May 6, 2018 RBC Capital Markets, LLC Helima Croft Global Head of Commodity Strategy Iran: Chain Reaction (212) 618-7798 [email protected] Commodity Strategy Christopher Louney While President Trump has not publicly announced his decision on the May 12 Iran Commodity Strategist sanctions waivers, it seems that the bureaucratic wheels are turning in Washington to (212) 437-1925 [email protected] prepare for a sanctions snapback and a renewed effort to reduce Iranian exports. Michael Tran While there is a scenario where Trump opts to waive sanctions once again due to North Commodity Strategist Korea, we think it is more likely that he opts to exit this week. Yet, whether or not the (212) 266-4020 [email protected] Iranian nuclear deal does die this month or later this summer, the exit terms will be key. Any delay in enforcement or grace period could push the volumetric impact into 2019. Megan Schippmann Associate Strategist While Saudi Arabia publicly promised to put additional barrels on the market last time to (212) 301-1531 avoid higher prices at the pump, their willingness to fill the gap cannot simply be assumed. [email protected]
The extraterritorial nature of US sanctions which cover energy, shipbuilding, finance, trade, insurance, etc., means that depending on the enforcement date, Iran’s oil exports could
credibly be curtailed by 200-300 kb/d. Also, we caution that the risk could span beyond barrels if Iran opted to resume suspended nuclear activities in a post-JCPOA world.
Ready to Roll Once again, decision day for Iran sanctions waivers is looming and we think that it is highly likely that President Trump will exercise the exit option despite the recent best efforts of European leaders to fix the nuclear deal. While there remains an outside chance that Trump will kick the decision until July because of the upcoming North Korea negotiations, we contend that such a delay would only represent a temporary stay of execution for the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA). Regardless of whether the nuclear deal dies this week or over the summer, the exact terms of the exit will be very important. A hard JCPOA exit with a swift sanctions snapback would force customers to reduce purchases almost immediately. A more gradual reinstatement of US extraterritorial sanctions would likely entail a grace period to allow foreign refiners to slowly reduce their Iranian imports. While the US would be going it alone this time around in re- imposing sanctions, we believe that the punitive US measures would curb the enthusiasm of European energy companies to invest in Iran and would likely cause European and Asian refineries (ex-China) to reduce their purchases by around 200 to 300 kb/d. A hard exit would make these losses a Q4 2018 event, while a soft exit would push those reductions into H1 2019.
Figure 1: Sanctions dates versus Iranian crude production
Iranian Crude Production versus Sanctions Events (mb/d) 4,500
UN US EU JCPOA
UK 4,000 CA
3,500
3,000
2,500 All values in USD unless otherwise noted.
Priced as of prior trading day’s market 2,000 close, ET (unless otherwise stated).
1,500 For Required Conflicts Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16 Jan-17 Jan-18 Disclosures, please see Source: Petro-Logistics SA, news and government sources, RBC Capital Markets page 5. RBC Capital Markets appreciates your consideration in the 2018 Institutional Investor All-America Research Team survey. Disseminated: May 6, 2018 14:00ET; Produced: May 6, 2018 12:15ET Iran: Chain Reaction
Figure 2: What did sanctions relief mean?
Top Oil Buyers from Iran and Reductions (kb/d) Under the JCPOA, sanctions relief helped Iran economically in Pre-sanctions Sanctions JCPOA a number of ways. Specifically, it was able to reach around 7% Country/Bloc (2011 avg.) (Jan. 2014) (Jan. 2016 ) growth in 2016 and 2017, while also increasing its oil exports European Union 600 Negligible near 2011 back to near pre-sanction levels (currently around 2 mb/d). Under the deal, Iran has also been able to attract some new China 550 410 near 2011 foreign investment and was able to secure deals to purchase Japan 325 190 near 2011 aircraft (i.e. from Boeing and Airbus). These benefits paid India 320 190 near 2011 dividends for some of the more moderate politicians in Iran, South Korea 230 130 near 2011 for example, President Rouhani was arguably aided by the Turkey 200 120 near 2011 JCPOA in winning re-election in May 2017. That said, some South Africa 80 Negligible unclear within the country still contend that Iran did not receive the Malaysia 55 Negligible unclear promised economic dividends. Prior to the nuclear deal, the US Sri Lanka 35 Negligible unclear had imposed sanctions over 2012-2015 which proved Taiwan 35 10 small increase challenging. During that time span Iran’s crude oil exports fell by 1.4 mb/d to around 1.1 mb/d (down from approximately Signapore 20 Negligible unclear 2.5 mb/d previously), and its economy contracted by 9% on Other 55 Negligible small increase average each year. Over $120bln in reserves held at Total 2.5 mb/d 1.1 mb/d 2.4 mb/d international banks was also inaccessible.
