NIE 68-57
Probable Developments in Laos Over the Next Few Months
20 August 1957 This document is made available through the declassification efforts and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of: The Black Vault
The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military.
Discover the Truth at: http://www.theblackvault.com '.' t:f:\l,~:;~,: I I" ,'i ", APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: JAN 2005 ~G· 3019~ ••. U·:ol·.!9~4¥r;~,~~1~
(b)(3)
,ION A L" ,I N, AT -' , - ,. .' .':": .,' .:",' . I',·,· " 'N'u,MBER, ,·6'857 " . :" '-.\-' . '".' .' . , , . '" , ,:(~"per$;des'~~,';e6:3.31i~~~,§.); . ~ "!,' ".' . ' . ":.' \ . ",' . ",J 'e" ;"" " :~ ::', ',_ .,1 ; '" • THE':NEXT'FSW MONTHS>i-~'.:: ".' .. '"",' ',,; ~"':~',,,,;,)! ' .• ':'; i'-· ,'. '.:; "DmECT~R!;~~~~~r~~~fLj~:~ci,.: ,';, ," ',;;!,:,,' , T4~:tqtloV?~~bf~;e~1~f!.n6Ii,~rd~~iZ~#9~:;;;~iti~!~~~~~~~'\;i,h~i: ;',' ' , prtparatiop.ot ~~u,:e.st~tnitte:; :'Th,:eCe.'1l:trtiZ ;rn~e.lltg'ence /igejiCiJi, andthe'f;iteilig~h&~~orgizniz'at£OfU;-:oj;the Deiiarihii,ents\ :ot': " i $~~te;:t#'e;A7;mll~:;th~, :Nqvy ;:'i:1te:-Athtofcej:~n(tT!it~}oi~t,StdtJ:i::: •,;: ':, ,,'" ,',' -" ,I '. 'INT~"IGENCEAD~SORY' CO~M~EE"., ": -,",-'> -D'iii,,%:,:t;;\.~:;~f\:~\~;,~,: on ~~ ,A.ug'USt.1.,~5? __ ',9*n~rfin~ we~~ t.~~,SP,~~f~1 A8~t~,nt, ~~<:, -': _:'" , :::: '>:,~V)~;t~r,;;:~~; telhgence, ,De1?~ttment 'o/: S,tq,te; the A.$si~~an~, pljiel of.$tafJ,:~ - " ."" '-:' ,'. :i;:; :,:"::1".i',:;':/,'·Y -Intelltgen,ce, Department of the, Ar;7n1l,: the ~ire{;tbr-df Navale, ,-. ". ,',/:-:::",;, 'r' :~,f.':~;:":i"'; Inttllligence,' ~h.e ,itl8$t8~a~t Ch},erol'~t'atJ, :lP.te.,l,l~ge1Jce; -U$.A~;;; " ': ,- - '_ /' --::'; '-:\:'~~\\~'H~~;{/:' ~~"'~~~~::P~~rfJ~W~;r~~I~#:t~~~:~{~j#~'::~Y:~e~f1:;:!:::!::," " ,,-: :\i;::?~\;;;:F;J&)~:!/~~:;i;,;; 'and the Assfsta7it1)frtctor,'Feder.i:iLBii.reau"()t-ln'Ve'stigi:ition~"i; "',\(,,.,:;:>..,::;:, ':":':~i"'1,j . ab'roill'"';:ih~¥~'~ib~~9~/~'~I~~·:~~¥'t'ff'··;r .... ,.' .. it;;;:j;~:!~~;~l~~ll ,;,.',-': . .:-'. ::.' .' ~ " 'L". ( .. ," : ~,-, PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN LAOS OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS THE PROBLEM To estimate trends in Laos over the next few months. CONCLUSIONS 1. Laos is the least developed country in widespread popular sentiment for ending Southeast Asia, and there is little contact the civil war and achieving national between the leaders and the people most unity. The possibility of large scale mil of whom live in primitive, self-sufficient itary action is largely ruled out by the villages. The inexperienced parliamen threat of military intervention by the tary government is rendered unstable Communist Democratic Republic of and ineffective by regional interests, Vietnam (DRV). Accordingly, there is family rivalries, and personality conflicts strong pressure on the RLG to negotiate within the small ruling elite. Lao politi a settlement with the Pathet Lao. In cal leaders are also deeply divided over his efforts to achieve an early settlement the policy to be followed vis-a-vis the Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma is sup Communist Pathet Lao. Political insta ported by several highly placed French bility has been further increased by Com advisors. For its part, the Pathet Lao, munist subversive activities in various which has access to DRV advisors, aid, parts of Laos, against which the internal and probably military support if neces security forces have achieved only spotty sary, is under no particular compulsion results. to reach a settlement. 2. These weaknesses are turned into a 3. In this situation the principal point of danger by the fact that the Royal Lao danger is that the RLG may accept a Government (RLG) has not been able to negotiated settlement which, although assert its authority over the two northern respectable in appearance, does not in provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly, fact have adequate safeguards to prevent where forces of the insurgent Pathet Lao the Pathet Lao from achieving a dom have been concentrated pursuant to the inant and eventually controlling position Geneva Agreements of 1954. There is in the government. elT g 1M I!l T 1 2 4. We do not believe that a settlement agreement. However, in the longer run, will be reached within the next few unless the governing" elite can be con months, because of the probability that vinced of the dangers' implicit in Pathet the Pathet Lao will .continue to stall in Lao demands, pressures for integration the hope of gaining further RLG conces probably will become, so great that no sions,' and the opposition of some RLG government will be able to resist, and the leaders who would prefer the existing RLG will accept a