IDEAS & ISSUES (FUTURE OPERATIONS) We Know Who We Are, But … Where will we fight? by Col J.J. Carroll, Jr., LtCol Michael Zimmerman & Maj Brett Swaim

n an open letter to the former Commandant, published in March >Col Carroll is the Deputy Commander of U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Europe and 2019 by War on the Rocks, Maj Leo Africa. He is an Infantry Officer, Marine Corps Mountain Leader, and was previ- Spaeder asks the question, “Sir, ously the Commanding Officer of Mountain Warfare Training Center, Bridgeport. Iwho am I?”1 This article has fostered significant discussion around the central >>LtCol Zimmerman is the Staff Judge Advocate for U.S. Marine Corps Forces, point of whether the Marine Corps has Europe and Africa, and has written on Arctic matters as part of the U.S. Naval lost its way in the wake of nearly two de- War College’s Arctic Scholars Initiative. cades of landlocked counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. >>>Maj Swaim is the Deputy Staff Judge Advocate for U.S. Marine Corps Forces, That question—or more aptly that Europe and Africa and heads the European Arctic portion of the Command’s crossroads—is not new territory for International Law portfolio. the Corps. As Maj Brian Kerg high- lights in his response, the Marine Corps tions about where those capabilities are the challenges on the horizon. When faced similar questions in the interwar likely to be most relevant. After all, asked where the next conflict is likely periods between the First and Second history is a useful guide for charting to be, many Marines will reflexively World Wars.2 During that time, semi- a course for the future, but it is only respond “the Pacific,” making history nal figures in modern Marine Corps a guide and not a mandate for repeti- a complete circle. However, a criti- doctrine, such as Maj John Russell and tion. We should use this opportunity cal review of conflict drivers suggests LtCol “Pete” Ellis, came forward to ad- to think critically about the next fight. that the next battlefield will likely be vocate for the Marine Corps’ role as an In the end, what made Pete Ellis such a a place with vast resources but unsettled amphibious and light naval-infantry, revered figure in Marine Corps history claims of ownership, a place where im- influencing the trajectory of the Corps was not simply his correct prediction mense fortunes are at stake but with for decades. that amphibious operations were the few clear lines granting authority over Fortunately, the recently released key to defining the future role for the those resources. The area above the Commandant’s Planning Guidance Marine Corps, but an articulated vision Arctic Circle contains an abundance conclusively answered the question of that those operations were going to be of untapped resources, but control who we are.3 In that directive, Gen- an integral part of a conflict he fore- and ownership of those resources is in eral Berger removed all doubt as to the saw in the Pacific. Thus, as the Marine question, gaining the attention of our Marine Corps’ identity, highlighting in Corps focused on its preparations for biggest competitors: Russia and China. bold on page one, the next battlefield in the years between Countering their influence in this vastly World War I and World War II, the littoral region will make control of the [T]he Marine Corps will be trained and equipped as a naval expeditionary doctrine, equipment, and training were sea and the adjacent land of paramount force-in-readiness and prepare to oper- all driving toward fighting and winning importance. ate inside actively contested maritime in a specific theater and with a specific As the Marine Corps shifts to re- spaces in support of fleet operations.4 future goal. turn to our amphibious purpose, and we As we execute the Commandant’s come to the realization that our theater However, as history has taught us, Planning Guidance and pivot back to is likely to be the austerity of the thaw- simply identifying who we are as the our amphibious skillset as the Fleet ing Arctic, we must then complete the Fleet Marine Force is an incomplete Marine Force, the most pressing ques- lessons of history and lean forward to answer. In concert with our reorienta- tion should be “where do we think we prepare the Corps to fight and win in tion on amphibious operations, we will will fight?” Answering that question that environment. Doing so will require do well to learn the lessons of Marines will drive our investment in equip- wise investment in capabilities, training, like Pete Ellis and ask the difficult ques- ment, training, and tactics to meet and doctrine.

