PART 5 Science, Technology, and Global Security

Overview we continue to confront the challenging issue of global security. Joel Primack, one of the world’s Contemporary international science and tech- leading cosmologists, set the stage for the panel nology policy engages problems as wide ranging presentations with an insightful commentary on as nuclear proliferation, terrorism, climate change, the moral and ethical issues surrounding science and genocide. The successful analysis of those and technology advising in this arena. Frank von issues promises peace and stability, not only for Hippel of Princeton University launched the ses- our nation, but for the world. sion with his observations on the relationship In recent years, the American Association for between how governments understand genuine the Advancement of Science expanded its science dangers and what must be done to prioritize and and technology policy fellowship programs to reduce those dangers. Following von Hippel, Victor include a fellowship in global security, in collabo- Utgoff from the Institute for Defense Analyses and ration with the Nuclear Threat Initiative. This new Maureen McCarthy from the Department of Home- fellowship demonstrates the seriousness with land Security each offered important observations which the science community views this subject: on science and technology’s relevance for nuclear AAAS noted that “the fellowship will provide a nonproliferation and international policy negotia- unique public policy learning experience, tions, emphasizing the need to have the broad including policy development, implementation, engagement of the scientific community at each and evaluation for professionals from biomedical level of discussion–from first responders to the and public health backgrounds. Fellows will gain most senior levels of planning and policymaking. expertise in national strategy as it applies to bio- Julie Fischer, a fellow from the Henry Stimson logical weapons, the architecture of federal Center, rounded out the presentations by response efforts, international arms control agree- addressing global disease threats, pointing out ments and negotiations, and mechanisms of gov- that both science and technology have the poten- ernmental funding for all these efforts.” tial to make a real difference through global dis- On the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the ease surveillance strategies. George C. Fidas of AAAS Science and Technology Policy Fellowship George Washington University concluded the Programs, we were fortunate to be able to formal presentations with further useful insights assemble a panel of experts whose breadth of into the intelligence community’s response to experience and profound insights demonstrated infectious diseases, noting that infectious dis- the important role science and technology play as eases are now a prominent feature of the interna-

Science, Technology, and Global Security: Overview 93 tional community’s health and political agenda. Together these experts underscored the signif- icant role science and technology policy can play in addressing the challenges of global security. As both Maureen McCarthy and Julie Fischer were themselves AAAS Fellows, their contributions were poignant reminders of the value of that set of experts on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the program.

94 Vision 2033: Linking Science and Policy for Tomorrow’s World

Introduction: Joel Primack

Joel Primack is one of the world’s leading cosmolo- on the board of the Federation of American Scientists gists, specializing in the formation and evolution of and was a founder of the Union of Concerned Scien- galaxies and the nature of the dark matter that tists. He is currently a member of the APS Panel on makes up at least 90 percent of all the matter in the Public Affairs. He has also served as an advisor to universe. Dr. Primack received his A.B. from and participant in the Science and the Spiritual Princeton in 1966 and his Ph.D. from Stanford in Quest project, and as chairman of the advisory com- 1970. Since 1973, he has been on the faculty of the mittee for the AAAS Program of Dialogue on Science, University of California, Santa Cruz. After helping to Ethics, and Religion. create what is now called the “Standard Model” of particle physics, Dr. Primack began working in cos- mology in the late 1970s, and he became a leader in the new field of particle astrophysics. He is one of the principal originators and developers of the theory of Cold Dark Matter, which has become the basis for the As your moderator, I welcome you to this session on standard modern picture of structure formation in global security. We are here, at least in part, to celebrate the universe. With support from the National Science the Science and Technology Fellowship Programs. In Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space 1970–1973, I played the main role in starting the Con- Administration, and the Department of Energy, he is gressional Science Fellows Program for AAAS and the currently using supercomputers to simulate and American Physical Society (APS). The program grew visualize the evolution of the universe under various out of one of the first of the Stanford Workshops on assumptions, and comparing the predictions of Political and Social Issues (SWOPSI). I organized and these theories to the latest observational data. led this workshop with Bob Jaffe, Frank von Hippel, and In addition to more than 200 technical articles in Martin Perl in 1969–1970.1 SWOPSI courses were professional journals, Dr. Primack has written a co-led by grad students (Jaffe and me, in this case) and number of articles aimed at a popular audience, faculty. They were unusual in that they aimed to including essays in the World Book Encyclopedia, improve the world—typically by doing studies on public Astronomy, Beam Line, California Wild, Sky and Tele- issues—as well as to educate. Our workshop was scope, the McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science, and focused on improving U.S. decisionmaking on techno- the Encyclopedia of Astronomy and Astrophysics. logical issues. One of our projects was to prepare a ques- Dr. Primack shared the American Physical Society’s tionnaire for Congress, which was distributed by Forum on Physics and Society Award in 1977 with Senator Alan Cranston and Representative Jeffrey Frank von Hippel of Princeton for their book Advice Cohelan. Of the several ideas we suggested, the two and Dissent: Scientists in the Political Arena (Basic that were most popular were a science advisory agency Books, 1974; New American Library, 1976). In 1995 for Congress (much like the subsequent Office of Tech- Dr. Primack was made a Fellow of the American Asso- nology Assessment), and a program of young scientists ciation for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), serving for a year on Congressional staffs. “for pioneering efforts in the establishment of the Our workshop wrote an analysis of the Congres- AAAS Congressional Science Fellows Program and sional questionnaire, and Frank von Hippel and I wrote for dedication to expanding the use of science in pol- a more general report, The Politics of Technology. I then icymaking throughout government.” He has served set out to try to get our recommendations implemented

Science, Technology, and Global Security: Primack 95 while I began my scientific career. When I was a Har- Cooper and Michael Telson and biologist Jessica vard junior fellow in 1970–1973, Ed Purcell was very Tuchman [Mathews]. Ben Cooper, one of the first two supportive of these ideas, and he got me appointed to APS Fellows, gave up tenure at Iowa State after his fel- relevant committees of APS and AAAS. I sought out lowship year to join the staff of the Senate Interior Com- other receptive officers of these organizations and mittee, subsequently renamed Energy and Natural worked with other young activists. Among my impor- Resources, where he remained for more than twenty tant allies in the effort to create the fellowship programs years. Michael Telson had received his Ph.D. from the were AAAS Treasurer William T. Golden and Carleton Massachusetts Institute of Technology just before College physics professor Barry M. Casper (who was becoming a AAAS Fellow. After his fellowship year, he also an early leader of the APS Forum on Physics and had offers from three universities and several federal Society). agencies, but he instead joined the staff of the newly Bill Golden challenged me to give him a list of sena- formed House Budget Committee working on energy tors and representatives who would like to host a and environment, where he stayed for twenty years. He Fellow, and a list of excellent young scientists who were subsequently worked as chief financial officer of the interested in applying for such a program. Although I U.S. Department of Energy for several years, and now was initially hesitant to employ the buddy system to do works for the University of California. Jessica Mathews the latter, I did what he asked. Golden responded by helped lead Maurice Udall’s presidential campaign, writing a personal check to fund the AAAS Congres- served on the National Security Council staff, was an sional Science Fellows Program, and he helped per- editor at the Washington Post, and is now president of suade the AAAS board of directors to start it. the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.2 APS Executive Secretary Bill Havens was initially The career paths of the 58 APS Congressional Fel- hard to convince, but he ultimately became one of the lows have been diverse. One, Rush Holt, is now the strongest supporters of the Congressional Science Fel- U.S. Representative for the New Jersey district that lows Program—and APS joined with AAAS in initiating includes Princeton University, where he had earlier the program. (A lesson I learned from this experience: worked at the Forrestal Research Center. Five others are the advantage of convincing a conservative is that you presently on Congressional staffs. Twelve have positions only have to convince him once!) Havens was per- in the Executive Branch, ten are at universities or labo- suaded that it would be a good thing for APS to help ratories, eleven work in industry, five are on profes- legitimize for physicists activities other than traditional sional society staffs, and seven work for public interest research in universities and industry. A supportive 1973 groups. Physics Today editorial pointed out that “a modest-size I have already mentioned SWOPSI. This program, business corporation faced with making million-dollar which I organized at Stanford in 1969 with undergrad- decisions typically has more specialists in science and uate student body president Joyce Kobayashi and fellow technology on its staff than are available to Congres- physics graduate student Bob Jaffe, continued for some sional committees reaching decisions on billion-dollar twenty years. I also played a major role in starting the questions.” At that time the entire Congressional staff American Physical Society’s program of studies on included only two Ph.D. physicists, John Andelin and J. public policy issues. Freeman Dyson and I drafted the Thomas Ratchford. I had consulted them, among many proposal for the first of these studies, on light water others including several members of Congress, in reactor safety, and in 1974 I led the group that obtained designing the program. funding for this study from National Science Foundation The three young scientists whom I recruited at Bill director Guyford Stever. Among the most ambitious of Golden’s request before the program existed all subse- the subsequent APS studies were those on directed quently became members of the first class of Congres- energy weapons (1987) and boost-phase missile defense sional Science Fellows. They were physicists Ben (2004).3 In 1976, at the first meeting of the AAAS Com-

96 Vision 2033: Linking Science and Policy for Tomorrow’s World

mittee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility, I We had urged creation of new institutions, such as the helped to start what has become the AAAS Program on Congressional Science Fellows and the APS studies, Science and Human Rights, which has also continued to partly to provide new avenues for scientists to con- the present. tribute to the public debate In creating enduring social innovations, such as on technological issues and It is important to SWOPSI, the Congressional Science Fellows Program, civilize the environ- to receive training and cre- the APS studies, and the AAAS Science and Human ment of public dentials. Several thousand Rights Program, I have found that the first requirement interest science, so scientists have become that more scientists is that the program must be “spherically sensible”—it can contribute. what Neal Lane calls “civic has to make sense from everyone’s perspective.4 The fel- scientists” through such lowship program, for example, benefited the Fellows channels, at least for a few themselves, the Congress, and the professional soci- years.7 As a result, there is no doubt that democratic eties—as well as the scientific professions and the larger decisionmaking on technological issues has improved. national interest. The second requirement is to recruit But despite all these efforts and many more by excellent people. Dick Scribner, the initial director of others, U.S. science and technology policy is terrible the Congressional Science Fellows Program, played a and getting worse! Examples of bad science and tech- crucial role in steering the program through its difficult nology policy in the current Bush Administration first years—and the Fellows themselves were superb. include the following claims: The final requirement is that initiators like me get out of • There is not enough evidence of global warming to the way! It is essential that the people who do all the actually begin to do something to slow the growth hard work have managerial responsibility and get credit in carbon consumption. for their successes. • But there is plenty of evidence to support deploying In 1974, Frank von Hippel and I published a book, a missile defense system now. Advice and Dissent: Scientists in the Political Arena.5 • And we need to be ready to test new generations of Our goal was to improve decisions on technology by nuclear weapons. improving both advice (from scientists to government) Advice and Dissent didn’t anticipate the willingness and and dissent (political advocacy by scientists and their ability of the federal government to persist in spending organizations). We presented many case studies of tech- a fortune on technology that was incapable of nological issues—anti–ballistic missile defenses, super- working—for example, the Strategic Defense Initiative sonic transports, cyclamates, persistent pesticides, (“Star Wars”) missile defense systems. How was this chemical and biological warfare, nuclear reactor possible? The public evidently doesn’t know enough or safety—and concluded that insider scientific advisors care enough to demand sound technological decisions. can tell government officials how to do better what they What can scientists do to improve the situation? We have already decided to do, but that turning govern- need to present, not only sound recommendations ment decisions around usually requires outsider backed up by convincing studies, but also wise moral activism. President Franklin D. Roosevelt once told vis- leadership. In short, at least some of the civic scientists We [scientists] need itors: “Okay, you’ve convinced me. Now go out and must become public heroes in order to be effective to present, not only sound recommenda- 6 bring pressure on me!” Both advice and advocacy are leaders. tions backed up by essential in a democracy. Two scientists who were heroes of mine and helped convincing studies, In Advice and Dissent we recognized that few people to inspire me by their examples were Andrei Sakharov but also wise moral leadership. can indefinitely sustain an intense involvement with and Linus Pauling. They also had enormous influence issues remote from their personal lives, and we argued on a wide public. I will never forget the impact on me that it is important to civilize the environment of public of Sakharov’s book Progress, Coexistence, and Intellec- interest science so that more scientists can contribute. tual Freedom (1968), which convinced me that the

