VOLAKHAVA, Liudmila. 2010. National Identity Dilemma: the “Who Are We?” Case of Belarus. The Annual of Language & Politics and Politics of Identity, Vol. IV. p. 31-44.

Reviewed journal ALPPI is published by Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Studies. www.alppi.eu

National Identity Dilemma: the “Who Are We?” Case of Belarus 1 Liudmila Volakhava 2 Abstract The article deals with the phenomenon of the Belarusian national identity, with a particular focus on its specific characteristics and attributes, taking into consideration the overall context and trends of the national consciousness shaping. By and large, the current tide of interest in the issue has been determined by a wide range of major and deep-rooted causes as well as a variety of external and internal factors. Given the consequences of the obtained national sovereignty, coupled with the utterly underdeveloped and deficient self-reflection of the post-soviet Belarusians, the above mentioned imperative becomes an issue of far greater concern of the recent political and analytical discourse. The author claims that the nucleus of the Belarusian national identity could be interpreted mainly in the context of the collective sense of membership and constituting a solid political community, a nation defined in terms of political determinants.

Key words national identity, Belarus, language policy, authoritarianism, nationalism, bilingualism

Timid men prefer the calm of despotism to the tempestuous sea of liberty. Thomas Jefferson

During the last two decades, modern Belarus has received the “oxygen of publicity” being labeled as the “unique case in the European context” [Lausten 2003] or the “odd one out” on the post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe political map, mainly due to its notorious

1 The article was written as a part of Research Plan of Department of Political Science, Institute of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague: MSM 0021620841 - Development of the Czech Society in the EU: challenges and risks.

2 Author Liudmila Volakhava is a Master Degree Candidate at the Institute of Political Studies of the Faculty of Social Sciences at Charles University in Prague. The areas of the author’s particular interest comprise the categories of national identity and nation-/identity-building (analyzed from the political perspective) as well as authoritarian regimes in the post-Soviet states. Contact: [email protected]

2 and highly controversial political regime personified by its first democratically elected president Alexander Lukashenko. Remarkably, both Western and home reputable think tanks have studied the state’s political system current functioning from a democracy standpoint, aimed at providing a multispectral image of today’s non-democratic Belarus – the country often specified as the “Cuba of Europe”, “the last Europe’s dictatorship”, a “Communism hotbed”, or classified as a sultanistic/neo-totalitarian/consolidated authoritarian system, to mention a few of the top-rated scholars’ cliché definitions associated with a state that has found itself “at a crossroads in history” [Zaprudnik 1993] after the demise of the . Most recently, however, a new trend tending to view Belarus as a tabula rasa on the outskirts of the European nations’ community, a “denationalized nation” [Marples 1999], a fictitious nation “in name only” [ Řezník 2007], “a post-colonial state” [Dan čák 1999], or somewhat “in between”, has been largely dominating the majority of the pundits’ analyses or mere observers’ assumptions on the issue, thus laying the foundation for the intellectuals’ reactions, controversial discourses and therefore entailing a perpetual debate on the topic. First and foremost, significant attention focused on the problem was determined by the relatively successful national resurgence and democratic transitions which occurred in Belarus’ closest neighboring states. Logically, a wide range of indicated dissimilarities triggered thorough research on the state- and nation-building aspects in what was supposed to constitute the sovereign Republic of Belarus. It emerged that most of the articulated arguments were likely to question and partially imperil the idea of Belarusian authentic national identity as a historical concept legitimate enough to serve as a solid ground for a traditional national state, diagnosed the lack of the required collective identity factor as a grave pathology and cultural handicap. In response to certain political events the interest in Belarusian national identity coupled with its characteristic and exceptional development circumstances has expanded well beyond academic circles involving local and international political and business figures and policy makers. A starting-point for the essay might be the question, whether the problem of inadequate national identity has (and still does) played the lead in Belarusian political and ideological framework, which can be addressed in a variety of substantially different ways. But, nevertheless, one thing seems clear: an attempt to resolve the permanent Belarusian identity dilemma by examining its very essence has the potential to submit the reasonable answers to the increasingly urgent questions that have engrossed today’s Belarus social and political landscape: why has no considerable change occurred by now? What’s the primordial source of the authoritarian regime stability? How come the Belarusian strongman Alexander

