CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

U.S. POLICY TOWARDS ULTRANATIONALIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN : THE POLICY OF NON-ENGAGEMENT EXAMINED gauge the extent to which such goals Marlene Spoerri are being met. This is accomplished by PhD Candidate in the Department of examining current US policy towards European Studies, ultranationalist political parties in the Universiteit van Amsterdam, Republic of Serbia. [email protected] Introduction Abstract1 With the process of democratic In Serbia, as in much of the Western consolidation in the Western Balkans Balkans, established democracies face now under way, the question of whether both a moral and political dilemma: to and how the governments of Western acknowledge ultranationalist parties’ and North America should democratic legitimacy as popularly approach the most conspicuous vestige elected actors or to isolate them as of post-communist politics—the symbols of the region’s authoritarian prominence of ultra-nationalist political past. In Serbia, the US has opted for the parties—is becoming increasingly latter, erecting a cordon sanitaire poignant. Policies aimed at isolating similar to those employed domestically such groups by banning diplomatic, against ultranationalist parties in financial and other forms of contact Western Europe. This article seeks to have failed to deny them their popular identify the goals underlying appeal; to the contrary, ultranationalist isolationist policies and in so doing, to forces are making electoral gains precisely where foreign to

1 their existence is most severe. Thus, A version of this article was first presented at despite a decade of intense international the 3rd Central European University Graduate Conference in the Social Sciences, Budapest, pressure, citizens in Bosnia- Hungary. I am grateful for the constructive Herzegovina continue to vote along comments and criticisms of Matthew Adams, ethnic lines for parties that espouse Vasyl Buchko, Kate DeBusschere, Jonathan intolerant rhetoric. While in Serbia, the L’Hommedieu, David Jijaleva, Tamas Meszerics, and Julien Theron. I am also grateful for the ultranationalist comments and criticisms offered by colleagues at could very well be on the verge of the American Graduate School of International forming a coalition government. Having Relations and Diplomacy where embryonic ideas failed to abolish support for related to the central argument of this article were presented in April 2006. I also acknowledge the ultranationalist forces in these support of David Lundberg, the School of countries, the time has come to review International Studies, the Division of Education, such policies. Arts and Social Sciences and the University of South Australia in preparing both the conference paper and this article. The author also This article takes an initial step in this acknowledges the comments of two anonymous direction. In addition to identifying the reviewers. 25 CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1 goals underlying isolationist policies in sentiments, the SRS is the only party in the Western Balkans, it gauges the Serbia to have enjoyed a solid base of extent to which such goals are being support since the pro-reformist coalition met. It does so by examining current centered on the Democratic Party (DS) US policy towards ultranationalist left government in early 2004. For over political parties in the Republic of four years, support for the party has Serbia.2 On the basis of interviews hovered at 30 percent, making the SRS conducted with local politicians, US “the most popular party in Serbia by a diplomats and aid-providers, the article significant margin.”3 The SPS, by concludes that the policy’s impact is contrast, has witnessed little but setback limited and is thus in need of revision. following its heyday at the helm of This argument is developed in three Serbian politics in the 1990s. Following stages. First, the reader is presented the extraditions of its former President, with an overview of the current policy Slobodan Milosevic, to The Hague in of non-engagement, along with an mid 2001, its popularity has dwindled introduction to the ultranationalist to the single digits. Whatever its losses, parties in question: the Serbian Radical however, the SPS is one of just ten Party (SRS) and the Socialist Party of parties in Serbian parliament, Serbia (SPS). Next, the goals of the occupying a total of 16 seats.4 As a policy are identified. Finally, these consequence, ultranationalist parties goals are examined in light of recent currently make up just under 40 percent events in Serbia and conclusions of Serbia’s 250-seat parliament. regarding their effectiveness are drawn. Although Serbia’s ultranationalist parties have failed to form a governing The cordon sanitaire: A policy of non- coalition since reformist parties engagement assumed power in October 2000, fear that they will do so in the future Since the fall of the Milosevic regime in continue to challenge the longevity of October 2000, Serbia’s ultranationalist Serbia’s liberal trajectory.5 parties have been met with markedly different fortunes. Long chastised for its anti-reformist and anti-democratic 3 Steven Woehrel, “: Current Situation and US Policy”, CRS Report for 2While this article focuses on US policy, it should Congress (June 21, 2006), 4. be noted that the European Union also employs a 4 Four of the ten parties in Serbia’s parliament are cordon sanitaire. Given that the EU does not have minority parties, each of which boasts no more a joint foreign policy, however, the than one to three seats in parliament. implementation of the ban is not always run 5 At the time of writing, Serbia’s ultranationalist smoothly, a prime example being the divergent forces were in coalition talks with the Democratic steps taken following SRS Deputy Nikolic’s Party of Serbia. It remained unclear as to whether appointment as Speaker of Parliament. Notably such a coalition would actually be forged. Should however, none of the major European political these parties succeed, they would represent the party institutes target ultranationalist parties in first ultranationalist coalition government since their programs. Milosevic’s ouster in 2000. 26 CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