Science, Technology, and Global Security: Primack 97

Cold War could be replaced by a more hopeful world. extremely rapid growth in resource use and develop a Despite his earlier leadership of the Soviet hydrogen sustainable relationship with the earth. We are familiar bomb program, Sakharov won the Nobel Peace Prize in with the growth in human population as a driver of our 1975 as a “spokesman for the conscience of mankind.” problems. During the past century, the number of people He was one of the greatest defenders of democracy and on our planet increased by about a factor of four. human rights in Russia. Pauling was an early and con- Nonetheless, that growth is dwarfed by the explosion in tinuing leader in applying quantum mechanics to chem- resource use. Over the same period, our energy con- “It is sometimes said istry. He received a Presidential Medal in 1948 for his sumption increased by a factor of nearly 100. Our collec- that science has contributions during World War II, and the Nobel Prize tive impact on planetary systems is now so great that this nothing to do with morality. This is for Chemistry in 1954. In the 1950s he showed that growth in resource use must slow very quickly, despite wrong. Science is the radioactive fallout from bomb tests causes cancer and the increasing global industrialization, as an increasing search for truth, the birth defects. His efforts to end bomb testing included fraction of the world’s people improve their lives. effort to understand circulating the scientists’ petition against nuclear The early universe apparently made such a transi- the world; it involves the rejection of bias, testing, speaking before diverse groups of scientists and tion, from a brief period of exponential expansion of dogma, of revela- citizens, and writing the best-selling book, No More (which we astrophysicists call cosmic inflation) to bil- tion, but not the War! He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1962 lions of years of much slower expansion.8 If we humans rejection of morality.” for his leadership in ending atmospheric testing of can make a graceful transition from exponential expan- nuclear weapons. He went on to show statistically that sion to a sustainably slower growth rate, our descen- smoking causes cancer. According to Pauling, “It is dants can look forward to an immense period of future sometimes said that science has nothing to do with evolution. If not, our descendants will never forgive morality. This is wrong. Science is the search for truth, us—if we have any descendants. the effort to understand the world; it involves the rejec- There will be many challenges in the coming years tion of bias, of dogma, of revelation, but not the rejec- that will require scientists and others to take intellectual tion of morality.” and moral leadership, as we try to lead humanity in a I completely agree with Ismael Serageldin’s comments new direction. Some scientists, in addition to their about the morality implicit in science and the need for sci- normal research and teaching, must benefit society by entists to become engaged in improving the world. The educating the public, as well as advising the govern- next 30 years will be a critical time for technology policy. ment. Such activities must be supplemented by public In that time, humanity must somehow stop the activism and occasional heroism.

98 Vision 2033: Linking Science and Policy for Tomorrow’s World Notes 1. Jaffe was chair of the faculty at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1992–1995, and he is now director of the Center for Theoretical Physics. Perl received the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1995 for the discovery of the tau lepton. Frank von Hippel is a pro- fessor of public and international affairs and co-director of the Pro- gram on Science and Global Security in the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University. One product of our workshop was an article: Martin Perl, Joel Primack, and Frank von Hippel, “Public Interest Science—An Overview,” Physics Today, vol. 27, no. 6, pp. 23–31 (June 1974). 2. For more on the early years of the program, including analysis of the impacts on Congress, the fellows, and their professional soci- eties, see Jeffrey K. Stine, Twenty Years of Science in the Public Interest: A History of the Congressional Science and Engineering Fellowship Program (Washington, D.C.: AAAS, 1994). 3. The APS studies are listed at http://www.aps.org/public_affairs/ popa/popa-studies.cfm. The APS Panel on Public Affairs (POPA) also does smaller studies, of which the two most recent are on the Hydrogen Initiative and the modern pit facility; see http://www.aps.org/public_affairs/popa/reports/index.cfm. 4. In testifying against the proposed Safeguard anti–ballistic missile system, physicist Marvin Goldberger said that it was “spherically senseless. It makes no sense no matter how you look at it.” Joel R. Primack and Frank von Hippel, Advice and Dissent: Scientists in the Political Arena (New York: Basic Books, 1974; New American Library, 1976), p. 70. 5. Primack and von Hippel, Advice and Dissent. 6. Saul Alinsky, Rules for Radicals (New York: Random House, 1971), p. xxiii. 7. In his article “Benjamin Franklin, Civic Scientist” (Physics Today, October 2003), Lane defined a civic scientist as one who uses his or her special scientific knowledge and skills to influence policy and inform the public. 8. Nancy Abrams and I discuss this and other modern cosmological metaphors in a book we are writing, tentatively titled The Mean- ingful Universe, to be published in 2006 by the Riverhead division of Penguin Books.

Science, Technology, and Global Security: Primack 99 Frank von Hippel

Frank von Hippel, a theoretical physicist, is a professor of public and international affairs at We are celebrating the success of the Science and Tech- Princeton University and co-director of Princeton’s nology Policy Fellowship Programs in helping more research program on Science and Global Security. scientists and engineers contribute to the national From September 1993 through 1994, while assistant policymaking process. I would like to start, however, by director for national security in the White House talking briefly about how, in a small way, this activity Office of Science and Technology Policy, he played a has begun to go international and about whether we major role in developing U.S.-Russian cooperative should consider adding an international dimension to programs to increase the security of Russian nuclear- the science and technology policy fellowships. Then I weapons materials. He is the chairman-elect of the will talk about two issues of current concern, namely, American Physical Society’s Panel on Public Affairs, the weaponization of space and nuclear terrorism. chairman of the editorial board of Science & Global For a testimonial to the value of international Security, and a member of the editorial board of the exchanges between scientists who work in the area of Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. international security, I recommend to you an excellent Since the early 1980s Dr. von Hippel’s research book, Unarmed Force, by has focused on developing the analytical basis for Matthew Evangelista. Evan- Western and Soviet deep cuts in the U.S. and Soviet/Russian nuclear gelista describes how scientists jointly created a back stockpiles; removal of their ballistic missiles from Western and Soviet scien- channel of technical launch-on-warning alert; verified nuclear-warhead tists jointly created a back advice to the Soviet elimination; a comprehensive nuclear-warhead test channel of technical advice government, thereby ban; and ending production, minimizing use, and dis- helping to make the to the Soviet government, Cold War less posing of excess weapons-usable fissile materials. thereby helping to make the dangerous and In 1977, Dr. von Hippel shared with Joel Primack Cold War less dangerous ultimately to bring it to an end. the American Physical Society’s Forum Award for Pro- and ultimately to bring it to moting the Understanding of the Relationship of an end. Physics and Society in recognition of their book, He tells of how Western scientists reached out to and Advice and Dissent: Scientists in the Political Arena. then brainstormed with a small group of senior Soviet In 1989, he was awarded the Federation of American scientists on ideas for possible initiatives to reduce the Scientists’ Public Service Award for serving as a “role nuclear danger and how some of these ideas led to model for the public interest scientist.” In 1991, the actions, such as Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev’s American Institute of Physics published a collection unilateral nuclear testing moratorium, which helped to of his articles under the title, Citizen Scientist, in its wind down the Cold War. Evangelista credits U.S. sci- Masters of Physics series. In 1993, he was awarded a entists with generating most of the ideas, but the Soviet five-year MacArthur Prize Fellowship, and in 1994 he scientists had much better access to their leadership. received the American Association for the Advance- Today, scientists don’t have such access to a world ment of Sciences’ Hilliard Roderick Prize for Science, leader. However, we do have a growing international Arms Control, and International Security. network of independent scientists working full time on developing the technical basis for cooperative approaches to international security. At Princeton, we deal with independent scientists working on nuclear

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issues at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Tech- Boost-phase interception allows you to hit a missile Perhaps it is time nology, Tsingua University in Beijing, Fudan University before it can deploy decoys, but the boost phase is very for the AAAS and its affiliated societies in Shanghai, Nehru University in New Delhi, Quaid-e- short—only a few minutes. This makes the challenge of and their foreign Azam University in Islamabad, and Darmstadt Tech- boost-phase interception almost impossibly demanding. counterparts to nical University in Germany. This network has been When the Reagan Administration proposed to orbit a begin to explore the funded in good part by U.S. private foundations. constellation of boost-phase interceptors, the Soviet possibilities for developing an inter- Perhaps it is time for the AAAS and its affiliated soci- leadership thought that the purpose would be to inter- national dimension eties and their foreign counterparts to begin to similarly cept surviving Soviet missiles after a U.S. preemptive to their science and explore the possibilities for developing an international attack. I think that they were right. If missile defense technology fellow- ship programs. dimension to their science and technology fellowship could work at all, it could only be under such circum- programs. For example, the German Physical Society stances. might send a physicist for a year to the new AAAS Today, with renewed U.S. interest in all sorts of mis- Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy. Or sile defense, both Russia and China are concerned the AAAS could establish a fellowship for a U.S. scien- because the vast bulk of both their missile forces are tist to spend a year with the arms control program at quite vulnerable to a first strike. Russia and China, Tsinghua University in Beijing. therefore, have been urging negotiations to ban the Having such fellowships would strengthen the chan- weaponization of space. The United States, under the nels of communication between the communities of Clinton and Bush Administrations, has adamantly independent security policy analysts in the United refused. This impasse has helped block the launch of States and their counterparts in Europe and China. That any arms control negotiations in Geneva since 1996, contact could help spread to their governments new when negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test ideas for cooperative security. Ban were completed. I was also asked to discuss some specific science and Fortunately, in back-channel discussions over the technology aspects of policy issues, so I will briefly give past 25 years, independent U.S. critics have been my views on two issues that are currently roiling the explaining to Russian and Chinese scientists why mis- physics side of the security-policy debate: the sile defense is mostly a waste of money. This is why, in weaponization of space and nuclear terrorism. 1987, Gorbachev decided on what he called an “asym- With regard to the weaponization of space, most metric response” to the U.S. “Star Wars” program. He independent scientists see proposals to weaponize space announced that, if the United States actually deployed in the same way that Marvin Goldberger described Star War systems, the Soviet Union would respond by national missile defense: “It is spherically senseless. It deploying relatively inexpensive countermeasures, makes no sense no matter how you look at it.” To strike rather than launching its own Star Wars program. a point on earth quickly from space, you would need a Gorbachev also stopped conditioning the Soviet constellation of hundreds of orbiting weapons, so that Union’s willingness to engage in bilateral reductions of one would be in range when you needed it. That’s a nuclear missiles on the United States’ willingness not to dangerous and very expensive strategy. The same limi- deploy Star Wars systems. As a result, today we have tations apply in attacking another countries’ satellites, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which which can be done much more cheaply from earth than has eliminated thousands of nuclear missiles and their space. The only application that requires space-based launchers. And we still don’t have a Star Wars system, interceptors is catching a missile from a large country despite the expenditure of more than $100 billion. like Russia or China in boost phase. From any land base Recently Russia and China also saw the light with outside their borders, you can’t get close enough to all regard to the weaponization of space. They dropped launch points in those countries to intercept their mis- their requirement that negotiations on a treaty to end siles while boosting. the production of nuclear materials for weapons should

Science, Technology, and Global Security: von Hippel 101

be linked to a treaty to prevent the weaponization of policymakers realized the folly of continuing to ship outer space. Unfortunately, it appears that the Bush highly enriched uranium to countries around the world. Administration has now reconsidered whether it is They launched the Reduced Enrichment Research and willing to take “yes” for an answer. Test Reactor Program to convert reactors to fuels not Finally, on nuclear terrorism, we worry today about usable for weapons, such as low-enriched uranium con- subnational groups such as al Qaeda acquiring nuclear taining less than 20 percent of the chain-reacting iso- weapons. In fact, the danger of subnational groups pro- tope, U-235. The Soviet Union launched a similar ducing nuclear-weapons materials should not arouse program. much concern. Any such group would have to have Today, this program is receiving a little less than $10 years to build and operate an enrichment plant and sup- million a year, while more than $10 billion a year is porting chemical conversion facilities or a reactor and being spent on missile defense. Nonetheless, the reactor plutonium separation plant in a secure location. It is conversion program is making a lot more progress. conceivable that al Qaeda might have gotten there if it Already, it has ended the flow of HEU to 23 countries. had ten more years in Afghanistan and the full coopera- The program could be a lot broader, and its progress tion from Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan’s could be a lot faster, but the U.S. government is cur- gas centrifuge program. rently more willing to give another $2 billion to the mis- A much bigger danger in my view is the potential of sile-defense program than it is to give another $2 subnational groups to acquire nuclear materials that million to the reactor conversion program. nations have already produced. Even though the government doesn’t always take Our security depends Many worried loudly in the past that Iraq might pro- our technical advice, we have to keep trying. upon governments vide terrorists with nuclear material and more recently In summary, my message is that our security depends understanding what that North Korea might do so. I am more worried, how- upon governments understanding what are genuine are genuine dangers, what can be done to ever, about the almost 2,000 tons of weapon-usable dangers, what can be done to reduce them, and how to reduce them, and highly enriched uranium that the United States and the prioritize them. The chances for achieving such under- how to prioritize Soviet Union produced during the Cold War. This was standing will be increased if the boundary between the them. The chances enough for tens of thousands of U.S. and Soviet nuclear government and the outside technical community is for achieving such understanding will weapons, with enough left over to fuel hundreds of made more permeable. The Science and Technology be increased if the research reactors spread across more than 40 countries Policy Fellowship Programs are one important inven- boundary between in the Atoms for Peace programs, as well as hundreds of tion that enhances this permeability. the government and the outside technical nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers, and other naval But many of the threats to our civilization are now community is made ships, including Russia’s nuclear-powered icebreakers. global, and the science and technology community is more permeable. As a result, high-enriched uranium (HEU) can be now global as well. My own university recognized this found in many locations, including a number of univer- a few years ago when it took its motto “in the nation’s sities and institutes that don’t have high security. This service” and added “and the service of all nations.” I wide availability of HEU is of special concern because, urge that we now explore how the science and tech- unlike plutonium, HEU can be used in a “gun-type” nology policy fellowships can develop an international device, such as the one that destroyed Hiroshima. This dimension as well. is a design in which one subcritical mass is fired into another to make a supercritical mass. I have never heard any nuclear-weapons expert argue that this design is beyond the abilities of a terrorist group. Following India’s “peaceful” nuclear explosion of 1974, which used plutonium produced with a reactor provided jointly by the United States and Canada, U.S.

