Strategic Communication Programme

EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE: INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS www.globsec.org AUTHORS Miroslava Sawiris, Research Fellow, StratCom Programme, GLOBSEC, Slovakia Lenka Dušková, Project Assistant, PSSI, Czech Republic Jonáš Syrovátka, Program Manager, PSSI, Czech Republic Lóránt Győri, Geopolitical Analyst, Political Capital, Hungary

GLOBSEC and National Endowment for Democracy assume no responsibility for the facts or opinions expressed in this publication or their subsequent use. The sole responsibility lies with the authors of this report.

METHODOLOGY Data were collected between 10. 4. 2019 and 10. 5. 2019 from 45 relevant Facebook pages in each country based on the following process. Local experts and publicly available sources (such as blbec.online) identified 30 Facebook channels that often publish content classified as disinformation or a pro-Kremlin narrative. In the selection of Facebook pages, those openly affiliated with a specific political party were omitted, including the Facebook pages of individual candidates. These were subsequently narrowed down to 15 of the most influential pages based on the following metrics: number of fans, number of page storytellers, and the average number of interactions per fan. In the Czech Republic, these pages were: AC 24, Časopis Šifra, České národní listy, Česko aktuálně, Český Zpravodaj, Organizace proti multikulturnímu fanatismu, Parlamentní listy, Pravý prostor, Proč Proto, Protiproud, Sputnik CZ, Středoevropan, Svobodné noviny, Zastavme zloděje, and Zpravodajství bez cenzury. In Hungary, these were: 888.hu, Drábik János, Felháborító Hírek, hirado.hu, Hírturi, HUN-News, KárpátHír, Leleplező Friss Hírek, Mindenegyben blog, ORIGO, Orosz Hírek, Patrióta Európa Mozgalom, PestiSracok.hu, TV2, and Vilaghelyzete.com. In Slovakia, these were: Česi a Slováci podporujú Ruský Krym, Chemtrails Slovensko, Hlavné Správy, Hrica Lubos, IdemVolit.sk, InfoVojna, Konzervatívny výber, Necenzurované informácie, Otec Marián “Maroš” Kuffa, Policajti objektívne, Sila pravdy, Slobodný vysielač, Sloveni, Zdrojj, and ZEM A VEK. The data were filtered using different forms of the term “election” in local languages and the term “euro”, and then labelled based on the sentiment toward the relevant political parties, and the most prevalent narratives identified.

© GLOBSEC GLOBSEC, Bratislava, Slovakia April 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE: INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS (3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

METHODOLOGY 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS 3 KEY HIGHLIGHTS 4 CZECH REPUBLIC 5 PERCEPTION AND PORTRAYAL OF POLITICAL PARTIES 5 THE MOST PREVALENT NARRATIVES 6 HUNGARY 7 ACTIVITY OF THE MONITORED FACEBOOK PAGES 7 PERCEPTION AND PORTRAYAL OF POLITICAL PARTIES 7 THE MOST PREVALENT NARRATIVES 9 SLOVAKIA 11 PERCEPTION AND PORTRAYAL OF POLITICAL PARTIES 11 ACTIVITY OF THE MONITORED FACEBOOK PAGES 12 THE MOST PREVALENT NARRATIVES 12 THE MOST PREVALENT NARRATIVES BY SOURCE 13

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 14 4) EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE: INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS

KEY HIGHLIGHTS

The purpose of this research was to identify how dif- In Slovakia, the narratives most often promoted by ferent political parties were being portrayed prior to the monitored channels in relation to the EP elec- the EP elections on channels that publish disinforma- tions were “migration as a threat” and “nationalism tion, as well as to assess the extent to which these as the only solution”. Although the migration crisis in channels have been active throughout the Central Europe that peaked in 2015 impacted Slovakia only European region. Another goal was to discover the to a very limited extent and subsided a long time narratives most often promoted by the monitored ago, ambitious far-right parties resurrected “migra- channels in the context of the upcoming elections tion as a threat” to justify their nationalist agendas. and whether these promoted narratives and myths The decision to use migration as a dominant narra- overlap across the region. tive in relation to the EP elections is all the more sur- prising since this narrative also played a very limited The monitored channels that regularly publish dis- role in the recent Slovak presidential election. information were not equally active in each Central European country. For example, in Hungary the num- Across Central Europe, the monitored Facebook ber of posts relevant to the EP elections in the mon- channels that often publish disinformation and itoring period amounted to 2,189 posts, whereas in pro-Kremlin content, actively promoted populist the Czech Republic, the number was much lower— parties with a strong anti-migration and Eurosceptic only 104 related posts. As the chapter on Hungary agenda in an effort to further the social and political explains, this difference can be attributed to the fact polarisation on the European level. that in that country, disinformation narratives are ac- tively promoted by pro-government media outlets, The research has identified a general negative por- whereas in the Czech Republic, the disinformation trayal of the EU in combination with “migration as campaigns are still predominantly spread by fringe a threat” as the two most recurring narratives across “alternative” channels. Central Europe in relation to the European Parlia- ment elections, followed by stories about a “Euro- While in Hungary the monitored channels portrayed pean populist bloc”. This shows that the narratives the ruling party Fidesz very positively, in the Czech dominating the monitored channels in relation to the Republic and Slovakia, the “anti-system” far-right upcoming EP elections are very similar across the re- parties were actively promoted by these channels. gion, with the only difference in the number of posts The ruling parties were not mentioned very much at that disseminated these messages. It remains to be all and pro-European parties in the opposition were seen what results this will yield. heavily criticised on the monitored channels. This suggests a regional trend in which the monitored channels that frequently publish disinformation are actively promoting the interests of parties on the ex- treme of the political spectrum in the upcoming EP election.

The most recurring narratives in the Czech Republic were related to a generally negative perception of the EU, an alleged “EU dictate”, suggestions of elec- tion interference, and “migration as a threat”. The Czech researchers have concluded that these narra- tives coincide with the far-right party SPD’s agenda and hence, may positively influence SPD’s election bid.

The most recurring disinformation narratives in Hun- gary combined “migration as a threat”, a negative portrayal of the EU, and the rise of far-right populist parties across Europe into one conspiracy theory in which nationalist parties are the only ones protecting the national interests against European elites who are trying to establish a “United States of Europe”. EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE: INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS (5

CZECH REPUBLIC

When it comes to the Czech Republic and its all. Whether the situation will change as the elections relationship with the European Union (EU), it is approach remains to be seen. possible to witness a sort of paradox. While it is one of the most Eurosceptic countries in the whole Union, the hardcore anti-EU parties did not significantly PERCEPTION AND succeed in previous elections to the European PORTRAYAL OF POLITICAL Parliament. This may be caused by low voter turnout (less than 20% in the 2013 EP elections) and the fact PARTIES that EU opponents expressed their opinion by not Since only a few posts were related to the elections, participating in the vote. the number of mentions of individual parties was low. For example, the right-wing ODS—the third- This paradox also plays a significant role in our strongest party in pre-election opinion polls—was research related to disinformation and the 2019 EP not mentioned even once, and so it would be elections. While the EU remains a frequent target of premature to draw some more general conclusions disinformation and conspiracy theories, there was no from the gathered data. evidence of any significant change in its coverage

Figure 1: Mentions and perceptions of Czech political parties However, so far, one can see a more positive attitude on Czech platforms spreading disinformation towards the hardcore Eurosceptic and anti-systemic between April 10 and May 10, 2019: only 104 posts parties, such as the far-right SPD in particular related to the EP elections were published. So far, (which was mentioned in 8 posts, of which 3 were the elections were most frequently mentioned by positively spun while the remaining 5 had a neutral the Russian state information agency, Sputnik CZ connotation). This party was not only praised but was (22 posts), the right-wing website Pravý prostor also provided with reporting from its election rallies. (20 posts), and the political tabloid Parlamentní listy (17 posts). Surprisingly, some of the notorious In contrast, the liberal and EU-sympathetic parties, conspiracy websites did not mention the elections at namely the coalition TOP 09/STAN (mentioned in 8 6) EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE: INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS

posts, of which 5 were negative) and the Pirate Party The EU was portrayed as a non-democratic monster (mentioned in 5 posts, of which 4 were negative) that just treads on national identities and which were portrayed negatively. Not only was the ideology dictates inter alia how citizens should vote. For or programme of these parties criticized but also instance, Sputnik CZ quoted SPD representative older scandals and other problems involving them Radim Fiala, who drew a parallel between the received new reporting. EU’s behaviour and the invasion by the Warsaw Pact armies of Czechoslovakia in 1968.1 Such The populist party ANO, clearly leading in the a presentation of the EU is further “embellished” election’s opinion polls, was mentioned in 3 posts by narratives that the mainstream media cannot without any particular sentiment attached. be trusted because they intentionally omit the Eurosceptic parties, manipulate public opinion polls, THE MOST PREVALENT and put forward pro-European propaganda. NARRATIVES The efforts of the EU to counter disinformation prior to the EP elections was presented conversely by the The narratives related to the EP elections and the EU observed websites as an attempt to manipulate the in general were overwhelmingly negative. However, electoral process. Migration as a theme is then used it was not possible to discern which narrative in various ways—as a demonstration of the Brussels’ will prevail in the upcoming elections. The most “dictate” and as an imminent threat that should unite prominent narratives were general criticisms of the patriotic political forces across Europe. EU, an alleged “EU dictate”, election interference, migration, and media manipulation. It is worth noting that these exact narratives represent notable points of the SPD’s campaign and so their spread might indirectly support the party’s bid.

Figure 2: The most prominent narratives in the Czech Republic

1 https://cz.sputniknews.com/ceskarepublika/201905049798445-fiala-si-nebere-servitky-breznevovy-tanky-nas-prijely-ucit-co-je-demokracie-nyni-nas-chce- eu-ucit/. EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE: INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS (7

HUNGARY

ACTIVITY OF THE and echoes the official messaging of the Hungarian government, so the ruling Fidesz-KDNP party MONITORED FACEBOOK coalition significantly benefits from disinformation PAGES activities in the Hungarian media space, either owing to these fringe accounts’ supportive role or to The Hungarian specialists identified 15 of the most the disinformation disseminated by pro-government relevant pro-Kremlin disinformation channels in media. Overall, Hungarian disinformation outlets Hungary on Facebook. Among these, mainstream significantly contribute to the political campaign. pro-government sources are listed, such as the main We could observe 2,189 relevant posts (out of 2,796 state channel, hirado.hu, and the leading commercial occurrences), or 78.3%, of the messages discussing online news site, origo.hu. This is because the the European elections in the period between April public and private media conglomerate comprised 10 and May 10, 2019. of more than 500 outlets and under the Hungarian government’s control has made conspiracy theories about George Soros, the EU supporting illegal PERCEPTION AND immigration, etc., and pro-Russian disinformation PORTRAYAL OF POLITICAL a daily staple of media consumption in Hungary.2 The data show that the activity of pro-government PARTIES media is on par with other far-right and pro-Russian Hungarian political parties were featured heavily on fringe/disinformation media in the campaign leading the Hungarian disinformation outlets, with 43.4% of up to the European Parliament election, as shown in the Facebook posts addressing them in one way the graph below.

Figure 3: Activity of Hungarian sources in relation to EP election The top five media include the fringe, anti-immigration or another. Given the Hungarian disinformation Patriotic Europe Movement (Patrióta Európa scene’s positive bias towards Fidesz-KDNP, it is no Mozgalom), the main pro-government mouthpiece wonder that 26.7% of posts dealing with parties PestiSracok.hu, the far-right, xenophobic HUN-News, expressed positive sentiments towards the ruling finally the pro-government hirado.hu and origo.hu coalition while only 0.1-0.8% of the messages (ORIGO). It is important to note that the activity of far- right and/or pro-Russian fringe pages closely follows

2 ‘Larger than life - Who is afraid of the Big Bad Russia?’, accessed 15 May 2019, https://politicalcapital.hu/russian_sharp_power_in_cee/research_results. php?article_id=2391. 8) EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE: INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS

Figure 4: Mentions and perceptions of Hungarian political parties mentioned opposition parties in a positive context in line with the “pro-immigration bureaucrats of at all. Brussels and all the other pro-immigration parties”.3 The disinformation tried to lump together all the In contrast, the outlets disproportionally attacked opposition parties with the same charges: they go opposition parties, mostly the leftist MSZP-P (14% of against the very interests of the Hungarian nation or the negative messages), the leftist-liberal Democratic Europe by supporting the alleged “pro-immigration Coalition (DK) led by former PM Ferenc Gyurcsány policy of the Soros network.”4 As a consequence, (13.7%) and the rightist, populist Jobbik (8.7%). Fidesz claimed the “moral” high ground against the Their main line of criticism was mostly based on opposition by praising the government’s effective Fidesz’s political campaign centred on immigration, anti-immigration policies, such as the construction claiming that MSZP wants to abolish European of the southern border fence,5 defending Hungarian borders to “flood the continent with (illegal) migrants” tradition, sovereignty, and European Christian

Figure 5: The number of positive messages about Hungarian parties between April 10 and May 10, 2019.

