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Class 11: Nicolas Malebranche, The Search is, then, no that can fail to follow the impulse of after (1674-75) this love. The just, the impious, the blessed, and the damned all love with this love. Given that this natural love we have for God is the same thing as our Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) was a natural inclination toward the good in general, toward and priest. He has a traditional scholastic education, the infinite good, toward the sovereign good, it is including three years at the Sorbonne. He entered the clear that all love God with this love because Oratory in 1660 and was ordained in 1664. The Ora- only He is the good, the infinite good, the tory was surely responsible for the Augustinian influ- sovereign good.… ence on his , but an accidental discovery in II. Inconstancy of will is the cause of the ’s lack 1664 of Descartes’ Treatise on Man provided Male- of and, consequently, of error. Thus, with branche with his other major influence. His first and the will always parched by a burning thirst, always most significant work, The Search after Truth, was driven by anxieties and desires for the good it does published initially in 1674-75 and subsequently not possess, it cannot comfortably allow the mind to printed with an increasingly long set of Elucidations. dwell for any over abstract that do not The work elicited critiques by Simon Foucher and affect it and that it judges incapable of making it Arnauld; although he denied having a taste for pole- happy. Thus, it continuously urges the mind to con- mics, Malebranche engaged in lengthy debates with sider other objects, and when in the course of these two critics, as well as others (e.g. Leibniz and driven by the mind encounters an bearing the the Cartesian Pierre-Sylvain Régis). In Search after mark of goodness, i.e., an object whose presence Truth, Malebranche presents and defends the two makes the feel a calm interior satisfaction, the doctrines for which he is best known, the occasion- heart’s thirst is then renewed, these desires and alism that denies causation between any finite sub- 1 longings are rekindled, and the mind, required to obey stances and the claim that we see all things in God. them, attends only to the object causing them, or appearing to cause in order to bring it near the soul, 2 Book III, Part I: The Understanding: Pure Mind which then tastes and feeds on it for a while. But since the emptiness of created things cannot fill the infinite Chapter 4 capacity of man’s heart, these trifling pleasures, I. The mind cannot long dwell on objects that have no instead of quenching its thirst, only aggravate it and relation to it, or that do not in some way involve the give the soul the vain and foolish hope of being infinite. It cannot be doubted that God is the author of satisfied by the multiplicity of terrestrial pleasures. all things, that He created them for himself and that This leads to a further inconstancy and inconceivable through an invincible natural impression that He con- weakness on the part of the mind whose duty it is to tinuously impresses in it, He inclines the heart of man find these goods for the soul. toward Himself. God cannot will that there be a will It is true that when by chance the mind encounters an that does not love him or that loves him less than some object involving the infinite, or containing something other good (if there could be any other good), because of great magnitude, its inconstancy and agitation he cannot will that a will not love what is supremely temporarily cease. For, realizing that the object bears worthy of love or love what is less worthy of love. the mark desired by the soul, it pauses and attends to Thus, natural love necessarily leads us toward God, it for a while. But this attachment, or rather, obsti- and since it comes from God and nothing can arrest nancy on the part of the mind in examining objects its impulse but God himself who impresses it. There that are infinite or too vast, does it no more good than

1 For more on Malebranche, see Charles J McCracken, A Cartesian Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Malebranche and British Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 1996); and , ed., Cambridge Compan- Press, 1983); Nicolas Jolley, The of the Soul: ion to Malebranche (Cambridge: Cambridge University Theories of in Leibniz, Malebranche, and Descartes Press, 1997). (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Steven Nadler, 2 Translated by Thomas M. Lennon and Paul J. Olscamp, Malebranche and Ideas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, in Nicolas Malebranche, The Search After Truth (New 1992), Tad Schmaltz, Malebranche’s Theory of the Soul: York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 109 the weakness with which it considers suited to its However, since men are led as if by to capacity. The mind is too weak to complete such a believe that only corporeal objects exist, they judge of difficult undertaking, and only in vain does it try to do the and of things in a completely so. What must make the soul happy is not, as it were, different way than they should. For once they per- the comprehension of an infinite object—of this it is ceive an object, they want it to be quite certain that incapable—but the love and possession of an infinite the object exists, even though it often happens that good, which the will is capable of though the impulse there is nothing outside. They want, in addition, for of love continually impressed on it by God…. the object to be exactly as they see it, which never happens. But, with respect to the that exists

