Nos. 61–2 Articles Published in the Newspaper Pravda in September–October 1919

18 September–12 October 1919

No. 61

‘The Lessons of Mamontov’1 18 September 1919

Mamontov’s cavalry has yet to be liquidated. After being driven out of Tambov province, it moved to Tula and the eastern part of Orel. Departing Orel and Tula, it began operating in Voronezh. From Voronezh, it will move wherever it has to, because our pursuing infantry cannot keep pace with it and is lagging some consider- able distance behind. And even if Mamontov’s force breaks through our frontlines in the near future and rejoins Denikin’s main forces, we can expect the same or a similar detachment to reappear soon, because the enemy’s first experience of a large-scale cavalry-attack

1. [From Pravda, 18 September 1919. The Russian-language title is: ‘Уроки Мамонтовщины’, There is no literal translation of this into English, but the term ‘Mamantovshchina’ evokes the sense of a ‘terrible experience’ with Mamontov. From 10 August to 19 September 1919, General Mamontov led a Cossack cavalry-raid in the rear of the Red Army’s southern front with the aim of disrupting a counter-attack by Soviet forces. On 10 August, Mamontov broke through Soviet defensive lines in the region of Novokhopersk, and from 18–31 August, captured Tambov, Kozlov and Elets. Burdened with heavy wagons and losing manoeuvrability, Mamontov was surrounded and made a difficult retreat back to the frontlines to link up, on 18–19 September, with a force under General Shkuro, sent by Denikin to assist Mamontov.] 486 • The Preobrazhensky Papers: Archival Documents and Materials on our rear has been so completely successful. It would be odd to think that it will not be repeated. The Denikinites have found a new way of utilising their superiority in cavalry. We must quickly find some way of utilising our superiority in infantry, and of employing all our resources in general, in the struggle against future attempts to disrupt our rear with impunity. What do the facts tell us? Tambov, Kozlov and Elets were surrendered to the Cossacks almost without a fight. In places where the Cossacks did meet with more-or-less stubborn resis- tance, in Rannenburg2 for example, they retreated and avoided any significant losses. This is understandable. A detachment that has broken through to the rear not only conserves its forces, which would otherwise melt away with every passing day, but also avoids becoming a large convoy, which is inevitable if it accumulates many wounded. The first conclusion to draw from these facts is the following. Behind our front, in the adjacent rear, we must create an uninter- rupted line of large and small strongholds that will be able to mount major or minor resistance to the very end, to the last soldier and the last cartridge. More- over, every narrow junction, all the large bridges, and generally every place that might be of interest to the robbers must be transformed into such a stronghold. All the garrisons of these reinforced positions must be more-or-less permanent forces, and every Red-Army man, along with every Communist in a reinforced position, must be especially accountable and subject to the most severe punish- ment for failing to show sufficient resistance to the enemy. Next, we must quickly reinforce the organisation of partisan-detachments on foot and horseback, which we have already begun, and they must tirelessly remain on the enemy’s heels without ever losing sight of him. All available auto- mobiles and motorcycles must likewise be used for this purpose. Further, it is necessary to establish assembly-points and the personnel for small partisan-detachments of Communists and sympathisers, who must remain in position without fail in the event of an enemy-attack and begin to operate exclusively in his rear. Then we must fundamentally change the practice of pursuing cavalry with masses of our regular infantry. Up to now, almost all of our infantry forces that have encountered Mamontov’s elusive supporters have, in fact, been useless and out of action, as if they did not even exist on the internal front. It is imperative to pursue the enemy with unbroken lines of infantry, however thin they may be. Only with such a system of pursuit can the latter assume a systematic charac- ter and, together with the lines of defensive strongholds, provide any essential result.

2. [In 1948, Rannenburg was renamed Chaplygin.]