 6. 1973: 38 PR 7562. Mar. 73. 1913; 39 YR :5274. May 2. 1074; 40 FR 48512. Oct. 16, 1975: 41 PR 3872. Jan. 27. 1976: 41 '8R 22357, June 3. 1976: 41 FR 34892. June 17. 1976; 41 PR 38027, Aug. 26, 1976: 47 PR 7256. Feb. 18. 1982; 47 PR 31565. Aug. 28. 19821

),472 APPENDIX 14 214

National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., DOT § 571.220

11571.220Standard 220: School hos inches shorter than the vehicle roof rollover protection. and 36 inches wide: and SI. Scope. This standard establishes lb) In the case of a vehicle with a performance requirements for schoolOVWR of10.000 pounds or- less, 5 bus rollover protection. inches longer and 5 inches wider than S2. Purpose. The purpose of thisthe vehicle roof. For purposes of these standard is to reduce the number of measutements. the vehicle roof is that deaths and the severity of injuriesstructure, seen in the top projected that result from failure of the schoolview, that coincides with the passen- bus body structure to withstand forces ger and driver compartment of the ve- encountered in rollover crashes. hicle. 83, Applicability, This standard ap. S5.3Position the force application plies to school buses. plate on the vehicle roof so .that its 84.Requirements. When aforce rigid surface is perpendicular 1.0 a ver- equal to. 11/2 times the unloaded vehl.tical longitudinal plane and it contacts de weigh', is applied to the roof of the..the roof at not leis than two points. vehicle's body structure through a and so that, in the top projected view, force application plate as specified initslongitudinal centerline coincides

35.. Test procedures. . with the longitudinal centerline of the cal The downward vertical move-vehicle, and its front andrear edges merit at any point on the application are an- equal distance- inside-the front plate shall not exceed 51/2 inches: and and rear edges of the vehicle roof at (bi Each emergency exit of the vehr the centerline. de provided in accordance Kith Stand- 85.4 Apply anevenly-distributed ard No. 21711 571.217v shall be.capable vertical force in the downward direc- of owning as specified in that stand-tion to the force application plate at ard during the full application of theany rate not more than 0.5 inch per force and after release of the force, iu-cond, until a force of 500 pounds has except Lutt an emergency exit located been applied. in the roof of the vehicle is not re 85,5Apply additional vertical foree quired to be capable of being opened in the downward direction to the force ,during the application of the force, A application plate_at a rate of not. more

. particular vehicle test spe(:imen) than" 0.5 inch per second until the need not meet the emergency exit force specified In 54. has been applied, opening requirement after releme of and maintain this application of force. force if it is subjected to the mermen- 85.6 Measure the downward move- cy exit opening requirements duringment of any point on the force appli- the full application of the force, - cation plate which occurred during the SC.Test procedures. Each vehicle_application of force in accordance with shall be capable of meeting the re 85,5. quirements of 84. when tested in ac- 85.7 To test the Capability of the cordance with the procedures set forthvehicle's emergency exits to open in below. . accordance with 84.(bi- 85.1 With any non-rigid chassis-to. tat In the case of testing under the body mounts replaced with equivalent fullapplication offorce, open the rigid mounts, place the vehicle fun a emergency exits as specified in 84,tb) rigid horimntal surface AO that the ye- while maintaining the force applied in hide is entirely supported by means of accordance with 85.4 and S5.5: and the vehicle frame. If the vehicle Is tbi In the case of testing after the constructed without a frame, place the release of all force, release all down- vehicle on its body sills. Remove any ward force applied to the 'force appli- components whichextendupwardcation plate and open the emergency from the vehicle roof. exits as specified in 84.1bi. 85.2 Use a flat, rigid. rectangular 80. Test conditions. The following force application plate that is meas conditions apply to the requirements ured with respect to the vehicle roof specified In 84. longitudinal and lateral centerlines. MU Temperature.Theambient fat In the case of a vehicle with atemperature is any level between 32' OVWR of more than 10.000 pounds. 12 F. and 90' F. 499 215 APPEND 1 X II

§ 571.221 49 CFR Ch. V (10-1-88 Edition)

