We Know Who We Are, but … Where Will We fight? by Col J.J
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IDEAS & ISSUES (FUTURE OPERATIONS) We Know Who We Are, But … Where will we fight? by Col J.J. Carroll, Jr., LtCol Michael Zimmerman & Maj Brett Swaim n an open letter to the former Commandant, published in March >Col Carroll is the Deputy Commander of U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Europe and 2019 by War on the Rocks, Maj Leo Africa. He is an Infantry Officer, Marine Corps Mountain Leader, and was previ- Spaeder asks the question, “Sir, ously the Commanding Officer of Mountain Warfare Training Center, Bridgeport. Iwho am I?”1 This article has fostered significant discussion around the central >>LtCol Zimmerman is the Staff Judge Advocate for U.S. Marine Corps Forces, point of whether the Marine Corps has Europe and Africa, and has written on Arctic matters as part of the U.S. Naval lost its way in the wake of nearly two de- War College’s Arctic Scholars Initiative. cades of landlocked counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. >>>Maj Swaim is the Deputy Staff Judge Advocate for U.S. Marine Corps Forces, That question—or more aptly that Europe and Africa and heads the European Arctic portion of the Command’s crossroads—is not new territory for International Law portfolio. the Corps. As Maj Brian Kerg high- lights in his response, the Marine Corps tions about where those capabilities are the challenges on the horizon. When faced similar questions in the interwar likely to be most relevant. After all, asked where the next conflict is likely periods between the First and Second history is a useful guide for charting to be, many Marines will reflexively World Wars.2 During that time, semi- a course for the future, but it is only respond “the Pacific,” making history nal figures in modern Marine Corps a guide and not a mandate for repeti- a complete circle. However, a criti- doctrine, such as Maj John Russell and tion. We should use this opportunity cal review of conflict drivers suggests LtCol “Pete” Ellis, came forward to ad- to think critically about the next fight. that the next battlefield will likely be vocate for the Marine Corps’ role as an In the end, what made Pete Ellis such a a place with vast resources but unsettled amphibious and light naval-infantry, revered figure in Marine Corps history claims of ownership, a place where im- influencing the trajectory of the Corps was not simply his correct prediction mense fortunes are at stake but with for decades. that amphibious operations were the few clear lines granting authority over Fortunately, the recently released key to defining the future role for the those resources. The area above the Commandant’s Planning Guidance Marine Corps, but an articulated vision Arctic Circle contains an abundance conclusively answered the question of that those operations were going to be of untapped resources, but control who we are.3 In that directive, Gen- an integral part of a conflict he fore- and ownership of those resources is in eral Berger removed all doubt as to the saw in the Pacific. Thus, as the Marine question, gaining the attention of our Marine Corps’ identity, highlighting in Corps focused on its preparations for biggest competitors: Russia and China. bold on page one, the next battlefield in the years between Countering their influence in this vastly World War I and World War II, the littoral region will make control of the [T]he Marine Corps will be trained and equipped as a naval expeditionary doctrine, equipment, and training were sea and the adjacent land of paramount force-in-readiness and prepare to oper- all driving toward fighting and winning importance. ate inside actively contested maritime in a specific theater and with a specific As the Marine Corps shifts to re- spaces in support of fleet operations.4 future goal. turn to our amphibious purpose, and we As we execute the Commandant’s come to the realization that our theater However, as history has taught us, Planning Guidance and pivot back to is likely to be the austerity of the thaw- simply identifying who we are as the our amphibious skillset as the Fleet ing Arctic, we must then complete the Fleet Marine Force is an incomplete Marine Force, the most pressing ques- lessons of history and lean forward to answer. In concert with our reorienta- tion should be “where do we think we prepare the Corps to fight and win in tion on amphibious operations, we will will fight?” Answering that question that environment. Doing so will require do well to learn the lessons of Marines will drive our investment in equip- wise investment in capabilities, training, like Pete Ellis and ask the difficult ques- ment, training, and tactics to meet and doctrine. 