necessarily and that cannot be other than as it is seen, Book III, Part II: The Pure Understanding. The they ordinarily judge without reflection that it is Nature of Ideas3 nothing—as if ideas did not have a great number of

properties—as if the idea of a square, for example, Chapter 1 were not quite different from that of a circle or of a 1. What is understood by ideas. That they truly exist number and did not represent completely different and are necessary to perceive all material objects. I things—which can never happen for nothingness, think everyone agrees that we do not perceive outside since nothingness has no properties. It is therefore of us by themselves. We see the sun, the stars, and an indubitable that ideas have a very real existence. But infinity of objects outside of us; it is not likely that the now let us examine what their nature is, and their soul leaves the body and, as it were, goes wandering , and let us see what in the soul can be capable about the heavens in order to contemplate all these of representing all things to it. objects. It does not therefore see them by themselves; All the things the soul perceives are of two kinds: the immediate object of our mind when it sees the sun, they are either in the soul or outside the soul. Those for example, is not the sun, but is something inti- in the soul are its own , that is, all its different mately united to our soul, and this is what I call an modifications, for by the words , manner of idea. Thus, by the word idea, I understand here no- thinking, or modification of the soul, I understand thing other than the immediate object, or the object generally all those things that cannot be in the soul closest to the mind, when it perceives something, without the soul perceiving them through the internal namely, what touches and modifies the mind with the sensation it has of itself—such as its own sensations, it has of an object. imaginings, pure intellections, or simply its concep• It must be noted that for the mind to perceive an tions, even its passions and natural inclinations. Now, object, it is absolutely necessary for the idea of that our soul does not need ideas in order to perceive all object to be actually present to it—it is not possible to these things in the way it perceives them, because doubt this—but it is not necessary for there to be these things are inside the soul, or rather because they something similar to that idea outside it. For it very are only the soul itself in this or that fashion, just as often happens that we perceive things which do not the actual roundness and of a body are only exist and even which have never existed; thus, we that body shaped and moved in this or that fashion. often have in the mind real ideas of things that have But as for things outside the soul, we can perceive never existed. When, for example, a man imagines a them only by means of ideas, assuming that these golden mountain, it is absolutely necessary that the things cannot be intimately united to the soul. There idea of this mountain be really present to his mind. are two kinds of these, spiritual and material. As for When a madman, or someone with a high fever or the spiritual ones, it seems that they can be revealed who is sleeping, sees some animal as if before his to the soul without ideas and by themselves. For al- eyes, it is certain that what he sees is not nothing, and though teaches us that we cannot commu- that, thus, the idea of this animal really exists—but nicate our thoughts to one another immediately and this golden mountain and this animal have never by ourselves, but only through speech or other sensi- existed. ble signs to which we have attached our ideas, it might

3 Translated by Roger Ariew and Marjorie Grene. 110 be said that God has decreed it thus only for the This participation in God’s power that men boast duration of this life, in order to prevent the disorder of for representing objects to themselves, and for per• that would happen if people could communicate as it forming several other particular actions, seems to pleased them. But when and order reign and involve a certain independence, as it is generally we are delivered from the captivity of our body, we explained. But it is also a chimerical participation, shall perhaps be able to communicate through the which the ignorance and vanity of men makes them intimate union among ourselves, as the angels seem imagine. Their dependence on God’s power and to be able to do in heaven. Thus, it does not seem to goodness is much greater than they think, but here is be absolutely necessary to have ideas represent spiri- not the place to explain this. Let us try only to show tual things to the soul, because it can happen that they that men do not have the power to form ideas of the are seen through themselves, though in a very imper- things they perceive. fect fashion. No one can doubt that ideas are real , since I shall not examine here how two minds can be they have real properties, that they differ from one united to one another and whether they can in this way another, and that they represent completely different reveal their thoughts to each other. I believe, however, things. Nor can we reasonably doubt that they are that there is no purely intelligible substance other than spiritual and very different from the bodies they God’s, that nothing can be discovered with evidence represent. This seems sufficient to make us doubt except in its light, and that the union of minds cannot whether the ideas by means of which we see bodies make them visible to each other. For although we are are not more noble than the bodies themselves. closely united to ourselves, we are and will be unintel- Indeed, the intelligible world must be more perfect ligible to ourselves until we see ourselves in God, and than the material and terrestrial