S6.2Windows and doors.Vehicle SS. Requirement. When tested ir..c- windows, doors, and enwrgency exitscordance with the procedure of 86., are in the fully-closed position, and each body panel Joint shall be capable latched but not locked. of holding the body panel to the member to which itis joined when 141 FR 3875. Jan. 27. 1976. sa atnendrd at 41 subjected to a force of 60% of the ten- FR 36026. 36027.Awe.26. 19761 sile strength of the weakest joined Standard No. 221: Sehool bus body panel determined pursuant _to 11 571.221 S6.2. body joint Mrenirth. S6. Proce lure. SI. Scope. This standard establishes 86.1Preparation of the test speci, requirements for the strength of the men. .-..- body, panel joint.s in school bus bodies. S6.1.1If a body panel jointis 8 32. Purpose. _ The_purpose of this inches long or longer, cut a test speci- .standard is to reduce deaths and inju- men that consists of any randomly series resulting from the structural col-lected 8-Inch segment of the joint.. to- lapseof school bus bodIes duringgether with a portion of the bus body crag es. . whose dimensions, to the extent per- S3. Application. This standard, ap-mitted by the size of the joined parts:' plies to school buses with gross vehicle are-those specified. in Figure 1, 80 that--" weight ratings of more than 10.000 the specimen's centerline is perpendicular to the joint at the midpoint of pounds, the joint segment. Where the body 84. Definitions. "Body component" panel joint is not fastened continuous- means a part of a bus body made fromly, select the segment so that it does a single piece of homogeneous mated-not bisect a spot weld or a discrete fas- al or from a single piece of composite tener. -* material such as plywood. S6.1.2If a joint is less than 8 inches "Body panel" means a body compo- long, cut a test specimen with enough nent used on the exterior or interiorof the adjacent material to permit It surface to enclose the bus' occupantto be held in the tension testing inn- chine specified in 86.3.- "Body panel joint" means the area se.1.3Prepare the test specimen in of contact or close proximity ne,..2..eenaccordance with the preparation pro- the edges of a body panel and .-mother cedures specified In the 1973 edition of body conponent, excluding spaces de- the Annual BOOk of ASTM Standards. signed for ventilation or another func- published by the American Society for tional purpose, and excluding doors,'restingandMaterials.1916 Race windows,andmaintenance access Street. --Philadelphia.Pennsylvania panels. 19102. -Bus body" means the portion of a .136.2Determination of minimum al- 'bus that encloses the bus's occupant,lowable strength. For purposes of de- space. exclusive of the bumpers, the terminingthe minimumallowable chassis frame, and any structure for- joint strength, determine the tensile ward of the forwardmost point of thetar:paths of the joined body compo- windshield mounting. nes its as follows:

500

234 APPENDIX M 216

National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., DOT § 571.222

FIGURE 1

Mtn callous. I an

Specimen centsdine I

1 3 3.d 24 24.

Asdimetokons a* mews

(a) If the mechanical properties of a 0 571.222Standard No. 222: School bus material are specified by the American passenger seating and crash protection, Society for Testing and Materials, the SI. Scope. This standard establishes, relative trmalle strength for such a ma-occupant protection requiremehts tor terial is the minimum tensile strength-school bus passenger seating and re- specified for that material in the 1073straining barriers. edition of trte Annual Book of ASTM 82. Purpose. The purpose of this Standards. standard is to reduce the number of (b) If the mechanical properties of adeaths and the .severIty of Injuries material are not specifiedby thethat result from the impact of school --American Society for Testing and Ma. busoccupantsagainststructures tertals, determine its tensile strengthwithin the vehicle during crashes and by cutting a specimen from the bussudden driving maneuvers. body outside the area of the joint and 83. Application. 7hIs standard ap. by testing it In accordance with 86.3. plies to school buses. 88.3 Strength test. 84. Definitions. "Contactable sue. 86.3.1 Grip the joint specimen onface- means any surface within the opposite sides of the joint in a tensionzone specified In 8.5.3.1.I that is con. testing machine calibrated in accord.tactable from any direction by the test ance with Method E4. Verification ofdevice described in 86.6. except any Testing Machines, of the American So.surface on the front of a seat back or ciety for Testing and Materials 41913roc:raining barrier 3 inches or more Annual Book of ASTM Standards). below the top of the seat back or re. 86.3.2 Adjust the testing machinestraining barrier. gripa SQ that the joint, under load, will -School bus passenger seat- means a be In stress approximaWly perpendlcu.seat in a school bus, other than the lar to the joint. driver's seat or a seat installed to ac . 86.3.3 Apply a termitic force to thecommodate handicapped or convales- cent passengers as evidenced by oder). specimen by separating the heads oftation of the seat in a direction that is the testing machine at any uniformmore than 45 degrees to the left or rate not leas than 1/4 inch and notright of the longitudinal centerline of more than itvinch per minute until thethe vehicle. specimen separates. 84.1 The number of seating posi- 141 FR 3672, Jan. 27. WI& as amended at 41 tions considered to be in a bench seat FR 36027. Aug 20. 19701 is expressed by the symbol W. and cal. culated as the bench width ln Inches 501