70 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • October 2019 eyes fixed on application in the Pacific. As we find ourselves once more at that junction, coming out of a landlocked war and needing to return to our role in helping the Navy win, we must re-center on our naval purpose as the Comman- dant’s Planning Guidance directs but also look critically at the map and study our competitors to determine where our doctrine will have the most relevance.

The Arctic: Scene of the Next Con- flict Though the Arctic is historically a place where cooperation has far out- paced conflict, it is not immune from the negative effects of competition over natural resources. (See Map 1.) From conflicts involving whaling in the 17th century to disagreements involving fish- ing in the present day, economic forces spawn friction in the region.12 As the Map 1. The Arctic region. (Map by the Arctic Portal.) Arctic sea ice recedes and more resources become recoverable, particularly oil and A Lesson from History In other words, he viewed the Marine natural gas, the potential for tensions On 25 April 1913, in Guantanamo Corps role as being tied to the Navy in to rise only grows.The Arctic has long Bay, Cuba, then-LtCol John A. Lejeune, a very practical way. been known to hold immense poten- Capt H.C. Snyder, and Capt D.B. Wills Many Marines know Pete Ellis as a tial for oil and natural gas production. created the Marine Corps Association pioneer in the field of amphibious war- In 2008, the United States geological to bring officers closer together and fare, but that accolade does not fully survey estimated that the area above foster an organized system of educa- account for Ellis’ passion and vision.8 the Arctic Circle contained at least 13 tion through shared experiences. The Yes, he developed doctrine for amphibi- percent of the planet’s easily recoverable Association believed, ous operations, but what cemented his oil reserves and 30 percent of its natural 13 The publication of articles prepared by legacy was the vision he cast for employ- gas. Map 1 highlights the location officers, together with the criticisms ing amphibious forces in the Pacific in and probability of recovery of those of such articles by other officers, will order to defeat an emerging adversary in reserves.14 offer an incentive to officers to study the Japanese during a future war.9 Based As the Arctic ice recedes, the region is professional subjects with a view to on his study of emerging great power likely to become one of substantial com- preparing other articles themselves competition, he predicted the war with petition over subsurface mineral rights, for publication and distribution to Japan nearly twenty years prior to the at- but the economic competition does not the service.5 tack on Pearl Harbor.10 Thus, when that end there. The Arctic is home to sev- It was Maj John Russell’s “A Plea for a war finally came, the Marine Corps was eral prime shipping routes including Mission and Doctrine,” in the second prepared with the doctrine, training, the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s published Gazette, which created the and equipment needed to fight because Arctic coastline, the Northwest Passage chain reaction resulting in LtCol El- LtCol Ellis studied Japan’s military ca- near Canada’s northern coast, and the lis’ prophetic and detailed plea for the pabilities and correctly determined their Transpolar Sea Route.15 (See Map 2.) Marine Corps to focus on amphibious most likely course of action.11 His status These routes provide a shorter transit operations.6 Ellis was confident in the as a prophet of Marines resides in a dual time between the world’s largest ports Marine Corps mission of supporting reading of his two most well-known which are predominately in Asia and the Navy publications: “Naval Bases; Location, Europe. For example, to move goods by performing the land operations nec- Resources, Denial of Bases, Security of between the port of Hamburg (Ger- essary for the successful prosecution Advanced Bases” and “Advanced Base many) and Shanghai (China) currently of war by the fleet … the purpose of Operations in Micronesia.” Published covers about 20,000 kilometers if tran- the naval service is to fight, and the in 1921, these documents comprised siting the Suez Canal and takes about purpose of the Marine Corps is to help the core of Ellis’ body of work up to 48 days.16 Utilizing the Northern Sea the Navy win.7 that time and pushed the Marine Corps Route, that same voyage is approxi- to develop amphibious doctrine with mately 14,000 kilometers, reducing