settlement without stalemate to an insufficiently guarded adequate safeguards. DISCUSSION PRESENT SITUATION political entity are the receipt of American assistance, continued Western diplomatic 5. The political situation in Laos continues to support, and the continued presence of be dangerously unstable. Western parlia French advisors in the government and army. mentary forms have been imposed on a rela tively primitive society and there is a wide 7. Since 1954, the fundamental problem fac gulf between the ruling elite and the villagers. ing the Royal Government of Laos (RLG) has The small ruling elite is divided by family been how to cope with the threat posed by the groupings, by regional interests, and by the Pathet Lao, a Communist insurgent group 'personal ambitions and bitter antagonisms of created and controlled by the Communist the leaders. Lao political leaders are also government of North Vietnam (DRV). Al-' deeply divided over the policy to be followed though the RLG's sovereignty throughout all vis-a-vis the Communist threat represented by Laos was recognized in the Geneva Agree the Pathet Lao. There is some coherence ments, these provided that until a political within particular political parties, but party settlement was reached the military forces of discipline is rudimentary. In this situation, the Pathet Lao would occupy "regroupment power is so fragmented among parties and areas" in two northern provinces, Sam Neua factions that groupings within the National and Phong Saly. The Lao government has Assembly can usually be formed to block or been unable to reach an understanding with stall any action in which a conflict of essen 'the Pathet Lao by negotiations or to gain tial interests exists. The stability of the Lao control of these provinces by limited military cabinet is further complicated by a recently and paramilitary operations. The use of suf adopted constitutional provision which denies· ficient military force to impose RLG rule has a vote on motions of confidence or censure to been forestalled by the preserice of the Inter deputies in the National Assembly who hold national Control Commission and even more cabinet positions. by the fear of DRV military intervention, 6. That Laos has not diSintegrated in the face 8. The Pathet Lao, which is estimated to have of such ineffective government is, in part, the a hardcore membership of only a few hun result of the apathy of the majority of its dred and a military force of about 6,300, con inhabitants, who live in primitive villages trols most of Sam Neua province, except for a which are largely self-sufficient and who are salient occupied by government forces, but little dependent on action by a central gov not more than one-half of Phong Saly prov ernment. Among the relatively educated, a ince. The Pathet Lao has succeeded in im pride in national independence, the symbolic presSing recent visitors to its territory with influence of the crown, and general member the efficiency and progress of the Pathet Lao ship in the Buddhist faith are cohesive factors areas as compared to non·Communist Laos. of some importance. Even more significant There have been indications that morale in factors which act to hold Laos together as a the Pathet Lao military forces has shown w£ 3 TABLE I POLITICAL STRENGTHS IN THE LAO NATIONAL ASSEMBLY Approximate Strength in National Principal Party ASsembly Leaders Source of Strength Orientation Nationalists 20 Katay Sasorlth and Souvanna Phouma Katay faction (12) Boun Oum family of Anti-Pathet Lao and southern Laos. Generally anti-Communist. has support of Crown Prince Savang. Souvanna faction (5) Northern regional inter Concession to PL for est. Generally supported purpose of achieving No firm alignment (3) by Prince Phetsarath, who unification. is senior of junior branch of Lao Royal family, and half brother both to Sou vanna Phouma and to Pathet Lao leader Sou phanouvong. Independents 10 Phoui Sanani Sananikone family of Moderate supporting kone Vientiane province. Katay and oppor tunistic. Democrats 3 Voravong family which Involved in a feud controls Savannakhet with Phoui Sanani province. kone family; sl1ghtly leftist. Nation Union 3 (to 5) Bong Souvan Bong Souvannavong's es strongly in favor of navong pousal of rapid unifica PL. tion of Laos. Unaffiliated 3 Total deputies 39 SW'Uf§I ..51' Hill 4 some improvement. apparently as a result of cal settlement. In subsequent negotiations increased quantities of supplies from the DRV concerning the implementation of the agree and of the success of a few small military ment the Pathet Lao, almost certainly under operations in Sam Neua. The Pathet Lao is guidance from Hanoi, has pressed for and has assisted by about 400 DRV military advisors