Aspects of the Theory of Syntax

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110 n 1 1 P4RNT RP.SIIM ED 030 113 AL 001 969 By -Schank. Roger C. Linguistics from a Conceptual Viewpoint(Aspects of Aspects of a Theory of Syqtax). Stanford'Univ.. Calif. Spons Agency -Department of Defense, Washington. D.C. Advanced Research-Pro;ectsAgency.; National Inst. of Mental Health (DHEW), Bethesda, Md. Report No-MEMO -AI -88 Pub Date 21 Apr 69 Note -23p. EDRS Price MF -$0.25 HC -$1.25 Descriptors-Child Language. Cognitive ProCesses, Computational Linguistics,*Concept Formation, *Language Universals. *Linguistic Competence, Linguistic Performance. *LinguisticTheory. Models. Semantics, Syntax, *Transformation Generative Grammar Identifiers-*Aspects Of The Theory 'Of *Syntax. Chomsky Noam. ConceptualParser. Stanford Artificial Inteliigence Project . Some of the assertions made by Chomsky in "Aspectsof the Theory of Syntax" are considered.In particular. the" ..notion of a "competence:" model inlinguistics is criticized. Formal postulates for a *Conceptually-basedlinguistic theory are presented. (Author/JD) April 21, 1969 STANFORD ARTIFICIALINTELLIGENCE PROJECT MEMO AI-88

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Linguistics from a Conceptual Viewpoint

(Aspects of Apects of a Theory ofSyntax)

Roger C. Schank

Theory ABSTRACT: Some of the assertions madeby Chomsky in AspecIs_of the of Syntax are considered. In particular, the notion of a competence' model in linguistics iscriticized. Formal postulates for a conceptually-basedlinguistic theory are presented.

This research is supported by GrantPHS MH 06645-07 from the National Institute of Mental Health, and(in part) by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Office ofthe Secretary of Defense(SD-183).

AL001969 Linguistics from a Conceptual Viewpoint

(Aspects of Aspects of a Theory of Syntax)

1. Although linguistics is often referred to as the 'science of language', it has been usual for linguists to resist this label and its concomitant expectations.With the exception of the attempts of Bloch (19)48) and Bloomfield (1926) at establishing postulates for language, the formalization that is often present in a science was difficult to find before 1957.

With the advent of transformational generative grammar however, the direction of the bulk of linguistic research changed considerably. Linguists who are in the transformational camp tend to be more concerned with precision and formalization than was common in the past.

It is perhaps enlightening to attempt to discover just how valid the assumptions that have led to the present conception of transformational grammar are; and, if they are not valid, agood question is just what assumptions might be considered valid.

Initially, transformational theory dealt only with kernelsand transforms. The kernels were the output of the PSG and certain obligatory transformations. Thus a transformational grammar was simply a specification of the permutations involved in correcting the output of a PSG. This system was still used until itbecame clear that it was insufficient to handle all

the complexities involved in natural language.

Bach (1964) stated that 'The minimal requirement that we can place

on a theory about a particularlanguage is that it specify or predict all

and only the sentences of the language'. Until this time, these were precisely

the requirements that were placed on a transformational grammar. Hawever,

two important problems resulted from this view ofwhat a linguistic theory was to accomplish. The first was that the systom of phrase structure grammar and the transformationsthat were added simply did not account for all

the sentences of English. The second problem is that the system As it stood

could not be extended to other languages without completel.y revampingboth

components in such a way that the two grammarswould be very dissimilar.

This clearly is in contradiction to a fact of language that we know verywell..

Namely, than any baby possesses the mechanisms to learn any language andthat

therefore, there must be some similarity between languages. Furthermore,

this similarity should pervade the grammars of different languagessuch that

things like translatability can be explained.