Marine Corps Gazette • October 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 71 IDEAS & ISSUES (FUTURE OPERATIONS) the duration by about 14 days.17 The result is a significant savings in reduced fuel and operations time of the ship. In addition, the Northern Sea Route does not require transit through areas of instability along the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. Controlling these emerging sea routes and ensuring freedom of navigation in international waters will become in- creasingly important as climate change makes these passages more routinely trafficable. Ensuring the free and open use of sea lanes is a principle of United States national security concern—as evidenced by the routine freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea—and is expressly one of the main pillars of the United States Na- tional Security Strategy for the Arctic. Released in 2013, the strategy states that one of the guiding principles is to safe- guard peace and stability in the region.18 Underneath that principle it states: This principle will include United Malte Humpert, The Arctic Institute States action, and the actions of other Map 2. Passages through the Arctic. (Map by .) interested countries, in supporting and preserving international legal princi- navigation operations and ensure inter- and governing structures to prevent ples of freedom of navigation and over- national norms remain intact, consistent malign actions. As indicated above, flight and other uses of the sea related with the United States’ National Secu- Russia has already shown a willingness to these freedoms, unimpeded lawful rity Strategy. Just as that same principle to bend or even violate international commerce, and the peaceful resolution has required a strong Navy and Marine norms to set whatever rules it deems of disputes. The United States will rely Corps Team in the Pacific, the remote appropriate in the Northern Sea Route. on existing international law, which and harsh environs of the Arctic require To further its reach, Russia has pursued provides a comprehensive set of rules the full spectrum of sea power, includ- a claim through the United Nations governing the rights, freedoms, and ing amphibious capabilities, to respond for an Arctic underwater feature called uses of the world’s oceans and airspace, to contested areas. the Lomonosov Ridge. In 2007, Russia 19 including the Arctic. The economic import of the Arctic planted a titanium Russian flag on that This puts the interests of the United assures it will be the next frontier in ridge—at the bottom of the ocean— States at odds with recent actions by the the great power competition between and has submitted a claim to have the Russian Federation. In a far-reaching the West, Russia, and China. Taking entire area, which extends up and over set of regulations, the Russian govern- into account the mineral resources and the North Pole and into the Western ment established rules for transiting the shipping routes, there is a signifi- Hemisphere, declared part of Russia’s the Northern Sea Route by requiring cant amount of profit at stake. How- extended continental shelf. If the United foreign warships to provide advanced ever, beyond the law of the sea, there Nations approves the claim, then the notice for permission to use the route are very few established rules for “who area will be treated like Russia’s exclu- and requiring those ships to take on owns what” in the region. The Arctic sive economic zone, granting Moscow Russian pilots during the transit; these has long been thought of as a “global the rights to things like the oil and gas requirements violate international law commons,” belonging to no one be- for a several thousand square kilometer principles of sovereign immunity and cause of its harshness, remoteness, and swath of the Arctic.21 Events like this freedom of navigation.20 As the ice almost complete inaccessibility. As the are evidence of Russia’s incremental ef- recedes and traffic increases along the climate changes and a greater quantity fort to dominate the Arctic and expand Northern Sea Route, Russian regula- of resources become available, those at- its ability to dictate terms for the region. tions will need to be contested so they titudes of global cooperation are likely To ensure its influence over the area, do not become customary international to change as well. Competition for the the Russian Federation has undertaken law. That means sea power will be need- resources and sea lines of communica- a large Arctic defense investment and ed in the region to conduct freedom of tion will have few international rules revitalization project. In fact, Russia’s

72 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • October 2019 military expansion in the Arctic is the largest since the Soviet era.22 Russia has also built or refurbished over twenty installations above the Arctic Circle to go along with its significant investment in capabilities and training. As Map 3 shows, that number dwarfs the total number of installations possessed by the rest of the world.