102 Vision 2033: Linking Science and Policy for Tomorrow’s World Victor A. Utgoff

Victor A. Utgoff is a deputy director of the Strategy, that time might be, yet distant enough that we can see Thirty years into the Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for how the choices made in the next few years might actu- future…sounds like a Defense Analyses (IDA). During 1998–1999, on a sab- ally play out. long time, but it's batical from IDA, he established the Advanced Sys- close enough that we The sponsors of this symposium asked me to address can have a pretty tems and Concepts Office, an in-house think tank for a couple of broad questions, which I have interpreted to good idea of what the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. During be: How will science and technology affect the ways in the science and tech- nology of that time 1977–1981, he was a senior member of the National which nations negotiate and enforce treaties, particu- might be, yet distant Security Council staff. Prior to those assignments he larly in the area of proliferation. I’m going to make my enough that we can worked for several research and aerospace organiza- best guess at an answer, and I’ll leave you to speculate see how the choices tions. He was editor and contributor to a volume of on other possibilities. It’s not a comfortable answer for made in the next few years might actually essays entitle, The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Prolifera- me, and it won’t be a comfortable answer for you. My play out. tion, U.S. Interests, and World Order (MIT Press, hope is that my best guess will provide you some ideas 2000), author of The Challenge of Chemical that you will find interesting and helpful in thinking Weapons: An American Perspective (Macmillan, about this problem. Of course, all of the points I will 1990), and co-author of Fiscal and Economic Implica- make here are my own. They are not blessed by the tions of Strategic Defenses (Westview, 1986). He has Institute for Defense Analyses, nor the Defense Depart- published a variety of papers on issues posed by the ment, nor any of the other people that we work for. proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical Let me start by citing a book that is very well known weapons. In 1999, he received IDA’s Andrew J. Good- to many of us in the national security analysis business. paster Award for Excellence in Research. Dr. Utgoff I read it shortly after it was published in 1982, and it received his SB in aeronautics and astronautics from impressed me a lot. It’s The Pursuit of Power: Tech- the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1960 nology, Armed Force and Society since A.D. 1000 by and his Ph.D. in electrical engineering from Purdue William H. McNeil, who was on the faculty of the Uni- University in 1970. versity of Chicago at the time. Among other things, the book describes the evolution of weapons, starting in antiquity but emphasizing the period from 1000 A.D. through World War II and somewhat beyond. It por- trays a bumpy but accelerating increase in military power, achieved first through small but decisive I’m happy to be here today and to offer my congratula- changes in military technology, like the use of bronze tions to the AAAS for having had the wisdom to start for swords and the development of stirrups that allowed and sustain the Science and Technology Policy Fellow- cavalry to ride with their hands free for the use of ship Programs so long ago. I like to think that the Insti- weapons, right through the invention of crossbows, tute for Defense Analyses is in a parallel position. We cannons, aircraft, and nuclear weapons. McNeil posits claim to be working the interface between policy, par- that this evolution toward more powerful weapons will ticularly security policy, and science and technology. continue until twentieth century techniques of man- I think it’s quite appropriate that you have chosen to agement and data retrieval begin to catch up with com- look forward 30 years into the future. That sounds like munications and transport, which will make global a long time, but it’s close enough that we can have a government truly possible. pretty good idea of what the science and technology of Now, the twentieth century has come and gone

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without such a transformation happening yet, but reductions in the two sides’ nuclear arsenals. McNeil is, in my view, still substantially correct. The Nonproliferation efforts have continued under every ever increasing destructive potential of weapons points president since the end of World War II. During the past toward what seems likely to be an untenable world. You 10 years some of the more notable nonproliferation might argue that we are headed toward a world in efforts were the framework agreement for suspending which the power to kill just about everybody could be the North Korean nuclear program and the institution- in the hands of just about anybody. Of course, humanity alization of cooperative threat reduction—both of is not going to let that happen. It will do something to those, in fact, were done under President Bill Clinton. stop it, and the question is what. President George W. Bush was skeptical about arms Turning to McNeil’s speculations about world gov- control when he took office, but he has since supported ernment, I doubt that many people would support the some new initiatives, including most recently the prolif- idea of world government without a lot of qualifica- eration security initiative to interdict black market trade tions. Nonetheless, throughout the twentieth century, in weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Other Bush the United States has been engaged in creating interna- initiatives include a UN Security Council resolution tional institutions to perform some of the most impor- requiring states to criminalize proliferation, enact strict tant functions of world government. The United States export controls, and secure sensitive materials within in fact is party to some 10,000 international treaties and their borders; the further expansion of the G-8 global agreements. Of course, international arms control partnership against the spread of weapons and materials agreements and institutions are part of this effort. The of mass destruction; the creation of a new global United States has been engaged in arms control since approach limiting permitted capabilities and activities to signing The Hague Convention of 1899, which resulted enrich and recycle fissionable nuclear material; and the in a prohibition of the use of projectiles, “the object of reform of some of the practices of the International which is the diffusion and asphyxiating or deleterious Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). gases.” That’s chemical warfare (CW), something we So where do we stand? What are the prospects that consider a weapon of mass destruction today. such nonproliferation efforts will in fact succeed in The advent of nuclear weapons in 1945 probably halting and rolling back WMD proliferation? The pic- marks the beginning of serious efforts led by the U.S. to ture is at best described as mixed. On the positive side, prevent the proliferation of what can truly be called there are far fewer nuclear powers today than experts weapons of mass destruction. In a radio broadcast on projected in the early years of the nuclear era. In fact, a August 9, 1945, President Harry Truman said that the number of states that once had nuclear weapons have atom bomb is too dangerous to be loose in a lawless given them up, and substantial progress has been made world. The Baruch Plan, proposed to the United by the United States and Russia in reducing their What are the Nations in 1946 by U.S. delegate Bernard Baruch, was nuclear inventories. The institutionalization of so many prospects that… intended to outlaw nuclear weapons and internation- nonproliferation measures is itself no small accomplish- nonproliferation efforts will in fact alize stocks of fissile materials, but failed. In the fol- ment. The moratorium on nuclear testing is holding, at succeed in halting lowing decades, a variety of nuclear weapons-related least for the time being. It in effect prevents states from and rolling back treaties were pursued, and in some cases agreed upon, developing thermonuclear weapons. You can build fis- WMD proliferation? The including the limited nuclear test ban treaties, the sion weapons and have confidence in them without picture is at best nuclear nonproliferation treaty, the biological weapons testing, but that doesn’t seem to be possible for ther- described as mixed. convention, the chemical weapons convention, and the monuclear weapons. Furthermore, the United States arms control treaties that helped stabilize the nuclear and Russia are destroying some of their chemical arms race between the United States and the Soviet weapons. That’s a reasonable highlighting, although not Union. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), a complete survey of positive steps, in my view. for example, was extremely important in achieving On the negative side, we still live with proliferation

104 Vision 2033: Linking Science and Policy for Tomorrow’s World every day. There are now eight nuclear powers, two start by examining the nature of the negotiation and additional states that we know of with nuclear pro- monitoring processes. Effective limitation of prolifera- grams, a few dozen states with chemical or biological tion of weapons of mass destruction has three compo- weapons, and a wide variety of states that you could nents: The first is getting international agreement to call latent nuclear powers in that they could be really outlaw weapons of mass destruction, not just to extremely close to producing nuclear weapons if they look the other way or wink at them. The second is get- thought there was a need. Some of the states with ting agreement to act decisively against proliferators, weapons of mass destruction or the ingredients for and by this I mean to engage in a methodical series of such weapons don’t have them under tight control. actions that gradually ratchet up the pressure and are Russia has a large advanced biological weapons capa- ultimately sufficient to force the proliferator to give its bility, in violation of the Biological and Toxin weapons up. The third is detecting illegal proliferation Weapons Convention (BTWC). Nothing is being done programs in the first place. about it, at least nothing I know of. Now, in my view, the international community has Other negatives include the lack of agreed provisions done the first task pretty well historically and has done for monitoring compliance with the BTWC. There was some new things fairly recently, such as declaring the an effort to develop some, but it was rejected. And WMD threat illegal. The second task, acting decisively while there are monitoring provisions for the Chemical against proliferators, has been more of a problem. The Weapons Convention, no efforts have been made—as story of Iraq has been discussed at great length else- yet, anyway—to use the provisions for dealing with where, and it’s something of a hot potato, so I’m not undeclared stocks of chemical weapons. Similarly, there going to go into it here. The story of Libya seems to be have been no challenge inspections, which are allowed a clearer case. Long-term imposition of painful eco- by the convention. Even more disturbing is the fact that nomic and political sanctions appears to have led several organizations and individuals have created or Colonel Moammar Gaddafi to agree to sacrifice his used or attempted to use chemical and biological WMD ambitions. The really difficult problem that weapons. Maybe most disturbing of all, al Qaeda is remains open is the third task, the detection of illegal attempting to obtain weapons of mass destruction. I WMD proliferation activities. The creation of substan- believe they have said their holy duty is to get these tial amounts of chemical weapons can be done in rela- types of weapons, and they have demonstrated their tively small facilities that can be well hidden. The willingness to make highly destructive attacks on the creation of nuclear weapons is harder to hide, but United States, its forces, and its allies. advancing technology is making this somewhat easier. Maybe the newest nonproliferation initiatives will Enrichment of uranium with highly efficient centrifuges make a decisive difference. Perhaps the U.S. willingness can be more easily hidden than the older enrichment to act forcefully against WMD proliferators will remain techniques. In the longer run, the United States or other credible and turn some of them around. Perhaps efforts states may develop the capability to build thermonu- to negotiate with Iran and North Korea to end their clear weapons that don’t require triggering by means of nuclear programs will eventually prove successful. Per- fission reactions. Such an advance could make nuclear haps efforts by the U.S. and others to defend themselves weapons programs much harder to detect. from WMD attacks will significantly discourage WMD Another complication that we may face in the future proliferation. But perhaps these various measures, along is the appearance of other types of weapons of mass with others that are taken as politically feasible today, destruction whose signatures we might not look for or will not be sufficient to take us to a tipping point where whose existence we might detect, but dismiss as unim- WMD proliferation is effectively reduced. portant. Solving the problem of detection of WMD pro- The questions are then, What next? What more can liferation requires two types of programs: one involves be done? To begin to answer those questions, I want to scientific and technological breakthroughs; the other

Science, Technology, and Global Security: Utgoff 105 The needed detec- involves political breakthroughs. I will discuss the S&T natures distributed over different types of information, tion capability would breakthrough first, because I think it is the part that’s space, and time. Obviously the information processing involve extensive and going to make us all uncomfortable. capabilities required would be enormous. Although we intensive surveil- lance of the activities The S&T breakthrough that seems to be needed is might find searching for highly complex signatures of of a large number of the capability to detect with high probability over not WMD-related activities a major challenge today, com- nations, a larger too long a period reasonably well hidden WMD pro- puting power continues to grow at a great clip, and I number of organiza- tions and facilities, grams. Now, I’m not going to go into any detail about think we will grow into the capability to do something and an even larger what the specifics of such a capability might be, but I like what I’m talking about. number of people. would like to make a few conjectures about its general Turning to the political breakthrough, what is needed nature. The needed detection capability would involve is some way of tolerating or avoiding the potential abuse extensive and intensive surveillance of the activities of of such a detailed surveillance system. Admiral John a large number of nations, a larger number of organiza- Poindexter, while working for the Defense Advanced tions and facilities, and an even larger number of Research Projects Agency (DARPA), took a few steps people. Soil samples, air samples, water samples, out- toward the development of a surveillance capability that side and maybe inside facilities, would have to be col- was seen as having the potential to intrude into the pri- lected and analyzed. We could find ourselves vacy of Americans, and his program suffered a quick monitoring financial transactions, communications, end when the Congress tumbled to it. The political travel, construction activities, imports, exports, and breakthrough then is the acceptance of the need for many other activities associated with potential prolifer- such intense surveillance in the United States and ation activities. We’d have to monitor them all. It seems everywhere else. Acceptance could be eased by likely that considerable attention would have to be paid designing and institutionalizing the surveillance system to people associated with these worrisome or suspect so that it can only be used to investigate possible prolif- activities. Network analysis would have to be done to eration-related activities and so that it can only be used identify who is involved with whom. People with the by officials tightly constrained to respect the civil and requisite technical experience or education might have property rights of the subjects of the investigation. This to be watched with special care. This kind of surveil- is far easier said than done, of course. Whether the lance is pretty scary, to say the least. temptations to employ the information for other pur- Such information would poses can be resisted is a huge question. have to be gathered world- An amount of infor- What could motivate the political change needed if wide, and this kind of sur- mation equivalent to this kind of surveillance is to be accepted? I suspect only the current contents veillance capability could of the Library of a really strong shock would do it, something much run to the many tens of ter- Congress would be worse than the destruction suffered on September 11, abytes a day. This informa- accumulated every 2001. That’s a horrible thing to contemplate, particu- few days, and several tion would have to be larly since I think the United States is probably the most thousand days of stored for long periods, so such information likely nation to suffer that sort of horror. But then you that correlations could be would be needed, asked about projections for 30 years into the future, and run as needed over many maybe more. that’s more than enough time, if we don’t stop prolifer- years. The storage require- ation, for such a possibility to occur. ments would be enormous. Now let me end here by noting that whether we suc- An amount of information equivalent to the current ceed in halting or rolling back the proliferation of contents of the Library of Congress would be accumu- weapons of mass destruction seems more likely to lated every few days, and several thousand days of such depend on political and international relations issues information would be needed, maybe more. The infor- rather than on science and technology. Nonetheless, the mation would be processed, searching for complex sig- challenge to science and technology to solve this moni-

106 Vision 2033: Linking Science and Policy for Tomorrow’s World toring and verification problem in as tolerable a way as possible is huge. In particular, success seems very likely to depend upon the actions of the United States more than that of any other state. Professor McNeil’s world government does not seem necessary, but a willingness on the part of all nations to accept some further infringe- ments on national sovereignty—and we have accepted a lot of them to solve international problems—does seem necessary if the problems of WMD proliferation are going to be solved.

