Soft Power, Hard Times: Russian Influence in the Post-Soviet Space during Periods of Military Conflict A thesis submitted to The University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities 2020 Connell S. Beggs School of Arts, Languages and Cultures Contents Figures and Tables 5 Acronyms 7 Abstract 8 Declaration 9 Copyright Statement 9 Note on Translation and Transliteration 10 Acknowledgements 11 Introduction 12 Concepts and Case Studies 16 Methodology 32 Thesis Structure 43 Chapter I. Research Context: Main Cultural Organisations, Central Concepts and Key Actors 47 1.1 Introduction 47 1.2 The Russian Orthodox Church: Status and State Ties 48 1.2.1 Domestic Concepts on the Church-State Relationship: ‘Symphonia’ and ‘Spiritual Security’ 48 1.2.2 Influence and Interests in the ‘Near’ and ‘Far’ Abroad 68 1.3 Fond ‘Russkii Mir’: State Influence Abroad 72 1.3.1 Defining the ‘Russian World’ Concept 72 1.3.2 FRM – Formation, Remit and State Ties 81 1.4 Conclusion 86 Chapter II. ‘Soft Power’ or ‘Hybrid Warfare’? Defining and Assessing the Conceptual Framework 90 2.1 Introduction 90 2.2 ‘Soft Power’ 92 2.3 ‘Hybrid Warfare’ 102 2.3.1 HW: Non-Academic Literature 102 2.3.2 HW: Academic Literature 111 2 2.4 ‘Information Warfare’ 117 2.4.1 IW: Non-Academic Literature 118 2.4.2 IW: Academic Literature 125 2.5 ‘Strategic Narratives’ 129 2.6 Conclusion 131 Chapter III. Conflict Coverage on Russian Television: State-Controlled Pervyi Kanal as the Kremlin’s Mouthpiece 134 3.1 Introduction 134 3.1.1 State of the Media: Television in Russia 136 3.1.2 Russian Media in the ‘Near Abroad’ 144 3.2 Pervyi Kanal’s News Coverage of the Russo-Georgian War 147 3.2.1 Pre-Conflict Period: 8th May – 7th August 2008 151 3.2.2 During-Conflict Period: 8th – 12th August 2008 156 3.2.3 Post-Conflict Period: 13th August – 12th November 2008 160 3.3 Pervyi Kanal’s News Coverage of the Ukraine Crisis 164 3.3.1 Russian Television in Ukraine: Availability, Audience Engagement and Public Trust 165 3.3.2 An Analysis of Scholarly Literature on Pervyi Kanal’s Coverage of the Ukraine Crisis 172 3.4 Conclusion 181 Chapter IV. Conflict Representations by an Organic Cultural Organisation: The Russian Orthodox Church 186 4.1 Introduction 186 4.2 OSMP’s News Coverage of the Russo-Georgian War 190 4.2.1 Pre-Conflict Period: 1st January – 7th August 2008 195 4.2.2 During-Conflict Period: 8th – 12th August 2008 200 4.2.3 Post-Conflict Period: 13th August – 12th November 2008 203 4.3 OSMP’s News Coverage of the Ukraine Crisis 212 4.3.1 Pre-Conflict Period: 21st November 2013 – 26th February 2014 217 4.3.2 During-Conflict Period: 27th February 2014 – 23rd February 2015 222 4.3.3 Post-Conflict Period: 24th February 2015 – 31st December 2015 225 4.4 Conclusion 229 3 Chapter V. Conflict Representations by a Manufactured Cultural Organisation: Fond ‘Russkii Mir’ 233 5.1 Introduction 233 5.1.1 Sources and Method 235 5.2 RM’s News Coverage of the Russo-Georgian War 238 5.3 RM’s News Coverage of the Ukraine Crisis 240 5.3.1 Pre-Conflict Period: 21st November 2013 – 26th February 2014 241 5.3.2 During-Conflict Period: 27th February 2014 – 23rd February 2015 246 5.3.3 Post-Conflict Period: 24th February 2015 – 31st December 2015 253 5.4 Engagement from and Impact on Audiences at RM 254 5.5 Conclusion 259 Conclusion 264 Summary: The Russo-Georgian War 265 Summary: The Ukraine Crisis 266 Analysis of the Findings 268 Implications of the Research 272 Limitations of the Research 276 Suggestions for Further Research 277 Bibliography 279 Appendix I. Major Patterns and Shifts in Crisis-Related Output on OSMP 325 Appendix II. Critical Discourse Analysis of OSMP News Reports 328 Framing Techniques during the Russo-Georgian War 328 Framing Techniques during the Ukraine Crisis 334 Appendix III. Critical Discourse Analysis of RM News Reports 341 Framing Techniques during the Russo-Georgian War 341 Framing Techniques during the Ukraine Crisis 346 Word Count: 75,548 4 Figures and Tables Chapter III Figure 3.1: Breakdown of Pervyi Kanal’s News Reports on the Russo-Georgian War Coded as ‘TENSIONS’ 153 Figure 3.2: Frequency of Pervyi Kanal’s News Reports on the Russo-Georgian War (‘WAR’ and ‘(GEO)POLITICAL COMMENTARY’) 159 Figure 3.3: Frequency of Pervyi Kanal’s News Reports on the Russo-Georgian War by Theme 162 Figure 3.4: Percentage of Ukrainians Receiving Russian TV Channels through Analogue Antenna in 2016 167 Figure 3.5: Russian Analogue TV Transmitters (i.e., Triangles) and Predicted Signal Strength at Polling Stations in 2018 169 Figure 3.6: Level of Trust in Russian Television in Ukraine (%) 171 Figure 3.7: Frequency of News Coverage of Ukraine on Pervyi Kanal 172 Table 3.1: Frequency of Pervyi Kanal’s News Reports on the Russo-Georgian War 152 Chapter IV Figure 4.1: Frequency of