Arctic Military Facilities23 Thus, Russia is postured to have forces and facilities in the area to exert influence and shape the region to its benefit. Given Russia’s behavior in other portions of the globe, there is no reason to believe the ultimate aim will be any different than what has already been demonstrated in places like the Black Sea. Russia seeks to dominate and will use every tool at its disposal, across the spectrum of national power, to tilt the region to its benefit. This is especially true given how much of Russia’s identity is tied to the Arctic and how important the region is, not only economically but Map 3. Arctic military facilities. (Map from The Barents Observer.) psychologically, to Moscow.24 China has also taken notice of the only extends through Russia’s North- fact, the Russia-China Arctic partner- warming Arctic and the economic po- ern Sea Route currently, it could cer- ship has already begun. Recently, a joint tential. In 2018, China released its first tainly expand to other avenues—like Russian-Chinese drilling platform in ever policy document on the Arctic and the Transpolar Sea Route—as the ice the Kara Sea (adjacent to the Barents outlined its goals for the region which recedes. Beyond the ice breaking im- Sea) discovered one trillion cubic meters are to “understand, protect, develop provements, China has also sought to of natural gas deposits, representing a and participate in the governance of expand its influence in the region by significant economic axis for the United the Arctic.”25 China’s Arctic Policy at- attempting to acquire port facilities and States’ two main competitors.30 tempts to justify its envisioned role by offering to build airports in Greenland: The key that will unlock the age of stating, an effort to solidify China’s status as a Arctic competition will be accessibility. 27 The utilization of sea routes and ex- self-described “near Arctic” country. Though significant portions of the Arc- ploration and development of the re- While those efforts have failed thus far, tic are currently not trafficable because sources in the Arctic may have a huge they demonstrate a resolve for Arctic of the polar ice cap, climate change is impact on the energy strategy and eco- legitimacy that is unlikely to subside as steadily reducing the extent and thick- nomic development of China, which the economic advantage of the region ness of that ice.31 Current projections is a major trading nation and energy increases. This assessment was recently show that within this century the Arctic consumer in the world. echoed in the DOD’s Annual Report will be ice free in the summer.32 Thus, This highlights China’s economic in- on Chinese military power.28 That as the Arctic Ocean turns from white terests as the major reason for wanting report contains two “special topics” (ice covered) to blue (ice free), the region to expand its role in the governance of culled out for emphasis to Congress, takes on a different feel, and access to the Arctic. and one of those topics is “China in the natural resources changes in scale of To exert its desired influence in the Arctic.” There, the DOD highlighted potential availability. This difference region, China recently launched its first China’s Arctic ambitions and the steps becomes especially apparent when the ice breaker, the Snow Dragon, and has China has taken to gain legitimacy in region is viewed without its traditional continued to invest in a number of heavy the region through investment in infra- white—ice extensive—covering. Below ice breakers to build a more robust capa- structure, scientific research facilities, is a depiction of the how the United bility.26 This investment in equipment and economic development. Thus, the States defines the Arctic which was for the region underscores China’s Arc- future Arctic environment is certain to recently included in a Congressional tic ambitions along with what it consid- contain the political and military influ- Research Services report to Congress ers the “Polar Silk Road.” Although it ences of both Russia and China.29 In on the region. (See Map 4.)

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From the highlighted area it is readily apparent that, while the region contains a large amount of sea space, there are also hundreds of islands and thousands of miles of coastline, making the litto- ral zone a dominant feature. To project power in the region and control the sea, it will be necessary to have a significant amphibious capability in order to re- spond to crises and contingencies. Thus, much like the Pacific in the years be- tween World War I and World War II, the Arctic appears to be a theater where the ability to project power from ship- to-shore will be highly relevant. Finally, the Arctic has the distinc- tion of being extremely remote. By most estimates, little more than four million people live above