The parties’ “quasi-fascist, populist norm since 2000, the impact appears program[s]”6 combined with their negligible: the SRS has more support refusal to renounce their roles in today than it did when the policy was wartime atrocities have made both the first implemented. Although the policy SPS and SRS the bane of Serbia’s pro- is reported to be ‘unofficial’ insofar as European majority. In Serbia, as in the origins of its mandate remain much of the Western Balkans, unclear and a paper-trail is lacking, established democracies face both a interviews with US officials reveal that moral and political dilemma: to it is rigorously adhered to.7 US acknowledge ultranationalist parties’ diplomats and donors are not permitted democratic legitimacy as popularly to engage with representatives of elected actors or to isolate them as ultranationalist parties or to support symbols of the region’s authoritarian projects in which SRS officials partake. past. In Serbia, the US has opted for the As one representative of the National latter, erecting a cordon sanitaire Democratic Institute for International similar to those employed domestically Affairs (NDI)—a US organization against ultranationalist parties in specialized in the provision of political Western Europe. Cordon sanitaire, party assistance—explained, “I can literally ‘quarantine line’, refers to a have no contact with the SRS, not even policy of non-engagement through to send a letter.”8 As a result, none of which extremist parties are politically the instruments typically employed to isolated with the aim of circumventing reform parties in new or struggling their proliferation. Ultranationalist democracies–including diplomatic parties, here defined as organizations contacts and democracy assistance—are which advocate a brand of nationalism applied in connection with Serbia’s so severe that it calls a state’s ultranationalist parties. The following international interests and cross-border section examines these instruments in cooperation into question, often fall greater depth. within this category. Strategies of engagement Little has been written regarding the effectiveness of non-engagement but its Until recently, it was common practice record appears to be mixed. In Serbia, to conceive of political transformation where a US policy of non-engagement as an exclusively domestic affair. Only with the SRS and the SPS has been the after the onset of the third wave of

6 This quote was made in reference to the SRS. 7 I collected a total of 80 interviews in Serbia See: Judy Batt, “The Question of Serbia”, (March and June/July 2007) and the US (April Institute for Security Studies 81 (August 2005), 8. 2007). Interviews were conducted with US Likewise, Balkans expert Sabrina Ramet labels diplomats and donors, Serbian politicians, the SRS “neo-fascist” in her article, “The Denial academics, and journalists. Syndrome and its Consequences: Serbian Political 8 Anonymous, National Democratic Institute, Culture Since 2000”, Communist and Interview conducted in , Serbia, on Postcommunist Studies 40 (2007), 41-58, 48. March 9, 2007. 27 CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1 democratization in the late 1970s did programs.10 Whatever their differences, exogenous factors receive systematic the ultimate goal of all democracy attention. To this end, established promoters is clear: “To help strengthen democracies have increasingly sought or reform parties in new or struggling to support, and in some cases, impose, democracies all around the globe.”11 democracy in foreign contexts, a practice referred to as ‘democracy There are a number of ways to work promotion’. This article examines a with parties. A combination of subset of this field pertaining to diplomacy and assistance political parties. It seeks to understand forms the backbone of US efforts to why and to what effect Western actors promote the democratic development of may opt not to work with select parties Serbia’s political parties and party in new democracies. system. While diplomacy aims to encourage, assistance aims to enable In spite of their current malaise, parties to implement the codes of political parties continue to fulfill conduct conducive to a democratic unique functions which civil society political party system. Each year, the cannot adequately perform.9 Thus, in US devotes over 60 million dollars to their quest to bolster democracy abroad, political party assistance.12 Such democracy promoters seek to assistance is meant to bolster parties’ strengthen political parties’ democratic organizational structures, teach modern attributes, including their representative campaign techniques, and enable capacities, their legislative competence, legislative competencies with the and their ability to function ultimate goal of facilitating the cooperatively with their opponents. The democratic process in newly US party institutes work to enable democratizing countries13 To meet these select parties to engage directly with the objectives donors’ posses a toolkit domestic electorate so that they may become more receptive to their voters’ preferences. Western Europeans, by 10 The six German political party foundations, the contrast, take pride in helping parties parteienstiftungen, are trendsetters in this regard. develop more ideologically coherent They seek out ideological sister parties abroad in an effort to assist platform building in manner more in line with the classically left-right ideological spectrum witnessed in Europe. 11 Thomas Carothers, Confronting the Weakest Link: Aiding Political Parties in New 9 Some of the functions unique to parties include, Democracies (Washington, DC: Carnegie though are not limited to: the aggregation and Endowment International Peace, 2006), 77. representation of citizens’ interests, the provision 12 Thomas Carothers estimates the total figure of a structured vehicle of political participation, spent in 2005 to stand at $68 million. See: and the translation of policy preferences into Thomas Carothers, (2006): 85. public policies. For more on this see: Ivan 13 “USAID Political Party Development Doherty, “Democracy Out of Balance: Civil Assistance”, United States Agency for Society Can’t Replace Political Parties”, Policy International Development (Washington DC, Review (April/May 2001), 25-35. 1999). 28 CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1 consisting of consultancy, commodity Figure 1 provides an overview of what I assistance, trainings, seminars, term the ‘engagement continuum’. workshops, and study tours.14 In the US such activities are implemented by the Serbian law prohibits political parties two US political party institutes: the from accepting material and/or financial International Republican Institute (IRI) assistance from foreign states, foreign and NDI, both of which receive their legal entities, and humanitarian primary support from the United States organizations.15 As such, most parties in Agency for International Development Serbia enjoy a form of limited (USAID) and the National Endowment engagement which includes various for Democracy. degrees of diplomatic contact and an array of assistance programs focusing How the US government chooses to on capacity building, platform employ diplomatic relations and development, and voter outreach. In political party assistance characterizes keeping with the cordon sanitaire, the strategy of engagement to which it Serbia’s ultranationalist parties—the adheres. For parties to which the US SRS and the SPS—are denied even the provides diplomatic support in most limited forms of cooperation. combination with the full gamut of Given that diplomacy and assistance political party assistance, we can speak aim to reform political parties in new of full engagement. Where the US opts democracies, why are the SRS and SPS to exclude one or more of these tools not included in US programs? To and/or to employ them to different answer this question the following degrees, a policy of limited-engagement section examines each of these parties exists. The advantage of a policy of in greater depth. limited-engagement is that it allows one to straddle the line between cooperation The Serbian Radical Party and support. When carefully crafted, diplomacy and political party assistance The SRS was founded in February 1991 may be employed in such a manner as as a union of two small, quasi- to qualify as cooperation, rather than oppositional parties; the National support, thereby thwarting accusations Radical Party and the Serbian Chetnik that the US is sanctioning a given Party. At outset, the SRS distinguished party’s policies. In rare instances, the itself from Serbia’s democratic US will employ a policy of non- opposition by appeasing Serbia’s engagement, which entails denying a President, Slobodan Milosevic. While party all forms of diplomatic support or its program was ostensibly one of anti- contact and political party assistance. , the party consistently