3 Lukashenko has preserved and consolidated his electoral base and high favorability despite the global economic recession aftermath? Why is there no significant popular support and solidarity with the nationally-minded political forces styling themselves as the West-backed democratic values’ advocates? It is commonly accepted to perceive an ethnic group’s close relation to the very fact of their belonging to the entity as a phenomenon of ethnic self-reflection, self-consciousness, or group/collective identity. Logically, the identity category is primarily associated with a certain territory, origin, socioeconomic, cultural and linguistic environment, albeit most nations’ individual evolution paradigms are not necessarily linked to the above-mentioned factors. That is why the ambition of this paper has been conceived as a merely historical and multidimensional “civilization” approach to interpreting Belarusian identity determinants. Generally, the nation “…can be defined as a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members” [Richmond 1984], whereas the afore- mentioned assumptions are meant to refer to the national identity core features. Broadly, “national identity and the nation are complex constructs composed of a number of interrelated components – ethnic, cultural, territorial, economic and legal-political” [Smith 1991]. Most the published studies, as well as experts’ papers and essays focused on Belarusian ambiguous self-identification, examine the problem from a rigidly historical perspective. According to numerous arguments and claims the entity’s historical background profound critical analyses, coupled with its self-determination as a social community, are considered to be the key element to interpretation. Given the burden of the paper is not to produce a survey of historic events, the sketchy trends are supposed to be the point of the essay’s greater concern. Speaking about the inherent milestones affecting Belarusian national identity and the formation of the cultural heritage pillars one should date back to the 13 th - 14 th centuries “balance of power”, to put it in modern social science vocabulary, when the area of today’s Belarus became codified as a geopolitical frontier – a territory exposed to the clash of two confronting civilization centers, i.e. the West (Europe) and the East (Eurasia). Historically, the permanent uncompromising conflict factor in the region resulted in consistent expansion of religious, socioeconomic, and political values : while during the 12 th - 15 th centuries the area appeared to be a crusades’ constant target, the belligerent symbol of the 16 th – 17 th were the Swedes. Likewise, the War of 1812, WWI, and WWII were regarded as originated in the West. At the same time, the Eastern dimension was no minor line at all, as the losses in the Livonian War series (1558-1583) counted up to 70% of ethnic Belarusian population in the

4 areas of Orsha and Mogilev, whereas the WWII human losses statistics emerged to be far more drastic, taking into consideration every third inhabitant fallen in action. In short, one argues that identifying the historical process on the whole could be fairly regarded as “civilizational” genocide due to the countless occupations and violent adaptation launched by the newcomers. What is more important, a natural aftereffect of the region’s wartime experience is linked directly to Belarusians’ extreme prudence (if not fear) syndrome distinguished and articulated by scholars’ careful “diagnosis”. These Belarusian mentality traits were a predictable Zeitgeist product allowing people to survive and get used to the hostile albeit inevitable conditions, thus nurturing the higher adaptability, adjustment, and even cooperation with new authorities. Most probably these were the circumstances the notorious Belarusian tolerance originated under 3. It should be noted that Belarus’s historic statehood experience is closely connected with multiethnic units’ tradition. Also, the statehood practice of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL) and Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (PLC) Belarusian lands were a constituent part of served as a solid local identity ground for a long period. B. Dan čák claims, that Belarusians’ “blurred national self- identification…might be interpreted in the light of the GDL ethos decay 4 and the consequent identity crisis...” [Dan čák, Fiala 2000: 214], as the GDL heritage influenced the Belarusians’ “authentic” national mythology substantially enough to be viewed by the 20 th century nationally-oriented political and intellectual circles as an integral factor for Belarusian national state. Herewith, the so-called civilization clash that was originated both in the GDL and PLC co-existence context, reached its climax after Rzeczpospolita third partition, and was aggravated by the intensive integration in the Russian Empire (overall Polonization versus ), determined the central conflict lines commonly defined as religious, political, economic, and cultural. So it’s no surprise that the cleavages are echoed back nowadays resonating with the confused “ghost” nation’s Herculean task - to remedy the acute self-