world, as we will see until he presents to us the perfectly intelligible idea he in what follows. Thus, when someone claims that men has of our being contained in his being. Thus, al- have the power to form such ideas as please them, he though it seems I am here allowing that angels can by runs the risk of claiming that men have the power of themselves make known to one another both what creating beings more noble and more perfect than the they are and what they are thinking—which at bottom world God has created. Yet we never reflect upon this, I do not believe to be true—I warn that this is only because we imagine that an idea is nothing, since it because I do not want to argue about it, as long as you cannot be sensed, or if it is considered as a being, it is grant me what is incontestable, namely, that material only as a meager and insignificant being, because we things cannot be seen by themselves and without imagine that it is annihilated as soon as it is no longer ideas…. present to the mind. Chapter 3 But even if it were true that ideas are only lesser and insignificant beings, they are nevertheless beings, That the soul has no power to produce ideas. Cause and spiritual beings; since men do not have the power of the error we make concerning this . The to create, it follows that they cannot produce these second opinion belongs to those who believe that our beings. For the production of ideas in the way it is have the power of producing the ideas of the explained is a true creation, and although they may try things about which they want to think—that they are to palliate and soften the audacity and harshness of moved to produce them by the impressions objects this view by saying that the production of ideas make on the body, even though these impressions are presupposes something existing, whereas creation not images resembling the objects that cause them. presupposes nothing, still they have not resolved the They claim that this is how man is made in the image difficulty. of God and how he participates in God’s power. Further, just as God has created all things from For we ought to take heed that it is no more diffi- nothing and can annihilate them and create new ones, cult to produce something from nothing than to pro- so can man create and annihilate ideas of all things as duce it by supposing another thing from which it it pleases him. But there is good reason to distrust all cannot be made and which can contribute nothing to these opinions that elevate man. They are normally its production. For example, it is no more difficult to thoughts arising from his pride and vanity, which the create an angel than to produce it from a stone, Father of did not issue. because a stone is something of a totally contrary kind 111 and cannot serve in any way toward the production of resembles a horse, if it does not already have a first an angel. But it can contribute toward the production idea to which it refers the second. And if it already of bread, of gold, etc., because stone, gold, and bread has a first idea, it is useless to form a second, and are just the same extension differently configured, therefore the question concerns the first idea; there• and all of these are material things. fore, etc. It is even more difficult to produce an angel from It is true that when we conceive of a square a stone than to produce it from nothing, because to through pure intellection, we can still imagine it, that make an angel from a stone, insofar as that can be is to say, perceive it in us by tracing an image in the done, the stone must first be annihilated and then the brain. But it should be noted, first, that we are neither angel must be created, and nothing needs to be the true nor the principal cause of that image (but it annihilated simply to create an angel. Therefore, if the would take too long to explain this here) and second, mind produces its ideas from the material impres• that far from the second idea accompanying the image sions the brain receives from objects, it is always being more distinct and more accurate than the first doing the same thing, or something as difficult, or idea, on the contrary, it is accurate only because it even more difficult, than if it created them. Since resembles the first, which serves as rule for the ideas are spiritual, they cannot be produced from second. For finally, we must not believe that the material images, which are in the brain and have no imagination and even the represent objects to common measure with them. us more distinctly than does the pure understanding, but only that they affect and move the mind more. For If it is said that an idea is not a substance, I would the ideas of the senses and of the imagination are agree; but still it is a spiritual thing, and just as it is distinct only through the conformity they have with not possible to make a square out of a mind, even the ideas of pure intellection. The image of a square though a square is not a substance, it is also not possi- that the imagination traces in the brain, for example, ble to form a spiritual idea from a material substance, is only accurate and well formed through the con- even though an idea would not be a substance. But formity it has with the idea of a square that we even if we granted to the mind of man a supreme conceive through pure intellection. It is this idea that power to annihilate and to create the ideas of things, rules the image. It is the mind that leads the imagi- it would still not be adequate to produce them. For just nation and requires it, so to speak, to consider from as a painter, no matter how skillful he is in his art, time to time whether the image it depicts is a figure cannot represent an animal he has never seen and of composed of four