15 See Article 6 of the “Law on Financing of 14 Krishna Kumar, “Reflections on International Political Parties” (Official Gazette of the Republic Party Assistance”, Democratization, 12 (August of Serbia”, No. 72/2003, 18 July and No. 75/2003, 2005) 4, 505-527. 25 July 2003). 29 CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1 supported the violent expansionist policies lead by Milosevic’s SPS. The party’s pro-regime sentiments, combined with its leader’s manipulation of domestic sympathy for the Serb minority living abroad, ensured that by 1992 the SRS had won 73 of Serbia’s 250 parliamentary seats.1616The party’s rapid rise to prominence owed much to the charisma of its leader, Vojislav

16 Vladimir Goati, Partije i Partijksi Sistem u Srbiji (Belgrade: OGI Centar, 2004), 250. 30 CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

Figure 1: The Engagement Continuum (Tool employed)

None DC DC & Limited PPA DC and PPA D.S. & limited PPA D.S. & PPA

Non-Engagement Å Limited-Engagement Æ Full-Engagement

(Type of Engagement) D.C. = Diplomatic Cooperation, D.S. = Diplomatic Support, PPA. = Political Party Assistance

Table 1: SRS Results from Republican Parliamentary Elections 1992 - 200717 Elections No. of MPs % of total MPs December 1992 73 29.2 December 1993 39 15.6 September 1997 82 32.8 December 2000 23 9.2 December 2003 82 32,8 January 2007 81182 32,4 May 2008 77 29,4

17 Ibid, 250. Data after 2004 is drawn from the Center for Free Elections and Democracy (CESID), at http://www.cesid.org/ 18 Although the SRS actually increased its share of the national vote by 1% from 2003 to 2007, legislative reforms lowering the electoral threshold required for minority parties to enter parliament meant that there were fewer seats to divvy up amongst the non-minority parties. Thus, despite increasing its share of the vote, the SRS actually lost one seat in parliament. 31 CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

victim of an anti-Serb agenda. With Seselj, whose affinity for nationalist support for DOS coalition parties rhetoric and populist tactics struck a waning, the SRS achieved what the US chord throughout Serbia. By the late- government referred to as a 1990s the SRS was the party of choice “spectacular victory, becoming by far for many of those who questioned the largest party in the Serbian Milosevic’s nationalist credentials in parliament”2, taking in almost 28 the aftermath of the Dayton Accords. percent of the vote in the republican Strong parliamentary results in Parliamentary elections of December September 1997 (see table 1) brought 2003.3 Regardless of its success the party executive powers: the SRS however, the SRS was unable to formed a coalition government with assemble the parliamentary majority Milosevic’s SPS and ; a necessary to form a governing coalition. party lead by Milosevic’s wife, Mirjana An alliance between several of Serbia’s Markovic. centrist parties ensured that the SRS would remain in the opposition. History The SRS’s grip on power was short- repeated itself in January 2007, with the lived. Domestic and international party taking in 29 percent of the vote, dissatisfaction with the Milosevic once again proving unable to form a regime culminated in October 2000, governing coalition. Despite the party’s when Milosevic was forced to step repeated failure to obtain executive down from the federal Presidency. Pro- powers, Vojislav Seselj remains the establishment parties met a similar fate formal president of the SRS. in the parliamentary elections of December 2000, with the SRS taking in Seselj’s leadership is not the only just nine percent of the popular vote. source of continuity within the party. In February 2003 Seselj was indicted On each of the most pressing political for crimes against humanity and issues the party’s views remain violations of the laws or customs of war identical to those it held over a decade by the ICTY.1 The charges referred to ago. In fact, the SRS party program— two sets of activities: Seselj’s close issued in 1996—remains virtually relationship to the paramilitary group, unaltered to this day. Thus, the party is the Seseljevci, and his role as a verbal (officially) opposed to transatlantic instigator of war crimes. Despite integration224, insists that Seselj’s indictment, the SRS refused to distance itself from its leader, opting 20 Woehrel (2006), 4. instead to capitalize on public antipathy 21 toward the ICTY by toting Seselj as a The party’s greatest competitor at the time, Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica’s DSS, received just 18 percent of the vote. 9 22 1 To see the initial ICTY Indictment against It should be noted that the SRS has wavered in Seselj, go to: its opposition to transatlantic integration, in http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/ses- particular its stance towards EU membership. ii030115e.htm. (See for example: Jovan Komsic, “Politicke 32 CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1 remain an integral part of Serbian territory, denounces the ambitions of Socialist Party of Serbia the ICTY, denies Serbia’s complicity in the atrocities of the , and The founding of the SPS predates that maintains territorial ambitions beyond of its ultranationalist counterpart. In the Serbia’s recognized borders23.5 Indeed, summer of 1990, the League of as Sabrina Ramet notes, the fact that Communists of Serbia merged with the “the neo-fascist” SRS remains “the small, left-leaning Socialist Alliance of most popular party in Serbia” continues Working People in Serbia to form the to shed doubt on the direction of Socialist Party of Serbia. Whereas the Serbia’s democratic trajectory24.6 political successors of communist regimes had generally fared poorly against their pro-democratic opponents stranke u Srbiji i evropske vrednosti – programi i throughout Central and Eastern Europe praksa” in: Zoran Lutovac, Politicke Stranke u Srbiji I Evropska Unija (Belgrade:Friedrich Ebert (with the notable exceptions of Bulgaria Stiftung, 2007), 9-49.) In 2003, SRS Deputy and Romania), in Serbia the collapse of Tomislav Nikolic stated that he fully supported the was in name only. EU membership. Again, in March 2007 he The SPS proved victorious in Serbia’s proclaimed himself not to be opposed to EU membership. In May 2007 Nikolic reversed his first-ever post-communist elections, stance on the issue, expressing his transformation winning 77.6 percent of seats in from a mere “Euro-skeptic” to a full-scale “EU parliament (see table 2). Although it opponent”. See: “Nikolic: State of Emergency failed to attain a majority of votes’ Could Put off Elections”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 May 2007, available at: caste, the party’s lead was decisive: its http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Bilteni/Engleski/b100507 nearest opponent, the Serbian Renewal _e.html#N2. In recent months, the party’s position Movement (SPO), received 16 percent has proven inconsistent, to say the least. During of the vote or 8 percent of seats in the run-up to Presidential elections in 2008, Nikolic campaigned on a moderately pro-EU parliament. platform, stating that Serbia’s relationship with need not preclude EU membership. The SPS’s electoral success stemmed Throughout the campaign, however, he was from its origins in the communist party. adamant that Serbia’s interests in Kosovo would prohibit EU accession; should the EU accept The monopoly on state institutions and Kosovo’s independence, Serbia would refuse EU national infrastructure that had once membership. Following Kosovo’s declaration of belonged to the League of Communists independence in February 2008, the SRS of Serbia was simply transferred to the leadership was a vocal critic of select EU member states’ decision to recognize the declaration. It is SPS. Slobodan Milosevic, the party’s worth noting that a similar position was also taken charismatic leader, exploited this by Serbia’s Prime Minister, Vojislav Kostunica, advantage to its fullest. It was largely in president of the Democratic Party of Serbia. 23 this manner that the SPS sustained its These views were reiterated in Seselj’s political predominant position in parliament testament, released in late 2006. 24 Sabrina Ramet, “The Denial Syndrome and its throughout the 1990s. Consequences: Serbian Political Culture Since 2000”, Communist and Postcommunist Studies 40 (2007), 41-58, 48. 33 CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