3 It goes without saying that national culture, literature, or folklore are generally considered to reflect a nation’s character, reveal its most prominent traits, and provide an overall outline of the entity’s historical background. Speaking about contemporary Belarus, one cannot help but notice the deep multi-generational meaning expressed in the national anthem (it should be pointed out, though, that this discourse deals with the official symbols of the Republic of Belarus, for it not to be confused with the attributes of the Belarusian National Republic in Exile). The core message has been embodied in the first verse which could be amateurishly translated (from Belarusian) into English as follows: “We, Belarusians, are peaceful people, wholeheartedly devoted to our Motherland. We are faithful friends, growing up and living in a hardworking and independent family…” [Source: http://president.gov.by/en/press29040.html#doc]. 4 Also, some scholars (D. Marples in [Korosteleva, Lawson, Marsh 2003]; [Dan čák, Fiala 2000]; [Eke, Kuzio 2000] et al.) suggest that “the loss of the city of Vilnius has been extremely dramatic and damaging to the long- term evolution of Belarusian national identity and its ability to promote historical myths in the contemporary situation…”, nevertheless, “Vilnius remains the ‘spiritual home’ of many Belarusian nationalists…” up to the present days [Eke, Kuzio 2000: 527].

5 awareness famine by apprehending distinctly the so-called “national truth” [Dan čák, Fiala 2000: 214]. In other words, according to some authors, today’s Belarus jeopardized identity code will be successfully legitimized as soon as the mysterious Belarusian soul solves the “who am I?” riddle by explicitly categorizing itself as a Belarusian (vis-à-vis Russians and Poles). The closely intertwined culture and identity lines fostered two prevalent rival concepts that were nourished mainly by the religious antagonism (Western Russianism and Polish Catholic motives), whereas an alternative semi-authentic Belarusian idea sought overcoming the initial duplicity through introducing “the locals’” identity model, thus opposing vigorously the dominating Russian (Orthodox) and Polish (Catholic) impact [more in Dan čák, Fiala 2000: 216-220]. As is well known, the Orthodox Church has been predominant in present-day Belarus, followed by the Catholic Church, since Protestantism in the area dates back to the 16 th century. Many scholars acknowledge the religion-based splitting being the leading indicator in dealing with the “influence zones”. Therefore eastern and central areas that historically occurred to be “under the auspices” of the Moscovite state tend to remain a stronghold of Orthodox tradition, whereas Catholic and Protestant denominations preserved stronger positions in the western part of the country. Regarded from an ideological standpoint, the Orthodox practice is characteristic for its inclination to penetrate into state institutions, call for influence and appeal to the faithful of the Church for relying upon the authority by entrusting it with their lives and authorizing to make vital decisions (therefore introducing the sacred triad: faith, Tsar, Motherland). Certainly, an analogy of the kind could be found in Belarus of today, since even the linguistic framework for addressing the country’s top official (president Lukashenko) contains apparently paternalistic attributes like “Father” (alias “Bat’ka” [in Belarusian]) and its vernacular derivatives. Hence, it’s a fair assumption that significant confessional differences had a great impact on the profane sphere, affecting the locals’ approach to such crucial aspects as labor or private property. Another point at issue, however, begs the question and the basic differences in terms of political culture. Absent consistent individual statehood experience, the Belarusian entity refers to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania period as the sole historically valid identity platform. Furthermore, given the local patriotically-minded intelligentsia supreme effort, profound research on its history and functioning has been carried out in the post-soviet times. It’s worth mentioning that a big number of GDL cities possessed the Magdeburg rights, which was regarded as an essential attribute of the Middle Age democracy implying the elected municipalities and their amenability to the citizens, to say nothing of their high degree of