been large~y successful in obtaining further who also train cadres to be sent to other areas concessions from the RLG. of Laos. 12. By the end of December 1956. the Lao 9. Pathet Lao subversive activities have government, without receiving any significant achieved some measure of success outside concessions in return, had agreed in principle Phong Saly and Sam Neua. The Communist to integrate Pathet Lao troops into the Royal apparatus appears to consist mainly of small army, grant positions in the civil adminiS mobile groups which are engaged in organiza tration to Communist f~.mctionaries, accept tion and information dissemination. While the Pathet Lao as a legal political party, Pathet Lao operations have probably been schedule supplementary elections for an en limited by a shortage of trained cadres; the larged National Assembly, include the Pathet Communist cause has on the other hand been Lao in a coalition government, adopt a neutral aided by the activities of Bong Souvanna foreign policy, and accept aid from any coun.: vong, leader of the National Union Party, try. However, Souvanna Phouma finally who, although not known to be a Communist, balked at a Pathet Lao demand that the Lao has been supporting the Pathet Lao political government, as a test of its Sincerity and objectives. willingness to pursue a neutral foreign policy, accept at once Chinese Communist economic 10. The 22,000-man army is the most effective aid. The Pathet Lao has not subsequently of the RLG security forces. The RLG has repeated this demand. also organized local partisan units with a total strength of about 9,000. which have 13. Negotiations were suspended in mid operated with particular effectiveness in April 1957. Thereafter, although the Na Phong Saly. The Lao pOlice force is reason tional Assembly gave approval in principle to ably effective, despite its rapid expansion Souvanna's agreement on 29 May, it failed to from under 500 in 1955 to nearly 3,000 in pass an advisory resolution calling for con 1957. The government in 1956 also reorgan tinued negotiations in accordance with his ized its counterintelligence agency, resulting stated policy. The unexpected vote resulted in increased attention to intelligence and from a temporary combination comprising propaganda. These measures have somewhat conservative deputies in the Independent restricted the extension of Pathet Lao sub Party and Souvanna's own Nationalist Party, versive activities. However, despite improve and, for different reasons, Bong's National ment and their new programs, the Lao secu Union deputies. The Souvanna government rity forces are not capable of enforcing in reSigned immediately. ternal security in all parts of the country at the same time. 14. A cabinet crisis persisted through the months of June and July, the Katay-Phoui 11. Efforts to resolve the impasse resulting coalition being unable to command quite from the Geneva Agreements have been enough strength to form a government. marked by inconclusive political negotiations Finally, on 9 August, Souvanna Phouma by a and intermittent military skirmishing. Sou vote of 26 to 8 obtained investiture for a skele vanna Phouma, who became Prime Minister ton six-man cabinet, which included only in the spring of 1956, pressed hard to find a three deputies from the assembly. The new formula which would end the division of the coalition cabinet of Nationalists and Inde country. To this end, he met in August 1956 pendents includes both Phoui and Katay; its with his half-brother Souphanouvong, the effectiveness will depend to a considerable leader of the Pathet Lao. They agreed to a extent upon their support. Despite Sou ceasefire and to broad principles for a politi- vanna's promise in his investiture speech of .8jl SS un 5 an immediate effort to reach a settlement Ouane Rathikhoune,l Chief of Staff of the with the Pathet Lao, the cabinet has decided Royal army who on several occasions has to proceed first with a revision of the consti boasted to US representatives that he could tution to reduce the influence of minority quickly resolve the problem of a divided coun groups on the formation and tenure of cab try by rapid decisive military action. inets. According to present plans, the re quirement of a two-thirds majority for 17. Nevertheless, we believe that during the investiture will be reduced to a simple ma period of this estimate neither side will seek jority while voting restrictions on deputies to gain complete control over Laos by military who hold cabinet positions will be retained. means. The major factor restraining the It is probable that acceptance of the revision Pathet Lao will continue to be the superiority will be followed by a reconstitution of the of the Royal army. The