Source: Congressional Research Service, RBC Capital Markets
Revoking sanctions waivers this week would finally end US participation in the landmark 2015 Iranian nuclear deal. By taking such action, President Trump would fulfill a key campaign promise and please key Middle Eastern allies as well as his increasingly hawkish foreign policy team. However, such a decision also entails some economic policy challenges in the form of potentially higher oil prices. The President’s recent twitter attack on OPEC can be seen as a sign that he is increasingly concerned about the political costs of rising gasoline prices. Hence, the timing of any sanctions snapback will be a critical policy decision for the White House. One option open to the administration is to adopt the Obama administration playbook of allowing a 180-day grace period before forcing foreign corporates to make “significant reductions” in their Iranian crude imports every six months. While the Congressional legislation never mandated a specific percentage for the required import reduction, the Obama White House used a 20% figure. If the Trump team adopts such a phased approach, that would push the actual reductions into H1 2019. An immediate reinstatement of the energy sanctions and the start of the 180-day import cut clock, in turn, would trigger a fairly sharp halt in Iranian crude purchases from consumers that seek to be compliant with US measures even if Trump opts to use the same 20% figure. While there is considerable debate over the effectiveness of unilateral US action on Iran, we think that a revival of the threat to lock non-compliant corporates out of US capital markets provides the White House with a pretty powerful stick. While Chinese compliance is probably a nonstarter, we do anticipate a high degree of cooperation from European, Japanese, and South Korean corporates despite their host government’s opposition to the US move. We would also point to the market reaction to the recent US sanctions targeting Rusal, as another indicator that such punitive measures can be enormously impactful even if they are unilateral.
Filling the Gap Another critical contingency will be the role of Saudi Arabia in helping to fill the supply gap. Given the tightening fundamental backdrop, especially with the escalating Venezuelan production outages, the White House will likely look to its key Middle Eastern ally, Saudi Arabia, to help fill the supply gap and prevent a price spike. The Kingdom has certainly been a strong opponent of the JCPOA and has consistently pushed Washington to take a tougher line on Iran’s support for a host of regional extremist groups and armed proxies. The Saudi May 6, 2018 2 Iran: Chain Reaction
leadership quickly (and enthusiastically) embraced President Trump, in no small part because they believed his arrival would end Obama’s rapprochement with Iran. However, Saudi’s willingness to put additional barrels on the market to assist Washington remains something of an open question. In 2012, the Kingdom publicly pledged to make up for any shortfall in exports from Iran and consulted closely with Washington on supply arrangements. This time around, Saudi Arabia seems more wedded to higher oil prices, as they provide the key enabling environment for many of the most important Vision 2030 reform measures. The Kingdom has gone from being one of the more dovish members of OPEC to being a preeminent hawk and cut enforcer. Despite subsidy cuts and the introduction of new taxes, the country’s fiscal needs appear to be climbing; with the IMF recently stating that Saudi's fiscal breakeven for oil has risen to $85-87/bbl (our 2018 estimate is $83/bbl). The Trump Administration may be hoping that Saudi barrels will be returning to the market anyways in 2019 with an anticipated sun setting of the OPEC cut agreement. With talk of an OPEC extension into 2019, still percolating despite the decent run up in prices, such optimism again may not be entirely justified.
