by Dr. Natalie Mychajlyszyn

NATO and PfP partners. KEEPING ITS OPTIONS OPEN: NATO’S NEW STRATEGIC CON- CEPT AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ENLARGEMENT

t its Washington Summit in April 1999, NATO enlargement. Indeed, the Washington round was neither formally accepted the , intended nor expected to be the last. To demonstrate and as the newest members their conviction, NATO allies upheld Article 10 of the of the Alliance. In doing so, NATO ful- North Atlantic Treaty in their “new” Strategic Concept filled the pledge made at its January released at the 1999 Summit, signaling enlargement as a A1994 Brussels Summit to “ … expect and … welcome prominent element of NATO’s future programme. NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states Specifically, paragraph 39 of the Concept states that the to our East…”1 In this respect, NATO’s enlargement Alliance, “expects to extend further invitations in com- was also a powerful demonstration of the Alliance’s ing years to nations willing and able to assume the confidence in the three former Warsaw Pact countries, responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as and of their evolution into reliable allies committed to NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations the common values upheld by the Alliance. would serve the overall political and strategic interests of

Rather than provide closure to the highly controver- Dr. Natalie Mychajlyszyn is Co-ordinator of the Centre for Security sial issue of expansion, the Summit instead stimulated and Defence Studies at The Norman Paterson School of speculations about a subsequent round of NATO International Affairs, Carleton University.

Winter 2000-2001 Canadian Military Journal 51 the Alliance, strengthen its effectiveness and cohesion, are all interdependent: the reasons for admitting addi- and enhance overall European security and stability.”2 tional members set out the criteria for membership, the fulfillment of which determines a country’s eligibility Speculation about the next round of enlargement and the timing of its accession. For instance, NATO has been fuelled primarily by the vagueness of para- argues that additional members will extend the zone of graph 39. More specifically, the new Strategic Concept security and stability delineated by the Alliance. This offers no information about which nations will be invit- argument is based in part on NATO acting as an agent ed to join NATO in the next round, the criteria for mem- promoting standards of good behaviour conducive to bership or the reasons for pursuing a second round. Of security and stability: democratic systems of govern- course, clarity on these issues in such a document would ment, democratic civilian control over the military, good be unrealistic and unreasonable. Not only does the neighbourly relations, co-operation, consultation and Concept’s silence on these issues reflect the reality of consensus-building, transparency in defence planning the current situation whereby no decisions have been and military budgets, and a common defence. These standards essentially build confidence among the NATO allies, diminish exclusive- ly national approaches to defence, and reduce the likelihood of misperception and instability that can lead to military conflict.3 Likewise, security is also enhanced whereby additional members, as presumed producers of security, strengthen NATO’s ability to con- tribute to European and international securi- ty, support peacekeeping activities under UN and OSCE auspices, and undertake new mis- sions.4 More specifically, new members are expected to strengthen the Alliance’s effec- tiveness and cohesion and preserve its politi- cal and military capability to perform its core functions of common defence.5 In addition, NATO enlargement reinforces the process of made concerning which state(s) are to be issued an invi- European integration of which it is only one component, tation to begin accession talks, but also that other NATO simultaneously serving to support the removal of ‘old documents (see the 1995 Study on Enlargement) have dividing lines’.6 already outlined the accession criteria the aspirants are to meet as well as the reasons and purpose for accepting It follows that these reasons for NATO enlargement new members to the Alliance. are reflected in the criteria for membership. They include the acceptance of and conformity with “the prin- Even so, speculation about the next round of ciples, policies and procedures of the Alliance at the enlargement is rampant, with little certain about it other time that they join and not only on paper but in practice than that it will occur and that it will feature many of (author’s emphasis)”; democratization; civil-military the same controversies of the previous round. Indeed, relations in a culturally relevant setting; transparency these controversies have already appeared, with the cur- in defence spending, planning and investments; and the rent lead-up to the expected subsequent round of peaceful settlement of ethnic or external territorial dis- enlargement dominated by questions of ‘who’, ‘when’ putes in accordance with OSCE principles.7 Additional and, notwithstanding NATO’s clearly stated intention to criteria include the ability to contribute militarily to enlarge, ‘why’. Using the Strategic Concept’s reference collective defence and to peacekeeping; being in to NATO enlargement as its starting point, this article possession of and demonstrating acceptable defence highlights some of the issues and concerns related to assets and capabilities (such as in Command, Control, this topic. It emphasizes that while the particular out- Communications and Intelligence, or C3I), as well as come for NATO remains unknown, enlargement is maintaining the effectiveness of the Alliance by sharing expected to have a profound and positive effect on roles, risks, responsibility costs and benefits of assuring European security in general. common security goals and objectives.8 Thus, the extent to which aspirants meet these criteria will deter- At the outset, it is important to understand that the mine in large part which countries receive an invitation issues of ‘who’, ‘when’ and ‘why’ of NATO enlargement to join NATO, as well as when the invitation is issued.