the Arctic Circle with an overall population density similar Map 4. Arctic boundary as defined by the Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA). All United to the Sahara Desert or the Australian States and foreign territory north of the Arctic Circle and all United States territory north and Outback.33 This makes the Arctic far west of the boundary formed by the Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers; all contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian less inhabited than most areas within chain. (Map Allison Gaylord, Nuna Technologies, May 27, 2009.) the Pacific theater, with much less infrastructure, and consequently far with a unique operating environment. a stark warning for how different and fewer anti-ship capabilities to threaten Though the Arctic is warming, it is far dangerous extreme cold can be.37 amphibious assets. This austerity also from warm; doctrine will need to be Apart from just the temperature, the means far less life support is available developed for cold weather and over- lack of infrastructure in the Arctic and from the local area, and because of the-snow operations. the harsh terrain must also be planned minimal investment and geography, The Arctic is a treacherous place be- for. Lessons from history abound that the communications infrastructure is cause the climate is exceedingly dan- being tied to the very limited number lacking. Thus, the Arctic region puts gerous; the cold will kill you without of roads in the high north is a plan a premium on forces that can operate any help from the enemy. According destined to fail. During the Winter War self-sustained for long periods of time. to a British study covering multiple between Finland and the USSR, the Without significant infrastructure and countries across the globe, cold weath- battle of Suomussalmi saw 11,000 Finn- with huge swaths of uninhabited or er is twenty times deadlier than hot ish soldiers defeat the Soviet 9th Army sparsely inhabited coastline, the Arc- weather.34 Given this finding, it is not with a strength of about 50,000.38 This tic presents a prime environment for surprising that the history of warfare was achieved because, unlike the Soviet amphibious operations to help support is littered with examples of the dangers Army, the Finnish forces were not de- maritime operations and national inter- associated with fighting in extreme cold pendent on paved roads but operated ests in an emerging frontier. weather when not properly trained or cross-country. As the Marine Corps prepared. The Marine Corps learned examines the likely terrain we will We Must Prepare this lesson during the Korean War. Col fight in, doctrine will need to be de- Returning to our amphibious core Homer Litzenberg, the Commander, veloped to ensure that the core tenants competency and identifying where the Regimental Combat Team 7 during the of maneuver warfare, fire and maneu- next challenges are likely to occur is still Chosin Reservoir Campaign, specifi- ver, can be executed in an area where an incomplete equation. The product of cally noted in his after-action report, cross-country movement over rugged the answers to “who are we” and “where “Hot weather, however uncomfortable it terrain will be critical.39 Determina- will we operate” must be the develop- may be, is fighting weather as compared tions will need to be made for whether ment of doctrine, equipment, and train- to sub-zero cold which seems to numb Marines will primarily maneuver via ing to allow the Marine Corps to meet the spirit as well as flesh.”35 The cold of vehicles, skis, or snow shoes, and the those future challenges. When it comes the northern Korean Peninsula inflicted expected range and rate of advance in to doctrine, while the central concepts more casualties on Marines than enemy the different geographic zones (plateaus, of amphibious operations are universal, action during the Campaign, making plains, mountain ranges, and forests) the harsh and remote Arctic will require the extreme cold weather an adversary with these differing equipment sets. the development and refinement of tac- in its own right.36 This lesson is but Once the doctrine is developed, criti- tics, techniques, and procedures to deal one of many from history that serves as cal follow-on decisions can be made to