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Discussion: Maureen I. McCarthy

Maureen I. McCarthy is director of research and able to see this many Fellows in the audience, across development in the Science and Technology Direc- the government, and all over the place, including many torate of the Department of Homeland Security, on my staff right now. The nation owes a debt of grati- where she manages research and development tude to AAAS for taking this program on, for managing assets including the federal and national laborato- it for 30 years, and for being sure that we can do it for ries, strategic partnerships with other federal agen- another 30 years. cies, fellowships and university programs, I would like to respond to my fellow panelists and international cooperative research and development also to address some issues that I think are critically efforts, and technical support to incident manage- important for the scientific community and for AAAS to ment. She is on detail from the National Nuclear consider in shaping the future of the fellowship pro- Security Administration. Dr. McCarthy has a Ph.D. in gram. First, I felt Dr. Serageldin’s presentation was chemical physics from the University of Colorado and absolutely brilliant and motivating. One of the things he graduated summa cum laude from Boston University said that resonated with me was his challenge to the sci- with a B.Sc. in chemistry. She was the first AAAS entific community to engage in issues of our time. From Fellow for defense policy. my perspective, homeland security is an issue of our time. The war on terrorism is an issue of our time. Although I have personal and emotional attachments to other issues that he brought up, such as the need to alle- viate poverty, I can tell you that in our world today understanding what homeland security means and It is a great pleasure for me to be here with an esteemed fighting the war on terrorism are absolutely critical. So panel to honor 30 years of the AAAS fellowship pro- I think it is a challenge to the scientific community to grams. I owe a personal debt of gratitude to Claudia engage in those issues productively and proactively. Sturges, Steve Nelson, and Al Teich for supporting the Inside the Department of Homeland Security, in the AAAS program and bringing me personally into govern- Science and Technology Directorate, we are in a unique ment. I was one of the people who didn’t return to my position. We have three core capabilities that we are original institution after being a AAAS Fellow. I stayed pursuing. First is the awareness of current and future We need to have a in government and subsequently have moved into the threats. That means bringing science to bear to under- different approach new Department of Homeland Security. It is also a great stand and prioritize the threats, not only current ones, to science, which pleasure to be able to say that we have with us at the but future ones as well. So we need to have a different in some cases might marry science with Department of Homeland Security the first AAAS fel- approach to science, which in some cases might marry intelligence and in lows for homeland security this year, and we are looking science with intelligence and in other cases might pro- other cases might forward to our next class coming in next year. vide a scientific and rigorous basis for understanding provide a scientific and rigorous basis It is my joy in working inside the government to tell what the real threat is. That’s a major core capability for understanding people repeatedly that there is a secret service of scien- that we need, and the scientific community has a huge what the real tists who are actually running the government’s scien- amount to offer in that area. threat is. tific policy. We all know the secret handshake; we all The second capability is the deployment of counter- went through orientation; we all know Claudia and the measures, whether they’re for prevention, protection, AAAS staff; and we are all actually making a difference response, or recovery. Much scientific investment is inside the government. It’s a great honor for me to be needed in this area, ranging from applied directed sci-

108 Vision 2033: Linking Science and Policy for Tomorrow’s World ence all the way through testing and evaluation to the ability to forge innovative public-private partnerships. deployment of systems and surveillance measures. For agencies of the U.S. government, that often will The third and probably the most important core mean learning to work better together. There aren’t a capability is scientific leadership. We are in a different lot of rewards inside the federal government for agen- place in the world now than we were years ago. cies to cooperate formally. We do it because it’s the right My experience comes out of the nuclear weapons thing to do, but we often do it against bureaucratic bar- world, the nonproliferation world, and I can tell you the riers. We have identified agencies with identified mis- challenges now are different. With all due respect to sions. We need to forge partnerships that allow federal Dr. Utgoff, I would say what is needed right now is not agencies to work better on shared mission responsibili- a shock to the system. I believe we have already had the ties. We need to forge better and innovative and shock to the system. I think strategic relationships between the federal government What we need to do we as scientists and scien- and the private sector and also between the federal gov- right now is stand up tific leaders in the govern- ernment and the academic community. And it has to be and be leaders in the field, to drive science ment, outside of the done on a strategic level, not just a tactical one, where to a new way, to pro- government, across the we are actually driving leadership to find new ways of ductively and proac- community, across the doing business. In our world of homeland security, we tively address the challenge of our nation, and across the in the government are really minor players. The rest of time, which for us is world, have all the shock the broad scientific and research community in this the security not only we need. What we need to nation is really what needs to be brought to bear. What’s of the nation but of do right now is stand up and needed for real leadership are innovative partnerships the world. be leaders in the field, to that are long term and sustainable, past the personal drive science to a new way, relationships that are developed by individuals. to productively and proactively address the challenge of The third important role for the scientific community our time, which for us is the security not only of the now is stewardship. Stewardship is a concept that may nation but of the world. sound familiar to people in the nuclear weapons com- So what’s fundamentally needed from the scientific munity, which I have been a part of for so long, stew- community? First of all, our world in homeland security ardship is the recognition that you are investing to build is multidisciplinary. We have to be able to break down an enduring capability, not only to fight today’s war this the stovepipes between traditional disciplines and have month or next month or this year or next year, but for scientists work together across the world, across disci- decades to come. plines, and across different points of view. We have to Building that kind of enduring capability requires be able to engage productively and proactively in multi- making investments in people, infrastructure, and pro- disciplinary research. Now, that sounds great. Every- grams. The most important of these is people. We have body says, Yes, of course, that’s a good thing to do. But to invest in people who understand the issues and are that approach will challenge the academic community dedicated to working on these issues long into the to develop a performance system that rewards people future, as we did with national security. We want to working on the edge of multidisciplinary research. It create a homeland security culture. While investments doesn’t provide methods for people to live inside of in infrastructure are not necessarily sexy, we need state- their boxes as physicists, chemists, biologists, or what- of-the-art infrastructure to do the job. Finally, program- ever. I think AAAS is a major force in encouraging the matic investments need to be made to include security academic community both to engage in multidiscipli- concerns in other, on-going programs. What we get nary research and to reward it over the long term, no then are dual-benefit solutions. We don’t necessarily get matter where people are working. programs intended solely to solve homeland security or A second thing that is very important right now is the nuclear terrorism, but we get solutions that can achieve

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It’s absolutely critical multiple goals and have a positive impact on society. comes our way. We’re resilient; we’re forceful; we’re that the scientific The essence of all these solutions, which Dr. Ser- powerful; and we’ll respond. community engages ageldin brought up, as many of my other colleagues All of the investments we’re making now can make the public, engages each other, engages have, is the broad engagement of the scientific commu- the world of the future not only safer and more secure, the government, nity. It’s absolutely critical that the scientific community but a better place to live, because there’s so much added engages the state engages the public, engages each other, engages the value that will come out of the dual benefit of our focus and local agencies, and engages the government, engages the state and local agencies, and on that area. If we rally our forces, we can avoid having first-responder engages the first-responder community. If we can do all to have another shock to the system to get us to do the community. this and project ourselves as scientific leaders, I believe right thing. We have had enough shocks already. Now we will have accomplished a major goal in the war on it’s our turn to do the right thing. If we project ourselves terrorism. I believe we will project deterrence for ter- outwardly as a force to be reckoned with, we will have rorism. an opportunity to make a major impact on an issue of Now, lots of people say you can’t deter terrorism, and our time, which is to really deter terrorism and to make maybe you can’t deter the individual acts of a few the world safer. I would like to close with a challenge to human beings willing to blow themselves up. But I can my AAAS colleagues right now to breed the first gener- tell you there is nothing more powerful on this planet ation of scholars and fellows in homeland security. That than the intellectual force of the scientific community in work has already begun, as AAAS Fellows have this nation. If we rally together, no matter what happens expanded to embrace these issues, and I believe that in the future, we have the brainpower, willingness, they will be our future leaders in this area. agility, and responsiveness to deal with anything that

110 Vision 2033: Linking Science and Policy for Tomorrow’s World Julie Fischer

Julie Fischer, a AAAS Congressional Science Fellow in Those are the diseases that we call outbreaks, the ones 2000–2001, worked during that year for Senator John that happen in a burst. There are several kinds of natu- D. Rockefeller IV on the staff of the Senate Com- rally occurring epidemic diseases, and they don’t only mittee on Veterans’ Affairs. Subsequently, as a affect people outside the United States, with its excel- member of the committee’s professional staff, she lent health care system. In the U.S. alone, influenza worked on issues of preparedness to combat costs between $71 billion and $167 billion a year, domestic terrorism and the consequences of biolog- including both direct medical care and opportunity ical, chemical, and radiological exposures during mil- costs such as sick leave and lost wages. Naturally occur- itary service. She joined the staff of the Henry L. ring epidemics can recur periodically; they can be Stimson Center in 2003 for a yearlong appointment spread by particular foods or pests; and they can affect as a Council on Foreign Relations International travelers as well as residents in any area. In the United Affairs Fellow. States, about 5,000 people die each year of foodborne Dr. Fischer received her bachelor’s degree in Eng- illnesses. lish and Biology from Hollins College in 1992 and her Because of their scale, epidemics can have enormous doctorate in Microbiology and Immunology from Van- economic impact. Devastating examples from the derbilt University in 1997. Her research focused on United Kingdom are the recent outbreaks of foot-and- factors that might enhance disease in children mouth disease in cattle and the ongoing problems of infected with a common respiratory virus and thera- wrestling with the policy implications of some of the peutic strategies to delay or prevent the onset of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies, especially AIDS in exposed individuals. Her interests lie at the the one known as “Mad Cow Disease.” intersection of public health and security, including Finally, epidemics are increasingly being thought of medical emergency preparedness, biological secu- as potential weapons. Since 2001, the notion of delib- rity measures and their impact on research, and erate outbreaks caused by biological or agricultural ter- effects of the global disease burden on international rorism has had an enormous impact on American security. consciousness. Emerging diseases are epidemic diseases that we are recognizing for the first time, either because they are new or because they are reemerging from a disease we thought had been conquered. For example, in many states of the former Soviet Union, where economic chal- I am an inadequate but hopefully enthusiastic substitute lenges are severe and the health care system is dam- for Dr. Gail Cassell, who would have been with us aged, emerging diseases are spreading opportunistically. except for an unfortunate minor accident. My goal is to Tuberculosis cases, particularly those that are resistant give you a brief overview of what global disease threats to multiple drugs, are on the rise, along with a bur- actually are, and then George Fidas, who has done geoning HIV problem that has social, sociological, and more work on the intelligence aspects of global disease political roots, but is truly exacerbated by a collapse of threats, will describe the U.S. strategies for dealing with the public health system. Today, the incidence of disease threats. emerging and remerging diseases, including the recent First, I want to briefly describe what I mean by global outbreak of SARS, which quickly spread from China to disease threats. The first comprises epidemic diseases. Canada, is a global issue.