52 Canadian Military Journal Winter 2000-2001 The interdependence of these issues underscores that The complexities of enlargement become even enlargement and its preparation offers no clear and sim- more pronounced when considering the potential candi- ple answers. Instead, the complex nature of NATO dates for NATO membership. In this respect, nine enlargement is reflected and reinforced, bringing to light countries have announced their interest in joining: many of the debates and challenges associated with the Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, process of accepting new members to the Alliance which Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The current NATO allies must somehow confront and over- decision of who to invite should be clear: those coun- come. For example, the reasons for continuing with tries who meet the eligibility requirements will be another round of enlargement is a target of much debate invited to join NATO; those who do not are not invited. and criticism. Rather than enhance European security However, problems and difficulties arise in several and strengthen NATO’s contribution to trans-Atlantic instances such as when NATO’s institutional limitations security, enlargement is argued to instead undermine sta- are juxtaposed with the overt desires of the aspirants. bility and weaken NATO’s efforts. In this respect, In other words, the desires of all nine countries to join because of the Article 5 security guarantees, further NATO conflicts with the Alliance’s limited ability to enlargement will perpetuate and cement destabilizing divisions in Europe between NATO members and non-NATO members, dangerously reinforcing a hierarchy of privileged states in Europe and of privi- leged security institutions. Additional members are also argued to detrimentally stretch NATO’s capacity to reach consen- sus decisions and prevent it from taking the necessary and effective action that may be required regarding a particular situa- tion. Furthermore, and notwithstanding NATO’s protests to the contrary, NATO enlargement is argued to be a provocative policy, bringing the Alliance geographical- ly closer toward an already insecure and vulnerable Russia which is looking for just such a reason as NATO expansion to justifiably reassert absorb only a small number of candidates at any one its influence and position in the region, and escalate ten- time, particularly as work on standardization and inte- sions with the West in the process. Moreover, enhancing gration in the Alliance does not end with accession, but a military alliance is argued to be unnecessary and futile instead continues at a deeper level of intensity. Thus, at a time when traditional security threats are non-exis- taking in all nine would overload NATO’s capacity to tent or new threats (organised crime, migration, disease) integrate its agenda to the detriment of its other current are of the type that require non-military responses. projects such as the Defence Capability Initiative and the development of a European Security and Defence The debates over ‘why’ extend to ‘when’ is NATO Identity within NATO. Indeed, the nine aspiring coun- to accept the next group of new members? For instance, tries issued a joint declaration in May 2000 in which as the prerequisite standards of good behaviour neither they affirmed their position that all should be invited to develop instantly nor have immediate effect, invitations join NATO as one group. More specifically, they “… may be issued prematurely and before aspiring countries call[ed] upon the member states at the next NATO have met the requisite criteria for membership. As a Summit in 2002 to invite [their] democracies to join result, countries may be admitted who, due to shortcom- NATO.”9 Implicit in this declaration is the conviction ings in their capabilities, undermine NATO’s capacity to that exclusive, individual invitations to join NATO will contribute to European and international security and to not be accepted. In this respect, this collective stance support peacekeeping activities under UN or OSCE aus- is looked upon as a strategy to ensure invitations are pices. As well, some of these countries may not have issued to countries who might not otherwise receive had sufficient opportunity to come to terms with historic one, and perhaps facilitating NATO’s decision. grievances with other states or to address minority issues, thus bringing such cases of potential conflict Moreover, it becomes apparent that not only is with them into NATO, and taking the Alliance into a enlargement a fundamentally complex process, but also dangerous and unwelcome direction. inherently political, and final decisions may be deter-