Communists will government, either by increasing the present probably continue to be reluctant to commit cabinet to normal size or forming a new one, DRV troops in the strength required to defeat and that the change will probably strengthen the Lao government, because of the fear of the position of Phoui and Katay. counterintervention by the West and because of the adverse effect such action would have on the general Communist line of "peaceful POSSIBLE LINES OF DEVELOPMENT competition." For its part, the Lao govern 15. The remainder of 1957 is likely to be a ment will probably not attempt a military period of continued uncertainty and political resolution of the impasse because of the threat instability in Laos, with the Pathet Lao prob of DRV intervention. 2 lem causing periods of tension and alternat ing lulls. In this situation there are three Negotiated Settlement possible lines of development: (a) military action on a large scale, (b) a negotiated set 18. With the possibility of large scale hostil tlement, and (c) the continuation of a stale ities largely eliminated by the bilateral threat mate and a divided Laos. of foreign involvement, we believe that both sides will be willing to resume negotiations. 16. The possibility of an. outbreak of large Despite the present agreement on broad prin scale hostilities between the RLG and the ctples, many crucial points remain unresolved, Pathet Lao forces cannot be excluded. Mili namely, the cabinet seats to be given to the tary skirmishing will almost certainly occur Pathet Lao, the timing of supplementary elec from time to time in areas where the two tions, the manner in which the Royal govern . forces are in contact and could lead to an ment is to assume control in the two northern expansion of hostilities. However, large scale provinces, tbe integration' of Pathet Lao per military action probably would occur only if: sonnel into the civil service and the military (a) the DRV estimates that the West would forces, and the specifics of a Lao neutral for not intervene and thereafter gives large scale eign policy. logistical and possibly troop support to the Pathet Lao, or (b) if the RLG estimates that 19. There are strong pressures on the RLG the DRV would not intervene in the event of to conclude a settlement. The desire for na- a large scale RLG attack against the Pathet Lao. Although the leaders of the Royal army 1 Colonel Ouane is a staunch nationalist and an have thus far remained outside politiCS, they intelligent, forceful leader. He fought against the Japanese in 1945, organized an anti-French might, as a result of their impatience with guerrilla force from 1945 to 1949, and subse inaction or fear of the extent of concessions quently was integrated into the Royal army. . to the Pathet Lao, seize control of the govern • We have estimated in NIE 63.2-57 that the ment and subsequently launch a major at DRV army, numbering some 268,000, given ex ternal logistical support, has the capab1l1ty of tack against the Pathet Lao. The most prob defeating the total military forces of Laos, South able leader of such a coup would be Colonel Vietnam, and Cambodia simultaneously. ...iF seF-.T 6 tional union has achieved an almost mystical Continued Stalemate Over the quality among the Lao leaders and populace, and provides the strongest Pathet Lao lever Next Few Months for obtaining concessions. This is reinforced 21. In pursuing a negotiated settlement, each by the view of many Lao leaders that the party will seek to spell out the present broad Pathet Lao comprises misguided nationalists principles of agreement in a manner that will who can be oriented away from Communist give it an advantage over its opponent. In influence once Laos has been unifled. Many this Situation, there are various factors which leaders and their French advisors believe that tend to prolong the stalemate over the next with unification contacts between Pathet Lao few months. members in the two northern provinces and their DRV supporters can be reduced. India, 22. The RLG negotiators will be influenced through the International Control Commis by a recognition that Laos is dependent on sion, and the Communist Bloc, through offers US economic and military assistance and by a of friendship that the Lao have not dared to desire to safeguard the government's pOSition refuse, have also exerted great pressure for a against bad faith on the part of the Pathet settlement. The French have encouraged a Lao. To the extent which Katay and Phoui settlement, particularly through their unre continue to cooperate and are able to control served support for Souvanna personally. This the actions of the cabinet, the Royal govern French attitude has cOIltrlbuted to the deteri ment probably will, at