2,3 5 217 APPENDIX N

§ 571.222 49 CFR Ch. V (10-1-88 Edition) divido-rt by 15 and rounded to the near- force to the seat back as specified in est whole number. S5.1.3,3 and S5A.3.4: 55. Requirements. (a) Each vehicle (a) The seat back force/deflection with a gross vehicle weight rating ofcurve shall fall within the zone speci- more than 10,000 pounds shall be ca. fied in Figure 1: pable of meeting any of the require- (b) Seat back deflection shall not ments set forth under this headingexceed 14 inches: (for determination when tested under the- conditions ofof (a) and (b) the force/oeflection Stl. However, a particular school buscurve describes only the force applied passenger seat (i.e., test specimen) inthrough the upper loading bar, and that weight class need not meet fur-only the forward travel of the pivot at- ther requirements after having mettachment point of the upper loading 85.I.2 and S5.1.5. or having been sub-bar, measured from the point at which jected to either 55.1.3. 55.1.4. or-55.3. the-initial applleation of 10 pounds of (b) Each vehicle with a gross vehicle force is attained.) weight rating of 10.000 pounds or les.s (c) The seat shall not deflect by an shall be capable of meeting the follow-amount such that any part of the seat ing requirements at all seating posi-moves to within 4 inches-of any part tions other than the driver's seat: (1)of another school...bus paxsenger- seat- The requirements of II 571.208.or restraining barrier In its originally 571.209. and 571.210 (Standard Nos.installed position: 208, 209. and 210i as they apply to (d) The seat shall not separate from multipurpose passenger vehicles: andthe vehicle at any attachment point; 12) the requirements of 55.1.2. S5.1.3, and 85.1.4. S5.1,5, and S5.3 of this stand- (e) Seat components shall not sepa- ard.However, the requirements ofrate at any attachment point. Standard Nos, 208 and 21(1 shall be met at W seating positions In a bench 55.1.3.1Position theloading bar seat using a body block as specified inspecified in 56.5 so that It Is laterally Figure 2 of this standard, and a par-centered behind the seat back with ticular school-bus pamenger seat (Le....the bar's longitudinal axis In a trans- a test specimen) In that. weight classverse plane of the iThiele and In any- need not meet further requirementshorizontalplanebet ween 4 Inches after having met 85.1.2 and 55.1.5. orabove and 4 inches below the seating having been subjected to either 55.1.3. reference point of the sehoo) bus pas- 85.1 4. 55.3. or I 571.210 (Stamfard No. senger seat behind the teyt specimen. 85.1 3.2Applya 210). _ forceof 700W 85.1 pounds horizontally In the forward di- Seating requirements. School rection through the loading bar at the bus passenger seats shall be forwardPivot attachment point. Reach the facing. specified load in nut less than 5-nor 55.1.1( Reserved! more titan 30 iwconds. 85.1,2Seat' back height and surface area. Each school bus paasenger scat 55.1.3.3 Nu sooner than 1,0 second afterattainingthe requiredforce, shall be equipped with a seat back reduce that force to 350W pounds and, that. in the front projected view, has a front surface area above the horizon- while maintaining the pivot point position of 1.41: lirst loading bar at thepo- t al plane that passes through the seat-sition where the 350W pounds Is at- mg reference. point, and below the tainc-d, position a aecond loading bar horizontal plane 20 inches above thedescribed In 86.5 so that it is laterally seating reference point, of not lesscentered behind the seat back with than 90 percent of the sea bench the bar's longitudinal axis vin a trans- width in inches multiplied by 20. verse plane of the vehicle and In the 85.1.3 Seatperformance forward. horizontal plane 18 inches above the When a school bus passenger seat thatseating reference point of the school has another scat behind it is subjected bus passenger seat behind the test to the application of-force-as specifiedspecimen, and move the bar forward in 85.1.3.1 and 85.1,3.2. and subse-against the seat back until a force of quently, the application of additional 10 pounds has been applied.) 502