Winter 2000-2001 Canadian Military Journal 53 mined regardless of a country’s criteria. For instance, tions about their defensibility and the practicalities of the most likely candidates of the nine appear to be implementing the Article 5 security guarantee. Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Despite their questionable capabilities as potential Alliance Appropriately, the salience of these controversies members and incomplete implementation of democratic concerning ‘why’, ‘when’ and ‘who’ has not been lost on the opponents and supporters of NATO enlargement. However, as the debates are engaged more directly and with greater urgency, it is equally important to not ignore the significance of the simultaneous and parallel partnership activities between NATO and its former adversaries irrespec- tive of their intentions regarding NATO membership. Many of these activities focus on building and developing cooperative relations and consultations with non-mem- bers. Indeed, the impact of such partner- ship programmes on European and interna- tional security is expected to be ultimately positive and sustained for all concerned, no matter the outcome of future enlargement rounds; therefore, these partnerships should not be disparaged as the focus on norms, Bulgaria and Romania are seen to have improved enlargement tends to suggest. In other words, since their chances for membership in light of their support security is not based on NATO enlargement alone, but for NATO’s operation.10 At the same time, these more essentially encompasses co-operation, confidence aspiring NATO members, together with Slovakia and and transparency, the prominence of these elements in Slovenia, would provide Hungary with the necessary NATO’s partnership programmes underscores the argu- landlink with other NATO members that is currently ment that European security can be enhanced by missing. As well, NATO may invite Slovakia as a avenues other than enlarging NATO’s membership. As reward for its progress towards democratization and paragraph 33 of the 1999 Strategic Concept emphasizes: reform, however delayed, and as an incentive to main- tain its momentum in this regard. Where Slovenia, Through its active pursuit of partnership, coop- Romania and Bulgaria are concerned, their accession eration, and dialogue, the Alliance is a positive may inject some degree of stability into the Balkans, a force in promoting security and stability region that remains vulnerable and badly in need of con- throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. Through out- fidence. Moreover, to the extent that Slovenia’s small reach and openness, the Alliance seeks to pre- size and status as a contender in the previous round may serve peace, support and promote democracy, offer a relatively smooth accession process, its chances contribute to prosperity and progress, and foster for being invited may increase despite concerns about genuine partnership with and among all demo- its contribution to NATO’s ability to enhance European cratic Euro-Atlantic countries. This aims at stability and security. enhancing the security of all, excludes nobody, and helps to overcome divisions and disagree- In contrast, despite their location in the Balkans, ments that could lead to instability and conflict. Albania and Macedonia are unlikely to receive an invi- tation in the next round in light of their slower progress Thus, since the early years of the post-Cold War era, in fulfilling NATO’s membership criteria. Where the NATO has agreed to a series of strategies by which to “ three Baltic states are concerned, and notwithstanding … avoid divisions or uncertainties in Europe and to advances in their efforts to meet NATO’s eligibility ensure broad, inclusive approaches to cooperative secu- requirements and their enthusiasm in joining NATO, it rity.”11 They include the Euro-Atlantic Partnership is unlikely that they will receive an invitation to join Council (EAPC), which evolved from the North Atlantic NATO given their shared border with Russia and the Cooperation Council (NACC) in May 1997. Like its detrimental effects this may have on European stability, predecessor, the EAPC essentially provides a framework not to mention their delicate relationship with their for- for dialogue among 46 countries: the 19 NATO allies mer oppressors. As well, their small size raises ques- and 27 non-NATO countries.12 Its activities emphasize