6 autonomy. By contrast, Eurasian political tradition promoted a strictly centralized form of governing headed by a king, a tsar, an emperor, or a president, whereas the electoral and control mechanisms per se were totally out of the question. Consider too, that it was just the year of 1905 that the Russian authorities were pushed to introduce a new political body – the State Duma. With those premises in mind, we could make a point on the socioeconomic differences. As noted above, the principles of private property and free enterprise are believed to constitute the backbone of the European civilization value paradigm. Thus similar ideas remain vivid in the western part of Belarus regardless of the fierce repressions and rigid collectivization during the Soviet era. Despite the serfdom abolished in in 1861, its consequences affected the economy to a great extent up to the first decade of the 20 th century. Of course, it’s beyond the scope of the paper to provide a detailed outline of the region’s history, but a basic pattern should be shaped. All in all, the Belarusian entity turned out to be historically bereft of a chance to benefit from national statehood which was aggravated by the GDP - Polish unification and the following Russian takeover and prefaced the entity’s national consciousness degradation greatly. Ultimately, the massive colonization was intensified by tough Russification and Polonization of the population, especially culturally and linguistically by dominating the education, religious, and state personnel policy spheres. That is to say, that at least ten generations (provided that one generation period is of about 25 years) of Belarusians were deprived of statehood in terms of clearly national criteria. It’s generally argued that “what one might call the nationalist history of the 20 th century, on the other hand, is riddled with controversy…” [Korosteleva, Lawson, Marsh 2003: 22]. Officially, the independent Belarusian National Republic (still under German occupation) was declared in March 1918 (25.03.1918) by a group of intellectuals and military representatives to last just a few weeks, which marginalized its role as that of a national revival impetus, thus turning BNR into a mere symbol. Moreover, the establishment of the BSSR with all the ensuing consequences, including severe Bolshevist purges, proved to be a dramatic omen for the nationalist elite portrayed as the custodians of the Rzeczpospolita and Russian Empire historical and symbolic legacy. Thousands of scholars, cultural workers, and public figures became the victims of the Stalinist purges, which practically exterminated the national element in the country. The most striking fact, however, was the absence of a consolidated resistance movement aimed at changing the entity’s historic lot. A far greater problem, on the other hand, was that Belarus served as a model for extremely successful denationalization and Sovietization according to the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) notorious homo sovieticus concept. It’s therefore no coincidence that in case of Belarus the national

7 sovereignty was not granted as a reward for the years of stubborn and desperate struggle, but inherited after the USSR collapse. From this perspective, it didn’t seem confusingly paradoxical that the new state of Belarus lacked common articulate national identity, inasmuch as the vast majority of disaffected, inanimate, and nationally impaired Belarusians did not regard the Soviet values framework as somewhat alien to their nature and tradition. Yet the situation turned out to be just the opposite of the idealistic and absolutely unreasonable expectations the ephemeral national-democratic elites’ cherished at that historical crossroads, thus claiming to be a formation originated from a solid cultural and ethnic ground. Since one is not to judge by mere rhetoric but by particular political conduct, it would be the right moment to stress that conceived as a well-structured national democratic movement, BNF (Belarusian National [Popular] Front) was posing itself as an anti- Communist as well as anti-Russian force. Though, obviously, it lacked both experience and clear social transformation strategy to be introduced to fulfill the post-Communist ideological vacuum. There can be little doubt that the BNF anti-Communist rhetoric let them receive a powerful backing from the working class and the nationalist-oriented intelligentsia. Meanwhile, the Front’s increasingly Russophobe sentiments provoked a backlash from the vehement adversaries of the aggressive Belarusization policy and played a mean trick on the party’s top representatives and its mentor Zianon Pazniak. Incidentally, the first (and by now only) more or less democratic presidential elections resulted in a decisive victory of a “stranger” associated with neither old nomenclature, nor nationalist political circles. A. Lukashenka “portrayed himself as a man of the people, he spoke their simple and non- convoluted language, he was nostalgic about the Soviet past and ties with Russia, and he was hostile to nationalists representing the Belarusian Popular Front and their ideals. In short, he was a symptom of the sentiments of many Belarusians, particularly the elderly, those living in rural areas close to the Russian border, and the military, espousing political ideas and ideals that reflected their political past.” [Korosteleva, Lawson, Marsh 2003: 28]. Given the premises, the question whether it was a singular historical coincidence, ill fate, or just meant to be, should remain unanswered to fuel a debate…Despite the interpretations available, it is obvious enough that the absurdity and tactics ingenuousness of the national resurgence idea- mongers’ reached its very climax as they endeavored to evoke historical consciousness by promoting rigidly mythologized and politicized ideals of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which was absolutely unlikely to resonate with the public mood. Formal celebrations of the Day of Belarusian Military Fame (commemorating the episodic Battle of Orsha of 1514 [in the context of the fourth Russian-Lithuanian War 1512-1522]), or implanting the historical