236 APPENDIX II 218

National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., DOT § 571.222 S5.I.3.4Apply additional forcerearward against the seat back until a horizontally in the forward direction force of 50 pounds has been applied. through the upper bar until 4.000W S5.I.4.2 Apply additional force inch-pounds of energy have been ab- horizontallyrearwardthroughthe sorbed in deflectin'g the seat back (orloading bar until 2,800W inch-pounds restraining barrier). Apply the addi-of energy has been absorbed in de- tional load in not less than 5 secondsflecting the seat back. Apply the addi- nor more than 30 seconds. Maintaintional load in not less than 5 seconds the pivot attachment pointinthe nor more than 30 seconds, Maintain maximum forward travel position forthe pivot attachment point inthe .not less than 5 seconds nor more than maximum rearward travel position for 10 seconds and release the load in notnot ler.s than 5 seconds nor more than less than 5 nor more than 30 seconds. 10 seconds and release the load in not (For the determination of S5.1.3.4 the less than 5 seconds nor more than 30 force/deflection curve describes only seconds. (For determination of S5.1.4.2 the force applied through the upperthe force/deflection curve describes loading bar, and the forward and rear- the force applied through the loading ward travel distance of the upper load- bar and the rearward and forward ing bar pivot attachment point meas- travel distance of the loading bar pivot ured from the position at. which theattachment point measured from the initialapplication of10 pounds ofposition at which the initial applica- force is attained.) tion of 50 pounds of force Is attained.) 25.1.4Seal performance rearward. 35.1.5 Seat cushion retention.In When a school bus passenger seat that the case of school bus passenger seats has another seat behind it is subjectedequipped with seat cushions, with all to the application of force as specifiedmanual attachment devices between In 85.1.4.1 and 85.1.4.2: the seat and the seat, cushion in the (a) Seat back force shall not exceedmanufazturers designed position for attachmer.t. the seat cushion shall not 2.200 pounds: separate from the seat at any attach- (b) In the case of a school bus manu-ment point when subjected to an factured on oraftevApril 1:113713, seatupward force of five times the seat back deflection shall not exceed 10-cushion weight, applied in any period inches: (For determination of (a) andof.not less than 1 nor more than 5 sec- (b)theforce/deflectibncurvede- onds, and maintained for 5 seconds. scribes only the force applied through 85.2 Restraining barrier require- the loading bar, and only the rearward merits. Each vehicle shall be equipped travel of the pivot attachment point ofwith a restraining barrier forward of the loading bar, measured from theany designated seating position that . point at which the Initial applicationdews not have the rear surface of an- of 50 pounds of force is attained. other school bus passenger seat within (c) The seat shall not deflect by an 24inches ofitsseating reference amount such triat any part of the seatpoint, measured along a horizontal moves to within 4 inches of any partlongitudinal line through the seating of another passenger seat in its origi-reference point in the forward direc- nally Installed position: tion.. (di The seat shall not separate from 85.2.1Barrier-seatseparation. The the vehicle at any 'attachment point;horizontal distance between the re- and straining bafflers rear surface and the (e) Seat components shall not sepa-seating reference point of the seat in rate at arry attachment point. front of which the barrier is required 85.1.4.1Position the loading bar de-shall not be more than 24 inches meas- scribed in 86.5 so that it is laterallyured along a horizontal longitudinal centered forward of the seat back with line through the seating reference the bar's longitudinal axis in a trans-point in thelorward direction. verse plane of the vehicle and in the 85.2.2Barrier position and rear horizontal plane 13:5-inches-above the surface- area.The position and rear seating reference point of the testsurface area of the restraining barrier specimen, and move the loading barshall be such that. In a front projected 503 I% Cs -- F7