54 Canadian Military Journal Winter 2000-2001 consultation and co-operation on political and security- was enhanced at the 1999 Washington Summit by estab- related matters.13 Building on the achievements of the lishing and/or expanding on a political-military frame- NACC, the EAPC is intended to involve partners at work for NATO-led PfP operations, a Planning and deeper levels in their co-operative efforts with NATO, Review Process akin to NATO’s force planning process, emphasizing an expanded political dimension of part- regular military consultations in NATO’s Military nership and raising military and political co-operation Committee with partners, the creation of Partnership to a new level. The EAPC is also intended to allow for Staff Elements and the Partnership Coordination Cell. the development of a direct political relationship The enhanced PfP is intended to build on PfP’s previous between partners and the Alliance as well as increased achievements and increase opportunities for the partici- decision-making opportunities relating to activities in pation of the partners in the planning of PfP operations which the partners participate. The opening statement and their provision of political guidance for and oversight by the Chairman of the EAPC at the July 1997 summit of NATO-led PfP operations. The result has been a more underscores the anticipated benefits of this partnership robust military co-operation programme Ð a more opera- arrangement for European security, irrespective of tional partnership with a stronger consultative forum.16 Alliance membership: The PfP’s intended impact on European security is to This cooperative approach has become a cen- diminish threats to peace, increase stability and promote tral part of the security policies of all our confidence. To have such an impact, PfP promotes better countries, for it is only through cooperation coordination, joint planning and conduct of training, and that we can face the challenges of the future. the interoperability of allied and partner forces, as well as Allies and Partners working together, … can providing allies and partners with a greater ability to transform this continent into a safer and more shape and respond to new security challenges. It facili- stable place where each country can live in tates transparency in national defence planning and budg- peace and security14 eting processes, ensures democratic control of defence forces, maintains capability and readiness to contribute to The contribution made to European security by the operations under the authority of the UN and OSCE, and, EAPC is further highlighted in para- graph 34 of the 1999 Strategic Concept:

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) will remain the overarching framework for all aspects of NATO’s cooperation with its Partners. It offers an expanded political dimension for both consultation and cooperation. EAPC consultations build increased transparency and confidence among its members on security issues, con- tribute to conflict prevention and crisis management, and develop practical cooperation activities, including in civil emergency plan- ning, and scientific and environmental affairs. ultimately, develops forces that in the long term are bet- ter able to operate with NATO forces.17 As described in Within the overarching framework provided by the paragraph 35 of the 1999 Strategic Concept, EAPC, the programme (PfP) makes its own distinct contribution to European securi- The Partnership for Peace is the principal mech- ty by intensifying practical military and defence-related anism for forging practical security links co-operation among the NATO allies and the 26 non- between the Alliance and its Partners and for NATO participants. Its areas of focused attention enhancing interoperability between Partners and include peacekeeping concepts, doctrines and joint NATO. Through detailed programmes that exercises, support for the development of democratic reflect individual Partners’ capacities and inter- civil-military relations, and co-operation in communica- ests, Allies and Partners work towards trans- tions, and command and control among others.15 The PfP parency in national defence planning and budg-

Winter 2000-2001 Canadian Military Journal 55 eting; democratic control of defence forces; pre- Disagreements are to be settled on the basis of goodwill paredness for civil disasters and other emergen- and mutual respect within the framework of political cies; and the development of the ability to work consultations. Paragraph 36 of the 1999 Strategic together, including in NATO-led PfP operations. Concept notes: “A strong, stable and enduring partner- The Alliance is committed to increasing the role ship between NATO and Russia is essential to achieve the Partners play in PfP decision-making and lasting stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.” planning, and making PfP more operational. Similarly, Ukraine’s partnership with NATO Other arrangements emphasize the fact that NATO’s through consultations and cooperative activities is partnerships with its former adversaries are not exclu- intended to promote further stability and common dem- sively for aspiring countries and are open to any inter- ocratic values in Central and Eastern Europe. ested country irrespective of its intentions regarding Furthermore, NATO and Ukraine are to consult together NATO membership. Moreover, these arrangements whenever Ukraine perceives a direct threat to its territo- emphasize the advancements and contributions that can rial integrity, political independence, or security.18 be made to European security without having to enlarge Paragraph 37 of the 1999 Strategic Concept reaffirmed the Alliance. This is demonstrated in particular in the the importance to European security of the partnership separate bilateral consultative arrangements NATO has between Ukraine and NATO.