Table 2: SPS Results from Republican Elections 1990 - 2007251

Elections No. of MPs % of total MPs December 1990 194 77.6 December 1992 101 40.4 December 1993 123 49.2 26 2 September 1997 110 44.0 December 2000 37 14.8 December 2003 22 8.8 January 2007 16 6.4 May 2008273 20 7.6

25 Goati (2004), 250. All data after 2004 were drawn from www.cesid.org. 26 The SPS ran for office in coalition with JUL and New Democracy. 27 The SPS ran for office in coalition with United Serbia and United Pensioners Party. 34 CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

The relationship between the SRS—the whose aims were those of “defending embodiment of Serb nationalism—and the Serbian people.”29 the SPS—the successor of the communist party—is something of a Like the SRS, the policies of the SPS paradox. Though not always symbiotic have exhibited remarkable continuity (in late 1994 Milosevic even had Seselj since October 2000. Although the party imprisoned), the two parties found introduced new programs in 2002 and common ground on Serbia’s so-called 2006, its positions on the most pressing ‘national question’. Writes Ognjen political issues, including the so-called Pribicevic, “…although ideologically national question and cooperation with almost poles apart, Milosevic and Seselj the ICTY remain substantively shared very similar, sometimes unaltered.30 During the run-up to identical, approaches to most of the Presidential elections in January 2008, problems related to the breakdown of the SPS candidate, Milutin Mrkonjic the Socialist Federated Republic of 281 publicly stating that armed intervention …” More often than not, in Kosovo was a legitimate means of Seselj provided the mouthpiece for defending state sovereignty. In his policies supported by Milosevic. By words, “We will defend every citizen of virtue of its association with its founder Kosovo by arms.”314In the aftermath of and President, the SPS should therefore Kosovo’s declaration of independence, not be considered any less nationalistic the party’s president, Ivica Dacic, went than its right-wing counterpart. Indeed, so far as to propose national legislation the party’s ultranationist sentiments explicitly forbidding domestic were on display when in May 1999 the organizations, political parties included, ICTY launched what would be the first from recognizing the territory’s claims. of three indictments against Milosevic 325 Indeed, whatever the party’s for war crimes committed throughout the territories of the former Yugoslavia. Like the SRS, the SPS refused to break 29 ties with its leader, despite his “Dacic Takes over Socialist Party”, B-92 Radio extradition to The Hague in June 2001. and Television, 4 December 2006, available at: It was only after Milosevic’s passing in http://194.109.152.234/eng/news/comments.php? nav_id=38375. 0 March 2006 that the party elected a new 3 See for example: “Programska Deklaracija president, Ivica Dacic. Perhaps not Sedmog Kongresa SPS”, Socialist Party of surprisingly, the party chose to Serbia, 2006, available at: commemorate Milosevic as a “hero”, http://www.sps.org.yu/uploads/progdekl7.pdf. 31 As quoted in: “Mrkonjic: Branicemo gradjane Kosova”, Radio and Television, January 15, 2008, available at: 28 Ognjen Pribicevic, “Changing Fortunes of the http://xs4.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=200 Serbian Radical Right” in The Radical Right in 8&mm=01&dd=15&nav_id=280668. 32 Central and Eastern Europe since 1989, ed. “SPS Zabraniti one sto priznaju”, B92 Radio Sabrina Ramet (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State and Television, Febuary 18, 2008, available at: University Press, 1999), 193-212. http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=20 35 CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1 rhetorical moderation, the SPS’s region’s future within a united Europe. perspective on the Yugoslav wars and Bearing these overarching goals in Serbia’s conduct therein has changed mind, what purposes might the cordon little since October 2000. Only when sanitaire serve? The following list the party’s stances on such issues are includes goals which were explicitly upturned, will the label articulated during my discussions with ‘ultranationalist’ lose its validity. US representatives working in Serbia, as well as those which logically stem Considering these parties’ past and from the broader context of US policy current practices, it comes as little in the Western Balkans. Such goals surprise that the established include: democracies hesitate to embrace them as potential harbingers of a peaceful, • Decreasing popular support democratic Serbia. That the US goes so for ultranationalist parties: To far as to employ a cordon sanitaire is lessen the likelihood that either the more so in light of its overriding aim to SPS or SRS enter government, the support democratic transformation in US may seek to ensure that public Serbia. Why, after all, refuse contact support for the parties decreases or, with ultranationalist parties if doing so at the very least, does not increase. might possibly bring about pro- By erecting the cordon sanitaire democratic reforms within the party? the US sends a very clear message Why not attempt to make these parties to Serbian voters that an SRS/SPS- ‘safe’ for democracy? The following lead government would leave section answers these questions by Serbia politically isolated. assessing the goals underlying US policy towards the SRS and SPS. • Keeping ultranationalist parties out of power: By denying The goals of the cordon sanitaire: Is it diplomatic contacts and political working? party assistance to ultranationalist parties, the US signals the US policy towards the Western Balkans consequences likely to follow is rooted in the desire to achieve peace cross-party cooperation with these and stability after a legacy of violent groups. In demonstrating its conflict and ethnic-strife33.6 Central to antipathy towards , such aims are efforts to mitigate the the US hopes to prevent center- power of ultranationalist forces (parties right parties (namely the DSS) among them), bolster liberal democratic from establishing a coalition development, and finally, facilitate the government which would provide ultranationalist forces with executive control. 08&mm=02&dd=18&nav_category=640&nav_id =285339. 33 Woerhol (2006). 36 CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