Thus it appeared obvious that an important step towards solving

both the first and second problems would be the positing of aUniversal

grammar that would hold forall languages and a particular grammar for each

language. Therefore, since the framework was alraady available, the phrase

.01.1.04601* r s I

structure component began tobe utilized as the basis for auniversal base

component. (As Robinson [1968] points out this was arelatively arbitrary

decision.) At this pointChomsky's AsEstsof the_l_y_lheor c_layr._IS.2.x appeared.

L - ...... MW down the 'mainbackground 2. In Chapter I ofAspects, Chomsky sets examine some assumptions' of transformationaltheory. It is worthwhile to

of these assumptionsin detail. assumption that hemakes is The first and perhapsmost important

(the speaker-hearer'sknow- the 'fundamentaldistinction between competence (the actual use of languagein con- ledge of hislanguage) and performance

cretesituations) [p.4] that he sets up. performance provides for This distinction betweencompetence and make their statementsabout transformationalists theplatform from which to discussion of what a'performance' transformations. Chomsky includes in his limitations, inattention,distraction model should do,factors such as memory 'competence' the formal- and non-linguisticknowledge. He thus leaves for speaker-hearer's know- ization of linguistic processesrepresentative of the

ledge of the language. however. It is This relegation ofcompetence makes abasic mistake of linguistic know- necessary todifferentiate theproblem of formalization from the simulationof linguistic ledge and processes,i.e., competence, and cannot be labeled as knowledge and processes. This simulation is not There is a differencebetween the what Chomsky wouldcall 'performance'. simulation of actualverbal simulation of knowledgeand processes and the Chomsky does, of theideal behavior. It is here that wemust speak, as speaker-hearer is notinattentive or dis- speaker-hearer. Clearly the ideal and non-linguisticknow- tracted. He does howeverhave memory limitations what must be simulated as aninclusive part of ledge. This is certainly which Chomsky linguistic theory. The kind of theoryof 'performance' of future to which Chomskyrelegates it. speaks may well be inthe far distant is not so far off. It would However, a theory ofsimulative performance seem very reasonablethat the possibility of the construction of alinguistic theory that both accounts for the dataand does this in such a way as to appear to be consonantwith the human method for doing so, is not so remote.

Clearly, such a theory must deal withnon-linguistic knowledge and problems

of human memory as well as theprdblems that Chomsky designates as'competence'.

Thus, it seems that the distinctionbetween competence and performance is a

contrived one at best. In particular, after elimination of someGI the be-

havioristic problems such as distraction, we canexpect to find a linguistic

theory that is neither one of'competence' or 'performance' but something in

between and therefore partiallyinclusive of both.

On Page 139 Chomsky states:

Thus it seems absurd to suppose thatthe speaker first forms

a generalizedPhrase-marker by base rules and then tests itfor

well-formedness by applying transformationalrules to see if it

gives, finally, a well-formed sentence. But this absurdity is

simply a corollary to the deeperabsurdity of regarding the sys-

tem of generative rules as apoint-by-point model for the actual

construction of a sentence by aspeaker.

The system presented in a theoryof simulativr, performance, on

the other hand, would be an attempt atformulating a system of rules that are

of a sentence by a speaker. a point-by-pointmodel for the actual construction

Furthermore, this system should be apoint-by-point model for theactual

analysis of a sentence by a hearer.These aims even if they areattainable

would be largely unverifiable exceptby the use of computers assimulative

devices.

On page 141 Chomsky.further statesthat: 6

The grammar does not, initself, provide any sensible

procedure for finding the deepstructure of a given sentence, or

for producing a given sentence,just as it provides nosensible

procedure for finding aparaphrase to a given sentence. It merely

defines these tasks in a precise way. A performance model must

certainly incorporate a grammar;it is not to be confusedwith a

grammar.

Thus it would be wise totake the notion of asimulative perfor-

and mance model asbeing somewhere betweenChomsky's notion of competence performance. Perhaps the notionof grammar too, shouldlie somewhere between

Chomsky's notion of a grammar andthe incorporation of a grammar.