While emphasizing the non-membership aspects of NATO’s partnership arrange- ments, their dual-purpose nature should not be minimized. Indeed, the EAPC and PfP serve as invaluable instruments for prepar- ing aspiring countries for NATO member- ship, as was proven in assisting the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in their membership preparation efforts. Moreover, some assistance specific to aspiring coun- tries was recognized to be in order in light of the difficulties many of the current aspiring countries will experience in meet- ing the membership criteria. As a result, NATO agreed to a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the 1999 Washington Summit to which all nine aspiring countries have sub- established with Russia and Ukraine, the NATO-Russia scribed. In essence, the MAP provides directed feed- Permanent Joint Council and the NATO-Ukraine back and advice on progress in implementing individual Commission, respectively. Indeed, these arrangements national programmes for meeting NATO membership serve as vital areas for consultation and co-operation on criteria, and assistance in targeting areas most relevant issues of common interest related to security and stabil- for nations preparing forces and capabilities for future ity in the Euro-Atlantic area, including among others membership.19 As noted at the May 2000 Ministerial conflict prevention, crisis management and conflict res- Meeting of the : olution, joint operations, defence policy and military doctrines, transparency issues, defence conversion, pro- We welcome the strong commitment of the nine gramme of expanded military co-operation between aspiring countries to the MAP, and to reform respective military establishments, arms control and and co-operation, as reaffirmed at Vilnius on 19 nuclear proliferation issues, enhanced military dialogue, May, and are pleased with the progress made to possibilities for joint exercises and training, democratic date in implementing the MAP. This spring, control of the armed forces, defence planning, interop- meetings of the North Atlantic Council have erability, and military training. taken place with senior members of the govern- ments of each of the aspiring countries to exam- More specifically, the arrangement between NATO ine progress made. Advice, feedback and assis- and Russia is intended to build increasing levels of tance given by the Alliance and by individual trust, unity of purpose and habits of consultation and co- NATO members has contributed significantly to operation in order to enhance each other’s security. better focusing their preparations for possible

56 Canadian Military Journal Winter 2000-2001 future membership in all areas covered by the also shows an understanding that the criteria will be dif- MAP, including political and economic issues, ficult on the part of some aspiring countries to fulfil defence and military issues, resource, security completely and that NATO may need to compromise, and legal issues. MAP-related Partnership accepting new members with shortcomings in these Goals and tailored PfP Individual Partnership Programmes have been agreed with the aspirants, to assist them in their efforts to meet the goals they have set themselves in the defence/military field. These goals are challenging. The establishment of pri- orities and the allocation of sufficient resources by the aspirants will be essential to achieve them.20

