“Man-In-The-Middle” Attacks in 3G. University of Tartu Computer Science Department Ksenia Orman [email protected]

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“Man-In-The-Middle” Attacks in 3G. University of Tartu Computer Science Department Ksenia Orman Kseniao@Ut.Ee “Man-in-the-middle” attacks in 3G. University of Tartu Computer science department Ksenia Orman [email protected] Introduction. GSM (Global System for Mobile communications) is the technology that supports most of the world’s mobile phone networks. Nowadays mobile phones are used by over than one billion of users worldwide (by mid-March 2006 there were over 1.7 billion GSM subscribers) and is available in more than 190 countries. [1] GSM security issues such as theft of privacy, service and legal interception are still significantly interesting in the GSM community. The purpose of security for GSM system is to make the system as secure as the public switched telephone network and to prevent phone cloning. Today’s GSM platform is growing and evolving. 3GSM is the latest addition to the GSM family. 3G Systems enable to provide a global mobility with wide range of services including telephony, paging, messaging, Internet and broadband data. 3GSM system makes possible to migrate users of current second generation (2G) GSM wireless network to the new third generation services with minimal disruption. 1. What is GSM? In the telecommunication’s world various systems were developed without the benefit of standards. This caused many problems directly related to compatibility, especially with the development of digital radio technology. In 1982 by the European Conference of Post and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT) was formed the name GSM, which first comes from a group called Group Special Mobile (GSM). The purpose of that conference was to develop European cellular systems that would replace the many existing inconsistent cellular systems. But in 1991 the abbreviation “GSM” was renamed to Global System for Mobile Communications. [2] GSM is the most popular phone system in the world. More than 1.7 billion people use GSM phones as of 2005, making GSM the dominant mobile phone system worldwide with about 70% of the world’s market. The legislation mandating of using the European-originated GSM (and its 3G successors), as the single mobile phone system in the countries of the European Union, gave the system a solid base for expansion to other countries who wish to roam in Europe. [3] GSM grew out of a vision that users should be able to make and receive calls on their mobiles, wherever they travelled. GSM is unique in having specific international roaming among telecommunications technologies. National roaming refers to the ability to move to a foreign service provider’s network. It is of particular interest to international tourist and business travellers. The billionth GSM user was connected in the first quarter of 2004. We can see in the figure 1 how quickly and successfully GSM has been developing. Fig.1. GSM subscriber statistics [1] 2. The GSM Network. GSM provides recommendations, not requirements. The GSM specifications define the functions and interface requirements in detail but do not address the hardware. It is made for limiting the designers as less as possible, but encouraging the operators to buy equipment from different suppliers. The GSM network is divided into the Base Station Subsystem (BSS), the Network and Switching Subsystem (NSS), the GPRS Core Network. All of the elements in the system are combined to produce various GSM services such as voice and SMS. Fig.2. Structure of a GSM network [2] The figure 2 shows the simplified structure of GSM network. • The BSS The Base Station Subsystem consists of the Base Transceiver Station (BTS) and the Base Station Controller (BSC). The BSC and the BTC are connected together via the interface. The Packet Control Unit (PCU) is a late addition to the GSM standard. It performs some of the processing tasks of the BSC, but for packet data. So The PCU is also shown connected to the BTS, although exact specification depends on the vendor’s architecture. • The NSS The Network and Switching Subsystem is shown containing the MSC/VLR connected via the SS7 network to the HLR. The Mobile Switching Centre or MSC performs the telephony switching functions of the system. It controls calls to and from other telephone and data system. It also performs functions such as toll ticketing, network interfacing, common channel signalling and others. The Visitor Location Register (VLR) is a database that contains temporary information about subscribers that is needed by the MSC in order to service visiting subscribers. The VLR is always integrated with the MSC. When a mobile station roams into a new MSC area, the VLR connected to that MSC will request the mobile station data from HLR. Later, if the mobile station makes a call, the VLR will have the information needed for call setup without having to interrogate the HLR each time. The Home Location Register (HLR) is a database used for storage and management of subscriptions. The