Chomsky describes a grammarof a language as'a description of the

and calls this a'genera- ideal speaker-hearer'sintrinsic competencev[p.4] 'generative grammar' tive grammar'. It is reasonable toconsider whether a describing what Chomsky in a large sense mightalso concern itself with calls 'competence', but in a wayin which the idealspeaker-hearer does so;

considerations as the speaker- in particular withoutexcluding such important

hearer's knowledge of theworld.

Now it is possible toredefine the notion of a'fully adequate

adequate grammar 'assign toeach of an grammar'. Chomsky would have a fully how this infinite range of sentences astructural description indicating However, the sentence is understoodby .the ideal speaker-hearer[p.5]. therefore by transformational structural descriptionemployed by Chomsky and question as to whether syn- grammar is syntacticin nature and there is some by the speaker- tactic descriptions reflectat all how a sentenceis understood 'fully adequate grammar' hearer. It would seem thatalthough the goal of a arrives at this grammar,and is to the point, themethod by which Chomsky therefore the grammar itself, isclearly not. That is, when Chomsky states that 'a grammar is descriptivelyadequate if it generates the correct setof structural descriptions' [p.60] it is reasonable to ask what makes aset of structural descriptions'correct', Since a transformational grammarat- tempts to be justified atthe level of descriptive adequacy, we canassume that to Chomsky a 'correct'structural description includesthe notion of what the Noun Phrase, VerbPhrase, and for that matter, thedummy symbol to be found in the structuraldescription are. If 'correct' for Chomsky does include only a competence grammarthen it must be clear thatthe structural description provided by itdoes not explain how aspeaker-hearer goes about understanding a sentenceand that this problem does notbelong to a performance grammar. The needed grammar must be inbetween Chomsky's

extremes and thestructural descriptions that itprovides must be in terms

of items more familiar tothe speaker-hearer than'dummy symbol'.

Thus, Chomskys 'fundamentaldistinction' between 'competence' and

1 performance' is fundamental only insofar as one would want todevelop a

adequate job of pro- competence grammar. Although Chomsky may have done an

7iding the basis of a competence grammar,the question remains as to what

the point of such a grammaris. Chomsky states that linguistictheory is

mentalistic in that it isconcerned with discovering amental reality under-

lying actual behavior[p.4]. However, results have beenlargely negative

when attempts to provethe.psychological validity of this competence grammar

have been made. Fodor and Garrett(1966;151) comment:

What is one t, make of such negativefindings? The simplest

move would be todeny the validity of theexperimental procedures...

If one is to deny the validityof suchprocedtres in cases where

they appear to fail, it seems onewill equally have to denytheir

41% 8

It is in any validity in the caseswhere they appear tosucceed.

negative data willeventually event nowconceivable that enough the theory that is at accumulate to make onewonder whether it is

...it is a mistake toclaim fault rather thanthe experiments generate psychological reality forthe operations whereby grannnars

structural descriptions.

that their theorydoes not make Thus, eventransformationalists recognize anyverifiable psychologicalclaims. explicating psychological If a competence grammaris not useful for It seems to methat the purpose processes whatother purpose couldit have? than just explainingthings about of a linguistictheory is somehow more 'traditional linguistics'explained language. What Chomsky refers to as but Chomsky and hisfollowers have deemedthis. a greatdeal about language, how formalizationfor its awn sake insufficient. It is hard for me to see A generative grammarshould account would make theseexplanations sufficient. is unverifiable,the formal- for psychological processesand as long as this generative grammarshould be useful in ization techniquespresented by a Clearly they are neededin computational any sensethat they might beneeded. have consistentlybeen very difficultto linguistics. But transformations reversable the outputwould be reverse forparsings. Even if they were of a transformationalgrammar syntactic, since jt isthe syntactic component The question remains asto whether nhat accounts forgenerative capacity. information, such as syntactic information, evenmeaning-oriented syntactic That is, is underlying com- deep structures, canaccount forunderstanding. would a model ofsimulative performance petence significant? In particular, from a psychologicaland compu- not be somewhat moremeaningful, at least

tational point of view? 9

On page 24 Chomsky notes that'we must be careful not to overlook 3.

the fact that surface similarities mayhide underlying distinctions of a

fundamental nature, and that it may be necessaryto guide and draw out the

speaker's intuition in perhaps fairlysubtle ways before we can determine what is the actual character ofhis knawledge of his language orof anything

else. He notes that 'the latter(point) is as old as Plato's Meno'.

