Evolving Property Rights in Domain Names Jeffrey R
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Outcomes Report of the GNSO Ad Hoc Group on Domain Tasting
GNSO Outcomes Report on Domain Tasting Doc. No.: Date: 2007/02/04 4 October, 2007 OUTCOMES REPORT OF THE GNSO AD HOC GROUP ON DOMAIN NAME TASTING 4 October 2007 Group Chair: Mike Rodenbaugh ICANN Staff: Olof Nordling, Patrick Jones STATUS OF THIS DOCUMENT This is the final version of the Outcomes Report from the GNSO ad hoc group on Domain Name Tasting, submitted to the GNSO Council on 4 October, 2007. GNSO Outcomes Report on Domain Tasting v1.6 Authors: Mike Rodenbaugh, [email protected] , Olof Nordling, [email protected] , Patrick Jones, [email protected], Page 1 of 144 GNSO Outcomes Report on Domain Tasting Doc. No.: Date: 2007/02/04 4 October, 2007 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 2 OBJECTIVE 5 3 BACKGROUND 7 4 OUTCOMES 10 5 NEXT STEPS 32 ANNEX 1 - SUBSCRIBERS TO THE DT LIST 33 ANNEX 2 - RFI RESPONSES 34 ANNEX 3 - EXPERIENCES FROM CCTLDS 97 ANNEX 4 - COMMENTS FROM UDRP PROVIDERS 104 ANNEX 5 – IPC CONSTITUENCY SUPPLEMENTAL RFI116 ANNEX 6 – REQUEST TO VERISIGN 144 GNSO Outcomes Report on Domain Tasting v1.6 Authors: Mike Rodenbaugh, [email protected] , Olof Nordling, [email protected] , Patrick Jones, [email protected], Page 2 of 144 GNSO Outcomes Report on Domain Tasting Doc. No.: Date: 2007/02/04 4 October, 2007 1 Executive summary 1.1 Background Following a request from the At-Large Advisory Committee in spring 2007, the GNSO Council called for an Issues Report on Domain Tasting from ICANN Staff in May 2007. This Issues Report, available at http://gnso.icann.org/issues/domain- tasting/gnso-domain-tasting-report-14jun07.pdf was discussed at the ICANN San Juan meeting, where the GNSO Council on 27 June 2007 (minutes at http://gnso.icann.org/meetings/minutes-gnso-27jun07.shtml) resolved to establish an ad hoc group for further fact-finding on the practice of domain tasting. -
July 2017 Your Property Sale Agreement: Be Careful How It’S Worded!
With Compliments Upper Ground Level Tel: 011 880 3300 8 Arnold Road Fax: 011 880 9128 Rosebank Email: [email protected] 2196 Website: www.hirschowitz-flionis.co.za Forward email Online Printable Version July 2017 Your Property Sale Agreement: Be Careful How It’s Worded! The bond clause and the better offer YOUR PROPERTY SALE AGREEMENT: BE CAREFUL HOW IT’S WORDED! One clause, two interpretations “In war and litigation, both A hard lesson for the sides suffer” (old Roman seller proverb) Is Your Domain Name at Risk Here’s yet another reminder from our from “Drop Catching”? courts on how important it is – if you want to avoid the trials of litigation - for What is “domain drop you to have your property sale catching”? agreement drawn up professionally. An administrative One thing it must do, as the case in oversight takes a website question clearly shows, is record the down; and a price-tag of terms of your agreement precisely and R200k to get it back without any room for argument. Don’t let that happen to your business! This High Court case revolved around a “bond clause” in a sale agreement. A bond clause is a standard protection for any buyer who needs finance in order to pay the purchase price. It’s a “suspensive” clause that means the sale agreement only Trusts: New Directive on becomes enforceable if and when it is fulfilled. Independent Trustees The bond clause and the better offer Evicting Your Troublesome Tenant: More Problems with The bond clause in an agreement of sale required the buyers, within 30 PIE days, to obtain from a bank a loan offer, quotation and pre-agreement. -
The Truth in Domain Names Act of 2003 and a Preventative Measure to Combat Typosquatting, 89 Cornell L
Cornell Law Review Volume 89 Article 3 Issue 6 September 2004 The rT uth in Domain Names Act of 2003 and a Preventative Measure to Combat Typosquatting Christopher G. Clark Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Christopher G. Clark, The Truth in Domain Names Act of 2003 and a Preventative Measure to Combat Typosquatting, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 1476 (2004) Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol89/iss6/3 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. NOTE THE TRUTH IN DOMAIN NAMES ACT OF 2003 AND A PREVENTATIVE MEASURE TO COMBAT TYPOSQUATTING Christopher G. Clarkt INTRODUCTION ................................................. 1477 I. CYBERSQUATTING AND TYPOSQUATTING ON THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY ............................ 1482 A. The Structure of the Internet: A Brief Overview .... 1482 B. Reserving Your Space in Cyberspace: The Domain Name Registration Process .......................... 1485 C. Typosquatting and Cybersquatting: Profit by D eception .......................................... 1487 D. The Case of the Notorious Typosquatter ............ 1491 II. LIVING IN A TYPOSQUATrER'S PARADISE: LIMITED DETERRENCE THROUGH FRAGMENTED LITIGATION AND INEFFECTIVE ARBITRATION ............................... 1492 A. The Mid-to-Late 1990s: The Federal Trademark D ilution Act ........................................ 1493 B. 1999-2003: The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ...................................... 1496 C. ICANN and Arbitration Under the Uniform Domain Name Resolution Policy .................... 1501 D. The Return of the Notorious Typosquatter ........ -