237 219 APPEND1X,M

- § 571.222 49 CFR Ch. V (10-1-88 Edition)

view of the bus, each point of the bar- (d ) Vertical transverse planes rier's perimeter coincides with or liesthrough and 30 inches forward of the outside of the perimeter of the seatreference point. back of the seat for wNch itisre- 55.1.1.2 Head form impact require; quired. ment. When any contactable surface S5.2.3Barrier performancefor-of the vehicle withIn the zones sped- ward. When force is applied to the re- fled in 85.3.1.1 is impacted from any straining barrier in the same manner direct'sn at 22 feet per second by the as specified In S5.1.3.1 through heat+ form described In S6.8. the axial 85.1.3.4 for seating performance tests:ace,..!eration at the center of gravity of (a) The restraining barrier force/de-the head form shall be such that the flectlon curve shall fall within the expression zone specified in Figure 1;

(b)Restrainingbarrier deflection __ shall not exceed 14 inches; (For com- [ putation of (a) and (b) the force/de- -- i adt flection curve describes only the force VI11) i, applied through the upper loading bar, and only the forward travel of the pivot attachment point of the loading bar, measured from the point at whichshall not exceed 1,000 where a is the axial acceleration expressed as a mul- the initial application of 10 pounds of tiple of g (the acceleration due to gray- force ls attained,) Ity), and t, and I, are any two points in (c)Restrainingbarrierdeflection time during the impact. shall not interfere with normal door 85.3.1.3 Head form force distribu- operation: tion. When any contactable surface of (d) The restraining barrier shall notthe vehicle within the zones specified separate from the vehicle at any at- in 85.3.1.1 is impacted from any direc- tP.chment point: and tion at 22 feet per second by the head (e) Restraining barrier components form described in 56.6. the energy nec- shall not separate at any sttachment --essary to deflect the Impacted materi- point. al shall _be not less than 40 Inch- 85.3Impact zone requirements. pounds before the force level on the 55.3AHead protection zone. Any head form exceeds 150 pounds. When contactabie surfaceofthe vehicleany contactable surface within such within any zone specified in 85.3.1.1zones is Impacted by the head form shall meet the requirements of 85.3.1.2from any directionat5feet per and S5.3.1.3. However, a surface areasecond, the contact area on the head -- that has been contacted pursuant toform surface shall be not less than 3 an Impact test need not meet furthersquare inches. requirements contained In 83.3. 55.3.2 Leg protectionzone. Any 85.3.1.1 The head protection zonespart of the seat backs or restraining In each vehicle are the spaces In frontbarriers in the vehicle within any zone of each school bun pamenger seat specified in 85.3.2.1 shall meet the re- which are not occupied by bus side- quirements of 85.3.2.2. wall, window, or door structure- and 55.3.2.1 The leg protection zones of which, In relation to that seat and itseach vehicle are those parts of the seating reference point. arc enclosed school bus pasaenger sear backs and by the following planes: restraining barriers bounded by hori- (a) Horizontal planes 12 inches andzontal planes 12 Inches above and 4 40 inches above the seating referenceinches below the seating reference point: point of the school bus passenger seat (b) A vertical longitudinal plane tan-immediately behind the seat back or gent to the inboard (aisle side) edge ofrestraining barrier. the seat: 85.3.2.2 When any point on the (c) A-vertical longitudinal plane 3.25-rear surface of that-part of a seat back inches inboard of the outboard edge ofor restraining barrier within any zone the seat, and specified in 85.3.2.1 la Impacted from