Clearly, the method employed by Socratesin The Meno for drawing

out one's actual knowledgeis basically fallaciousboth with respect to the

problem of geometry in The Menoand with respect to language. The slave boy

questioned by Socrates is clearlybeing taught. It is hard to believe that

the knowledge eventuallydisplayed by the slave boy was therefrom another

life, but rather it is easy to detectthe teaching method that Socrates em-

psychiatric ploys. For determing the actualknowledge of a patient in a

interview the Socratic method iscertainly worthwhile.This is so precisely

because the information beingsought is definitely present. Clearly, this

is not the case in questioning a youngboy about geometry. What actually

does happen is that certainimplications of already presentknowledge are

brought to the surface.

Chomsky would have us believethat this process would bevalid in

conversation that attempts to linguistics. One can imagine a Socratic

bring to the surface thesupposedly already presentknowledge that sentences It is necessary to are constructedwith noun phrases as component parts.

distinguish here between the actualknowledge and a description of that

knowledge. Clearly, sentences can be describedin terms of noun phrases.

However, it is difficult toconvince a speaker that he actuallyrewrites an

S as an NP VP. From a descriptive point of viewthese NP's and VP's may

be considered to be present. They are not, however, verylikely to be part 10

of the actual knowledgeof the speaker. Thus, the notion of thespeaker's intuition is a somewhat tenuous one. As was shown bySocrates' attempts, wishes it to the speaker's intuition isexactly that which the questioner

subtle' be.:thus, if we draw out thespeaker's intuition in a 'fairly enough way such as to elicitthe fact that there is an NP presentin all of the sentences that he utters,it is unclear exactly what wehave accomplished.

Certainly this cannot be thebasis for a linguistic theorythat does any more.than describe the data. This description may be nice tohave but it does not tell us anythingabout the actual process oflanguage.

At this point numerous transformationalists are liable toobject

that all a transformational grammaris supposed to do is describethe data.

If this is the case, one is proneto ask why one isconcerned with the

dpeaker's intuition at all, and inparticular haw is it possible tojustify

Chomsky's Beckman Lectures at a statementsuch as the following from

Berkeley (1967:111:9):

We cannot avoid beingstruck by the enormous disparitybetween

knowledge and experience - inthe case of language, betweenthe

generative grammar that expressesthe linguistic competence ofthe

native speaker, and the meagerand degenerate data on thebasis

of which he has constructedthis grammar for himself. Thus Here Chomsky equates'knowledge' with a generative grammar.

it would appear to be the casethat despite protestations tothe contrary,

fact a generative Chomsky believes thatpeople's knowledge of language is in

grammar. That is, a generative grammaris not intended to be a description

of his kpawledge but hisactual knowledge.Yet the information forthis

grammar can bederived from the somewhat tenuousframework of the Socratic

further lauded when Chomsky notes method! The results of this approach are (1967:111:5)

that if success is achieved in constructing empirically

adequate generative grammars and determining the universal prin-

ciples that govern their structure and organization, then this

will be an important contribution to human psychology.