least initially, press oration of US-UK-French unity on Lao issues, for a settlement which provides: (a) that since the United States and the United King agreement on a coalition' government be con dom have supported the strongly anti-Com tingent upon prior restoration of effective munist position, as represented by Katay and government administration in the northern his supporters. Finally, Souvanna Phouma provinces; (b) that the number of Pathet Lao military personnel to be integrated into has publicly set the date of 1 October for the the Royal army be so limited that army loy implementation of previous agreements with alty to the crown will not be jeopardized; the Pathet Lao and this may engender addi and (c) that positive assurances of Commu tional pressures on the Lao government. nist compliance be secured. The insistence on 20. The Pathet Lao is under much less pres these safeguards will vary considerably with the fluctuating power of key pOlitical leaders, sure to reach a settlement. It has effective and will range between Katay's "hard line" control of the two northern provinces and and Souvanna Phouma's apparent willingness ready access to DRV assistance if this con to make whatever concessions may be neces trol is seriously threatened. It is well aware sary to reach agreement.. It is also possible of the popular sentiment for ending the civil that in the present unstable political situation, war and unifying Laos. It has a subversive ap opposition parties or factions may exercise a paratus in Royal Lao territory and also bene greater influence upon settlement terms than fits from support of its position by Bong's warranted by their numerical strength. National Union Party. The chief likelihood of Pathet Lao concessions in the near future 23. Once negotiations are resumed the Pathet would spring from a Communist estimate that Lao is likely to follow its previous strategy the Pathet Lao could make a better deal with of waiting and searching for new areas in Sou vanna Phouma than with any probable which the RLG might make further conces successor, and that the advantages to the sions. The leaders may believe that they do Communist cause of another "legal" Commu not have to accept the risks involved in a nist movement and another neutralized coun . coalition government, that time is on their try would outweigh the danger that the Pathet side, and that either the RLG will disintegrate Lao would be effectively submerged in an in to a point at which it cannot resist Pathet tegrated government. Lao demands, or the Pathet Lao will be able s I' 7 to develop sufficient covert strength outside mate, pressures for unification will continue its two provinces to seize control of the gov to grow. Unless the governing elite can be ernment. convinced of the dangers impliCit in Pathet Lao demands, pressures·. for integration in 24. On balance, we believe it unlikely that a time probably will become so great that no settlement will be reached during the next six government will be able to resist, and the RLG months. Given the incompatible objectives will reach a settlement which, although re of the two sides, no settlement is probable un spectable in appearance, in fact will not have less one side misjudges the implications of the adequate safeguards to insure Pathet Lao agreement. In view of the pressures on the compliance. RLG and the lack of understanding of inter national Communism in Laos, this consti 26. In the fluid political situation existing in tutes a particular danger to the West, espe Laos, there are a number of possible con cially if Souvanna Phouma is able to gain sup tingent developments which could affect the port for his policies. However, it is unlikely conclusions reached above. Although we do that adequate safeguards can be worked out not consider any of these developments to be which are satisfactory both to the Pathet Lao probable in the next few months, a serious and to the Katay and Phoui Sananikone deterioration of the political situation, such groups on whom Souvanna at present depends as another prolonged cabinet crisis, might re for his tenure in office. Furthermore, we do sult in. increasing pOlitical intervention by not believe the Pathet Lao will be inclined to Crown Prince Savang, includIng an extra make major concessions until it feels it has parliamentary form of government. Other adequately tested the Royal government's contingencies include the re-emergence of ability to withhold additional concessions. Prince Phetsarath as a dominant figure, and an internal crisis over the succession to the 25. Although we have concluded that Laos throne in the event of the death of ailing will remain divided for the period of this esti- King Sisavong Vong. &Sf! Ii 1M