Plenty of Phish in the Sea: Analyzing Potential Pre-Attack Surfaces
Plenty of Phish in the Sea: Analyzing Potential Pre-Attack Surfaces Tobias Urban13[0000−0003−0908−0038], Matteo Große-Kampmann123, Dennis Tatang3, Thorsten Holz3, and Norbert Pohlmann1 1 Institute for Internet-Security, Westphalian University of Applied Sciences, Germany 2 Aware7 GmbH, Germany 3 Ruhr-Universit¨atBochum, Germany Abstract. Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are one of the main challenges in modern computer security. They are planned and performed by well-funded, highly-trained and often state-based actors. The first step of such an attack is the reconnaissance of the target. In this phase, the adversary tries to gather as much intelligence on the victim as possible to prepare further actions. An essential part of this initial data collection phase is the identification of possible gateways to intrude the target. In this paper, we aim to analyze the data that threat actors can use to plan their attacks. To do so, we analyze in a first step 93 APT reports and find that most (80 %) of them begin by sending phishing emails to their victims. Based on this analysis, we measure the extent of data openly available of 30 entities to understand if and how much data they leak that can potentially be used by an adversary to craft sophisticated spear phishing emails. We then use this data to quantify how many employees are potential targets for such attacks. We show that 83 % of the analyzed entities leak several attributes of uses, which can all be used to craft sophisticated phishing emails. Keywords: advanced persistent threats · phishing · OSINT · reconnais- sance · MITRE · cyber kill chain · measurement study. -
Property Rights As a Bulwark Against Dns Censorship
MASTERS OF THEIR OWN DOMAINS: PROPERTY RIGHTS AS A BULWARK AGAINST DNS CENSORSHIP NICHOLAS NUGENT* It is increasingly becoming the practice of domain name system (DNS) intermediaries to seize domain names used by lawful websites for violating acceptable use policies related to offensive content or hate speech. Website hosting companies and social media platforms, entities that use but do not operate core Internet infrastructure, have long reserved and exercised their rights to gate their offerings, leaving booted speakers free to migrate to other providers. But registrants deprived of their domain names lack similar options to maintain their presence in cyberspace. The loss of a domain name inexorably results in the takedown of any website that uses the domain name, even if hosted elsewhere, and leaves a potentially invaluable asset essentially free for the taking by another. Proponents of Internet freedom have therefore argued that companies that operate foundational Internet infrastructure, such as the DNS, should play no role in policing content, no matter how deplorable, and that DNS censorship, once normalized, could easily spread to other minority groups and viewpoints. Acknowledging that DNS intermediaries—the companies that offer domain names and make them operational on the Internet— are private actors whose actions are not subject to First Amendment constraints, critics of DNS censorship seem to tacitly concede that DNS intermediaries may take whatever actions are permitted under their terms of service, appealing instead to policy arguments or calls to enact new protective legislation. But I argue that registrants already possess the legal means to protect themselves from domain name seizure through the property rights they acquire in their domain names. -
The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