One wonders if the method for determining universals is akin to somelarge scale drawing out of the speaker's intuition. Certainly it is doubtful if the process used by Socrates in The Meno was an important contribution to human psychology (although it certainly may have been to pedagogyand philosophy). One wonders, how a supposedly descriptive device such as a generative grammar formed in the above ways can contribute atall to describing how a human does what he does when he speaks language. intended to be The notion of adescriptive grammar, if it were 4. However, it would appear only that, would not beparticularly bothersome. descriptive grammar,he that although Chomskycontinually refers to just a than this. Consider is just ascontinually implying that heis seeking more from his discussionof univer- for example, a statementof Chomsky's taken .

sals. (p. 30) severely Formal constraints...on asystem of concepts may linguist) of a descriptive limit the choice(by the child, or the

grammar, givenprimary linguistic data. Chomsky seems to beimplying The pareAtheticalremark is most revealing. selection of a grammar bythe that there is somecorrelation between the linguist is supposed tobe construc- child and by thelinguist. Yet, if the only describes the dataof ting a 'descriptivegrammar', that is, one that PK, This seems the language in some way,the child must bedoing this also. description hard to believe. Can the child besaid to be constructing a Somehow this notion seemsunlikely. In of the data thathe has gathered? other notion of fact, if this werethe case, there wouldbe no need for any Yet, Chomskyconsistently maintains a grammarbesides a descriptive one. intended to be 'apoint-by-poin that a transformationalgrammar is not by a speaker'(p. 139). model for the actualconstruction of a sentence which is But it is clearlythe case that achild is constructing a grammar construction of a sentencein exactly a procedure forthe point-by-point procedure that is thechild's grammar. his awn head. Certainly, it is this intends it. This is not a descriptivegrammar inthe sense that Chomsky is possible for Chomskyto make Thus, there is somequestion as to how it

the statement thathe does make on page30. led to a great many The confusion thatChomsky allows here has problems with respect to just what transformational grammars are and what

it is they can do. This confusion muddles not only his followers but

Chomsky himself. Consider for example, the paragraph following the quote

on page 30.

The existence of deep-seated formal universals, in the sense

suggested by such examples as these, implies that all languages.

are cut to the same pattern, but does notimply that there is any

point-by-point correspondence between particular languages. It

does not, for example, imply that there must be some reasonable

procedure for translating between languages.

Certainly there is a reasonable procedure for translating between

languages since people do it all the time. What Chomsky means here is that

the descriptive grammar that he is constructing may not provide that proce-

dure. In fact, after many attempts it has become clear that a transforma-

tional grammar will not provide that procedure. But certainly that pro-

cedure exists. It is necessarily implicit in'the point-by-point procedure

that the child.discovers for construction of a sentence. Thus, a procedure

for translating between languages should be available as soon as a grammar

of the point-by-point model that Chomsky seems so willing to disregard is

available. This model would necessarily be founded on what Chomsky chooses

to call substantive universals. That is, whatever is present in all lan-

guages, or underlying all.languages,should form the basis (and in fact does)

for translating between languages. However, the presence of formal uni-

versals in a linguistic description implies very little. It is a formal

universal of the room in which I am sitting and therefore all rooms that

if I paint everything in the room purple, all things in the roomwillbe purple.

It may be a formal universal of language that if one generates the basis ofa sentence and then permutesthe output with enough special transformations and ad hoc constraints that alanguage can be described by this process.

The question is whether thig is atall meaningful. op, of this kind, to harp on 5 Perhaps it is unfair, in a discussion

what is wrong with a theorywithout explaining what might beright. It

should be clear from what has been said sofar, that it is a theory ofsimu-

lative performance that would satisfy myaims for linguistics. It would

seem to me thatthis theory would have to besemantics-based. That is, it

would, as do humans, start withbeliefs (or meaning) inherent in adiscourse,

and then try to generate thed-iscourse. To do this, it wouldprobably be

necessary to passthrough sorli vetsion of syntax along the way.

This generative the 'Ad also employ a Universal andParticu-

lar grarmnar, but one that Ic ec. phase separate from the other. For

example, Chomsky states that the sentence'The harvest was clever to agree'

violates certain 'rules ofEnglish' (p. 76).We would require that a theory

of simulative performance findthis sentence in perfect accordwith the rules

of English but discordant withthe conceptual rules of theUniversal com-

ponent. 16

6. It is my purpose here to explicate what the point of alinguistic formalization might be, and to give some definitions of theelements needed in that formalization.