Science, Technology, and Global Security: Fischer 111 Endemic diseases are those that have never been TABLE 1. Deaths from Leading Endemic truly eradicated and that occur regularly, usually in a Diseases, 2002 predictable cycle. The World Health Organization, Leading causes of disease Deaths (millions) drawing on data from 2002, the last year for which Respiratory diseases 3.9 complete data are available, has identified the leading HIV/AIDS 2.9 causes of death and disease in the world (Table 1). The Diarrheal diseases 2.0 first is respiratory diseases. That’s a collective term for a Tuberculosis 1.6 lot of diseases, many of which are greatly exacerbated Malaria 1.1 by malnutrition. HIV/AIDS is second, with almost 3 Measles 0.7 million deaths in 2002, and that number continues to climb. Diarrheal diseases, globally, are enormous killers Source: World Health Organization. of children age five and under, although HIV skews that. Diarrheal diseases are mostly caused by lack of access to adequate nutrition and safe water, although some viruses contribute to the great burden of disease. Tuber- TABLE 2. Infectious Disease Deaths as a culosis accounts for 1.6 million deaths a year; malaria, Proportion of All Deaths, 2001 a disease for which we still have no effective vaccine, Region % of deaths attributed accounts for 1.1 million; and measles, for which we to infectious diseases have a completely adequate vaccine, accounts for Africa 62 700,000 deaths a year. Eastern Mediterranean 34 Where do these endemic diseases have their primary Southeast Asia 31 impact? Infectious diseases primarily impact the devel- Western Pacific 11 oping world. This is not a surprise. Data from the Global North & South America 10 Health Council shows what proportion of deaths in Europe 5 each region are caused by infectious diseases as opposed to other causes (Table 2). In Africa, more than three- Source: Global Health Council. fifths of deaths are from infectious disease, and in South- east Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean, the share is nearly a third. At the end of 2002, 42 million people treat or prevent 25 million cases in 2010. Although the around the world were living with HIV and AIDS (Table investment necessary to do that is an enormous one, it 3). The crisis is greatest in Sub-Saharan Africa, which has to start now. I won’t dwell on the security impact, now has more than 30 million infected. But the number because Mr. Fidas will talk about that more, but I do is growing in Eastern Europe and in Southeast Asia, want to point out the socioeconomic impact of dealing where the implications for an uncontrolled burst of HIV with disease, not only the direct costs, but also the indi- infections are of a scale that is difficult to grasp. Table 4 rect human costs. shows an estimate from the National Intelligence In some nations in Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, Council of what HIV and AIDS might look like in sev- when you as a university president go to hire an aca- eral countries at the next wave of the epidemic. As you demic specialist to teach a course, you need to hire can see, the potential for India at the high end of the three people, because chances are that two of them will estimate for 2010 ranges up to about 25 million people. be HIV-infected, and you can’t afford that loss in conti- We are making a fairly significant investment in the nuity. There are nations in which 10 to 60 percent of United States right now to treat and prevent more AIDS the young men eligible to be military recruits are HIV- cases throughout the world, especially the developing positive, which has direct implications for you as a mil- world. Nonetheless, it doesn’t touch the level needed to itary planner. You need to think about how they deploy,

112 Vision 2033: Linking Science and Policy for Tomorrow’s World TABLE 3. Adults & Children Estimated To resources we need are safe and adequate water and Be Living with HIV/AIDS, December 2002 food. The Millennium Development Goals approach those basic needs in a not incredibly ambitious way, as Region Number of living with HIV/AIDS Dr. Serageldin noted. By 2015 we could get safe water Sub-Saharan Africa 29,400,000 to half the people who don’t have it now. South & Southeast Asia 6,000,000 We could also reduce disease threats by increasing What does it take to Latin America 1,500,000 developing nations’ access to prevention and treatment stop these global Eastern Europe & Central Asia 1,200,000 interventions, such as vaccines, diagnostics, and med- disease threats? East Asia and Pacific 1,200,000 ical care. We’ll talk more about that later. Another Without question, it takes a lot of North America 980,000 proven technical intervention involves improving resources. Western Europe 570,000 maternal health and education. Educating women does North Africa & Middle East 550,000 as much to prevent child mortality as many other more Caribbean 440,000 expensive public health efforts, because if women Australia & New Zealand 15,000 understand where contamination and disease come Total 42,000,000 from and have some ability to control contraception, they have a better chance to raise healthy children and Source: UNAIDS. less need to bear many children to ensure that at least some will survive. Another critical resource is a public health infra- structure to count the ill, to screen for disease, and to TABLE 4. HIV/AIDS-Infected Adults in treat them. What’s needed isn’t a one-time, single-dis- Next-Wave Countries, 2002 and Projected ease campaign, but rather an on-going, long-term com- to 2010 mitment to provide health services. National Country Estimated Projected Immunization Days, for example, have been tried by HIV infection HIV infection the vaccine community to approach an entire popula- as of 2002 (millions) as of 2010 (millions) tion quickly and get big coverage with a lot of fanfare, Nigeria 4–6 10–15 advertising resources, and public relations campaigns. Ethiopia 3–5 7–10 That approach works great for one-time goals, but it Russia 1–2 5–8 doesn’t cover the long-term needs posed by diseases India 5–8 20–25 such as HIV/AIDS, and I predict gloomily that China 1–2 10–15 HIV/AIDS will not be the last pandemic. We cannot set

Source: National Intelligence Council. up systems that address one disease at a time. We must have an infrastructure for dealing with everything that comes. Otherwise, we spend a fortune recreating the not only for themselves and for military strength, but for wheel at each new outbreak. how they might deploy with others in joint exercises, as Instead, we need a strategic framework. I mean that the UN’s rules about privacy prevent screening joint both in the sense of ensuring our security and in the forces for HIV. When the maneuvers start, you might sense of understanding what we want. Right now our then very effectively export HIV/AIDS to other nations. plans to fight disease locally in the United States, What does it take to stop these global disease threats? whether deliberate outbreaks caused by bioterrorists or Without question, it takes a lot of resources. Dr. Ser- naturally occurring diseases, are based on a limited- ageldin has eloquently described the connections resources model. How much money do we have? What between disease, poverty, technology, education, and can we do with it? How far does it go? We haven’t yet how interlinked they are. The most immediate begun to ask the key questions What do we want to

Science, Technology, and Global Security: Fischer 113 accomplish? What will it take for us to get there? How I’m going to give you an example where market pres- do we afford this? To achieve the Millennium Develop- sure changes because of changes in risk perception. ment Goals—which we have described as not incred- Remember SARS, the little disease that roared? SARS ibly ambitious, but certainly a good start—the World probably caused about 8,100 identified cases, although Bank calculated that the cost would be $40 billion to our case definition was actually pretty lousy, so I would $70 billion of additional assistance a year worldwide. guess that’s a gross underestimate. But, of the cases that Compare that to what we spend in Iraq, now estimated were actually identified, SARS caused about 800 to be about $4 billion a month for military operations deaths. Now that’s 800 deaths as opposed to, say, alone. 700,000 deaths from measles. Yet, the indirect eco- Building a strategic health framework will require nomic costs of SARS were about $30 billion or more in public–private partnerships. Governments alone cannot Southeast Asia alone. That doesn’t include Canada or do it, because they are not the sole source of the neces- lost opportunities for travelers and for other economic sary resources, technology, and human ability. The U.S. developments. This tiny little disease in terms of impact government cannot solve the world’s problems. We prompted an enormous, quick response. We tested have multilateral health organizations, some of long what we could do for a new disease, and it was standing, like the World Health Organization, that are amazing. The Centers for Disease Control and Preven- currently reexamining what kinds of new authority and tion, the World Health Organization, and their global new abilities they need to be truly global in scope. collaborators sequenced and identified the virus in Private efforts are leading in the same direction, par- record time. In less than two weeks we knew what the ticularly through mega-philanthropy. When the Gates virus was and what family it belonged to. Already in Foundation can come in and give as much money to the 2004, there are numerous candidate SARS vaccines. A Global Alliance for Vaccine Immunization as the U.S. lot of these achievements are driven by money. The government in a year, that changes the playing field. I National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases at don’t think anyone understands what that means in the the NIH gave out about $21 million in contracts to sev- long term. eral companies to develop vaccines, and it’s happening What are the realities driven by public-private part- fast. When we want it, we can develop the technology nerships? I’m going to use the vaccine market as an with quick turn-around. But that shift in priorities has example because it’s the one I know best. Vaccines are an impact on everything else. Those multiple SARS vac- an incredibly inexpensive intervention to prevent dis- cines are coming in a fixed pipeline from companies ease and death—let’s think of the 700,000 deaths a that will not be producing cheaper vaccines in that year from measles. Vaccines are about 1 percent of the same pipeline for the endemic diseases of the world. market share of pharmaceuticals. To compare markets Finally, I am going to conclude with the issue of and profitability in 2002, the global market for all vac- where in the world this impact is felt the most. Of cines was about $6 billion, while that for Lipitor, a course, the impact is greatest on the billions of people single cholesterol-lowering drug, was about $6.2 bil- living in developing countries. Judging from the lion. Thus, market incentives are not driving the devel- National Intelligence Council’s typology of countries opment of vaccines or similar interventions that will be according to their health care status, the developing mostly applied in poor developing nations. High-income world generally has a long way to go before we can country demand for vaccines, as an example, is 82 per- institute the kind of public health infrastructure and cent of the industry revenue and 12 percent of global clinical infrastructure to respond to epidemic, endemic, volume. Right now the World Health Organization and and emerging diseases. UNICEF buy 40 percent of the vaccines that go to 40 The U.S. Surgeon General in 1967, W. H. Stewart, percent of the world’s children, and these organizations observed then that we in the United States no longer spend about 2 percent of the money spent on vaccines. really needed a public health infrastructure so much

114 Vision 2033: Linking Science and Policy for Tomorrow’s World because “the time has come to close the book on infec- acceptable in other places, and we shouldn’t expect it to tious diseases.” Science and technology have tri- be. Even here in the United States, we should question umphed. This may have been a bit over-optimistic. whether that’s how we want to spend our money. We What do science and technology have to contribute? need improved vaccine and drug delivery systems. Actually, quite a lot. We have to have real global disease That’s not just a better vaccine or a better drug, surveillance, both as a protection against naturally although we need that, too. We haven’t had a new class occurring diseases and as a defense against biological of effective antibiotics in 10 years or more. But terrorism. We need to know worldwide what kind of improved delivery systems must address the whole diseases are really occurring where and when. We need system for getting the drug or vaccine into place. You to get better at counting. During those National Immu- can’t just buy the vaccine and stick it on the shelf, as we nization Days I was telling you about, in some countries have learned here for biodefense purposes. There’s a the way that counting happens makes it very hard to tell whole social, legal, ethical, and political background to whether we’re doing a good job. In fact, in some dis- getting the vaccine from the thought into a needle into tricts in Africa during last year’s National Immunization an arm. Successful delivery requires the support of Days, many precincts managed to accomplish as much nations and international organizations. And finally, we as 115 percent vaccine coverage. That’s commendable, need agricultural technologies for better nutrition, yet not very dependable in terms of understanding which is something that has been talked about a lot what’s happening in the world. here already. Science needs to provide technologies that are low I would like to conclude by thanking AAAS person- cost, rapid, robust, and acceptable for disease screening ally for giving me the opportunity to pursue a fellow- and diagnostics. Of course, what is acceptable here in ship, stay in Washington, and embark upon this merry the United States, which might be a $100,000 machine career path, which I see so many luminaries in the audi- into which one pops a DNA chip and looks at screening ence have started upon. for a panoply of infections diseases, is not necessarily

Science, Technology, and Global Security: Fischer 115 Discussion: George C. Fidas

George C. Fidas is a professorial lecturer at the Elliott School of International Affairs of George Washington It’s a pleasure to participate in this important sympo- University, where he teaches seminars on intelli- sium to discuss the impact of infectious diseases on gence and national security, transnational security human and global security. For the record, my com- issues, and the Mediterranean region. He is also the ments will reflect my own views rather than those of director for outreach in the Office of the Assistant the U.S. government or its intelligence community. Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Pro- In his 1947 novel The Plague, about an epidemic in duction, where his responsibilities include increasing a sleepy North African town, Albert Camus wrote, “We the nexus between the intelligence community and tell ourselves that pestilence is a bogey of the mind, a knowledge communities outside the government. bad dream that will pass away. But it doesn’t pass Before taking that position, he served as intelligence away…it is the men who pass away.” In the case of officer-in-residence at the Elliott School of Interna- AIDS, one might add, it is the young men and especially tional Affairs. the young women who will die—perhaps as many as Before his tour at the Elliott School, Mr. Fidas one half or more of young adults in the hardest hit coun- served as deputy and later acting national intelli- tries—while diseases in general will remain the leading gence officer for economics and global issues on the cause of infant and childhood deaths for the foreseeable National Intelligence Council. Earlier he held several future. analytical and managerial positions at the Central I would like to start with a discussion about why Intelligence Agency and also served tours in the infectious diseases, led by AIDS, are a national and State Department’s Bureau of European and Cana- global security threat. I will then discuss intelligence dian Affairs and on the faculty of the National and policy community responses to health security and Defense University. Mr. Fidas has written extensively other nontraditional security issues in the post-9/11 about European and global issues, including Balkan world. I will conclude with some thoughts on the role politics, health and environmental security, and inter- that science and technology may play in confronting the national migration. He was the principal author of a disease threat over the next few decades. National Intelligence Estimate on the security impli- Despite earlier optimism in the health community, cations of infectious diseases such as AIDS, a infectious diseases remain a leading cause of death, National Intelligence Estimate on growing global accounting for a quarter to a third of worldwide annual migration and its implications for the United States, deaths and two thirds of childhood deaths. The and an Intelligence Community Assessment on the renewed threat owes to environmental degradation and environmental outlook for Central and Eastern global warming, which are spreading diseases; changes Europe. Mr. Fidas received his B.A. and M.A. in polit- in human demographics and behavior, such as acceler- ical science from the University of Rhode Island and ated urbanization and unsafe sex and drug injection did additional graduate work in international affairs practices; changing land and water use patterns, which at the University of Maryland. increase contact with disease vectors; and growing international travel and commerce, which can spread microbes as fast as the speed of aircraft. Of special sig- nificance for this symposium is that the resurgent dis- ease threat also results from high-tech medical procedures, which carry a higher risk of infection, and