74 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • October 2019 program procurement actions to obtain in Europe and the Korean peninsula. rine Corps’ Arctic mission and what the necessary gear and equipment to ex- Those regiments would receive prior- will be needed to ensure victory in the ecute that doctrine. For example, before ity for summer and winter exercises at next fight. Once the next theater is procuring a new ski system, the Marine MWTC and be the primary audience identified, the Corps can proceed on Corps needs to identify how far and for the MWTC formal schools as well its mission to man, train, and equip how fast they would wish their Marines as cross-training and interoperability toward that concept. It must also be to travel, over what terrain, and with training with partners and allies. recognized that the Navy will need what gear. A reconnaissance platoon However, simply training the infan- to be a close partner in this endeavor. traversing an Arctic plain might need a try in Arctic survival and operations The Marine Corps shift in focus north very different platform than scout/snip- is an incomplete result. The entire will require amphibious shipping and ers in an Arctic mountain environment. MAGTF needs to be trained and ca- potentially ice-capable amphibious The Marines of an artillery battery will pable of operating in the extreme cold shipping with reinforced hulls. The require a very different method of ma- and required to participate in tailored planning for this next battlespace can- neuvering over the snow compared to an cold weather and mountainous exer- not be done in a vacuum; the Navy infantry platoon. But the predominant cises at MWTC or abroad with allies must be a partner in the development factor in all of these is there will be few and partners. Light armored reconnais- of the Arctic concept. roads, and the existing roads will be heavily protected or denied. Once the doctrine and equipment decisions are made, then the Marine In addition, regular exercises to ensure Arctic capa- Corps can establish training programs bility need to be placed on the training exercise and to ensure standards can be met. The harsh climate and rugged environment employment plan. of the Arctic can be replicated in places like Mountain Warfare Training Center in Bridgeport (MWTC), but units can sance needs to understand the effects As the year 2020 approaches, the also be trained by experts in Arctic war- of snow and heat signatures; artillery Marine Corps finds itself at a familiar fare in Europe. Currently, the Marine needs to understand the effects of cold transition with some familiar choices to Rotational Force-Europe is postured and latitude; rotary-wing aviation needs make. Just like the generation of officers in Norway, but it exercises in Sweden to understand the unique qualities of who approached the interwar years in and Finland while also training with take-off, flying, and landing in white- the 1920s and 1930s, this generation NATO allies that have significant Arc- out conditions; and logistics needs to must carefully consider the answers to tic expertise like the United Kingdom understand how to supply, sustain, and these questions. While history is a great and the Netherlands. Their persistent maintain the force in this incredibly guide, it is by no means a rote template presence in the Arctic not only provides challenging environment. that merely requires applying the same the Marine Corps with invaluable cold In addition, regular exercises to en- answers. The Commandant has made weather operations experience but also sure Arctic capability need to be placed it overwhelmingly clear that there is no ensures the availability of a large cadre on the training exercise and employ- identity crisis; we know we are not a of allies and partners that are winter ment plan. A MEB-level exercise should second land army. The Marine Corps warfare specialists to validate doctrine be set every odd year and a MEU-level is the world’s premier naval expedition- and equipment decisions. More im- exercise should be established in every ary force, but that requires returning portantly, these nations can also plan, even year to ensure that different levels to our amphibious roots. In doing so, deliver, and evaluate training in order of MAGTF power are ready to survive we must study the ever changing globe to make sure that the Marines receive and operate in the Arctic environment. and think critically about where am- the best possible preparation for fighting The ultimate goal is an eventual MEU phibious doctrine will be most relevant in the unforgiving cold. deployment to the Arctic either once for the Navy in the next conflict, just To align the Marine Corps properly ice conditions subside or as part of a as Pete Ellis did. Given the abundant for cold weather competency, one infan- multinational task force with allied or resources, lucrative shipping routes, and try regiment on the East Coast and one partner icebreaking capability. lack of clear ownership, the next zone infantry regiment on the West Coast To achieve all of this development of Great Power competition is likely should be given the responsibility of in doctrine, equipment, and training, to be in the Arctic. The vastly littoral, gaining and maintaining cold weather the Marine Corps should look back harsh, and remote environment above expertise. That will provide six infantry at the interwar years and establish a the Arctic Circle makes amphibious battalions with the necessary training new “Ellis Group”: a team of Marines operations highly relevant. To prepare and equipment to operate in the Arctic. experienced in cold weather operations, for that environment, the Marine Corps These forces can also be assigned to with a demonstrated creative and inge- must make wise decisions to develop operational plans in cold environments nious nature, to think about the Ma- doctrine, capabilities and training to