3 ‘Fidesz: Európát a Bevándorláspártiak Veszélyeztetik’, PestiSracok.hu, accessed 16 May 2019, https://www.facebook.com/pestisracok.hu/ posts/2197203273701348. 4 ‘Az Ellenzék Összetartóelemei: A Gyűlölet És a Nemzetrombolás!’, Patrióta Európa Mozgalom, accessed 16 May 2019, https://www.facebook.com/ patriotaeuropa/posts/2050710995047709. 5 ‘A Migráción Múlhat Az EP-Választás’, PestiSracok.hu, accessed 16 May 2019, https://www.facebook.com/pestisracok.hu/posts/2212436638844678. EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE: INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS (9

civilisation.6 The biased reporting on the ruling In this interpretation, the EU is responsible for the coalition and the opposition remained unchanged (irregular) migration crisis by not defending its throughout our monitoring period. borders effectively, handing out so-called “migrant bank cards” to further fuel the inflow,7 and finally, According to the party sentiment trend figure, by forcing or “dictating” European member states Fidesz-KDNP was featured increasingly positively on to accept the European migration quotas.8 The the disinformation outlets over time while opposition new alliance of “the defenders of Europe”,9 namely parties, on the other hand, did not significantly between PM Viktor Orbán and the Italian Minister of change in their constant low share of positive Interior Matteo Salvini or the leader of the Austrian messages. Freedom Party, Heinz-Christian Strache, legitimise their European populist bloc through a set of narratives based on such values as the defence of THE MOST PREVALENT Christianity, European traditions, or homogenous NARRATIVES societies and strong nation-states in the face of “illegal” immigration.10 Issues such as Brexit or the The most prevalent narratives pushed by the East/West divide are redefined along these lines. analysed disinformation Facebook pages concerning So, while PM Orbán declares that the “European the upcoming European elections detailed a simple, Union is torn apart” over views on migration,11 yet dangerous conspiracy theory. According to this a disinformation article expresses support for disinformation storyline, anti-immigration and pro- Brexit because it represents the cause of “the sovereignty parties are battling pro-immigration sovereigntist-national independence” movements in forces and the current EU’s elite, who are hell-bent the European Union.12 The “conspiracy and hidden on creating a federalist “United States of Europe”. interests” narrative about Soros, elites, or oligarchs The stakes of the current European elections are, ruling the world is intended to accuse the EU or thus, the future of European civilisation and that Brussels of enacting the most heinous plots. One of the nation-states, so a new “European populist of the far-right HUN-News’ posts detailed how the bloc” of Eurosceptic, far-right parties needs to be EU is supposedly trying to secretly upend European established to replace the incumbent European Christianity to “refresh” the European population political elites. Therefore, Eurosceptic and nativist through Muslim mass migration.13 Another article narratives dominated the disinformation discourse even cited the tragic Notre Dame fire as a sign for in Hungary, amounting to more than two-thirds, or the need for political change in the EU.14 77%, of the posts under examination, as seen in the word cloud below.

Figure 6: The most prominent narratives in Hungary.