News Reports on the Russo-Georgian War on OSMP and Pervyi Kanal 197 Figure 4.2: Frequency of OSMP’s News Reports on the Russo-Georgian War (August 2008) 204 Figure 4.3: Frequency of OSMP’s News Reports on the Russo-Georgian War (‘PEACEKEEPING’ and ‘HUMANITARIANISM’) 206 Figure 4.4: Frequency of OSMP’s News Reports on the Ukraine Crisis 219 Figure 4.5: Frequency of OSMP’s News Reports on the Ukraine Crisis (‘PEACEKEEPING’ and ‘HUMANITARIANISM’) 224 Figure 4.6: Frequency of OSMP’s News Reports on the Ukraine Crisis by 5 Theme and Time-Period 226 Figure 4.7: Frequency of OSMP’s News Reports on the Ukraine Crisis (‘HUMANITARIANISM’ and ‘PERSECUTION’) 228 Table 4.1: Frequency of OSMP’s News Reports on the Russo-Georgian War 196 Table 4.2: Frequency of OSMP’s News Reports on the Ukraine Crisis 218 Chapter V Figure 5.1: Frequency of News Reports on the Ukraine Crisis on RM and OSMP 242 Figure 5.2: Frequency of RM’s News Reports on the Ukraine Crisis (‘POLITICS’ and ‘CULTURE’) 250 Figure 5.3: Frequency of RM’s News Reports on the Ukraine Crisis (‘HUMANITARIANISM’ and ‘MMST’ + ‘MEDIA’) 252 Table 5.1: Frequency of RM’s News Reports on the Ukraine Crisis 244 Appendix I Table A1: Main Patterns and Shifts in Coverage of the Russo-Georgian War on OSMP 325 Table A2: Main Patterns and Shifts in Coverage of the Ukraine Crisis on OSMP 325 Table A3: Correlations between Variables in Coverage of the Ukraine Crisis on OSMP 326 6 Acronyms AOC Abkhazian Orthodox Church CDA Critical Discourse Analysis CEPA Center for European Policy Analysis CIS Confederation of Independent States CLA ‘compatriots living abroad’ FRM Fond ‘Russkii Mir’ FSB Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (Federal Security Service) GOC Georgian Orthodox Church GONGO government-organised non-governmental organisation GPW Great Patriotic War HMA Holy Metropolis of Abkhazia HW ‘hybrid war(fare)’ IW ‘information war(fare)’ KIIS Kiev International Institute of Sociology MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation OSMP Ofitsial’nyi Sait Moskovskogo Patriarkhata (Official Website of the Moscow Patriarchate) RM Russkii Mir ROC Russian Orthodox Church ROCOR Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia UAOC Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church UGCC Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church UOC-KP Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kiev Patriarchate) UOC-MP Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) 7 Abstract Russia’s assertive foreign policy since 2004 has caused much concern in the West. Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, many Western commentators have claimed that Russia has adopted a new military strategy called ‘hybrid warfare’, in which the country’s main cultural organisations that have a presence in neighbouring post-Soviet states are mere tools at the disposal of the Russian government. In response, these cultural organisations deny such accusations, with many of Russia’s state representatives arguing that they simply engage in public and cultural diplomacy and, as a result, are agents of Russian ‘soft power’. To understand the nature of Russia’s activities on the international stage, this thesis investigates the role of two main cultural organisations, the Russian Orthodox Church and Fond ‘Russkii Mir’, in support of the Kremlin’s policies during two major cases of Russian military intervention in the so-called ‘near abroad’ – the Russo-Georgian War (2008) and the Ukraine crisis (2013–present day). To address this issue, conflict representations disseminated on the media outlets of these organisations were assessed and compared to those on the state- controlled, Kremlin-aligned television channel Pervyi Kanal. A content analysis, thematic analysis and frame analysis were conducted in order to evaluate the outlets’ narrative framing of these two military conflicts. Whilst concluding that neither the concept of ‘hybrid warfare’ nor ‘soft power’ are useful analytical tools for understanding the activities of Russia’s cultural organisations during these military conflicts, this research reveals a significant difference in the activities of the ROC and FRM. Despite organisational autonomy being restricted in times of crisis, the Russian Orthodox Church expressed significant agency, which was evident from its deviation from the Kremlin-preferred line on issues of direct relevance to its own interests. Conversely, no such deviation occurred with Fond ‘Russkii Mir’. Consequently, this thesis demonstrates that the specific agendas and agencies of Kremlin-affiliated actors within Russia are dependent on the nature of such actors’ relationships with the country’s political leadership. 8 Declaration No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.