However, where NATO enlargement is specifically concerned, participation in the partnership programmes such as EAPC, PfP or MAP are not endorsements of the partic- ular country’s interest in joining NATO if such interest has been demonstrated. Likewise, programmes such as MAP are not intended to provide a checklist of criteria that if met areas if the tendency and pressure to maintain enlarge- prejudge NATO’s decision regarding who will be invit- ment momentum cannot be resisted.24 ed to begin accession talks. Even with such assistance programmes, the conditions in many of these countries At the same time, these partnership programs play are such that the criteria for membership will not be eas- an important role in NATO’s strategy for European ily or quickly met. For instance, weaknesses in commu- security and its approach to enlargement, particularly as nications and defence capabilities will be particularly the nine countries are unlikely to accede simultaneous- difficult to overcome. Problems are also evident in the ly. More specifically, these partnerships counter the implementation of democratic civil-military relations effects and politics of disappointment following each and the negative impact that such shortcomings have on accession announcement and keep aspirants actively the individual country’s ability to operate a national engaged in NATO activities in between rounds of security structure that would contribute to NATO’s enlargement. Programs such as MAP demonstrate to the operations and capabilities and enhance its ability to aspirants that they are not abandoned. Moreover, while realize its core security functions.21 not as robust as Article 5 guarantees, the assurances of consultations with NATO offered by these partnerships Instead, the existence of such programmes empha- signal to the partners that they will not be left alone to size NATO’s determination to keep its options open and deal with threats to their territorial integrity, political to remain in control where enlargement is concerned. In independence or security. As affirmed in the 1999 this respect, NATO is cultivating relations with its for- Strategic Concept: mer adversaries while offering no pretence that these associations are to naturally lead to membership. NATO has undertaken to consult with any active Indeed, NATO has remained firm that not only are there participant in the Partnership if that Partner per- no rigid criteria to be met for membership but that it ceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, alone will decide on a case-by-case basis whether or not political independence, or security.25 they have been fulfilled by a particular aspirant.22 As was made clear in the Study on Enlargement, “[d]eci- CONCLUSION sions on enlargement will be for NATO itself.”23 This position wisely allows for consideration of undefined nlargement has been announced as a topic for and intangible political factors in addition to the hard E review at NATO’s next summit meeting in 2002.26 criteria, and provides a ready excuse for withholding an Ultimately, no matter the outcome of this Summit, the invitation to a country that may have met all the criteria enlargement process will have and has had a profound but whose membership would undermine European and positive effect on European security. It has done so security and NATO’s effectiveness as an alliance. It primarily by putting in place a set of consultative and

Winter 2000-2001 Canadian Military Journal 57 cooperative arrangements with former adversaries, defence alliance. Instead, this article has sought to regardless of their aspirations or intentions towards draw attention amidst the speculations and controversies NATO. The end result has been the replacement of Cold of the next round of NATO enlargement to the benefits War divisions with a common European strategy that is accrued to the Euro-Atlantic area of the seemingly sec- informed by an appreciation of the indivisibility of ondary partnership arrangements. In this respect, security. None of this is to suggest that the military NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept and its treatment of alliance itself no longer serves a purpose. Indeed, that enlargement should not be criticized for being vague there are so many countries aspiring for NATO member- and therefore irresponsible but congratulated for sensi- ship argues the contrary. As well, the uncertainties of bly and unambitiously keeping NATO’s options open Europe’s transitions and the strains in current relations regarding a complex and hopeful situation. with Russia underscore the continued utility of a