My underlying assumption here is that language isconceptually- based. By that I merely intend to emphasize the fact thatlanguage and throught are related, very much so in fact. Thus, it is possible to view the problem of formalization of language as the problemof the formalization of the underlying conceptual basis of language. Therefore, the rules that would be used for this formalization wouldexplicate the elements of the conceptual process and then relate the output of that process tolanguage.

Of course, the main problems in an attempt of thiskind are de-

termining what is meant by the conceptual processand how one can be able

to view that process.The answer is that we cannot know for certain that

our formalization isrepresentative of the method that humans employ, hut we can know ifthe output of the conceptual apparatus that humansemploy

is the same as the output of theformalization.

The following, then, are some basic definitions necessary tothe

formalization of the conceptual basis forlanguage. They are the defini-

tions that are used as the basis of acomputational parsing system for

natural language that extracts the language-free conceptualizations inherent in a

piece of discourse. (This 'conceptual parser' is currently operating at

the Stanford Artificial Intelligence Project.[see Schank and Tesler (1969)]) 17

Formal Postulates and Definitions

The Conceptual Basis f Language

1) The basic unit of language is the conceptualization.

a) A conceptualization is a language-free proposition expressing a relation

between a linguistic concept that is an actor or a conceptualization,

and an action and the ob'ect of that action.

b) A linguistic concept with respect to an actor or object, consists

of a bundle of descriptive attributes that define at what point the

notion of the concept of that actor or object is complete in a

given language. Linguistic concepts are language-free insofar as

they have conceptual referents. Each language may define a lin-

guistic concept at any point that it chooses and translatability

between linguistic concepts indifferent languages can be said to

be a function of the number of descriptive attributes needed to

be added in order to have equivalence.

c) An actor (denoted PP) is a category of linguistic concept that

performs certain actions. In a conceptualization an actor may have

a relation to another actor or to a descriptor instead of performing

an action.

d) An object is an actor that is not acting but rather is being acted

upon in a given situation. Thus an object is also denoted PP and

is capable of performing an action simultaneously.

e) An action is a linguistic concept that corresponds to any real

world action.

f) A relation is defined as a dependence between two linguistic concepts.

A dependence denotes that the dependent is adding information to 18

the governor. There are 8 types ofdependence. dependence is necessaryin 1) Two-way dependence ( 04. ) a two-way

order to.havea'conceptualization. This dependency denotes that that the governor-dependentrelationship is mutual and each other. the connected concepts areadding information to

This dependency isreserved for 2) Objective dependency ( ).

objects of actions. The object may be aPP or a conceptualization. of the governor 3) Attributive dependency(0. Here an attribute

is explicated. This dependency givesinfor- 4) Prepositional dependency(44).

mation as to therecipient of an action.

dependency (ft)..This dependency 5) Attributive prepositional those parts of explicates attributesabout a PP as opposed to

a PP. two conceptdaliza- 6) Causal dependency. The dependency between

tions when one isthe cause of the other. two conceptual- 7) Conditional dependency. The dependency between of the izations when thetruth of one isdependent on the truth

other. An entireconceptualization 8) Attributive two-waydependency.

servesattributively. relation Within aconceptual- The Syntax of languageconsists of rules of ization. the syntax of alanguage) is a) The syntax oflanguage (as opposed to but not an expressionof the so-callednatural order of ideas, relations between classes rather is an expressionof the possible all languages is the sameat the of concepts. Thus, the syntax of 19

level of conceptualization. The syntax consists of conceptual

categories and their possible relations.

b) The categories of a linguistic system are(parenthesized expression

corresponds to section numberabove):

