◀ Mogao Caves Comprehensive index starts in volume 5, page 2667. Mongolia, , and Russia Relations Měnggǔ-​Zhōngguó-Éluósī de wàijiāo guānxì ​ 蒙古,中国,俄罗斯的外交关系

Mongolia has long been a bone of conten- Mongolian independence in order to maintain ­China-​ tion between Russia and China. Russia his- ­Russia relations and not alarm Japan. After 1917 the Soviet torically has seen Mongolia as a buffer state, Union eventually did support Mongolian independence whereas China historically has seen Mongo- but was not firm in that support. China, however, per- sistently tried to absorb Mongolia into the new Chinese lia as part of China. Although Mongolia has nation. achieved varying levels of independence since 1911, subsequent political instability and war in both China and ­Russia—​­and Mongolia’s and current geopolitical position between both Mongolian Independence ­countries—​­complicates relations among all three. After the Chinese revolution in October 1911, Mongolia declared independence in December 1911 and proclaimed the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu leader of the independent Mongolian nation. Mongolia had enjoyed a special re- hen Russia pushed into the Far East and China lationship with the Manchu (1644–​1912) pushed its domination north of the Great Wall court, and Mongolians believed that Mongolia was not in the early twentieth century, Mongolia be- an integral part of China. China maintained that Mon- came an arena of the “Great ­Game”—​­the struggle for golia was indeed an integral part of the country but did empire between China and Russia. Mongolia’s leader not have the military strength to force the integration of at the time, the Jebtsundamba (holy venerable lord) Mongolia into the new Chinese republic. Khutukhtu (1874–​1924), called Mongolia’s geopolitical Russia’s czarist government also was debating policy position a “critical condition, like piled up eggs, in the toward Mongolia. Russia had not recognized the indepen- midst of neighboring nations.” dence of Mongolia but was providing ­Urga—as​­ the Mon- Russia historically has regarded Mongolia as a buffer golian capital, Ulaanbaatar, then was ­called—​­military, state, whereas China historically has regarded Mongo- political, and financial support. In ­Japanese-​­Russian ne- lia as part of China. But after the Manchu Qing dynasty gotiations as early as 1907 Russia considered partitioning (1644–​1912) fell, Mongolia ­asserted—​­and has since Mongolia into inner and outer zones, with Japanese and ­preserved—​­its independence as a nation in the midst Russian spheres of influence, respectively. of two great powers. Russia’s policy initially strove to During the period from 1911 to 1915 Mongolia, Rus- preserve Mongolian autonomy, but it did not support sia, and China held convoluted negotiations, including

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Mold. Kazakhstan North Aral Sea Romania Mongolia Aral Sea Kuril Islands Bulgaria Georgia Kyrgyzstan North Korea ArmeniaAzerb. TurkmenistanUzbekistan Caspian Tajikistan Turkey Sea Syria South Cyprus Japan Lebanon Iran Afghanistan China Korea Israel JordanIraq Pakistan Kuwait Saudi Arabia Nepal Bahrain Bhutan Egypt Qatar Bangladesh U.A.E. Oman India Burma Laos Eritrea Yemen Thailand Philippines secret bilateral talks, and did much military posturing, White Russians ­(anti-​­Bolsheviks) drove the Chinese which in June 1915 resulted in a tripartite agreement that from Urga in 1921, only to be defeated themselves by the gave the broadest possible autonomy for outer Mongolia Bolsheviks. and would make possible its eventual total independence from China. The agreement included provisions on taxes, trade, and other matters but no boundary agreement, but Mongolian People’s Republic a neutral zone was established between outer and inner Mongolia. With the blessings of the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu and China rejected the agreement after the 1917 Russian the Soviet Union, Mongolian revolutionaries established revolution, and under pressure from China the Jebtsun- a Marxist regime in Urga in 1921. But the Soviet Union, damba Khutukhtu in November 1919 petitioned for the like czarist Russia, continued to view Mongolia as a bar- abolition of Mongolia’s autonomy, a petition with which gaining chip in its dealings with China. The Soviet Union China gladly complied. But the reassertion of Chinese in May 1924 recognized China’s “full sovereignty” over control of Mongolia did not last long: Mongolia be- outer Mongolia. A month later, however, after the death came a battlefield during the Russian civil war, and the of the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu, Mongolia declared