116 Vision 2033: Linking Science and Policy for Tomorrow’s World

the inappropriate use of antibiotics, which fosters micro- will endanger US citizens at home and abroad, threaten bial resistance and makes them increasingly ineffective. US armed forces deployed overseas, and exacerbate Twenty well-known diseases—including tubercu- social and political instability in key countries and losis (TB) and malaria—have reemerged or spread geo- regions in which the United States has significant inter- graphically over the past three decades, often in more ests.” virulent and drug-resistant forms. More ominously, 35 The NIE contributed to a broader debate between new diseases have been identified, including HIV, hepa- those emphasizing the importance of state security and titis C, and most recently SARS, for which few cures are a growing body of scholars and some in government Of the biggest killers yet available. who emphasize human security. The state-centric worldwide, AIDS, TB, and malaria continue Of the biggest killers worldwide, AIDS, TB, and model focuses on protection of a state’s territory and to surge, with AIDS malaria continue to surge, with AIDS and TB likely to population from external military, economic, and ideo- and TB likely to account for the overwhelming majority of deaths from logical threats emanating from another sovereign state account for the over- diseases among adults in developing countries by 2020. or alliance. Its responses call for strong defense budgets, whelming majority of deaths from diseases • Some 60 million people have been infected with military counter alliances, and the projection of diplo- among adults in HIV over the past two decades and 40 million are matic, economic, and military power. The human secu- developing countries living with the virus. The disease has killed nearly rity-centric model, in contrast, argues that states cannot by 2020. 30 million people, and by 2020, at least another 68 be stable or secure if the individuals that compose them million will die of AIDS, 55 million of them in Sub- feel insecure and threatened by disease, crime, poverty, Saharan Africa. environmental degradation, and unresponsive or repres- • The threat from TB, especially drug-resistant TB, sive governments. Human security also assumes that continues to grow, fueled by poverty, the AIDS pan- many of these threats do not emanate from recogniz- demic, and immigration. Nearly 9 people million able or intentional threateners and thus call for global develop TB annually, 2 million die, and some 35 cooperation to confront. million will die by 2020. Since publication of that NIE, and more recent intel- • Malaria is making a deadly comeback—especially ligence assessments on countries in the next wave of in Sub-Saharan Africa, where infection rates high HIV prevalence and the lurking SARS threat, sev- increased by 40 percent in the final three decades eral experts have elaborated on their points and given of the last century. Malaria kills over 1 million them more empirical content. Convincing the world’s people annually and afflicts another 300 million to political leaders that diseases such as AIDS pose a 500 million worldwide each year. national and global security threat is a more daunting • Hepatitis C, respiratory infections, measles, and task, because there will rarely if ever be a smoking gun diarrheal diseases appear to have peaked at a high that can tie them directly to national and global security. level and will continue to take a heavy toll among Instead, to paraphrase Thomas Hobbes, diseases will young and old alike. make life even more nasty, brutish, and short. It is the • And epidemiologists continue to believe that it is cumulative effects of this Hobbesian process that will only a matter of time before another killer flu erode national and global security, as mass killers such emerges on the scale of the pandemic of 1918, as AIDS, TB, and malaria undermine social and eco- which took over 20 million lives nomic growth and development, stymie political devel- Four years ago, a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate on opment, and intensify the struggle for scarce resources the global infectious disease threat opened the debate and thereby destabilize already troubled polities. about a link between disease and security by warning In sum, if national security is defined as protection that “new and emerging infectious diseases will pose a against threats to a country’s population, territory, and rising global health threat and will complicate US and way of life, then AIDS and other infectious diseases global security over the next 20 years. These diseases present a gathering danger to much of Sub-Saharan

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Africa and some Caribbean countries—and a growing the rise. threat to the vast populations of Asia and Eurasia, which Infectious diseases will take an increasingly heavy eco- have the world’s steepest HIV infection curves. nomic toll at the state and international level, adding to Many of the disease-ridden countries, initially in Sub- domestic and international political tensions. Globaliza- Saharan Africa and later in other regions, will face a tion entails many things, including the globalization of demographic catastrophe as AIDS and associated dis- fear itself. The appearance of SARS in the fall of 2003, eases reduce life expectancy by as much as 40 years and for example, caused a global panic that temporarily kill up to a quarter or more of their populations over the brought the Chinese economy to a near standstill and next 10 to 15 years, including half or more of their curbed travel and commerce throughout much of the young adults. world. Such disturbances are likely to be typical as new AIDS will further impoverish the poor and often the diseases emerge and stoke public fears even when they middle class and produce a huge orphan cohort that will are not particularly contagious or deadly, as is the case be unable to cope and vulnerable to exploitation and with SARS. radicalization. There are over 13 million AIDS orphans Infectious diseases are in Africa now; some 20 million will belong to this lost having a particularly perni- orphaned generation by 2010, and perhaps 40 million cious economic impact at AIDS will further impoverish the poor by 2020. The pervasive child soldier phenomenon in the state level and will take and often the middle Sierra Leone and Uganda is one example of the vulner- an even greater toll on pro- class and produce a ability to which AIDS contributes; the street gangs in ductivity, profitability, and huge orphan cohort Nairobi, Johannesburg, and Rio De Janeiro may be foreign investment. World that will be unable to cope and vulnerable another, and the angry young terrorists emerging from Bank models suggest that to exploitation and dysfunctional societies and failed states may be another. when national AIDS infec- radicalization. Communal security also is at risk as local social and tion rates exceed 5 percent, civic institutions are decimated. Because AIDS and economic growth slows considerably; at 10 percent, related diseases are socially neutral in developing coun- growth stops; and at 20 percent, growth is reversed and tries, they are also making major inroads into the pro- economies shrink by fessional classes of teachers, civil servants, engineers, 1 percent or more of GDP annually—2 percent or more health workers, and policemen, who have formed the if they also have high malaria prevalence. social backbone of recent advances in both political and The corrosive impact of AIDS and other diseases on economic life. the socioeconomic underpinnings and elites of hard-hit • Forty percent or more of the teachers in some states threatens to slow democratic development and African countries are HIV positive and 1 million add to instability. have died over the past decade. • The infiltration of AIDS into the ruling political and • Health care workers are often dying faster than they military elites and middle classes is likely to inten- can be replaced. sify the struggle for political power to control scarce • Civil servants are experiencing high infection rates, state and societal resources, reduce the capacity of as well, endangering the capacity of governments to governments to provide needed social services, and deliver services and probably adding to already per- thereby erode their legitimacy. vasive corruption as civil servants purloin funds to • A CIA-sponsored study on the causes of instability secure treatment and provide for their families after entailing 127 cases over a 40-year period suggests they die. that infant mortality—which is highly correlated • Police and internal security forces are being deci- with infectious disease—is a powerful predictor of mated by AIDS at a time when criminal and other political instability. types of antisocial behavior and civil strife are on • Another study found that states with the highest

118 Vision 2033: Linking Science and Policy for Tomorrow’s World infant mortality were 17 times more likely to expe- quently launched a major effort in Congress, the United rience armed conflicts. Nations, and with U.S. allies and lending institutions to AIDS and other diseases also will hamper secure more funding for AIDS and related diseases. national security and internal order as militaries are The Bush Administration has followed suit, with Sec- ravaged by them. HIV-prevalence among militaries retary of State Colin Powell reaffirming that AIDS is a is often three to five times higher than that of national security threat, support for the establishment of civilian populations and can range as high as 75 per- the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria, and a cent owing to risky life styles. bold new initiative to triple the amount of funding for • Mounting HIV infections and AIDS deaths among AIDS programs to $15 billion over five years. “I know the officer corps also may contribute to the depra- of no enemy in war,” declared Secretary Powell at the vation, insecurity, and political machinations that UN General Assembly Special Session on AIDS in June incline some to launch coups and countercoups or 2001, “more insidious than AIDS, an enemy that poses other unlawful behavior aimed, more often than a clear and present danger to the world.” In April 2004, not, at plundering state coffers. Cadres of the Secretary Powell reiterated that AIDS—not terrorism— vicious Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone, poses the greatest threat to the world. for example, reportedly justified their rapaciousness Indeed, since 9/11, U.S. policy-makers have become and violence by claiming that they were doomed to much more inclined to see terrorism as the result of dys- die of AIDS anyway, so why not? functional societies, as well as rogue states and violence- The negative impact of high HIV prevalence on mili- prone individuals. They now talk and act more taries is likely to be felt in peacekeeping operations as forcefully about getting at the roots of terrorism by well, which currently include some 52,000 troops in 15 expanding efforts against so-called soft issues, such as missions. It is noteworthy that, in anticipation of troop disease, malnutrition, illiteracy, and corrupt or inept shortages, the United States is about to launch a $700 governments. In short, they are beginning to accept the million Global Peace Operations Initiative to train an validity of the human security as well as the state secu- additional 75,000 foreign troops for peacekeeping mis- rity paradigms. The Bush Administration initiatives, sions. such as the Millennium Challenge Account that has The fallout from the infectious disease threat also will increased foreign aid by 50 percent and the tripling of increase political tensions among countries. Antago- funding for HIV/AIDS, are measures of that conversion, nisms are likely to increase as a result of embargoes, though we are still far from a paradigm shift that would boycotts, and disputes over intellectual property rights devote considerably more funds and effort to human to drugs that will determine who lives and who dies, as security and soft issues. in the case of antiretroviral AIDS drugs Most developing and former communist countries Following decades of indifference or complacency in initially were ambivalent about this increased attention developed countries and denial or incapacity in devel- to AIDS and other diseases. They welcomed the oping ones, infectious diseases are now a prominent fea- prospect of greater assistance, but were reluctant to ture of the international community’s health and admit to the scope of the problem because of cultural political agenda. Since 2000, developed countries led reservations; economic and political fears about the by the United States have become sensitized to the impact on national prestige, tourism, and foreign invest- renewed threat of diseases to their own populations and ment; and a focus on broader priorities, such as socioe- to their potentially catastrophic impact in developing conomic development and defense. These attitudes countries and are beginning to strengthen measures to have begun to change over the past four years, as both combat them. Responding in part to the 2000 National public and international pressure to confront the Intelligence Estimate, the Clinton Administration problem has increased while more funds have become declared AIDS to be a national security threat. It subse- available to confront the disease threat.