8 symbols associated not solely with the GDL knights, but also discredited by Belarusian WWII collaborators, together with rousing national hatred and grossly exaggerated propagation, could be just a few glaring examples to mention. As a result, the promising nationalist movement aspiring to breathe new life into the national state and revitalize national identity was entrapped and withdrawn from the race ending up as half- dissident Lukashenko’s vocal critics whose impact on the national political landscape does not go beyond a statistical error. All in all, Belarusian national revival process appeared to “mutate” into Belarusians’ national degeneration. Furthermore, when the “moment of truth” occurred giving the entity a chance to build up a democratic national state, the lack of the family feeling predetermined the nation’s weak consolidation and its political choice for an authoritarian model with subtle tints of Eurasianism. Assumptions of this sort provide an explanation why the majority of the population doesn’t identify itself as a nation. Independent public opinion survey on the inherent principals of the Belarusian nation indicates that the civil (state) attribute tends to prevail greatly. Interestingly enough, the most common answer to the question “What is the Belarusian nation for you/How could you define the Belarusian nation?” was “all the citizens of the Republic of Belarus regardless of their ethnicity, mother tongue, or national tradition” (38,2 % of respondents), whereas only 26,8% of respondents advocate the ethnicity primacy regardless of permanent residence or citizenship. Although an insignificant minority of Belarusians speak the titular language on a daily basis, over 25% of respondents addressed it as the innate determinant of the nation [ Source : http://www.iiseps.org/12-06-4.html]. Consider too, that over 64% of the polled defined themselves as relate to Belarusian cultural tradition vis-à-vis 13,6% of respondents who appeared to associate themselves with the Russian cultural space, while 13,3% with the Soviet, and mere 8% with the European cultural framework. I claim that national identity per se is a highly relative and loose concept, which is to be taken into account in any research or study. A working definition of the national identity category comprises the whole scope of socio-cultural, economic, and political bonds, as well as the extent of individuals’ commitment and involvement. Perhaps the most crucial Belarusian specificity in terms of self-identification process is being fully directed and controlled by the political establishment. Actually, it was the Belarusian strongman Alexander Lukashenko who managed to detect and appraise the significance of the country’s clash from the current geopolitical constellation perspective determined by the Eastern Partnership (the West) versus The Union State of Russia and Belarus confrontation. It emerged that it is primarily the statehood factor - focused on consolidating the state independence - to shape and affect the