• Limiting ultranationalist cordon sanitaire to serve a variety of parties’ influence on policymaking: purposes, each aimed at eliminating the In outlining its aversion to relevance and prevalence of ultranationalist parties, the US may ultranationalist forces. The goals also seek to lessen the extent to sketched above are therefore directed at which these parties’ programmatic cross-cutting levels: the Serb electorate, preferences impact upon Serbian the party system as such, the republican policy. The isolation of Serbia’s parliament, ultranationalist parties ultranationalists could potentially themselves, and the US public at large. serve to undermine their base of Given that the cordon sanitaire likely support, thereby challenging their serves an amalgamation of the grip on Serbia’s political aforementioned purposes, to what transformation. extent are its goals being met? The following pages examine each of these • Inciting change within goals in greater depth. ultranationalist parties: By isolating ultranationalist parties, the Decreasing support for US tacitly conditions its assistance ultranationalist parties on programmatic and ideological reform within these parties. Having Perhaps the chief aim of the cordon been refused US assistance and sanitaire is that of quelling further cooperation, it is clear to SRS and support for Serbia’s ultranationalist SPS representatives that unless parties. Were this goal being met, one they reject ultranationalism, they would expect support for will continue to be ostracized by ultranationalist parties to stagnate and, the international community. ideally, decrease, in the aftermath of the policy’s implementation. The evidence • Maintaining ideological indicates that the policy’s record is distance from ultranationalism: By mixed in this regard. denying US assistance and contacts to the SRS and SPS, the cordon If comparing the evolution of the sanitaire may likewise seek to parties’ cumulative popular support highlight US opposition to from the date of regime change ultranationalism. In refusing to (October 5, 2000) to today, we see that communicate with these parties, the policy has been largely ineffective: the US sends a clear message that it the parties’ cumulative share of votes in opposes a politics based on ethnic both parliamentary and presidential exclusion. elections, as well as these parties’ combined share of seats in parliament, In sum, it is conceivable that in its has increased since the policy was first desire to bring peace and stability to the implemented in 2000 (see figure 2). Western Balkans, the US employs the Although Serbia’s ultranationalist

37 CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

Figure 2: Combined SRS/SPS Party Strength 1990-2008341

50 45 Combined share of votes for SRS/SPS in parliamentary elections 40 35 30 25 Combined share of votes for 20 SRS/SPS candidates in 1st round of presidential elections 15 10 5 Combined share of SRS/SPS seats in 0 parliament 2000 2003/2004 2007 2008

34 The Presidential elections held in September 2000 were at a Federal level, as opposed to the Republican level. It should also be noted that in the parliamentary elections of May 2008 the SPS competed in coalition with two small parties. As such, the share of votes for the SRS and SPS in parliamentary elections is slightly lower than is reflected in this graph. All data concerning election results were drawn from Goati (2004), 250 and CESID, available at: www.cesid.org. 38 CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

Figure 3: Combined SRS/SPS Party Strength from 1990-2000 and 2000-2008352

80

70 Combined share of votes for SRS/SPS in parliamentary 60 elections 50 Combined share of votes for 40 SRS/SPS candidates in 1st 30 Round of presidential elections 20 Combined share of SRS/SPS 10 seats in parliament