6 Menczer: A Határvédelem a Józan Ésszel Függ Össze’, hirado.hu, accessed 16 May 2019, https://www.facebook.com/hirado.hu/posts/2487852537913809. 7 ‘Egyre Kevésbé Áttekinthetőek a Migránskártyák’, ORIGO, accessed 16 May 2019, https://www.facebook.com/OrigoHirek/posts/2338433256207586. 8 ‘Orbán Viktor: Most Meg Kell Védeni Európát!’, 888.hu, accessed 16 May 2019, https://www.facebook.com/888ponthu/posts/2068978516563480. 9 ‘Alakul Végre Európa Megmentőinek Szövetsége!’, Patrióta Európa Mozgalom, accessed 16 May 2019, https://www.facebook.com/patriotaeuropa/ posts/2187471878038286. 10 ‘Egy Új, Biztonságos És Hagyományos Értékeken Alapuló Európát Építene Magyarország És Olaszország’, Vilaghelyzete.com AWAKENING THE WORLD. EVERY HEART MAKES A DIFFERENCE, accessed 16 May 2019, https://www.facebook.com/AWAKENINGtheWORLD/posts/2174770689274036. 11 ‘Orbán Viktor Szerint Kettészakad Az Európai Unió - Magyar Expressz’, HUN-News, accessed 16 May 2019, https://www.facebook.com/hungaryannews/ posts/2196023573807778. 12 ‘Brexit: A Szuverenisták Esélye’, 888.hu, accessed 16 May 2019, https://www.facebook.com/888ponthu/posts/2062397300554935. 13 ‘Az EU Vezetőinek Asszistálásával, Titokban Zajlik a Kereszténység Fölszámolása?’, HUN-News, accessed 16 May 2019, https://www.facebook.com/ hungaryannews/posts/2159479664128836. 14 ‘Notre-Dame-Tűz: Nincsenek Véletlenek’, ORIGO, accessed 16 May 2019, https://www.facebook.com/OrigoHirek/posts/2342192315831680. 10) EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE: INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS

The trend line of Eurosceptic narratives shows, as and the “migration” narratives, backed by the seen below, that the number of generally negative constant presence of the “conspiracy and hidden posts about the EU (negative) moves strongly interests” narrative, which makes the EU look like it together with the “EU is responsible” for issues is responsible for “illegal” immigration.

Figure 7: Dominant Eurosceptic narratives on the monitored Hungarian pages over time. EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE: INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS (11

SLOVAKIA

PERCEPTION AND as often, perhaps because the party’s campaign in the EP elections has been very low key and not PORTRAYAL OF POLITICAL generated much attention. SMER-SD was never PARTIES portrayed in a positive light.

Three political parties were mentioned on the The monitored disinformation pages actively monitored Facebook pages the most often: Kotleba- promoted the Kotleba-ĽSNS party by sharing ĽSNS, an extreme right-wing party,15 the PS–SPOLU their campaign materials, for example, the page coalition,16 and the Sme rodina17 party. None of Necenzurované informácie (Uncensored information) them are in the current ruling coalition. Even re-posted a promotional video with strong racist and though the number of mentions dedicated to both homophobic overtones from Milah Uhrík’s official Kotleba’s party and the PS–SPOLU coalition is almost Facebook page, in which members of Kotleba-ĽSNS the same, they were portrayed very differently. While invite viewers to vote for them in the EP elections in Kotleba’s party was portrayed in the most positive order to stop “Brussel’s politics which destroys the light of all the parties in the context of the upcoming EU as well as Slovakia”.18 The quantitative analysis EP elections, PS and SPOLU were often portrayed has demonstrated that the monitored Facebook negatively. Kollár’s Sme rodina party was portrayed pages that often publish disinformation are actively almost as often in a positive light as Kotleba’s ĽSNS, promoting parties on the extreme end of the political particularly ever since Boris Kollár announced his spectrum, thus contributing to the further polarisation party’s alliance with Salvini and France’s Marine of Slovak society. Le Pen in the far-right bloc Europe of Nations and Freedom, should his party win seats to the EP. The current ruling party, SMER-SD, was not mentioned

Figure 8: Mentions & perceptions of Slovak political parties

15 Exists since 2010 as a continuation of the ultranationalist Slovenská pospolitosť party, which was dissolved in 2006 by the Slovak Supreme Court because its political activities were in breach of the Slovak constitution. 16 The two relatively new pro-European liberal parties announced they would run jointly in the EP elections. The popularity of Progresívne Slovensko grew rapidly in the wake of its former Deputy Chairwoman Zuzana Čaputová’s success in the presidential election. 17 Active on the Slovak political scene since 2015, this populist party defends a strong anti-immigration agenda and conservative values. 18 https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=2774530579229126 & id=1441545275861003. 12) EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE: INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS

ACTIVITY OF THE THE MOST PREVALENT MONITORED FACEBOOK NARRATIVES PAGES

Figure 9: Activity of Slovak sources in relation to the EP elections.