9 self-identification progress in Belarusian case. But what is most important, the authentic language-culture dilemma is viewed by a vast majority of Belarusians as neither a point of great concern, nor an urgent issue to gain an advantage over Belarusian sovereignty. Thus, according to the authorities’ official slogan message propagated during the presidential electioneering of 2006 (advocating “the prosperous, strong, and independent Belarus”), the regime version of a “catch-all” national idea absorbed some of the BNF authentic political postulates to be in tune with the nationalist adherents. Recently, a new trend has been set to revise the outdated imperial-Soviet values and to revive the native principles instead by introducing a “new” national dimension. According to summarized public opinion survey data providing a retrospective public mood overview during a 3-year period (2006-2009), the overall attitude towards the fundamental issues has changed substantially (given a relatively short time period): the percentage of the Russia-Belarus Union ardent supporters decreased from 46,4% to 39% 5, whereas the number of the pro-Union-minded respondents decreased by almost 21% when they had to choose between the Union and the EU (59,1% in 2005 versus 38,3% in 2009) [ Source : http://www.iiseps.org/trend.html]. Furthermore, certain changes have been observed regarding the European integration perspectives for Belarus: over 44% of the respondents would approve of Belarus becoming a European Union member (compared to 32% in 2005) [ Source : http://www.iiseps.org/trend.html ]. But as it has been already noted, ethnocultural values still remain a side issue vis-à-vis state and politics. At the same time, the current situation brings forward the relevance of the national culture promotion in order to encourage the process of self-identification, although the aspiration is quite problematic in the increasingly informationally, culturally, economically, and politically interconnected “flat” world. Under the current circumstances, the Russian media dominating Belarusian media space together with intensive labor migration flows from Belarus to Russia (mainly Moscow), a large number of mixed marriages, the growing influence of Moscow Patriarchate etc. could be named among the most powerful stimuli pushing the Belarusians’ self-identification process in the Euroasian direction. So to sum up, the ethnic component of Belarusian national identity today cannot be regarded as an absolute indicator, for it represents just one side of the phenomenon, provided that most surveys and analyses reveal the Belarusians’ deep-rooted longing for an independent state offering political and social stability (the methods, however, are not at issue here), which is considered to be the major value compared to “ephemeral

5 The question was formulated as “If you were to vote in a referendum on Russia-Belarus unification today… ”

10 profundities” like democracy, the Belarusian language, or the GDL legacy, politicized and misinterpreted by the modern national resurgence preachers. As for other peculiarities of the Belarusian self-identification model, a fragmentary cultural linguistic basis (e.g. the predominant position, whereas Belarusian has been virtually consigned to limbo in everyday life; the so-called “trasianka” as a vernacular used mainly in rural areas; speaking Belarusian is a priori associated with certain political preferences, nationalist and pro-democracy intellectuals, or the opposition) could be named. This aspect makes the identity formation in compliance with the traditional language model. Generally, a grave misinterpretation of this very fact by the BNF leader Z. Pazniak resulted in the nationalists’ striking defeat in the first presidential elections in 1994, as A. Lukashenko managed to unprecedentedly exploit the tense cultural and language situation to win the election under pro-Russian (or rather pro-Soviet) slogans. The election outcome highlighted that Belarusization policy, both conceptually and practically, due to the atmosphere of overall discredit of the democratic transformations in the post-Soviet area, ethnically motivated conflicts, etc., was in fact tantamount to a political suicide. In the aftermath of the nationalists’ rigid and uncompromising political conduct, the BNF ended up as a totally marginalized elite-like formation of national linguists. All in all, peaceful consensual cultural coexistence with both, East and West, as well as Orthodoxy and Catholicism, in Belarusian context is highly probable without coercion, although any form of unity is still unlikely. I claim that the national idea nourished solely by the tutelary language, cultural, or ethnic components is not in great demand in contemporary Belarus, since the Belarusians still refer to their nation in terms of sovereignty, common law, and social order. It should be emphasized, however, that there is no evidence of common consent on the issue in scholarly circles. Belarusian expert V. Akudovich claims that “while Belarusian intellectuals were preoccupied by resolving the problem of ethnic and cultural unity, the Belarusian nation was “built”, albeit on different grounds…” [Volodazhskaja 2008]. In contrast to this view, V. Bulgakov advocated the existence of a consolidated Belarusian identity based on “the GDL legacy/continuity, Catholicism, and the Belarusian language” [Volodazhskaja 2008], which he defines as the greatest challenge for modern Belarus. But on the whole, numerous statements and opinions can be divided into two main groups according to a preferred national identity pattern: either bringing the so-called nation project to a conclusion by adopting existing “universal models” [Volodazhskaja 2008], or focusing on processing a nationally-neutral concept to address the current situation in a proper way.