0 1990‐2000 2000‐2008

35 All data concerning election results were drawn from Goati (2004), 250 and CESID, available at: www.cesid.org. 39 CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

parties fared minor cumulative losses considerably, since the 1990s. This from 2003/2004 to 2007/2008, the speaks to a mixed record of success in parties recently experienced a what is perhaps the policy’s chief goal. significant turn of fortunes in Serbia’s Presidential elections held in January Keeping ultranationalist parties out 2008, with their support increasing by of power more than ten percentage points. This suggests that the implementation of the At the time of writing, more than seven cordon sanitaire has failed not only to years have passed since Milosevic left diminish support for ultranationalist office and Serbia’s ultranationalist parties but also to stabilize that support parties have yet to regain control of the at more modest levels. republic’s executive branch. Despite strong public support for the SRS, the If, however, the post-communist period party has failed to reassume executive is viewed in its entirety (and the results powers. Likewise, the SPS has yet to of 2000 are taken to represent an partake in a coalition government. This anomaly), the outlook is less somber. indicates that at least one goal of the As figure 3 demonstrates, the combined cordon sanitaire; that of effectively share of votes for the SRS and SPS in sidelining Serbia’s ultranationalists, has parliamentary elections has decreased been met. considerably from 1990 to the present. From 1990-2000 the combined share of On the surface, this is irrefutable. As of votes for the SRS and SPS in May 2008, the SRS and the SPS have parliamentary elections averaged 52.6 failed either to form a coalition percent, while from 2000-2008 that government or to obtain the Serbian figure was just 40.6. Viewed in terms of presidency36. To date, the closest these seats in parliament, from 1990 – 2000 parties have come to executive control the SRS and SPS occupied a combined was the silent support the SPS provided average of 72.2 percent of seats in the government of the DSS, the G17 parliament, as compared to 2000-2008 Plus, the , when they held an average of just 34.8 and New Serbia. It is noteworthy, percent of seats in parliament. There however, that the election results of has also been a cumulative decrease in May 11, 2008 have provided Serbia’s support for SRS and SPS presidential ultranationalists with their first candidates. opportunity to form a post-Milosevic government. Although coalition Unfortunately, such divergent findings negotiations were still ongoing at the are ultimately inconclusive. While, on time of writing, the SRS and SPS the one hand, support for coalition had already achieved what had ultranationalist forces has risen since hitherto been beyond reach: a pledge of the policy was first implemented in support from Kostunica’s DSS. In fact, 2000, it has diminished, in some cases less than 24 hours after the election

40 CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1 results were announced, DSS and SRS Limiting ultranationalist parties’ spokesmen confirmed that the two influence on Serbian policy parties were engaged in coalition negotiations37.1 By May 13—just two Intimately connected with the days after parliamentary elections were aforementioned goals is that of limiting staged—the parties announced that they ultranationalist parties’ influence on had drafted an agreement laying out the Serbian policy. The cordon sanitaire character and goals of Serbia’s next has been less successful in this regards. “national” government38.2 Were the Perhaps the clearest indication hereof is SPS coalition to agree to these terms, offered by Freedom House’s Nations in Serbia’s ultranationalists would have Transit Index. As figure 4 illustrates, the number of mandates necessary to Serbia’s transition to liberal democracy form a governing majority. Such an stagnated in the midst of 2002. This alliance would place executive powers period corresponds to an upsurge in in ultranationalist hands. popular support for Serbia’s ultranationalist parties, which briefly By all accounts, the results of the May ebbed after Djindjic’s assassination in 11 elections have crowned the SPS as March 2003 but increased markedly in the next government’s ‘kingmaker’. It the months thereafter39.3 is uncertain whether they will chose to form a government with the SRS and As a consequence of ultranationalists’ DSS or opt instead to forge an alliance resurgence, the DSS-led government with the DS-lead coalition, “For a did not command the votes necessary to European Serbia”. Regardless of their pass legislation on its own. To get its options, two things are now clear: 1) the proposals accepted by parliament, it DSS no longer opposes a republican- depended on the support on the level alliance with Serbia’s opposition, including Serbia’s extremist ultranationalists, and 2) the next parties. According to the ICG, “The Serbian government will most likely Kostunica government has also had to include at least one ultranationalist rely covertly on that extremist party party: the SPS. Neither of these speaks [the SRS] to pass several key laws and to the cordon sanitaire’s success. has often acted as though it were a coalition partner.” 40 Serbia’s first post- Milosevic constitution adopted in 2006

37 “DSS, SRS discuss next cabinet”, b92 Radio and Television, May 12, 2008, available at: 39 http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics- For polling data pertaining to popular support article.php?mm=5&dd=12&yyyy=2008. for Serbian political parties during this period, 38 “Radicals, DSS come up with draft see: Strategic Marketing Research, available at: agreement”, b92 Radio and Television, May 13, http://www.smmri.co.yu/code/navigate.asp?Id=65 2008, available at: . 40 http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics- International Crisis Group, “Serbia Spinning its article.php?mm=5&dd=13&yyyy=2008. Wheels”, Europe Briefing, 39 (23 May 2005), 2. 41 CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1

Figure 4: Freedom House’s Nations in Transit Score for Serbia41

4,5 4 3,5 3 2,5 2 1,5 1 0,5 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

4 1 Nations in Transit examines the process of democratic reform in the post-communist states of Europe and Eurasia. Countries are given a score from 1 to 7, 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of progress (Freedom House 2007). 42 CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1 is exemplary of this phenomenon. Not awarded lucrative posts in state-owned only has autonomy to the Serbian firms as well as positions in public province of Vojvodina been limited, but service. There is thus little doubt the it has become considerably easier for third goal of the cordon sanitaire, that authorities to call a state of emergency, of limiting ultranationalists’ influence and the independence of the judiciary on Serbian policy, has not been has been compromised. There is in fact achieved. little doubt that the constitution was the product of a bargain between the DS, Inciting change within the DSS, the SRS, and the SPS.421 ultranationalist parties

