Panel Discussion: Recent Developments in Friday August 5, 2005

In a statement released on July 28 th , 2005, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) declared that it was ending its armed campaign against British rule in Northern Ireland and would henceforth use only peaceful and democratic methods to advance its cause. C rucially, it pledged to engage with the IICD (Independent International Commission on Decommissioning) to complete the process of putting its arms beyond use. Th e statement was gen erally well received. Tony Blair hailed it as a “step of unparalleled magnitude,” and Irish leader Bertie Ahern welcomed the move. Unionists were, unsurprisingly, more skeptical. DUP leader Ian Paisley said that his party would “judge the IRA's bona fid es over the next months and years based on its behaviour and activity.”

Although the statement marks a positive step in the process that has been underway since the ceasefire in 1994, it masks several problems. The central question concerns the validity of the statement: who authorized it, what proportion of the IRA they represent, and whether they have the ability to enforce their will on the remainder. All indications are that the more extreme factions on both sides are now “at the table,” and that the refore this statement has considerable credibility. However, the problem of splinter groups remains, and the practical question of who actually has control of the weapons stocks (and whether anyone knows how many weapons there really are) will be crucial to real progress . Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this move is one of enormous political risk for the Sinn Fein leadership of (leader) , Martin McGuinness (chief negotiator) and Martin Ferris (their most senior Irish parliamentarian; for mer arms smuggler) : they have all spent considerable political capital over the last several years in bringing the militants to the table; if this move fails then the entire peace process will be vulnerable to collapse .

On the Unionist side, problems also remain. The IRA statement was, of course, met with suspicion, particularly the lack of a stated timetable for decommissioning or a pledge to engage with the new policing structures in Northern Ireland. There also remains an ongoing feud within the Loyal ist paramilitary movement which now has a chance of being transposed onto the Catholic/Nationalist community. For the IRA’s traditional enemies, future actions will speak louder than these words.

The immediate reasons for this most recent advance in the peace process will not become public knowledge for several years, but large -scale changes in the political and economic context appear to have been important. First, Britain and Ireland’s increasing integration into the European Union and the EU’s emphasi s on regionalism has made moves towards new power structures in Northern Ireland less exceptional and therefore more palatable to the British and Irish electorates , particularly when placed alongside devolution moves in Scotland and Wales. Second, members hip of the European Union has allowed the UK and Republic of Ireland to relate on a more equal state -to -state level , and deal jointly with Northern Ireland, rather than it being viewed simply as a security problem for the UK. Third, and perhaps most impor tantly, the recent spectacular economic development in Ireland has defused much social tension, and eroded some of the economic problems that reinforced and magnified cultural and religious tensions. The lessons to be learned from the Northern Ireland con flict and its progress towards resolution are difficult to untangle from the specific circumstances of . Given this, any lessons may have more relevance to Sri Lanka, Kashmir and northern Spain than they do to the problem of Islamist terror: a lthough religion was an important factor in Northern Ireland, both sides had specific political demands , and , over time, the conflict developed more of the characteristics of a conflict between communities rather than religious factions . In this situation , it appears to have been important that the peace process be as inclusive as possible, that any potential solution be put to a popular vote, and that “truth and reconciliation commission -style” processes perform a useful cathartic function by demonstratin g that no communi ty has a monopoly on suffering. On a procedural level, deadlines do appear to have been useful, albeit not in the most obvious of ways. Their use to set the pace for nego tiations is double -edged since they set tests that can be failed an d, as Peter Mandels on (Former UK Secretary of State for Northern Ireland) commented, encourage an “all or nothing” at titude to the peace process . They do, however, set the tone and motivate potential participants to consider their position and enter a neg otiating stance.

With the statement only a few weeks old, it may be too early to examine the chances for success this time around . Ho wever, t he apparent involvement of the mainstream of the Republican moveme nt augers well for the future. It makes the ap pearance of splinter groups less likely and makes it more likely that if they did appear they would be small er , short er -lived and more rapidly alienated , and therefore less able to derail the peace process. Significant challenges remain, however: real pro gress on decommissioning, whether the IRA reduces its role in organized crime, whether it accepts and works with the new policing structures, and the political problem of dealing with the disbandment of the three battalions of the Royal Irish Regiment that are based in Northern Ireland.