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As developed and developing countries contemplate lectual property rights issue. their responses to disease threats, they will face a Fourth, even with plummeting drug prices and variety of complex challenges and choices. First, policy- growing international commitment and assistance, no makers must assess the salience of the issue, including international aid effort will succeed unless the recipient its political salience, since this will influence the atten- countries show similar resolve and receptivity to its tion and resources it is likely to receive. The trend is goals and make their best efforts to use their own toward highlighting both the health and security risks of resources to combat the threat from AIDS and other dis- diseases, but opinion will likely remain divided. Clearly, eases. AIDS and other diseases will be far better funded if they Although the challenges ahead are formidable and are seen both as a serious health and security issue. potentially divisive, a number of sensible policy Second, policy choices need to be made along three responses are already under way, spearheaded by the dimensions: spending for health versus spending for United States, WHO, UNAIDS, the World Bank, and other objectives such as education, infrastructure, and the Global Fund. These proposals and responses vary in defense; treating AIDS versus treating other serious ill- the attention they focus on detection, prevention, treat- nesses; and preventing HIV infection versus treating ment, and broader socioeconomic development. But all those with AIDS. note the need for a multisectoral approach, perform- • AIDS will pose cruel budgetary dilemmas in many ance-based metrics, and a dramatic increase in funding. countries where annual treatment for one AIDS The Global Fund has 225 projects in 121 countries patient can cost as much as educating several pri- totaling nearly $4 billion; the WHO’s Three by Five Pro- mary school students. The priority given to AIDS gram aims to raise $5.5 billion to provide treatment to compared with other illnesses also will remain con- 3 million AIDS patients by 2005; and the U.S. Global troversial in developed countries. AIDS Initiative commits $15 billion over five years to • The issue of who gets treated and who does not treat 2 million AIDS patients and prevent 7 million HIV could dramatically widen the health divide infections in 15 designated countries. A comprehensive The issue of who between and within states and become one of the immunization and treatment program for most devel- gets treated and who does not could most contentious issues of the twenty-first century. oping country illnesses is estimated to cost some $27 dramatically widen Although virtually all North Americans and Euro- billion, according to the World Bank. the health divide peans have access to both prevention and treatment What role have science and technology played in the between and within states and become programs for almost all infectious diseases, fight against infectious diseases, and what is their likely one of the most con- including AIDS, most people in developing coun- future impact? It is a bit ironic that while science and tentious issues of the tries have neither. technology were instrumental in the dramatic reduction twenty-first century. • Even with drug treatment costs dropping below in the number of infectious disease deaths for the better $250 annually, the World Health Organizations part of the twentieth century, they also have con- (WHO) reports that only about 385,000 of the tributed to their resurgence since 1980. It remains to be developing world’s 6 million people infected with seen whether science and technology can rise to the full-blown AIDS are on antiviral therapy, less than occasion again in this century to spearhead another 100,000 of them in Africa out of a total of 4.5 mil- major victory against infectious diseases. lion in need of treatment. From a high of some 800 deaths per 100,000 Amer- Third, the emerging international coalition that aims to icans at the turn of the last century, medical advances confront AIDS, TB, malaria, and other diseases will and particularly the antibiotic revolution of the 1940s remain fragile even though it is off to a decent start. It and 1950s brought the death rate down to 59 per will remain particularly dependent on the commitment 100,000 in 1960 and a low of 36 per 100,000 in 1980. of the major developed countries, agreement on the But that downward trajectory has reversed since 1980, allocation of aid, and a balanced handling of the intel- as the number of deaths has grown by 5 percent annu-

120 Vision 2033: Linking Science and Policy for Tomorrow’s World

ally, reaching 59 deaths per 100,000 by 1996 and • Ominously, HIV also displays a high rate of genetic Although technolog- erasing more than 35 years of progress. mutation that will present significant problems in ical breakthroughs have greatly facili- Although technological breakthroughs have greatly the development of an effective vaccine. Some 10 tated the detection, facilitated the detection, diagnosis, and control of dis- to 25 percent of those being treated already have diagnosis, and con- eases, they are also introducing new dangers, especially acquired some degree of resistance. That per- trol of diseases, they in the developed world where they are used exten- centage is likely to be higher in developing coun- are also introducing new dangers, espe- sively. Invasive medical procedures, for example, are tries where there is greater likelihood of cially in the devel- resulting in a surge in hospital-acquired infections. Fur- nonadherence to drug regimens. This will have a oped world where thermore, the growing speed and ease of travel means strong blowback potential to developed countries, they are used exten- sively. that microbes can be transported to any corner of the where drug resistance is the single biggest threat for world in less than 36 hours—which is shorter than the HIV-positive people. incubation periods of many infectious diseases. The development of new antimicrobial drugs and vac- The globalization of the world’s food supply owing to cines is in fact not keeping pace with new and resistant improvements in refrigeration and in the hardiness of pathogens, because of the complexity of pathogens such fruits and vegetables means that, at times, 75 percent of as HIV and malaria, the slow pace of new antimicrobial fruits and vegetables are imported and more likely to be development and approval, and in many cases a lack of infected with food-borne diseases as a result of nonhy- commercial incentives for drug companies to develop gienic practices in originating countries. Disease out- new antibiotics. Therein lies the biggest challenge to the breaks due to Cyclospora, E. coli, and Salmonella and scientific professions. WHO estimates that development the emergence of BSE or “Mad Cow Disease” and the of an effective vaccine against malaria is at least 10 years related Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease affecting humans all away, while a cure for HIV/AIDS is likely to be even result from such food practices. more distant. And most notably, the antibiotic revolution itself is According to the WHO, “In the struggle for sowing the seeds of its own possible demise, as micro- supremacy, the microbes are sprinting ahead and the bial adaptation and resistance expand inexorably due to gap between their ability to mutate into resistant strains pathogen mutation and indiscriminate use of antibiotic and man’s ability to counter them is widening fast.” drugs. As a result, an expanding number of strains of Some epidemiologists and health experts have even sug- such diseases will remain difficult or virtually impossible gested that we may be entering a post-antibiotic era in to treat. which existing antimicrobials will lose their effective- • The first line drug treatment for malaria is no longer ness against the most common infectious diseases while effective in over 80 of the 92 countries where the the development of cures for new diseases will lag. disease is a major health problem. It is up to you science and technology professionals • Penicillin has substantially lost its effectiveness at this symposium and others in the science and tech- against several diseases, such as pneumonia, menin- nology field to exploit genomics and other cutting edge gitis, and gonorrhea, in many countries. disciplines to ensure that that we do not enter a post- • Even vancomycin, the last defense against hospital- antibiotic era that further expands the infectious disease acquired infections, is losing its effectiveness. threat and with it, the threat to human and global secu- • Influenza viruses, in particular, are especially effi- rity that would surely follow. cient in their ability to survive and sometimes change into deadly strains.

Science, Technology, and Global Security: Fidas 121 Questions and Response

DR. PRIMACK: Now, the audience has the opportunity be successful. Even suicide bombers don’t want to to ask questions, and while they’re preparing them, throw their life away for nothing. If we had a much let me ask if the panelists agree with Victor Utgoff’s better surveillance system that led them to believe statement that a likely response to a second major that their preparations for terrorist attack, or even the attack on the United States, possibly much worse beginning moves they made toward executing such than 9/11, would be a global surveillance system. an attack, were likely to be detected and they were The question in my mind is, Is that likely to be likely to be stopped, then it would seem to me that’s accepted by other countries or even to be pushed going to have a deterrent effect. by the United States? And would such a system be effective? But I wonder whether other panelists DR. VON HIPPEL: I think that prevention is certainly want to further discuss that issue, which Victor something we can invest in more. In the nuclear himself said we would find challenging. area, prevention efforts can certainly focus on reducing the stockpiles and the distribution of mate- DR. UTGOFF: Well, I would like to first respond to what rials, which is a much more effective approach than Maureen said. I certainly don’t think that it’s desir- starting to track everybody who’s ever taken a able for us to have a couple of WMD events in course in nuclear physics. I think we really do need order to get us into intrusive surveillance. I just targeted approaches to surveillance. I think the don’t see how we’re going to solve the problem of IAEA’s approach with the Additional Protocol to the spreading WMDs unless we can somehow have a Nonproliferation Treaty, which requires a country fair chance of detecting illicit programs. I think to provide more information and more access to much more intense surveillance is going to be inspectors, makes a lot of sense, and the techniques required. Do we need a shock in order to get into that have been brought to bear have already shown this? Gee, I hope not. I’d love to see us solve this what can be done in unraveling a nuclear program problem without any further shocks. such as Iran’s, for example. Let me also note that, if there are no WMD events, maybe it’s not quite so important that we do DR. UTGOFF: Some really marvelous things have been solve this surveillance problem. I worry about the done in controlling nuclear proliferation. I think great sensitivity in our society to the idea of intense that’s one of the most hopeful cases we have. What surveillance, and I have it myself. There are prob- I worry about most, though, is detecting biological ably ways, in fact, to do a much better job of weapons programs, and that is where the greatest detecting WMD programs without in fact intruding need for improved surveillance lies. on our property rights, our privacy rights, or our civil rights DR. VON HIPPEL: What we need in the case of biolog- Maureen made the comment that she thinks ical weapons is something much more like a neigh- deterrence is going to solve the problem of terrorism, borhood watch within the community of the life although maybe I’ve overstated that a bit. The Insti- scientists, rather than any 1984 kind of centralized tute for Defense Analyses (IDA) did a study that was, surveillance. in fact, reasonably optimistic about whether there are ways to deter terrorists. One of the more important DR. FISCHER: May I respond to that before I have a ways is to make them doubt that their attacks would stroke? It’s clearly a much more technologically

122 Vision 2033: Linking Science and Policy for Tomorrow’s World daunting challenge to detect biological agents, DR. VON HIPPEL: I agree. Obviously, if we actually get because most of the major threats that we have agreements to reduce these stockpiles from their identified, with the exception of smallpox, are crazy sizes, which are on the order of 10,000 each endemic in parts of the world. The neighborhood in the United States and Russia, we will help a lot. watch system that you have suggested has mostly I might mention that there was recently a poll of been our national strategy so far. That strategy has U.S. attitudes toward WMD, and the question was, involved controlling access to pathogens, screening How many do we need? The median answer was the people who have access, and locking the doors, 100. That was the encouraging part. The discour- with guns, gates, and guards. I think the neighbor- aging part was when they asked, How many do we hood watch idea has to go beyond pathogens to have? The median answer was 200. address issues of knowledge, skills, and people. We get a false sense of security when we think that we DR. PRIMACK: A question again addressed to Drs. von can identify the people who work with high-risk Hippel and Utgoff. In 30 years, what will be the biological threats and stop there; it’s a matter of value of N in the N-country level problem? That educating all scientists to understand that there are means, of course, the number of countries with potentials for misuse, which go beyond the agents nuclear weapons. themselves. But we don’t want to hone a fine para- noia, either. Establishing the sense of the norms DR. VON HIPPEL: I don’t know. through education and awareness, I think, would be the most powerful deterrent. DR. UTGOFF: I think it’s up to us, to some extent.

DR. PRIMACK: Let me take some of the questions from DR. PRIMACK: Well, let me go on to the next question, the audience and address them to the people on the which is addressed to the whole panel, and is panel. There were questions for both Frank von related. Do you think the U.S. example of arms lim- Hippel and Victor Utgoff. Which is a more impor- itation will have an effect on proliferation in anti- tant security threat, Soviet tactical nuclear weapons American areas? For example, al Qaeda? Or will it or Pakistani warheads? leave a hole in security by eliminating the mutually assured destruction? So I guess the question is, Will DR. VON HIPPEL: Actually, I’m more worried about the the United States improve or diminish its security nuclear materials that haven’t been weaponized, with arms limitation? Anyone want to tackle that although I am worried about the future of Pakistan one? and its nuclear weapons. But in the case of Russia, the tactical nuclear weapons are in a relatively small DR. UTGOFF: It’s a very complex question, obviously. number of well-guarded places, maybe 20, while One of the dilemmas is that the United States talks the nuclear materials are in many more, less well- about nonproliferation, where you’re trying to guarded places. encourage everyone else to give up nuclear, biolog- ical, and chemical weapons, and it’s important that DR. UTGOFF: There have been rumors, in fact, that small we set a good example. I see where the Defense (suitcase size) nuclear weapons have been pur- Department is reviewing the need for nuclear chased through the black market by states outside weapons; there is lots of theorizing about what the Russia, drawing upon Russian stockpiles. I certainly requirements may be in the future. I wouldn’t be hope that’s not true, and I do think it underlines the surprised—but this is only my personal opinion—if extreme importance of getting Russian and Pakistani we see further very substantial reductions in the nuclear capabilities under control. U.S. nuclear stockpile over the next 10 to 15 years.

Science, Technology, and Global Security: Questions and Response 123 One of the more interesting questions right some point by the early 1990s, and AIDS started to now, though, is about the possible need to develop seep into the heterosexual population that it and test new nuclear weapons and possibly break became more of an issue. the test moratorium. That’s a big question, and I The same trend applies, really, in the developing think it will have a negative impact on U.S. prolif- world. There wasn’t really much consciousness eration efforts. That isn’t to say that, in the grand about AIDS until relatively recently. Most assess- balance of puts and takes necessary to understand ments about the impact of AIDS underestimated it the effects of any particular policy choice on net by 300 percent. The only accurate one was a U.S. security, that new nuclear weapons will be National Intelligence Assessment around 1990 or totally ruled out. But I do think you can argue that so, and even when we started to raise the estimates going for any new nuclear weapon will have a neg- around 2000, there was still some questioning ative effect on nonproliferation efforts. about whether AIDS was really a security threat. But as more work has been done, the numbers DR. PRIMACK: That’s certainly my opinion, as I said have just kept growing. We’re talking about 20, 30, briefly in my talk. The United States has done more or 40 percent HIV infection rates in some countries. tests than all other countries put together. The only If these people don’t have access to drugs, they will other country that comes close is Russia. For us to surely die. When you translate those numbers to reopen that door would only encourage other coun- the United States, of course, they clearly pose a tries to come closer to our capabilities, which security threat. So it’s really taken some time for cannot possibly be to our advantage. That’s my people to realize the magnitude of AIDS. opinion. Here’s another question, specifically We’re just at the beginning of the AIDS epi- addressed to Frank von Hippel. The questioner says demic. The huge death statistics haven’t arrived that space-based lasers could help with boost phase yet, but they will unless the world really moves intercept. Do you see a role for space-based lasers in very quickly and treats all these people. We are the next 30 years? moving in the right direction, finally. While there are 40 million or so infected, only about 6 million DR. VON HIPPEL: No! are now in urgent need of treatment, which is achievable. But it is a moving target because more DR. PRIMACK: Many of the rest of the questions are and more people are falling into that category now, about the issues that were discussed by Julie Fischer as the number with HIV has grown by tens of mil- and George Fidas. Here’s a question for George: lions. The impact of HIV-AIDS on social instability has been known at least since the late 1980s. Why has DR. PRIMACK: Another question for George Fidas: You it taken so long to raise public awareness, so that said that infant mortality correlates with govern- we can begin to take some steps? And is there ment instability. The question is, Which is the something that we can do to get ahead of the cur- cause, and which is the effect? rent situation? MR. FIDAS: Infant mortality is correlated closely with MR. FIDAS: Well, AIDS wasn’t discovered until 1983, I disease, and it’s really a surrogate variable for a low believe, and throughout the 1980s most people in standard of living overall, low economic capacity, this country didn’t know much about it. Then and probably low political capacity. So I think gen- when they did, it was seen as a disease unique to erally it does cause instability. I think most people the gay population and drug users. It was only would agree, based on that kind of rationale. when we reached 50,000 or 60,000 deaths, at