11 A search for solid solutions for Belarusian identity dilemma begs another question: why do we generally attribute such paramount importance to this problem? And why do many authors believe that, given a distinctive identity element, Belarusians would have chosen another political option, or would not have tolerated grave democracy fundamentals violation. It’s a fair assumption, however, that “…the people bereft of national or civil self-awareness do not constitute a regime opposition, but obedient material in authorities’ hands. Whenever authorities hold a referendum on the EU integration, Belarus will tacitly follow Europe, but in case of union with Russia, the country will drift in the opposite direction abandoning the sovereign right for self-determination” [Manajev 2005: 734]. Yet paradoxically, Belarusian post-Communist officialdom headed by president Lukashenko happened to be a deviancy compared to other USSR succession states, as it underestimated the role and importance of the newly acquired independence, hence intending to jeopardize the state sovereignty by selflessly promoting the integration project with Russia (and Ukraine as it was primarily suggested). And even today the ticklish topic of the state independence remains the regime’s geopolitical trump card played to satisfy the requirements of the higher-ups. Secondly, an overwhelming majority of the republic’s population voted de facto for the Russian language prevalence vis-à-vis Belarusian in the president-initiated referendum of 1995 covering a number of relevant issues, including that of the Russian language official status. Vox populi granted Russian the status of the state’s official language equal to Belarusian which confirmed and legitimized bilingualism in the country 6 [more on the Belarusian language in Dan čák, Fiala 2001; Ioffe 2003; Smolicz, Radzik 2004; Riegl, Vaško 2007]. By the same token, the titular national culture remained the culture of a national minority, for the national self- awareness bearers vehemently opposed Lukashenko regime. Basically, national self-consciousness implies a higher degree of social consolidation, benign conditions for statehood claims, and, of course, a far more effective national state, both within and outside the country. The unexpected independence fallen to the Belarusians’ (meaning the inhabitants of the former BSSR) lot after the collapse of the USSR produced a national state with all the crucial attributes, but its population, albeit placed in absolutely new political borders, still positioned itself as the Soviet citizens (both politically and mentally) and thus experienced deep frustration and disaffection in the newly established context. As noted above, all the citizens regardless of their social/linguistic/professional background were

6 “In 1998, “the Law about Languages” was amended in a peculiar way: the choice between Belarusian and Russian for official usage was left to individual bureaucrats, with freedom to choose either one” [Korosteleva, Lawson, Marsh 2003: 116].

12 forced to participate in the complex and extremely dolorous social adaptation process in the light of a critical social disorientation, the so-called interim syndrome, an acute de- identification and denationalization. So to summarize the key aspects that have determined (and still affect) the Belarusian self-identification, it would be reasonable to sketch internal and external factors. While Russian increasingly consistent foreign policy towards its Western neighbor (Belarus), the EU, the Moscow Patriarchate, as well as Holy See, with their cultural and information intervention, represent the outer vector, the internal factors include: 1) authorities’ current political course declaring the state independence solemnity instead of the Pan-Slavic orientation (popularized in 1994-2000/2002) allowing limited medialization of genuinely Belarusian cultural, language, and historic values under state control; smoothing over the contradictions with Vatican; 2) NGOs, political parties and movements, non-state sector with a pronounced nationalist or national-democratic program. With this caveat in mind, certain specific factors supplementing the nation’s self-identity should be accentuated: 1) social demographic (mixed marriages, centre-periphery cleavage as for culture standards, Chernobyl issue, largely impoverished and marginalized population, labor migration to Russia, disastrous demographics, a large number of former Soviet military officers resided in Belarus after the demise of the USSR); 2) close connection between the modern Belarusian identity pillars and the paradigms of the post-Soviet consciousness; 3) the civil self- determination is intertwined with the people’s social and political considerations. I argue that the burden of an effective national idea apt to fit the contemporary situation in Belarus as well as resonate with the public mood is to preserve and reinforce the state independence. Firstly, it implies the country’s transformation into a sovereign national state and, consequently, dealing with the authoritarian regime elimination problem in order to ensure a successful democratic transition. Provided that the monumental task is fulfilled, it would be the right time for a democratic Belarusization policy on a voluntary basis aimed at introducing a consensual pattern taking into consideration the minorities’ rights and preferences. In other words, an updated national idea is to focus on the political content, instead of rigidly emphasizing the cultural dimension. Furthermore, the lessons from the nationalists’ (BNF) history reveal that the most reasonable takeoff for the denationalized entity would be defining Belarusians as all the citizens of the newly formed state avoiding politicizing the ethnic origin or the language issue 7. Such an approach has the potential to