William & Mary Law Review Volume 43 (2001-2002) Issue 1 Article 7 October 2001 Designing Non-National Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy Laurence R. Helfer Graeme B. Dinwoodie [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr Part of the International Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons Repository Citation Laurence R. Helfer and Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 141 (2001), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol43/iss1/7 Copyright c 2001 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr DESIGNING NON-NATIONAL SYSTEMS: THE CASE OF THE UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY LAURENCE R. HELFER & GRAEME B. DINwoODIE* TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ..................................... 144 I. HYBRID NON-NATIONAL SYSTEMS: THE EXAMPLE OF THE UDRP ...................... 154 A FramingTrademark-Domain Name Conflicts ........ 154 B. The Evolution of Non-NationalDispute Settlement for Cybersquatting ..................... 157 1. The gTLD-Mo U's Administrative Challenge Panels (ACPs) ................................ 158 a. The gTLD-Mo U's Authority for Creatingthe ACPs .......................... 159 b. The Hybrid Nature of ACP Dispute Settlement .... 160 c. Narrowing the Scope of EligibleDisputes ....... 163 2. The WIPO Domain Name Consultative Process ..... 164 a. Authority for WIPO Consultations and Proposals .............................. 166 b. The Scope and Hybrid Nature of Dispute Settlement Under WIPO's Proposals ............ 171 (1) WIPO's Interim Report .................... 171 * Larry Helfer is Professor of Law at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, and Graeme Dinwoodie is Professor of Law at the Chicago-Kent College ofLaw. -
Plenty of Phish in the Sea: Analyzing Potential Pre-Attack Surfaces
Plenty of Phish in the Sea: Analyzing Potential Pre-Attack Surfaces Tobias Urban13[0000−0003−0908−0038], Matteo Große-Kampmann123, Dennis Tatang3, Thorsten Holz3, and Norbert Pohlmann1 1 Institute for Internet-Security, Westphalian University of Applied Sciences, Germany 2 Aware7 GmbH, Germany 3 Ruhr-Universit¨atBochum, Germany Abstract. Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are one of the main challenges in modern computer security. They are planned and performed by well-funded, highly-trained, and often state-based actors. The first step of such an attack is the reconnaissance of the target. In this phase, the adversary tries to gather as much intelligence on the victim as pos- sible to prepare further actions. An essential part of this initial data collection phase is the identification of possible gateways to intrude the target. In this paper, we aim to analyze the data that threat actors can use to plan their attacks. To do so, we analyze in a first step 93 APT reports and find that most (80 %) of them begin by sending phishing emails to their victims. Based on this analysis, we measure the extent of data openly available of 30 entities to understand if and how much data they leak that can potentially be used by an adversary to craft sophisticated spear- phishing emails. We then use this data to quantify how many employees are potential targets for such attacks. We show that 83 % of the analyzed entities leak several attributes of uses, which can all be used to craft sophisticated phishing emails. Keywords: advanced persistent threats · phishing · OSINT · reconnais- sance · MITRE · cyber kill chain · measurement study. -
Cybersquatting, Typosquatting, and Domaining
CYBERSQUATTING, TYPOSQUATTING, AND DOMAINING: TEN YEARS UNDER THE ANTI-CYBERSQUATTING CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT By: Carl C. Butzer and Jason P. Reinsch In Leviathan (1651), Thomas Hobbes described the natural state of the human condition as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” The solution to this chaos, he argued, was government and the rules of civil law. In the 1800s, America’s “Wild West” (including outlaws like the notorious Texas gunfighter, John Wesley Hardin)1 tested existing laws and government. History has proven that the challenges posed by America’s last “new frontier” were not insurmountable. The turmoil observed by Hobbes and the Texas Rangers2 seems to pale in comparison to the disorder caused by the Internet over the past 15 years. A senior IBM consultant was recently quoted as saying “The Internet has finally taken on the characteristics of the Wild West where no one is to be trusted.” http://news.techworld.com/security/3201556/the-internet-is-the-new-wild- west-reports-ibm-consultant/ (last visited September 21, 2009). It is no secret that legislators, jurists, and organizations – despite many years of effort – continue to search for solutions to the complex legal issues spawned by the World Wide Web, a technological forum that allows billions of people to communicate almost instantaneously. 1 Hardin (1853-95), who reportedly shot 30 men, was so mean he once killed a man for snoring too loudly. Hardin later complained: “They tell lots of lies about me. They say I killed six or seven men for snoring. Well, it ain’t true, I only killed one man for snoring.” Trachtman, Paul (1974).