Of perhaps even greater significance for The cordon sanitaire has had even less Serbia’s tardy trajectory was the silent success in facilitating transformation support the SPS provided to the within ultranationalist parties. Although Kostunica government. In 2004, the there is a marked decrease in DSS-lead coalition formed a minority inflammatory rhetoric, neither the SRS government. To achieve the majority nor SPS has abandoned its necessary for a working quorum, the ultranationalist sentiments. Both parties coalition depended on the silent support renounce cooperation with the ICTY, of the SPS. It goes without saying that refuse to admit to Serbia’s complicity in SPS support did not come without atrocities conducted during the concessions. It was thus reportedly Yugoslav wars, and have yet to under SPS pressure that the government renounce the use of violence in Kosovo. halted forcible (i.e. involuntary) Thus, the SRS adheres to the same extraditions to the ICTY43.2 Likewise, it party program that it did in 1996443 and was thanks to SPS demands that the its party magazine is tellingly entitled governing coalition supported the Velika Srbija (). In fact controversial Law on the Rights of the most radical version of SRS Indictees in the Custody of the nationalism was put forth by Vojislav International Criminal Tribunal and Seselj as late as 2006. In his political Members of their Families, entitling testament, Seselj instructed party Serbian indictees and their families to members never to abandon their pursuit free legal representation, of a Greater Serbia and to “persistently accommodation in The Hague, and fight to free Krajina travel to and from the Netherlands. and Republika Srpska and to unite all Additionally, SPS representatives were Serbian territories.”45 The SPS, for its part, has publicly stated that violence is 42 International Crisis Group. “Serbia’s New Constitution: Democracy Going Backwards”, 44 Europe Briefing, 44 (8 November 2006), 4. Jovan Komsic (2006): 15. 43 45 Despite this policy, the voluntary nature of Seselj’s testament available at: DSS-lead extraditions, including that of General http://www.srpskinacionalisti.com/sadrzaj.php?tip Sretan Lukic, was in question. =ves&is117328. 43 CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1 a legitimate means to maintain Serb preferences, the parties now emphasize sovereignty in Kosovo and most socioeconomic issues such as pension recently supported legislation which reform, privatization, and college would effectively deny domestic tuition fees, rather than high-profile organizations the freedom to recognize (and highly divisive) issues such as the Kosovo’s independence. A key Greater Serbia project or cooperation indicator of these parties’ with the ICTY. According to the SRS’s ultranationalist sentiments can be socioeconomic program, for example, witnessed in parliament, which both the fight “against corruption and parties regularly exploit as a platform criminals” ranks highest amongst its list from which to hurl rhetorical abuse at of concerns47.6 During his Presidential colleagues from opposing parties. One campaign, the SRS candidate, Tomislav widely reported example took place in Nikolic, even refrained from wearing late 2006, during the parliamentary the standard party badge depicting a proceedings for the nomination of portrait of Vojislav Seselj. According to Serbia’s Deputy Prime Minister. SRS Nikolic, doing so would have served to parliamentarian Zoran Krasic publically divide Serbs; as a presidential branded the ’ nominee, Ivana candidate, his intention was to represent Dulic-Markovic, as an Ustasha46.5 The Serbia in its entirety. As for the SPS, it SRS proceeded to launch a virulent eagerly portrays itself as a run-of-the- campaign against Dulic-Markovic, mill left-of-center European party. As repeatedly questioning her loyalty to the one member stated, “We are a left Serbian state, as well as that of her party. We want to be included in the left brother and father. Indeed, both SRS parties of Europe. Every country needs and SPS MPs regularly resort to a party to take care of the losers of slanderous rhetoric, profanity, and transition.” 48 7 The SPS has also gone similarly provocative behavior. to great lengths to stress its pro- European orientation. It thus To be sure, the parties are also emphasizes its support for EU entertaining modest, if cosmetic, membership and has been markedly less reforms. In recent years, each party has emphatic about its opposition to NATO sought to target its public relations membership. effort at the so-called ‘losers’ of Serbia’s transition. Without Unfortunately, such changes remain substantively altering their policy only skin-deep. Whatever its claim to European ideals, members of the Socialist International were 46 Ustasha refers to a nationalist organization aimed at securing independent statehood for 47 . They came to power briefly in World War Party program as listed on the website of the Two, having allied with the Nazis. They are Serbian Radical Party. 48 accused of large scale atrocities against Serbs and Dejan Backovic, Socialist Party of Serbia, other minorities, including the establishment of interview conducted on 10 February 2007 in numerous concentration camps. Belgrade, Serbia. 44 CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1 unconvinced by the SPS’s self- the Greater Serbia project50.9 While the professed transformation; its application US was one of the foremost advocates for membership was denied on the of an independent Kosovo, the SRS and grounds of the party’s unrepentant SPS continue to insist on Serbia’s ultranationalism and its leading role in territorial continuity. By refusing to the Yugoslav wars. Moreover, despite devote taxpayers’ money to the these parties’ alleged aversion to establishment of contacts with or the corruption and criminality, past provision of assistance to Serbia’s practices on the part of the SRS and ultranationalists, the US has sent a clear SPS call the veracity of such statements signal that such positions will not be into question49.8 And, as stated above, supported by the US administration. the parties’ positions on the so-called ‘national question’, including Conclusion cooperation with the ICTY, have gone unchanged. Clearly then, the fourth goal In light of the assessment laid out of the cordon sanitaire, that of inciting above, what course of action should US change within ultranationalist parties, democracy promoters take when it has gone unmet. comes to ultranationalist parties in Serbia and the Western Balkans at Maintaining ideological distance large? Should they maintain the status quo or has the time come to consider The final goal of the cordon sanitaire is possible alternatives to the cordon that of indicating US disapproval of sanitaire? ultranationalism. As regards this goal, there is little doubt that it has been As we have seen, in Serbia the policy achieved. Indeed, few have reason to can claim modest successes. Two goals doubt the sincerity of this conviction or of isolationism have thus far been met: the scope of the schism between US and at the time of writing, neither the SRS ultranationalist policies. On virtually all nor the SPS has gained hold of the fronts, US and SRS/SPS policies are executive branch and ideological irreconcilable: Where these parties’ distance from ultranationalism has been officials regularly invoke the attained. Both are reputable Virovitica-Karlovac-Karlobag line US achievements: executive powers would representatives consistently condemn enable ultranationalists to determine the course of Serbian politics, while its condemnation of ultranationalism 49 The links between both parties to Serbia’s provides the US with clear moral underworld has been well documented. See for authority. Unfortunately, the policy’s example, Maja Miljkvic and Marko Attila Hoare, “Crime and the Economy under Milosevic and his Successors”, in Sabrina Ramet, Serbia since 50 1989: Politics and Society under Milosevic and The line is a euphemism for the Greater Serbia After (London: University of Washington Press, project referring to the geographical borders of a 2007), 192-226. united Serbian nation. 45 CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1 successes end there. The goal of lessening support for ultranationalist After all, when in May 2007 Nikolic parties has been only vaguely realized. was appointed Speaker of Parliament, Compared to the support these parties’ the repercussions hereof were more boasted in the 1990s, their popularity than rhetorical: the Serbian Dinar fell to has waned considerably. Yet since the record lows against the Euro and the implementation of the policy in 2000, Belgrade Stock Exchange declined support for these parties has actually dramatically. Thus, if tallying the totals increased, so much so that few would of successes and failures, one is forced deny their corrosive impact on Serbia’s to conclude that there is ample room for liberal democratic trajectory. Notably, improvement (see table 3). two of the policy’s goals have not been As has been demonstrated, the policy’s realized: apart from cosmetic inability either to promote change alterations, both parties exhibit within ultranationalist parties or to remarkable continuity with the negate their impact on national policy is Milosevic era and, despite their lack of worrisome, not least because the access to the executive branch, both direction of Serbia’s transition remains parties continue to exert pressures on so precarious. It is telling that an national policymaking. Such failures increasingly vocal group of US are significant, not least because of the government officials and assistance growing likelihood of an SRS-DSS-SPS providers doubt the wisdom of alliance and the numerous maintaining this policy. One USAID consequences such a government would official based in Serbia remarked that, have on Serbia’s international standing. “Personally, I think that we should be