straight and equal lines, whose which he has no idea (in such a way that the picture angles are exactly ninety degrees—in a word, whether he would be required to produce could not be similar what one imagines is similar to what one conceives. to this unknown animal), so a man cannot form the idea of an object unless he knew it beforehand, that is, After what we have said, I do not think we can unless he already has the idea of it, which does not doubt that those who assert that the mind can itself depend on his will. But if he already has an idea of it, form ideas of objects are mistaken, since they attri- he knows the object, and it is useless for him to form bute to the mind the power to create, and even to a new idea of it. It is therefore useless to attribute to create with wisdom and order, even though it does not the mind of man the power to produce its ideas. have of what it does—for this is not con- ceivable. But the cause of their error is that people We could perhaps say that the mind has general never fail to judge that a thing is the cause of some and confused ideas it does not produce, and that those effect when the two are joined together, assuming that it produces are plainer and more distinct particular the true cause of the effect is unknown to them. This ideas. But this is still the same thing. For just as a is why everyone concludes that a moving ball meeting painter cannot draw the portrait of a particular person another is the true and principal cause of the motion it in such a way that he is certain of having succeeded if communicates to the other, and that the soul’s will is he does not have a distinct idea of him (even if the the true and principal cause of motion of the arm, and person is present), so also a mind that has, for exam- other such similar prejudices, because it always ple, only the idea of being or of animal in general, happens that a ball moves when it is struck by another, cannot represent a horse to itself, or form a very that our arms move almost every time we want them distinct idea of it, or be sure that the idea exactly 112 to, and that we do not sensibly see what other thing and principal cause of the motion of the ball it finds could be the cause of these . in its path, since the former ball does not have the power to move itself. They can only judge that the Even when an effect does not so often follow collision of two balls is the occasion for the Author of something which is not its cause, still, there are a great all the motion of matter to execute the decree of his number of people who believe that the thing is the will, which is the universal cause of all things. This cause of the effect that happens, though not everyone he does by communicating to the second ball part of falls into this error. For example: a comet appears and the motion of the first—that is, to speak more clearly, afterwards a prince dies; stones are exposed to the by willing that the latter ball should acquire as much moon and they are eaten by worms; the sun is in motion in the same direction as the former loses—for conjunction with Mars at the birth of a child and the motive force of bodies can only be the will of the something extraordinary happens to the child. This is one who preserves them…. enough to convince many people that the comet, the moon, and the conjunction of the sun with Mars are Chapter 6 the causes of the effects just noted and others similar to them; and the reason why not everyone is of the That we see all things in God.… It is absolutely same is that these effects are not always necessary for God to have in himself the ideas of all observed to follow these things. the beings he has created, since otherwise he could not have produced them, and thus he sees all these But since all persons normally have ideas of things beings by considering those perfections he contains to present lo the mind as soon as they want them, and which they have a relation. We must know, further, this happens to them many a day, almost every• that God is very closely united to our souls through one concludes that the will accompanying the pro• his presence, so that we can say that he is the place of duction, or rather, the presence of ideas is their true minds in the same way that spaces are, in a , the cause, because they see nothing at the time they can place of bodies. Assuming these two things, it is attribute to them as their cause, and because they certain that the mind can see what in God represents imagine that ideas no longer exist once the mind no created beings, since the latter is very spiritual, intel- longer sees them and begin to exist again when they ligible, and present to the mind. Thus, the mind can are represented to the mind. This is also why some see in God the works of God, assuming that God does people judge that external objects transmit images indeed will to reveal to the mind what it is in him that resembling them, as we have just pointed out in the represents them. Now, here are the reasons that seem previous chapter. Since it is not possible to see objects to prove that he wills this rather than the creation of by themselves, but only through their ideas, they an infinite number of ideas in each mind. judge that the object produces the idea: once it is present, they see it; as soon as it is absent, they no Not only is it in strict conformity with reason, but longer see it; and the presence of the object almost it is also apparent in the economy of all of nature, that always accompanies the idea representing it to us. God never does by very difficult means what can be done by very simple and easy means. For God never Yet if people were not so precipitous in their judg• does anything in vain and without reason. What ments, from the fact that