© 2009 by Berkshire Publishing Group LLC 1510 Berkshire Encyclopedia of China 宝 库 山 中 华 全 书 its independence as the Mongolian People’s Republic did acquiesce to China’s assuming a more dominant role (MPR). China’s own internal problems kept it from reas- in Mongolia. serting control over Mongolia; the most that China could Soviet complacency over China’s ambitions in Mon- do was protest the ­Soviet-​­Mongolian agreements. golia soon turned to alarm as ­Sino-​­Soviet relations de- At the Yalta Conference two decades later Mongo- teriorated in the late 1950s. The Soviet Union responded lian independence was bolstered when the Allied powers to the Chinese challenge, and Mongolia was caught in agreed that the status quo in Mongolia should be pre- the middle of the ­Soviet-​­Chinese dispute. Mongolia’s served after the war. After a plebiscite (a vote by which initial wish was to remain neutral, and one official said the people of a country express an opinion for or against the ­Soviet-​­Chinese dispute would not affect Mongolia’s a proposal especially on a choice of government or ruler) relations with China or the Soviet Union. But Mongo- in Mongolia overwhelmingly favored independence, the lia’s precarious geopolitical situation made it impossible Chinese grudgingly recognized to remain neutral for long. Mongolia took a ­pro-​­Soviet Mongolia’s independence in 1946. position after the open split between China and the So- viet Union occurred at the ­Twenty-​­second Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Congress in October Quest for Influence 1961. In June 1962 Mongolia became the first Asian state to become a full member of the Council on Mutual Eco- China’s Communists also were reluctant to recognize nomic Assistance (COMECON). This move was a clear Mongolia’s independence and harbored irredentist sen- indication that Mongolia would closely cooperate with timents. ( is political or state policy directed the Soviet Union to the exclusion of China. toward reincorporating a territory that was historically or China, in its attempt to gain influence in Ulaanbaatar, ethnically related to that state but which has fallen under appealed to Mongolian nationalism. In 1962, during the the control of another.) Even before the founding of the commemoration of the eight hundredth anniversary of People’s Republic of China (PRC), in a ­January–February​­ Mongolian conqueror Chinggis (also spelled Genghis) 1949 meeting with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s personal Khan’s birth, Mongolia dedicated a statue at a location be- liaison to the Chinese Communists, Chinese Communist lieved to have been his birthplace. China also celebrated Party leader (1893–1976)​ raised the question the birthday and supported Mongolia’s festivities. China, of the Soviet Union’s attitude concerning the unification with both racist and nationalistic overtones, character- of outer and inner Mongolia. ized Chinggis Khan as a positive “cultural force.” The So- Mao again raised the question with Stalin directly viets Union, not surprisingly, criticized the celebrations, while in Moscow in February 1950. Mao expressed his characterizing Chinggis Khan as a reactionary “who had desire for the eventual “reunion” of Mongolia with China, overrun, looted, and burned most of what was then Rus- but he did not let his irredentist dreams prevent the con- sia” and saying that his “bloody invasions” were a “great clusion of a ­Sino-​­Soviet treaty. The Soviet Union and historical tragedy” (Hersch 1963, 1). MPR were uneasy about China’s ambitions in Mongo- lia and demanded that China acknowledge Mongolia’s independence. Current Situation In spite of that declaration, in October 1954 China raised the question again during the first visit Soviet On 16 December 1962 China announced that Mongo- leader Nikita Khrushchev (1894–​1971) made to China lian leader Tsedenbal (1916–​1991) would come to Beijing after the death of Stalin. Chinese premier Zhou Enlai to sign a treaty to settle the boundary. After demarcat- (1868–​1976), under great pressure from Mao, reluctantly ing the boundary, a treaty was signed in Ulaanbaatar raised the issue with Khrushchev. According to Khrush- on 2 July 1964. The agreement closed a long chapter in chev’s memoirs, he declined to speak for Mongolia but did ­Mongolian-​­Chinese relations. But in spite of the treaty not voice strong opposition. Although the Soviet Union China and Mongolia remain sensitive about their histori- may have refused to reconsider the status of the MPR, it cal relationship.

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Mongolia-China-Russia relations entered a new period Bulag, U. E. (2002). The Mongols at China’s edge: History in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Mongolia and the politics of national unity. Lanham, MD: Row- conducted a peaceful transition to democracy and a mul- man & Littlefield. tiparty political system. This newfound independence re- China stakes a claim to all of the Mongolias. (1992, April invigorated Mongolian nationalism. China and Russia still 30). International Herald Tribune. control parts of historical Mongolia, and ­pan-​­Mongolian Ewing, T. (1980). Between the hammer and the anvil: Chi- nese and Russian policies in outer Mongolia, 1911–​1921. sentiments are somewhat alarming. China is sensitive to Bloomington: Indiana University, Research Institute the growing popular influence of Mongolia on its Inner for Inner Asian Studies. Mongolian Autonomous Region and represses any expres- Friters, G. M. (1974). Outer Mongolia and its international sion of Mongolian nationalism among Chinese Mongols. position. New York: Octagon Books. Geopolitics remains a concern. Russia needs Mon- Grousset, R. (1989). The empire of the steppes: A history golia to act as a buffer to shield it from China as China of central Asia. Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University becomes an economic and military power. And the legacy Press. of the Chinese empire apparently lingers in the minds of Hersch, J. C. (1963, December 11). Genghis Khan Rides some Chinese: China’s State Security Ministry in 1992 Again. Christian Science Monitor, 1. revived the specter of Chinese irredentism when it said: Liu Xiaoyuan. (2006). Reins of liberation: An entangled “As of now, the Mongolian region comprises three parts history of Mongolian independence, Chinese territorial- that belong to three ­countries”—​­the Russian regions of ity, and great power hegemony, 1911–1950.​ Stanford, CA: Tuva and Buryatia, Mongolia, and the Inner Mongolian Stanford University Press. Rossabi, M. (2005). Modern Mongolia: From khans to com- Autonomous ­Region—​­but “the Mongolian region has missars to capitalists. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Uni- from ancient times been Chinese territory” (China stakes versity of California Press. a claim to all of the Mongolias , 1992). Rupen, R. A. (1966). The Mongolian People’s Republic. Eric HYER Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Sandag, S., & Kendall, H. H. (2000). Poisoned arrows: TheStalin- ­ Choibalsan​­ Mongolian massacres, 1921–1941.​ Further Reading Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Bawden, C. R. (1989). The modern history of Mongolia.New Soucek, S. (2000). A history of Inner Asia. New York: Cam- York: Routledge. bridge University Press.

China changes constantly, and 閒談​ the Encyclopedia of China will chat change and grow, too. Berk- shire’s authors and editors wel- come questions, comments, and corrections: [email protected].

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