The Day After The Iranian response to a US withdrawal from the JCPOA will also warrant very close watching. The recent ramp up in Iranian exports is likely part of Tehran’s advance preparation for a sanctions snapback and an effort to secure the highest supply benchmark before percentage cuts are applied. In addition, the Iranian leadership will likely appeal to the Chinese to increase their purchases of Iranian barrels to make up for the losses to other markets. One factor that bears keeping in mind is that there are a number of other punitive US measures, beyond the outright export restrictions, that will potentially curtail Iran’s ability to move their barrels. In particular, we would cite the prohibitions on providing shipping and insurance services to facilitate the transport of Iranian crude as particularly meaningful.
Figure 3: Iranian Crude Exports, ISA – IFCA – Oil Export Sanctions and Penalties
2,750 Iranian Crude Exports (mb/d) Details: Under the ISA which covers investment in Iran’s energy sector etc. at least 5 of 12 sanctions (menu below) must be imposed upon violators. The menu targets a variety of financial items, trade licenses, transactions, US government bond dealing etc. The IFCA covers a wide range of Iranian economic sectors, human rights, etc. and blocks US-based property of any 2,000 entity that provides goods, services, or other support to any Iranian entity designated by the Treasury Dept. as a “specially designated national” (SDN). If a bank knowingly enables a financial transaction with a SDN, that bank is prohibited from operating within the US. Entities violating sanctions related to energy, shipbuilding, and shipping sectors, dealing in 1,250 precious metals and insurance activities also face a mandatory 5 of the 12 sanctions menu. Oil Export Sanctions sought to reduce Iran’s oil exports by sanctioning the mechanisms importers use to pay. Penalties target activities with Iran’s Central Bank, requiring the President to block foreign banks and companies that conduct business with Iran’s central bank from 500 opening accounts in the US. An exemption highly incentivizes curtailing Jan-15 Oct-15 Jul-16 May-17 Feb-18 Iranian crude intake stating that foreign institutions are exempt if that institution’s home country “significantly reduced” purchases of Iranian oil. Sanctions Penalty Menu 1) Denial of Export-Import Bank loans, credits, or credit guarantees for U.S. exports to the sanctioned entity. 2) Denial of licenses for the U.S. export of military or militarily useful technology to the entity. 3) Denial of U.S. bank loans exceeding $10 million in one year to the entity. 4) If the entity is a financial institution, a prohibition on its service as a primary dealer in U.S. government bonds; and/or a prohibition on its serving as a repository for U.S. government funds. 5) Prohibition on U.S. government procurement from the entity. 6) Prohibitions in transactions in foreign exchange by the entity. 7) Prohibition on any credit or payments between the entity and any U.S. financial institution. 8) Prohibition of the sanctioned entity from acquiring, holding, using, or trading any U.S.-based property which the sanctioned entity has a (financial) interest. 9) Restriction on imports from the sanctioned entity, in accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. 10) A ban on a U.S. person from investing in or purchasing significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of a sanctioned person. 11) Exclusion from the United States of corporate officers or controlling shareholders of a sanctioned firm. 12) Imposition of any of the ISA sanctions on principal offices of a sanctioned firm.
Source: Petro-Logistics SA, Congressional Research Service. RBC Capital Markets
May 6, 2018 3 Iran: Chain Reaction
Finally, we would also warn that oil’s fear premium could rise if Iran decides to immediately resume suspended nuclear activities in an effort to rapidly reach weapons breakout capability. Saudi’s Crown Prince has already warned that the Kingdom will opt for its own nuclear program in the event that Iran does pursue nuclear weapons capabilities—raising the prospect of a Middle East arms race. Israel’s reaction in such a scenario will also be critical, especially as it has recently stepped up airstrikes on Iranian military facilities in Syria. Perhaps Iran will play it safe and remain largely compliant with the terms of the JCPOA in order to garner international sympathy. However, senior Iranian officials have recently pledged to resume suspended nuclear work (including enriching uranium at high levels and spinning high-speed centrifuge devices) if the US withdraws from the deal. There were always powerful elements in the leadership—principally the revolutionary guards—that opposed the agreement and they will likely push for an end to the restrictions. For now, oil market participants are principally focused on the barrel count risk entailed in a JCPOA exit, but we contend that the stakes are in fact much be higher.