the ideas of things are shows his wisdom and his power is not his doing present to their mind as soon as they want, they would small things with great means—this goes against conclude only that according to the order of nature reason and indicates a limited —on the their will is generally necessary for them to have these contrary, it is doing great things with very simple and ideas, and not that the will is the true and principal easy means. Thus, it was with extension alone that he cause that makes them present to their mind, and still produced everything we see that is admirable in less that the will produces them from nothing (or in nature and even what gives life and motion to the way they explain it). Nor should they conclude animals. Those who absolutely insist on substantial that objects transmit species resembling them because forms, faculties, and souls in animals to perform their the soul ordinarily perceives them only when they are functions (different from their blood and bodily present, but only that the object is ordinarily neces- organs) at the same time would have it that God lacks sary for the idea to be present to the mind. Finally, intelligence, or that he cannot make all these admir- they should not judge that a moving ball is the true 113 able things with extension alone. They measure the But the strongest argument of all is the way the power and supreme wisdom of God by the smallness mind perceives all things. It is certain, and everyone of their mind. Thus, since God can reveal everything knows it from experience, that when we want to think to minds simply by willing that they see what is in about some particular thing, we first glance over all their midst, that is to say, what is in him which is beings and then apply ourselves to considering the related to and represents these things, there is no object we wish to think about. Now, it is indubitable likelihood that he does it otherwise and that he pro- that we could not desire to see a particular object we duces for this as many infinities of infinite numbers had not already seen, though confusedly and in of ideas as there are created minds. general. Thus, since we are able to desire to see all beings, sometimes one, sometimes another, it is cer- But it should be carefully noted that we cannot tain that all beings are present to our mind; and it conclude that minds see the essence of God from the seems that all beings cannot be present to our mind fact of their seeing all things in God in this way. God’s without God—he who contains all things in the essence is his own absolute being, and minds do not simplicity of his being—being present to it. see the divine substance taken absolutely, but only as relative to creatures or as they are able to participate It even seems that the mind would not be capable in it. What they see in God is very imperfect and God of representing to itself universal ideas of genus, is most perfect. They see matter shaped, divisible, and species, etc., had it not seen all the beings contained so forth, but in God there is nothing divisible or in one. Since every creature is a particular being, we shaped, for God is all being, because he is infinite and cannot say that we see something created when, for comprises everything; but he is no particular being. example, we see a triangle in general. Finally, I do not However, what we see is only one or several parti- think that we can account for the way the mind knows cular beings and we do not understand this perfect abstract and general truths, except through the pres• simplicity of God, which contains all beings. In ence of him who can illuminate the mind in an infinity addition, it might be said that we do not so much see of different ways. ideas of things as things themselves represented by Finally, the most beautiful, highest, most solid, ideas; when we see a square, for example, we do not primary proof of God’s existence (or the one that say that we see the idea of the square united to the makes the fewest assumptions) is the idea we have of mind, but only the square outside it. the infinite. For it is certain that the mind perceives The second reason for thinking that we see beings the infinite, though it does not comprehend it, and that because God wills that what is in him representing it has a very distinct idea of God, which it can have them be revealed to us—and not because we have as only by means of its union with him, since we cannot many ideas created with us as we can see things—is conceive that the idea of an infinitely perfect being— that this puts created minds in a position of complete the one we have of God—should be something dependence on God, the most complete possible. For created. this being so, not only would we see nothing unless But not only does the mind have the idea of the God wills that we see it, but we would see nothing infinite, it even has it before that of the finite. For we unless God himself made us see it. [...] conceive of infinite being merely by conceiving of For, after all, it is difficult enough to understand being, without thinking whether it is finite or infi• distinctly the dependence that our minds have on God nite. But, in order for us to conceive of a finite being, in all their particular actions, assuming that they have we must necessarily subtract something from this everything we distinctly know to be necessary for general of being, which consequently must them to act, or all the ideas of things present to their come first. Thus, the mind perceives nothing except mind. And that general and confused word concourse, in the idea it has of the infinite; and as for this idea by means of which we claim to explain the depen- being formed from the confused assemblage of all our dence of creatures