70 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • October 2019 eyes fixed on application in the Pacific. As we find ourselves once more at that junction, coming out of a landlocked war and needing to return to our role in helping the Navy win, we must re-center on our naval purpose as the Comman- dant’s Planning Guidance directs but also look critically at the map and study our competitors to determine where our doctrine will have the most relevance. The Arctic: Scene of the Next Con- flict Though the Arctic is historically a place where cooperation has far out- paced conflict, it is not immune from the negative effects of competition over natural resources. (See Map 1.) From conflicts involving whaling in the 17th century to disagreements involving fish- ing in the present day, economic forces spawn friction in the region.12 As the Map 1. The Arctic region. (Map by the Arctic Portal.) Arctic sea ice recedes and more resources become recoverable, particularly oil and A Lesson from History In other words, he viewed the Marine natural gas, the potential for tensions On 25 April 1913, in Guantanamo Corps role as being tied to the Navy in to rise only grows.The Arctic has long Bay, Cuba, then-LtCol John A. Lejeune, a very practical way. been known to hold immense poten- Capt H.C. Snyder, and Capt D.B. Wills Many Marines know Pete Ellis as a tial for oil and natural gas production. created the Marine Corps Association pioneer in the field of amphibious war- In 2008, the United States geological to bring officers closer together and fare, but that accolade does not fully survey estimated that the area above foster an organized system of educa- account for Ellis’ passion and vision.8 the Arctic Circle contained at least 13 tion through shared experiences. The Yes, he developed doctrine for amphibi- percent of the planet’s easily recoverable Association believed, ous operations, but what cemented his oil reserves and 30 percent of its natural 13 The publication of articles prepared by legacy was the vision he cast for employ- gas. Map 1 highlights the location officers, together with the criticisms ing amphibious forces in the Pacific in and probability of recovery of those of such articles by other officers, will order to defeat an emerging adversary in reserves.14 offer an incentive to officers to study the Japanese during a future war.9 Based As the Arctic ice recedes, the region is professional subjects with a view to on his study of emerging great power likely to become one of substantial com- preparing other articles themselves competition, he predicted the war with petition over subsurface mineral rights, for publication and distribution to Japan nearly twenty years prior to the at- but the economic competition does not the service.5 tack on Pearl Harbor.10 Thus, when that end there. The Arctic is home to sev- It was Maj John Russell’s “A Plea for a war finally came, the Marine Corps was eral prime shipping routes including Mission and Doctrine,” in the second prepared with the doctrine, training, the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s published Gazette, which created the and equipment needed to fight because Arctic coastline, the Northwest Passage chain reaction resulting in LtCol El- LtCol Ellis studied Japan’s military ca- near Canada’s northern coast, and the lis’ prophetic and detailed plea for the pabilities and correctly determined their Transpolar Sea Route.15 (See Map 2.) Marine Corps to focus on amphibious most likely course of action.11 His status These routes provide a shorter transit operations.6 Ellis was confident in the as a prophet of Marines resides in a dual time between the world’s largest ports Marine Corps mission of supporting reading of his two most well-known which are predominately in Asia and the Navy publications: “Naval Bases; Location, Europe. For example, to move goods by performing the land operations nec- Resources, Denial of Bases, Security of between the port of Hamburg (Ger- essary for the successful prosecution Advanced Bases” and “Advanced Base many) and Shanghai (China) currently of war by the fleet … the purpose of Operations in Micronesia.” Published covers about 20,000 kilometers if tran- the naval service is to fight, and the in 1921, these documents comprised siting the Suez Canal and takes about purpose of the Marine Corps is to help the core of Ellis’ body of work up to 48 days.16 Utilizing the Northern Sea the Navy win.7 that time and pushed the Marine Corps Route, that same voyage is approxi- to develop amphibious doctrine with mately 14,000 kilometers, reducing Marine Corps Gazette • October 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 71 IDEAS & ISSUES (FUTURE OPERATIONS) the duration by about 14 days.17 The result is a significant savings in reduced fuel and operations time of the ship.