7 It should be stressed that many scholars have been confused with a false assumption that gained predominant significance since A. Lukashenka took up the reins of power. It’s been widely accepted that Belarusian speakers “tend to be more pro-democracy oriented compared to Russian-speaking Belarusians. It emerged, however, that

13 create another consolidating platform for the opposition – a “catch-all” democratic movement on pro-statehood or pro-independence grounds – which is likely to extend the democratic forces’ social base, promote the democratic principles and ideas more efficiently among the regime’s supporters, avoid the extremes and perils of ethnocentricity, and finally re-open the door to Europe. This goal, however, appears to be highly problematic because of the lack of concerted action in the pro-democracy camp. I truly believe that the origination of Belarusians’ national identity on the ethnic and cultural basis in modern circumstances is hardly possible due to the apparent civilization clash in the area. Otherwise, it would generate two separate entities moving in opposite directions: one towards the Russian Orthodox identity, whereas the other will be guided by the European “family” and influenced by Polish Catholic tradition substantially. Paradoxically, today’s most consistent and vigorous propagator of a constructive universally-accepted national idea model is none other than Europe’s “last dictator” (though recent progress in Belarus-EU relations smoothed the European elites’ tone and rhetoric). As is well known, the dawn of Lukashenko’s presidential path was marked by a clearly pro-Russian inclination, his advocating the “good old” Soviet social setup, and zealous Pan-Slavism in the hope of inheriting the Kremlin throne. The unexpected geopolitical turnout, given the Belarusian strongman managed to benefit from the population’s inside-out USSR-made identity to consolidate his power, compelled the leader to exonerate and adopt some of the nationalist core maxims - those of sovereignty and the national state supremacy - to his political discourse. Consequently, the about-face in the regime’s rhetoric intensified the latent self- identification process, thus implicitly revealing the fact that Russia-Belarus integration as well as the recent Eastern Partnership initiative are nothing more than a Lukashenko’s geopolitical trick. That is why, some of the prominent pro-democracy opposition representatives are eager to cooperate with the high profile officials on temporary terms to support the president’s genuine national interests’ uphold (A. Milinkevich could be a proper example). There’s no doubt that authoritarianism has been more of a necessity from its very first days, for even today its ideological and power resources remain quite stable. Moreover, the self- identification development turned out to be directed from above by means of the state efficient ideology machinery covering the official media space 8. Perhaps the best way to sum

Belarusian speakers support A. Lukashenko to a much greater extent than those speaking Russian. The Belarusian language is spoken mainly by the elderly and poorly-educated people of the rural areas notorious for their ‘conservatism’” [Manajev 2005: 72-73]. 8 The state-triggered “re-Belarusization” implies the pro-national propaganda measures as: introducing a new state TV channel focused on national culture issues (advocating the historical values of the Belarusian entity),

14 up the above-mentioned observations is to point out that in the light of the Belarusians’ gradually formed self-awareness the generally accepted democratic ideals are still not perceived as a topic du jour by a grand majority of the population vis-à-vis cherished social and political stability. By and large, the Belarusian national identity can be interpreted as a Belarusian defining himself as an integral part of the political community granting a fair cultural/language diversity combining Orthodox, Catholic, and Soviet maxims.

References

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