509

238 APPENDIX M 220

National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., DOT §571.222 any direction at 16 feet per second bypoints of the two sphericsl outer sur- the knee form specified in 36.7. the re-faces which constitute the head form sisting force of the impacted materialshape. shall not exceed 600 pounds and the 36.6.2 The head formisinstru- contact area on the knee form surfacemented with an acceleration sensing shall not be less than 3 square inches.device whose output is recorded in a 36. Test conditions. The followingdata channel that conforms to the re- conditions apply to the requirementsquirements for a 1,000 Hz channel specified in S5. class as specified in SAE Recommend- S8.1Test surface. The bus is at rested Practice J211a. December 1971. The on a level surface. head form exhibits no resonant fre- S8.2Tires. Tires are inflated to thequency below three times the frequen- pressure specified by the manufactur-cy of the channel class. The axis of for the gross vehicle weight rating.the acceleration sensing device coin- S6.3Temperature.Theambientcides with the straight line connecting temperature is any level between 32the centerpoints of the two hemi- . er.degrees P. and 90 degrees F. spherical outer surfaces which consti- 86.4 Seat back position. If adjusta-tute the head form shape. ble, a seat back is adjusted to its most 88.6.3 The head form is guided by a upright position. stroking device so that the direction of 86.5 Loading bar. The loading bartra. el of the head form is not affected Ls a rigid cylinder with an outside di-by impactwith the surface being ameter of 6 inches that has hemi-tested at the levels called for In the spherical ends with radii of 3 inchesstandard. and with a surface roughness that S6.7 Knee form.,The knee form for does not exceed 83 micro-inches, rootmeasurement of force ls a rigid 3-inch- mean square. The length of the load-diameter cylinder; with an equivalent ing bar is 4 inches less than the widthweight of 10 pounds. that hats one of the scat back In each test. Therigid hemispherical end with a PA strokingmechanismappliesforceinch radius forming the contact sur- through a pivot attachment_at_ theface of the knee form. The hemispher- centerpoint of the loading bar whichical surface roughness does not exceed allows the loading bar to rotate In a63 micro-inehe.., root mean square. horiwntal plane 30 degrees in either 86.7.1 The direction of travel of the direction from the transverse position.knse form is coincidental with the cen- 86.5.1 A vertical or lateral force ofterline of the rigid cylinder. 4.000 pounds appliedexternally 86.7.2 The knee form is instrument- through the pivot attachment point dfed with an acceleration sensing device theloadingbaratanyposition whose output is recorded in a data reached during a test specified in thischannel that conforms to the require- standard shall not deflect that pointments of a 600 Hz channel clam aa more than 1 inch. specified in the SAE Recommended 86.8 Head form. The head form forPractice J211a. December 1971. The the measurement of acceleration is itknee form exhibiLi no resonant fre- rigid surface comprised of two hemi-quency below three times the frequen- spherical shapes, with total equivalentcy of the channel class. The axis of weight of 11.5 pounds. The first of thetheaccelerationsensingdeviceis two hemispherical shapes has a diame-aligned to measure acceleration along ter of- 6.5 Inches. The second of thethe centerline of the cylindrical knee two hemispherical shapes has a 2 inehform. diameter and is centered as shown In 86.7.3 The knee form is guided by a Figure 3 to protrude from the outerstroking device so that the direction of surfaceofthefirsthemisphericaltravel of the knee form Is not affected shape. The surface roughness of theby Impact with the surface being hemispherical shapes does not exceedtested at the levels called for In the 63 micre-inches, root mean square. standard. 36.6.1 The direction of travel ut the 88.8 The head form, knee form. head form ls coincidental with theand contactable surfaces are clean and straight line connecting tne center-dry during impact testing. 505

239 221 APPEND I X

§ 571.222 49 CFR Ch. V (10-1-88 Edition)

2,400 16in, 240Orbsj

2,00 SEAT BACK FORCE/DEFLECTION CURVE SHAU. NOT ENTER SHADED AREAS

15in, 10001* 1,00

8 8 10 12 14

DEFLECTION !INCHES!

FIGURE 1 FORCE/DEFLECTION ZONE

506

240 APPENDIX M 222

National Highway Traff lc.Safety Admin., DOT § 571.222

43 BLOCK COVERED BY 1.00 MED, DENSITY CANVAS COVERED FOAM RUBBER

0,75 MA, 2.00 9 - 3.34 MAU HOLE

11.00 9 9.00 5.00 2.00

L2,00 5,26 -4.. 1.94 ITYFI 20.00 _ - --- FIGURE 2 - BODYBLIXX FOR LAP BELT

507 223 APPENDIX M

§ 571.222 49 CFR Ch. V (10-1-88 Edir

141 FR 4018, Jan. 28. 1970, :m amended at 41 YR 28528. July 12, 1976: 41 yu. 38027, Aug, 20, 1976; 41 FR 54945. Dee. DI 1978; 42 FR 04120. Dec. 22, 1977; 43 FR. 9150, Mar. 11, 1910; 44 R 18475, Mar, 20, 1971); 48 YR 12380. Mar. 21, 1983;

508

11.11,COYCIMMEOT flill;f100 OIVICLII9V0./t1,volonwo 242 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION Office of Educational Research and Improvement (OEM) Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC) ERIC

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