HLR is considered the most important database, as it stores permanent data about subscribers, including s subscriber’s service profile, location information, and activity status. Signalling System #7 (SS7) is a set of telephony signalling protocols which are used to set up the vast majority of the world’s public switched telephone network (PSTN) telephone calls. SS7 provides an universal structure for telephony network signalling, messaging, and network maintenance. It deals with establishment of a call, exchanging user information, call routing, different billing structures and supports Intelligent network (IN) services. The AUC and EIR, although technically separate functions from the HLR are shown together since combining them is almost standard in all Vendor’s networks. The Authentication Centre (AUC) provides authentication and encryption parameters that verify the user’s identity and ensure the confidentiality of each call. The AUC protects network operators from different types of fraud found in today’s cellular world. The Equipment identity register (EIR) is a database that contains information about the identity of mobile equipment that prevents calls from stolen, unauthorized, or defective mobile stations. The AUC and EIR are implemented as stand-alone nodes or as a combined AUC/EIR node. The NSS is connected by the A interface to the BSS. It has a direct connection to the PSTN from the MSC. There is also connection to the Packet Core although this is optional and not always implemented. • The GPRS Core Network The GPRS Core Network shown here simply and has the SGSN (connected to the BSS by the interface) and the GGSN. The GSN (GPRS Support Nodes) supports the use of GPRS in the GSM core network. All GSNs should have an interface and support the GPRS tunnelling protocol. There are two key variants of the GSN: GGSN and the SGSN defined below. For encyclopedical inquiry on GPRS please check [12] . 3. Introduction to 3G. 3GSM is the latest addition to the GSM family. It enables the provision of mobile multimedia services such as music, TV and video, rich entertainment content and Internet access. Global operators, in conjunction with the 3G Partnership Project (3GPP) standards organisation, have developed 3GSM as an open standard. [4] 1G or First generation wireless refers to analog networks introduced in the mid-1980s. Most 1G technologies and systems were country or region-specific and thus offered limited coverage. As mobile communications grew in popularity, networks often became overloaded, 1G was replaced in the early 1990s by 2G digital cell phones. This allowed a considerable improvement in voice quality. 2G networks may offer an optional service to transfer low-speed data, such as email or software, in addition to the digital voice call itself. 2G technologies can be divided into TDMA-based and CDMA-based standards depending on the type of multiplexing used. [5] The main 2G standards are: • GSM came originally from Europe but used worldwide • TDMA (Time Division Multiple Access) was used in the Americas and Latin America • CDMA (Code division multiple access) IS-95 or cdmaOne was used primarily in the Americas and Asia Pacific. Fig.3. GSM Technologies Evolution [1] The Evolution to 3G started in 1999. Japan is the first country, who has introduced 3G nationally, and in Japan the transition to 3G will be largely completed during 2005/2006. In other countries it can last till 2010. [6] The main reasons for these changes are basically the limited capacity of existing 2G networks. The 2G was built mainly for telephone calls and slow data transmission. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) has defined the demands for the third generation mobile networks with the IMT-2000 standard. [7] Today, WCDMA (Wideband CDMA) and CDMA2000 are the dominant standards in terms of current commercial services. CDMA 2000 1X was the world’s first operational 3G technology, capable of transmitting data faster than most dial-up services. Today, more than 190 million people enjoy the benefits of CDMA-2000 1X. [7] Also known as UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System), WCDMA is the 3G standard chosen mostly by GSM/GPRS wireless network operators. WCDMA supports speeds between 384 kbit/s and 2 Mbit/sec. When this protocol is used in a WAN (wide area network), the top speed is 384 kbit/s. When it is used in LAN (local area network), the top speed is 2 Mbit/s. [7] As of February 2006, more than 51 million subscribers were using WCDMA for their mobile voice and data needs. [7] For consumers’ 3G offers high-quality, low-cost voice, fun and useful data services, such as: • Mobile Internet connectivity • Mobile email • Multimedia services (digital photos, movies etc) • Wireless application downloading • Real-time multiplayer gaming • Video-on-demand Finally, 3G technology’s data capabilities open up an enormous world of opportunity for application developers and content providers. 4. GSM Security model. What is different in 3G. GSM was designed with a moderate level of security.
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