reviewing that policy.” 5312 Indeed, for Table 3: Goals Met and Unmet5110 many of those working in Serbia, the Goal Result policy seems untenable, with one Decreased party strength 2 USAID employee calling the policy 52 11 5413 54 14 Lack of power 3 “ridiculous” and another “silly” . Policy influence 1 Whatever the policy’s successes, its Change within party 1 failures call its relevance into question. Maintaining distance 3 The task now is to devise a policy that would exert a moderating influence on Total 10 Serbia’s ultranationalist parties, without

51 3 = goal achieved, 2 = state of ambiguity, 1 = goal unachieved. A score of 15 would represent 53 total success and a score of 5 total failure. The Anonymous, USAID Belgrade, interview score of 10 places the policy precisely in the conducted in Belgrade, Serbia on March 2, 2007. 54 middle, reflecting a state of overall ambiguity. Anonymous, USAID Belgrade, interview 52 At the time of writing, the SPS was on the conducted in Belgrade, Serbia on June 21, 2007. 55 verge of forming a coalition with either the SRS Anonymous, USAID Economics and or the DS. Should they form either such coalition, Governance Office, interview conducted in this score would decrease. Belgrade, Serbia on March 15, 2007. 46 CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1 compromising the achievements that Democratization, 12 (August have thus far been made. 2005) 4, 505-527. Miljkvic, Maja and Marko Attila Hoare, “Crime and the Economy under Milosevic and his Successors”, in Sabrina Ramet, Serbia since 1989: Politics and Society under Milosevic and After. London: Bibliography University of Washington Press, 2007. Batt, Judy. “The Question of Serbia”, “Law on Financing of Political Parties”, Institute for Security Studies 81 Official Gazette of the Republic of (August 2005). Serbia”, No. 72/2003, 18 July and Carothers, Thomas. Confronting the No. 75/2003, 25 July 2003. Weakest Link: Aiding Political Pribicevic, Ognjen. “Changing Fortunes Parties in New Democracies. of the Serbian Radical Right” in Washington, DC: Carnegie The Radical Right in Central and Endowment International Peace, Eastern Europe since 1989, ed. 2006. Sabrina Ramet. Pennsylvania: Doherty, Ivan. “Democracy Out of Pennsylvania State University Balance: Civil Society Can’t Press, 1999 Replace Political Parties”, Policy “Programska Deklaracija Srpske Review (April/May 2001), 25-35. Radikalne Stranke”, Serbian Goati, Vladimir. Partije i Partijksi Radical Party, March 1991. Sistem u Srbji. Belgrade: OGI “Programska Deklaracija Sedmog Centar, 2004. Kongresa SPS”, Socialist Party of International Crisis Group, “Serbia Serbia, 2006. Spinning its Wheels”, Europe Ramet, Sabrina. “The Denial Syndrome Briefing, 39 (23 May 2005). and its Consequences: Serbian International Crisis Group. “Serbia’s Political Culture Since 2000”, New Constitution: Democracy Communist and Postcommunist Going Backwards”, Europe Studies 40 (2007), 41-58. Briefing, 44 (8 November 2006). “Statut i Program Srpske Radikalne Komsic, Jovan. “Politicke stranke u Stranke” Serbian Radical Party, Srbiji i evropske vrednosti – April 1996. programi i praksa,” in:, Politicke USAID Political Party Development Stranke u Srbiji I Evropska Unija, Assistance”, United States Agency ed. Zoran Lutovac. for International Development Belgrade/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, (Washington DC, 1999). 2007. “USAID Serbia Budget 2006”, United Kumar, Krishna. “Reflections on State Agency for International International Party Assistance”, Development.

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