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allow the Fleet Marine Force to survive 10. LtCol E.H. Ellis, “Naval Bases; Location, 22. Andre Osborn, “Putin’s Russia In Biggest and respond to a crisis or contingency Resources, Denial of Bases, Security of Ad- Arctic Military Push Since Soviet Fall,” Reuters, in the unforgiving High North. vanced Bases,” (Washington, DC: 1921). (Online: January 2017), available at https:// www.reuters.com. 11. LtCol E.H. Ellis, “Advanced Base Opera- Notes tions in Micronesia,” Fleet Marine Force Ref- 23. Eric Roston and Blacki Migliozzi, “How erence Publication 12-46, (Washington, DC: a Melting Arctic Changes Everything Part II: 1. Leo Spaeder, “Sir, Who Am I? An Open Headquarters Marine Corps, 1992). The Political Arctic,” Bloomberg, (Online: May Letter to the Incoming Commandant of the Ma- 2017), available at https://www.bloomberg.com. rine Corps,” War on the Rocks, (Online: March 12. Christopher R. Rossi, “A Unique Interna- 2019), available at https://warontherocks.com. tional Problem: The Svalbard Treaty, Equal 24. Jeremy Bender, “The Arctic is Russian Enjoyment, and Terra Nullius; Lessons of Ter- Mecca,” Business Insider, (Online: April 2015), 2. Brian Kerg, “Russell’s Century-Old Plea for ritorial Temptation from History,” (St. Louis, available at https://www.businessinsider.com. the Marine Corps,” War on the Rocks, (Online: MO: Washington University Global Studies April 2019), available at https://warontherocks. Law Review, 2015); Torbjørn Pedersen, “The 25. The State Council Information Offi ce of com. Svalbard Continental Shelf Controversy: Legal the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Arctic Disputes and Political Rivalries,” Ocean Develop- Policy,” (Beijing, ROC: January 2018). 3. 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps, ment and International Law, (Online: 2006), Commandant’s Planning Guidance, (Washing- available at https://www.tandfonline.com; and 26. Lyle J. Goldstein, “Why Does China Sud- ton, DC: July 2019). Alexander Nurnberg, “An Arctic Circle Chase denly Want Nuclear Ice Breakers,” The Na- Pits Norway and Russia,” The New York Times, tional Interest, (Online: April 2019), available 4. Commandant’s Planning Guidance. There (New York, NY: October 2005). at https://nationalinterest.org. are several sections within the Planning Guid- ance where this direction to return to our naval 13. Kenneth J. Bird, et al., “Circum-Arctic 27. See John Simpson, “How Greenland Could purpose and be the Fleet Marine Force. For Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Become China’s Arctic Base,” British Broadcast- example, on page four we are directed in bold Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle,” U.S. ing Corporation, (Online: December 2018), text to “re-focus on how we will fulfi ll our man- Geological Survey, (Washington, DC: 2008). available at https://www.bbc.com. date to support the fl eet” and on the fi nal page the Commandant emphasizes that “we are not 14. The Arctic Portal, (Online), available at 28. Department of Defense Annual Report to experiencing an identity crisis ... [w]e are a naval http://library.arcticportal.org/1496/. Congress, “Military and Security Developments expeditionary force capable of deterring malign Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019,” behavior and, when necessary fi ghting inside out 15. Malte Humpert and Andreas Raspotnik, (Washington, DC: 2019). adversary’s weapons-engagement-zone to facili- “The Future of Arctic Shipping,” The Arctic tate sea denial in support of fl eet operations.” Institute, (Online: October 2012), available at 29. President of the United States, National The Commandant goes on to drive home the https://www.thearcticinstitute.org. Security Strategy of the United States of America, point stating, “We are not a second land army, (Washington, DC: December 2017). nor do we aspire to be anything other than 16. Niall McCarthy, “Global Warming Opens the world’s premier naval expeditionary force.” Arctic Passage for Container Ships,” Forbes, 30. Atle Staalesen, “Chinese Rig Makes Second (Jersey City, NJ: Aug 2018), available at https:// Large Discovery in Russian Arctic Waters,” The 5. Staff, “The Marine Corps Association: Its www.forbes.com. Barents Observer, (Online: May 2019), available Formation and Objects,” Marine Corps Gazette, at https://thebarentsobserver.com. (New York, NY: March 1916). 