on God, does not awaken any dis- ideas of particular beings, as think, on tinct idea in an attentive mind; and yet it is good that the contrary, every particular idea is only a participa- people know very distinctly that they can do nothing tion in the general idea of the infinite: In the same without God. way, God does not derive his being from creatures, 114 while every creature is only an imperfect participation But although I may say that we see material and in the divine being. sensible things in God, we must take note that I am not saying that we have sensations of them in God, Here is a proof that may constitute a demonstration but only that it is God who acts in us; for God surely for those accustomed to abstract reasoning. It is cer• knows sensible things, but he does not sense them. tain that ideas are efficacious, since they act in the When we perceive something sensible, two things are mind and illuminate it, and since they make it happy found in our perception: sensation and pure idea. The or unhappy through the pleasant or unpleasant per• sensation is a modification of our soul, and God ceptions by which they affect it. Now nothing can act causes it in us. He can cause this modification even in the mind immediately unless it is superior to the though he does not have it himself, because he sees in mind; nothing but God alone can do this. For only the the idea he has of our soul that it is capable of it. As Author of our being can change its modifications. for the idea united to the sensation, it is in God, and Therefore, it is necessary that all our ideas are located we see it because it pleases God to reveal it to us. God in the efficacious substance of the divinity, which unites the sensation to the idea when objects are alone is intelligible or capable of illuminating us, present so that we may believe them to be thus and because it alone can affect . [...] enter into the sensations and passions we should have Finally, it is not possible for God to have any other in relation to them. [...] principal end for his actions than himself. This is a Book VI. Part II: On Method notion common to all people capable of some reflec• tion; and Sacred Scripture does not allow us to doubt Chapter 3 that God has made all things for himself. It is there- The most dangerous error of the philosophy of the fore necessary that not only our natural love—I am ancients. Not only do philosophers say what they do referring to the impulse he produces in our mind— not at all conceive when they explain natural effects tends toward him, but also the knowledge and light he through certain beings of which they have no particu• gives the mind must allow us to know something in lar idea, they even furnish a from which very him, for everything coming from God can only be for false and very dangerous conclusions can be drawn God. If God made a mind and gave it the sun as an directly. idea, or as an immediate object of knowledge, it seems to me that God would be making this mind and For if we assume, according to their view, that the idea of this mind for the sun and not for himself. there are entities distinct from matter in bodies, then, having no distinct idea of these entities, we can easily God, therefore, cannot make a mind in order for it imagine that they are the true or principal causes of to know his works without that mind in some way the effects we see happening. This is even the general being able to see God in seeing his works. Thus, it opinion of ordinary philosophers: For it is principally might be said that if we did not see God in some way, to explain these effects that they think there are sub• we would not see anything, just as if we did not love stantial forms, real qualities, and other similar God—I mean if God did not continuously impress entities. Next, if we consider carefully the idea we upon us the love of good in general—we would not have of cause or of power to act, we cannot doubt that love anything. For, this love being our will, we cannot this idea represents something divine. For the idea of love or will anything without it, since we cannot love a supreme power is the idea of a supreme divinity and particular goods except by determining toward these the idea of a subalternate power is the idea of an goods the motion of love God has given us for him- inferior, but genuine, divinity, at least according to the self. Thus, in the same way that we do not love any- pagans, assuming that it is the idea of a genuine power thing except through the necessary love we have for or cause. We therefore admit something divine in all God, we do not see anything except through the the bodies around us when we admit forms, faculties, natural knowledge we have of God; all the particular qualities, virtues, or real beings capable of producing ideas we have of creatures are only limitations of the certain effects through the force of their nature; and idea of the Creator, just as all the motions of the will thus we insensibly adopt the view of the pagans toward creatures are only determinations of the because of our respect for their philosophy. It is true motion toward the Creator. [...] that corrects us, but perhaps it can be said that if 115 the heart is Christian, the mind is at bottom pagan. nothing other than the will of God. Thus, bodies have Perhaps it will be said that substantial forms—for no action; and when a moving ball collides with and example, those plastic forms which produce animals moves another, it communicates to it nothing of its and plants—do not know what they are doing and own, for it does not itself have the force it communi- that, thus, lacking intelligence, they have no relation cates. However, a ball is the natural cause of the to the divinities of the