Related Commodity Strategy Research Commodity Comment: Dire Straits Commodity Comment: Tripwire Geopolitics: Bye Bye Bye
Other Recent Commodity Strategy Research Oil Strategy: Advancing the IMO 2020 Conversation Commodity Surveyor: Sector by Sector Natural Gas Strategy: Desensitized
OPEC Watch List Risk Ranking Revisions Iran’s risk rating was increased from 7 to 9 due to sanctions (and other) risks. Iraq, Nigeria and Libya’s risk ratings were lowered to 8 reflecting the relative shifts in risks versus Iran; however all three remain high on our watch list.
Figure 4: OPEC Watch List
Oil production (mb/d) Geopolitical risk Country 2017 avg Last month Past year This year Comment Saudi Arabia 9.97 9.90 6 7 Hawkish foreign policy raises confrontation risks Iraq 4.44 4.43 9 8 Upcoming elections represent a potential destabilizing factor Iran 3.79 3.75 6 9 The lightning rod for regional grievances and sanctions risks UAE 2.91 2.86 2 3 Best in class in OPEC but high military expenditures Kuwait 2.71 2.70 3 3 Financially flush but the population does not want austerity Venezuela 1.94 1.55 10 10 With few economic options left, oil production is at risk and falling Nigeria 1.71 1.81 10 8 Does face a number of challenges including political ones Angola 1.66 1.50 6 6 Angola is facing strong economic headwinds amid a transition Algeria 1.04 0.99 8 7 While Algeria's risk rating is lower y/y, it remains elevated Libya 0.83 0.99 9 8 Being the IS fallback option could push it up again Qatar 0.61 0.61 2 7 Faces a current crisis and a longer term LNG challenge Ecuador 0.53 0.52 5 5 Amid a political transition but middle of our risk spectrum Gabon 0.20 0.19 6 6 Low production but rising political risk over the course of the year
Scale: High -> Low High -> Low Source: Bloomberg (production date), RBC Capital Markets
May 6, 2018 4 Iran: Chain Reaction
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May 6, 2018 5 Iran: Chain Reaction
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May 6, 2018 6 Iran: Chain Reaction
Global Macro, Economics & Rates Strategy Research Team
Europe RBC Europe Limited: Vatsala Datta UK Rates Strategist +44 20 7029 0184 [email protected] Sam Hill, CFA Senior UK Economist +44 20 7029 0092 [email protected] Cathal Kennedy European Economist +44 20 7029 0133 [email protected] Peter Schaffrik Global Macro Strategist +44 20 7029 7076 [email protected]
Asia-Pacific Royal Bank of Canada – Sydney Branch: Su-Lin Ong Head of Australian and New Zealand FIC Strategy +612-9033-3088 [email protected] Robert Thompson Macro Rates Strategist +612 9033 3088 [email protected]
North America RBC Dominion Securities Inc.: Mark Chandler Head of Canadian Rates Strategy (416) 842-6388 [email protected] Simon Deeley Rates Strategist (416) 842-6362 [email protected]
RBC Capital Markets, LLC: Michael Cloherty Head of US Rates Strategy (212) 437-2480 [email protected] Jacob Oubina Senior US Economist (212) 618-7795 [email protected] Tom Porcelli Chief US Economist (212) 618-7788 [email protected] Ashutosh Kamat Associate Rates Strategist (212) 618-2528 [email protected]
Commodities Strategy Research Team
North America RBC Capital Markets, LLC: Helima Croft Global Head of Commodity Strategy (212) 618-7798 [email protected] Christopher Louney Commodity Strategist (212) 437-1925 [email protected] Michael Tran Commodity Strategist (212) 266-4020 [email protected] Megan Schippmann Associate (212) 301-1531 [email protected]
May 6, 2018 7