17. Ibid. 31. See Chelsea Harvey, “Arctic Sea Ice is Get- 6. Maj John H. Russell, “A Plea for a Mission 18. President Barrack Obama, National Security ting Younger. Here is Why That is a Problem,” and Doctrine,” Marine Corps Gazette, (New Strategy for the Arctic Region, (Washington, DC: E&E News, Scientifi c American, (Online: May York, NY: June 1916). May 2013). 2018), available at https://www.scientifi cam- erican.com. 7. Staff, “Discussion on a Plea for a Mission,” 19. Ibid. Marine Corps Gazette, (New York, NY: June 32. Ibid. 1916). 20. Margarita Assenova, “Russia’s New Rules for Northern Sea Route Violate International 33.Victor Kiprop, “Where Is the Arctic Circle,” 8. U.S. Marine Corps, Ellis Group, “U.S. Am- Law,” Polygraph, (Online: March 2019), avail- The World Atlas, (Online: April 2019), available phibious Forces: Indispensable Elements of able at https://www.polygraph.info. at https://www.worldatlas.com. American Seapower,” Marines, (Online: August 2012), available at https://www.marforcom. 21. See Levon Sevunts, “Russia Scores Scientifi c 34. Antonio Gasparrini, et. al, “Mortality Risk marines.mil. Point in Quest for Extended Arctic Continental Attributable To High And Low Ambient Tem- Shelf,” The Barents Observer, (Online: April perature: A Multicountry Observational Study,” 9. Maj Gabriel L. Diana, “Vision, Education, 2019), available at https://thebarentsobserver. The Lancet, (Online: July 2015), available at and Experimentation: Marine Corps Organi- com. https://www.thelancet.com. zational Behavior and Innovation During the Interwar Period,” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, June 2013).

76 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • October 2019 35. Lynn Montross and Nicholas A. Canzona, dics show that everything, no matter how trivial either BAE-Hagglunds BEOWOLF/VIKING U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950–1953, or complex, becomes exponentially more dif- or ST-Kinetic EXTREMV/BRONCO. In a Volume III: The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, fi cult in the extreme cold. Therefore, a fi ghting similar vein, adversaries have already fi elded (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, force must spend signifi cant amounts of time new capabilities; the Russian Vityaz DT-XX 1957). simply learning how to stay alive before they All-Terrain Vehicle and the Chinese Jonyand can even begin to operate in this deadly climate. JY813—very similar to ST-Kinetic BRONCO. 36. Ibid. The Chinese also sustained heavy ca- If a tracked vehicle OTS capability is selected as sualties from the extreme cold weather during 38. Allen F. Chew, FMFRP 12-178, The White method of mobility, then a series of programs the Chosin Reservoir Campaign with estimated Death: The Epic of the Soviet Finnish War, will need to be established to procure the vehicle rates number in the 10,000’s. (Washington, DC: 1971). and establish stock levels for parts, establish schools for maintenance personnel and vehicle 37. The recent successful experience with fa- 39. Without a credible Over-The-Snow (OTS)/ crews as well, as doctrine for employment and miliarization training for desert deployments All-Terrain Vehicle (ATV) capability, Marine concept of use. could serve to obscure the important difference Corps forces will fi nd themselves fi xed by roads, between extreme heat and extreme cold in the water, and bridges. Much like the Soviet 9th >Authors’ Note: All opinions expressed in this minds of decision makers. Extreme heat can be Army at Suomussalmi, in challenging environ- article are those of the authors and do not adapted to with some basic training in hydration ment and terrain, the Marine Corps risks being refl ect the opinions of the DOD, The United and managing heat-related casualties. The ex- out maneuvered by an adversary fi elding supe- States Marine Corps, or United States Marine periences in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate rior capabilities. The Marine Corps currently Corps Forces, Europe and Africa. that the familiarization with a desert environ- relies on OTS/ATV platforms being provided ment from pre-deployment training exercises by Norway through the BV206, an unprotected was effective in training Marines to fi ght in hot and aging platform with 38 years of service, weather. History and the objective facts show globally approaching its end of service. A Euro- that the Arctic is simply more demanding and pean consortium of six nations is working on a deadly than other climates and requires more BV206 successor program with both protected time to learn to survive and adapt. Numerous and unprotected variants, and the U.S. Army after-action reports from recent Marine Corps and U.S. National Guard are doing the same. cold weather training and exercises in the Nor- The current options under consideration are

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