pagans. But who will be able to motion it communicates. A natural cause is therefore believe that what produces works manifesting a not a real and true, but only an occasional, cause, one wisdom surpassing that of all the philosophers pro• that determines the Author of nature to act in such and duces them without intelligence? [...] such a manner in such and such a situation. In order that we shall no longer be able to doubt It is certain that all things are produced through the the falsity of this unfortunate philosophy and recog• motion of bodies, visible or invisible, for experience nize with evidence the soundness of the and teaches us that bodies whose parts have more motion the distinctness of the ideas we use, it is necessary to are always those that act more and produce more establish clearly the truths that are opposed to the change in the world. All natural forces are therefore errors of the ancient philosophers, and to prove in a nothing but the always efficacious will of God. God few words that: there is only one true cause because created the world because he willed it—“He spoke there is only one true God; the nature or power of each and it was done”—and he moves all things, and thus thing is but the will of God; all natural causes are not produces all the effects we see happening, because he at all true causes but only occasional causes; and some also willed certain laws according to which motions other truths following from these. are communicated upon the collision of bodies; be- cause these laws are efficacious, they act, and bodies It is evident that bodies, large and small, do not cannot act. There are therefore no forces, powers, or have the power to move themselves. A mountain, a true causes in the material and sensible world; and we house, a rock, a grain of sand—in brief, the smallest must not admit forms, faculties, and real qualities for or largest body conceivable—does not have the power producing effects that bodies do not produce and for to move itself. We have only two sorts of ideas, ideas sharing with God the force and power that are of minds and ideas of bodies; and since we should say essential to him. only what we conceive of, we should reason only according to these two. Thus, since the idea we have Not only can bodies not be the true causes of any- of all bodies makes us know that they cannot move thing whatsoever, but the most noble minds are simi- themselves, it must be concluded that it is minds larly powerless. They can know nothing unless God which move them. But when we examine the idea we illuminates them. They can sense nothing unless God have of all finite minds, we do not see any necessary modifies them. They are capable of willing nothing if connection between their will and the motion of any God does not move them toward good in general, that body whatsoever. On the contrary, we see that there is, toward himself. 1 admit that they can determine is none and that there can be none. We must also toward objects other than himself the impression God conclude, if we wish to reason according to our lights, gives them toward himself, but I do not know if that that no created mind can move any body whatsoever can be called power. If the ability to sin is a power, it as a true or principal cause, just as we have said that will be a power that the Almighty does not have, as no body could move itself. Saint Augustine says somewhere. If people held of themselves the power to love the good, we could say But when we think of the idea of God, that is, of they had some power; but people can love only an infinitely perfect and consequently omnipotent because God wills that they love and because his will being, we know that there is such a connection be• is efficacious. People can love only because God con- tween his will and the motion of all bodies, that it is stantly pushes them toward the good in general, that impossible to conceive that he wills a body be moved is, toward himself; for God having created them only and that this body not be moved. We must therefore for himself, he never preserves them without turning say that only his will can move bodies if we wish to and pushing them toward him. It is not they who move say things as we conceive of them and not as we sense toward the good in general, it is God who moves them. The motive force of bodies is therefore not in them. They merely follow this impression through an the bodies that are moved, for this motive force is 116 entirely free according to the law of God, or tween the will of an infinitely perfect being and its they determine it toward false goods, according to the effects. Therefore, only God is the true cause who law of the flesh, but they can determine it only truly has the power to move bodies. In addition, I say through their view of the good; since they can do only that it is inconceivable that God could communicate what God makes them do, they can only love the to people or to angels the power he has to move good. bodies, and that those who claim that the power we have to move our arm is a true power must admit that But if we were to assume what is true in one sense God can also give minds the power to create, annihi- that minds have in themselves the power to know the late, and to do all possible things—in short, that he truth and to love the good—if their thoughts and wills can render them omnipotent, as I shall show. produced nothing externally, we could always say that they can do nothing. Now it appears to me quite God needs no instruments to act; it suffices that he certain that the will of minds is not capable of moving wills4 in order for a thing to be, because it is the smallest body in the world; for it is evident that contradictory that he should will and that what he there