124 Vision 2033: Linking Science and Policy for Tomorrow’s World DR. FISCHER: Although it’s an extraordinarily compli- being devoted to homeland security consistent with cated issue, it’s clear that high infant mortality exac- the priorities? For example, we are all aware of the erbates instability and economic problems. Much of tremendous effort to protect the air transportation the economic cost comes from the enormous system, but as far as I can see, very little effort to amount of human resources that have to be dedi- protect the ports, whereas the chances of major cated to caring for the ill and then the economic impacts to the country from attacks through the productivity lost to both women of childbearing age ports might be greater. So has there been prioritiza- and caregivers who could otherwise be occupied in tion of the threats, and if so, has there been con- jobs that are economically productive. Infant mor- comitant response? tality is high because support is low. But when infant mortality is high, you have to dedicate so DR. MCCARTHY: It’s a very good question, and first let much of the limited resources available to deal with me give the short answer. Yes. We’re making a it that you can’t break out of the cycle. major effort, both inside the department and in some interagency fora that are very active right DR. PRIMACK: Here’s a question addressed to the now. Inside the science and technology directorate, whole panel: The United States is vulnerable to a which is the primary advocate in the department broad range of infrastructure attacks, such as the for dealing with and addressing the issues of chem- contamination of water supply. Can we really pro- ical or biological weapons and countermeasures, tect ourselves against such attacks? Maureen? we are making very systematic and rigorous internal prioritizations. We have spent countless DR. MCCARTHY: Yes, of course, we can protect our- hours in a very aggressive, detailed, and rigorous selves with some certainty. But is it 100 percent? strategic planning process that’s driving our budgets No, just as it isn’t 100 percent for anything that we and the prioritization inside of the department. are dealing with—any natural disaster or disease Within the rest of the government, various inter- outbreak. But we in homeland security have agency fora are very active right now, one of which invested a lot of energy in understanding the nature is working on the development of a national research of the threats, prioritizing those things that we and development (R&D) strategy for homeland secu- think are going to have impact, and trying to lessen rity. That’s bringing in all of the agencies through a our vulnerability systematically in various areas. We series of working groups to decide where we need to can’t seal ourselves off and be 100 percent safe or put our R&D investment. Unfortunately, these efforts secure, but we can make substantial inroads in are probably not visible outside the government right matching what we understand about the threats to now, but they will be in the next few months. I think what we understand about the vulnerabilities. the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Obviously, we define critical infrastructure very Homeland Security Council, and the National Secu- broadly to include the economy, the country’s phys- rity Council are leading efforts that are driving us for ical infrastructure, the agricultural community, and the first time to examine not only the threats, but human health. When you define it broadly, you can more importantly, the governmental space and the better understand the broad impacts, and you can various agencies needed to deal with them. start to close the gaps of vulnerability as fast as you possibly can. DR. VON HIPPEL: I would like to reiterate that preven- tion is much less costly than cure. If we could elim- DR. PRIMACK: Now let me follow up with a related inate the places where we know nuclear materials question that’s been bothering me. Has there been can be found, there is going to be much less of a some effort to prioritize, and are the resources challenge to detect such materials when they come

Science, Technology, and Global Security: Questions and Response 125 across our borders. I would also like to emphasize established international communications channels the importance of cooperative versus unilateral for collaboration ahead of time. We cannot, during approaches. We need both, but I do think we under- a disaster, say, Oh, God, I think this is a virus—who estimate cooperative approaches. An excellent in the world knows about these? Rather, you need example is the so-called Nunn-Lugar Cooperative to know ahead of time who are your trusted inter- Threat Reduction Program, which, at a cost of $400 national experts and what are your channels of million a year for the last decade or so, has made it cooperation and collaboration for medical research. possible for Russia to eliminate thousands of mis- SARS showed that we get pretty good in an emer- siles. At one point Senator Sam Nunn was talking gency at thinking creatively. about this program, and he asked, “How much would we have given for a weapon that would have DR. PRIMACK: Here is a question addressed specifically destroyed all those thousands of missiles?” to Maureen McCarthy and George Fidas. The ques- tion is: What is the future for Project Bioshield? I DR. PRIMACK: Let me go on to another question. The don’t know what that is. Maybe whoever addresses questioner says: It was noted that there was a quick this could explain what it means. global collaboration in the science community in response to SARS, and this is cited as good news for DR. MCCARTHY: Project Bioshield is shared between bioterrorism preparedness. But in a bioterrorism the Department of Homeland Security and the event, unfettered scientific inquiry is unlikely. What Department of Health and Human Services to acti- should we do about this? vate a set of resources to rapidly procure counter- measures against known threats. Initially, there is DR. FISCHER: First, I believe we can’t assume that in a what is called a material threat determination, bioterrorism event we would not cooperate. In the which is done by the Department of Homeland case of SARS, as an example, we didn’t know what Security, to determine whether the threat is indeed it was originally; any outbreak could be deliberate a material threat to humans. Then after that deter- or natural, and what it actually is may not be mination is made, the Department of Homeland apparent until well into the management of the out- Security and the Department of Health and Human break. SARS was new, and we couldn’t identify the Services collectively agree on a procurement agent initially. But a deliberate outbreak, using a strategy that activates resources that can start coun- known agent, will look no different from a natural termeasures that are not already commercially outbreak, except perhaps in location. available. The program is working quite well. It has In either case, would we have cooperation? not been officially passed, but we are still engaging Some of the limitations that we have put in place in in the discussion. Actually through my office, we law and regulation to control access to dangerous have a very close working relationship with the pathogens make it difficult to exchange those director of the Bioshield office in HHS. pathogens and to exchange information with inter- national collaborators. DR. PRIMACK: This is addressed to any of the panelists. But I think it is a mistake to say that in a bio- The question starts by saying: George Fidas asked, logical attack we would not cooperate in the same What is the role of science and technology in way. We have tremendous capacity domestically, addressing the problems of infectious disease? But, but we have to have a truly dual-benefit system that the questioner says that the question that he or she looks for deliberate or naturally occurring outbreaks is interested in is, To what extent is the current U.S. and puts the infrastructure into place that would administration doing what is needed to mobilize deal equally well with either. We also have to have these resources?

126 Vision 2033: Linking Science and Policy for Tomorrow’s World MR. FIDAS: Well, I think in the case of AIDS, the one set of foreign aid health programs to fulfill the Clinton Administration and the current Bush promise of a different set in the future. So, we have Administration have really taken the lead globally to look carefully at where the resources to confront to mobilize resources to fight AIDS and related dis- a threat come from. The resources come from eases. It was the Clinton Administration that first somewhere. The question is, after the decision to brought the issue to the UN Security Council, then take money away from some other goal, Are there pressed for a UN General Assembly meeting, and bad consequences from that decision? then pressed our allies and the World Bank to join the effort. James Wolfensohn of the World Bank DR. VON HIPPEL: We are spending a lot of money on declared AIDS to be the single biggest threat to eco- biodefense research and development—I think nomic development, and so on. That really was a AAAS has estimated the cost at $3 billion a year. I’m U.S. initiative, and it remains so to this day, with concerned about the strategy. There’s a debate the Bush Administration’s $15 billion fund. That emerging about whether we are condemned to a has not been matched elsewhere, even proportion- new kind of arms race with subnational groups ately. You know, we often hear that, in terms of using these new capabilities of biotechnology to overall foreign aid, the United States is dead last develop genetically engineered agents. For among the industrial countries. In funding for AIDS example, a terrorist group might develop modified and infectious diseases, however, it’s probably at the pathogens that would not be susceptible to existing top. Whether that is enough is another question, vaccines. A major sector in the community feels but that gets to my thesis about determining the that we have to develop the worst things that we real threats out there. Even if you accept that ter- could imagine, so that we can develop defenses rorism is the principal threat, how do you get at it? against them. If we go that route, I think we have Do you get at it by preventive measures, by defense, to do it in a very thoughtful way. by homeland security, or do you also get at it by There is a related issue, which is secrecy. How dealing with the roots of terrorism? You know, much of this research should be secret, and how some could argue that it’s still way out of sync much should it be subject to open peer review? If when you devote hundreds of billions of dollars to we reveal what our worst fears are, will we be defense and $15 billion to foreign aid. making it easier for our enemies to engineer them? These two issues—the extent to which we actually DR. FISCHER: I think there’s one other complementary try to develop new diseases in order to find cures issue, which is, Are we doing what we should do? for them and the extent to which parts of these pro- Are we lurching from threat to threat, in general? In grams are conducted in secrecy—really need to be complement to what Mr. Fidas just said, the other debated by the life science community. danger is, Are we drawing the resources out of other critical systems to do so? For example, the DR. PRIMACK: Here is a question that is directed to Dr. $15 billion over five years to fight HIV-AIDS is an Fischer: What would be the impact of global amazing first investment, and it is commendable. A warming on the epidemiology of diseases such as lot of the money for the first-year funding for that malaria? Will this have any impact on the interests program came out of the budgets of maternal and of the drug industry? child health programs, TB prevention programs, and vaccine programs. Now the argument was that DR. FISCHER: In other words, if New York gets hit, will the HIV-AIDS money would build infrastructure in we have drugs for it? Global warming will have an these nations, so that’s perfectly okay. But in the impact because changes in climate also change the short term, it certainly had a devastating impact on geographic areas that can be occupied by the vec-

Science, Technology, and Global Security: Questions and Response 127 tors of many diseases. And it is not completely DR. VON HIPPEL: Is this question from somebody with unpredictable, although it requires multidisciplinary $1 million? exchange between the life sciences, including ecol- ogists, clinicians, and veterinarians, and the climate DR. PRIMACK: There is always that possibility. research communities to understand what is likely to happen as human pressures and climate change DR. MCCARTHY: The AAAS has been amazingly effec- push people, animals, and insects into new places tive in building the program up by creating advo- where they come into contact with each other. cates within the organizations for which the Will the increased number of malaria cases Fellows are working. When I went about creating make finding a cure more financially attractive to the Homeland Security Scholars and Fellows Pro- drug companies? I have a hard time seeing that the gram, I built a lot on the AAAS model. At AAAS, it’s market would become substantially larger to impel not just about bringing people in and giving them a industry to seek a solution without any other incen- grant to be here for a year or two years or however tive. There are some short-term approaches, which long it is. It is about fostering a relationship with the include funding through, for example, the Global organization that they are going to and building the Fund and the Gates Foundation to create more mentoring relationship necessary to keep them research incentives. The Gates Foundation has involved throughout their fellowship term. It is also recently started a very large project to look at coun- very important culturally, and I think AAAS termeasures, treatments, and prevention for deserves a lot of credit for creating a culture when malaria, which could produce the fundamental they bring people in from disparate places all over research that can be developed then in public-pri- the country. Each year, the program creates a class, vate partnership. with its own identity. My fellow Fellows are my closest friends in Washington. The fellowship pro- DR. PRIMACK: There is one last question that was actu- gram has invested a lot in fostering a relationship ally addressed to me, but I think it is really more not only between the Fellows and their agencies or appropriate to pass it on to the panel, since I don’t Congressional offices, wherever they serve, but also have the answer. The question is: If funding for the among each other. AAAS Science and technology Fellowship Programs So I would gladly see the million dollars could be increased by $1 million a year, how would invested, first, in substantially increasing the you use this increase? Would you simply do more of resources for the staff who manage these programs, the same? I helped to start the program 31 years whom I know are overworked and overtapped, ago, but I actually don’t know much about the and, second, in bringing different agencies into the details of how the program is working now. We program. I think the broadening of the fellowship have on the panel two fairly recent Fellows, and I program from its traditional role on the Hill into the know that Frank von Hippel has been involved in executive branch and into other areas has really choosing Fellows, so I would like to turn this ques- expanded the knowledge base and the interaction tion over to the panelists. Frank, in particular, had of the Fellows. It has increased not only the impact said that he recommends an international extension that we have on the government, but also the of the program, so he’s already suggested one direc- impact that we have on each other. tion. DR. PRIMACK: That’s all the time we have for ques- tions. Thank you all.

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