1) (lc) PP

2) (1d) PP

3) (le) ACT

4) PA, a descriptor of PP's

5) AA:a descriptor of ACT's

6) LOC, the location of a conceptualization

7) T, the time of conceptualization

c) The possible relaticns between these categories are: PA 1) (lf1) PP a ACT; PP a PP; PP a PA; fACT1

2) (1f2) ACT .-- PP ACT

ACT a a PA PA AA 3) (1f3) PP ttfttt PA AA LOC T PA AAAA

4) (.1t14.) ACT PP + (indicates that this dependence can bemultiple)

5) (1f5) PP

3) The Semantics of language is defined as the rules that permit arelation

to exist. Thus, although the universal syntax may permit a given de-

pendency, that dependency cannot exist unless the universal semantics

also permits it. The semantics consists of semantic files associated

with each possible conceptual governor in a ^onceptual relation for

specific concepts and for ApJAA.qia_sair.A.

a) A semantic category represents a node in a hierarchical treethat

divides the universe of physical objects. The tree branches every 20

of a semantic time a descriptiveattribute can modify a part

category without beingable to modify thecomplementary part

of that semantic category.

b) A semantic file consists ofthe list of descriptiveattributes

obtained by starting at a nodein the hierarchical treeand

tracing up. A semantic fileexisti for each possible dependency.

c) A specific concept is definedby the possible dependent concep-

tual categories and theirassociated semantic files. In each

of the associated semanticfiles specific attributes arefilled

with respect to eachdescriptive attribute for eachspecific

concept. language specific rules of 4) The RealizationRules of a language are the

the linguistic system. These rules map parts of aconceptualization

into an acceptablelinguistic construct. The Realization Rules serve

to define what anacceptable linguistic constructis, in the concept-to-

word phase; and serve torecognize a linguistic constructin terms of The Realization its conceptual realizatein the word-to-conceptPhase.

Rules are reversible andthus are the same inanalysis and synthesis.

However, in the actualuse,.the Realization Rules areonly partially they are used used for understanding(in order to disambiguate), while

in toto for generation. 7. The definitions presented here represent assertionsabout the character of language. They are also the basicsof a computationallinguistic system described in Schank (1969).

I share Chomsky's belief that 'the realproblem for tomorrow is that

of discovering an assumption regardinginnate structure that is sufficiently

rich' (1967:111:10). Many of the notions thatare offered to us by trans-

formational grammar regarding the universalgramnar that would be a part

of this rich innate schemaare valuable. However, it seems to me that this universal grammar is conceptually basedand thus must conform, toa large

extent, to the postulates that I have presentedhere. That is, we must begin to speak of describing what is goingon inside the child and not inside

the linguist. yr

References

Bach, Emmon. 1964. An Introduction To TransformationalGrammar. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Bloch, Bernard. 1948. A Set of Postulates for PhonemicAnalysis. Lg. 24.3- )4-6.

Bloomfield, Leonard. 1926. A Set of Postulates for theScience of Language. Lg.2.153-64.

Chomsky, Noam. 1967. LinguisticContributions to the Study of Mind. Beckman Lectures, Berkeley.

Chomsky, Noam. 1965. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. Cambridge, M.I.T. Press.

Fodor, J., and Garrett, M. 1966. Same Reflections on Competence andPerfor- mance. Psycholinguistics Papers, ed.J. Lyons, and R. Wales. Edinburgh, University Press.

Robinson, Jane. 1968. Dependency Structures andTransformational Rules. Specification and Utilization ofa Transformational Grammar 3, ed. by Warren J. Plath. YorktawnHeights, I.B.M.

Schank, Roger. 1969. A Conceptual DependencyRepresentation for a Computer- Oriented Semantics. Ph.D. Thesis,University of Texas, Austin. Stanford Artificial IntelligenceProject Memo 83, Stanford, Computer Science Department,Stanford University.

Schank, Roger,and Tesler,Lawerence. 1969. A Conceptual Parser for Natural Language presented to First InternationalJoint Conference on Artificial Intelligence,.Washington,D.C., May 7-9, 1969.