is no necessary connection between the will we wills should not be. Therefore, his power is his will, have to move our arm, for example, and the motion of and to communicate his power is to communicate the our arm. It is true that the arm moves when we will it, efficacy of his will. But to communicate this efficacy and that we are thus the natural cause of the motion of to a person or an angel can signify nothing other than our ann. But natural causes are not at all true causes; to will that, for example, when a person or angel shall they are merely occasional causes acting only through will this or that body be moved, the body will actually the force and efficacy of the will of God, as I have just be moved. Now in this case, I see two wills concurring explained. when an angel moves a body—that of God and that of the angel—and in order to know which of the two is For how could we move our arm? To move it, we the true cause of the motion of this body, we must must have animal spirits, we must send them through know which cause is efficacious. There is a necessary certain nerves toward certain muscles to inflate and connection between the will of God and the thing he contract them, for that is how the arm attached to them wills. God wills in this case that, when an angel wills moves; or according to some other views, we still do this or that body be moved, the body will be moved. not know how that happens. And we see people who Therefore, there is a necessary connection between do not even know that they have spirits, nerves, and the will of God and the motion of the body; and muscles move their arm, and move it even with more consequently God is the true cause of the motion of skill and ease than those who know anatomy best. the body and the will of the angel is only an Therefore, people will to move their arm, and only occasional cause. God is able and knows how to move it. If a person is not able to knock down a tower, at least he knows But to show this still more clearly, let us suppose what must be done to knock it down; but no person that God wills to produce the opposite of what some knows what must be done to move just one of his minds would will, as might be thought for demons or fingers by means of animal spirits. How, then, could some other minds deserving of this punishment. We people move their arm? These things appear evident could not say in this case that God would commu• to me and, it seems, to all those willing to think, nicate his power to them, since they could do nothing though they are perhaps incomprehensible to all those they wished to do. However, the wills of these minds willing only to sense. would be the natural causes of the effects produced. Such bodies would be moved to the right only be• But not only are men not at all the true causes of cause these minds willed them to be moved to the left; the motions they produce in their body, it even seems and the desires of these minds would determine the contradictory that they could be. As I understand it, a will of God to act, as our will to move the parts of our true cause is a cause such that the mind perceives a bodies determines the first cause to move them. In this necessary connection between it and its effect. Now the mind perceives a necessary connection only be•

4 Malebranche: I am clearly speaking here about practical volitions, or those God has when he claims to act. 117 way, all the volitions of minds are only occasional causes. But if after all these arguments someone still wanted to maintain that the will of an angel who moved a body would be a true and not an occasional cause, it is evident that this same angel could be the true cause of the creation and annihilation of all things. For God could communicate his power to create and annihilate bodies to the angel, in the same way he does the power to move them, if he willed all things to be created and annihilated—in short, if he willed all things to happen as the angel would wish it, just as he willed bodies to be moved as the angel would will. Therefore, if someone claims that an angel and a person are truly movers because God moves bodies when they wish it, he must also say that a person and an angel can truly be creators, since God can create beings when they would will it. Perhaps he could even say that the vilest animal, or matter all alone, would effectively cause the creation of some substance, if he assumed, as do the philosophers, that God produced substantial forms when required by matter. Finally, because God resolved from all eter- nity to create certain things in certain times, he could also say that these times would be the causes of the creation of these beings—just as he claims that one ball colliding with another is the true cause of the motion it communicates to the latter, because God willed through his , which causes the order of nature, that when two bodies collide, such a communication of motion would occur. There is therefore only a single true God and a single cause which is truly a cause, and we should not imagine that what precedes an effect is its true cause. God cannot even communicate his power to creatures, if we follow the light of reason: He cannot make true causes of them; he cannot make them . But even if he could, we cannot conceive of why he would. Bodies, minds, pure intelligences, all these can do nothing. It is he who makes minds, who illuminates and moves them. It is he who created heaven and earth, and who regulates their motions. In the end, it is the Author of our being who executes our wills: “Once God judges, the will always obeys.” He even moves our arm when we use it against his orders; for he complains through his pro- phet (Isa. 43.24) that we make him serve our unjust and criminal desires. [...]