Of all the monitored pages that publish disinformation In the context of the EP elections, “nationalism as the content, Zdrojj has been the most active in relation only solution” and “migration as a threat” were the two to the EP elections (this channel was also the most most dominant narratives promoted on the monitored active in the Slovak presidential election campaign19), channels. They are complementary in that migration as over 30% of the related posts were published on is often being portrayed as an imminent existential this channel, followed by Hlavné správy (21%), and and cultural threat (even though in Slovakia irregular Slobodný vysielač (12%). However, the frequency with migration has been a negligible issue) to which which a particular channel publishes content does extreme nationalism, as promoted by the Kotleba- not necessarily mean it has influence. For example, ĽSNS and Sme rodina parties, is the only suitable Zdrojj’s posts are often shared only a few times, answer. Other frequently recurring narratives equally whereas a video published on Hrica Lubos’s page work in tandem: “liberalism” (a term so largely void promoting extreme right-wing politics in relation of any specific meaning now that it can mean almost to the EP elections was shared more than 1,700 anything to anyone) is portrayed as a force somehow times.20 Although his posts are not as frequent as undermining the stability of Slovak society in particular those of the other monitored channels, they have and European societies generally. Against this much wider reach. However, in comparison to the supposed destruction, the European populist bloc, as Slovak presidential election, the monitored Facebook represented by the rise of the populist Eurosceptic channels are generally much less active—in the period leaders, will take a strong stance and save their between 10. 4. 2019 to 10. 5. 2019, only 175 posts were populations from the “EU dictate”. Without much actually related to the European parliament election. elaboration on what the “EU dictate” and “liberalism” This is because traditionally, in Slovakia, voter turnout actually mean, these terms serve as vague symbols and public interest in the EP elections are very low of “what is wrong” and something against which the and, hence, spending too much time and effort on this populations can unite. These narratives together thus topic may be considered inefficient. Also, Slovakia create one overarching metanarrative, a modern myth held municipal elections in November 2018, a two- that imbues complex political realities with a simple round presidential election in March and April 2019, explanation. and is expecting parliamentary elections in March 2020. All three command considerable attention and coverage in the country, which might come at the expense of the EP elections.

19 https://www.globsec.org/publications/slovak-presidential-election-followed-through-facebook-disinformation-channels/ 20 https://www.facebook.com/hricalubos1/posts/869965620015073. EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE: INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS (13

Figure 10: The most recurring narratives

a threat” was pushed by almost all of the monitored THE MOST PREVALENT sources. This suggests that the monitored pages NARRATIVES BY SOURCE that often publish disinformation and manipulative content are trying to keep this theme relevant to steer Hlavné správy and Zdrojj were the most active potential voters in the EP elections to vote for radical channels in the promotion of the top 5 most recurring populist candidates by exploiting existing fears. narratives, followed by the page Necenzurované informácie. The remaining sources promoted only some of them, for example, Konzervatívny výber did not push the “EU dictate” narrative throughout the monitoring period at all. However, “migration as

Figure 11: 5 most recurring narratives in Slovakia by source. 14) EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE: INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ČSSD Česká strana sociálně demokratická (Czech Social Democratic Party)

DK Demokratikus Koalíció (Democratic Coalition)

EP European Parliament

EU European Union

KDH Kresťanskodemokratické hnutie (Christian Democratic Movement)

KDNP Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (Christian Democratic People’s Party)

Kotleba-ĽSNS Kotleba-Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko (Kotleba - People’s Party Our Slovakia)

KSČM Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia)

LMP Lehet Más a Politika (Another Politics Is Possible)

MKKP Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt (Hungarian Two-tailed Dog Party)

MSZP-P Magyar Szocialista Párt (The Hungarian Socialist Party)

ODS Občanská demokratická strana (Civic Democratic Party)

OĽaNO OBYČAJNÍ ĽUDIA a nezávislé osobnosti (Ordinary People and Independent Personalities)

PM Prime Minister

PS Progresívne Slovensko (Progressive Slovakia)

SaS Sloboda a Solidarita (Freedom and Solidarity)

SMER SD SMER Sociálna demokracia (SMER Social Democracy)

SNS Slovenská národná strana (Slovak National Party)

SPD Svoboda a přímá demokracie (Freedom and Direct Democracy)

STAN Starostové a nezávislí (Mayors and Independents)

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