NOTES

1. Declaration of the Heads of State and management; regional matters; arms control 25 April 1999; Towards a Partnership for the Government, NATO Summit, Brussels, issues; nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) 21st Century - The Enhanced and More 11 January 1994. proliferation and defence issues; international Operational Partnership. 2. The full text reads: The Alliance remains terrorism; defence planning and budgets and 17. Partnership for Peace: Framework open to new members under Article 10 of the defence policy and strategy; security impacts of Document, Brussels, 10 January 1994. Washington Treaty. It expects to extend further economic developments. There will also be 18. Charter on a Distinctive Partnership invitations in coming years to nations willing scope for consultations and cooperation on between NATO and Ukraine, Madrid, and able to assume the responsibilities and issues such as: civil emergency and disaster 9 July 1997. obligations of membership, and as NATO deter- preparedness; armaments cooperation under the 19. For example, the first MAP conference will mines that the inclusion of these nations would aegis of the Conference of National Armaments be held in July 2000 with Slovakia, Bulgaria serve the overall political and strategic inter- Directors (CNAD); nuclear safety; defence and Romania on communications planning. ests of the Alliance, strengthen its effectiveness related environmental issues; civil-military Confidential briefing to author by NATO offi- and cohesion, and enhance overall European coordination of air traffic management and cials, Brussels, Belgium, 19 June 2000; NATO’s security and stability. To this end, NATO has control; scientific cooperation; and issues relat- Open Door Policy, NATO Basic Fact Sheet, established a programme of activities to assist ed to peace support operations.” Basic April 1999. aspiring countries in their preparations for pos- Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 20. Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of sible future membership in the context of its Council, 30 May 1997. Like its predecessor, the North Atlantic Council, Florence, Italy, wider relationship with them. No European the EAPC is also active in information matters 24 May 2000. democratic country whose admission would and scientific and environmental matters. 21. Daniel Nelson and Marybeth Ulrich, fulfil the objectives of the Treaty will be Their activities in these areas are set out in a Intractable Problems: Armies, National excluded from consideration. workplan prepared annually by the representa- Security and Democratic Transition, unpub- 3. Study on NATO Enlargement, NATO, tives of the EAPC. lished manuscript, presented at the ISA Annual September 1995, para. 3. 14.Opening Statement by the Chairman of Convention, Los Angeles, March 2000. 4. NATO’s Enlargement, NATO Basic Fact the EAPC, EAPC Summit, Madrid, Spain, 22. NATO’s Open Door Policy, NATO Basic Sheet No. 13, June 1997. 9 July 1997. Fact Sheet, April 1999. 5. Study on NATO Enlargement, NATO, 15. Areas of co-operation include those listed 23. Study on NATO Enlargement, NATO, September 1995, para. 4. in the July 1997 NATO fact sheet on the September 1995, para. 7. 6. Study on NATO Enlargement, NATO, Enhanced Partnership for Peace Programme: 24. Confidential briefing to author by NATO September 1995, para. 2 and 3; NATO’s Air Defence Related Matters; Airspace officials, Brussels, Belgium, 19 June 2000. Enlargement, NATO Basic Fact Sheet No. 13, Management/ Control; Consultation, Command 25. Paragraph 35, 1999 NATO Strategic June 1997; NATO’s Open Door Policy, NATO and Control, including Communications and Concept. Basic Fact Sheet, April 1999. Information Systems, Navigation and 26. At the Washington Summit, NATO Heads of 7. NATO’s Enlargement, NATO Basic Fact Identification Systems, Interoperability State and Government decided to review the Sheet No. 13, June 1997; confidential briefing Aspects, Procedures and Terminology; Civil enlargement process at their next Summit meet- to author by NATO officials, Brussels, Emergency Planning; Crisis Management; ing, which will be held no later than 2002, and Belgium, 19 June 2000. Democratic Control of Forces and Defence tasked us to keep the process, including the 8. Study on NATO Enlargement, NATO, Structures; Defence Planning and Budgeting; implementation of the Membership Action Plan September 1995, paragraph 5; NATO’s Defence Policy and Strategy; Planning (MAP), under continual review. We considered Enlargement, NATO Basic Fact Sheet No. Organisation and Management of National today a consolidated progress report, submitted 13, June 1997. Defence Procurement Programmes and to us by the Council in Permanent Session, on 9. Vilnius Statement, 19 May 2000. International Cooperation in the Armaments the first year’s activities under the MAP. We 10. Confidential briefing to author by NATO Field; Planning, Organisation and Management have directed the Council in Permanent Session officials, Brussels, Belgium, 19 June 2000. of National Defence Research and Technology; to continue to pursue active implementation of 11. Study on NATO Enlargement, NATO, (non-military) Exercises and Related Training the MAP and to examine improvements to its September 1995, para. 13. Activities; Consumer Logistics; Medical functioning, consulting the aspirants as appro- 12. The 45 current members of the EAPC Services; Military Infrastructure; Conceptual, priate. Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting include the nineteen NATO members plus Planning and Operational Aspects of of the North Atlantic Council, Florence, Italy, Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Peacekeeping; Operational, Materiel and 24 May 2000. Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Administrative Aspects of Standardisation; Georgia, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Language Training; Meteorological Support for Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Romania, Russia, NATO/Partner Forces; Military Exercises and Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Related Training Activities; Military Tajikistan, Macedonia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine Education, Training and Doctrine; Military and Uzbekistan. Geography and Electronic Warfare. 13. “Topics might include but are not limited 16. Chairman’s Summary of the Meeting of the to: political and security related matters; crisis EAPC at Summit Level, Washington, D.C.,

58 Canadian Military Journal Winter 2000-2001